Notes Introduction 1. As will be further explained in note 3 of Chapter 6, the idea of this interpre- tation was first advocated by Professor Emeritus Soshichi Uchii, and devel- oped by Nakano-Okuno, who discussed this topic with him in 1997. In the Japanese version of this book, this interpretation appeared as ‘Uchii-Okuno Interpretation’, but was renamed as Independent Interpretation at the sugges- tion of Prof. Uchii in January 2011. 2. As far as I know, the only exception is Uchii’s 1998 paper, in which he criti- cized Hare based on his interpretation of Sidgwick as stated in note 1. 1 The Scope of Ethics 1. The reason why Sidgwick did not make such a distinction is suggested in ME Book III, Chapter 7, Section 1, where he discusses the classification of com- mon virtues and duties. There Sidgwick points out that classifying duties, as well as virtues, into social and self-regarding ones does not precisely reflect our common moral sense for the following reasons. First, the distinction between social and self-regarding duties seems to be drawn by considering whether the consequences of acts affect others or the agent himself, but at least some common moral rules apparently order certain acts without referring to any ulterior consequences. Second, almost all actions bring about various effects both to others and to the agent himself, and we have to select among relevant effects to make the above distinction. It is hard, however, for our commonsense to discern which effects are significant and which ones are not. Furthermore, some virtues, such as courage, can be exercised both for egoistic and social purposes. According to the classification stated above, we would have to discuss such virtues as both social and self-regarding ones, and that means dividing the same virtue into two categories. For this reason it is problematic to classify the rules of common virtues or duties into individual acts performed in public and those that are done in a purely personal domain. Thus Sidgwick, who wanted to start his discussion with the examination of commonsense morality, did not adopt this classification. However, in 11.2.1 of the present book I will argue that when we configure the proper scope of utilitarianism, it is helpful to use the distinction between a personal ethical view that an individual embraces in his mind and a social moral code that he must follow in public. 2. On page 5 of ME Sidgwick shows the idea that a rational act must be deter- mined by referring to a certain principle. This requirement is not unnatural, because we turn to ethics to obtain a systematic guide for actions. 245 246 Notes 2 An Overview of The Methods of Ethics 1. In doing so, Sidgwick recognized that he must base his examination of the three methods and the fundamental moral principles on rigid analyses and verification, rather than dogmatically claiming the validity of a par- ticular method. This stance is clearly demonstrated in Sidgwick’s criticisms of his contemporary thinkers. For example, he could not agree with James Martineau, an intuitionist who attempted to solve moral issues by referring to a ranking table of various motives for actions. He did not sympathize with Thomas Hill Green’s theory of self-realization either, pointing out that it is very ambiguous which actions would lead to the fulfillment of one’s own potential. Sidgwick was also critical of evolutionary ethics, as advocated by Herbert Spencer and Leslie Stephen, which was very popular in his time; he strongly suspected that not everyone would agree with the ultimate grounds for their claims. 2. For example, Book IV, Chapter 3 of the first edition of The Methods of Ethics was titled ‘The Proof of Utilitarianism (continued)’, whereas the same chap- ter in the seventh edition is renamed ‘The Relation of Utilitarianism to the Morality of Common Sense’. The former gives us the impression that the validity of utilitarianism can be proved when we examine our common-sense morality. Additionally, though the ending of ME is essentially the same in both editions in that Sidgwick confesses his inability to reconcile utilitarian- ism and egoism, the first edition presents only two fundamental moral princi- ples, that is, the Principle of Justice and the Principle of Rational Benevolence (considered to be the foundation of utilitarianism), and does not contain the Principle of Rational Self-Love, which is stated in the seventh edition as the essential component of egoism. The readers of the first edition of ME might have had the impression that utilitarianism has a certain philosophical basis, in the form of fundamental principles, while egoism does not have such solid theoretical grounds. 3. Some may argue that Sidgwick criticized and eventually rejected dogmatic intuitionism. However, by examining the method of utilitarianism, Sidgwick came to reaffirm the importance of having certain moral rules for our daily life, assuming that those rules are similar to the existing rules of common- sense morality. Thus Sidgwick did not completely deny the main claim of dogmatic intuitionism, that is, the importance of observing ordinary rules. 4. Schneewind and Peter Singer correctly understand this point. See Schneewind 1977, Ch. 6 pp. 191–2 and Singer 1974. Donagan sees ME as a somewhat inconsistent work which attempted to defend utilitarianism but failed to establish its validity. This opinion may perhaps sound close to Sidgwick’s own voice, but it fails to grasp the intent of The Methods of Ethics, which confined itself to the impartial criticism and explication of all three methods. Donagan in Schultz 1992, p. 447. 5. Schneewind regards the relationship between morality and Christianity as one of the main subjects of The Methods of Ethics (Schneewind 1974, p. 391). Even if this was true, however, I am not going to read ME from a religious perspective, for I strongly believe that Sidgwick’s argument on the essential features of ethics can be fully understood and accepted by people from all walks of life, with or without religious beliefs. Notes 247 3 Three Methods, Intuition, and Commonsense 1. R. M. Hare addresses this point. According to him, ‘universal’ is the opposite of ‘singular’, and ‘general’ is the opposite of ‘specific’ (MT 2.6. See also 8.2.1 of the present book). However, it seems to me that in our daily use of language, the term ‘general’ does not necessarily mean ‘nonspecific’, but very often simply means ‘widely accepted’ or ‘prevalent’. 2. As for the reason why he listed happiness, perfection/excellence and virtues (duties) as the ultimate reasons for action, Sidgwick leaves us with the com- ment that ‘This threefold difference in the conception of the ultimate reason for conduct corresponds to what seem the most fundamental distinctions that we apply to human existence’ (ME Bk. 1 Ch. 6 p. 78). These distinc- tions include the one between the conscious being and the stream of conscious experience, the latter of which can further be divided into action and feeling. According to Sidgwick, excellence or perfection is the ideal object of human development, in which a human individual is regarded as a continuous being. Duties or virtues denote the actions that ought to be done, and thereby reflect the fact that humans have various experiences and perform different kinds of action. Happiness means a set of desirable feelings, and thus assumes that humans have feelings (ME Bk. 1 Ch. 6 Sec. 1 p. 78. It is said that Sidgwick added this part for the second edition. See Schneewind 1977, Ch. 6 p. 199). By this Sidgwick probably means that the classification of the ultimate reasons into happiness, perfection and virtues (duties) holds true because it corresponds to these distinctions about human existence. However, this explanation does not sound convincing to me. A more important argument for identifying the widely accepted ultimate reasons for conduct would be the one in which Sidgwick examines and eliminates other candidates for such ultimate reasons besides the four described above. 3. Schneewind insists that Sidgwick actually envisioned the fourth method, that of pursuing perfection, and that there was no need to include it in the method of intuitionism (Schneewind 1977, p. 204). For Sidgwick, however, it was hard to identify the method of aiming for perfection independently of other methods. In a footnote of Book I, Chapter 2 of ME, Sidgwick states as follows: ‘I omit, for the present, the consideration of the method which takes Perfection as an ultimate end: since, as has been before observed, it is hardly possible to discuss this satisfactorily, in relation to the present question, until it has been somewhat more clearly distinguished from the ordinary Intuitional Method’ (ME p. 20 fn.). It is not a serious defect that he did not discuss the method of perfection independently. What Sidgwick addressed in ME were mainly two things, that is, the reconciliation of utilitarianism with common-sense morality, and the discrepancy between utilitarianism and egoism. For his purpose, it was probably sufficient to categorize the con- formity with virtues/duties as versions of common-sense views and discuss them in Book II of ME, and to provide an additional examination of the concept of perfection in his discussion of the ultimate good and the proof of hedonism. 4. Sidgwick does not clearly define the term ‘principle’ in ME. However, he seems to be using this term in the sense we explained here, judging from his use of ‘principle(s)’ in ME Bk. 1 Ch. 1 pp. 5–6 and 8, in the title of Bk. 1 Ch. 6, 248 Notes and in other places where Sidgwick talks about the principle and the method of egoism or utilitarianism.