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Belarus | Freedom House Belarus | Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/belarus A. ELECTORAL PROCESS: 0 / 12 A1. Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? 0 / 4 The president is elected for five-year terms without limits. Alyaksandr Lukashenka was first elected in 1994, in the country’s only democratic election. He has since extended his rule in a series of unfair contests, and secured his fifth consecutive term in a noncompetitive presidential race in 2015. Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors noted that longstanding deficiencies in Belarusian elections had not been addressed, including a restrictive legal framework, media coverage that fails to help voters make informed choices, irregularities in vote counting, and restrictions on free expression and assembly during the campaign period. The group concluded that the elections fell considerably short of democratic standards. A2. Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 0 / 4 The 110 members of the Chamber of Representatives, the lower house of the rubber- stamp National Assembly, are popularly elected to four-year terms from single- mandate constituencies. The upper chamber, the Council of the Republic, consists of 64 members serving four-year terms: 56 are elected by regional councils, and 8 are appointed by the president. An OSCE observation mission assessing the 2016 parliamentary elections concluded that the polls took place in a restrictive environment, and that electoral procedures lacked transparency. Local elections held in February 2018 took place in a similarly controlled environment. A3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies? 0 / 4 The legal framework for elections fails to meet democratic standards. Among other problems, electoral commission members of all levels are politically aligned with and dependent on the government, and independent observers have no access to ballot- counting processes. Early in 2018, the chairperson of the Central Election Commission indicated that electoral reforms could be a component of Lukashenka’s previously stated intention to “modernize” the Constitution. However, in an April address, Lukashenka indicated that no constitutional referendum was forthcoming. 1 of 7 7/26/2019, 10:39 AM Belarus | Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/belarus B. POLITICAL PLURALISM AND PARTICIPATION: 3 / 16 (−1) B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings? 1 / 4 There is no official progovernment political party, and very few lawmakers are affiliated with any party. Political parties face formidable challenges when seeking official registration. While the Tell the Truth movement was finally registered in 2017 after six failed attempts, authorities have repeatedly blocked registration of the Belarusian Christian Democracy party, which has now been seeking official status for almost a decade. Most recently, the Justice Ministry said in March 2018 that its latest attempt to register had been suspended, without offering any justification. Such futile attempts to gain official status serve to discourage other politically active Belarusians from organizing and attempting to gain formal party recognition. Involvement in political activism is considered risky in Belarus, and can result in a loss of employment, expulsion from educational institutions, smear campaigns in the media, fines, and the confiscation of property. B2. Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? 0 / 4 (−1) Belarus has never experienced a democratic transfer of power, and there is effectively no opportunity for genuine opposition candidates to gain power through elections. While two candidates not aligned with Lukashenka became members of parliament in 2016, many analysts have dismissed their election as immaterial and designed to placate the opposition, or democratic European countries with which the government seeks to better relations. Registered opposition candidates made up about 2 percent of all candidates in 2018 local elections. And, in some 18,000 races, just two opposition candidates won seats— one of whom was an independent, and another of whom belonged to an unregistered party. Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because of repression conditions that allowed the victory of just two opposition candidates in the roughly 18,000 races in 2018 local elections. B3. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group that is not democratically accountable? 1 / 4 While private citizens and political candidates have some limited opportunities to express their views and make political choices, Lukashenka’s regime is unaccountable to voters, and meaningful participation in politics is generally not possible. B4. Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities? 1 / 4 2 of 7 7/26/2019, 10:39 AM Belarus | Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/belarus No registered party represents the specific interests of ethnic or religious minority groups. Women formally enjoy equal political rights but are underrepresented in political leadership positions. Women’s advocacy groups have diverging positions on promoting the political rights of women, with some such groups taking the position that there is no need for gender equality initiatives in Belarus. There has been some visible activism by women’s groups seeking to raise awareness of violence against women. C. FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT: 2 / 12 C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government? 0 / 4 The Constitution vests power in the president, stating that presidential decrees have higher legal force than legislation. Lukashenka, who was not freely elected, considers himself the head of all branches of government. C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective? 1 / 4 The state controls an estimated 70 percent of the economy, and graft is encouraged by a lack of transparency and accountability in government. There are no independent bodies to investigate corruption cases, and graft trials are typically closed. Presidential clemency is issued frequently to free convicted corrupt officials, some of whom Lukashenka puts back into positions of authority. C3. Does the government operate with openness and transparency? 1 / 4 Governmental institutions for the most part fail to adhere to legal requirements providing for access to information. However, in recent years, authorities have moved to make some basic information about government operations available online. Additionally, in 2017, authorities announced that all websites will publish information in both Belarusian and Russian, and other languages as necessary, beginning in 2019. D. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND BELIEF: 2 / 16 (−1) D1. Are there free and independent media? 0 / 4 (−1) The government exercises unrestricted control over mainstream media. The 2008 media law secures a state monopoly over information about political, social, and economic affairs. Libel is both a civil and criminal offense, and the criminal code contains provisions protecting the “honor and dignity” of high-ranking officials. The government owns the only internet service provider and controls the internet through legal and technical means. The official definition of mass media includes websites and blogs, placing them under Information Ministry’s supervision. Most independent journalists operate under the assumption that they are under surveillance by the 3 of 7 7/26/2019, 10:39 AM Belarus | Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/belarus Committee for State Security (KGB). In 2018, the state enacted measures that effectively impose restrictions on independent online media. In June, the parliament passed legislation allowing the prosecution of anyone deemed to be spreading false information online, while amendments to the media law that took effect in December mandated highly bureaucratic registration requirements for online media outlets. In another development, authorities launched a criminal investigation into the so- called BelTA case, in which journalists from the online portal TUT.by, the information agency BelaPAN, and other outlets were accused of receiving access to news releases of the state-run BelTA information agency without a paid subscription. The offices of TUT.by and BelaPAN were raided in August, and three journalists were temporarily detained as part of the investigation. Authorities also attempted to recruit at least one journalist as an informant against his colleagues by threatening consequences for him and members of his family. Authorities also continued to impose disproportionately heavy fines on journalists for trumped-up or minor violations, including working for foreign media outlets that had been denied official accreditation. In 2018, journalists were fined 106 times for “illegal production and distribution
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