Objectification, Dehumanisation, and Othering Course Guide 2019-20

Course Organiser and Lecturer: Dr. Aidan McGlynn ([email protected], DSB 6.12, he/him, office hour Thursday 11-12 or by appointment)

Course Secretary: Ann-Marie Cowe ([email protected], Undergraduate Teaching Office DSB G.06)

1. Course Description

This course looks at three ways that certain behaviours, attitudes, institutions, representations, and ways of using language have been morally criticised. To objectify is to treat or represent a person as a mere thing; to dehumanise is to treat or represent a person as lacking in humanity, for example, as animal-, insect-, or disease-like; while to treat someone as the Other is to enjoy and depend on their recognition of oneself as a subject, while failing to fully reciprocate this recognition. However, these slogans leave the crucial questions largely unanswered. It’s left unclear what it is to treat people in these ways, in what ways such treatment might be morally problematic, and to what extent these three notions overlap (and whether we’re really dealing with three distinct notions here at all). Moreover, philosophers such as Kate Manne and Mari Mikkola have recently denied the significance of objectification and dehumanisation, as typically understood, while Nancy Bauer has questioned whether philosophers can say anything true and significant about them. This course introduces leading philosophical accounts of objectification, dehumanisation, and othering, and investigates the degree of overlap between the three notions. We will also examine scepticism about the significance of these notions, looking closely at a number of case-studies in order to assess the plausibility of this kind of scepticism. These case-studies will include sexist pornography, epistemic injustice (Miranda Fricker’s term for ways in which one can be harmed in one’s capacity as an epistemic subject), and the roles of dehumanising language and imagery.

2. Intended Learning Outcomes

This course will allow students to demonstrate core skills in philosophy, including interpreting and critically engaging with philosophical texts, evaluating arguments and theories, and developing one’s own ideas in response to the issues discussed. Students will be able to understand, explain, and critically evaluate the principal theories of objectification, dehumanisation, and othering, as well as the most pressing issues facing such theories, and will be able to write short, clear papers on the topics covered in the class, manifesting the core philosophical skills listed above.

1 3. Course Content

1. Can Philosophers Teach Us Anything About Objectification?

Primary Readings

Nancy Bauer, 2015, ‘What Philosophy Can’t Teach Us About ’, in Nancy Bauer, How To Do Things With Pornography, Harvard University Press: 21- 37. Available online through University library.

Simone de Beauvoir, 1949, The Second Sex, Vintage Books, Introduction to Volume 1. (Borde and Malovany-Chevallier translation preferred, but Parshley will be fine and is more widely available.)

2. Objectification as a Cluster Concept

Background

Barbara Herman, 1993, ‘Could It Be Worth Thinking About Kant on Sex and Marriage?’, in Louise Anthony and Charlotte Witt, eds, A Mind of One’s Own, Westview Press/Routledge: 49-67.

Primary Readings

Martha Nussbaum, 1995, ‘Objectification’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 24: 249-91. Available online through University library.

Further Readings

Langton, Rae, 2005, ‘-Denial in Objectification’, reprinted in Rae Langton, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 223-40. Available online through University library.

Rae Langton, 1995, ‘Sexual Solipsism.’, reprinted in Rae Langton, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 311-55. Available online through University library.

Lina Papadaki, 2010, ‘What is Objectification?’, Journal of Moral Philosophy 7: 16-36. Available online through University library.

2 3. Objectification as Imposition

Background

Catharine MacKinnon, 1987, Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, Harvard University Press.

Primary Reading

Sally Haslanger, 1993, ‘On Being Objective and Being Objectified’, in Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique: 35-82. Available online through University library.

Further Readings

Timo Jütten, 2016, ‘Sexual Objectification’, Ethics 127: 27-49. Available online through University library.

Rae Langton, 2000, ‘Feminism in Epistemology: Exclusion and Objectification’, reprinted in Rae Langton, Sexual Solipsism, Oxford University Press, 267-88, section 3. Available online through the university library.

Patricia Hill Collins, 2000, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (Second Edition), Routledge, chapters 4 and 5. Available online through University library.

4. Othering as Derivatisation

Primary Reading

Ann Cahill, 2011, Overcoming Objectification: A Carnal Ethics, Routledge: chapters 1 and 2.

Further Reading

See week 9.

5. Dehumanisation

Primary Reading

David Livingstone Smith, 2016, ‘Paradoxes of ’, Social Theory and Practice 42 (2): 416-43. Available online through University library.

Further Reading

3

David Livingstone Smith, 2011, Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others, St. Martin’s Press.

6. Human, All Too Human

Background Reading

Kate Manne, 2014, ‘In Ferguson and Beyond, Punishing Humanity’, The New York Times: https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/in-ferguson-and-beyond- punishing-humanity/

Primary Reading

Kate Manne, 2018, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny, Oxford University Press: chapter 6. Available online through University library (or as audiobook from other places).

Advanced Reading

Mari Mikkola, 2016, The Wrong of Injustice: Dehumanization and its Role in Feminist Philosophy, Oxford University Press: chapter 6. Available online through University library.

7. Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Objectification

Background

Aidan McGlynn, draft, ‘Epistemic Injustice’. Available on Learn.

Main Readings

Miranda Fricker, 2007, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Oxford University Press, chapter 6. Available online through University library.

Aidan McGlynn, forthcoming, ‘Epistemic Objectification as the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice’, Episteme. Available online through University library.

Further Reading

Aidan McGlynn, 2019, ‘Testimonial Injustice, Pornography, and Silencing’, Analytic Philosophy 60: 405-17. Available online through University library.

4 8. Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Othering

Background

Week 4 readings

Axel Honneth, 1995, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, Polity Press: chapter 6.

Primary Readings

Gaile Pohlhaus Jr., 2014, ‘Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice’, Social Epistemology 28 (2): 99-114. Available online through University library.

Emmalon Davis, 2016, ‘Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice’, Hypatia 31: 485-501. Available online through University library.

Further Readings

Aidan McGlynn, draft, ‘Objects or Others? Epistemic Agency and the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice’. Available on Learn.

Paul Giladi, 2017, ‘Epistemic Injustice: A Role for Recognition?’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 44 (2): 141-58. Available online through University library.

Matthew Congdon, 2017, ‘What’s Wrong with Epistemic Injustice? Harm, Vice, Objectification, Misrecognition’, in Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, Routledge: 243-53. Available online through University library.

Miranda Fricker, 2018, ‘Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory: A New Conversation Afterword’, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4): 1-5. Available online.

José Medina, 2018, ‘Misrecognition and Epistemic Injustice’, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4): 1-16. Available online.

9. Objectifying Representations

Background

Lorna Finlayson, 2016, An Introduction to Feminism, Cambridge University Press: chapter 9. Available at the university library.

Primary Readings

5

Aidan McGlynn, draft, ‘Epistemic Objectification in Pornography’. Available on Learn.

A. W. Eaton, 2012, ‘What’s Wrong With the (Female) Nude? A Feminist Perspective on Art and Pornography’, in Hans Maes and Jerrold Levinson, eds. Art and Pornography: Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press: 229-53. Available online through University library.

10. Dehumanising Language

Background

Mark Greenberg and Gilbert Harman, 2008, ‘Conceptual Role Semantics’, in Ernest Lepore and Barry Smith, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press: 295-322.

Primary Readings

Lynne Tirrell, 2012, ‘Genocidal Language Games’, in Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan, Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech, Oxford University Press: 174-221.

Eleonore Neufeld, forthcoming, ‘Pornography and Dehumanization: The Essentialist Dimension’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Available online.

Further Reading

David Livingstone Smith, 2011, Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others, St. Martin’s Press.

11. Revision

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