Venezuela's Private Media Wither Under Chávez Assault

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Venezuela's Private Media Wither Under Chávez Assault Venezuela’s private media wither under Chávez assault A special report by the Committee to Protect Journalists Committee to Protect Journalists In Venezuela, a media landscape transformed In more than a decade in power, President Hugo Chávez Frías has overseen the transformation of nearly every aspect of Venezuelan society, including the media. When Chávez came to office in 1999, he enjoyed the support of the country’s established private media. But the relationship soon soured, and in April 2002 he was briefly deposed in a coup that he alleges was carried out with the support of key media owners. Today, several of the most critical media outlets are either gone or scared into silence, and a vast state media presence echoes the government’s positions. By Joel Simon Hugo Chávez at a campaign rally in Maracay, Venezuela, on July 1. (AP/Ariana Cubillos) The highly polarized presidential campaign under way in Venezuela pits Chávez against former Governor Henrique Capriles Radonski. The polarization is dramatically reflected in the press, with the private media largely backing Capriles and the state media mounting a full-throated appeal in support of Chávez. The cacophony drowns out meaningful debate, and in the context of the electoral campaign the public is the loser. Through its massive state media presence and its use of censorship, legal harassment, and administrative sanctions, the Chávez government sets clear limits on public dissent, as this report shows. This is CPJ’s fourth special report on Venezuela since Chávez took office; reading them in sequence paints a clear picture of just how dramatically the media environment has declined during this period. The first report, “Radio Chávez,” published in February 2001, described a vibrant media scene in which the president with increasing frequency took over the airwaves to deliver long-winded diatribes on everything from “the joys of having a girlfriend to ‘the revolutionary process in the universities.’” It ended by noting ominously, “[I]f all revolutions eat their young, Venezuelan journalists had better hope that Chávez doesn't get too hungry.” The second report, called “Cannon Fodder” and published following the failed 2002 coup attempt, described a series of physical attacks in which beat reporters “caught between Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez Frías’ inflammatory rhetoric and the active political role that media publishers and editors have taken find themselves victims of attacks from the public.” CPJ’s third report, 2007’s “Static in Venezuela,” recounted in detail the government’s failure to renew the license of critical broadcaster RCTV and demonstrated how the deepening media crackdown was provoking sweeping self-censorship. In the years since that report was published, RCTV has been silenced along with dozens of other critical broadcasters; journalists have been jailed for allegedly defaming officials; and regulators, together with a judiciary closely allied with the executive, have imposed censorship on sensitive coverage. The decline of Venezuelan journalism has broad implications not only for the country, but for Latin America as a whole. Nearly all of Chávez’s strategies to rein in and isolate critical journalists have been emulated by sympathetic governments across the region, from Nicaragua to Ecuador. Today, Venezuela is part of a bloc of counties within the Organization of American States looking to dismantle its system of human rights protection, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and its special rapporteur for freedom of expression. In the 1980s, as Latin America turned to democracy after a decade of brutal dictatorships, electoral politics took hold across the region. Chávez himself won at the polls and took office with widespread support from the Venezuelan public. But he has used his time in office to undermine rather than develop the institutions of democratic government. With Chávez battling cancer, he must confront his legacy. While he focuses on consolidating the Bolivarian Revolution, Chávez’s failure to support and nurture independent institutions—including the media—has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the upcoming elections. Regardless of who prevails at the polls, rolling back a decade of media repression and fostering a climate that is more open and more tolerant will be a key challenge for the next administration. Joel Simon is the executive director of the Committee to Protect Journalists. He has written widely on media issues, contributing to Slate , Columbia Journalism Review , The New York Review of Books , World Policy Journal , Asahi Shimbun , and The Times of India . He has led numerous international missions to advance press freedom. Venezuela's private media wither under Chávez assault The Chávez administration has used an array of legislation, threats, and regulatory measures to gradually break down Venezuela’s independent press while building up a state media empire—a complete reversal of the previous landscape. One result: Vital issues are going uncovered in an election year. A CPJ special report by Monica Campbell Hugo Chávez at a December 2011 press conference. (AP/Ariana Cubillos) Published August 29, 2012 CARACAS It seemed like a routine story. In March, José Gregorio Briceño, governor of Venezuela’s southern state of Monagas, appeared on national television and complained that federal officials were not addressing claims of contaminated water in his state. An oil pipeline managed by the state-run oil company PDVSA had recently burst in the Guarapiche River, which runs through Monagas. News accounts followed with testimonies from independent experts and families with ill children. Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez Frías vowed to act—not to investigate potential water contamination, but to counter the “media terrorism” threatening the country. Federal officials complained of political manipulation and a media conspiracy in an election year; Chávez is up for a third six-year term in October. Attorney General Luisa Ortega Díaz announced a new federal injunction requiring journalists to base reports on water quality on a “truthful technical report backed by a competent institution.” Otherwise, journalists risked “destabilizing” public order, and could incur fines or jail time. “So what happens if a woman comes out of her house with a glass of brown water or a child with diarrhea? We can’t transmit it. And what if the community protests over dirty water? We still can’t transmit it?” said Silvia Alegrett, president of the local journalists' group Colegio Nacional de Periodistas. Alegrett and other Venezuelan journalists said that while the government cites water quality studies, obtaining copies of such studies can be difficult. “Officials will wave the studies in the air and say, ‘What the press or activists say isn’t true.’ But then we won’t see the reports,” Alegrett said. The injunction on water reporting is only the latest addition to a minefield of legislative changes and presidential decrees put forth by Chávez’s administration to restrict the independent media since he took office in 1999. To sidestep the potential fines or prison terms, many journalists and publications censor their own coverage. The administration has also blocked critical coverage, closed broadcasters, sued reporters for defamation, excluded those it deems unfriendly from official events, and harassed—with the help of government allies and state-run media—critical journalists. The result is that key issues—Chávez’s health, rising unemployment, overcrowded prisons, and the condition of Venezuela’s vital state-run energy sector—are not receiving in- depth, investigative coverage at a critical moment for the country, as Chávez grapples not only with cancer but with an unprecedented challenge for his office from Henrique Capriles Radonski, the governor of the state of Miranda. Henrique Capriles Radonski poses an unprecedented challenge to Chávez. (AP/Ariana Cubillos) The gradual dismantling of Venezuela’s more critical and independent press and the building up of a vast state- run media empire is a remarkable reversal of the media landscape prior to Chávez's rule. Then, major newspapers and television and radio stations were dominated by a private-sector, business-oriented elite determined to shield its audience from leftist and socialist views. When critics accuse Chávez of a media power grab, his loyalists counter that the government effectively democratized the press by wresting control from a powerful oligarchy with its own agenda. The resulting polarization is reflected in the news coverage leading up to the elections. In February, Venezuela held a primary that resulted in an unexpectedly high turnout and a strong win for Capriles as the opposition coalition candidate, although Chávez still leads most polls. But polls favoring either candidate are questioned, while violence at campaign rallies is often blamed on agents planted by the other side. As much as the independent press shines its light on Capriles, the vast government-friendly network of television, radio, and print pushes ahead with coverage either negative to Capriles or, at best, superficially informative about his campaign. Meanwhile, nuanced and comprehensive coverage of the Chávez campaign and his party’s proposals is largely absent within the private press. A balanced, probing look at either candidate is hard to find. “As Chávez has made his presidential power more permanent, we’ve seen more disrespect for the rules of the game,” said Carlos Correa, executive director of Espacio Público, a local free expression group. Legal and regulatory threats intimidate Years of legislation that tightened Chávez’s grip on the media are paying off. In 2004, lawmakers loyal to Chávez passed a new broadcast law banning content before 11 p.m. that could be considered too violent or sexual for children or could “incite or promote hatred or intolerance” or “disobedience of the current legal order.” In December 2010, legislators in Chávez’s United Socialist Party broadened this statute and extended it to the Internet. Government officials can now order Internet service providers to restrict websites that violate the controls.
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