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Timor-Leste, Australia, and Asia's Contested Maritime Order

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Timor-Leste, Australia, and Asia's Contested Maritime Order Timor-Leste, Australia, and Asia’s Contested Maritime Order Evan A. Laksmana n September 1, the Permanent Court Sea (CMATS) with Australia. This treaty, of Arbitration in The Hague (as a along with the 2003 International Unitization Oregistry for a conciliation commission Agreement for the Greater Sunrise, was established under UN the Convention on designed to establish a framework for the joint Law of the Sea or UNCLOS) announced that development of the contested gas field while Timor-Leste and Australia have agreed on placing a 50-year moratorium on permanent the central elements of a maritime boundary maritime delimitation. delimitation in the Timor Sea. The ‘package’ agreement would address the legal status Despite the breakthrough, the conciliation of the Greater Sunrise gas field (and the process will still continue. The parties have establishment of a Special Regime to manage yet to formalize the agreement and several it) as well as a pathway to the development of issues remain to be negotiated. They will the resource and the sharing of the resulting continue to meet with the commission and revenue. all the details of the agreement will remain confidential until then. The compulsory non-binding conciliation process was enacted in April of 2016--the first The long and complicated history between time in UNCLOS history--after the Timorese Timor-Leste and Australia over the Timor Sea government terminated the 2006 Treaty on offers two salient lessons for contemporary Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor maritime order in Asia. The writer is a visiting fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research in Seattle, Washington and a senior researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, Indonesia. He is also a doctoral candidate at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, where he was a Fulbright Presidential Scholar (2011-15). A condensed version of this essay appeared in the Jakarta Post on September 22, 2017. 1 Future of the Asian Order First, the peaceful resolution of the dispute concept of ‘natural prolongation’, where the should give us reason to be simultaneously division of the Timor Sea would be based on optimistic and cautious about the future of the two separate continental shelves separated region’s maritime order. by the Timor Trough. Prior to UNCLOS, this was a powerful argument under international First, it seems to be going against the regional law, as the ICJ had noted in its 1969 trend. By one account, between 1945 and Judgement on the North Sea Continental 2000 Asia experienced more territorial Shelf cases. disputes and armed conflicts over territory than any other part of the world. Specifically, However, Indonesia’s occupation of Timor there have been twenty-eight disputes over (1975-1999) and a series of agreements maritime boundaries in Asia with only about it signed with Australia during this period, 14 percent of these completely resolved. That created an unusual situation over time: in the Dili and Canberra are committed to a peaceful central and northern Timor Sea, Australia had resolution is therefore commendable. jurisdiction over the continental shelf while Indonesia had jurisdiction over the overlying But the complexity of the case also suggests water column. While the series of agreements that the prevalent strategic narrative that between Timor and Australia since 2002-- maritime Asia should be upheld by a ‘rules- from the Timor Sea Treaty to CMATS--reflect based order’ cannot be considered in linear this complex arrangement, the asymmetrical fashion, as if it is perfectly clear who has starting points for both parties persisted. abided by or broke the rules. The arrival of UNCLOS in 1994 has in fact complicated the To complicate matters, Australia withdrew region’s patchy and overlapping maritime from the jurisdiction of the ICJ and the domain. While UNCLOS provides the International Tribunal on the Law of the framework for a peaceful management of Sea (ITLOS) regarding maritime boundary maritime disputes, it does not predetermine disputes in March 2002. In effect, Timor the processes or results. The regime does not could not take Australia to court to obtain an indicate a preferred method of delimitation of independent, final, and binding judgment of states’ economic exclusion zones (EEZ) and its maritime boundaries. It is worth briefly continental shelf, for example. Instead, it calls juxtaposing Canberra’s position and its on the disputants to find an ‘equitable solution’ rhetoric in the context of the 2016 South themselves. China Sea tribunal case, for criticizing Beijing over the importance of UNCLOS for peace Consider some of the legal complexities and stability in East Asia. underpinning the Timor-Australia case. Up until today, there is no permanent maritime Second, as UNCLOS does not provide boundary between the two states. Timor- clear-cut solutions to the complex maritime Leste is not a party to agreements made boundaries in the region, we should pay between Indonesia and Australia prior to its serious attention the various bilateral non- independence. Any subsequent agreements legal contexts as well. The road to the Timor- made since then have also been grounded Australia conciliation process, after all, was on the temporary suspension of delimitation paved with a mix of resource management talks. Further, both Dili and Canberra start pressures, domestic politics, and geo-political with different premises about the basis of their insecurities. claims under international law. The resource-management negotiations On the one hand, Dili has consistently argued center on the exploitation of the contested for a median or equidistant line between Greater Sunrise which contains an estimated their opposite coasts according to UNCLOS. 8.4 trillion cubic feet of gas and 295 million Indeed, equidistance has been the most barrels of condensate, worth up to $53 billion. popular method of delimitation, accounting for While both sides equally claim the area, almost 89% of delimited maritime boundaries. what these resources could bring home have On the other hand, Canberra preferred the different effects. 2 Unlike Australia, Timor is wholly dependent increased its economic influence as Dili’s on petroleum revenue to survive. The Joint relations with its traditional donors, including Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) in the Australia, flounder. Timor Sea (designated by the Timor Sea Treaty and CMATS) contributed more than 90 China has been making overtures to Timor percent of government budget and 70 percent through the Asian Infrastructure Investment of its total GDP. Additionally, oil from the JPDA Bank (AIIB) as Chinese and Timorese is estimated to be depleted by 2020 and the companies built office buildings for Timor- country’s wealth fund will only last until 2025. Leste’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and the Timor-Leste Defense Force, Little wonder the Timorese parliament and as well as the Presidential Palace. Xanana government have created new political Gusmao, Timor’s independence hero and infrastructure to deal with the dispute with chief negotiator in the maritime case against Australia, indicating a broad consensus to Australia, saw China as an “old friend”. confront Canberra on the issue. Additionally, Former Timorese President Ramos-Horta key political elites in Dili have returned to also believed that China is an alternative to the “politics of mobilization” to manifest Japanese and American aid. public sentiment on this issue, claiming the maritime boundary is matter of sovereignty And yet, Indonesia might be the wild card and necessary to complete Timor-Leste’s here that “unscrambles the omelet” of the independence. The expectation is that maritime agreements between Jakarta and the same public diplomacy strategy that Canberra, according to former foreign minister successfully led to Timor’s independence in Alexander Downer. For over a decade, 1999 could once again work against Australia. Australian authorities have been concerned that agreeing to an equidistance line-based But the dispute did not become an especially boundary may have a knock-on effect to its salient political issue during the 2004 existing boundaries with Indonesia. While Australian election. Canberra’s position during an automatic ‘unscrambling’ of agreements the negotiations also did not appear to be is unlikely, there is concern Jakarta’s softened by Timor’s political mobilization. Only involvement might complicate permanent recently have divisions emerged between the boundary talks. two largest Australian parties. The opposition Labor Party (ALP) announced that it was In conclusion, the September 1st prepared to negotiate the maritime boundary breakthrough between Dili and Canberra and that if there was no agreement, an should be cautiously welcomed. It is a positive ALP government would be willing to submit development whenever a maritime dispute to international adjudication or arbitration. could be resolved peacefully. However, the Analysts have argued that this shift in the bilateral, historical, and domestic as well as previously bipartisan consensus impacted geo-political contexts of the dispute should the current government’s position behind the also give us pause before aggressively scenes that led to Canberra’s willingness to championing a ‘rules-based order’ in Asia’s negotiate and conclude an agreement. maritime domain. Geopolitically, there was also apparently pressure from Washington for a resolution
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