Policy Number 316 | Railway Procedures

Policy | Procedure

Railway procedures

New policy number: 316 Old instruction number: ON35 Issue date: 13 January 2003 Reviewed as current: 9 January 2015 Owner: Head of Operational Resilience Responsible work team: Operational Planning Team

Contents 1 Introduction ...... 2

Section 1 ...... 3 2 The railway infrastructure and railway operators ...... 3 3 Operational considerations...... 4 4 Hazard identification and risk control measures...... 4 5 Operational procedures ...... 6 6 Traction current isolation ...... 9 7 Communications – overhead line equipment and sub-surface...... 10 8 Contingency planning and training...... 11

Section 2 ...... 13 9 London Underground Limited (LUL) ...... 13 10 London Underground - Jubilee Line Extension (JLE)...... 16 11 Docklands Light Railway (DLR) ...... 23 12 Post office automated rail link (Mail Rail)...... 25 13 Heathrow Express (HEX) ...... 26 14 Tramlink...... 27 15 Network Rail ...... 32 16 Index ...... 35 Appendix 1 – Key point summary - Railway procedures ...... 36 Document history ...... 37

Review date: 9 January 2018 Last amended date: 17 February 2017 316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 1 of 38 1 Introduction 1.1 The London Fire Brigade (LFB) has within its boundaries, the largest concentration and types of main line and underground railway infrastructure in the UK. This infrastructure is further increased by the presence of a tram service in the transport network.

1.2 This policy details the London Fire Brigade’s operational procedures for incidents involving railways. 1.3 Section 1 Parts 2 to 8 are generic to all modes of rail transport; however, there may be references in Section 1, which are operator specific. 1.4 Section 2 Parts 9 to 15 give specific instructions and information regarding the various infrastructure controllers and operating companies found within the London Fire Brigade area. 1.5 By their very nature, a flexible approach is vital at incidents involving railways or the railway infrastructure. It is recognised that each circumstance will bring its own unique problems as far as firefighting and rescue operations are concerned. 1.6 The purpose of this policy is to make all operational personnel aware of the potential inherent hazards associated with the various infrastructures to be found in the London Fire Brigade area. It will also assist incident commanders to make a risk assessment and formulate a sound tactical plan when dealing with incidents on or near these infrastructures. 1.7 When dealing with incidents on or about the rail infrastructure, incident commanders are to use the most recently issued Brigade practices and procedures when preparing their operational plan.

Abbreviations 1.8 Abbreviations used in this policy: • CSS - Command Support System • CTA - Central Terminal Area • DLR - Docklands Light Railway • HAL - Heathrow Airport Limited • HEX - Heathrow Express Link • IP - Intervention Point • JLE - Jubilee Line Extension • LUL - London Underground Limited • MDT _ Mobile Data Terminal • OLE - Overhead Line Equipment • ORD – Operational Risk Database • RIO - Rail Incident Officer • RVP - Rendezvous Point • SCD - Short Circuiting Device • SCR - Station Control Room • SPT - Signal Post Telephone • TOC - Train Operating Company • TOPS - Total Operations Processing System • TSS - Technical and Service Support

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 2 of 38 Section 1

2 The railway infrastructure and railway operators 2.1 Within the Brigade area the key organisations in respect of railway operations are as follows: • Network Rail (infrastructure) - Responsible for the operations and maintenance of the main line track, power supplies and signalling. • Train Operating Companies (TOCs) - The companies that run the trains and in some cases are responsible for the maintenance of stations and sidings, excluding those areas that are the responsibility of Network Rail. • London Underground Limited (depots and sidings) - Responsible for all issues and equipment relating to both surface and sub surface rail operations.

Infrastructure companies:

2.2 The day to day management has been divided into management companies known as InfraCo’s as detailed below: − SSL - InfraCo Sub Surface lines. − JNP - InfraCo Jubilee, Northern and Piccadilly Lines. − BVC - InfraCo Bakerloo, Central and Victoria Lines. • Docklands Light Railway (DLR) (part sub surface part surface) - As London Underground in respect of issues relating to the light railway system. • Heathrow Express Link - (HEX - part sub surface, part surface running on Network Rail infrastructure). • Tramlink - (tram system running on road and ex Network Rail infrastructure). • Post Office Railway - (fully automated not accessible by the public).

Rolling stock 2.3 The following types of rail vehicles may be found throughout the London area: • Battery operated trains. • Electric trains (Network Rail). • Electric trains (LUL). • Electric trains (DLR). • Diesel electric multiple units. • Diesel electric locomotives. • Diesel locomotives. • Automatic trains. • Trams. • Steam trains.

Depots and sidings 2.4 Train and rolling stock movement in many depots and sidings are independent of the permanent way signalling and control systems. It is important that Incident Commanders establish and maintain links with the person responsible for train movement in these areas before committing crews. 2.5 It is vital therefore that regular 7(2) (d) visits are made to these sites and the following should be noted (see also Part 8).

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 3 of 38 • Access and out of hours contact names and numbers. • Water supplies. • Traction current isolation arrangements. • Siding or depot control rooms. • Hazardous materials. Note: A contingency plan should be made for the site and the relevant information entered onto the operational risk database (ORD).

3 Operational considerations 3.1 The Brigade has clear agreement with both the infrastructure and train operators that the safety of the public, rail staff and fire crews is the over-riding priority. Notwithstanding this, it must be clearly understood that power isolation and train stoppages will only be requested when it is considered essential in order to protect life and property. Incident commanders need to be aware that the isolation of power supplies and the stopping of trains other than at station platforms, can have serious implications away from the immediate scene of operations including: • Passengers alighting from trains that have stopped outside stations and walking along tracks which may still be in use or live. • Overcrowding of stations and platforms. • Physical and mental distress of passengers on trains in tunnels. • Widespread disruption to train services. 3.2 Widespread disruption to train services can lead to long delays and substantial business loss. There is a duty of care on the Brigade to consider the wider impact on the railway operator and passengers. The above points are unlikely to be immediately visible at rail incidents, but despite that they are nonetheless a real issue. Consequently, there may be circumstances where it is better to let a small trackside fire burn out. It is still stressed, however, that in the event of a genuine threat to the safety of the public or fire crews, these issues become secondary and power isolation and or train stoppages will be expected to be initiated as quickly as possible. 3.3 It is always necessary for the Brigade to carry out its duties successfully and in a professional manner, and incident commanders who require power to be isolated and trains stopped, where it is not absolutely necessary to do so, will lose the Brigade the confidence of both the railway operators and the public. The Brigade will always defend where possible the judgement of its officers, but if confidence is lost, there is a greater chance of our requirements being questioned in situations where power isolation and train stoppages are urgently required.

4 Hazard identification and risk control measures 4.1 There are potentially a number of general hazards associated with the railway infrastructure. These include the following:

• Access/location; • Movement of trains; • Speed of trains and air turbulence; • Stopping distances; • Number of controlling operators; • Transportation of hazardous materials; • Variety of rolling stock; • Electric power supplies; • Residual current; • Tunnels;

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 4 of 38 • High voltage power cables (non Network Rail along track side); • Trains bridging ‘live’ and ‘isolated’ sections of track; • Uneven surfaces and tripping hazards; • Points – the risk of trapping; • Derailed carriages; • The possible presence of asbestos in some rolling stock. 4.2 The above hazards present a number of possible risks: • Electrocution; • Hit by moving train or dragged towards a moving train by air turbulence; • Chemical/biological contamination; • Slips, trips and falls; • Trapping limbs/clothing in points. 4.3 Fires in tunnels and sub-surface stations present additional hazards: • Rapid development and spread of dense smoke. • Rapid rise of temperature. • Undetected fire travel in voids and ducts. • Storage of hazardous materials and cylinders. • High voltage electrical equipment. • Communications difficulties. • Physiological effects on fire fighters. • Very limited area to work in around trains. • Long travel distances. • Height from track to carriages. • Possibility of large numbers of passengers in an unfamiliar environment. • Possibility of mobility impaired passengers. 4.4 The safety of personnel is the main priority and the following risk control measures must be considered when dealing with incidents:

• Consider using safety officers/sector commanders. • Power isolation. Remember unless earthed conductor may hold residual charge. • Establish the line speed, see paragraph 5.12 to 5.18 and figure 1. • Trains stopped. • Trains run at caution. • Avoiding conductor rails. • High visibility clothing. • Stop, look, listen, remain vigilant at all times. • Always assume the power supply is ‘live’. • Use of short circuiting devices (SCD)* - see note below. • Personal protective system (PPS). • The use of electrical gloves. • Rain and flooding can increase electrification hazard. • Stand on dry non-conducting material. • Push or pull the casualty/ies clear with a dry line or wooden pole. • Personnel and equipment should not normally be allowed within 3 metres of any overhead line equipment (OLE), for the rescue of live person/s personnel and equipment must not come closer than 1 metre. • Use of other procedures e.g. BA.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 5 of 38 *Note: On third rail, DLR and LUL systems, there may be rare occasions when Brigade personnel may be required to use SCDs. SCDs MAY ONLY BE USED BY FRU TRAINED PERSONNEL IN AN EMERGENCY AND IN THE ABSENCE OF RAILWAY PERSONNEL. In the vast majority of cases, the rail operator’s personnel will have placed them in position. SCDs can usually be found in train driving cabs and may be available on station premises. Incident commanders are to be aware that twin track configurations may require SCDs to be placed on to the non incident line in order to provide a safe working environment for emergency service personnel. When operations are complete UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES should SCDs that have been placed on the track be removed by Brigade personnel. 4.5 When gathering information to assist in the dynamic risk assessment, the incident commander may use:

• 7 (2)(d) information. • Operational risk database (ORD) via the MDT • Rail control rooms. • Total Operations Processing System (TOPS). • HAZCHEM. • Rail incident officer (RIO) • Command Planning System (CPS). • Brigade Control. 4.6 The Total Operations Processing System (TOPS) is a computer based information system which details information on coach, wagon and freight identification numbers. The information available covers the location, origination, destination, details of the contents, and other rail operators’ information. 4.7 TOPS information is available to the incident commander via Brigade Control by sending a message prefixed “request TOPS information on carriage number…….at (location).

5 Operational procedures 5.1 Incident commanders (IC) should carry out a dynamic risk assessment taking into account the particular circumstances of the incident and the hazards and roles outlined above to consider whether:

• It is safe to work on or near the track with the traction current left on. • It is safe to work near to the track with the trains running under caution see note* below. • It is safe for trains on adjacent lines to continue to run under caution. • Diesel trains need to be stopped as they will be unaffected by an isolation of the traction current. • The traction current needs to be isolated. • Trains need to be stopped. • To use any of the risk control measures in paragraph 4.4 above to safely deal with the incident. Note: The term “trains run under caution” means that the driver is warned that personnel are on the track and they must proceed at a speed which will enable them to safely stop the train if necessary. On long straight stretches of line when visibility is clear, trains can run at a maximum of 50 mph. On stretches of track which are obscured by bends or in bad visibility, the speed could be as low as 5 mph.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 6 of 38 Person(s) not in immediate place of risk/hazard 5.2 If a person that needs to be rescued or assisted is in a place of relative safety and there is no immediate risk, firefighters are not to be placed at risk. Under such circumstances, and until the appropriate risk control measures are put in place to enable them to be accessed safely, the person should be comforted and reassured. 5.3 If a casualty is beyond assistance or humanitarian aid, then personnel are not to be placed at risk.

Person(s) in immediate place of risk/hazard 5.4 There may be circumstances when, in order to attempt to preserve human life, Incident Commanders may need to commit crews to the track. Persons trapped, injured, unconscious, or in distress in circumstances that are a direct and immediate danger can be considered to require urgent action. 5.5 Action as described in paragraph 5.4 will mean that, in the event of the incident commander committing crews, procedures detailed in other parts of this policy and appendices may be compromised. It is important therefore to remember that such action should only be taken as a last resort. In all such circumstances a priority message should be sent to Brigade Control. This message is to detail: • The location and nature of the incident. • If trains need to be stopped. • If trains need to be run at caution. • If traction current isolation is required. • The action that the incident commander is initiating. e.g. ‘From E351, from Sub.O.Adams, at Hornshay Street, one injured adult male on southbound track between South Bermondsey, Queens Road and Peckham stations, request traction current isolation and all trains stopped on southbound track, all trains to run at caution on northbound track. Crew being committed to southbound track. Brigade lookouts deployed at 700 metres’. 5.6 It is important that radio communication, both incident ground and main scheme, is maintained from this stage in order that the incident commander remains advised of the rail operator’s responses.

Train movements and traction current isolation 5.7 Incident commanders are to be aware of the situation as it relates to trains running at caution/trains stopped/traction current isolation. 5.8 All trains can coast long distances. Non electric trains will be unaffected by isolating traction current on the third rail or overhead line equipment (OLE).

5.9 When a message requesting ‘all trains stopped’ is sent by the incident commander, Network Rail Control will, by using railway signals, track management systems and internal communication systems, bring the trains to a controlled stop. 5.10 Remember trains may have passed a critical signal and therefore be unaware of personnel on the line, or not receive a message in the limited time to come to a controlled stop or run under caution. 5.11 It is for the above reasons that it will be necessary to implement additional risk control measures.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 7 of 38 Additional risk control measures 5.12 The following guidelines will apply to all rail infrastructures within the brigade area: • Brigade lookouts to be placed on either side of the incident site. • Whenever and wherever possible, maintain line of sight (see paragraph 5.14). • Suitable emergency evacuation route/s and the time needed to reach them should be determined to designated places of safety, and crews briefed accordingly. These must lead to at least 3m from any immediate risk and under the supervision of a safety officer. • Minimum personnel and equipment sufficient to undertake the task. • Do not enter any tunnels until it has been confirmed that trains have stopped. • Crews are to be withdrawn immediately the operation is completed and Brigade Control informed.

The use of lookouts

5.13 In order to act as designated lookouts, infrastructure staff (Network Rail) receive extensive training and continued assessment of their competence. The role of a designated lookout is extremely demanding due to: • The complexity of multiple lines. • Bi-directional running of trains. • The layout of railway lines. • The speed of the trains. • Varying weather and visibility conditions. Note: It is for these reasons that the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister has advised that the procedures detailed in the Manual of Firemanship Book 4, ‘use of Brigade personnel, to act as lookouts, to warn crews working on the track of an approaching train’ are extremely dangerous and should no longer be used. Note: The repeat of this section in section 2 paragraph 15.12 is deliberate.

Brigade lookouts 5.14 Whilst the Brigade acknowledges the level of detail required by rail infrastructure staff (Network Rail) is complex, the Brigade area is served by a range of operating companies. As a consequence it is considered inevitable that on some occasion the use of Brigade lookouts may be required if paragraph 5.4 above applies. In such circumstances the following guidelines are to be followed.

5.15 The incident commander will be responsible for determining the location of Brigade lookouts. 5.16 As described previously, rail operator’s lookouts are highly skilled in their knowledge of the railway network, its topography, signalling and communication systems. See paragraph 15.11.

5.17 Brigade lookouts will not have this knowledge, therefore when detailed they should: • Make sure they are in possession of a hand held radio on a dedicated channel with the safety officer at the scene of operations and an Acme Thunderer whistle and in hours of darkness, a Wolflight/hand lamp. • Remain in constant contact with the safety officer responsible for the crews working on the track and the incident commander (an assistant may be required specifically for this purpose). • Position themselves to give crews working on or near the lines maximum warning. This will also give approaching train(s) as much stopping distance as possible. See table figure 1. • Inform the incident commander/safety officer of their distance and location in relation to the incident or agree distances before taking up position.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 8 of 38 • Lookouts must not reposition without informing the incident commander/safety officer. • Be aware of automatic train operation. • Stand in a position of safety, a minimum distance of 3m from the track and facing the direction of approaching train/s and remain vigilant at all times. • Wear high visibility clothing. • Warn brigade personnel of approaching trains (policy number 496 – Tactical withdrawal, emergency evacuation and firefighter emergency refers). • Warn approaching train drivers that personnel are on the line: − In daylight by - holding both arms straight above the head. − At night by - waving a bright light violently from side to side in the direction of the approaching train. Figure 1 - Sighting distances in metres to provide maximum warning times. Speed (approximately) Sighting distance in metres to provide maximum warning time Mph Kph 15 sec 20 sec 25 sec 30 sec 35 sec 40 sec 45 sec 140 235 1000 1300 1600 1900 2200 2600 2900 125 200 900 1200 1400 1700 2000 2300 2600 100 160 700 900 1200 1400 1600 1800 2100 90 155 700 900 1100 1300 1500 1700 1900 75 120 600 700 900 1100 1200 1400 1600 60 100 500 600 700 900 1000 1100 1300 40 70 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 20 35 200 — 300 — 400 — —

5.18 Using the above table incident commanders/safety officers can deploy Brigade lookouts at a safe distance from the incident site. For example, maximum speed for track 100mph/160kph. For personnel to reach a place of safety within 25 seconds, the lookouts must be positioned at least 1,200 metres from the scene of operations, and must signal before the front of the train has passed their location.

6 Traction current isolation 6.1 If the incident commander decides it is necessary for the traction current to be isolated and/or trains to be stopped a ‘priority’ message must be sent to Brigade Control requesting that traction current be isolated between two known locations and trains stopped. The precise reasons for this request must be given. As previously stated in paragraph 2.3 to 2.5, in the case of depots and sidings the incident commander is to identify the person responsible for power isolation and train movements. Once the incident commander is satisfied that it is safe for Brigade operations to commence they are to inform Brigade Control.

6.2 Brigade Control will advise the incident commander when confirmation has been received from railway control that power supplies have been isolated and trains stopped. Only the named officer of the Brigade and the rail controller who agreed traction current isolation can agree the restoration of the traction current.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 9 of 38 6.3 In LUL and HEX tunnel sections, a general indication that the traction current has been discharged is that the tunnel emergency lights will be on. However, caution should be exercised as Network Rail tunnels have no lighting and DLR tunnel section lighting (Thames and Bank tunnels) and Tramlink tunnel lighting (Sandilands), is on at all times. 6.4 Fire crews must be aware that by isolating the traction current within one section of the rail infrastructure there are significant implications in terms of the widespread safety and control of trains, possibly nationwide. This may result in some delay in the isolation of traction current being achieved. 6.5 Incident commanders and fire crews must remain aware of the fact that not all power sources on or adjacent to the rail infrastructure are under the control of Network Rail/rail operators. It is vital therefore that when requesting a shutdown, every effort is made to identify whose equipment/cable is involved. It must also be remembered that a traction current shut down or isolation means just that. No other electrical supplies will be shut down or isolated.

7 Communications – overhead line equipment and sub-surface 7.1 These facilities allow communications to be achieved between Brigade personnel, rail personnel or to advise passengers. The availability, location, flexibility, and use of this equipment should be known. The facilities available include: • Headwall telephones - (Section 2 paragraph 9.5). (London Underground). • Signal post telephones (SPT). (Network Rail). • Overhead Line Equipment (OLE) gantry telephones. (Network Rail). • Public address systems. (London Underground/Network Rail). • Leaky feeder systems. (London Underground). 7.2 Trackside telephones are indicated by a red telephone on a white background marked with the word ‘ELECTRIFICATION’ and are connected directly to the rail operator’s control. The ringing button must be operated for at least 4 seconds. Extreme caution is to be used at all times if using these telephones Stop, look, listen. A train travelling at speed creates strong air turbulence. Personnel within 3 metres of a train travelling at speed are in danger of being dragged towards the train. 7.3 Signal post telephones are marked with diagonal black and white stripes and are connected to the signal box. Extreme caution is to be used at all times if using these telephones. The safety precaution outlined in 7.2 also applies. 7.4 All sub-surface stations in the LFB area are equipped with a UHF channel ‘5’ radio base station, designed to provide effective fire ground radio coverage throughout the station complex and up to the RVP. 7.5 Information relating to the current status of the radio base station can be found in the LFB station plans box as follows: • ‘Channel ‘5’ base station defective.’ • ‘Channel ‘5’ base station defective’. (Copy of TSS/Communications section test results). • ‘Channel ‘5’ base station in operation.’ 7.6 During a 7(2)(d) inspection the radio communications system must be tested and if the coverage deviates from the status indicated the crew/watch commander must: • Inform the station management.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 10 of 38 • Amend the status sign in the LFB plans box. • Inform Brigade Control on return to station, who will report the defect to Procurement Department (PD) (Communications). 7.7 When notification is received that the defect has been rectified, the station commander will arrange for a retest of the system to be carried out. Once the retest has been completed, Brigade Control and PD/Communications are to be notified.

8 Contingency planning and training 8.1 Planning for incidents on the rail infrastructure is a necessary part of the Brigade’s operational response. All fire stations with rail infrastructure on their ground should make sure that appropriate contingency planning is undertaken. Such planning should include some or all of the following: • 7(2)(d) visits. • Access. • Rendezvous points (RVPs). • Plan boxes. • Station control rooms (SCRs). • Intervention points (IPs). • Ventilation systems. • Fixed installations. • Communications. • Traction current supply system. • Hazardous materials. • Line speeds. 8.2 At many locations, railway operators’ interface, and at these locations, consideration must be given to incorporating the different rail operators’ emergency procedures into contingency plans.

Access 8.3 When visiting stations or premises, on the rail infrastructure, consideration must be given to all practical and reasonable areas of access, these may include: • Stations (both surface and sub surface). • Tunnels. • Intervention points. • Cuttings. • Bridges. • Sidings and depots. Rendezvous points (RVPs)

8.4 In determining the most suitable position for an RVP, consideration must be given to: • Crew safety. • Access for appliances. • Effective communications. • Plans boxes. • Water supplies.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 11 of 38 Station control rooms (SCRs) 8.5 An understanding of the facilities afforded by the station control room (SCR) and the SCR personnel will assist in determining the means by which an incident can be managed, these are as follows:

• Location. • Alternative access/egress. • CCTV. • Public address systems. Note: Not all stations have SCRs, full use of (7)(2)(d) visits should be made to determine the presence and location of SCRs.

Intervention points (IPs)

8.6 These are both a means of access for an emergency response and a means of escape for passengers and staff. Brigade personnel should be aware of the following features: • Their location. • RVPs. • Access. • Plans. • Water supplies.

Ventilation

8.7 Most sub-surface stations now have ventilation systems which will assist in the control of the fire/accident environment. Crews should be aware of the type, location, and operation of the control systems. Types of system include: • Mechanical. • Natural. • Manual override. CAUTION – ventilation systems should not be turned off or re-configured until a risk assessment has been made and the full consequences of these actions are known.

Fixed installations 8.8 Station premises may have a range of fixed installations to assist firefighting operations. The location, use, and implications of using them should be known and understood. Fixed installations available include:

• Automatic fire detection systems. • Sprinkler systems. • Inert gas systems. • Fire mains/hydrants.

Operational risk database 8.9 Important information obtained during 7(2)(d) visits should be entered onto the ORD via Station Diary. It may also be included in the Command Planning System (CPS). Information to be included on the CPS should be forwarded, by either the watch or station commander, to the station commander, Command Support Centre.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 12 of 38 Training 8.10 Effective and realistic training programmes will prepare fire crews for the variety of characteristics and conditions, which may be encountered at incidents on all railway premises. Training exercises should be designed to include the participation of rail operator’s staff in order that personnel from the relevant services develop a greater understanding, confidence and awareness of their roles and functions. Section 2

9 London Underground Limited (LUL) 9.1 When attending incidents on LUL premises, incident commanders should consider the following: • Close liaison with a responsible member of staff. • Committing a reconnaissance team. • The use of station plans. • Use of the station control room. • Consider the use of secondary access routes and intervention points. • Assess water supplies. • Consider the use of ventilation systems. • Consider the use of communication links, CCTV and public address systems and leaky feeder. 9.2 The following risk control measures may be available and should also be considered: • Automatic sprinklers. • Hydrants and hose reels. • Smoke extraction. • Wet falling mains. • Extinguishers. • Escalator sprinkler system. • Use of intervention points. • Use of tunnel smoke control systems. • Use of train without passengers for reconnaissance. • Use of thermal image camera. 9.3 The following risk control measures may be considered with regard to passenger safety: • Preventing trains from stopping at affected stations. • Disembarking passengers at adjacent stations. • Using trains to evacuate areas below the incident. • Stopping trains at other stations. Note: Passenger evacuation in tunnels should only be carried out as a last resort, due to the hazardous nature of the tunnels. 9.4 Intervention points can be identified by any of the following means (see also paragraph 9.12): • Labelled access doors with ‘IP’ in black letters on a white background. • Signs provided at track level indicating the distance and direction of adjacent stations and the normal running direction of trains. • Signs provided in the running tunnels indicating the location of intervention points. • Access keys provided in the LFB plans boxes of the adjacent stations. • Intervention point information can also be obtained via a priority message to Brigade Control. Note: Facilities can vary greatly from line to line.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 13 of 38 9.5 If you arrive on an LU station for an emergency incident and traction current needs to be switched off you should liaise with a member of LU staff who will assist you in getting it switched off. Once LU staff have confirmed traction current is off, a message must be sent to LFB Control confirming this. If staff are not available you must contact LFB Control and inform them you require traction current to be switched off. You must inform Control of your exact location and why you require power to be switched off. Control will contact the London Underground Control Centre (LUCC) and inform the LUCC manager that you require power to be switched off. The LFB Control Room Operator must state why the request is being made, the exact location of staff relaying this request and any other relevant details such as: line, station, platform number, direction, any specific landmarks grid reference, road names etc. The Duty Network Operations Manager (DNOM) will then call the Service Controller for the specific line and request TC to be switched off. Once done, the DNOM will confirm to LFB control that TC has been switched off. A message will then be relayed from LFB Control to the IC. You must not go on to the track until you have confirmation that power has been switched off.

LFB plans boxes 9.6 All LUL sub surface stations are provided with an LFB plans box situated in an agreed position at the LUL/LFB rendezvous points. The boxes contain: • Two sets of station plans (command and control/BA). • A communications status indicator, and where necessary. • A key to adjacent IV points. 9.7 The boxes can be opened using the standard FB14 key carried on pumping appliances. LUL stations do not hold keys to the boxes.

9.8 If, at an incident, the lock mechanism is found to be defective, the box may be opened by cutting the ‘L’ shaped quick release bolt with bolt croppers. In these circumstances, and at the conclusion of the incident, the incident commander must hand the plans to the LUL station supervisor for safe keeping until the box is repaired (this must be done within 24 hours). Arrangements are to be made by the incident commander for the LUL station to be visited after the 24 hour period has elapsed to make sure that the plans have been returned to the box and the box secured. If the work has not been carried out, inform Operational Planning Division, Brigade HQ.

Sub-surface communications on LUL stations

9.9 All LUL sub surface stations have a permanently live UHF channel 5 radio base station system installed. This system is designed to provide effective fireground radio coverage throughout the station, and tunnels, including the rendezvous point/s and entrances to which an attendance is made. It allows communication between two or more hand held fireground radios when switched to channel 5. 9.10 To advise personnel attending an incident of the current status of the installation, an engraved yellow plastic sign is contained in the station plan box indicating:

• Ch 5 base station is in operation. • Ch 5 base station defective.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 14 of 38 9.11 The installation is to be tested by Brigade personnel during annual watch visits. If a significant deviation exists from the status indicated or from the limitation information held in the plans box, the officer in charge is to: • Inform LUL station management of the fault. • Make sure that the station indicator is altered as necessary. • On return to the fire station request Brigade Control to record the defect, amend the ORD information, and inform the LUL Report Centre.

LUL intervention points:

LUL Station IV No. IV Point Command Aldgate East/ 1 St Marys disused stn 43Wb83 Whitechapel R/Of 100 Whitechapel Rd F33 Whitechapel Angel/Old St 2 City Rd disused stn 41Sb83 City Rd J/W F24 Shoreditch Moreland St Arsenal/Finsbury Pk 3 Isledon Rd vent shaft 33Qb62 F52 Hornsey Baker St/Finchley Rd 4 Swiss Cottage disused stn 38Fb61 Belsize Rd subway of JLE G49 Belsize Baker St/Finchley Rd 5 Marlborough Rd disused 39Fb61 stn Finchley Rd J/W G49 Belsize Queens Grove Baker St/Finchley Rd 6 Lords disused stn 41Gb81 Lodge Rd NW8 G48 Paddington High St Kensington 12 Earls Court/ 48Eb81 Gloucester Rd/ Gloucester Rd Deport G33 Kensington Earls Court Finsbury Park/ 14 Netherton Rd N15 30Tb43 Seven Sisters Detraining Point F53 Tottenham Green Park/ 17 Down St disused stn 46Kb82 Hyde Park Down St. W1 G44 Knightsbridge Hampstead/ 18 Bull & Bush disused stn 32Eb61 Golders Green Hampstead Way NW11 G51 West Hampstead Kings Cross 11 Kings Cross Bridge 3G193 F47 Clerkenwell Mile End/Stratford 21 Old Ford detraining point 40Cc64 Wick Lane E3 F27 Bow Tower Hill/ 24 Mark Lane disused stn 45Ub83 Monument entry via subway adjacent F48 Dowgate 16 Byward St EC3 Caledonian Road 25 174 York Way N1 38Pb62 York Way disused stn G46 Euston.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 15 of 38 10 London Underground - Jubilee Line Extension (JLE) 10.1 The Jubilee Line Extension (JLE) runs from Green Park to Stratford covering approximately 16.3km, and consists of eleven stations of which eight are sub surface. There are a number of design features which differ to the existing underground system, and the purpose of this part is to outline those features. 10.2 As the first new build tunnelling system on the London Underground since the Victoria Line, several new initiatives that enhance both public and firefighter safety have been incorporated. 10.3 Generally, the differences between the JLE and existing underground systems are described in paragraphs 10.4 and 10.5.

Stations 10.4 Each station on the extension is an individually architect designed structure, which includes the provision of: • Station control rooms - with protected route access. • Platform edge doors. • Ventilation control systems. • 110v DC power supply points on stations and in tunnels. • At least one dedicated pressurised firefighting staircase and firefighters lift.

Tunnels

10.5 Tunnels include: • Ventilation control systems. • Fire fighting staircases (IPs). • Fire mains. • 110v DC power supplies. • Communication systems in the running tunnels incorporating minimal overlap areas. • Emergency service walkways.

Station control rooms

10.6 Each station has a control room, which as well as providing a day to day control centre, acts as an emergency control centre in the event of an incident. Station control rooms* all have dedicated protected access/egress (one hour) which, together with mid-tunnel intervention points (see paragraph 10.12 below), are built to existing and accepted standards of fire protection (BS 5588). *Note: Due to the construction of North Greenwich and Canary Wharf stations, the control rooms used for day to day running are not fire protected. Secondary control rooms are provided at these stations for use in the event of the main control rooms becoming unusable.

10.7 Full use of 7(2)(d) visits should be made to familiarise personnel with the whereabouts of the secondary control rooms.

Platform edge doors 10.8 Eight of the new JLE stations feature platform edge screens and doors constructed from toughened glass. The system consists of a curtain wall structure (12mm) which is attached to the platform edge. The barrier is 2.5m high and runs the full length of the public area of the platform.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 16 of 38 10.9 The doors (8mm) in the screen open automatically when they are correctly aligned with the train drivers door. LUL personnel are trained in the operation of the platform edge doors, however, a standard budget key will open the doors in the event of an emergency. 10.10 The stations featuring platform edge screens and doors are: Westminster 47 Nb 82 A24 Soho Waterloo 47 Qb 82 H22 Lambeth Southwark 46 Rb 83 A28 Dowgate London Bridge 46 Tb 83 E34 Dockhead Bermondsey 48 Xb 83 E34 Dockhead Canada Water 47 Yb 84 E34 Dockhead Canary Wharf 46 Cc 84 F22 Poplar North Greenwich 47 Gc 85 E23 East Greenwich 10.11 It is important to note that platform edge doors are unique to the JLE. Stations where the JLE interfaces with other lines (e.g. Canada Water = JLE/ East London Line) will have a mixture of protected and unprotected platforms.

Mid tunnel intervention points (IPs) and fire fighting staircases 10.12 Where the distance between sub-surface stations exceeds 1km, intervention points have been strategically sited for emergency service access. These are located at: Storeys Gate 47 Mb 82 A24 Soho Wardens Grove 46 Sb 83 A28 Dowgate Druid Street 47 Vb 83 E34 Dockhead Downtown Road 47 Ac 84 E36 Deptford Pioneer Wharf 46 Cc 84 F22 Poplar Prestons Road 46 Ec 84 F22 Poplar Canning Town Portal 45 Hc 85 F22 Poplar Note: Wardens Grove, Druid Street, Prestons Road and Canning Town Portal are combined intervention and ventilation shafts. However, although at the same location, and sharing common plantroom facilities, the stairway and airway are totally separate shafts. 10.13 At the head and base of each shaft, a dedicated telephone marked ‘LFB’ is located which provides a direct link between the shaft and the Line Controller at Neasden. Note: All of these locations are identified on the Brigade Command Planning System (CPS), as are the dedicated ventilation shafts.

Fire mains 10.14 A 150mm fixed falling fire fighting main is provided with street inlets at stations and intervention shafts. In the tunnel section instantaneous outlets are sited at approximately 60 metre intervals and are secured in the closed position by light retaining straps. The fire main is permanently filled with water, and must be pressurised from inlets at stations or IPs by Brigade appliances. Each

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 17 of 38 outlet is fitted with an automatic pressure limiting device which allows water to flow at no more than 4.5 bar pressure. 10.15 To avoid flooding the tunnels in the event of leakage or train derailment, isolating valves are sited along the main at approximately 180m intervals Crews entering the tunnels must follow the signed instructions, which detail the mode of operation of the isolating valves. Isolating valves are fitted with a status indicator (see fig 2). Both the hydrants and isolating valves are clearly identified by signs on the tunnel wall immediately adjacent to the valve. Fig 2 – status indicator Valve open Valve closed

10.16 After use at an incident, the fire main system must be re-instated by LUL engineers/contractors Note: The fire main terminates at Storey’s Gate IP shaft.

Ventilation control systems 10.17 An integral system of smoke control is featured on the JLE, which is incorporated into the design of the tunnels and stations. Fans on either side of the incident can be operated in the supply or extract mode in order to create the necessary airflow. Both systems are controlled via the line control room at Neasden. 10.18 Upon arrival at an incident, the incident commander must obtain a ventilation information sheet from the station control room. This information will identify the location of the incident, the direction of train passenger evacuation and the ventilation fan configuration.

Stations 10.19 Each new JLE station also has a smoke control system, controlled via the line control room at Neasden, which can operate independently of the tunnel control system and enables smoke to be vented from the station.

Tunnels 10.20 If, due to an incident, the tunnel ventilation system has been operated prior to the arrival of the Brigade, or the Brigade operates the system, a priority message is to be sent to Brigade Control indicating that the ventilation system has been actuated, and the direction in which the airflow is travelling, e.g. ‘westbound from London Bridge to Redcross Way in eastbound tunnel’. 10.21 Incident commanders should establish and maintain close liaison with LUL station control room personnel/line controller regarding fan configuration. No further adjustments are to be made to the fan configuration/ airflow without the express instruction of the incident commander, acting in conjunction with the line controller. Note: When fans are running, crews should expect strong air currents, especially in tunnels.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 18 of 38 10.22 Dedicated ventilation shafts are sited at: Redcross Way 47 Sb 83 A28 Dowgate Culling Road 48 Yb 84 E34 Dockhead Durrands Wharf 47 Yb 84 E36 Deptford and at the ends of each station. Note: Ventilation shafts provide no emergency access or egress to/from the running tunnels.

Emergency service walkways 10.23 An emergency service walkway has been provided at track level throughout the extension tunnels. However, it should be noted that signalling equipment is situated on the walkway at intervals along the tunnels, but does not prohibit passage. 10.24 The walkways are accessed from the bottom of the IP shaft via fire lobbies and runs left and right of the tunnel access doors. However, due to engineering constraints, the walkway sited in the westbound tunnel at Storey’s Gate can only be accessed by crossing the running rails (see figures 3 and 4). 10.25 Additionally, the track bed is constructed of brushed concrete which could be used as a pathway, however, personnel should be aware that tracks, track fastenings, signalling equipment, cables etc. will present trip hazards along the length of the track bed.

Power supplies 10.26 Traction power is identical to the existing LUL infrastructure, and should be isolated in accordance with existing procedures. When traction power is isolated, emergency tunnel lighting automatically illuminates, providing lighting for emergency crews.

10.27 A separate power supply is provided throughout the tunnel system, feeding 110v DC outlets spaced at intervals along the tunnels and in the head and tailwall cabinets on station platforms. This facilitates the use of power tools in tunnel and station complexes without the use of portable generators. The 110v outlets are clearly signed.

Radio communications 10.28 Radio coverage for emergency service communications is provided (Ch5) throughout the tunnels, intervention shafts, RVPs and stations. 10.29 Crews should however, be aware that to prevent radio transmission being broadcast across the whole of the LUL network, ‘minimal overlap’ areas have been built into the tunnel systems between each base repeater on the stations. 10.30 Minimal overlap areas can be identified by clear signs on the tunnel wall (see figure 5 - typical overlap area sign) and strong interference in radio signals (receiving both base station repeaters at adjacent stations simultaneously). When such interference is evident, it is an indication that crews are proceeding beyond the radio coverage of their entry point, and onto the radio coverage of the adjacent station.

10.31 The overlap area covers approximately five metres, and it is important for personnel to understand that radio communication is not being lost, but transferred to the next base station repeater along the line. As a consequence, it is vital that the incident commander make certain that a crew is despatched to the adjacent/secondary location in order to make sure that a continuous base station (Ch 5) communications link is maintained throughout the duration of the

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 19 of 38 incident. Crews passing through these areas are to inform their entry control officer that they are moving into the next communication area (see fig 5) and are then to report to the new communications officer. If no contact is made, then they are to return back to the control of their previous entry control officer. See also part 11 - Docklands Light Railway. 10.32 Incident commanders should also be aware of the need to maintain surface communications between these two points. This will be of particular significance during BA operations.

Familiarisation 10.33 Station and watch managers whose stations have the JLE system on their ground, or stations whose grounds are adjacent, should make sure that full use of (7)(2)(d) visits are made to familiarise themselves with RVPs, intervention shafts, telephones, hydrant locations, fire mains, firefighting stairs etc.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 20 of 38 Figure 3 — Typical JLE shaft layout

Shaft Entrance

Street Level

Walkway

Fire Lobbies Track Bed

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 21 of 38 Figure 4 - Storey’s Gate intervention shaft and tunnel layout Please note the location of the walkway in the westbound tunnel

Shaft Entrance

Walkway

Track Bed

Eastbound Tunnel

Fire Lobby Track Bed

Westbound Tunnel

Walkway

RADIO COVERAGE CHANGING TO NORTH GREENWICH

Figure 5 – Typical overlap

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 22 of 38

11 Docklands Light Railway (DLR) 11.1 The Docklands Light Railway consists of surface and sub surface stations (all have rendezvous points with standard signage) running from Beckton and King George V stations in the east to Bank and Tower Gateway stations in the west, and Stratford station in the north to Lewisham station in the south. The DLR system normally operates automatically, using driverless trains that can run in either direction on any line, at a maximum speed of up to 55mph. However, each train carries a member of staff, known as a Passenger Service Agent (PSA) who is in direct contact with the DLR Control Centre at Poplar by two-way radio, and can manually drive the train if and when required. 11.2 The DLR operates using a third rail system. The traction current is supplied from raised, plastic shrouded (except in tunnels), conductor rails mounted on posts next to the track. 11.3 If it is necessary for crews to go on the track, a priority message for the isolation of power and the stopping of trains should be made to Brigade Control. Brigade Control will notify the DLR Control Centre. The following points must also be considered: • Safe working distance: on DLR, this distance is 2 metres from the running rails. • Place of safety: on DLR, a defined term, being at least 2 metres from the running rails. • Acknowledgement signal: On DLR the raising of one arm above the head (train approaching) and facing the train signifies that the individual has heard the train warning signal but is only given when that individual is in a position where they believe the train can pass safely. Note: The signal for a train to stop is when both arms are raised above the head.

Emergency access 11.4 Train doors cannot be opened once a train has left a station except by emergency procedures. If access is required, one set of doors on either side of the train can be opened externally. These doors can be found to the left of the centre articulation joint when facing the side of the train. They can also be identified by the inset step beneath the door and the emergency release mechanism, accessed by a lift key, to the right of the door. Once on board the train the other emergency doors can be opened by using release handles beside the doors, which are accessed by removing clear perspex covers. Operating the handle clockwise releases the lock mechanism and isolates the air pressure allowing the door to be opened manually.

Safety equipment 11.5 All trains carry 2 x 5.5 litre AFFF extinguishers. 11.6 An emergency equipment locker is sited in each carriage. This locker is marked with a green and white sign and can be accessed using a key held by the PSA (Train Captain). The following equipment is stowed in the locker: • One ‘ARCUS’ short circuit devices (SCD). • One passenger detraining ladder. • One detraining board, for emergency transfer of passengers between two trains. 11.7 Note: Further ‘ARCUS’ SCDs are stowed in external cabinets (also marked with a green and white sign) at the ends of each carriage next to the train coupler. 11.8 The trains power pick-up shoes make contact with the underside of the conductor rail. These shoes interfere with jacking operations on that side of the train or when working under the train. The shoes can be lowered by operating the air release valve situated inside the vehicle beneath

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 23 of 38 the driving position at each end of the car. When this operation has been carried out, the shoe will be sprung down clear of the conductor rail. 11.9 Emergency jacking of the train should only be performed on the approved jacking points. Jacking of the body of the train can only be carried out using the 20-ton Hydrolite jack, which is carried on the FRUs. Jacking operations on the bogie can be carried out using either 10 or 15 ton Hydrolite jacks. 11.10 DLR has four Res-Q-Rail trolleys, which are primarily for transporting stretcher borne casualties, by rail, from an incident to a convenient transfer point for ambulance transport. These can be transported to site by DLR upon contacting the Railway Control Centre at Poplar.

Tunnel section 11.11 DLR has two sub-surface tunnels on the system known as the Thames and Bank Tunnels. 11.12 The section of the DLR between Island Gardens and Cutty Sark stations, runs under the River Thames predominantly in a single track, twin bore configuration, connected by a single cross passageway at mid point. The tunnels can be entered via both Cutty Sark and Island Gardens and the tunnel portals or the intervention point near Greenwich (Network Rail) Station. 11.13 The section of the DLR between Royal Mint Street and Bank Station is predominantly in single track, twin bore configuration connected by six cross passageways with a short single track, single bore headshunt west of Bank Station. The tunnels can be entered via Bank Station or the tunnel portal at Royal Mint Street. 11.14 Ch 5 radio communication is provided throughout the tunnels and cross passageway, and incorporates a minimal overlap section similar to that on the JLE (see Part 10 JLE – paragraphs 10.28 - 10.32). 11.15 Both tunnels have wet falling mains. In Thames Tunnel this is situated below the Emergency Service walkway with outlets indicated by standard hydrant plates at approximately 100 metre intervals. The main can be charged from Cutty Sark and Island Gardens Stations and also at each portal north and south of the river. Standard signage is provided at each inlet. In Bank Tunnel the main is on the opposite side to the walkway and is charged from Fish Street Hill or the tunnel portal.

Intervention points 11.16 Intervention points on the DLR are situated at the: • North side of South Eastern Trains Greenwich station, into the Thames tunnels (E22 Greenwich). • Crossharbour Sub-station compound (F23 Millwall). • Royal Mint Street (F33 Whitechapel). • Bow Industrial Park on Violet Road near Devons Road DLR station (F34 Bow). • South of Lower Lea Crossing, off Dock Road (F46 Silvertown)

General information 11.17 An emergency service walkway is provided on all elevated sections of track and tunnel sections. At intervals along the Thames Tunnel walkways, fixed ladders are provided to facilitate access to track level. 11.18 DLR staff will attend all incidents to offer specialist advice and carry out liaison duties.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 24 of 38 11.19 Some sections of the DLR run alongside track owned by Network Rail. Network Rail permanent way can be identified by the third rail traction current supply/OLE. At these locations, it may be necessary to isolate both sections of track in order to safely deal with an incident. In any event incident commanders should inform Brigade Control when in attendance at such sections. Brigade Control will notify all of the Railway Control Rooms involved. 11.20 The Poplar Control Centre is a computerised signalling and operations centre with CCTV links to all stations and is staffed 24 hours. The centre is responsible for notifying the emergency services of incidents and will inform Brigade Control of the location and type of incident.

11.21 Emergency train stop buttons are on every DLR station platform. These stop automatic trains as soon as the button is activated, but do not isolate the 750v DC traction current to the conductor rails and trains. 11.22 Emergency train stop buttons are also situated at one hundred metre intervals between DLR and Network Rail lines. 11.23 Passenger alarms are sited on every DLR station platform. These allow two way communications to be established between the station and the Poplar Control Centre and automatically activates the CCTV camera pointed at the alarm.

12 Post office automated rail link (Mail Rail) 12.1 The system is owned and operated by the Post Office, it is fully automatic and operates on 37 kilometres of track, with seven stations between Paddington and Whitechapel. The system uses a third rail with power supplies up to 450 volts DC. 12.2 The space between the trains and tunnel walls is minimal and there are no places of safety in the tunnels to avoid approaching trains. Therefore personnel must not enter the tunnels until the power has been isolated and all trains stopped. 12.3 Any request for power isolation must be made by sending a ‘Priority’ message to Brigade Control and prefixed ‘Post Office Railway’. Brigade Control will advise the incident commander when this request has been carried out. 12.4 Incident commanders should be aware that there are battery powered passenger cars used for maintenance purposes and for showing visitors the system. These are normally operated during periods of maintenance, during breakdown of the system or for other emergencies.

Post Office rail link stations 12.5 Post Office rail link station addresses: Address Station Ground Paddington Office 44 Fb 81 A21 Paddington London Street West London Office 43 Lb 82 A24 Soho Rathbone Place West Central Office 44 Mb 82 A24 Soho New Oxford Street Mount Pleasant Office 42 Qb 82 A30 Islington Farringdon Road

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 25 of 38 City of London Office 44 Sb 83 A28 Dowgate King Edward Street Liverpool Street Office 43 Ub 83 F24 Shoreditch Liverpool street Eastern Office 43 Wb 83 F33 Whitechapel Whitechapel Road

13 Heathrow Express (HEX) 13.1 The Heathrow Express is a high speed overhead electrified (25kV AC) rail link between Paddington station and stations at the central terminal area (CTA), and Terminal 4 (T4) at Heathrow Airport. 13.2 Heathrow Airport Limited (HAL) are responsible for the railway from the west of Hayes and Harlington station on the existing Great Western main lien through to T/4. This section of the route comprises approximately 6.8km of both cut and cover, and bored twin tunnels.

13.3 The system is operated from a central control room sited in the CTA and includes monitoring and control facilities to oversee the overall operations of the Heathrow Express. In the event of an incident on the system, there is a facility for a fire brigade officer to attend the central control room for command/liaison purposes. 13.4 Should an incident occur in the tunnel system, dedicated emergency entrance and passenger exit shafts are positioned at approximately 1000m intervals and are located at: • Shepiston Lane - (49 Rf 76) G40 Hayes emergency escape staircase in shaft and cross passageway. • Sipsons Farm - (51 R 98) G40 Hayes emergency escape staircase in shaft and cross passageway. • Custom House – (53 R 98) G56 Heathrow emergency escape staircase in shaft and cross passageway. • Car park 5 - emergency escape staircase in shaft – (55 R 98) G56 Heathrow. • CTA down line platform – (55 Q 98) G56 Heathrow. • Pier 7 - emergency escape staircase in shaft (airside) – (55 Q 98) G56 Heathrow. • Start of T4 platform – (58 R 98) G56 Heathrow. 13.5 These routes are available for both emergency passenger egress and emergency service access. However, access for the emergency services is via protected shafts with independent access at the top and bottom of the stair, and passengers evacuating will not impede access of Brigade personnel. 13.6 A telephone is provided at the base of each intervention point at the stair side of the fire door. This enables secure communications to be established between the control room and the intervention point or bridgehead. Dedicated emergency service radio channels are also provided for normal radio communications.

13.7 A continuous raised walkway has been provided in each running tunnel, designated for the primary purpose of evacuation, should a train become totally immobilised or the need for detrainment arises in the event of an incident.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 26 of 38 13.8 In the event of an incident in the running tunnels, HEX has a manual/auto ventilation and smoke control system in order to evacuate passengers and crew, and to assist firefighting operations. This system operates in the push-pull mode from either side of the incident. 13.9 A dedicated fire main runs the complete length of each of the twin tunnels from the portal, through to the CTA station, with hydrant locations at intervals of approximately every 100m, and at the bottom of each intervention shaft. The hydrants are sited below the tunnel walkway, and are indicated by reflective hydrant signs on the tunnel wall at each hydrant position, together with a painted yellow H symbol on the walkway slab. 13.10 The mains in the two tunnels are cross-connected at the tunnel portal, and the emergency intervention points at Shepiston Lane, Sipson Farm; Custom House, and the CTA station fuel depot. A single main then continues through to T4 station. 13.11 Requests for power isolation in the event of an emergency should be made through Brigade Control. As the HEX also runs over Great Western main line tracks, the OLE traction supply is dictated by Network Rail, and controlled solely by the Network Rail Electrical Control. Facilities are however, available to de-energise locally in an emergency on the HEX spur. A responsible person will be nominated for this procedure within the HEX control room for liaison purposes. Sectional re-energisation may be jointly approved subsequently, to enable the earliest possible resumption of partial or normal train services, or to assist in passenger evacuation via the unaffected tunnel.

14 Tramlink 14.1 The Tramlink system consists of a network of lines, centred on Croydon and radiating out to: • Wimbledon. • New Addington. • Beckenham Junction/Elmers End. 14.2 These lines total some 28 Km, of which, all but approximately 3Km are on segregated rights of way, using either redundant railway alignments or new construction. The Tramlink system also runs adjacent to live Network Rail infrastructure at: • Dundonald Road Wimbledon. • Birkbeck to Beckenham Junction. • Waddon New Road between Roman Way and Rectory Grove, Croydon. 14.3 Control of the system, as well as maintenance and storage of the trams, is located at Therapia Lane Depot, situated on the Wimbledon route. 14.4 The tram units can be run at speeds of up to 50 MPH, but on a public highway, they are restricted to the legal speed limit, and are further restricted when operating in pedestrian areas.

Communications 14.5 The Tramlink control room is equipped with direct line telephones to each of the three emergency services control rooms, as well as to the Network Rail signalling centres responsible for those sections of the network where trams and trains run alongside each other. These provide for two-way communication between the relevant parties, and are recorded. 14.6 In addition, each tram is equipped with fixed radios to allow communication between the driver and the control room; Tramlink field operations staff are similarly equipped using portable equipment.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 27 of 38 Rolling stock 14.7 The vehicles are 30m in length and weigh 36.5 tonnes when empty. They are articulated in the centre to allow them to negotiate sharp curves. Power is drawn from an overhead conductor, energised to 750v DC and applied to four 120Kw electric motors located on the two outer bogies. The electrical equipment to control these motors, as well as to provide auxiliary power for the tram (lighting and control), is located on the roof of the car in weatherproof cases.

Driving controls 14.8 Driving controls for the tram are provided at each end, making the tram fully reversible. In addition to the power/brake controller, which incorporates a ‘dead man’ facility, the driver is provided with similar facilities to those on a bus, i.e. speedometer, door controls, radio communication, etc. 14.9 Facilities are provided for public address, both within the tram and outside, and for audible warning using either a bell, for in street use, or a horn for off street use. Access to the drivers cab is via the door into the passenger saloon of the car or on the off side of the cab. Neither of these doors has an external handle and if access is required it will be necessary to break the door glass and use the internal handle to release the door.

Emergency facilities 14.10 If the driver is incapacitated, facilities are provided on the outside of the tram to isolate the vehicle electrically and allow access to the public area of the tram.

Emergency isolation switch

14.11 This is located, as shown on figures 6 and 7, at the left hand end of each side of the tram, behind the bogie skirt panel. Lifting this panel will reveal a red mushroom push button which, when pushed in will: • Cause the pantograph to be lowered, disconnecting the tram from the 750V supply. This also removes all power from the trams traction circuits. • Isolate the 24v batteries from the trams control circuits, which also fully applies the brakes on all wheels. This isolation will also cause all lighting in the passenger saloon to be lost. 14.12 Releasing the push button will not cause the tram circuits to be re-energised. Restoring the vehicle to a normal operational state is the responsibility of Tramlink personnel following consultation with the emergency services.

Emergency access 14.13 Emergency access is located as shown in figure7, at the right hand end of each side of the tram, between the doorways, and consists of a square shaft located in a recessed pocket in the body side. Turning this through 90 degrees causes the mechanism of the doorway to the right of the handle to be released, after which the doors can be slid apart by hand.

Pedestrian safety 14.14 To protect pedestrians from injury, a beam known as the ‘lifeguard’, is fitted across the front of the outer bogies to prevent pedestrians from coming into contact with the wheels. The lifeguard is hinged against springs and is kept approximately 80mm from the road surface unless struck by a body, where the force of impact will cause it to be pushed backwards and downwards, closing the gap beneath it to approximately 25mm.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 28 of 38 14.15 The ‘lifeguard’ is only completely effective on the street running sections of the tramway, where the track is flush with the road surface. 14.16 In the event of an incident, access may be obtained by the removal of the skirt panel at the end of the train. This is held in place by six square key locks, and is of lightweight construction to enable ease of handling. Depending on circumstances, it may also be necessary to lift the end of the tram in order to increase the available working space.

Lifting 14.17 To lift part of the tram clear of the rails to obtain adequate access beneath it, jacking points are provided at the ends and at the centre of the tram. See figures 6 to 9. There are two types of jacking points: • Low level - located under the edge of the body side, consisting of a U shaped stirrup in which the head of a jack can rest. • High level - consisting of a beam which can be pulled out from the body side. These are normally concealed behind cover plates, held in place by two socket screws. 14.18 An additional jacking point is available below the cab floor if required. 14.19 Because of the length of the tram, and its inability to twist along its length, it should always be lifted by jacking equally on both sides. Jacking at one corner only would expose personnel to unnecessary risk and cause damage to the tram. Note: For the above reason, air bags should not be used to lift an upright tram standing on or off the rails under any circumstances. Tangye jacks carried on Fire Rescue Units (FRUs) are suitable to achieve a horizontal lift on the jacking beams. 14.20 Whilst two jacks of at least 6 tonne capacity, are sufficient to lift the end of a tram, four jacks are necessary to lift the centre section. This is because the body is articulated in three sections, with two joints. The maximum lift at any jacking point is 700mm. 14.21 Because it is the body that is being lifted, the wheels will not leave the rails until the suspension has been unloaded. This occurs after approximately 65mm of lift, after which the bogie will lift with the body. There is no facility for locking the suspension.

14.22 Whenever jacking, make sure the brakes have been applied on all wheels. With one bogie lifted, the brakes on the remaining two bogies will be sufficient to hold the tram stationary. 14.23 If it becomes necessary to lift at more than one location, and the track is not level or close to level, it will be necessary to anchor to one or more fixed objects.

Brakes 14.24 Due to the ‘fail safe’ design of the brakes, operating the external emergency isolation switch (see paragraph 14.11) will cause the brakes to be applied as the control power supply for them is isolated.

System power supply 14.25 Power is supplied at between 11Kv and 6.6Kv. This supply is transformed and rectified to the 750v in 13 Tramlink substations. At any incident at one of these substations the provisions of policy number 45 – ‘Incidents involving electricity board premises and equipment’ will apply. 14.26 The overhead line consists of twin solid copper conductors, supported by poles and bracket arms. In built up areas, building fixings are used instead of poles, with the contact wire

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 29 of 38 suspended from rope span wires. Every overhead line fixing, irrespective of type (pole or building attachment) will carry an identifying plate. The inscription on the plate will take the form:

EJ 01 123 14.27 By relaying this information to Tramlink Control via Brigade Control, the identified section and the appropriate adjoining section will be de-energised. 14.28 The overhead line remains energised at all times, even during non-service hours and should always be treated as such, unless informed by a named line controller that de-energisation has taken place. 14.29 Normally once the tram pantograph is dropped, the system does not need to be de-energised for incidents involving the tram. However, in the event of an incidents involving a building adjacent to the tramway, or requiring the use of ladders at street level, it will be necessary to de-energise the overhead line so that work can proceed safely. Note: Because the contact wire is under tension, it should not be cut in any circumstances.

Incident management 14.30 At every incident involving a tram or the infrastructure, a suitably qualified member of Tramlink will be mobilised to liaise with the emergency services, initially the tram driver will be the point of liaison.

Highway intersections 14.31 At all road intersections the tram has priority, and by means of an on-board transponder can communicate with the traffic signal controller to demand a change of phase to stop the road traffic and allow it to proceed unimpeded. Note: Because of tram priority, drivers of Brigade appliances/vehicles should treat all tram/highway junctions as STOP when attending emergency calls and then proceed accordingly (Policy number 203 – ‘Traffic regulations and safety when attending incidents’ refers). Figure 6 – Croydon Tramlink

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 30 of 38

Figure 7 – Low level jacking point to the left of the open flap, isolation button coloured red can be seen under the flap to the right, indicated by white arrow.

Figure 8 - Picture showing the two high level jacking points at the articulated section of the tram

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 31 of 38

Figure 9 - Picture showing the high level and low level jacking points at the front/rear of the tram

15 Network Rail 15.1 This part should be read in conjunction with ‘Railway Safety for the Emergency Services’, available on hotwire. 15.2 Network Rail are responsible for the tracks, power supplies and some major properties throughout the Brigade’s area utilising the following power supplies:

• Third rail systems with power supplies operating up to 1200 V DC. • Overhead line equipment with power supplies up to 25000 V AC. • Fourth rail system with power supplies up to 750 V DC. 15.3 At any major incident the request for power isolation and trains stopped will be dealt with by Network Rail as a matter of urgency. 15.4 At minor incidents on or adjacent to the track, Network Rail may be reluctant to deal with a request for power isolation or the stopping of trains immediately. Therefore it is important that the incident commander gives as much information as possible about the incident to Brigade Control. 15.5 The following classification of incidents should be considered when requesting power isolation at incidents:

• Small fires on permanent way. − Small trackside fires. − Small fires adjacent to permanent way. − Small embankment fires. − Alleged fires not apparent. • Fires on multi - track networks. − Serious fires adjacent to permanent way. − Minor derailments.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 32 of 38 • Major incident. − Serious fire involving rolling stock. − Serious fire on/or affecting the permanent way. − Serious fires on bridges/viaducts. 15.6 Network Rail actions relating to class of incident: • Slowing trains by running them at caution. Train drivers are warned that emergency services personnel are on the track. They must drive at such a speed, depending upon circumstances, that they can stop short/clear of any person who may be on the track and does not move clear. • Stopping trains by use of signals. The normal signalling system provides the most positive and reliable method to stop trains. • Switching off the electricity supply. This is done if necessary to protect people from risk of electrocution. It is not used simply to stop trains – they can still coast long distances, diesels are unaffected.

Liaison 15.7 The Network Rail controller will mobilise a railway incident officer (RIO) to all incidents whose role is to liaise with and advise the incident commander on safety issues relating to brigade personnel working on/or adjacent to the permanent way.

15.8 It may be appropriate for the incident commander, in consultation with the RIO to allow trains to run in certain areas of the track in a controlled way (under caution). It is also important that incident commanders also make sure that power and train movements are restored at the earliest opportunity, compatible with the safe and effective resolution of the incident. It is important to remember, that traction current, and train movements will only be reinstated on the basis of a message, which carries the names of the officer initiating the shutdown and the line controller. 15.9 Brigade Control will establish immediate contact with Network Rail to request traction current isolations and train stoppages as a result of incidents. The justification passed to Brigade Control will be passed to Network Rail, who should then take the necessary action. Brigade Control will pass any information about Network Rail actions back to incident commanders. Sometimes, more information may be sought by Network Rail before action is taken. This should always be provided as required.

Network Rail lookouts 15.10 There may be occasions when the RIO, in liaison with the incident commander, will provide Brigade personnel with look outs to provide warning of approaching trains as an alternative, or in addition to, issuing a caution or stopping rail traffic. 15.11 The role of a designated Network Rail lookout is extremely demanding due to: • The complexity of multiple lines. • Bi-directional running of trains. • The layout of railway lines. • The speed of the trains. • Varying weather and visibility conditions. 15.12 In order to act as designated lookouts, Network Rail personnel receive extensive training and continued assessment of their competence.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 33 of 38 15.13 It is for the above reasons that the Department for Communities and Local Government has advised that the procedures detailed in the Manual of Firemanship Book 4, of using Brigade personnel to act as lookouts to warn crews working on the track of an approaching train are extremely dangerous and should no longer be used. Note: This repetition is deliberate. The brigade’s policy on lookouts is detailed in paragraphs 5.12 to 5.17 of this policy. 15.14 The Operational Planning Division maintain regular liaison meetings with rail operators at strategic, tactical, and operational levels. One of the principal aims of these forums is to discuss issues raised as a result of operational incidents, and in particular to resolve any problems that have resulted from such incidents. All cases where difficulties are experienced are taken most seriously by both sides in these arrangements.

Reporting procedure 15.15 For the liaison outlined above to be effective, officers in the Operational Planning Division need to be informed of all incidents where the direction or outcome of the incident, or firefighter or public safety may have adversely been affected. Operational personnel who experience any breakdown of liaison with rail staff, have a vital role to play in reporting such occurrences at the earliest opportunity.

15.16 If the guidelines described above are followed, many issues should be resolved at the scene. Some incidents however, may raise wider implications, or, although considered minor, when taken in isolation may demonstrate a trend across the Brigade, and will need to be taken up with the appropriate rail operator as part of the ongoing liaison process. In either instance, it is important that Operational Planning Division is able to maintain a complete overview. 15.17 Following any incident where the incident commander considers that unnecessary difficulties have been encountered, even though they may have been resolved at the scene, a detailed report is to be submitted via borough commanders (BC). In addition, the following information is to be passed to the Resource Management Centre (RMC) on extension 88111 immediately following the incident: • Date of incident, name of rail station and line involved. • Incident number and station ground. • Name of incident commander. • Type and location of incident and stop code. • Time of request for traction current off and time request actioned. • Was the Brigade met on arrival, and what was the standard of co-operation during the incident? • Any other supporting information. 15.18 The RMC will allocate a notification number, which is to be recorded in the report forwarded by the incident commander.

Action at Brigade Headquarters 15.19 On receipt of the above information, the RMC will inform the group commander (Transport Group), Operational Planning Division, that an issue in respect of railways has been raised, and is being progressed as outlined in this policy. Liaison officers at Brigade HQ will then examine the issues, together with representatives of the rail operator.

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 34 of 38 16 Index Abbreviations Section 1 part 1.9 Access Section 1 part 8.3 Communications General Section 1 part 7 LUL Section 2 part 9.9 JLE Section 2 part 10.28 Tramlink Section 2 part 14.5 Depots and slidings Section 1 part 2.3 Fire mains Section 2 part 10.14 Fixed installations Section 1 part 8.8 Intervention points (IPs) General Section 1 part 8.6 LUL Section 2 part 9.4/9.12 JLE Section 2 part 10.12 DLR Section 2 part 11.3 LFB plan boxes Section 2 part 9.6 Lookouts The use of Section 1 part 5.13 Network Rail Section 2 part 15.10 Person at/not at risk/hazard Section 1 5.2/5.4 Platform edge doors Section 2 part 10.8 Rendezvous points (RVPs) Section 1 part 8.4 Risk control measures Section 1 part 5.12 Rolling stock General Section 1 part 2.2 Tramlink Section 2 part 14.7 Short circuiting devices Section 2 part 4.4 Station control rooms (SCRs) General Section 1 part 8.5 JLE Section 2 part 10.6 Total operations processing Systems (TOPS) Section 1 part 4.5 Traction current isolation Section 1 part 5.7 Training Section 1 part 8.10 Ventilation General Section 1 part 8.7 JLE Section 2 part 10.17

316 Issue date: 13 January 2003 35 of 38 Appendix 1

Appendix 1 – Key point summary - Railway procedures

Information on task or event Information about resources Information about risk and benefit • Liaise with responsible person • PDA. • Is it safe to work on or near track? on site. • FRU if not on PDA. • Small trackside fire. • Railway incident officer (RIO). • Is it safe to work near to the track with the trains running • • Small fire adjacent to permanent RART. under caution? way. • USAR. • Is it safe for trains on adjacent • Small embankment fire. • British Ttransport Police. lines to continue to run under • Serious fire adjacent to • LAS. caution? • Diesel trains need to be stopped permanent way. as they will be unaffected by • Alleged fire not apparent isolation of the traction current. • Serious fire adjacent to • The traction current needs to be permanent way. isolated.

• Minor derailment. • If a casualty is beyond assistance • Serious fire involving rolling or humanitarian aid, then personnel are not to be placed stock. at risk.

• Serious fire on/or affecting the • Access/location. permanent way. • Movement of trains. • Serious fire on • Speed of trains & air turbulence. bridges/viaducts. • Stopping distance. • Transportation of hazardous material. • Electrical power supplies. • High voltage power cables. • Uneven surfaces and tripping.

Gathering and thinking

Objectives Plan

• Save life. • Be aware of the railway type you are attending such as • Ex tinguish fire. LU, DLR etc. • Protect the environment. • Carry out a DRA to establish if it’s safe to work on or • Minimise business disruption. near the track with either the traction current on/off. Is it safe for trains run under caution or to run on adjacent tracks or should they be stopped?

Communicating • Check if diesel trains run on the line as they will be • Adopt NICS principles. unaffected by track isolation. • Liaise with representative/responsible person from • In order to attempt to preserve human life, incident

respective railway company. commanders may need to commit crews to the track. • Ensure communications are established and This action should be taken as a last resort, with maintained between, LFB, Control and railway increased safety measures introduced and a priority representative. message to control detailing whats actions are being • Where subsurface leeky feeders exist test and undertaken. secure channel 5. • Classify the incident when requesting power isolation; such as small fires on permanent way, fires on multi- track networks or major incidents. • It is considered inevitable that on some occasions the Controlling use of Brigade lookouts may be required. • Establish and maintain scene safety. • Be aware of the ‘knock-on’ effect that stopping trains • Ensure track current is isolated if working on or have on the remainder of the network. near permanent way. • Crews should be kept to a minimum.

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Document history Assessments An equality, sustainability or health, safety and welfare impact assessment and/or a risk assessment was last completed on: EIA SDIA 08/10/13 HSWIA RA

Audit trail Listed below is a brief audit trail, detailing amendments made to this policy/procedure. Page/para nos. Brief description of change Date Key point summary added – 15/07/2009. Reviewed as current. 06/08/2009 Page 4 Third bullet point from the end – ‘Confirmation of track isolation 01/04/2011 and train movement must be received through Brigade Control before committing crews to the track’ - wording deleted and new content added. Throughout References to Central Risk Register (CRR) deleted and replaced with Operational Risk Database (ORD). Throughout All references to the operational information folder deleted as this 27/03/2013 has been removed from appliances. Page 17 All references to 1(1)(d) removed and changed to 7(2)(d). 18/04/2013 Paragraph10.7 Page 37 SIA data added. Protective marking changed to security marking 21/07/2014 classification. Page 35 Key point summary removed from page 2 and new appendix 1 – 19/08/2014 key point summary flowchart added. Page36 Subject list and FOIA exemptions tables updated. 09/12/2014 Throughout Amendments throughout policy to reflect LSP5 changes to 09/01/2015 stations ground and a few term changes i.e. commander to manager, removed reference to obsolete equipment e.g. ‘box lamps’ etc. Page 15 Table removed from ‘LUL interverntion points’. 13/01/2015 Page 14 Paragraph 9.5 re-written. 17/02/2017

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Subject list You can find this policy under the following subjects. Incident management Railways Transport Transport incidents Train stations and railways Incident command Firefighting – special risk areas Firefighting – special ground procedures Flowchart – key point summary (KPS) Mobile data terminals (MDT) Operational procedures Transportation

Freedom of Information Act exemptions This policy/procedure has been securely marked due to: Considered by: FOIA exemption Security marking (responsible work team) classification

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