House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee
The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?
Third Report of Session 2013–14
Report, together with formal minutes
Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 19 November 2013
HC 842 Published on 23 November 2013 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £13.50
The Scottish Affairs Committee
The Scottish Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Scotland Office (including (i) relations with the Scottish Parliament and (ii) administration and expenditure of the offices of the Advocate General for Scotland (but excluding individual cases and advice given within government by the Advocate General)).
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Mr Ian Davidson MP (Labour/Co-op, Glasgow South West) (Chair) Mike Crockart MP (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West) Mrs Eleanor Laing MP (Conservative, Epping Forest) Jim McGovern MP (Labour, Dundee West) Graeme Morrice MP (Labour, Livingston) Pamela Nash MP (Labour, Airdrie and Shotts) Sir Jim Paice MP (Conservative, South East Cambridgeshire) Simon Reevell MP (Conservative, Dewsbury) Mr Alan Reid MP (Liberal Democrat, Argyll and Bute) Lindsay Roy MP (Labour, Glenrothes) Dr Eilidh Whiteford MP (Scottish National Party, Banff and Buchan)
The following members were also members of the committee during the Parliament: Fiona Bruce MP (Conservative, Congleton) Mike Freer MP (Conservative, Finchley and Golders Green) Cathy Jamieson MP (Labour/Co-op, Kilmarnock and Loudoun) Mark Menzies MP (Conservative, Fylde) Iain McKenzie MP (Labour, Inverclyde) David Mowat MP (Conservative, Warrington Sout h) Fiona O’Donnell MP (Labour, East Lothian) Julian Smith MP (Conservative, Skipton and Ripon)
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The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 1
Contents
Report Page
Summary 3
1 Introduction 4
2 What would Scotland want its armed forces to do? 6 Independent States and defence 6 Scotland and the United Kingdom 6 Foreign policy and defence policy 7 Threats and risks to Scotland 8 Beyond territorial defence 9 Why would joining an alliance affect Scotland’s defence forces? 10 The ability to deploy overseas 12
3 Defence budget and division of assets 14 The defence budget 14 International comparisons 15 Transitional costs 17 The cost of intelligence 18 Sharing intelligence 20 The division of assets 21 The division of assets and integrated armed forces 23 The division of assets and the transition 24
4 A possible Scottish defence force 26 A Scottish Navy 27 Frigates and Offshore Patrol Boats 27 Submarines 28 A Scottish Air Force 31 Maritime air 31 Air policing and fast jets 32 Chinooks and Hercules 34 A Scottish Army 36 A two brigade army 36 Scottish raised and restored UK regiments 37 How would this meet the needs of Scotland? 39 Reserves 40 Choice and recruitment 40 Basing 44 Faslane and Rosyth 44 Headquarters 46 Army basing 47 Air force basing 47 Joint defence and joint basing 48 Special Forces and Royal Marines 50
2 Optional header
Training 51
5 Scotland and NATO 52 NATO and nuclear weapons 53 NATO countries and nuclear weapons 54 Trident 56
Conclusions and recommendations 59
Formal Minutes 68
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 69
The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 3
Summary
The first duty of a government is to protect its citizens.
The Scottish Government’s White Paper must therefore make absolutely clear the details of both its foreign and defence policies and how these translate into armed forces, with specifics given on planned personnel, equipment, bases and alliances.
The time for vague generalities is over.
Much of what the Scottish Government have suggested up to now suffers from a conspiracy of optimism—the assumption that everything will go according to plan, that every other government and international body will fall in with the Scottish Government’s proposals. But what if this doesn’t happen? What are their alternatives? The Scottish Government must also spell out its fallback positions in the event that everything does not go according to plan.
The most explicit pledges made to date include: that the whole cost of security and defence will be no more than £2.5 billion, that personnel in the armed services will total 15,000 full time and 5,000 reserve personnel, and that the defence force will include “current Scottish raised and restored UK regiments”.
What does this mean in practical terms? Will we have a defence force which is army heavy? An army which is infantry heavy? Or will historic regiments be redesignated as platoons, reserves or non–infantry units?
If Faslane is to be kept at its existing workforce, how will people be retrained? What effect will this have upon other bases? What costs will be inccurred in the transition to the new Scottish Defence Force? Can we assume that Scotland will inherit only the equipment it desires? What are the implications for procurement whether or not Scotland gets the assets it wants?
Hanging over all of this is the future of Trident. What does “earliest safe removal” actually mean when the United Kingdom, rightly or wrongly, believes that its safety requires Trident to remain for the foreseeable future? Will a separate Scotland impose unilateral nuclear disarmament on the UK? And since membership for Scotland of NATO will require not only the unanimous agreement of all the existing NATO members, but also the resolution of any disputes with the UK, then how does the Scottish Government propose to resolve these matters?
The Scottish Government must make clear that it accepts that no service personnel can be forcibly transferred into any Scottish Defence Force against their will and spell out what wages and conditions it would propose to offer to compensate those who would leave behind participation in world class armed services.
As we move ever closer to the date of the referendum the people of Scotland are entitled to expect that those who propose drastic change can explain what the consequences would be and how future defence would be organised.
Anything else would be a dereliction of duty.
4 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?
1 Introduction
1. The question of how Scotland, post Separation, would choose to defend itself must be absolutely clear before any vote as to whether Scotland leaves, or remains within, the UK is cast. It is the absolute duty of a sovereign country to defend itself, its people and its interests. It is, to an extent, an assertion of nationhood in itself. The Scottish Government paper published in 2009, Your Scotland, Your Voice, listed some of the reserved matters “seen as fundamental to the state”. These included “the Head of State, citizenship, foreign affairs, and defence and security.”1 We agree, and that is why defence matters are central to the debate about whether Scotland leaves the UK.
2. In October 2011, we launched two distinct strands of inquiry into the Referendum on Separation for Scotland, the first into the mechanics and process of the referendum itself,2 and the second examining the potential impact of separation on key substantive issues. We published three Reports on the implications of separation for defence matters in Scotland: Terminating Trident—days or Decades?, Separation Shuts Shipyards, and How would separation affect jobs in the defence industry in Scotland? 3 This Report follows on from those and specifically focuses on the potential creation of a Scottish defence force, and how a separate Scotland might provide for the defence and security of the people of Scotland. 3. The issue has been widely debated; there have been several seminars and conferences, and many papers published: The Royal United Services Institute, the Scotland Institute, the Henry Jackson Society, and most recently, Scottish Global Forum have all published relevant reports.4 Our colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee and on the Defence Committee, plus on the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs have also carried out related inquiries.5
4. Our Report is divided into four main sections. First, we consider what a separate Scottish State might want its armed forces to do, and how that might impact upon its relationships with its neighbours. Second, we evaluate some of the issues around a possible defence budget and the transition period from the status quo to a free standing defence force. In the third section, we assess the crucial area of personnel numbers and equipment. Finally, we consider Scotland’s relationship with NATO. The Scottish Government has said that its White Paper on Independence, to be published on 26 November 2013, will
1 Scottish Government, Your Scotland, Your Voice, 2009, page 3 2 We have published a series of reports in relation to the first area as follows: Eighth Report of Session 2010-12, The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Do you agree this is a biased question?, HC 1492; Second Report of Session 2012-13, The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: making the process legal, HC 542; Third Report of Session 2012-13, The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: a multi-option question, HC 543, Sixth Report of Session 2012- 13, The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: The proposed section 30—Order Can a player also be the referee? HC 863. 3 Fourth Report of Session 2012-13 Terminating Trident—Days or Decades? HC 676; Seventh Report of Session 2012- 13, Separation shuts shipyards, HC 892; Eighth Report of Session 2012-13, How would separation affect jobs in the Scottish defence industry? HC 957 4 Malcolm Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, RUSI, April 2012; 5 Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixth Report of 2012-13, Foreign policy considerations for the UK and Scotland in the event of Scotland becoming an independent country, HC 643; Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2013-14, The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence, HC 198; House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, Second Report of Session 2012-13, The Economic Implications for the United Kingdom of Scottish Independence, HL Paper 152
The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 5
include a section on defence. It is crucial that the White Paper addresses, in detail, the issues raised in our Reports.
6 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?
2 What would Scotland want its armed forces to do?
Independent States and defence 5. The key function of any State is to provide for the defence and security of its citizens. In his paper, The End of an Auld Sang, Professor Malcolm Chalmers, Research Director and Director, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), described the possession of armed forces as the “foundation of national sovereignty in international law and practice”. He wrote: Independence of action—the right to say no, or yes, to military action—is universally viewed as being part of what it means to be a sovereign state.6
Dr Andrew Murrison MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for International Security Strategy, Ministry of Defence, said:
Independence means sovereign control of your armed forces.7
And in 2009, the Scottish Government said: Independence would give Scotland full responsibility for matters of defence, security and resilience, like other nations. Independence would allow Scotland to decide an approach to these issues that best fits the national interest.8
Scotland and the United Kingdom 6. In the event of separation, it is likely that there would be many situations where the interests of a new Scottish State and the residual UK State would coincide, and representatives of both Governments anticipate a friendly relationship with each other. Sir Nick Harvey MP, then Minister for Armed Forces, said he would expect the UK and Scotland to be “friendly, allied neighbours”.9 Similarly, Nicola Sturgeon MSP, Deputy First Minister, Scottish Government, told the Foreign Affairs Committee:
I think that Scotland and the rest of the UK would have a very close and constructive relationship. On many issues of foreign policy we would probably have very similar views and interests and could work together to advance those.10
She added, however:
There are issues, I am sure, where we would take a different view to not just the Government of the rest of the UK but other Governments across the world.11
6 Malcolm Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, Defence in an independent Scotland, RUSI, April 2012 7 Q 3933 8 The Scottish Government, Your Scotland, Your Voice, A National Conversation, 2009 9 Q 355 10 Oral evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, 28 January 2013, Q 224
The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 7
7. In defence terms, this could have implications. A separate Scotland would no longer benefit automatically from the protection of the British Army, Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force, or its security services. Stuart Crawford, former Lieutenant Colonel in the Royal Tank Regiment, said: “Scotland as part of the UK is defended by the UK's defence inventory,” and therefore, if Scotland was threatened, it would be defended by the UK defence forces.12 This would not be the case if Scotland was outside the UK. Professor Chalmers indicated that the “level of expectation and guarantee would be significantly less if there was independence.”13
8. In a separate Scottish State, the Scottish Government would be free to pursue the foreign policy and defence goals of its choosing, in the best interests of Scotland as they saw them. The remainder of the UK would be free to do likewise. While the Scottish Government could choose to not support the UK in defence matters, similarly, the UK Government could choose to not support Scotland in defence matters. There may be many benefits in co-operation, but mutual support could not be taken for granted.
Foreign policy and defence policy 9. Determining the size and nature of potential Scottish armed forces is, to a certain extent, dependent upon the foreign policy aspirations of a separate Scottish Government. As Professor Sir Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor of the History of War, University of Oxford, said: “you only know what the armed forces will look like when you know what they are for.”14 Witnesses commented on the difficulty in answering this question without more information on the future foreign policy of a separate Scotland, and how it would interact with other countries.15 This is crucial, as the ability of Scotland to pursue a different foreign policy to that of the UK has been cited as a motivation for Scotland separating from the UK.16 George Grant, Associate Fellow, Henry Jackson Society, said:
You have to define what sort of country you are going to be in the world, what your foreign policy objectives will be, what you think the risks to your national security would be and—this is a really important point—what prioritisation you will give to certain things. Once you have done that and, secondly, once you have worked out what your limitations are in economic and geographical terms, you can start saying, “Having considered all of that, this is what we would want and this is what we would not want.”17
10. There is a clear link between foreign policy and defence policy. Understanding the likely foreign policy of a separate Scotland is important in understanding what objectives its armed forces would be designed to achieve.
11 Q 224 12 Q 639 13 Q 153 14 Q 157 15 Q 153 16 See the Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixth Report of 2012-13, Foreign policy considerations for the UK and Scotland in the event of Scotland becoming an independent country, HC 643, paras 112-123. Malcolm Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, 2012 17 Q 3463
8 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?
Threats and risks to Scotland 11. We discussed the potential risks and threats to Scotland with a range of witnesses. Mr Grant pointed out the UK National Security Council had identified a list of priority risks to the UK,18 and that these risks “would not be diminished in an independent Scotland”.19 It would be for Scotland to decide if it placed a similar priority on the risks identified in the current Strategic Defence and Security Review. There was a consensus that, while Scotland was unlikely to suffer a conventional land invasion, the seas around Scotland and its airspace have a strategic importance,20 so defence of its air and sea territory would be a priority.21 For example, Professor Ron Smith, Birkbeck College, said:
Their central security issue is going to be naval; it is the fisheries, the oil and so on. The question is how you provide that. It is a very long coastline, so providing a navy, even though it does not have the same heritage role as the highland regiments, is going to be important.22
Francis Tusa, Editor, Defence Analysis, concluded that: Based on the quite sparse policy statements in manifestos, talking about defence of airspace, economic zones and so forth, if that is what the policy on defence structure is, it leads you pretty inevitably towards a maritime and air-based armed forces, with much smaller land forces. 23 However, the SNP Defence Policy Update said:
The Scottish armed forces will be focused on territorial defence. 24
12. There was general agreement that Scotland would need armed forces in order to:
• Protect its economic assets such as oil and gas infrastructure and fisheries,
• Protect Scottish territory, including land, but also air and sea routes, and
• Provide aid to the civilian administration, e.g. foot and mouth, heavy flooding.25 13. George Grant said that while there were no current existential threats to the UK, it would “be foolish to calibrate your long-term defence posture on the basis that things will remain that way.”26 The Scottish Government would need to prepare and retain the
18 Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy, HC 761. The risks range from international terrorism, a conventional attack on an EU or NATO partner to which the UK would have to respond, to disruption to satellites. 19 Q 3479 20 Q 2348 21 Q 205, Q 208 22 Q 2158 23 Q 191 24 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 25 For example, see Stuart Crawford and Richard Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI October 2012, pp 3-6. For more examples, see www.army.mod.uk/ . Also Cm 8174 paras 1.9-1.10 26 Q 3489
The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 9
capability to respond to the unexpected. There would also be some threats to Scotland, such as terrorism, which may involve conventional defence forces but also other aspects of the state, such as the security services. Professor Strachan said “vulnerability to attack includes both the capability of defending but also the capability to anticipate to some degree.”27
14. Nicola Sturgeon MSP, recognised cyber attack, international terrorism, the threat that comes from global instability and the possibility of failed states, and international organised crime as potential threats to Scotland.28 The Scottish Government published an earlier paper on independence in 2009, Your Scotland, Your Voice, in which it discussed perceived threats in general terms and how the “the security of any state can be threatened”.29 The Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update agreed at the SNP conference in October 2012 said:
While conventional military threats to Scotland are low, it is important to maintain appropriate security and defence arrangements and capabilities. This includes a cyber security and intelligence infrastructure to deal with new threats and protect key national economic and social infrastructure.30
15. In the event of separation, the Scottish Government would have to consider how best to protect its territory, its people and its interests. It is crucial that the forthcoming Independence White Paper sets out the likely risks specific to Scotland, and how the Scottish armed forces and security service would be structured in order to best anticipate and respond to those threats. This would include conventional threats, but also emerging threats such as terrorism and cyber attack.
Beyond territorial defence 16. A separate Scotland would have to consider the possible threats from beyond its borders, and how it addressed these would influence further what kind of military it developed. In their report, A’ The Blue Bonnets, Stuart Crawford, a former Army Officer in the Royal Tank Regiment, and Richard Marsh, an economist, recognised the need to maintain “wider security interests and the fulfilment of regional and international defence obligations”. At the same time they saw the Scottish defence force as having a “regional, rather than global focus”.31 The SNP Defence Policy Update said:
The SNP recognises our national responsibilities as a northern European nation to work with our neighbours to fulfil current defence and security responsibilities and improve collective regional arrangements. Environmental changes to the High North and Arctic Region raise major regional challenges and responsibilities which
27 Q 201 28 Oral evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee, Q 309 29 Scottish Government, Your Scotland, Your Voice, 2009, para 8.26 30 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 31 Crawford & Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI October 2012
10 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?
Scotland shares. Scotland will require military capabilities to fulfil these responsibilities.32
17. There may be situations which affect Scotland, but are taking place beyond its own immediate territory. The threats recognised by Nicola Sturgeon included several which have an international dimension, such as global instability and the possibility of failed states.33 Stuart Crawford also mentioned the need to consider “Scotland’s rights and interests”.34 There are many situations where Scottish citizens may need assistance abroad. For example, the Royal Navy sent warships to evacuate UK citizens from Lebanon and Libya.35 There were Scots among the hostages at the Amenas gas plant in Algeria.36 In the event of separation, the Scottish Government will need to assess the possible threats to its people and interests beyond its own territorial boundaries, and determine how it would respond to incidents on a regional and international scale, and whether this response would include a military dimension. If the Scottish Government intends to rely on the goodwill of the UK, or other potential allies, in such circumstances, then this should be spelt out and thus identified as a topic for future negotiations.
Why would joining an alliance affect Scotland’s defence forces? 18. Connected to the ability to address threats beyond its own territory is the question of what relationships Scotland would have with other countries and whether Scotland would be part of an international military alliance. There has been considerable debate around Scotland’s potential membership of NATO, but there are other international bodies which Scotland may wish to be part of. If a separate Scotland successfully joined the EU, it may wish to participate in the EU Common Security and Defence Policy.
19. There may be situations, such as those created by melting sea ice in the Arctic,37 which could affect Scotland, but would not affect Scotland alone. The Scottish Government must consider its role and response in this context. Professor Chalmers said:
For me, that question would come down to the issue of the alliance relationships Scotland was seeking to form—not just in general terms about being a member of NATO, but also whether it felt it had to make a contribution to the security of the countries to which it was closest in northern Europe. Norway and Denmark do have these capabilities. It is possible that the Scots might say, “We can’t be entirely free- riders; we want to make a contribution. This is where we are in the north Atlantic. There is a worsening problem in the Arctic, so we’ll make a contribution to what our
32 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 33 Oral evidence FAC, Q 309 34 Crawford & Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI October 2012 35 Libya protests: UK deploys warship to help evacuate British citizens, The Guardian, 22 February 2011; Prime Minister praises military effort in Libyan evacuations, www.gov.uk 28 February 2011; Evacuation from Lebanon, BBC News, 21 July 2006 36 Algeria siege: Alex Salmond says Scottish hostages safe and well, BBC News, 18 January 2013 37 The Melting Arctic: Northern Sea Route Shipping Has Already Quadrupled Last Summer’s Record, 24 July 2013, www.theatlantic.com . How the Arctic Ocean could transform world trade, Al Jazeera, 27 August 2013 www.aljazeera.com
The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 11
neighbours do.” It would be mainly about national and NATO responsibility and not free-riding.38
20. Joining any international alliance would bring obligations and the question would arise as to what contribution Scotland could provide. To use Denmark as a comparator, Ole Kværnø, Director of Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College, said:
Our vision is by no means to defend ourselves. We, as a state, are no longer able to defend ourselves in military terms. Instead, Denmark enhances its security by being in NATO. Mr Kværnø said that, as a result, Denmark’s priorities depended on the priorities of its allies: So our investment is not in our direct and own defence but rather in keeping our preferred partners happy so that they will come to our rescue at the end of the day.39
One of the ways in which Denmark had contributed was to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. 40 ISAF had asked for battle groups—self- contained infantry units—because, as Francis Tusa put it: “they have been so short of bodies, they have been crying out loud for boots on the ground”.41 Over 50 States contributed troops to ISAF.42 Denmark also sent F-16s to support the recent NATO operation in Libya.43 21. In addition, Scotland would be expected to make a contribution in peace time. Denmark allows the US to have a radar base on Greenland,44 and we note the First Minister has floated the idea of Scotland hosting a US base.45 NATO also coordinates air policing over Europe and the Royal Air Force currently plays an important part in NATO Air Policing Area 1.46 Scotland could contribute to that but it would involve considerable additional expenditure, as exemplified when we asked Mr Crawford about the aircraft in his proposed air force:
I do not see how a small country like Scotland with limited military aspirations—I have assumed that, in the absence of foreign policy—would require Typhoon jets unless it wanted to make a specific contribution to some wider alliance47
38 Q 2274 39 Scottish independence: How do you defend a small country? BBC Scotland, 1 March 2013 40 Q 208. There are between three or four battle groups in a Brigade. A typical ba ttle group contains about 600 men with armoured personnel carriers. 41 Q 208 42 Q 203 43 Nato operations in Libya: data journalism breaks down which country does what, The Guardian, 31 October 2011 44 Scottish independence: How do you defend a small country? BBC Scotland, 1 March 2013 45 Scottish Independence: SNP open to US military bases, The Scotsman, 6 April 2013 46 NATO Air Policing also enables countries with jet capability to provide consistent protection of the air above those NATO Member States without the capability to police their own air space. Belgian Jets Begin Baltic Air Policing Mission, Atlantic Council, September 2013 47 Q 621
12 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?
The required contribution to any alliance would be a significant driver of how Scottish armed forces would be designed and configured.48
22. The Scottish Government could choose to manage its security by being part of an international alliance. Being a member of such an alliance would require a commitment in times of peace and conflict. This would impact upon the level of the investment in, and design of, the armed forces of a separate Scottish State. The Scottish Government’s White Paper must make clear what level of commitment, with what forces and to which alliances, is planned.
The ability to deploy overseas 23. The British Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force retain the ability to operate overseas on a global scale. The UK has sent forces to the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan,49 and more recently Libya. 50 The UK Armed Forces also contributes to humanitarian operations around the world.51 Alastair Carmichael MP, Secretary of State for Scotland, told us that UK Armed Forces personnel, including Scots, were part of the humanitarian relief activities in the Philippines following typhoon Haiyan.52 HMS Daring and at least one C 17 transport plane were being sent to the area.53 24. It is difficult to establish both whether Scotland would be willing to engage in many of these activities, but also whether it would have the capability to engage in many of these activities. The Scottish Government suggested in 2009 that Scotland would not retain the capability to do so: Scotland could focus primarily on securing its territory, compared to the United Kingdom approach of also having the capacity to conduct overseas wars.54
The contrast with the UK approach would imply that the Scottish military would not want to “also” have the capacity to deploy overseas. However, the SNP Defence Policy Update in 2012 motion said:
The Multi Role Brigade structure and interoperable air and sea assets will provide deployable capabilities for United Nations sanctioned missions and support of humanitarian, peace-keeping and peace-making ‘Petersburg Tasks’55
48 Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, RUSI, April 2012 49 Q 187 50 HC Deb, 14 November 2011, Col 517W. See also House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/1A/5909, 24 Oct 2011 51 Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8174, para 1.24 52 Q 3962 53 HMS Daring deployment to boost UK response to Philippines typhoon, www.gov.uk 12 November 2013. Providing assistance was made easier by the fact HMS Daring was already in Singapore. 54 The Scottish Government, Your Scotland, Your Voice, A National Conversation, 2009 para 8.38 55 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy update, October 2012. The Petersberg tasks were set out in the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in June 1992, as part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). They include tasks such as: peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation. It has involved deployment as far as the DRC
The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 13
25. Establishing what this would mean for Scotland, in terms of military assets and posture, would require more detail. George Grant said:
Some of the big issues would include: would Scotland seek to be proactively involved in UN peacekeeping operations or would it limit itself to disaster relief and so forth? Such questions will obviously impact on what sort of defence force you have.56
Looking at the SNP defence motion, Professor Chalmers said
We are not talking about a highly agile and deployable army, at least not autonomously.57
He continued:
If you are talking about intervening outside Europe, I imagine the Scots would have no interest in doing that by themselves; they would do it only as part of NATO, the EU or UN.58 26. He suggested that, if Scotland had been independent at the time, and had deployed to Afghanistan, then it could have provided forces to supplement UK forces, “as the Danes and Estonians have done in Helmand” but it would have relied on other allies for the “more expensive and non-personnel intensive” enabling assets.59 27. The UK Government has the capacity to transport its armed forces to carry out a range of roles, including peace-keeping, throughout the world. This requires substantial investment. Without committing similar levels of investment, the Scottish Government would be reliant upon its allies in order to deploy its armed forces beyond its immediate territory. Again, the White Paper must make the Scottish Government’s plans clear.
56 Q 3473 57 Q 2159 58 Q 2165 59 Q 2159
14 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?
3 Defence budget and division of assets
The defence budget 28. UK Defence spending in 2012-13 was more than £34 billion.60 Professor Chalmers could not see Scotland spending more than the NATO average of 1.4% of GDP on defence, and that would mean a budget of somewhere between £1.7 billion to £2.1 billion a year.61 This is not too dissimilar from that proposed by Stuart Crawford and Richard Marsh, in their paper, A’ The Blue Bonnets, Defending an Independent Scotland.62 Their model outlined a Scottish defence force on a budget of £1.8 billion a year, or 1.3% of GDP. 63
29. The SNP defence motion said a separate Scotland, led by the SNP, would “commit to an annual defence and security budget of £2.5 billion”.64 The SNP defence motion does not give any detail as to how the £2.5 billion figure has been calculated. The SNP defence motion said further that the budget of £2.5 billion represented “an annual increase of more than £500 million on recent UK levels of defence spending in Scotland but nearly £1bn less than Scottish taxpayers currently contribute to UK defence spending.”65
30. It is difficult to say with any confidence what the level of defence spending in Scotland is. As Professor Ron Smith said “The whole system is so interdependent that it is very hard to track down regionally. Some of it you can. We do not know whether the £2.5 billion will be more or less than is spent in Scotland at the moment; there is real uncertainty about it.”66 Richard Marsh, co-author of the Crawford model, used a figure for current Scottish defence expenditure of nearly £3.3 billion in 2010–11, and said that the £3.3 billion figure came from a Scottish Government publication, Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland, which:
looks at all the money spent for the benefit of Scotland. It specifically identifies defence expenditure, so that is defence expenditure spent for the benefit of Scotland.67
31. The allocation of expenditure does not equate to the level of security on a regional basis, not least because an amount of Ministry of Defence expenditure is spent overseas, for example to support The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards based in Germany.68 Scotland as part of the UK is defended by the sum of UK assets and the collective defence that comes with being a member of NATO. The UK’s commitment to NATO may require its assets and
60 Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8174, executive summary 61 Q 158 62 Crawford and Marsh, A’ The Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012, This updated the earlier Crawford paper, written under the pseudonym Jack Hawthorn, Some Thoughts on an Independent Scottish Defence Force, 1997 63 Crawford and Marsh, A The Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012. See Scotland could afford ‘regional defence force’, 17 October 2012, www.defencemanagement.com 64 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 65 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 66 Q 2175 67 Q 2346 68 www.army.mod.uk/armoured/regiments/26871.aspx
The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 15
personnel to be outside the UK. Expenditure on the defence of Scotland is not limited to the assets based in Scotland. As Stuart Crawford pointed out:
the defence of Scotland does not necessarily mean that the forces have to be deployed in Scotland per se; they have to be deployed where Scotland’s interests are best protected.69
Acceptance of this was implied in the 2009 Scottish Government paper, Your Scotland, Your Voice, which said: Defence spending is intended to benefit the whole of the United Kingdom, through providing security and stability, but defence spending also has a positive economic impact on the regions and countries where it takes place.70
Professor Chalmers suggested that a relevant comparison would be the proportion of the current UK defence budget according to Scotland’s population, or 8.5% of £38 billion,71 or £3.23 billion. He said that, if a separate Scotland matched the proportion of GDP spent by the UK, it would have an annual defence budget of between £2.6 billion and £3.1 billion.72 The Scottish Government’s document, Scotland’s Balance Sheet, said that, if Scotland reached the EU-15 average of 1.5% of GDP, it would suggest defence expenditure of approximately £2.2 billion.73
32. Stuart Crawford indicated, however, that, despite the different methodologies in calculating likely defence spending, the estimated budgets were similar: The model presented here indicates an annual defence budget of £1.6–£1.8 billion, which represents some 1.3 per cent of an independent Scotland’s estimated GDP. This compares to the £2.5 billion of the current SNP model and the £1.7–£2.1 billion estimate by Malcolm Chalmers, so there is a broad agreement on the ballpark figures amongst those who have, so far, dared to make an estimate.74
33. It is virtually impossible to determine how much money is spent specifically in Scotland for the defence of Scotland, as at present the defence of Scotland is inextricably linked with the defence of the rest of the UK. By population share, over £3.2 billion is currently spent on the defence of Scotland.
International comparisons The UK Government Scotland Analysis paper on Defence included data on various European countries with similar populations to Scotland.
69 Q 2356 70 Your Scotland, Your Voice, 2009, page 121 71 Q 2182. Professor Chalmers used his own estimate of £38 billion for UK defence spending 72 Chalmers, End of an Auld Sang, 2012. (In 2015 but at 2010 prices). 73 Scottish Government, Scotland’s Balance Sheet, April 2013. (2010-11 figures) EU-15 (Members of the EU upto April 2004) are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 74 Crawford and Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012
16 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?
Country Defence budgets, 2012 Defence budget, % GDP
Denmark £2.8 billion 1.4
Norway £4.4 billion 1.4
Slovakia £0.6 billion 1.1
Finland £2.3 billion 1.5
Ireland £0.7 million 0.6
Croatia £0.6 billion 1.7
Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8714, Annex B 75
34. Norway clearly spends the most, nearly £4.4 billion a year,76 and maintains a military with F-16 fighter jets, frigates, diesel electric submarines,77 and 25,000 regular and 45,000 reserve personnel. 78 Denmark spends about £2.8 billion a year, maintaining an air force which includes F-16 jets and a navy which includes frigates. It also has 18,600 regular and over 50,000 reserve personnel.79 Both Norway and Denmark have built up capable armed forces, and currently spend 1.4% of their GDP on defence, but they have had many years to build up their military.80 The defence budget for Norway is far above anything we have seen proposed for Scotland.81
35. Some of the evidence suggested Ireland or Denmark would be closer comparators. 82 Professor Chalmers said: There is a lot of discussion about how Ireland, Norway, Denmark and sometimes Sweden are models, and you can look at how much they spend on defence. It is possible that an independent Scotland, looking at how difficult transition would be, would adopt the Irish option.83 36. Ireland is not a member of NATO. It has a small defence budget, less than £1 billion a year, and has reduced its military to a small territorial defence force, with a navy that
75 See also Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, RUSI, April 2012, and Francis Tusa, Defence Analysis, Scottish Independence Issues, January 2007, Vol. 10 Issue 1; and Francis Tusa, Defence Analysis, Scottish Independence: The Defence Equation, February 2012, Vol. 15 Issue 2; Briefing: Separation anxiety, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 June 2012 76 See Q 153 and Q 158 77 Q 158 78 Military Balance 2012. Note Norway has conscription. 79 Military Balance 2012 80 Q 2289 81 For example, see Scotland Institute, Defence and Security in an Independent Scotland, June 2013, pages 28-29 82 Q 2157 83 Q 187. See also Q 158, and Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, RUSI, April 2012
The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 17
patrols its coastline, and a minimal air force.84 Ireland takes part in peacekeeping roles, but does not retain the capability to deploy substantial forces away from Ireland. Francis Tusa said the ambition of a country to send its armed forces abroad was reflected in its budget:
a Scottish self-defence force that is not even going to be spending 1.4% of GDP on defence will not want to be sending much more than a couple of observers on UN missions, and most of the forces will stay within the 12-mile limit.85
Transitional costs 37. There are further difficulties in estimating a Scottish defence budget because the costs associated with the transition from the status quo to a free standing defence force are unknown. UK defence spending is used for many things including the recruitment, training, and housing of personnel; equipment procurement and development; support capabilities such as medical care and logistics; headquarters facilities for command and control, and the Ministry of Defence civil service.86 These services would have to be replicated in Scotland, without the same economies of scale. 87 Professor Smith said:
For a country of 5 million to spend £2.5 billion on defence with armed forces of 15,000, it is perfectly understandable and seems quite reasonable in a steady state. The real difficulty is going to be getting there from here, because most of the equipment they inherit will be inappropriate.88
Professor Chalmers said: Anything is possible, but it is difficult for me to imagine, given the very difficult economic circumstances an independent Scotland would face, especially in the transition but perhaps also longer term, that it would be prepared to give defence as high a relative priority as the rest of the UK.89 38. The UK Government has pointed out that of the similar European countries used as comparators for Scotland, none of Denmark (£2.8 billion), Norway (£4.4 billion), Finland (£2.3 billion) nor Ireland (£0.7 billion) has had to contend with the start-up costs of recently becoming a newly separated state.90 39. It is a matter of great concern to us that it remains unclear as to whether or not an assessment has been made of the potential aims of a separate Scottish Defence Force and the personnel and equipment which would be necessary to meet those aims. This matter needs to be clarified by the Scottish Government as a matter of urgency. If an assessment has been made of the assets which the Scottish Government would ask the Ministry of Defence to transfer, then this detail must be made available. If no such
84 www.military.ie/ 85 Q 178 86 Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8174, para 1.58 87 Cm 8174, para 1.53 88 Q 2157 89 Q 187 90 Cm 8174, para 1.68
18 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?
assessment has been made, then how the £2.5 billion figure has been calculated is a mystery.
40. It is unclear as to whether this £2.5 billion budget is the budget of a separate Scottish State defence force, wholly independent of the UK Ministry of Defence; whether this budget makes any allowance for the transitional period; or on which assumptions about the division of assets the figure is based. This is wholly unacceptable, and we seek clarity from the Scottish Government as a matter of urgency in its forthcoming White Paper.
The cost of intelligence 41. The UK has developed an intelligence infrastructure to address security threats such as terrorism and cyber threats, including a domestic security service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also known as MI6), and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The Foreign Secretary has ministerial responsibility for the SIS and GCHQ. The Home Office has responsibility for MI5. The UK budget for its entire security network is over £2 billion a year. Its cyber security programme alone costs £860 million.91 The Ministry of Defence has a role in UK cyber security. 92 42. Nicola Sturgeon noted that:
In terms of security and intelligence, I would envisage Scotland having independent domestic intelligence machinery in Scotland sitting alongside our police service.93 However, developing a network to gather intelligence on an international scale is expensive and, in the case of the UK, has been built up over many years. It would take time to replicate. Professor Ron Smith told us:
It is not primarily to do with money. You just cannot buy those cryptanalysts, cryptographers and the experience of the whole structure. That is just a vast knowledge base that is shared with NSA [National Security Agency in the US] and the other groups there. You could spend vast amounts of money, as GCHQ has done, but the crucial thing is not so much the equipment, but the skills involved in it.94
George Grant also made the point that recruitment of cyber security experts is difficult because there are so few of them with the requisite specialist skills.95
43. In purely budgetary terms, the SNP Defence Policy Update said it would include:
A cyber security and intelligence infrastructure to deal with new threats and protect key national economic and social infrastructure.96
91 Scotland Analysis: Security, Cm 8741, page 7. Q 2172 92 www.gov.uk/government/news/reserves-head-up-new-cyber-unit 93 Oral evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee, 28 January 2013, Q 310 94 Q 2168 95 Q 3485
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It is unclear if the £2.5 billion budget is supposed to include this cyber security and intelligence infrastructure. Professor Chalmers said:
I have the resolution in front of me. It talks about an annual defence and security budget of £2.5 billion, so my understanding is that it doesn’t only include defence, but also includes intelligence services. Whether it includes an element for the counter-terrorist aspects of the police I do not know. 97
44. Dr Murrison MP said that, while it would not be normal practice,98 he understood the £2.5 billion budget to be for defence and security, so that would include intelligence and cyber security.99 Professor Chalmers calculated an approximate contribution of the UK £2 billion security budget, based on Scotland being 8.5% of the population, to be a little under £200 million. If this amount was subtracted from the proposed total £2.5 billion defence and security budget, then that left for defence would be nearer £2.3 billion.100 Again, this presumes a steady state budget and does not appear to include any start-up costs.101
45. The Crawford model, with a budget of £1.8 billion, does not include the cost of security and intelligence gathering. On recreating something like GCHQ he said:
In my opinion, there is absolutely no question that Scotland would be able to replicate GCHQ and all its tentacles because the budget would be prohibitive—not just the capital cost of setting up a GCHQ in Scotland, but also the running costs, which I understand on the UK budget are in the order of £200 million a year on top of the build. It is a hugely expensive project for a small country. 102 46. In the event of separation, the Scottish Government would have to make an assessment of the role and nature of the security services it would require in order to address security threats such as terrorism and cyber attack, and how such services should be paid for. 47. The UK administration has considerable experience in the area of counter- terrorism, and invests £2 billion a year in its security and intelligence services. This is in addition to the UK’s £34 billion annual spend on defence. Should the Scottish Government spend a proportionate amount, this would amount to £200 million a year on security and intelligence services. This figure, however, does not take into account the start-up costs for an entirely new intelligence infrastructure. The Independence White Paper should make clear whether the proposed defence and security budget would include spending on the equivalent of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. This is essential in order to evaluate fully whether the security of a separate Scottish State would be diminished compared to that of Scotland in the UK.
96 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 97 Q 2171 98 Q 3936 99 Q 3940 100 Q 2172 101 Scotland Analysis: Security, Cm 8741, paras 2.25-2.27 102 Q 2308
20 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?
Sharing intelligence 48. Countries share intelligence with one another.103 The question is whether a separate Scotland would rely upon other countries for intelligence because it did not have certain capabilities, such GCHQ. Professor Chalmers said that smaller countries tended to adopt this approach:
They get by partly by partnership with others, being friendly with others, heeding the wishes of bigger powers with more capabilities, and sometimes by having some degree of specialism so they have something particular to offer.104
But he warned that, again, it would depend on Scotland’s foreign policy: That degree of interdependence in security capabilities will constrain the ability of a Scottish Government to pursue a radically different foreign and security policy agenda, because that could have consequences for the willingness of the rest of the UK to continue with it.105 Stuart Crawford said that, due to the cost:
An independent Scotland would have to rely on intelligence being fed down from the rest of the UK.106
49. When asked about the investment to create the necessary security infrastructure to persuade allies to share intelligence, the Deputy First Minister told the Foreign Affairs Committee:
There is capability we would have from day one. There would be capability we would develop over time. There would be continued shared arrangements with the rest of the UK regardless of our independent capability.107 50. It is not a case of sharing all or nothing. The country with the intelligence determines how much it shares with which another country. Such intelligence relationships allow the UK, and others, to determine how much it shares with individual countries as appropriate to the relationship with that country. 108 The UK is also part of the Five Eyes arrangement to share intelligence with the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.109 It is highly unlikely that a separate Scotland would be allowed access to such privileged intelligence as that acquired by the UK through the Five Eyes arrangement. The views of the other
103 Scotland Analysis: Security, Cm 8741, paras 2.17-2.19, and paras 3.26-3.30 104 Q 2168. See also Scottish civil servants probe plans for 'Nordic' intelligence services after independence, The Herald, 27 July 2013 105 Q 2168 106 Q 2308 107 FAC, Q 316 108 Cm 8174, para 1.62. See also Q 201 109 Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8714
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members of the Five Eyes arrangement would be critical when considering what intelligence could be shared with Scotland.110
51. It is possible, post separation, that the Scottish Government could argue it has contributed to the international networks, experience and relationships that the UK has built up over time. However, just as it is not possible simply to break off 8.5% of GCHQ, it would also not be possible to continue with the existing relationship as if nothing has happened. Intelligence exchange is based on mutual interest and established networks. In the event of separation, the Scottish Government would have to negotiate access to intelligence from the UK. Scotland would not automatically access privileged information from other countries on the same basis as the UK services currently do. The Independence White Paper should make clear how the Scottish Government would establish its future intelligence relationship with the UK and other key allies. 52. It is difficult to establish the cost of intelligence and security, and the cost of the transition period, upon the proposed defence budget for Scotland. It is likely that such costs would place pressure upon the proposed £2.5 billion budget. If we accept £200 million as the cost of a very basic intelligence and security service, this would leave £2.3 billion per annum for defence purposes.
The division of assets 53. Most of our witnesses indicated that if Scotland left the UK it would seek a share of the current UK MoD assets, valued at around £88 billion. 111 Sir Nick Harvey acknowledged that what Scotland would want would be a matter for a future separate Scottish Government to decide “but I suppose their starting point would be that they would aspire to use existing defence assets or at least some of them.”112 Keith Brown MSP, Minister for Transport and Veterans, Scottish Government, told the Defence Committee he felt Scotland would be entitled to “between £7 billion and £8 billion of assets.”113
54. There would be an economic incentive for Scotland to acquire as much as possible through negotiation rather than have to spend resources on new equipment. Stuart Crawford’s model relied upon it:
We do not assume in our figures that anything is paid for up front. One would imagine that much of the equipment of an independent Scottish defence force would inevitably be negotiated as part of the so-called share of the UK defence force. 114
55. However, Keith Brown MSP told the Defence Committee that:
110 Sixth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2012-13, Foreign policy considerations for the UK and Scotland in the event of Scotland becoming an independent country, HC 643, paras 135-136. Q 201, Qq 2333-2335, Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8714, paras 2.23-2.24 111 Q 158 Professor Chalmers quoted this value as “after depreciation”. 112 Q 353 113 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 326 114 Q 158, Q 2322
22 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?
We do not think it is possible to have an agreed division of assets that would give us all that we need, so we will be looking for further procurement.115
The SNP defence motion said capability gaps would be filled through a Scottish defence industrial strategy, and both joint procurement and sharing with allies, including the UK.
56. There are precedents from other countries. Professor Smith said that in the examples of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, there was an element of trying to “make things up as you go along”.116 One of the lessons from other countries is there is a big difference between negotiating over something which both parties want, and negotiating over something only one side wants—or neither side wants.117
57. Dividing assets according to where everything lay on a particular date, would be simple and quick, and makes sense for physical assets, e.g. Fort George barracks, home of 3 Scots, near Inverness. However, that method would be unlikely to produce what either a separate Scotland or the UK would want, and might just extend the negotiations as each side made claims for what had been left on the ‘wrong’ side of the border. Scotland may want particular aircraft, such as Hawk jets, but these are not based in Scotland. Similarly, under this principle, all the Royal Navy submarines would be part of the Scottish equation. 118 After the SNP Conference in 2012, the First Minister said:
The nuclear weapons concerned are not Scotland's nuclear weapons, [...] If they are regarded as an asset, which I would find difficult to regard it as, then I am quite certain that we can trade that asset for something more useful.119 58. Alternatively, the assets could be divided according to population share, Scotland being 8.5% of the UK population. However, some items are easier to divide into equal whole numbers than others. Francis Tusa said Scotland could get 15 Tornadoes, one third of an aircraft carrier, and one and three quarters of a Type 23 Frigate.120 In addition to inheriting fractions of warships, which the Secretary of State for Defence referred to as “clearly a technical problem”,121 many of the UK assets would be too expensive to operate for a country with a smaller budget. Professor Chalmers said: If a Scottish Government, in such a scenario, were to be strategic, it would look at all the sorts of calculations Francis has done in relation to how many Tornadoes Scotland would be entitled to and so on, and then say, “Could we afford to maintain those Tornadoes? Could we afford to train their personnel?” The running costs of a lot of these high value assets are much bigger than the capital costs.122
115 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 295 116 Q 2173 117 Qq 2293-2296 118 Q 158 119 Alex Salmond: Independent Scotland could trade its share of Trident, STV News, 18 July 2012 120 Q 168 121 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 387 122 Q 169
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59. Professor Chalmers concluded that a mis-match would be inevitable between the UK assets and what Scotland would want or inherit: “It would want 5% rather than 10% of the total” and it might want to trade that for something else.123 This may include accepting cash in lieu.124 When Keith Brown MSP went before the Defence Committee, he said it was difficult to provide more detail as to what assets Scotland would have in its defence force because the Ministry of Defence would not enter into discussions with Scottish Government officials in advance of the referendum. These would be discussions, not pre- negotiations.125
60. Nevertheless we can see no reason why the Scottish Government should not spell out, clearly, how it would wish to see assets allocated and which additional equipment it would wish to claim, having seen these as desirable. Such information is crucial, not least because there will be a consequential impact upon procurement decisions. To give a recent example, the number of ships a Scottish navy would seek to inherit will undoubtedly impact upon the number it might subsequently wish to build. In these circumstances we can see no reason why the MoD should not provide factual details in response to reasonable requests from the Scottish Government.
The division of assets and integrated armed forces 61. The Ministry of Defence has said that dividing up the UK Armed Forces would be difficult, because of their integrated nature. The Secretary of State for Defence has described the UK Armed Forces as “a highly integrated and sophisticated fighting force,” and “the idea that you can sort of break off a little bit, like a square on a chocolate bar and that would be the bit that went north of the border, is frankly laughable.”126 Professor Chalmers said: There is not very much the UK deploys that is only for the purposes of Scotland. All of the assets the UK deploys in Scotland, Faslane most obviously, will still be required by the UK, but that is also true of air defence assets and so on to a very significant, if not total, extent.127 62. We visited several defence establishments in Scotland which demonstrated this. The radar station at RAF Clettraval on North Uist is part of a UK-wide network feeding into RAF Bulmer, in Northumberland, which monitors UK airspace and is essential for the operation of the Qinetiq missile range on Benbecula. RAF Leuchars is one of only two bases that provide 24 hour Quick Reaction Alert air policing over the UK, DM Beith is one of eight munitions stores spread around the UK, HMNB Clyde is due to become the only Royal Navy base for submarines in the UK. If Scotland left the UK, the Ministry of Defence would have to recreate facilities such as these south of the border. At the same time, a new separate Scottish State would be duplicating similar facilities that already exist in the UK.
123 Q 170 124 Q 158 125 Oral Evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 261, Q 268, Q 282 126 How would an independent Scotland defend itself? The Guardian, 1 March 2012; Briefing: Separation anxiety, Ja ne’s Defence Weekly, 14 June 2012 127 Q 187
24 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?
63. The division of assets would be subject to negotiation between two governments and, as Dr Murrison told us: “It is important to record that a yes vote next year would be the start of the process and not the end of one.” He also repeated the problem of dividing up complex platforms and added that the same would be true of units of the British Army. 128 Similarly, Dr Patrick Mileham, former officer in the Royal Tank Regiment and military historian, told us it would be unlikely for the Ministry of Defence to allow the transfer of the Royal Regiment of Scotland, the Scots Guards and the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards because they are in the Order of Battle and the British Army would be making plans on the assumption they will remain.129
The division of assets and the transition 64. In the event of a yes vote, there would be a transition period during which the UK and Scotland separated themselves. In practical terms, there would have to be an audit of assets and valuations, negotiations and agreement on what was disputed. This would be immensely complex. For example, the value of Coulport and Faslane are difficult to determine—would the nuclear facilities be priced at replacement costs, construction costs or value to a future Scottish Government? Similarly legislation that had been drafted on the presumption of the United Kingdom would have to be untangled.130 The British Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force would have to adjust to operating without the use of bases and territory in Scotland. Scotland would have to create its own structures according to what a separate Scotland wanted. Professor Chalmers said:
It would not be an overnight job. Thinking about what Scotland would ideally want, it will not get what it ideally decides for another 20 or 30 years in a rapidly changing world.131 The Scottish Government has proposed that, in the event of a yes vote on 18 September 2014, then negotiations would take place and agreement would be reached with the UK Government, in time to enable independence day to be at some time in March 2016. The Scottish Government paper, Scotland’s Future: from the Referendum to Independence and a Written Constitution, said:
Following a vote for independence in 2014, agreements will be reached between the Scottish and UK Governments, in the spirit of the Agreement, setting the parameters for Scotland’s transition to independence. These agreements would establish:
• The timetable towards independence day—which the Scottish Government would intend to be in March 2016, just before the start of the 2016 election campaign;
And these negotiations would include:
• the division of financial and other assets and liabilities (including oil revenues and assignation of other tax revenues, military bases and overseas assets), the transfer to
128 Q 3946 129 Q 3790 130 Qq 174-175 131 Q 158
The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 25
the Scottish Parliament and Government of political authority over institutions previously controlled at Westminster, the ongoing co-operative arrangements that the peoples of Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland would share, and the timetable for the speediest safe removal of weapons of mass destruction from Scotland.
It conceded:
Of course, some matters may continue to be discussed after independence (as was the case, for example, with the Czech Republic and Slovakia). 132
65. How Scotland acquired those assets it did not inherit would be for Scotland to decide over a period of time. As Professor Smith said:
There is a temptation to adopt what is called in the trade a conspiracy of optimism and say, “It will all work out okay. Maybe we will be able to afford that.” That is where the transition will be really hard.133 A separate Scotland could buy second hand, it could tender for new items and, depending on Scotland’s industrial policy, possibly build what it wanted domestically. The defence industry across the UK, including Scotland, has evolved to meet the needs of the British Army, Royal Air Force and Royal Navy.134 It would not necessarily make the things that Scotland would want.
66. We have heard no evidence that would lead us to believe that negotiations on such complex matters could be even close to resolution in such a restricted time period. Experience in dispute resolution leads us to believe that when one party has a deadline and the other has not, then the closeness of the deadline undermines the position of the party to whom it is important. In this context, of course an agreement could always be reached in time, but this would be likely to involve substantial concessions by those to whom the deadline is essential.
67. Like all UK taxpayers, people in Scotland have contributed over the years to the development of the current defence assets of the UK; the Scottish share of these assets has been estimated at between £7 billion and £8 billion. However, the division of defence assets would not be straightforward and would be subject to difficult and complex negotiations. 68. The Scottish Government would need to take into account whether it could afford the ongoing operating costs for any equipment inherited, and whether it had the necessary skilled personnel to operate this equipment.
132 Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: from the Referendum to Independence and a Written Constitution, February 2013 133 Q 2188 134 Eighth Report of 2012-13, HC 957
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4 A possible Scottish defence force
69. There have been few models of what a Scottish defence force might look like, especially any which have been worked through in any detail. In the model drawn up by Stuart Crawford and Richard Marsh, they described a Scottish defence force as consisting of:
• 10,000-12,500 personnel in a two brigade army (75% regular and 25% reserves), some transport aircraft, but no tanks or heavy artillery,
• 1,500-2,000 personnel in a navy of about 20 to 25 ships, including patrol vessels,
• 1,750-2,250 personnel in an air force of around 60 aircraft, but no fast jets.
70. The force outlined by Mr Crawford had a total of between 13,250 and 16,750 personnel.135 This compares to the SNP’s proposed 15,000 regular personnel and 5,000 reserves.136 In both proposals, costs relating to personnel would account for a high proportion of the defence budget. Professor Chalmers said: [T]he SNP projection of service personnel numbers is about 16,000 full-time equivalents, and in 2020, which is when we are talking about, that will be about 11% of total UK personnel numbers, but they are talking about a defence budget that is more like 6% or 7% of likely UK defence spending, excluding operations, in 2020, so you have got a much higher proportion of personnel than you have of spending. You can make those two add up, but only by having a defence budget for Scotland that spends a much higher proportion of its budget on personnel and a much lower proportion on equipment.137
Francis Tusa agreed:
Manpower is just expensive. If you want large manpower armed forces, something will give, and the equipment will give, which means those armed forces will do less.138
As of July 2013, the UK Armed Forces had 11,100 regular personnel and 2,200 volunteer reserves based in Scotland.139
71. Crawford and Marsh estimated their model force would be possible on £1.8 billion a year, and that while it was “very much a basic model” it illustrated what was possible. 140 Importantly, the model is based on the assumption that Scotland inherited the equipment it wanted in the division of assets and it did not include any costs incurred if Scotland did not get what it wanted in the short term.141 We identified a broad consensus among our
135 Crawford and Marsh, A’ The Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012 136 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 137 Q 215 138 Q 162 139 HC 139-II, Ev 303. There are also 4,690 MoD civilians in Scotland. By 2015, the UK is forecast to have a full-time Army of 95,000, RAF of 33,000, and Na vy of 30,000—or 155,000 in total.139 140 Q 2375 141 Q 2389
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witnesses that the Crawford model provided a good starting point.142 Professor Sir Hew Strachan saw no reason “to dissent from Stuart Crawford's figures as a departure point,”143 but thought that questions would remain about the “things that are not there that a force might want”, for example: Would it need fast jets? If so, how would it get them? What sort of maritime capability would it want? Would it want frigates as opposed to simple maritime patrol capabilities?144
72. Furthermore, it assumed that all Scotland’s initial military needs are met in the division of assets with the UK, and then operates on a £1.8 billion annual budget. It does not make clear what would be the choices, and financial implications, if Scotland was unable to secure all it required in the division of assets.
A Scottish Navy
Frigates and Offshore Patrol Boats 73. We asked our witnesses what kind of equipment they would want if their priority was territorial defence, and in particular defence of Scottish waters.145 Stuart Crawford said his navy of six offshore patrol vessels, six mine countermeasure ships and around ten smaller boats, would be “a navy that would be capable of defending its maritime interests”.146 He said that Scotland would not need ships like the aircraft carriers currently being built in Scotland because “power projection on the scale that these ships could facilitate is unlikely to be a Scottish requirement, and the cost of their aircraft alone would be prohibitive.” At the present time, the aircraft carriers, like the Type 45 Destroyers built on the Clyde, are part of the UK defence inventory which can be called upon to defend Scotland as part of the UK. In addition to patrol ships, Mr Crawford proposed that the navy should have possibly two frigates, with anti-submarine or anti-aircraft capability, for “likely tasks of maritime diplomacy, control and escort of shipping, and providing a Scottish naval contribution to regional and international alliances”.147 The SNP Defence Policy Update noted: “A Scottish defence industrial strategy and procurement plan will fill UK capability gaps in Scotland, addressing the lack of new frigates”.148 Further clarification is needed in the White Paper to establish how many frigates the Scottish Government would wish to inherit and, consequently, how many it would wish to buy new, and when.
74. The main issues around surface vessels in a navy which concentrated on maritime patrol of territorial waters appeared to be whether Scotland would need anything more than patrol vessels, and whether would there be a role for larger ocean-going vessels with sophisticated equipment such as anti-submarine surveillance. Professor Smith explained
142 Q 158 143 Q 157 144 Q 157 145 Crawford & Marsh, A’ The Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012 146 Q 511 147 Crawford & Marsh, A’ The Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012 148 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012
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that many of the Royal Navy’s ships, such as its frigates, were expensive because they are built to withstand difficult conditions such as in the North Atlantic and because of the sophisticated equipment they carry. The Royal Navy is currently at the design stage for the new Type 26 Frigates, estimated to cost between £250 million and £350 million each, with an expected crew of around 120.149
75. Professor Smith suggested Scotland would have more use for big patrol boats, which would be a lot cheaper than frigates:
It would be a much simpler patrol boat—a corvette type of thing—which would be there primarily for fishery protection, protection of North sea oil and occasional issues to do with piracy and terrorism.150
The Royal Navy River Class Offshore Patrol Vessel has a crew of 30. 76. Scotland could hope to inherit one of the current Royal Navy Frigates, the Type 23s due to be replaced by the new Type 26, but Professor Chalmers said even a refurbished Type 23 Frigate would be too sophisticated for patrolling Scottish waters.151 Professor Chalmers said that the focus for a Scottish navy would not be frigates:
Scotland might well end up inheriting one frigate, but that would not be the centrepiece of its navy in terms of what it had to confront; it would have to have a significant number of other smaller vessels.152
77. The Scottish Government should identify, in the Independence White Paper, the preferred type and number of surface vessels which would be required, what their role would be, and how this compares to the assets currently provided by the Royal Navy. It should also clarify whether the Scottish navy would be limited to the protection of its territorial waters or have an ocean-going capacity. We are unconvinced that an ocean- going complex warship the size of a frigate would be the most effective way of meeting the priorities of a separate Scotland, particularly if resources were limited. However, if the Scottish Government decides that it wishes to order new Type 26 Frigates, or other vessels, to keep the Clyde shipyards busy, then they must spell out the patterns of orders, the cost, and in particular the date of commencement, to clarify how they will avoid any interruption in work flow and how this will impact upon the proposed defence budget.
Submarines 78. The debate on possible naval vessels has also included suggestions that Scotland might replace the nuclear fleet with conventional submarines—commonly diesel electric. Professor Smith gave some reasons why a country would use submarines:
149 Type 26 Global Combat Ship (GCS) Programme, naval-technology.com 150 Q 2270 151 Qq 2276-2278 152 Q 2268
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If you have a fleet, submarines are quite effective at protecting it, but we do not imagine the Scottish fleet going off doing that. If you want to deliver special forces into hostile areas, submarines are very effective at doing that, but, again, it is unlikely that the Scots would be doing that. As for patrolling particular areas in the Arctic without being seen, submarines can do that. Their advantage is stealth. I am just not clear why Scotland would require that. 153
Similarly, Dr Phillips O’Brien, Scottish Centre for War Studies, University of Glasgow, said: You don't need submarines at this point to protect the North sea assets; you need surface vessels, helicopters and air power.154
Professor Chalmers thought that if Scotland did acquire submarines it would be in order that it could contribute to an alliance or regional security.155
79. Stuart Crawford recognised the possible benefits of a submarine capability for “policing sea routes and defending against foreign naval aggression” and supported the idea of Scotland having submarines in an earlier 1997 report.156 In his 2012 report he decided against it, because Scotland would not want nor be able to afford the current nuclear ones, and there are no conventional submarines in the Royal Navy to inherit.157 Apart from the SNP Defence Policy Update, the only other advocate for submarines that we can find is the Scottish Global Forum report, Securing the Nation, which considered the usefulness of Scotland acquiring submarines and said: Given that the cost of a new submarine of the type we specify would be between £210 and £330 million each, the cost of one—or even two—of these boats is a financial commitment that is manageable when one considers the ‘start-up’ fund that Scottish military planners would have to draw from in light of a negotiated settlement agreement between Edinburgh and London.158
In our previous report, Separation Shuts Shipyards, we received evidence from Professor Trevor Taylor, Head of RUSI’s Defence, Industries and Society Programme, and Dr Henrik Heidenkamp, Research Fellow at RUSI, on the subject of Scotland acquiring its own submarines. They said:
Scotland would have to decide on the broad share of its defence budget that it wished to invest in new equipment. [...] the average for NATO countries on the Western littoral of Europe is 15.8% and the median figure was 16.4%, so an estimate of 16% might be thought reasonable. That would yield an annual equipment spend for
153 Q 2274 154 Q 1443 155 Q 2274 156 Jack Hawthorn, Some Thoughts on an Independent Scottish Defence Force, 1997 157 Q 272, Q 2443, Crawford and Marsh, A’ The Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012 page 8 158 Scottish Global Forum, Securing the Nation Defending an independent Scotland, pages 26-27
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Scotland of between £272 and £336 million, roughly speaking the cost of one submarine. 159
We concluded submarines are both very difficult and expensive to build.160 There appears to be an assumption that purchasing conventional submarines would be possible because of the cash negotiated in lieu from the UK after separation. Again, the Scottish Government’s White Paper must spell out how much it expects to have available to spend on new submarines, whether it plans to have these built in Scotland and to what timetable. 80. If the nuclear submarines are evicted from the Clyde then any replacement conventional submarines will be much smaller than the current nuclear submarines in the Royal Navy—an Astute Class submarine has a crew of 98, a Trafalgar Class submarine has a crew of 130, a Vanguard Class submarine has a crew of 135.161 The Norwegian ULA Class conventional submarines have a crew of 21.162 The nuclear submarines in Scotland make a difference to the number of support personnel required. There are 4,530 regular Royal Navy personnel based in Scotland. 163 For comparison, the entire Norwegian navy, with five frigates (built in Spain) and six conventional submarines (built in Germany), has 4,000 personnel.164 81. It is not clear whether the SNP defence industrial strategy and procurement plan for submarines, or frigates, is a cast iron commitment or a long-term aspiration. Nor is it clear how this would be scheduled to provide a steady work flow if, as anticipated, the UK Government remains wedded to retaining sovereign capability for complex warships and orders production of the Type 26 from BAE Systems from within the UK’s new boundaries. While recognising that the Scottish Government does not accept this perspective, nevertheless we believe there has to be a Plan B to take account of what most neutral observers believe is inevitable.
82. Acquiring submarines would mean putting a large portion of the defence budget into a very expensive asset which would not be the most cost-effective way to deal with the day to day needs of the Scottish navy. Most of the evidence we received indicated that if a separate Scotland assessed the risks it faces, and chose to acquire submarines, then these would be incredibly expensive if built in Scotland; therefore we believe it would be highly unlikely that they would ever be built here.
159 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland, Session 2012-13, HC 139-II, Ev 313 160 Eighth Report of Session 2012-13, Separation Shuts Shipyards, HC 892 161 www.royalnavy.mod.uk/ 162 HC 139-II, Ev 297 163 HC 139-II, Ev 303 164 HC 139-II, Ev 297. The Norwegian figure includes civilian and military personnel
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A Scottish Air Force
Maritime air 83. Until 2011, UK maritime patrol capacity was provided by the Nimrod MR2 fleet based at RAF Kinloss. The fleet was due to be replaced by the Nimrod MRA4, until the MRA4 was cancelled due to delays and cost overruns.165 The Royal Navy currently uses a mixture of sea and helicopter-based surveillance.166 Much of the evidence we heard suggested that if Scotland concentrated on territorial defence, then this would mean patrolling its coastline, waters and airspace. Stuart Crawford said maritime surveillance aircraft would be a “high priority”167 and the SNP defence motion included maritime patrol aircraft in the items to be addressed by a Scottish defence industrial strategy and procurement plan.168
84. However, it is unlikely the Nimrod would have suited the needs of a Scottish air force carrying out “coastguard-type operations”.169 For example, one of its roles was to be the protection of the Trident submarines.170 Both Stuart Crawford and Professor Chalmers thought Scotland could purchase something like the P-3 Orion.171 The Scotland Institute report, Defence and Security in An Independent Scotland, said:
The case for reinstatement of maritime surveillance capacity at Kinloss is not without merit. The question is whether IS [Independent Scotland] would be best placed to undertake that task. There are alternatives to the Nimrods which might be purchased, such as the Lockheed P-3 Orion or the more sophisticated Boeing P-8A Poseidon. These, however, do not come cheap ($45 million and $175 million apiece respectively).
The report continued:
Any commitment to develop a fleet would thus make a major and probably unsustainable dent in an independent Scotland’s modest defence budget.172
Dr Murrison also questioned whether Scotland would have the capability to address any threat identified by their surveillance aircraft:
There is simply no point in having this unless you are going to do something with what the aircraft is able to deliver to you—in other words, the intelligence and capability of dealing with any threat that the aircraft may reveal. 173
165 RAF ‘offer to scrap £3.5 billion Nimrods, Daily Telegraph 20 July 2010 166 George Grant, In Scotland’s defence? 2013, page 54 167 Crawford and Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012 168 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 169 George Grant, In Scotland’s Defence? 2013, page 54 170 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 17 November 2010, HC 600-i, Q 39 171 Q 637; Q 225. 172 The Scotland Institute, Defence and Security In An Independent Scotland, June 2013 173 Q Qq 3928-3929
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There appears to be an assumption that purchasing, not inheriting, maritime patrol aircraft would be possible because of the cash negotiated in lieu from the UK after separation. Again this would seem to be further evidence of a conspiracy of optimism.
85. The Scottish Government must identify in the Independence White Paper what Scotland’s maritime patrol aircraft would do, what level of technology the aircraft would require, whether their role would be limited to Scotland’s territorial waters, how many of their preferred type of maritime patrol aircraft would be required, and at what costs, both capital and revenue.
Air policing and fast jets 86. The UK monitors its airspace with a network of civilian and military radar stations, which feed centrally into RAF Boulmer, Northumberland. If any unidentified or unauthorised aircraft enter UK airspace then the RAF maintain a Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) fleet of Typhoons, held at 24 hour readiness and available to intercept the rogue aircraft.174 The UK QRA force has two bases: QRA South is RAF Coningsby in Lincolnshire and QRA North is RAF Leuchars in Fife. QRA North is due to move to RAF Lossiemouth in 2014. 87. The RAF exchanges information with NATO Combined Air Operations Centre at Finderup, Denmark,175 as part of the UKs contribution to collective policing of NATO Air Policing Area 1 (UK, Norwegian, Icelandic, Danish and international airspace).176 Between 2006 and 2011, the UK QRA force was scrambled on 87 occasions, either because Russian military aircraft approached NATO Air Policing Area 1, or because aircraft entered UK civil airspace that were causing concern to air traffic controllers.177 88. The SNP Defence motion said Scotland would carry out domestic air patrol duties and the fast jets it would use to do this would be made up “initially” of Scotland’s share of current assets.178 Keith Brown MSP told the Defence Committee that:
I think the Typhoons would be beyond the requirements of an independent Scotland. Obviously we have contributed substantially to their cost, but there may be more suitable ways for us to provide air cover.179 89. Stuart Crawford said Scotland would need to carry out air policing, but said the choice of aircraft was limited to what could be inherited from the UK assets: Typhoons, Tornadoes or Hawks. He said
I do not think an independent Scotland needs aircraft like the Typhoon, which is hugely sophisticated and much more expensive than the Hawk aircraft.180
174 Ev 308, HC 139-II 175 HC Deb 31 January 2012, col 574W 176 HC Deb 13 December 2010, Col 457W. The airspace covered by NATO Air Policing Area 1 is UK, Norwegian, Icelandic, Danish and international airspace 177 HC Deb 12 December 2011, col 473W 178 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update 179 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 318
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And that:
I do not see how a small country like Scotland with limited military aspirations—I have assumed that, in the absence of foreign policy—would require Typhoon jets unless it wanted to make a specific contribution to some wider alliance.181
90. The Crawford model chose Hawks. The debate as to whether Hawks can carry out air policing for Scotland is well rehearsed elsewhere.182 The argument in favour is that they are available, can be operated reasonably cheaply, and could be adapted to carry out the role of an attack aircraft. The arguments against include the fact that the Hawk is a training aircraft, without sophisticated radars or target-acquisition systems, has limited firepower and can only travel at subsonic speed.183 It is not as effective as either a Typhoon or a Tornado. 184 Keith Brown said he thought that “there could very well be a role” for Hawks but that they would not be able to do air intercepts—essentially what the QRA does. 185 91. Alternatively, several witnesses suggested Scotland might buy some second-hand F- 16s186—what Stuart Crawford called, the ‘smaller nations’ aircraft of choice.187 Others have suggested Scotland buy some Gripens from Sweden.188 Norway and Denmark both have F- 16s.189 However, Stuart Crawford said: We cannot just take the Danish model, as many commentators attempt to do, and say that because the Danish have four squadrons of F16 jets—or whatever it is—we should have that as well because we have the same population size. Their political stance on a whole host of issues is likely to be completely different. 190 Again, there appears to be an assumption that purchasing, not inheriting, jet aircraft would be possible because of the cash negotiated in lieu from the UK after separation. Evidence would be helpful as to the justification, scale and timing of any cash transfer.
Operating costs 92. Several witnesses pointed out that operating cost for sophisticated aircraft was a more important determining factor than the initial capital cost.191 Professor Smith explained:
It depends on what sort of avionics, radar and missiles have gone in. That is why very often they cover a whole range of variants, depending on the capability of it. Then
180 Q 621 181 Q 621 182 George Grant, 2013, In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy, pp 51-53 183 Qq 2479-2480 Supersonic is faster than the speed of sound or 768 miles per hour. Subsonic is not. 184 Qq 2481 - Q 2483, Q 2476 185 Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Qq 319-320 186 Qq 2185-2188 187 Qq 2465-2466 188 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 327. Scottish Global Forum, Securing the Nation, Defending an independent Scotland, 12 November 2013 189 The Military Balance, 2012 190 Q 663 191 Q 169. Crawford and Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012, page 11
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you need the training sites in order to get the whole thing through. The infrastructure is probably five times the purchase cost in order to keep the whole structure going. 192
93. The MoD calculated the cost of a Typhoon in 2010-11 was £70,000 per flying hour compared to the RAF Hawk T1 at £10,000 per flying hour. 193 The RAF maintains its aircraft to be ready to go at very short notice.194 On our visit to RAF Leuchars we were told that if a Typhoon had to stay in the air for prolonged periods, then they could receive air- to-air refuelling from tanker aircraft based at RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire.195 A separate Scotland could reduce its operating costs by having its jets at a lower state of readiness, but Professor Smith explained that, while this reduced the maintenance costs, the pilots got fewer hours in the air, less training and gained much less experience.196
94. Throughout our inquiry we have found the term ‘fast jet’ to be unhelpful. Speed is important, particularly the ability to fly faster than your enemy, but the term implies that speed is the only relevant factor. Richard Marsh, co-author with Stuart Crawford of the their proposed defence model for a separate Scotland, said:
Ideally, looking at the other document [SNP motion], we would like someone to sit down and explain exactly what is a fast jet, what has been assumed in terms of operating and capital cost and so on, and how that stacks up with the £2.5 billion.197
95. Other factors, such as the sophistication of the onboard radar, the target acquisition systems, the weaponry, the skills of the pilots and the availability of training are also relevant to their effectiveness. These factors add to the expense.
96. Whether a separate Scotland would be in possession of fast jets, and if so which, remains a crucial question which must be addressed in the forthcoming White Paper. The SNP has said it would have fast jets for domestic air policing duties. If so, it should make clear how this would be delivered, and also clarify whether the intention is to have a Scottish air force capable of carrying out its own air policing duties on the first day of independence.
Chinooks and Hercules 97. The Crawford model proposed Scotland would have around six Hercules aircraft and six Chinook helicopters.198 The SNP motion said that their inheritance from UK assets would include “transport aircraft and helicopters”. Similar to fast jets, assets like Chinooks
192 Q 2190. See also Q 2192 193 HL Deb 25 Nov 2010: Column WA368, and HC Deb 3 Mar 2011: Column 562W. The figures include servicing, fuel, crew costs, training costs, cost of capital charge, depreciation and amortisation. The Typhoon cost per flying hour reflecte d small numbers in service and was expected to reduce as the fleet increased in number. 194 Q 2184 195 Royal Air Force Brize Norton is the home of fixed-wing Strategic and Tactical Air Transport which, in addition, incorporates RAF's Air-to-Air Refuelling capability. www.raf.mod.uk/rafbrizenorton/equipment/index.cfm 196 Q 2188 197 Q 2478 198 Qq 652-660
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have high fixed costs,199 and Professor Chalmers said it was unlikely Scotland could afford fast jets as well as Chinooks.200 There was also a question as to the purpose of Scotland acquiring transport aircraft, especially expensive ones. Many countries do not have transport aircraft capable of carrying very large loads long distances.201 Professor Chalmers said:
It is a matter of degree and size. On this budget, Scotland could afford some transport aircraft, but the more difficult the place to get to, the further away it is and the more equipment they have to take and so on, the more they would have to rely on others.202
Neither Chinooks or Hercules are currently based in Scotland.203
98. The kind of air transport that Scotland would need would depend on what the Scottish Government would want its armed forces to do, and how far from Scotland it wished to travel. If the intention is to prioritise territorial defence, with reduced involvement in overseas deployment, then the need for transport aircraft diminishes. The Independence White Paper should set out the role of any transport aircraft, and whether the aircraft would be used to transport Scottish personnel and equipment within Scotland or whether the intention is to use their transport aircraft on an international basis, including in conflict situations.
Air force Personnel 99. The current Royal Air Force presence in Scotland provides the air policing role and to provide a home base for three squadrons of Tornadoes and one squadron of Typhoons. As a result there are over 3,400 regular Air Force personnel in Scotland.204 Sir Nick Harvey said that, following the closure of RAF Leuchars, RAF Lossiemouth would have three squadrons and about 1,500-2,000 personnel. This includes pilots and support staff. Stuart Crawford proposed an air force of between 1,750 and 2,250 personnel. This is based on two squadrons of Hawk jets and some transport planes and helicopters, totalling around sixty aircraft. This provides a ratio of about thirty staff per aircraft. Any reduction in the number of squadrons based in Scotland, the number of aircraft in each squadron and the state of readiness required for the aircraft would result in a reduction in the number of air force staff in Scotland. The Scottish Government should spell out clearly the number and types of aircraft and helicopters it hopes to inherit, those it consequently would intend to purchase and the implication for numbers of service personnel and civilian support staff.
199 Q 2194 200 Q 2193 201 The Hercules C-130 can carry 120 personnel and can travel as far as 3,500 miles www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/herculesc1c3.cfm 202 Q 2161 203 Malcolm Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, RUSI, April 2012 204 HC 139-II Ev 305
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A Scottish Army
A two brigade army 100. The SNP defence motion said it would have an army “organised into one regular and one reserve Multi Role Brigade (MRB)” and that “the Multi Role Brigade structure and interoperable air and sea assets will provide deployable capabilities for United Nations sanctioned missions.”205 There is no detail as to how many of the 15,000 regular and 5,000 reserve personnel proposed in the SNP defence motion would be in the army.206 The Crawford model had a similar total number of personnel and a two brigade army of between 10,000 and 12,500,207 with one brigade of reserves with a territorial focus, and one made up of full-time personnel with the ability to deploy overseas but not necessarily to deploy independently.208
101. The ability, and willingness, of a Scottish army to send units of its army abroad would be important if Scotland wanted to join NATO.209 Denmark is in NATO. It does not have much expeditionary capability,210 but elements of its army served in Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan.211 Ireland is not in NATO. Ireland contributed seven personnel to ISAF Afghanistan. Francis Tusa described the Irish army as “not even a gendarmerie [...] a pretty ineffective force that has to rely on everyone else for anything.”212 It has contributed to UN peace keeping in small numbers, and presently, has over 450 peace keeping troops in southern Lebanon (UNIFIL).213
102. Keith Brown MSP told the Defence Committee that the Scottish Government had thought the Multi Role Brigade of about 6,000 full-time soldiers and one reserve brigade would suit its purposes, but appeared to roll back from this position.214 It is unclear what this would mean for the pledge to have a two brigade army or a size of full-time personnel in a Scottish army.
103. However, the SNP defence motion also said: “Regular ground forces will include current Scottish raised and restored UK regiments.”215 There is no further information on what “current Scottish raised and restored UK regiments” means, but in evidence to the Defence Committee, Keith Brown MSP referred to: “our commitment to reinstate Scottish
205 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update 206 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Qq 278-279 207 Crawford and Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October page 27 208 Q 454 See also Crawford and Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012 209 Q 191 210 Q 2157 211 It’s time we knew the cost of the SNP’s defence policy, Daily Telegraph, 21 January 2013 212 Q 158 213 www.military.ie/overseas/current-missions/unifil/ 214 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 285 215 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy
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regiments previously abolished.”216 This clearly would have an impact on the number of full-time personnel in a Scottish army.
Scottish raised and restored UK regiments 104. We tried to establish what the idea of “current Scottish raised and restored UK regiments” meant for the number of personnel in a Scottish army, what capabilities it would have, and how this matched with the priorities for a separate Scotland outlined earlier. Sir Nick Harvey MP said that nine of the 141 Regular Regiments/Battalions in the British Army draw their historical origin from Scotland. These are the five infantry battalions, formed into the Royal Regiment of Scotland in 2006: The Royal Scots Borderers, The Royal Highland Fusiliers, The Black Watch, The Highlanders, and The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The other four were the 1st Battalion Scots Guards, The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards, 19th Regiment Royal Artillery and 40th Regiment Royal Artillery.217
105. It is not clear if the pledge to restore previously abolished regiments goes back further than the creation of the Royal Regiment of Scotland in 2006. The Royal Scots Borderers had been created by the amalgamation of the Royal Scots and the King’s Own Scottish Borderers earlier in 2006. If the intention is to go back further, then going back to before 1994 would allow the Gordon Highlanders and the Queen’s Own Highlanders to be restored. Going back to 1968 would allow the Cameronians to be restored.218 The problem would be that this would create more infantry.
106. The desire to form an army out of the traditional Scottish regiments is also complicated by what seems to be an arbitrary definition of what a Scottish regiment could be. This is exemplified by the example of the Scots Guards. Stuart Crawford’s proposed army, which followed a similar pattern of using the regiments and battalions in Scotland which recruit in Scotland, did not include the Scots Guards. Stuart Crawford said this was because “their long-standing integration as part of the Brigade of Guards raises questions about whether they might ever form part of the Scottish Army.”219 Dr Mileham agreed that the Scots Guards would consider themselves a Guards regiment first. He also pointed out he thought it unlikely the Scottish Government would want to “disturb those sorts of constitutional arrangements that include household troops.”220 In contrast, the First Minister for Scotland has said he wanted a Scottish army to include the Scots Guards.221
107. In a speech on 14 March 2013, Philip Hammond MP, the Secretary of State for Defence, said that the five battalions of the Royal Regiment of Scotland, plus the Scots
216 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 332 217 HC Deb 27 March 2012 c1051W. The 40th Regiment Royal Artillery (Lowland Gunners) has since disbanded and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders have been downsized to Company strength. 218 Q 3737, Q 3744. Iain Gordon, Bloodline, The Origin and Development of the Regular Formations of the British Army 219 Crawford and Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012 220 Qq 3763-3767 221 Independent Scottish defence force plans spark political row, Guardian, 20 January 2012; Former Army officers ridicule SNP plans to transfer famous regiments into ‘Alex Salmond’s home guard’, Daily Telegraph, 22 January 2012; Briefing: Separation anxiety, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 June 2012 222 Philip Hammond MP, speech in Edinburgh 14 March 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2013-03-14-stronger-and-safer-together
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Guards, the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards, and the King’s Own Borderers would add up to 4,650 posts. That would mean almost a third of a Scottish army made up of infantry and one Cavalry regiment. In general, a brigade consists of a headquarters, several combat battalions and supporting troops. The nature of the combat battalions and supporting troops varies according to whatever task the deployment has been given. Mr Hammond pointed out that the British Army had a ratio of 1:2 for frontline troops to support personnel and, if the Scottish army operated with a similar proportion, then that would require nearly 9,000 support personnel:
So if these fighting units are going to be supported by artillery, supplied by logisticians, kept on the move by engineers, and able to talk to each other thanks to signallers, then that’s 14,000 of the entire defence force of 15,000 used up just on ground forces.222 Unfortunately, only one unit of the raised and restored UK regiments could be described as ‘support’ arms, i.e. the 19th Regiment Royal Artillery. To compare, a brigade in the British Army, the 4th Mechanised Brigade recently deployed to Afghanistan, included five battalions of infantry (one of which was 1 Scots, formerly the Royal Scots Borderers), two Cavalry Battalions, and also units of Artillery, Signals, Logistics and Military Policemen.223
108. Dr Patrick Mileham told us that, if there was an upper limit of 15,000, and this had to include the air force and navy, which he estimated to be about 2,000 to 3,000 each, that would mean an army of about 9,000.224 He said the combat to support troops ratio within that would be about one third to two thirds,225 or 3,000 combat and 6,000 support.226 The army proposed by the SNP does not appear to allow sufficient room for the range of support units such as Signals or Logistics.227
109. Dr Mileham said the ratio between combat and support personnel could be altered by relying on other nations in an alliance to fill the gaps of what Scotland did not have.228 This would require Scotland to be part of an alliance, such as NATO, with other members which had the units Scotland lacked.229
222 Philip Hammond MP, speech in Edinburgh 14 March 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2013-03-14- stronger-and-safer-together 223 The full list of 4th Mech Bde: The Queen’s Royal Lancers and The Royal Dragon Guards; 1st Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland, 1st Battalion Royal Scots Guards, 1st Battalion The Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment, 1st Battalion The Mercian Regiment (Cheshire), 1st Battalion The Royal Gurkha Rifles; 204 Signal Squadron, 4th Regiment Royal Artillery, 12 Logistic Support Regiment and 150 Provost Company RMP. www.army.mod.uk . The Scotland Analysis Defence paper includes a similar example of the variety of units deployed to Afghanistan in October 2013, Cm 8174 Annex A 224 Q 3747 225 Qq 3756-3757 226 Q 3758 227 Qq 2222- 2230 228 Q 3757 229 Q 3762
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How would this meet the needs of Scotland? 110. Professor Tim Edmunds, Professor of International Security, University of Bristol, commenting on the SNP proposal, said:
The proposed size of the SDF [Scottish Defence Force] would represent a significant constraint on their capacity for independent deployment in multinational missions and the nature of tasks they could undertake therein. Given the need to rotate troops in and out of theatre, as well as to provide for territorial defence, training, logistics and other support functions at home, and across land, sea and air environments would likely be very modest.
He said a small, well funded SDF could offer contributions to multinational operations, but “as with many other smaller states, in most cases these would need to be integrated within contingents from larger contributors.”230
111. We asked our witnesses their views on the value in emphasising the Scottish Regiments. Francis Tusa said:
They would also be very expensive armed forces in terms of just paying people. If an independent Scotland wanted seven named infantry battalions, plus named artillery regiments and armoured regiments, fine. They will just be very manpower-intensive and expensive armed forces, which will not necessarily be able to do much. 231
And if Scotland did not send its army overseas, Francis Tusa said: I think taxpayers in an independent Scotland after five years would be saying, “Why have we got all these barracks and units when they don't seem to go anywhere?”232
Professor Chalmers said that the SNP defence motion pointed toward: “a much more army-focused force structure” which reflected “the stronger political imperative of the Scottish regiments as compared with maintaining naval or air capability.”233
112. The intention to create a regular army based on the historical Scottish regiments does not appear to be based on any strategic assessment. The emphasis on infantry means the budget leans towards proportionately high personnel costs and therefore less resource being available to purchase and maintain equipment.
113. The issue remains, if a separate Scottish State is a Member of NATO and wishes to retain the capability to take part in overseas wars, then it might be expected to retain full time, well trained infantry regiments. If it is not in NATO or adopts the Irish model of only taking part in peace keeping exercises, then the justification for a large standing army is diminished.
230 The Scotland Institute, Defence and Security in an Independent Scotland, June 2013, pages 31-32 231 Q 159 232 Q 191 233 Q 2158
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114. It is essential that the Scottish Government’s White Paper clarifies exactly what is meant by “current Scottish raised and restored UK regiments” and tells us which units will exist in a separate Scottish army, the size of these units, which will be reserves, the level of supporting units that will be provided and the overall cost of this provision.
Reserves 115. The British Army currently has a 75% regular to 25% reserve split. The SNP motion also has a ratio of 75% regular to 25% reserves, but this is for all three services and there is no detail on the split for the army.234 Reserves are cheaper than regular soldiers, a reserve is around 20 per cent of the cost of a full-time regular soldier.235 Other countries have a higher proportion of reserves, for example Norway has 25,000 regulars and 50,000 reserves.236
116. Professor Strachan said if Scotland was going to focus on territorial defence, then “it implies a big switch away from regulars to reservists [...] that implies a commitment to defend Scotland and not much more.”237 Stuart Crawford said that, while his model provided for the five infantry units of the Royal Regiment of Scotland, he conceded that some of those units in his model, which are currently regular battalions, might become territorial battalions.238 Keith Brown MSP told the Defence Committee that the Scottish Government was considering reducing the number of personnel in each regiment or battalion.239
117. We are unconvinced that the emphasis on restoring Scottish regiments would address the fundamental needs of a Scottish army. It is not clear if the motivation to retain those units of the British Army associated with Scotland is simply to keep up numbers and maintain bases, or based on a more strategic assessment of what a separate Scottish State would either need or could afford. It is not clear how, or based on what criteria, a separate Scotland would define “Scottish raised and restored UK regiments” and how many of the disbanded or merged regiments would be restored.
118. The debate around the future of the Scottish regiments is highly emotive. It is unsettling and unfair to create uncertainty among those who serve now, or have done in the past, in those parts of the British Army with a Scottish association
Choice and recruitment 119. There was a general consensus in our evidence that no one in the British armed forces could be compelled to join a Scottish military. Sir Nick Harvey MP said:
234 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 235 Crawford and Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012, page 27 236 Q 158 Norway has conscription Q 525 237 Q 213. See also Q 192 238 Q 536 239 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 332
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Soldiers, sailors and airmen cannot simply be co-opted. They cannot suddenly be declared to be part of another country's Armed Forces. They would have to be given a choice240
The mechanism for how this would take place would need to be established. The decision as to who would be eligible to choose would be highly important to many people, not just in the traditional Scottish regiments, but all those currently based in Scotland, and Scots serving throughout the British Armed Forces in a myriad of roles. In considering what factors might influence this choice, Stuart Crawford said: The pattern tends to be that when you are young and single, and full of vim and vigour, you want an adventure.241
He continued: There is always a danger that, when you have a domestically-based armed force without any expeditionary function, it tends to become populated by people who, through personal circumstances, wish to be more geographically settled.242
120. Professor Strachan said part of the appeal was that servicemen knew where they were in their current role in the British forces:
I think the much bigger question arises if you are somebody in mid-career—let's say, a colonel, senior warrant officer, sergeant or NCO in the Army. You have a fair degree of pension entitlement, reasonable career prospects, and you have done the hard graft of your military service. Which way would you go?243
And that size provided for a greater number of opportunities:
If you are serving and you are an ambitious soldier, you want the career opportunities that a large regiment creates. If you are in a single battalion, the opportunities narrow right down. [...] What concerns me in terms of the move to an independent Scotland is that not only would Scotland struggle to sustain a reasonable number of infantry battalions but many Scots, if they possibly could, would vote with their feet and go to the Army that will give them the career options and openings.244
121. This would apply to Scots serving throughout the three services. Stuart Crawford accepted that a smaller Scottish navy would not necessarily provide the range of roles and specialist careers of the Royal Navy, and said:
240 Q 434 241 Q 530 242 Q 532 243 Q 181 244 Q 160
42 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?
there is no guarantee that Scots serving with the RN [Royal Navy] would transfer to the SN [Scottish Navy] en masse come independence so recruitment—as well as the correct mix of crew skills matched to ships—might well be an issue.245
122. Not only would this choice have to be made by those currently serving, but the question “What are my career choices?” would apply to all future recruits. The British Army still attracts recruits from the Republic of Ireland and commonwealth countries. 246 Professor Strachan said:
You see it already with the Irish who serve in the British Army rather than the Irish Army, and it happened before 1707. That was exactly what the Scots did. They did not serve in the Scots Army; they served in the English establishment because that was where the opportunities were.247
Professor Strachan continued:
If you are a young man or woman in Scotland 20 years after independence and you decide to join the armed forces, it may well be that at that point you take a totally open decision. You say, “I'm a Scot and therefore I serve in the Scottish defence force”, except that, if there is a hangover and Scots continue to pursue careers in the armed forces of the rest of the UK immediately after independence, I suspect that trend may continue, if it is legally possible to do so.248 It is not clear if the Scottish army would allow only Scottish citizens to undertake military service, or if choosing to serve in Scottish forces entitled the person to citizenship.249 There would be a pull of a regiment associated with a certain recruiting area, and the link between generations of families and certain regiments. However, Dr Mileham thought the link with the past would not be straightforward. He saw the process involving the disbandment of regiments from the British Army, and a Scottish army having to restore the regiment. If the new constitutional settlement happened, I think the Scots nationalists would probably want to re-raise in a new Scots Army a regiment that had been existence in the British Army and had been reduced to a battalion—(Royal Scots Borderers) or whatever it is. There would suddenly be a resurgence of the old name, but it would be a very different sort of regiment.250
123. In evidence to the Defence Committee, Keith Brown said he did not see the scale of the British Army as a factor in offering opportunities to service personnel, and he felt it would be possible to offer comparatively better terms and conditions in the Scottish defence forces. He also said a Scottish army would offer a job for life and take better care of its veterans.251 Similarly, Stuart Crawford suggested that the wages and terms of
245 Crawford and Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012 246 Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8174 247 Q 160 248 Q 181 249 Q 186 250 Q 3753 251 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Qq287-289
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employment in a Scottish army could be better than the British Army, although this would add to the cost of an already manpower expensive military.
124. Stuart Crawford noted a level of uncertainty about the number of military personnel who might choose to transfer to a Scottish defence force.252 George Grant interviewed servicemen and found a clear desire for more information. This dilemma would have to be managed during the transitional period, but it is very difficult to know how long it would take for a Scottish military to be established and have an established career path to offer.253
125. This would have to be seen in the context of current recruiting patterns. The Ministry of Defence does not maintain statistics according to whether individuals in the British Army, or the Navy or Air Force, consider themselves Scottish. They do, however, record statistics for each recruitment office. From 2007 to 2012, the percentage of total recruits to the British Army through Scottish recruitment offices has varied between 6% and 11%, to the Royal Navy between 6% and 8%, and to the Royal Air Force between 6% and 9%. 254 The population of Scotland is 8.5% of the UK.
126. Professor Strachan said that there have been problems recruiting to fill the Scottish regiments since 1881.255 The Royal Regiment of Scotland maintains one regular battalion more than it can fill with Scots,256 and at the moment they are kept up to strength by Fijians.257 A Scottish army, based on the information given, would appear to be dominated by infantry regiments at risk of being reduced in size, converted into another role, or possibly made into reserves. In contrast, the bulk of what a Scottish army would look like, engineers, logistics, signallers etc., is not given much attention. For example, Dr Mileham pointed out that Scotland would have to build up a group of officers for its new forces, and that:
If Scotland had to start all over again, it would be very difficult for it to build up quickly an officer corps that would be as good as the others, unless a large number came across, which is probably unlikely.258
127. The British Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force are designed to operate across the globe. At present, it is unclear whether the Scottish defence force would be expected to operate beyond its own territory and territorial waters. The Independence White Paper should set out the range of career choices and opportunities that it expects its armed forces to offer, together with any variations in terms of conditions of employment which could be offered, and the anticipated timetable for having armed forces independent of the UK. It should set out the areas where it would anticipate a
252 Qq 527-529 253 Q 181 254 Ministry of Defence, FOI Reference 13-02-2012-121523-005, 23 February 2012. Figures for regular service recruits. Royal Air Force figures are by calendar year. Army and Navy by financial year. 2011-12 Royal Navy figures up to 31 Jan. Army Figures up to 20 Feb. Air Force up to 17 Feb 255 Q 160 256 Q 525. HC Deb 14 June 2012, col 576W 257 Q 160 258 Q 3769
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drawn out transition period or long term interdependence with the UK in the event of recruitment not reaching the required levels.
128. Without more information we find it difficult to understand the nature of the offer that would persuade individuals to transfer from the British Army to any future Scottish army. Furthermore, this would apply not only to the wider British Army, but also throughout the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy.
129. If the UK Government did agree to the transfer of units to a separate Scotland, then it should not be assumed that all those serving in that unit would transfer with it. We call upon the UK Government to reiterate its position that no one would be forced to transfer to join a possible separate Scottish defence force. We call upon the Scottish Government, in their White Paper, to publicly accept the right of all serving UK Armed Forces personnel to choose whether to transfer from the UK Armed Forces to a possible Scottish defence force.
Basing 130. The Ministry of Defence has a considerable footprint in Scotland.259 The location of its major bases and facilities are due to the strategic needs of the UK as a whole. They also make an important social and economic contribution to the local economy. If Scotland left the UK, and we assume that a future Scottish military would want to use most of these facilities, then as physical assets they would probably be attributed to Scotland in the negotiations. A separate Scotland, when it considered its strategic needs and its available budget, would need to address the question of where it based its people and equipment. Such decisions would have considerable impact across all three services. The future of HMNB Clyde, known as Faslane, is a case in point.
Faslane and Rosyth 131. At present, Scotland has one major naval base: HMNB Clyde, commonly known as Faslane, although it also includes RNAD Coulport. It is one of only three major naval bases in the UK—alongside Devonport and Portsmouth. It is designed as a submarine base and is set to be the home base for all the Royal Navy submarines by 2017. We discussed the future of the nuclear fleet in our earlier report, Terminating Trident—Days or Decades?260 If the submarines are forced to leave, then it will have implications for thousands of navy and civilian workers currently employed at Faslane, and the wider community which benefits from the naval base. Personnel numbers at Faslane are currently forecast to be around 8,200 by 2022, if Scotland remains in the UK.261
132. Most of the evidence we received considered whether Scotland would need one or two navy bases; and if it had only one, whether it would be Faslane.262 Mr Crawford’s model
259 Scotland Analysis : Defence, Cm 8174 260 Fourth Report of 2012-13, HC 676 261 Ev 311-312, HC 139-II 262 For example, see Q 1420
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includes two bases, Faslane and Rosyth,263 to avoid having all its naval “eggs in one basket.”264 Rosyth, on the east coast, would be well placed to protect shipping lanes, fisheries, and the oil and gas fields in the North Sea, whereas Faslane, with vessels having to exit round the Mull of Kintyre, is arguably in the worst possible location for these roles. Rosyth also has facilities for ship maintenance and would be close to the seat of power in Edinburgh.
133. Dr Phillips O’Brien, University of Glasgow, suggested Scotland might follow Denmark, which has two naval bases with slightly different responsibilities. One focuses on domestic security and patrols,265 which in Scotland could be Rosyth, Inverness or Aberdeen on the east coast. The second Danish base is for international forces, which might be deployed as a contribution to NATO—which could be Faslane.266 However, the Danish navy has a considerable navy of about 70 vessels, including seven frigates, and yet each base still only has 500-600 personnel each.267 The SNP has not made clear how many ships they anticipate being in their navy, but the Stuart Crawford navy has only 20-25 vessels. 268 The numbers at Faslane could be increased by accommodating army personnel, but Dr O’Brien said that it would “probably be 2,000 to 3,000, not 6,500” if it was part of a two base navy.269
134. Francis Tusa did not think it was likely that Scotland would have two naval bases, if it was “about three frigates and four fishery patrol vessels”. He said most comparable countries, such as New Zealand, only had one naval base.270 Norway has a single base at Haakonsvern, near Bergen. It is well-placed strategically, provides a single home for the whole Norwegian fleet—including five frigates and six submarines271—and is supplemented by the Norwegian naval command and naval officer training school. Even then, it only has a personnel component of approximately 4,000.272
135. The SNP Defence Policy Update allocated Faslane as the Joint Forces Headquarters and also Scotland’s “main conventional naval facility”. (It did not mention Rosyth.) However, if Scotland followed the example of Norway, and only had a single base, it would be more sensible for it to be near the oil and gas installations facing the east coast. Professor Smith said “basing it all at Faslane would not seem sensible”.273
136. When asked what the proportion of the proposed 15,000 military personnel could be at Faslane, compared to now, Professor Chalmers said:
263 Rosyth was a Royal Navy base until 1996 264 Q 2448 265 Q 1428 266 Q 1429 267 Ev 298, HC 139-II 268 Q 558. A’ The Blue Bonnets, RUSI, 2012. Also Defence Management, 17 October 2012 269 Q 1430 270 Q 283 271 Ev 297, HC 139-II . See also http://mil.no/organisation/equipmentfacts/sea/Pages/default.aspx 272 Qq 1426-1430. And Ev 298, HC 139-II 273 Q 2284
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I cannot imagine that 5,000 of those 15,000 would all be based at Faslane, so the service number would come down significantly. In terms of the navy specifically, we are talking about a much smaller navy, probably of the order of a couple of thousand. If all of those 2,000 were based at Faslane and we had some headquarters people on top, you might have 3,000, but you certainly would not have the numbers you have now.274
The Scottish army could introduce army units into Faslane, but this would have implications for the SNP pledge that: “All current bases will be retained to accommodate units”.275 As Dr O’Brien said:
If you are going to have two bases—one east and one west—and 6,500 to mirror what Faslane has now, in a sense you have nothing anywhere else.276
George Grant pointed out that not only would the number of jobs at Faslane probably change, but also the type of job would change:
They have said that they would have their armed forces HQ there, but let’s be quite clear about this: the sorts of people you need for your armed forces HQ will not be the same sorts of people you need for the maintenance of a fleet.277
137. Faslane was designed and built as the base for the Royal Navy submarines. If the submarines are evicted, then it creates doubt as to the reasons for keeping Faslane open. We have not seen any evidence that suggested a separate Scotland would have a navy that required facilities on anything like the scale of that currently provided at Faslane.
138. A separate Scottish State would have a choice, between either having two navy bases and accepting this would have a large reduction upon the personnel numbers at Faslane, or having one navy base, in what is not the ideal strategic location, but still having a considerable reduction in personnel numbers at Faslane.
Headquarters 139. The Ministry of Defence is based in Whitehall providing the political headquarters for the armed forces, close to the seat of power and decision makers. There are other functions which are managed elsewhere, such as human resources and payroll.278 Furthermore, each service has its own headquarters and other locations have particular responsibilities. 279 Stuart Crawford said it would be “very desirable” for the headquarters to be close to the seat of political power in Edinburgh, particularly when short-order decisions are taken in matters of national significance.280 The SNP proposed their Joint Forces Headquarters to be at Faslane. Faslane is a naval base designed for submarines. Faslane does not have an
274 Q 2283 275 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 276 Q 1426 277 Q 3546 278 For example, the British Army service records at Kentigern House in Glasgow 279 The Royal Navy headquarters is at Whale Island, Portsmouth; the British Army headquarters is at Andover; and the Royal Air Force headquarters is at RAF High Wycombe. 280 Q 2396, Qq 2398-2399
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airstrip and the geography does not allow for one,281 which would make it awkward for the air force. It would have command and control equipment.282
140. A separate Scottish military would have to recreate a headquarters and institutional structure which replicates that currently provided by the Ministry of Defence and its agencies. The priority, if there would be a single Joint Forces Headquarters, would be for it to be near the seat of power in Edinburgh. If there was to be only one headquarters, then Faslane would be geographically unsuitable.
141. If Faslane was chosen as a Joint Forces Headquarters, then it would be a short term measure based on a need to have a functioning military headquarters as soon as possible and to delay the inevitable loss of personnel and jobs as a result of the Royal Navy submarine fleet leaving.
Army basing 142. The British Army has several bases in Scotland. 283 When the SDSR 2010 and the Basing Review 2013 have been fully implemented, the British Army presence in Scotland by 2020 is anticipated to be near 4,000 soldiers accommodated at six sites. Any further increase in numbers would require investment and alterations to other property. Stuart Crawford recognised that the existing accommodation would not be sufficient for the forces he proposed, and further locations would need to identified and modernised, with the necessary investment.284 It is difficult to understand the need for army accommodation without more information on the number of full-time personnel in the Scottish army. 143. There are unanswered questions around the balance of regular and reserve forces in a separate Scottish army. This would have an implication for the number of barracks which needed to be provided for full time army personnel in a separate Scotland. The Scottish Government should make clear which bases it would anticipate using to accommodate the raised and restored Scottish regiments.
144. If army units were introduced to a Joint Forces Headquarters at Faslane then this would reduce the proportion of Scottish army personnel accommodated at the current army bases in Dreghorn Barracks, Glencorse Barracks, Fort George, and Redford Barracks.
Air force basing 145. The RAF in Scotland had two bases; RAF Lossiemouth, home to three squadrons of Tornado fast jet aircraft, a search and rescue helicopter unit, and an RAF Regiment field squadron; and RAF Leuchars, currently home to one squadron of Typhoon fast jet aircraft, an RAF Regiment field squadron and a military mountain rescue team. The Scotland
281 Ev 298, Q 1418 282 Q 2394, Q 2398 283 Dreghorn Barracks, Edinburgh, Glencorse Barracks, Penicuik, Fort George, Inverness, and Redford Barracks, Edinburgh, each currently housing a battalion. There are other buildings in Scotland for administrative and ceremonial purposes. 284 RUSI, Crawford and Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012, October 2012
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Analysis: Defence paper said “Fast jets are expensive, both in terms of equipment, maintenance and infrastructure costs and the numbers of personnel required to support them.”285 The total cost for running RAF Leuchars in 2010-11 was £62 million a year.286 The Ministry of Defence is investing £85 million to develop RAF Lossiemouth in anticipation of the QRA force being moved there from RAF Leuchars in 2014.287 After the RAF leave, Leuchars is being converted into an army base in anticipation of the return of the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards from Germany in 2015.288
146. The SNP defence motion said their air force would operate from two bases: Lossiemouth and Leuchars.289 However, Keith Brown MSP told the Defence Committee: “As things stand, we believe that the one air base would be sufficient for Scotland’s needs.”290 He implied Scotland would be limited to the number of air bases which it inherited.291 Keith Brown said that bringing an air base or army base back into use “presents different logistical challenges.”292
Joint defence and joint basing 147. The SNP Security and Defence Policy Update suggested that there could be “shared conventional basing, training and logistics arrangements”, and that included “sharing conventional military capabilities, setting priorities and better coordinating efforts providing economic synergies, job stability and taxpayer value for money.”293 It may be that the UK and a separate Scotland could co-operate.294 Sir Nick Harvey said the extent to which the two militaries could possibly work together would depend on Scotland’s ambition:
At the moment the UK forces have global interests and ambitions. We are geared up for expeditionary warfare. I have no idea whether a future Scottish force would have that sort of ambition or a far more limited ambition. Therefore, the scope for working with them is hard to determine.295
148. Shared defence was even less likely. As we raised earlier, there is a link between foreign policy and defence policy and, as Alastair Carmichael MP said “if you are to buy in to somebody else’s defence policy, then inevitably you buy in at the same time to the foreign policy.” Professor Chalmers pointed out that while many States rely on each other for protection, “not a single one of the 193 members of the UN shares its armed forces with
285 Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8174, para 1.65 286 HC Deb 7 Jan 2013, Col 43W 287 Scotland Analysis Defence, Cm 8174, para 1.88 288 www.army.mod.uk 289 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 290 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013 Q 323 291 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013 Q 324 292 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013 Q 325 293 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update 294 Dr Colin Fleming, A Scottish Defence Model, 11 February 2013 www.referendum.ed.ac.uk/ 295 Q 353
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another”. 296 Sir Nick Harvey, former Minister of State for the Armed Forces, said that there was no example of joint defences among sovereign UN member states to be found anywhere in the world. 297 On the idea of joint basing, Sir Nick Harvey said:
The difficulty of having joint bases, if you have two different Governments pursuing two different foreign policies and two different defence policies, is what would happen in the event that there was a divergence of view, for example, about deploying aircraft or naval assets in this joint base. Would the Government that did not wish to get involved start trying to frustrate the preparations of the one that did wish to? This is intrinsically a very difficult proposition.298
149. However, Scotland could allow the air force of another country to operate out of a sovereign base in Scotland. Sir Nick Harvey agreed that:
If a future Scottish Government were to make an assessment that they felt that Scotland faced a similar aerial threat from the north that the residual UK believed it did and were to negotiate with the residual UK that it provided air cover for Scotland, and as part of that arrangement some decision was made to base part of that capability somewhere in Scotland, with the UK operating it in a sovereign sense but providing some cover to Scotland, I could imagine an arrangement of that sort being negotiated,299
George Grant said that in such a scenario, Scotland would be “ceding control of their airspace to a foreign country.” And that: The UK would not automatically [be] on call to do all the things that a Scottish Government would want their air force to do. That air force would be reacting to threats to the UK’s security and operating in its interests, not at the beck and call of a foreign Government.300 150. It was suggested that this could be done under the auspices of NATO. Stuart Crawford said: If I was advising the Government of an independent Scotland, of whatever political hue, I would probably be suggesting that at least they make the offer of establishing a NATO air base in Lossiemouth in Scotland, which would seem to make a lot of sense from both a defence and economic point of view.301 The First Minister has said he would allow a NATO base on Scottish soil.302 However, similar to the issues around a UK sovereign base, it is not clear whether Scotland could stop NATO using it in operations that the Scottish Government did not support.303 Similarly,
296 Malcolm Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, RUSI, April 2012 297 Q 365 298 Q 372 299 Q 372 300 Qq 3543-3544 301 Q 2467 302 Scotland as a Good Global Citizen, Address to the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 9 April 2013 303 SNP split over post independence US base plan, The Scotsman, 12 April 2013
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there are serious doubts as to whether a Scottish Government could stipulate what types of weapons were located at or transited through such a base.
151. While it is clear that an independent country would have responsibility in areas such as where to base its own air force, it is not clear if the people of Scotland are being given enough information so they can assess whether they would feel safe in a separate Scotland. It is difficult to draw sensible conclusions on air force basing in a separate Scotland without more information on the foreign policy of a separate Scotland, if it would operate its own air policing, and if Scotland would be in NATO. The Scottish Government must provide answers to these questions as a matter of urgency.
Special Forces and Royal Marines 152. Scotland would need some sort of elite troops to be able to react to acts of terrorism, such as an attack upon the oil and gas infrastructure.304 Stuart Crawford used broad numbers, originally proposed by Clive Fairweather, former officer in the Kings Own Borderers and the SAS, for Scotland to recruit, train and maintain one squadron of at least 75 special forces personnel.305 The SNP motion noted that a separate Scotland would want “Special Forces and Royal Marines” with “responsibility for offshore protection”.306
153. There are over 1,000 Royal Marines currently based in Scotland: 43 Commando Fleet Protection Group at Faslane307 and 45 Commando at RM Condor, Arbroath.308 The SAS and SBS are based in Hereford and Devon, both in England. The Government of a separate Scotland could not compel anyone already serving in the current SAS, SBS or Royal Marines to join a Scottish defence force, no matter where they were based.
154. If Scotland focussed on territorial defence, then the opportunities and challenges for someone serving in the potential Scottish special forces would be different to that offered by the UK. Special Forces need large pools of regular troops to recruit sufficiently qualified people.309 Stuart Crawford accepted that recruitment would be “challenging” and that he anticipated it would take “three years or possibly more” after independence to establish special forces.310
155. The Scottish Government should outline, in the White Paper, its position on the Royal Marines currently stationed in Scotland, and acknowledge the very strong likelihood that if Scotland left the UK then the Royal Marines would leave Scotland. The base at RM Condor, Arbroath would be vacated.
304 Q 2265 305 Crawford and Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012 306 SNP Defence Policy Update, October 2012 307 www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/The-Royal-Marines/3-Commando-Brigade/43-Cdo-Fleet-Protection-Group 308 HC 139-II, Ev 303. See www.royalnavy.mod.uk/ 309 Q 2263 310 Crawford and Marsh, A’ the Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012
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156. The Scottish Government should make clear what their strategy would be if recruitment to Scottish special forces or marines proved difficult, and they were faced with a vulnerability after Independence Day.
Training 157. The UK carries out different types of military training in different parts of the UK. All British infantry basic training takes place at Catterick in England. Officer training for the British Army takes place at Sandhurst. The Royal Naval College at Dartmouth trains all the Royal Navy officers. RAF College Cranwell trains all RAF officers, airmen and aircrew, and has responsibility for all RAF recruiting and initial training.311 Professor Strachan said training was an example of how the British military was integrated across the UK:
When we see Stuart Crawford's analysis we tend to think of this in terms of assets and small units, but I am thinking of the collective capabilities that the UK armed forces have: the Defence Academy, the individual service establishments in terms of training and education, and, above all, intelligence. Where would Scotland have those?312
158. It is cost effective for a large military with a wide range of capabilities to invest in specialist training facilities. Smaller countries often outsource where possible—the Dutch and Norwegians still send their submariners to Portsmouth because it is not economic for them to replicate those facilities.313 The British also have arrangements for training in different climates and terrain in Canada, Norway, Kenya and Brunei. The Secretary of State for Defence told the Defence Committee that a separate Scotland could not presume access to these facilities.314 159. Training facilities would need to be provided in a separate Scottish State. It would be unusual if Scotland did not provide at least basic training for its own army, navy and air force in Scotland. The Scottish Government could request to continue using facilities in the UK during the transition period. Officer training would need to be provided as well as training for specialist roles within its forces. The Scottish Government must clarify whether their proposed budget of £2.5 billion includes the transitional costs of developing basic, specialist and officer training facilities.
311 www.raf.mod.uk/rafcollegecranwell/ 312 Q 181 313 Q 280 314 Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013 Qq391-392
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5 Scotland and NATO
161. The question of whether or not a separate Scottish state would be a member of NATO is a key one for any separate Scottish state. A Scotland in NATO could benefit from the deterrent effect provided by NATO allies, including the US, and could rely on NATO Article V—whereby an attack on one is an attack on all.315 Scotland in NATO could also rely on its allies in peace time, for example NATO air policing similar to the Baltic states. Furthermore, NATO countries are more likely to train together and buy equipment together, which could provide economic benefits.316 The SNP’s previous policy was to not be a Member of NATO, but instead join NATO’s Partnership for Peace scheme. 317 Partnership for Peace could enable co-operation with NATO Member States, but does not provide security under Article V.318 This is still Scottish Government policy if they are unable to join NATO as a full Member.319
162. It would be in the UK’s interests to have Scotland in NATO. Sir Nick Harvey MP said that, if Scotland was a member of NATO, it would be a “very significant” factor in how the relationship between the UK and a separate Scotland developed,320 and this relationship would be important for Scotland. Dr Murrison said “if a hypothetically independent Scotland was not part of NATO’s capability. That would be a loss to us all, I believe, as, indeed, it would be a loss to the defence and security of the United Kingdom.”321
163. Professor Smith commented on how this relationship might evolve in the long term: In areas of maritime and air protection, or indeed cyber defences or counter- terrorism, there would be a very strong interest for both Governments to co-operate. Where there were gaps in Scotland’s capabilities, as I am sure there would be for a long transition period, or perhaps permanently, it would be in their interest to call upon the assets of the rest of the UK. [...] There would still be interdependence. 322
And Professor Chalmers said:
One of the questions that the SNP document does not explore is what that sort of interdependence would be. What are the areas in which Scotland would continue to rely, on their scenario, on the rest of the UK in defence in areas like those Ron mentioned—maritime patrol, air patrol and so on—where it would be very hard to have a totally autonomous capability?323
315 Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8174, page 56 316 Q 202 317 Scottish Government, Your Scotland, Your Voice, para 8.42 318 Q 3890 319 SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 320 Q 355 321 Q 3889 322 Qq 2166-2167 323 Q 2159
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164. At the same time, Scotland would have to consider how far it wanted to get into a wider insurance scheme.324 Insurance requires premiums to be paid, and a Scotland in NATO would have to invest beyond what it would need just for territorial defence. This would include crisis management co-operative security beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. The Scotland Analysis: Defence paper said:
Acceptance into NATO would therefore depend on an independent Scottish state demonstrating that it had both the political will and the military capabilities to make a contribution, alongside others, to addressing shared security challenges at home and abroad.325
Professor Strachan said Scotland would have to “remain at the same level of operational confidence and interoperability that NATO forces have at the moment.”326
165. Alternatively, Scotland could choose to be like Ireland, outside NATO. Mr Tusa said:
A Scotland not in NATO and with a loose set of alliances, one less concerned with overseas offensive actions does not look like a country that will have the need for either large or complex armed forces;327
He said a Scotland outside NATO would not take part in any significant deployment of troops overseas.328 However, allies, such as Canada and the US, would consider it odd if Scotland did not want to join NATO. 329 Dr O’Brien said:
It would make it much easier to have Scotland within NATO. If Scotland is outside NATO, a lot of bets are off. No one in the State Department or Department of Defense will go on record about this, but they are very worried about a non-NATO Scotland.330
NATO and nuclear weapons 166. The need for a clear idea of Scottish Government foreign policy in relation to nuclear weapons is very important, not least because the SNP had traditionally said that Scotland should not seek NATO membership because NATO is based on a principle of nuclear deterrence.331 This policy was reversed in October 2012, when the SNP Conference agreed a Defence, Security and Foreign Policy update, which said:
On independence Scotland will inherit its treaty obligations with NATO. An SNP Government will maintain NATO membership subject to an agreement that Scotland will not host nuclear weapons and NATO takes all possible steps to bring
324 Q 153 325 Cm 8174, para 2.33 326 Q 203 327 Francis Tusa, Defence Analysis, Scottish Independence: The Defence Equation, February 2012, Vol. 15 Issue 2 328 Q 191 329 Malcolm Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, RUSI, April 2012 330 Q 1396 331 Q 192
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about nuclear disarmament as required by the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty of which all its members are signatories, and further that NATO continues to respect the right of members to only take part in UN sanctioned operations.332
Nicola Sturgeon told the Foreign Affairs Committee:
We have made it very clear that we want to continue to be a member of NATO but on the condition that we do not host nuclear weapons. 333
167. Many of our witnesses said this position was difficult. Professor Chalmers said Scotland would have to sign up to the NATO constitution, as reaffirmed in Lisbon in 2010:
A Scotland in NATO would have to endorse a Strategic Concept that states that ‘as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance’ and goes on to agree that ‘the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the 334 United States’. In the event of separation, the issue of NATO membership is absolutely crucial to the future defence of Scotland. The Scottish Government should make clear, as a matter of the utmost urgency, in the White Paper on Independence, its position on whether a separate Scottish State would seek NATO membership and sign up to the NATO Strategic Concept.
NATO countries and nuclear weapons 168. Three NATO countries, the US, the UK and France, possess nuclear weapons. Five NATO countries, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, have US nuclear weapons on their territory. George Grant said: I know of at least three of those—Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands—that have stated their desire to divest themselves of those weapons, but they have all agreed that to do so they must have the agreement of all 28 member states.335
Germany recently made clear that it wishes the US tactical nuclear weapons on its territory to be removed, but it has accepted that this will only happen when a consensus exists across NATO. 336 169. There are NATO countries which have an anti-nuclear policy and no nuclear weapons on their territory, such as Norway.337 George Grant said:
332 SNP Defence Policy Update, October 2012. See also, Note by the Director, The DItchley Foundation, The future of Scotland: international implications and comparisons, 6-8 June 2013 333 Oral evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, 28 January 2013, Q 279 334 Malcolm Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, RUSI, April 2012 335 Q 3487 336 Malcolm Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, RUSI, April 2012 337 The Herald, Threat to SNP policy to scrap nuclear weapons, 20 August 2012
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There are countries such as Norway that are anti-nuclear in principle, the SNP’s posture would [...] have very practical ramifications. If you are against something in principle and you do not have any bombs, that is fine—but this would have actual strategic consequences.338 Furthermore, Norway’s anti-nuclear policy includes a position where they do not ask if visiting ships are carrying nuclear weapons.
170. George Grant highlighted that the SNP policy on nuclear weapons would ban nuclear weapons being based in Scotland and also that they would not allow nuclear armed vessels docking in Scottish ports.339 He said “no NATO member has sought to proscribe freedom of movement for the alliance’s cornerstone strategic asset in this way.”340 Asked how this might work in practice, Mr Grant said:
“Don’t ask, don’t tell” was the point that Alex Salmond laid out. He said that obviously it is a moot point, because there would be a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, but that seems to be contradicted by what Angus Robertson subsequently said about the fact that they wouldn’t want these vessels docking in their ports. I agree that if you are going to have that policy, you need to know whether vessels are carrying nuclear weapons. That is something that the SNP would have to resolve.341
171. The White Paper on Independence should clearly set out the Scottish Government’s policy on vessels from nuclear powers docking in Scottish ports, whether it would require foreign naval ships from nuclear powers docking in Scottish ports to declare if they are carrying nuclear weapons, and what measures a Scottish Government would use to enforce this prohibition.
172. There are NATO countries, Greece and Canada, which used to have nuclear weapons on their territory but those weapons have been removed. The US withdrew their nuclear weapons from Greece as part of the post Cold War reduction in nuclear weapons. The Canadian Government chose to not have their own nuclear weapons and decided not to acquire US nuclear weapons. However, no NATO member has forced the removal from its territory of nuclear weapons which form part of the NATO collective defence.342 NATO officials in Brussels have told officials from the Scottish Government that an applicant country would have to resolve military or territorial disputes with other members before joining.343 The UK Government has said:
All 28 NATO Allies would need to approve an independent Scottish state’s application to join the Alliance. The SNP’s policy position, to seek membership of
338 Q 3487 339 George Grant, In Scotland’s Defence? Page 33. See Interviewing Alex Salmond, the man who wants to break up Britain, The Economist, 12 July 2012 340 George Grant, In Scotland’s defence? 2013 341 Q 3500 342 George Grant, In Scotland’s defence? 2013 343 Scottish Independence, Scottish Government-NATO talks, 16 August 2013. BBC, Scottish Independence: Scottish Government officials meet with NATO, 15 August 2013
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NATO while opposing NATO’s Strategic Concept, undermining the collective defence of NATO Allies, would represent a significant complication.344
173. There is a fundamental inconsistency in the Scottish Government’s potential position in accepting the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s security while demanding their rapid removal from Scotland’s own territory. NATO has made it clear that it would expect a new Scottish State to have settled any disputes with other NATO Members before it could apply for membership. This would appear to mean that a solution to Trident basing which was acceptable to the UK would be necessary before the NATO membership of a separate Scotland could be considered. Thus the Scottish Government could not dictate the terms of its application to NATO.
Trident 174. In our previous inquiry Report Terminating Trident: Days or Decades? we found that the nuclear weapons in Scotland could be made inoperative within days and the warheads removed from Scotland within two years. The process, carried out this quickly, would lead to the UK losing its ability to carry out Continual At Sea Deterrence and thus forcing the UK into unilateral nuclear disarmament.345 In its response to that Report, the Scottish Government did not comment on the timetable beyond saying that “Scottish Ministers are firmly committed to securing the earliest safe withdrawal of nuclear warheads from Scotland.”346 Nicola Sturgeon has stated categorically that:
The position that we would want Trident to be removed from Scotland is not negotiable.347
And referring to the two year timetable outlined by CND Scotland, Ms Sturgeon said:
As a responsible Minister in a responsible Government, I would not want to impose a time scale that was unsafe and we would not do that. We would have sensible discussions about that timescale with the UK Government but on the basis that it is about the speediest safe removal.348
Similarly, speaking to the Brookings Institute in the US, the First Minister said “We recognise that the safe removal of the UK’s Trident system would require careful discussion with the UK Government and our NATO allies.”349 175. Scotland is not a nuclear power under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and does not have the requisite skilled staff so could not remove the warheads unilaterally.350 Recreating the Faslane and Coulport facilities elsewhere in the UK would be complicated and
344 Cm 8174, page 53 345 Fourth Report of 2012-13, Terminating Trident: Days or Decades? HC 676. See also Independence would end UK role as a nuclear power, says ex-spymaster. Scotsman, 10 December 2012 346 Letter from the Deputy First Minister, Scottish Government, to the Chair of the Committee, February 2013. See also SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 347 Oral evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee, 28 January 2013, Q 293 348 Oral evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee, Q 296 349 Scotland as a Good Global Citizen, Address to the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 9 April 2013 350 Q 1168 [Ainslie] Q 1415 [Walker]
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expensive. Professor Smith said insistence upon immediate removal would “pollute almost everything else” as it “causes all sorts of problems for the rest of the UK in dealing with it. 351 It would be expensive, and any cost would be included in the overall separation negotiations. Professor Chalmers said disagreement on Trident would bring all negotiations to a “juddering halt,”352 and that:
If an independent Scottish Government were to insist on the Trident submarines being removed rapidly without the UK Government having anywhere to put them, that would create a very bad atmosphere between Scotland and the UK, and indeed between Scotland and the wider international community. It is one thing accepting a re-division of territories, which very few other countries in NATO would sympathise with at all, but quite another if it was seen to be taking a radically different foreign policy course, and that is what rapid expulsion would be.353
176. We note that Professor Chalmers described the rapid removal of Trident as “a radically different foreign policy course”. It is clear that the expulsion of Trident from Scotland would constitute the kind of dispute between a separate Scottish State and a NATO Member State that would obstruct Scotland’s application to NATO.
177. Professor Chalmers said that if the negotiations were carried out in a hostile spirit then it would be very difficult to reach an agreement and “the bargaining power would undoubtedly be with the UK rather than Scotland.”354 It could stall negotiations on both defence and non-defence matters, and could extend the transition period. Professor Chalmers said politicians in a separate Scotland would have to prioritise: On the Scottish side, you would probably see quite a significant political re- orientation and a dispute between those who thought smooth transition to independence was the most important objective and those who thought rapid de- nuclearisation was.355 Furthermore, he went on to explain that if Scotland did show a willingness to allow Trident to stay on the Clyde according to the UK timetable, it would be in a much stronger negotiating position on other issues. Professor Chalmers said:
If a Scottish Government were to accept that for a significant period of time, perhaps indefinitely but certainly a long period of time, Trident would have to remain because there simply is not anywhere else to put it, that in itself would be a significant bargaining card for Scotland. Scotland could say, “We've given you this, but in return we want a reasonable negotiation that leaves Scotland with a defence force that is small but does the job, and a Scotland in NATO that therefore does not have to rely entirely on itself for its own security.”356
351 Q 2174 352 Q 2174 353 Q 165 354 Q 165 355 Q 2174 356 Q 165
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178. It would be in the interests of both States to cooperate and allow Trident to remain for the foreseeable future.357 There are precedents. Ireland allowed the UK to retain access to the Treaty Ports between 1921 and 1938. The UK would need to be able to protect the base, which would necessitate the RAF and Royal Navy having a presence in Scotland.358 If this took the form of a sovereign base then the UK would expect complete freedom of action, complete control and complete sovereignty over the facility.359 However, when asked about the prospect of the UK Government leasing the submarine base on the Clyde, Nicola Sturgeon said a future SNP Scottish Government “would not be in a position of accepting that kind of arrangement.”360 179. We welcome the fact that the Scottish Government has acknowledged the need for sensible discussions about the timetable with the UK Government if, in the event of separation, they would pursue their policy of removing Trident from the Clyde. We welcome the First Minister’s acknowledgement that these discussions have a NATO dimension. We re-state our previous recommendation that the Scottish Government must provide more detail on their desired timetable for the speediest safe removal of Trident from the Clyde.
180. Trident is part of the nuclear security umbrella provided by NATO. If Scotland evicted Trident from the Clyde it would greatly damage Scotland’s relationship with other NATO countries, and impact upon any application to join NATO. A future Scottish Government may demand Trident is evicted, but that decision would have repercussions. The Independence White Paper should set out the potential implications of such a decision. It should also set out how Scotland would defend itself if evicting Trident on a timetable unacceptable to the UK and NATO meant Scotland’s application to NATO was rejected or stalled significantly.
357 Qq 2338-2340. See also Dr Colin Fleming, A Scottish Defence Model – Learning from Others, 11 February 2013, www.referendum.ed.ac.uk 358 Qq 2207-2209 359 Q 331 360 Oral evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee, 28 January 2013, Q 295
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Conclusions and recommendations
What would Scotland want its armed forces to do? 1. In a separate Scottish State, the Scottish Government would be free to pursue the foreign policy and defence goals of its choosing, in the best interests of Scotland as they saw them. The remainder of the UK would be free to do likewise. While the Scottish Government could choose to not support the UK in defence matters, similarly, the UK Government could choose to not support Scotland in defence matters. There may be many benefits in co-operation, but mutual support could not be taken for granted. (Paragraph 8)
2. There is a clear link between foreign policy and defence policy. Understanding the likely foreign policy of a separate Scotland is important in understanding what objectives its armed forces would be designed to achieve. (Paragraph 10)
3. In the event of separation, the Scottish Government would have to consider how best to protect its territory, its people and its interests. It is crucial that the forthcoming Independence White Paper sets out the likely risks specific to Scotland, and how the Scottish armed forces and security service would be structured in order to best anticipate and respond to those threats. This would include conventional threats, but also emerging threats such as terrorism and cyber attack. (Paragraph 15)
4. In the event of separation, the Scottish Government will need to assess the possible threats to its people and interests beyond its own territorial boundaries, and determine how it would respond to incidents on a regional and international scale, and whether this response would include a military dimension. If the Scottish Government intends to rely on the goodwill of the UK, or other potential allies, in such circumstances, then this should be spelt out and thus identified as a topic for future negotiations. (Paragraph 17)
5. The Scottish Government could choose to manage its security by being part of an international alliance. Being a member of such an alliance would require a commitment in times of peace and conflict. This would impact upon the level of the investment in, and design of, the armed forces of a separate Scottish State. The Scottish Government’s White Paper must make clear what level of commitment, with what forces and to which alliances, is planned. (Paragraph 22)
6. The UK Government has the capacity to transport its armed forces to carry out a range of roles, including peace-keeping, throughout the world. This requires substantial investment. Without committing similar levels of investment, the Scottish Government would be reliant upon its allies in order to deploy its armed forces beyond its immediate territory. Again, the White Paper must make the Scottish Government’s plans clear. (Paragraph 27)
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The defence budget 7. It is virtually impossible to determine how much money is spent specifically in Scotland for the defence of Scotland, as at present the defence of Scotland is inextricably linked with the defence of the rest of the UK. By population share, over £3.2 billion is currently spent on the defence of Scotland. (Paragraph 33)
Transitional costs 8. It is a matter of great concern to us that it remains unclear as to whether or not an assessment has been made of the potential aims of a separate Scottish Defence Force and the personnel and equipment which would be necessary to meet those aims. This matter needs to be clarified by the Scottish Government as a matter of urgency. If an assessment has been made of the assets which the Scottish Government would ask the Ministry of Defence to transfer, then this detail must be made available. If no such assessment has been made, then how the £2.5 billion figure has been calculated is a mystery. (Paragraph 39)
9. It is unclear as to whether this £2.5 billion budget is the budget of a separate Scottish State defence force, wholly independent of the UK Ministry of Defence; whether this budget makes any allowance for the transitional period; or on which assumptions about the division of assets the figure is based. This is wholly unacceptable, and we seek clarity from the Scottish Government as a matter of urgency in its forthcoming White Paper. (Paragraph 40)
Intelligence and security 10. In the event of separation, the Scottish Government would have to make an assessment of the role and nature of the security services it would require in order to address security threats such as terrorism and cyber attack, and how such services should be paid for. (Paragraph 46)
11. The UK administration has considerable experience in the area of counter-terrorism, and invests £2 billion a year in its security and intelligence services. This is in addition to the UK’s £34 billion annual spend on defence. Should the Scottish Government spend a proportionate amount, this would amount to £200 million a year on security and intelligence services. This figure, however, does not take into account the start-up costs for an entirely new intelligence infrastructure. The Independence White Paper should make clear whether the proposed defence and security budget would include spending on the equivalent of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. This is essential in order to evaluate fully whether the security of a separate Scottish State would be diminished compared to that of Scotland in the UK. (Paragraph 47)
12. It is possible, post separation, that the Scottish Government could argue it has contributed to the international networks, experience and relationships that the UK has built up over time. However, just as it is not possible simply to break off 8.5% of GCHQ, it would also not be possible to continue with the existing relationship as if nothing has happened. Intelligence exchange is based on mutual interest and established networks. In the event of separation, the Scottish Government would
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have to negotiate access to intelligence from the UK. Scotland would not automatically access privileged information from other countries on the same basis as the UK services currently do. The Independence White Paper should make clear how the Scottish Government would establish its future intelligence relationship with the UK and other key allies. (Paragraph 51)
13. It is difficult to establish the cost of intelligence and security, and the cost of the transition period, upon the proposed defence budget for Scotland. It is likely that such costs would place pressure upon the proposed £2.5 billion budget. If we accept £200 million as the cost of a very basic intelligence and security service, this would leave £2.3 billion per annum for defence purposes. (Paragraph 52)
The division of assets 14. Nevertheless we can see no reason why the Scottish Government should not spell out, clearly, how it would wish to see assets allocated and which additional equipment it would wish to claim, having seen these as desirable. Such information is crucial, not least because there will be a consequential impact upon procurement decisions. To give a recent example, the number of ships a Scottish navy would seek to inherit will undoubtedly impact upon the number it might subsequently wish to build. In these circumstances we can see no reason why the MoD should not provide factual details in response to reasonable requests from the Scottish Government. (Paragraph 60)
The division of assets and the transition 15. We have heard no evidence that would lead us to believe that negotiations on such complex matters could be even close to resolution in such a restricted time period. Experience in dispute resolution leads us to believe that when one party has a deadline and the other has not, then the closeness of the deadline undermines the position of the party to whom it is important. In this context, of course an agreement could always be reached in time, but this would be likely to involve substantial concessions by those to whom the deadline is essential. (Paragraph 66)
16. Like all UK taxpayers, people in Scotland have contributed over the years to the development of the current defence assets of the UK; the Scottish share of these assets has been estimated at between £7 billion and £8 billion. However, the division of defence assets would not be straightforward and would be subject to difficult and complex negotiations. (Paragraph 67)
17. The Scottish Government would need to take into account whether it could afford the ongoing operating costs for any equipment inherited, and whether it had the necessary skilled personnel to operate this equipment. (Paragraph 68)
A Scottish Navy 18. Furthermore, it assumed that all Scotland’s initial military needs are met in the division of assets with the UK, and then operates on a £1.8 billion annual budget. It
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does not make clear what would be the choices, and financial implications, if Scotland was unable to secure all it required in the division of assets. (Paragraph 72)
19. Further clarification is needed in the White Paper to establish how many frigates the Scottish Government would wish to inherit and, consequently, how many it would wish to buy new, and when. (Paragraph 73)
20. The Scottish Government should identify, in the Independence White Paper, the preferred type and number of surface vessels which would be required, what their role would be, and how this compares to the assets currently provided by the Royal Navy. It should also clarify whether the Scottish navy would be limited to the protection of its territorial waters or have an ocean-going capacity. We are unconvinced that an ocean-going complex warship the size of a frigate would be the most effective way of meeting the priorities of a separate Scotland, particularly if resources were limited. However, if the Scottish Government decides that it wishes to order new Type 26 Frigates, or other vessels, to keep the Clyde shipyards busy, then they must spell out the patterns of orders, the cost, and in particular the date of commencement, to clarify how they will avoid any interruption in work flow and how this will impact upon the proposed defence budget. (Paragraph 77)
21. There appears to be an assumption that purchasing conventional submarines would be possible because of the cash negotiated in lieu from the UK after separation. Again, the Scottish Government’s White Paper must spell out how much it expects to have available to spend on new submarines, whether it plans to have these built in Scotland and to what timetable. (Paragraph 79)
22. It is not clear whether the SNP defence industrial strategy and procurement plan for submarines, or frigates, is a cast iron commitment or a long-term aspiration. Nor is it clear how this would be scheduled to provide a steady work flow if, as anticipated, the UK Government remains wedded to retaining sovereign capability for complex warships and orders production of the Type 26 from BAE Systems from within the UK’s new boundaries. While recognising that the Scottish Government does not accept this perspective, nevertheless we believe there has to be a Plan B to take account of what most neutral observers believe is inevitable. (Paragraph 81)
23. Acquiring submarines would mean putting a large portion of the defence budget into a very expensive asset which would not be the most cost-effective way to deal with the day to day needs of the Scottish navy. Most of the evidence we received indicated that if a separate Scotland assessed the risks it faces, and chose to acquire submarines, then these would be incredibly expensive if built in Scotland; therefore we believe it would be highly unlikely that they would ever be built here. (Paragraph 82)
A Scottish Air Force 24. The Scottish Government must identify in the Independence White Paper what Scotland’s maritime patrol aircraft would do, what level of technology the aircraft would require, whether their role would be limited to Scotland’s territorial waters, how many of their preferred type of maritime patrol aircraft would be required, and at what costs, both capital and revenue. (Paragraph 85)
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25. Whether a separate Scotland would be in possession of fast jets, and if so which, remains a crucial question which must be addressed in the forthcoming White Paper. The SNP has said it would have fast jets for domestic air policing duties. If so, it should make clear how this would be delivered, and also clarify whether the intention is to have a Scottish air force capable of carrying out its own air policing duties on the first day of independence. (Paragraph 96)
26. The kind of air transport that Scotland would need would depend on what the Scottish Government would want its armed forces to do, and how far from Scotland it wished to travel. If the intention is to prioritise territorial defence, with reduced involvement in overseas deployment, then the need for transport aircraft diminishes. The Independence White Paper should set out the role of any transport aircraft, and whether the aircraft would be used to transport Scottish personnel and equipment within Scotland or whether the intention is to use their transport aircraft on an international basis, including in conflict situations. (Paragraph 98)
27. Any reduction in the number of squadrons based in Scotland, the number of aircraft in each squadron and the state of readiness required for the aircraft would result in a reduction in the number of air force staff in Scotland. The Scottish Government should spell out clearly the number and types of aircraft and helicopters it hopes to inherit, those it consequently would intend to purchase and the implication for numbers of service personnel and civilian support staff. (Paragraph 99)
A Scottish Army 28. The intention to create a regular army based on the historical Scottish regiments does not appear to be based on any strategic assessment. The emphasis on infantry means the budget leans towards proportionately high personnel costs and therefore less resource being available to purchase and maintain equipment. (Paragraph 112)
29. The issue remains, if a separate Scottish State is a Member of NATO and wishes to retain the capability to take part in overseas wars, then it might be expected to retain full time, well trained infantry regiments. If it is not in NATO or adopts the Irish model of only taking part in peace keeping exercises, then the justification for a large standing army is diminished. (Paragraph 113)
30. It is essential that the Scottish Government’s White Paper clarifies exactly what is meant by “current Scottish raised and restored UK regiments” and tells us which units will exist in a separate Scottish army, the size of these units, which will be reserves, the level of supporting units that will be provided and the overall cost of this provision. (Paragraph 114)
31. We are unconvinced that the emphasis on restoring Scottish regiments would address the fundamental needs of a Scottish army. It is not clear if the motivation to retain those units of the British Army associated with Scotland is simply to keep up numbers and maintain bases, or based on a more strategic assessment of what a separate Scottish State would either need or could afford. It is not clear how, or based on what criteria, a separate Scotland would define “Scottish raised and restored UK
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regiments” and how many of the disbanded or merged regiments would be restored. (Paragraph 117)
32. The debate around the future of the Scottish regiments is highly emotive. It is unsettling and unfair to create uncertainty among those who serve now, or have done in the past, in those parts of the British Army with a Scottish association (Paragraph 118)
Choice and recruitment 33. The British Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force are designed to operate across the globe. At present, it is unclear whether the Scottish defence force would be expected to operate beyond its own territory and territorial waters. The Independence White Paper should set out the range of career choices and opportunities that it expects its armed forces to offer, together with any variations in terms of conditions of employment which could be offered, and the anticipated timetable for having armed forces independent of the UK. It should set out the areas where it would anticipate a drawn out transition period or long term interdependence with the UK in the event of recruitment not reaching the required levels. (Paragraph 127)
34. Without more information we find it difficult to understand the nature of the offer that would persuade individuals to transfer from the British Army to any future Scottish army. Furthermore, this would apply not only to the wider British Army, but also throughout the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy. (Paragraph 128)
35. If the UK Government did agree to the transfer of units to a separate Scotland, then it should not be assumed that all those serving in that unit would transfer with it. We call upon the UK Government to reiterate its position that no one would be forced to transfer to join a possible separate Scottish defence force. We call upon the Scottish Government, in their White Paper, to publicly accept the right of all serving UK Armed Forces personnel to choose whether to transfer from the UK Armed Forces to a possible Scottish defence force. (Paragraph 129)
Basing 36. Faslane was designed and built as the base for the Royal Navy submarines. If the submarines are evicted, then it creates doubt as to the reasons for keeping Faslane open. We have not seen any evidence that suggested a separate Scotland would have a navy that required facilities on anything like the scale of that currently provided at Faslane. (Paragraph 137)
37. A separate Scottish State would have a choice, between either having two navy bases and accepting this would have a large reduction upon the personnel numbers at Faslane, or having one navy base, in what is not the ideal strategic location, but still having a considerable reduction in personnel numbers at Faslane. (Paragraph 138)
38. A separate Scottish military would have to recreate a headquarters and institutional structure which replicates that currently provided by the Ministry of Defence and its
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agencies. The priority, if there would be a single Joint Forces Headquarters, would be for it to be near the seat of power in Edinburgh. If there was to be only one headquarters, then Faslane would be geographically unsuitable. (Paragraph 140)
39. If Faslane was chosen as a Joint Forces Headquarters, then it would be a short term measure based on a need to have a functioning military headquarters as soon as possible and to delay the inevitable loss of personnel and jobs as a result of the Royal Navy submarine fleet leaving. (Paragraph 141)
40. There are unanswered questions around the balance of regular and reserve forces in a separate Scottish army. This would have an implication for the number of barracks which needed to be provided for full time army personnel in a separate Scotland. The Scottish Government should make clear which bases it would anticipate using to accommodate the raised and restored Scottish regiments. (Paragraph 143)
41. If army units were introduced to a Joint Forces Headquarters at Faslane then this would reduce the proportion of Scottish army personnel accommodated at the current army bases in Dreghorn Barracks, Glencorse Barracks, Fort George, and Redford Barracks. (Paragraph 144)
42. While it is clear that an independent country would have responsibility in areas such as where to base its own air force, it is not clear if the people of Scotland are being given enough information so they can assess whether they would feel safe in a separate Scotland. It is difficult to draw sensible conclusions on air force basing in a separate Scotland without more information on the foreign policy of a separate Scotland, if it would operate its own air policing, and if Scotland would be in NATO. The Scottish Government must provide answers to these questions as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph 151)
Special Forces and Royal Marines 43. The Scottish Government should outline, in the White Paper, its position on the Royal Marines currently stationed in Scotland, and acknowledge the very strong likelihood that if Scotland left the UK then the Royal Marines would leave Scotland. The base at RM Condor, Arbroath would be vacated. (Paragraph 155)
44. The Scottish Government should make clear what their strategy would be if recruitment to Scottish special forces or marines proved difficult, and they were faced with a vulnerability after Independence Day. (Paragraph 156)
Training 45. Training facilities would need to be provided in a separate Scottish State. It would be unusual if Scotland did not provide at least basic training for its own army, navy and air force in Scotland. The Scottish Government could request to continue using facilities in the UK during the transition period. Officer training would need to be provided as well as training for specialist roles within its forces. The Scottish Government must clarify whether their proposed budget of £2.5 billion includes the
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transitional costs of developing basic, specialist and officer training facilities. (Paragraph 159)
NATO and nuclear weapons 46. In the event of separation, the issue of NATO membership is absolutely crucial to the future defence of Scotland. The Scottish Government should make clear, as a matter of the utmost urgency, in the White Paper on Independence, its position on whether a separate Scottish State would seek NATO membership and sign up to the NATO Strategic Concept. (Paragraph 167)
47. The White Paper on Independence should clearly set out the Scottish Government’s policy on vessels from nuclear powers docking in Scottish ports, whether it would require foreign naval ships from nuclear powers docking in Scottish ports to declare if they are carrying nuclear weapons, and what measures a Scottish Government would use to enforce this prohibition. (Paragraph 171)
48. There is a fundamental inconsistency in the Scottish Government’s potential position in accepting the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s security while demanding their rapid removal from Scotland’s own territory. NATO has made it clear that it would expect a new Scottish State to have settled any disputes with other NATO Members before it could apply for membership. This would appear to mean that a solution to Trident basing which was acceptable to the UK would be necessary before the NATO membership of a separate Scotland could be considered. Thus the Scottish Government could not dictate the terms of its application to NATO. (Paragraph 173)
Trident 49. It is clear that the expulsion of Trident from Scotland would constitute the kind of dispute between a separate Scottish State and a NATO Member State that would obstruct Scotland’s application to NATO. (Paragraph 176)
50. We welcome the fact that the Scottish Government has acknowledged the need for sensible discussions about the timetable with the UK Government if, in the event of separation, they would pursue their policy of removing Trident from the Clyde. We welcome the First Minister’s acknowledgement that these discussions have a NATO dimension. We re-state our previous recommendation that the Scottish Government must provide more detail on their desired timetable for the speediest safe removal of Trident from the Clyde (Paragraph 179)
51. Trident is part of the nuclear security umbrella provided by NATO. If Scotland evicted Trident from the Clyde it would greatly damage Scotland’s relationship with other NATO countries, and impact upon any application to join NATO. A future Scottish Government may demand Trident is evicted, but that decision would have repercussions. The Independence White Paper should set out the potential implications of such a decision. It should also set out how Scotland would defend itself if evicting Trident on a timetable unacceptable to the UK and NATO meant
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Scotland’s application to NATO was rejected or stalled significantly. (Paragraph 180)
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Formal Minutes
Tuesday 19 November 2013
Members present:
Mr Ian Davidson, in the Chair
Mike Crockart Sir Jim Paice Graeme Morrice Mr Alan Reid
Draft Report (The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism?), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 180 read and agreed to.
Summary agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Third Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
[Adjourned till Wednesday 20 November at 12.30 pm
The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 69
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament
The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.
Session 2010–12 First Report Postal Services in Scotland HC 669 (HC 884) Second Report Video Games Industry in Scotland HC 500 (Cm 8067) Third Report UK Border Agency and Glasgow City Council HC 733 Fourth Report The Scotland Bill HC 775 Fifth Report Student Immigration System in Scotland HC 912 (Cm 8192) Sixth Report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: HC 1806 Unanswered Questions Seventh Report The Crown Estate in Scotland HC 1117 Eighth Report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Do you HC 1942 agree this is a biased question?
Session 2012–13 First Report A Robust Grid for 21st Century Scotland HC 499 Second Report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: making HC 542 the process legal Third Report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: a multi- HC 543 option question? Fourth Report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: HC 676 (HC 861) Terminating Trident—Days or Decades? Fifth Report The Future of HM Coastguard in Scotland HC 583 Sixth Report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: The HC 863 proposed section 30 Order—Can a player also be the referee? Seventh Report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: HC 892 Separation shuts shipyards Eighth Report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: How HC 957 (HC 257) would Separation affect jobs in the Scottish Defence Industry?
Session 2013–14 First Report Remploy Marine Fife HC 454 Second Report The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: The HC 828 Need for Truth