House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? Third Report of Session 2013–14 Report, together with formal minutes Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 19 November 2013 HC 842 Published on 23 November 2013 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £13.50 The Scottish Affairs Committee The Scottish Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Scotland Office (including (i) relations with the Scottish Parliament and (ii) administration and expenditure of the offices of the Advocate General for Scotland (but excluding individual cases and advice given within government by the Advocate General)). Current membership Mr Ian Davidson MP (Labour/Co-op, Glasgow South West) (Chair) Mike Crockart MP (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West) Mrs Eleanor Laing MP (Conservative, Epping Forest) Jim McGovern MP (Labour, Dundee West) Graeme Morrice MP (Labour, Livingston) Pamela Nash MP (Labour, Airdrie and Shotts) Sir Jim Paice MP (Conservative, South East Cambridgeshire) Simon Reevell MP (Conservative, Dewsbury) Mr Alan Reid MP (Liberal Democrat, Argyll and Bute) Lindsay Roy MP (Labour, Glenrothes) Dr Eilidh Whiteford MP (Scottish National Party, Banff and Buchan) The following members were also members of the committee during the Parliament: Fiona Bruce MP (Conservative, Congleton) Mike Freer MP (Conservative, Finchley and Golders Green) Cathy Jamieson MP (Labour/Co-op, Kilmarnock and Loudoun) Mark Menzies MP (Conservative, Fylde) Iain McKenzie MP (Labour, Inverclyde) David Mowat MP (Conservative, Warrington Sout h) Fiona O’Donnell MP (Labour, East Lothian) Julian Smith MP (Conservative, Skipton and Ripon) Powers The committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk. Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/scotaffcom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present parliament is at the back of this volume. The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Rebecca Davies (Clerk), Rhiannon Hollis (Clerk), Duma Langton (Inquiry Manager), Gabrielle Hill (Senior Committee Assistant) and Ravi Abhayaratne (Committee Support Assistant). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Scottish Affairs Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6123; the Committee’s email address is [email protected] The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 1 Contents Report Page Summary 3 1 Introduction 4 2 What would Scotland want its armed forces to do? 6 Independent States and defence 6 Scotland and the United Kingdom 6 Foreign policy and defence policy 7 Threats and risks to Scotland 8 Beyond territorial defence 9 Why would joining an alliance affect Scotland’s defence forces? 10 The ability to deploy overseas 12 3 Defence budget and division of assets 14 The defence budget 14 International comparisons 15 Transitional costs 17 The cost of intelligence 18 Sharing intelligence 20 The division of assets 21 The division of assets and integrated armed forces 23 The division of assets and the transition 24 4 A possible Scottish defence force 26 A Scottish Navy 27 Frigates and Offshore Patrol Boats 27 Submarines 28 A Scottish Air Force 31 Maritime air 31 Air policing and fast jets 32 Chinooks and Hercules 34 A Scottish Army 36 A two brigade army 36 Scottish raised and restored UK regiments 37 How would this meet the needs of Scotland? 39 Reserves 40 Choice and recruitment 40 Basing 44 Faslane and Rosyth 44 Headquarters 46 Army basing 47 Air force basing 47 Joint defence and joint basing 48 Special Forces and Royal Marines 50 2 Optional header Training 51 5 Scotland and NATO 52 NATO and nuclear weapons 53 NATO countries and nuclear weapons 54 Trident 56 Conclusions and recommendations 59 Formal Minutes 68 List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 69 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 3 Summary The first duty of a government is to protect its citizens. The Scottish Government’s White Paper must therefore make absolutely clear the details of both its foreign and defence policies and how these translate into armed forces, with specifics given on planned personnel, equipment, bases and alliances. The time for vague generalities is over. Much of what the Scottish Government have suggested up to now suffers from a conspiracy of optimism—the assumption that everything will go according to plan, that every other government and international body will fall in with the Scottish Government’s proposals. But what if this doesn’t happen? What are their alternatives? The Scottish Government must also spell out its fallback positions in the event that everything does not go according to plan. The most explicit pledges made to date include: that the whole cost of security and defence will be no more than £2.5 billion, that personnel in the armed services will total 15,000 full time and 5,000 reserve personnel, and that the defence force will include “current Scottish raised and restored UK regiments”. What does this mean in practical terms? Will we have a defence force which is army heavy? An army which is infantry heavy? Or will historic regiments be redesignated as platoons, reserves or non–infantry units? If Faslane is to be kept at its existing workforce, how will people be retrained? What effect will this have upon other bases? What costs will be inccurred in the transition to the new Scottish Defence Force? Can we assume that Scotland will inherit only the equipment it desires? What are the implications for procurement whether or not Scotland gets the assets it wants? Hanging over all of this is the future of Trident. What does “earliest safe removal” actually mean when the United Kingdom, rightly or wrongly, believes that its safety requires Trident to remain for the foreseeable future? Will a separate Scotland impose unilateral nuclear disarmament on the UK? And since membership for Scotland of NATO will require not only the unanimous agreement of all the existing NATO members, but also the resolution of any disputes with the UK, then how does the Scottish Government propose to resolve these matters? The Scottish Government must make clear that it accepts that no service personnel can be forcibly transferred into any Scottish Defence Force against their will and spell out what wages and conditions it would propose to offer to compensate those who would leave behind participation in world class armed services. As we move ever closer to the date of the referendum the people of Scotland are entitled to expect that those who propose drastic change can explain what the consequences would be and how future defence would be organised. Anything else would be a dereliction of duty. 4 The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland–A Conspiracy of Optimism? 1 Introduction 1. The question of how Scotland, post Separation, would choose to defend itself must be absolutely clear before any vote as to whether Scotland leaves, or remains within, the UK is cast. It is the absolute duty of a sovereign country to defend itself, its people and its interests. It is, to an extent, an assertion of nationhood in itself. The Scottish Government paper published in 2009, Your Scotland, Your Voice, listed some of the reserved matters “seen as fundamental to the state”. These included “the Head of State, citizenship, foreign affairs, and defence and security.”1 We agree, and that is why defence matters are central to the debate about whether Scotland leaves the UK. 2. In October 2011, we launched two distinct strands of inquiry into the Referendum on Separation for Scotland, the first into the mechanics and process of the referendum itself,2 and the second examining the potential impact of separation on key substantive issues. We published three Reports on the implications of separation for defence matters in Scotland: Terminating Trident—days or Decades?, Separation Shuts Shipyards, and How would separation affect jobs in the defence industry in Scotland? 3 This Report follows on from those and specifically focuses on the potential creation of a Scottish defence force, and how a separate Scotland might provide for the defence and security of the people of Scotland. 3. The issue has been widely debated; there have been several seminars and conferences, and many papers published: The Royal United Services Institute, the Scotland Institute, the Henry Jackson Society, and most recently, Scottish Global Forum have all published relevant reports.4 Our colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee and on the Defence Committee, plus on the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs have also carried out related inquiries.5 4. Our Report is divided into four main sections. First, we consider what a separate Scottish State might want its armed forces to do, and how that might impact upon its relationships with its neighbours. Second, we evaluate some of the issues around a possible defence budget and the transition period from the status quo to a free standing defence force.