Operations and Logistics in Post-Conflict Mali 0 C4ads
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A Fragile Recovery: Operations and Logistics in Post-Conflict Mali 0 c4ads Operations and Logistics in Post-Conflict Mali January 2014 January 2014 © 2014 A Fragile Recovery: Operations and Logistics in Post-Conflict Mali 1 Contents I. Introduction _____________________________________________________________ 3 II. The Economic Environment ______________________________________________ 4 An Economy in Recovery… _________________________________________________________ 4 …But Concentrated in the South _____________________________________________________ 4 A Comparatively Pro-Investor Business Environment ____________________________________ 6 III. Government – NGO Relations ____________________________________________ 8 A Cumbersome and Opaque Regulatory Environment ___________________________________ 8 The Important, But Elusive, Accord-Cadre ____________________________________________ 9 Size Matters ______________________________________________________________________ 9 IV. The Security Environment ________________________________________________ 10 Lingering Instability _______________________________________________________________ 10 Military Violence in Bamako ________________________________________________________ 12 Persistent Presence of AQIM in Timbuktu _____________________________________________ 14 Protracted MUJAO Threat and Civil Unrest in Gao ______________________________________ 16 The Kidal Quagmire _______________________________________________________________ 18 V. Transportation _________________________________________________________ 20 Routes __________________________________________________________________________ 20 Seaports ________________________________________________________________________ 23 Roads __________________________________________________________________________ 24 Air _____________________________________________________________________________ 27 Rail ____________________________________________________________________________ 28 River ___________________________________________________________________________ 28 VI. Communications _______________________________________________________ 28 The Mobile Phone Explosion _______________________________________________________ 28 Access for Humanitarian Organizations _______________________________________________ 31 VII. Energy & Water ________________________________________________________ 32 State-Owned Services Are Insufficient ________________________________________________ 32 VIII. Banking _____________________________________________________________ 34 An Inaccessible Financial System ___________________________________________________ 34 The Boom in Mobile Money Transfers _______________________________________________ 34 Resuming Operations in the North __________________________________________________ 34 IX. Conclusion ____________________________________________________________ 36 January 2014 A Fragile Recovery: Operations and Logistics in Post-Conflict Mali 2 Figures Figure 1. Economic Resources Concentrated in the South __________________________________ 5 Figure 2. Population Distribution by Commune __________________________________________ 5 Figure 3. Comparatively Friendly Entrepreneurial Environment _____________________________ 7 Figure 4. Lower Tax Rate and Less of a Time Burden _____________________________________ 7 Figure 5. Conflict Events Map, August 12 to December 29, 2013 _____________________________ 11 Figure 6. Conflict Events Timeline, August 12 to December 29, 2013 __________________________ 12 Figure 7. Dangerous Areas in Timbuktu _________________________________________________ 15 Figure 8. Dangerous Areas in Gao ______________________________________________________ 18 Figure 9. Primary International Corridors to Mali _________________________________________ 21 Figure 10. Primary Domestic Corridors _________________________________________________ 22 Figure 11. Mali’s Fuel Costs Are Above Average in the Region ______________________________ 25 Figure 12. Import/Export Costs and Times Are Among the Highest in the Region _____________ 26 Figure 13. Mobile Coverage Is Extensive _______________________________________________ 29 Figure 14. Few Internet Users, But Many Mobile Subscriptions _____________________________ 30 Figure 15. Maintaining Pace with the Mobile Explosion ____________________________________ 31 Figure 16. The Existing Energy Network Leaves Many Uncovered __________________________ 33 Figure 17. State-Owned Water Utility Locations Are Few __________________________________ 33 Tables Table 1. Ports to Mali _______________________________________________________________ 24 Table 2. Road Network ______________________________________________________________ 24 Table 3. Commercial Communications Providers ________________________________________ 29 Table 4. Utilities’ Availability _________________________________________________________ 32 Table 5. Reopened Banks ____________________________________________________________ 35 January 2014 A Fragile Recovery: Operations and Logistics in Post-Conflict Mali 3 I. Introductioni One year ago, in early 2013, Mali was slipping towards the status of failed state. A patchwork of Islamists and separatist movements controlled the northern parts of the country, military leaders from an April coup d’état continued to pull the strings of a fledgling transitional government, and Mali gained international attention as a nexus for the trafficking of drugs and illicit goods across its poorly governed territory. Without a swift military intervention in January 2013 by France, Mali’s former colonizer, the country may have become West Africa’s Somalia. French intervention restored state territorial integrity, pushed Islamists from their strongholds, and facilitated the democratic election of a new president and national assembly. The state is reasserting its authority in the three northern regions (although incompletely) and displaced populations are trickling back into their communities. As Mali emerges from conflict, humanitarian and development actors, international organizations, and foreign investors will require new tools to navigate the post-conflict environment. This report seeks to clarify a complicated setting and facilitate responsible re-engagement by foreign partners by addressing critical factors in logistics and operations planning. This includes the economic environment, government regulations, security environment, transportation networks, communications capabilities, energy and water infrastructure, and banking sector. Inarguably, the entire population of Mali Broken Door at Cimetière des Trois Saints (Destroyed by AQIM), suffered during the crises of 2012 and Timbuktu (C4ADS) 2013. However, this report will primarily focus on the capital, Bamako, and the three northern regions: Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. The nature of the conflict meant these localities were most affected by instability. In order to supplement desk research from Washington, DC, the authors travelled to the cities of Bamako, Timbuktu, and Gao in December 2013 to collect original data and conduct interviews with actors in the field. Excerpts from these interviews have been cited where applicable, unless the interviewee requested anonymity or if the information may harm the interests of the individual or organization. i This report was authored by Eric Wulf and Farley Mesko of c4ads, supported by a grant from Working Partners Foundation International. The opinions stated herein are those of the authors and need not represent those of c4ads, Working Partners Foundation, or their directors or associates. January 2014 A Fragile Recovery: Operations and Logistics in Post-Conflict Mali 4 II. The Economic Environment AN ECONOMY IN RECOVERY… Unsurprisingly, the Malian economy contracted in 2012. The country was plagued with political instability, elite infighting, a separatist rebellion, 10 months of Islamist rule in the north, and security concerns. A lack of investor confidence and decreased government spending, coupled with the disruption of commerce in the north and the suspension of foreign aid flows, led to a negative real GDP growth of 1.5 percent.1 This occurred despite impressive domestic growth in the gold and cotton sectors, which are Mali’s largest exports. In 2013, economic forecasts were much more optimistic. The African Development Bank projects the Malian economy to rebound to a 5.4 percent growth rate in 2013, followed by 5.1 percent growth rate in 2014.2 Increased cotton and gold production, along with increasing world prices, will be significant contributors. Equally as important will be the resumption and increase of foreign aid flows as Mali continues to regain stability. Following Mali’s relatively successful and peaceful legislative elections in December, the United States restored Mali to privileged partner status as a reward for its return to democracy.3 Mali will now be able to take advantage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), further encouraging improved economic growth. AGOA was launched by the US Congress in 2000 and facilitates African exports to the US market in order to promote economic development in low-income countries. Landlocked Mali relies on its neighbors for access to ports and trade. Mali is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a bloc of 15 countries that was founded in 1975 to facilitate regional economic integration. The role of ECOWAS has expanded over time. ECOWAS routinely conducts