The Triple P of RuNet Politics: Protest, Political Technology, Public Sphere Revolutionary seasons – Arab Spring and Slavic Winter

by Henrike Schmidt, Berlin

“ lavic Winter” – this was one of the head- apogee of digital and networked activism. The Slines of the news magazine Spiegel online, focus of the following paper will be according- when political protests against the results ly placed on the analysis of this social media of the parliamentary elections and the poli- component in recent political activities in Rus- tics of the so called Medvedev-Putin tandem sia against the background of a short history drove thousands of Russians onto the streets of politics of RuNet, as the Russian Internet is in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities almost tenderly called by its protagonists.3 around the country in December 2011.1 Thus, by giving the movement a symbolic name, an “For Fair Elections”. With Facebook obvious parallel was drawn to the so called against Electoral Fraud ‘Arab spring’ and the ‘Facebook revolutions’. And while the political background behind On December 4th 2011, the elections for the the protests in the Arab countries and in post- Russian parliament, the State Duma [Gosu- communist Russia differs largely2, the impor- darstvennaya Duma], resulted in a decrease tance of new media as a mobilizing power is in support for the ruling party United Rus- indeed characteristic in both cases. This also sia [Edinaya Rossiya], which gained only 49.3 holds true for other mass protest movements percent of the votes, in comparison to 64.1 per- which were different in their intentions, aims cent in the year 2007. With the parliamentary and agents, such as the ‘London riots’, the elections being understood as a test for the protest against the Euro crisis management presidential elections in spring 2012, the loss in Greece or the riots surrounding the ethnic of votes made supporters of the Medvedev- conflicts in Katunica, Bulgaria. Thus, 2011 Putin tandem, and especially the latter in his has good chances to be remembered for this aim to reclaim the position of the President, react nervously. At the same time, the politi- 1 Benjamin Bidder, “Russischer Blogger Warlamow. Aufklärer an allen Fronten” [Russian cal opposition in the country as well as exter- Blogger Varlamov. Enlightment proponent on all fronts], Spiegel Online, 14 December 2011, http:// 3 For possible definitions of the RuNet www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,803244,00. see Karina Alexanyan and Olessia Koltsova html (5 January 2012). (2009). “Blogging in Russia is not Russian 2 Experts underline, for example, the Blogging”. In: Adrienne Russell (Ed.). International different if not opposed demographics of the Arab Blogging: Identity, Politics and Networked Publics. States, which are characterized by a specifically New York: Lang, pp. 65-84; Henrike Schmidt and young population while Russia is constantly Katy Teubener (2006). “‘Our RuNet’? Cultural growing older, see Ayke Süthoff, “Putin Russland Identity and Media Usage”. In: Henrike Schmidt, Wahlbetrug: Interview mit Russland-Experten Katy Teubener and Natalja Konradova (Eds). Hans-Henning Schröder” [Putin Russia Electorial Control + Shift. Public and Private Usages of the Russian Fraud: Interview with Russia expert Hans-Henning Internet. Norderstedt: Books on Demand, pp. 14-20, Schröder], News.de, 12 December 2011, http:// http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/russ-cyb/library/ www.news.de/politik/855252297/putin-russland- (accessed 13 January 2012). wahlbetrug-interview-mit-russland-experten- texts/en/control_shift/Schmidt_Teubener_Identity. hans-henning-schroeder/1/ (5 January 2012). pdf> (30 May 2009).

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nal experts witnessed serious violations of the on by that time and election process in favour of the ruling party.4 was one of the ma- Violations were documented by official and jor speakers at the unofficial observers and published on Youtube ‘Christmas’ rally, on the day of the election. has been a promi- As a result of the allegedly manipulated elec- nent figure of the tions, the first protesters met on the Chisto- Russian opposi- prudny square in the centre of the capital on tion throughout December 5th. Although the meeting was the last few years. officially authorized, conflicts occurred be- He demonstrated tween the organizers and the police forces in a particularly high the course of the event and several hundred level of activity protesters were at least shortly imprisoned. and proficiency in Among them was the renowned blogger and digital mobiliza- political activist Aleksey Navalny, who went tion and tactic me- to prison for 15 days. dia usage.5 He has Protest meetings nevertheless kept on grow- the reputation of a ing with two mayor rallies “For fair elections” notorious fighter [Za chestnye vybory], on December 10th at against corruption Bolotnaya square. It attracted between 20,000 within the Russian protesters, as reported by the Moscow Main State institutions Office of the Interior, and 50,000 protesters, as and mayor eco- Fig. 1: More than 53,000 proclaimed by the organizers. There was an- nomic companies. people planned on going other protest on December 24th at Sakharov Thus, he is the cre- to the “Rally for Fair square with 30,000 to 100,000 participants – ative ‘genius’ of Elections”, Facebook group depending on accounts of the public authori- an initiative called (accessed 13 January 2012) ties in Moscow or the organizers of the protest invest-activism, rally. As was the case with the Arab spring, which means buy- Facebook and Twitter played the most impor- ing small shares tant role in organizing these protest meetings, in the stocks of big Russian companies and followed by the ‘home-made’ social network thereby forcing them from the inside to dis- clones Vkontakte [InContact] and Odnoklass- close their management activities and adhere niki [Schoolmates]. to more transparency. Navalny is also the ini- tiator of the website RusPil, a platform gather- Aleksey Navalny, who was released from pris- ing information concerning corruption within the Russian bureaucracy and economy. The 4 Michael Schwirtz and David M. abbreviation means ‘The Russian Saw’, a witty Herszenhorn, “Voters Watch Polls in Russia, play on words which is illustrated by the logo and Fraud Is What They See”, The New York Times, 5 December 2011, http://www.nytimes. 5 See Navalny’s homepage http://navalny. com/2011/12/06/world/europe/russian- ru/, his http://navalny.livejournal.com/ and parliamentary-elections-criticized-by-west.html his twitter account https://twitter.com/#!/navalny (accessed 13 January 2012). (accessed 13 January 2012).

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White Ribbons on the Internet against Black-Listing on TV

While Navalny provokes with clear cut state- Fig. 2: Logo of the Russian Internet platform ments and rude language, another recent cam- against corruption RosPil (Russian Saw http://rospil.info) paign initiated via the Internet presented itself as colourless in the literal sense: the white rib- of the website as well. bon campaign, which was initiated only a few days after the Duma Elections by the writer In his blog, read daily by approximately 40,000 and IT-professional Arsen Revazov. It calls for thousand users, Navalny criticizes the politi- the Russian people to demonstrate their wish cal elite in frank words, referring to the ruling for democratic reform and transparency by party Edinaya Rossiya as a “party of crooks wearing a white ribbon in order to visualize and thieves” [partiya zhulikov i vorov]. This the mass of people in discontent with the cur- rude formulation turned into a popular meme, rent political situation in the country. When a stereotypical formulation dispersed on the protest meetings and oppositional politicians Internet in a virus-like manner. In the follow- are black-listed from the state-owned national ing illustration it is used as a slogan for a ban- TV channels, the otherwise silent mass shall ner to mobilize further protests against elec- be visually present on the streets. The move- tion fraud: “On December 4th I voted against ment steers clear of the harsh political rhetoric the party of crooks and thieves”. of Navalny and other members of the non- It should be noted that Navalny has a quite systemic7 political opposition. It avoids the contradictory reputation among the opposi- terminology of revolution and thus especially tion. For example he was excluded from the attracts members of the rather apolitical mid- liberal party Yabloko for allegedly nationalist dle class, who previously did not join the op- behaviour. A weakness of oppositional forces position. Against this background the choice in Russia throughout the last decade consists of the colour white is even the more symboli- in the fact that a strongly nationalist and a cal as it clearly distinguishes itself from the so more liberal western-oriented wing co-exist, called ‘coloured revolutions’ in the Ukraine or which are united only by the goal of regime Central Asia, which do not enjoy popularity change, but largely differ in their views on the among the Russian population. political future of Russia. The last person to countercheck the potentially nationalist ideol- ogy of the blogger Navalny in the first days of 2012 was the renowned Russian writer of Akunin’s blog, “Razgovor s politikom”, 3 January historic novels, Boris Akunin, who himself 2012, http://borisakunin.livejournal.com/49763. actively participated in the December protest html (accessed 14 January 2012). meetings. Akunin published on his blog three 7 In Russian political vocabulary this interviews with Navalny, evidently subjecting was distinguished from the ‘systemic opposition’ to scrutiny his qualities as a potential leader of [sistemnaya oppoziciya], said to be controlled from the Kremlin within its system of ‘managed the broader oppositional forces.6 democracy’ [upravlyaemaya demokratiya]. 6 ‘Love for History’ [Lyubov k istorii]. Boris

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opposition in the rudest and most obscene words8, which would have been more char- acteristic of ex-President and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Reworded in more decent language, the original author Rykov and Medvedev accused the opposition in their forwarded message of being a herd of dumb sheep, which is being manipulated by its lead- ers.9 The re-tweet scandalized and/or revolted large parts of the RuNet population because, firstly, the chosen vocabulary was not suitable to the position and the reputation of the Rus- sian President and, secondly, it expressed a cynical attitude towards the protest of the po- litical opposition. The fact that the incriminat- ed wording was a mix of original citations by the oppositional leader Navalny himself did not help to solve the confusion and irritation.10

The shocking re-tweet was online for exact- ly seven minutes, before it was deleted. The events behind these digital seven minutes of fame remain mysterious. The official expla- nation given the next day by the Presidential administration was that a member of the staff had misused his competencies and that “the

responsible will be punished”. In its Soviet Fig. 3: Banner of the protest movement

8 See: Spiegel Online, “Obszöner Tweet bringt Kreml in Verlegenheit” [Obscene tweet Thieves and Sheep. The War of Memes embarrasses the Kremlin], 8 December 2011, http:// www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,802569,00. Let me now examine one charateristic ex- html (accessed 3 January 2012). ample of the mobilization wars on the digital 9 The Week, “Medvedev: protesters are ‘sheep getting fucked in the mouth’”, 8 December battlefield in more detail, that is: the scandal 2011, http://www.theweek.co.uk/russia/russia- surrounding the Twitter activities by Presi- elections/43402/medvedev-protesters-are-sheep- dent Dmitry Medvedev. With his reputation getting-fucked-mouth (accessed 14 January 2012). of a technology aficionado, Medvedev char- 10 See: Fontanka.ru, “Navalny prolez acteristically reacted to the events around the v Twitter Medvedeva” [Navalny entered the parliamentary elections as well via Twitter. Medvedev Twitter], 7 December 2011, http://www. On December 7th, he re-tweeted a post by fontanka.ru/2011/12/07/026/ (accessed 3 January 2012). Konstantin Rykov discrediting the political

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Fig. 4: The White Ribbon campaign “is not a party or organization, but a community of thinking people“

style, the press release contributed only further However, RuNet insiders came to the conclu- to the RuNet making fun of the affair. Digital sion that the war of memes was won by the Kremlinologists assumed behind the incident ‘original author’ Navalny.12 Attempts to dis- attempts to discredit the position of President credit him have not been successful, and the Medvedev by means of virtual counter-propa- “thieves” of the ruling party have not been re- ganda, in favour of the current Prime Minister placed by the “sheep” of the opposition. who is assumed to be re-elected President. Digital counter-attacks have also been Twitter theatre – Staging digital iden- launched by the Medvedev supporters, who tity politics tried to re-frame the scandal and re-use it in favour of Medvedev, as was previously suc- Regardless of Medvedev’s awkward disclaim- cessfully done with other discrediting RuNet- er and even further fuelled by speculations memes. Thus, a supporter of the Pro-Kremlin and rumours about the initiators of the tweet Youth Organisation Nashi [Ours] published on scandal, the digital politics of the President his blog a video showing the blogger Navalny were once and for all discredited; his aura of at the December 5th protest while addressing direct and authentic communication via the his own followers with the now famous slo- gan “sheep”. The video is suggestively mixed Prudakh” [How people were bluffed at Chistye with a photograph of the symbolic animal Prudy], kristotupchik‘s blog, 6 December 2011, and the suggestive question “Will you follow http://krispotupchik.livejournal.com/297903.html (accessed 13 January 2012). Navalny?”11 12 See Fontanka.ru, as cited above. 11 “Kak ‘razveli’ lyudey na Chistykh Euxeinos 4 (2012) 9 Henrike Schmidt

10

Fig. 5. The opposition as “sheep”. The scandalous political re-tweet, c.f. Fontanka.ru (2011)

web was destroyed. This is a symbolic failure, there existed and exist a number of diverse as Dmitry Medvedev from the beginning of twitter accounts related to Medvedev, two of- his political career as Russian president gave ficial ones and a number of parodist versions.13 himself the image of a digital insider. He From the beginning, his twitter activities con- showed knowledge of Russian Internet slang, sisted of two separate identities, which were the famous “jargon of the padonki”, charac- used in order to stage digital identity politics. terized by obscene language and subcultural language norms. He started a video blog and 13 For a faked twitter account of Putin see for example https://twitter.com/#!/PremierRussia soon became one of the most prominent blog- (accessed 13 January 2012). For a discussion of gers of the country. While openly admitting faked identities in the social networks in Russia that he did not write the posts himself, he see also Henrike Schmidt (2009). “Das Spiel auf claimed to personally control the content of der Partitur der Partizipation. Social soft­ware und his LiveJournal. Medvedev entertained direct virales Marketing im politischen Runet” [Playing political contacts with the digital elite and participation games. and viral marketing on the political Runet]. The Russian the representatives of the digital economy in Cyberspace Journal 1 (2009), pp. 41-60, http://www. Russia. He used Twitter as an efficient means russian-cyberspace.com/pdf/issue1/Designing- of political communication, integrating or at Political-Participation_H-Schmidt.pdf (accessed 13 least tolerating even parodist activities. Thus, January 2012).

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Fig. 6: Obscene citations re-mix by political technologist Konstantin Rykov, c.f. Fontanka.ru (2011)

The first identity is the one of Dmitry Medve- Thus, the double twitter identity illustrates the dev as the official President, under the efforts of the Kremlin and Dmitry Medvedev #KremlinRussia and with about 270,000 fol- to use digital and networked media for inti- lowers. Here, administrative communiqués mate communication with the people and to are announced and accounts given of the endow political communication with an aura meetings the President attended, the admin- of intimacy, spontaneity, authenticity. istrative decisions and decrees he signed. The At the same time, the tweet identities of Dmit- language style is official and ‘dry’. The second ry Medvedev soon became the object of politi- identity is the one of Dmitry Medvedev the cal satire and parody, with – at least – two fake President as a private person, who reflects on Medvedev-twitterers occupying the terrain. this ‘job’, who shows the human face of the The first parody under the hashtag #Kerm- official person. Under the hashtag #Medve- linRussia spoofs the official Kremlin account devRussia the public-private Medvedev posts openly, by offering alternative versions of po- personal comments to state affairs, shares litical events and announcements. With about private information, for example concerning 205,000 followers, it is no less popular than pop and rock music concerts he attended, and the official account. Its message is provocative shows emotions. With roughly 850,000 follow- and critically mirrors the posts of #Kremlin- ers, the informal tweet has almost three times Russia. The parodist private-public account more readers than the official one, which tell- under the hashtag #DmitrijMedvedev is less ingly illustrates its significance and efficiency. popular, with only about 320 people follow-

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Fig. 7. Animal symbolism: Re-coding

ing and much less regular updates. 2011, a tweet was posted here which boost- ed the first twitter scandal of the year which Read together with the official tweet, the paro- was so rich in digital scandals.14 Around this dies offer an alternative news feed, illustrating time, the Russian entrepreneur and billionaire the function of the internet to serve, at least Mikhail Prokhorov joined the political party partly, as a corrective to the official media poli- “Right Cause” [Pravoye dyelo] and was elect- cies. Until early summer 2011, no attempts of ed as its leader.15 Dmitry Medvedev met with controlling or censoring the parodist tweets were undertaken. Apparently, the authenticity 14 Svetlana Bocharova, “Nenastojashchi prezident zainteresovalsya nebyvalym premyerom” claim of Medvedev-the Twitterer was not af- [The fake President took interest in the fictitious fected by the parodist counter-attacks, or even Prime Minister], Gazeta.ru, 28 June 2011, http:// increased by demonstrating a liberal position www.gazeta.ru/politics/2011/06/28_a_3678281. towards Internet criticism and creativity. shtml (accessed 14 January 2012). There existed still another fake tweet though. 15 Analytics reflected on the founding of Under the hashtag #blog_medvedev the Presi- the party in 2007 and Prokhorov’s engagement dent’s personal voice and message were more as another effort of ‘managed democracy’ [upravlyaemaya demokratiya], that is, an attempt mimicked than parodied. In comparison to the to simulate the existence of a multi-faceted political original tweet, it was almost impossible for the party spectrum. Prokhorov himself proposed a unalert eye to notice the difference. In June similar explanation when redrawing from his

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Fig. 8 and 9: Twitter identities of Dmitry Medvedev

Prokhorov in person in order to congratulate with regard to increasing tendencies towards him. Speculations around the significance of transmediality and media convergence – cited this event exploded, when the ‘oligarch’ con- the tweet as authentic. The provocative term fessed himself to being a potential candidate “oligarch” pronounced by the head of state for the position of the Prime Minister. The fake provoked a scandal no less spiky than the later Twitter account #blog_medvedev accordingly one concerning the usage of obscene vocabu- came up with the following question to its ‘fol- lary. When it became obvious that the tweet lowers’: was a fake, the respective Twitter account was closed by intervention of the Kremlin admin- “What do you think about Mikhail Prokhorov istration.16 as leader of “Pravoye dyelo”? Would you go The incident is insightful in many respects: and vote for an oligarch? Is he worthy of the post of the Prime Minister?” 16 Obshchaya gazeta, “Kreml zakryl ‘poddelnyj blog Medvedeva’” [The Kremlin has This fake tweet was mimicked so convincingly closed Medvedev’s ‘fake blog’], 11 July 2011, http:// that several traditional media – if such a dis- www.og.ru/news/2011/07/11/55366.shtml (accessed tinction can still be thought of as productive 13 January 2012). Parodist fake accounts on Twitter exist for politicians worldwide; see for example the position as leader of Pravoye dyelo only four month case of Nicolas Sarkozy. In February 2012, during after his election. See: Ellen Barry, Andrew E. Sarkozy’s re-election campaign for the French Kramer, “Billionaire Condemns Party He Led as a presidency, several such satiric Twitter accounts Kremlin ‘Puppet’”, The New York Times, 15 September were shut down; see Ole Reißmann, “Twitter sperrt 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/world/ Sarkozy-Satire aus” [Twitter locks out Sarkozy europe/amid-political-rancor-russian-party-leader- satire], Spiegel online, 20 February 2012, http://www. mikhail-prokhorov-quits.html?_r=1&hp (accessed spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/0,1518,816371,00. 13 January 2012). html (accessed 21 February 2012).

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Fig. 10 to 11: Parodist Twitter accounts of Dmitry Medvedev

it documents how closely the party building or discrediting it as a danger to education and and democracy ‘managing’ processes are in- moral values. tertwined with digital politics, how different Medvedev’s digital doctrine of using the inter- parodist and fake identities function within net as tactic media for soft state propaganda political communication, and how shaky the evidently failed, as the events of 2011 show. borders are between politically acceptable This time, even the professional political tech- satire and censorship. While – even rigorous nologists surrounding Medvedev did not suc- – political parody is admissible or can even ceed in their attempt to turn the scandalous be transformed into symbolic capital, proving “sheep” tweet into a meme in favour of the political open-mindedness, the mimicking of President. A TV discussion also reflects an at- fake identities becomes too dangerous and di- tempt to maintain the upper hand in this war rect action is taken against digital resistance. of tactical media. Here, the Kremlin-sympa- By developing a distinct digital strategy and thizer and glamour writer Sergey Minaev, the identity and relying on the capacity of the In- RuNet pioneer and political technologist Kon- ternet to generate or at least simulate a new stantin Rykov and the well-known blogger intimacy of communication, Dmitry Med- and new media ‘guru’ Anton Nosik confront vedev positioned himself in a characteristic one another. During the discussion, the two opposition to his ‘tandem’ partner Vladimir first-mentioned figures deliberately attempt Putin, who in his politics of representation re- to discredit the personality and the activities lied mainly the image of physical power and of the opposition leader Navalny, while he is vitality. Putin presented himself as a Judoka, defended by Nosik.17 a big game hunter and as fighter aircraft pilot, 17 “Minaev i Nosik o Navalnom” [Minayev either showing no interest into digital politics and Nosik about Navalny], Youtube, posted by politrash, 30 August 2011, http://www.youtube.

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Fig 12.: Mimicked and censored Twitter account of Dmitry Medvedev18

Campaigning websites by Dmitry Medve- are encouraged to share their wishes for the dev and Vladimir Putin experienced a simi- future of Russia with the candidate.20 Among lar failure. In December the internet project the first recommendations, though, were nu- “Yes. Web Community in support of Dmitry merous posts that wished Putin would with- Medvedev” was started, and in mid-January draw. When these posts disappeared from the the Putin web-platform “Putin 2012” was re- site, rumours came up concerning censorship. leased18. Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, com- mented on the disappearance of such critical Both websites have been at least partially real- posts and explained that this was due to tech- ized by New Media Stars, a company founded nical problems that occurred throughout the by political technologist Konstantin Rykov, launch of the new project.21 The ‘withdrawal- who stands at the origins of the ‘Sheep-Twit- 20 For a similar project see Angela Merkel’s 19 ter’-scandal. But while both projects include interactive website calling for the German citizens elements of interactivity, especially the Putin to engage in direct dialogue with the government. 2012-site has had a false-start. Under the slo- The top ten of popular topics included suggestions gan “Let’s change Russia together”, citizens for free drug consumption or more liberal gun laws, thus challenging the political agenda com/watch?v=UfBvQUwVQ5M&feature=player_ of chancellor Merkel, see Philipp Wittrock, embedded (accessed 14 January 2011). “Internetdialog der Kanzlerin” [The internet 18 Cited from Sibirskoye agenstvo novostei, dialogue of the German chancellor], Spiegel online, http://fed.sibnovosti.ru/pictures/0368/1420/blog.jpg 8 February 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ (accessed 14 January 2012). deutschland/0,1518,813812,00.html (accessed 22 February 2012). 19 Marker, “Predvybornyj sajt Putina nachal rabotu” [Putin’s pre-election website has been 21 Ellen Berry, “Online Suggestion Box a launched], 12 January 2012, http://marker.ru/ Peril for Putin”, The New York Times, 12 January news/511632 (accessed 14 January 2012). 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/world/

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Fig. 13: Campaigning website of Dmitry Medvedev

slogans’ indeed later have been returned to the start a technological endeavour undertaken site, but the initial effect of direct democratic under the auspices and by the money of the exchange between the old and possibly new government, in Russia the implementation of president with his people was spoiled. communication technology in the early 1990s In order to understand more fully the outlined was more of a bottom-up-affair and initiative. particularities of political communication on Russian-Soviet scientists from the field, who the RuNet, it is insightful to take a look back had been deprived for decades from participa- into history. tion in the rocketing development of commu- nication technologies, seized the initiative and Public Sphere or Polit Technology – A contributed technologically, administratively short history of RuNet politics and culturally to the development and im- plementation of digital and networked com- The Russian Internet, or RuNet as it is called munication in Russia and – still – the Soviet among its participants, has been political from Union, later the CIS States.22 its beginnings, as is – of course – the case with every communication device. But while in the 22 Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins of the Internet. United States the Internet was from the very Simon & Schuster, 1996; Vadim Maslov, “Russkaja Set’. Istorii” [The Russian Web. Histories]. Žur­ europe/vladimir-putin-web-site-opens-campaign- nal.ru. Vestnik setevoj kul’tury, 1999, http://www. to-criticism.html (accessed 14 January2012). zhurnal.ru/1/maslov.htm (accessed 14.01.2012).

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Fig. 14: Official campaigning website of Vladimir Putin

As early as 1991, when Communist party lead- cal infrastructure as well as into educational ers tried to regain power from Gorbachev with programmes in the field of digital and net- an attempted coup d’état because of their dis- worked media. The Open Society Foundation content with the Perestroika, the still nascent of George Soros can be regarded as the most RuNet was used in order to communicate the prominent player in the field; without its in- events to the outer world. The State represen- volvement the cultural and humanitarian In- tatives, though, were hopelessly behind, if ternet of the early 1990ies in Russia is unimag- not ignorant of the new means of communi- inable. In the middle of the 1990s the public cation.23 While the Russian State institutions authorities and the Kremlin administration until the mid-1990s tended to ignore the sig- also recognized the strategic importance of the nificance of the Internet, foreign institutions internet and began taking action with RuNet and foundations understood the potential role initiatives. This resulted in conflicts between of the Internet in Russia for the formation of a the competing ‘players’: while foreign foun- public sphere and democratic political culture dations viewed their own involvement in the early and started to invest into the technologi- media as a form of promoting democratic cul- ture, official Russian policy often viewed it as 23 Larry Press, “A Computer Network for an intervention into internal Russian affairs. Democracy and Development”, 26 August 1991, http:// www.ibiblio.org/pub/docs/about-the-net/Usenet/ These conflict lines led, among other reasons, soviet.coup (accessed 14 January 2012). to the withdrawal of the Open Society Insti-

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tute from its involvement in Russia in 2003.24 moting it and by this turning into an instru- This set of problems is prominent in the dis- ment of subtle propaganda and control.26 Such cussions concerning the alleged promotion of a position became part of the pop cultural dis- the so called Orange Revolution in the Ukraine courses and mythologies through the popu- in 2004 by American foundations and is just lar new-media novels by Viktor Pelevin Gen- recently, in another cultural context, recurrent eration P (1999) to The Helmet of Horror [Shlem in the infringement of restrictions on the work uzhasa, 2005]. of foreign Foundations in Egypt. The next phase in the development of the Ru- At the same time, among the media elite of the Net as a political space and technology took early ‘RuNet’ a decidedly apolitical position place in the years 1998-2000. With the financial was taken vis-à-vis the political potentials of crash of the year 1998 the RuNet became an the Internet as a new public sphere. The ex- important information source for the whole perience of Soviet type authoritarianism led country, with value exchange rates changing to two opposing positions among the digital every second and the Internet being the only protagonists, prototypically embodied by the medium capable of reacting on the spot. Its writer, journalist and literary scholar Evgeny significance for political communication and Gorny on the one hand and the digital artist governance becomes more and more obvious Aleksey Shulgin on the other. Gorny claimed to the State institutions. And the web was used the Internet to be a sphere free of political ex- for the first time as a fully-fledged instrument ploitation, which should not define itself in of political propaganda in the election cam- opposition neither to offline culture nor official paigns of 1999-2000, which brought Vladimir politics; he thus promoted the utopia of a com- Putin to power. Two aspects are of importance munication realm of ‘real freedom’.25 Shulgin, here, the set of strategies used for political against the experience of Soviet propaganda, campaigning and the actors who took part in argued that the hypertextual liberation of the first digital electoral campaigns. The me- thought and mind turned into a technology dia tactics employed embraced positive and simulating freedom of choice rather than pro- negative propaganda, that is, the creation of the first official websites of politicians, and 24 Anna Kachurovskaya, “Džordž Soros their faking. The latter strategy was used for kloniroval svoj fond” [George Soros cloned his the systematic discrediting of potentially suc- foundation], Kommersant, 14 January 2004, http:// cessful candidates through ‘sliv’ [compromis- www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=440350 ing information]. The campaigns were carried (accessed 14 January 2011). out partly by the Foundation of Effective Poli- 25 Eugene Gorny, A Creative History of tics FEP [Fond Effektivnoy politiki], founded the Russian Internet: Studies in Internet Creativity, VDM Verlag, 2009. See: Henrike Schmidt and Katy by the gallery owner Marat Gelman and the Teubener, “(Counter)Public Spheres on the Russian journalist and ex-Samizdat activist Gleb Pav- Internet”. In: Henrike Schmidt, Katy Teubener, Natalya Konradova (Eds.). Control + Shift. Public and 26 Aleksey Shulgin, “MANIFEST Iskusstvo, Private Usages of the Russian Internet. Norderstedt: Vlast’ i Kommunikacija” [MANIFEST Art, Power Books on Demand, pp. 51-72, http://www.ruhr-uni- and Communication], guelman.ru – Sovremennoe bochum.de/russ-cyb/library/texts/en/control_shift/ iskusstvo v seti, http://www.guelman.ru/slava/ Schmidt_Teubener_Public.pdf (accessed 14 January manifest/istochniki/shulgin.htm (accessed 14 2011). January 2011).

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lovsky.27 cation can be associated with the increasing This period of RuNet politics can in retrospect development of the social media in a more be associated with the term ‘polit technology’ narrow sense, that is, the turning away from or ‘political technologists’, the media manag- ‘static’ digital representation as websites to ers and ‘magicians’, who understood media personal and collective networks. This politics as the art of manipulation of the pub- new stage in the development of the RuNet lic opinion. In the specific RuNet slang, such is, of course, part of a broader global tenden- creative political media memes are also called cy and affected Russia with a slight delay in ‘kreatiff’, a derivative neologism of the Eng- 2000-2002. It coincides with the appearance lish “creative”. Once again, this development on the scene of Dmitry Medvedev as the lo- of the RuNet as an arena for political propa- cal incarnation of the smart digital politician, ganda or ‘technology’ has inspired a series of who globally is embodied by the political icon novels by popular Russian writers, ranging Barack Obama. from patriotic-nationalist Aleksandr Prokha- Throughout all the periods and stages rough- nov (Gospodin Geksogen [Mister Hexogen], ly sketched here, issues of direct or indirect 2002) to the glamour-populist Sergey Minayev political and technological control have been (Media sapiens. Povest’ o tret’em sroke [Media ardently discussed as well by the users them- sapiens. A Tale of the Third Term], 2007). The selves as by politicians. Fears of implemen- new-media-novels of the latter are best-sellers, tation of control technologies go back to the reaching particularly high circulation. 1990s and find their equivalent in numerous It is noteworthy that conspiracy theory plays initiatives by State representatives for tech- a very important role in these pop-cultural re- nological and juridical control. As a direct re- flections on the nature of political communica- action to the protest movements in Russia in tion and digital technology, characterized by winter 2011, discussions concerning censor- a strong tendency towards the discrediting of ship or the restriction of anonymity within the foreign influences, whether it is the ‘eternal’ social networks re-occurred.29 Nevertheless, Jewish conspiracy against Russia (Prokha- no effective technological control and censor- nov), the attempt of the fallen oligarchs to fi- ship of the RuNet has effectively been imple- nance political change from their exile abroad mented.30 (Minaev), or – in real political life – the stereo- typical accusation that US is interfering into 29 Rebekah Heacock, “Second- and Third- Generation Controls Rise in Russian Cyberspace”, Russian internal politics. This argument was OpenNet Initiative, 7 July 2011, http://opennet. recently put forward by Prime Minister Vladi- net/blog/2011/04/second-and-third-generation- mir Putin.28 controls-rise-russian-cyberspace (accessed 12 April The next stage in RuNet political communi- 2011); RIA Novosti, “Russia’s top cop opposes ‘face control’ on social networks”, 08.12.2011, 27 See Schmidt and Teubener, “(Counter) http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111208/169493821.html Public Spheres on the Russian Internet”, as cited (accessed 14 January 2012). above. 30 Reporters Without Borders, “Russia: 28 BBC News Europe, “Russia PM Vladimir Under Surveillance” in Internet Enemies: Re-porters Putin accuses US over poll protests”, 8 December Without Borders for Press Freedom, 77-80, 2011, http:// 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- march12.rsf.org/i/Internet_Enemies.pdf (accessed europe-16084743 (accessed 14 January 2012). 12 April 2011).

Euxeinos 4 (2012) 19 Henrike Schmidt

In the informal sphere, hacking evolved as a appears rather as a danger than as a hopeful complementary tool of Russian digital poli- utopia, and secondly: the idea that the revo- tics, with oppositional websites being blocked lutionary changes will not lead to democracy by DDOS-attacks. While it is difficult in such but to chaos and instability in the region. On cases of virtual attacks to track the initiators, the other hand, against the background of a they are subsumed to be either representatives growing dissatisfaction with the political situ- of the patriotic-nationalist youth or initiated ation in the Russia itself, the successful usage on State order. Thus, throughout the election of digital and networked media for political campaign of 2008, political oppositional par- change made Russian officials nervous and ties complained about first of all being de- let them think about strategies to circumvent prived of representation in the traditional me- similar processes, already before the ‘Slavic dia as television and print and second about Winter’ season started. Discussions of control being hindered in their online activities by of- resume the old lines as well. The digital activ- ficially initiated or supported hacker activities. ists resume their position of fear vis-à-vis a More seldom, anonymous hackers also target possible state control, while the State institu- official web resources.31 tions on their behalf call for a stricter monitor- ing. At the same time, discourses and practices Apathetic, Cynic or Hedonistic. RuNet criss-cross, when an oppositional blogger uses Publics and their Political Attitudes a drone in order to document and substanti- ate the power of the oppositional movement,33 Against this background of two decades of po- while official politicians propose to control litical (mis-)usage of the Russian Internet, the further elections with the help of web cameras so called Arab Spring provoked very specific in order to avoid misuse.34 reactions. On the one hand, the revolutions in Interestingly, public opinion and expert anal- the Arab States are judged in Russia more neg- ysis for once seem to convene concerning the atively than elsewhere in the world32. Such cau- rather sceptic attitude towards the potentials tious to pessimistic reactions are presumably of digital media for political change. Con- grounded in two conflicting rationales: first, cerning the political potential of the RuNet for many Russians, with their painful experi- specifically, throughout the last two decades ence of regime change in the 1990s, the idea of scholars from Russia and from abroad mostly democratization has lost its initial charm and adhere to a negative, dystopian point of view, denying or at least doubting its democratizing 31 See Henrike Schmidt, “Virtual Vova und Präsident Medved – Kunst, Literatur und Politik im potential. russischen Internet” [Virtual Vova and President These discussions unfold within the over- Medved – Art, Literature and Politics on the Russian Internet]. Transit. Europäische Revue 35 (2008), pp. 33 See Benjamin Bidder “Russian Blogger 175-193. Varlamov”, as cited above. 32 Gazeta.ru, “Opros: naibolee negativno k 34 The Power Vertical, Blog by Brian ‘arabskoj vesne’ otnosjatsja v Rossii” [Survey: The Whitmore on Radio Free Europa/Radio Liberty, most negative attitude towards the ‘Arab spring’ “The Putin Show and the Kremlin Shuffle”, 15 prevails in Russia], 15 December 2011, http://www. December 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/the_ gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2011/12/15/n_2135714.shtml putin_show_and_the_kremlin_shuffle/24423344. (accessed 14 January 2012). html (accessed 14 January 2012).

Euxeinos 4 (2012) 20 Henrike Schmidt

all framework of theorizing the relationship • The idea of a public sphere is principally between media and power, communication not applicable to the Russian Internet as technology and public sphere, digital media historically communication was either and new forms of democratic empowerment organized vertically by the authoritarian and deliberation. The respective positions rule (Tsarism, Soviet regime) or enacted have been largely discussed throughout the through informal channels. Accordingly, last two decades, and not surprisingly they other models and metaphors seem to be span between the two opposite poles of media more adequate to grasp the specific con- utopia and media dystopia.35 While the repre- texts of the RuNet, for example the con- sentatives of the first hoped for a deliberation cept of Samizdat or Soviet style kitchen of thought and science, of political debate and talk.36 social engagement through participative me- • The Russian society is too apathetic to use dia, the latter suspected the new digital media the Internet as a public sphere.37 No digital of turning into even more effective tools for public sphere can develop without a pub- the power elites. lic sphere already existent in ‘offline’ so- Evgeny Morozov with his book The Net Delu- ciety. It would be illusionary to subsume sion. How not to liberate the World (2011) is re- that online activism could stimulate polit- cently the most prolific critic of the ideas of the ical activity within a society like Russian democratizing power of the new media. His society which does not have a vital sector argument can be divided into two parts. First, of civic engagement and institutions.38 he theoretically doubts the techno-determinist 2. Political technology position that a change in communication tech- • Public discourse on the RuNet has been nologies can lead to a change in social and po- overruled by political technology already litical behaviour, and second he empirically at an early stage of its evolution. Parts of strives to demonstrate how the controlling the early RuNet elite themselves have en- state and not the protesting opposition profits gaged in these “dark arts”, a term coined most from digital communication technology by Andrew Wilson, and thus discredited with its great potential for monitoring and the idea of ‘authentic’ political communi- surveying, collecting and archiving data.

36 Eugene Gorny, A Creative History, as cited While agreeing in their mostly pessimistic above. conclusions, RuNet analysts, base their po- 37 Gasan Gusejnov “Liberty’s Autistic sitions though on different, sometimes self- Face: Challenges and Frustrations of the Russian excluding arguments, which can be grouped ”, Manuscript, 2008. around some central topics and motifs of digi- 38 Floriana Fossato, John Lloyd, with tal and new media theory: Aleksandr Verchovsky, “The Web that failed. How opposition politics and and independent 1. RuNet and public sphere initiatives are failing on the Internet”. RISJ Challenges. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of of the University of Oxford, 2009, 35 For example Megan Boler (ed), Digital http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/ Media and Democracy: Tactics in Hard Times. documents/Publications/The_Web_that_Failed.pdf Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008. (accessed 14 January 2012).

Euxeinos 4 (2012) 21 Henrike Schmidt

cation.39 tion of the “designing of an apolitical and • At the same time, the cynical media elite distracting entertainment” [dizajn apolit- has helped to implement an official digi- ichnogo i rasslablennogo dosuga].41 tal strategy, which is less concerned with technological control and political cen- First Lessons from the Slavic Winter. Hy- sorship, but more with manipulation of potheses the public opinion, a strategy embodied prominently by President 2.0, Dmitry It is, of course, too early to qualify the politi- Medvedev. Networked participation then cal protest and the ‘thaw effects’ of the ‘Slavic is part of the system of ‘managed democ- Winter’. And it has to be seen, whether the racy’. opposition is willing and able not only to or- • The Internet if not already existent would ganize spontaneous protests but to transform have to be invented by the secret service them into a political agenda. Commentators agencies, the Russian FSB, as it allows for see Aleksey Navalny taking exactly such steps very effectively collecting data, monitor- from anarchist blogger to a public figure and ing social movements and mobilizing cul- active politician.42 And Mikhail Prokhorov tures. appeared on the scene as a candidate for the 3. Digital consumerism and hedonism Presidential Elections who might serve as a • The ‘old’ media elite of the 1990s was still uniting figure for parts of the otherwise most influenced by an autobiographical experi- heterogeneous opposition, even if his candi- ence of the Soviet past, what manifested dacy may be seen once again as part of the itself in the sketched above utopian and ‘managed democracy’ strategy by the Krem- dystopian visions. The younger new me- lin. dia elite is the first generation which has Nevertheless, I would like to draw at least no biographical background in the Soviet some preliminary conclusions of the events of system anymore. They engage in pure the Slavic or Russian Winter 2011/2012. digital consumerism and hedonism, com- 1. The popular hypothesis that the Russian munication pleasure and entertainment, 41 Sudha Rajagopalan in her analysis of without being willing or capable to en- Russian fan cultures demonstrates, that as well the gage within public discussions about the seemingly apolitical publics do not succumb blindly common good. Very prominently, such a to the norms and moral values implemented on the web through State generated and propagated position is expressed by Dmitry Golynko- content: see: Sudha Rajagopalan, “How to Be a 40 Volfson , who puts forward the formula- Well-groomed Russian: Cultural Citizenship in the Television/New Media Interface”, Digital 39 Henrike Schmidt and Katy Teubener, Icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central “(Counter-)Public Spheres”, as cited above. European New Media, No. 3 (2010), pp. 87-101, 40 Dmitrij Golynko, “Social’nye seti v here 99, http://www.digitalicons.org/wp-content/ nesetevom sociume” [Social networks in an non- uploads/2010/07/Rajagopalan-3.5.pdf (accessed 14 networked society], Digital Icons: Studies in Russian, January 2012). Eurasian and Central European New Media, Vol. 1, 42 Vedomosti, “Politik goda” [Politician No. 2 (2009), pp. 101-113, http://www.digitalicons. of the Year], 30 December 2011, http://www. org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Dmitry-Golynko- vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/273807/politik_ DI-2.7.pdf (accessed 14 January 2012). goda#ixzz1ibcsca3G (accessed 14 January 2012).

Euxeinos 4 (2012) 22 Henrike Schmidt

population is predominantly apathetic aim at bridging the epistemological and em- and the young media elites are either pirical gap between online and offline, should cynic or hedonistic does not seem to be be applied more coherently to studies of the adequate anymore. With thousands of political RuNet.44 people reclaiming the streets, not only in Moscow, but in other mayor cities of the country, a new political consciousness is evolving. The consumption of media ser- vices in this respect differs from the con- sumption of material goods. 2. As in the case of the Arabic spring, pro- tests have been stimulated not only by economic reasons and fostered not pri- marily by the possibilities of digital me- dia, but by a feeling of hurt dignity, when a political elite detached from the people swapped roles and traded political posi- tions too blatantly. This feeling of hurt dignity manifests itself in the oppositional pairing of the Internet memes of “thieves” and “sheep”. 3. The official digital doctrine using the In- ternet as a tactical means of soft propa- ganda as promulgated by Dmitry Med- vedev and enacted by his media experts and political technologists has failed. The official players will either have to engage in a more open, not merely simulated dis- cussion with their citizens, or implement technologically and institutionally effec- tive censorship. While in 2008 commentators still viewed the Internet largely as a playground for the digital elite without any effects for real politics or even worse as a ‘safety valve’ preventing political protest, in 2011/2012 the playground turned University Press, 2006. into a battleground and, maybe, in perspective 44 Such endeavors have been undertaking into an arena for public discussion. Accord- so far mainly in the field of cultural studies, see ingly, the recently much discussed aspects of for example “Transmedial Practices in Post- transmediality and media convergence43, that Communist Spaces”, Digital Icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media, 5 (2011), 43 Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where http://www.digitalicons.org/issue05/ (accessed 14 Old and New Media Collide. New York: New York January 2012).

Euxeinos 4 (2012) 23 Henrike Schmidt

Fig. 15 to 16: “We are no sheep”. Stills from a video showing the protest rally on December 24 at Sakharov square, labelled the “most important video of the year” in the blog by Aleksey Navalny

Euxeinos 4 (2012) 24