Historical Report of Operation VARSITY H
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Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Libraries HQ Donovan Research Library Armor Research Library Fort Benning, Georgia Report date: 23-30 March 1945 Title: Operation Varsity Author: U.S. Army 17th Airborne Division Abstract: Historical summary of Ground Forces participation in Operation Varsity dated 25 April 1945. Include maps. Number of pages: 25 p. Notes: From the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA. Documents collection. Call #: D767.72 .U317. Classification: Unclassified; Approved for public release D 767.72 U 317 U°So APY 17TH AIR- dU borne div. Historical report of operation VARSITY H- QJP7iI i ?e~cn4 C~pLI MC. Ge*W.WWJ i.. M. NJVDJlrA 6M n MAR, C2 9 U045 to.. 3 0 DaICCE 9R C©]PY N© 60 _RbI"- BY 3060 ENGR. TOPO. GO. (CORPS) .,ADQUARTERS XVIII CORPS. ,(AIRBORNE) Office. of the Corps: Commande r APO 109, U S. Army SUU.'ARY OF GROUND FORO7S PARTICIPATI ON IN ..... __ OPERATIO1 N .11VAR$"ITY"tt- .... 25 April 1945 GEYETRAL 1. On or aebout 09 February 1945, while still engaged in the ROER River- area north of SC}QE.IDT, I received from the SUPRE.E CO .11.'ANDER, in person, my .first instructions concern- ing this operation. He informed methatthe XVIII Corps (Air- borne) would successively comman-d a three .airborne division operation east. of the RKINE, in support of the 21st Army Group; would be promptly withdrawn; and shortly thereafter a two-airborne division operation, likewise east of the RHINE, in support of the 12th Army Group.. 2, The Corps was withdraw from the S CIDT area, .1 Feb" ruary, returnd- to base at EPERNAY, FRANCE, and, in accordance with directives" from FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARTY, began planning for TVARSITY, under planning control of the.2lst Army.Group. PLANTThG $. 21st Army Group directed thie operation v.rould be in, support of British SECOND ARM. , The-.misson, eviolved from con- ferences with General .Officer Cwommandinig-.:hhat Arry,-Commanding General, FIRST ALIED AIRBORNE AMY, :and .Commanding General, XVIII Corps (Airborne), was: To disrupt the hostile defense of the Rt{INE in the V.SEL sector by the seizure of ley teriain by airborne attack, ii order rapidly to deepen the bridgehead to be seized in an assault crossing of the RHINE by British ground forces, and in order to facilitate the further offensive operations of the SECOND ARMii1Y. It The 6th British and the 13th and 17th U. S..Airborne DiVisions were made available :to the Corps. British SF.COND ARJJY and U. S. NINTH ARMY-, both under, 21st Army. Group control, were directed to furnish the necessary supporting troops' and serv- ices. Both were .furnished in generous measure, the bulk con-m ,sisting of Bri.tish formations, particularly artillery, .Subse-<V ciuently , due to insufficient ai i lft.. the. 13th Airborne Divi- sion was Withdrawn from the operation...- 4. -British SECOND ARMY agreed to defer its assault cross- ing of the RHINE by as much as five days, if weather should. com- pel postponement of the airborne effort, which the CO vMANDER-1N- CHIEF, 21st Army Group, and the GeneralOfficer Commanding Britis SECOND ARIMY, considered essential to the success of the RHINE crossing. Daylight was chosen for, the arborne operatiot, in order to take full advantage o complete Allied air su'premacy 7 - and the overwhelming superiority of available Allied artillery. 5. Decision was made that the airborne strike would follow the ground force assault crossing, the first time during the em- ployment of airborne forces in. which this .was ..,one... •~ { .. - i . __(Summary of Ground Forces Par.ticipation in Operation Varsity", Continued.) .6 Development .. of th e Sop a plane succ to clear and. secure-.di-vision al "areas;tesalhcontat rearward: with* ass(a-lllting 'British XII Corpos an ean te, bfiyelea I~adt- .t'C off W!ES5EL admk ~ 13; ';'~Il a~ liEt tOes ize~ by ist'Comaa "Briad) a rapid-oeio nightz hs sault by thu Briti1 ,,S.0haept ofabout-'10,000 yad y orinated Corps -attack to seize key, te rain; 'o be.prepaelonpAeb a-d-ka-~ -ra-ll- ord toso dpepnti ats h -r)of E.and- bridgehead SE 'boh- to 15,000an*e yards by an attack in .onjunctIon with XI,'Corps on its ef t and thence: to exploit' eastwlard' in ccordan ce( with ARY rdr a.d the, seituiatiCont. 7r Ivth assdecing t'thtee XII Corps airborne), thes its divisions, dtould wtraw o 'th oeration notater tha K be ppe8.di n thencetoehlitrw.o rder, elth ..t Excuoneirb oeo$e, opbratioh, onD as directedd, 24d rh. oth dvsn d w t pe .... ahafsh.ue h up44uto pemte 'cnelto glid"tThe drops, elemntfrotyaf co0mnci at1Qn~r, no'hou, ctnchlVfteno ded aint irortheth later as 24 i division.odc a bi 's B cts Corps n oderDtyo aond feengand bring operation s bec 'phe ofUVRSITY theYef '-eernt t a bit p the time -tas b f g-ldops.r,.eored i em nt thi...sh rdy)ftne rgard ev n..:'0. dbr innd :.,L uriximu. .11,cnnr or'-x iter.ioio .h4s .... - ethestoeethe t at et DULxcel ndi HALTeRutint s d orerc o areaspemi be'd 0.n Prior to thvisntite 6-th Guaird arm ehons,rade l(hs ie 'rab sou r olstrg.am..n,00yad dtGt1 p urs,wa abouKt Grendiea IlG-uathb& r 3hd-1hd Sthe en a ..- b.:9!:j)h o~ratin!Vasdvlpe:.. n:Ti ~n~mSy? h _. by: _p aS _6,0 iit . 'pC.~ ,; y th:- in"b; ... te;,ria:oefnd~ att'ache t ''0 O 0C othAtachhin. the 5:. hPar chute Inatryh i~~~~~~~bu inS' 5 ] ~ . ~~: d (:1p :wS'.W [Ip; d.u -eo~.e r ~lh,-;[th/.. to tis 'br" ;igadei 'wasntcpushed" w:ith'."aimume speedh andi ensergyi-iJ. th east and rRS'TQidltheizred trihedbouchmnt areas onDsire.i Immediately on the heels of this brigad,, the infantry of the 17th Airborne Division arrived, took oVor the defense of these areas, and freedthe Guards Arm.red' Brigade for its rapid s'ub- seQuent movement on I IUNSER. -. I.! Meanwhile, through both the DULM N and ALTERN dI of which were now securely held, the U. S.. 2d Armored Divisthe exits ion: exploited eastward. STTISTICS 12. During. the six-day peri0d, 24 to 30 March, inwhich this Corps controlled the operation, it averaged a daily advance of over seven mile; took 8,000 prisoners; destroyed the 84th infa ntry Division; and,. by ,verified but very incomplete count, -V. -. ' p 4 (Summary of Ground Forces Participation in Operation ,,Varsityt, Continued.> captured or- destroyed 124 artillery and AApieces and 26 tanks. The withdrawal of the Corps on D/6 Made it impossible to get full reports from the divisions. It is believed that the amount of materiel captured and destroyed greatly exceeds the above figures. CONCLUS IONS 13. a. Conceptan4 planning were sound and thorough, and execution flaless. b. The impact of the1airborne , completely shatteredthe hostile defense,divisions, permitting- at prompt.-one blow, link-up WVith the assaulting"XII Corps, the 1 st, Commando Brigade, and the NINTH R on th south. c. The rapid deepening of.the bridgehead materially increased the rapidity, of bridging operations, which, in turn, greatly increased the rate Of build-up, ,on the ea,st bank, So essential to- sub.sequent successes. The :,insistent drive of the Corps to the est,. .and the rapid sei.zre ofke-y terrain- inthe"DUL.-- n -LTERareas, were decisive contributions 0tothis Ipeationi andi t.0 bSequs t developments, as by it both British and U. S- armor'were able to debouch into the north German- plain at full' strength and ino- mentum. I r-•;,,--- , .. .n. .z e. Inpann and. in execution,.d the cooperi~tion of participating air forc ' bth British and American, I!*consider copletely sat isfactory. There. was-no enpm air ivntrcpion. The- f ghtr-b ombers in th4'r couter-flak i6lt er ' ffec- tive could,6as h p beV.n -expected" The. air -est.pply-byheavy bombers was timuy and mdt ac\ritical ned. ,TrVop delivery by IX Troop. Carrier Corutand vwas on.-time,n, ie, and V,.'c h rIivor xc4 p -4 tions, in the correct areas. f. lwviish particularly to record that throughout both planning and execution, the cooprati on nnd actual assistance provided by the .Commanders, Staff and troops of the British formations under which this Corps served, which it comrmanded, or with which it was: associated, left' nothing ,to-be d'esired. For my part, I have never had imorQ satisfying professional- service in combat, nor more agreeable personrl.. relatons: With participating coimianders.-"...- T or'General, U. SArmyj Commnd'- , r. pl, 4 .. :Auth: CG,;XVIII • rps,.(Abn) HEADQU ARTERS, XVIII CORPS (AIRBORNE) Init::9 APO 109, United States Army -Da1e: 25 Apr 45 25 April 1945 REPORT ON OPERATION VARSITY 1. PLANNING PHASE: a. Headquarterls, XVIII Corps (Airborne) was at ZIEIFALL, GERMANY preparing plans to cross ROER River when Major General M. B. RIDGWAY received orders to report for conference 9 February-1945 with Commander-In-Chief, TWENTY-FIRST ARLY GROUP. At this conference the XVIII Corps (Airborne) was alerted for Operation VARSITY, an airborne operation in conjunction with the crossing of RHINE River by SECOND BRITISH ARf, with date to be 31 March 1945.. The Corps was relieved from FIRST U.S. ARMY and proceeded to base in EFERNAY, FRANCE, closing there 14'February 1945. b. The 6th British Airborne Division, 17th U.S. Airborne Division and 13th U.S., Airborne Division were assigned for the airborne operation. The 6th British Airborne Division movd 'to ENGLAND from FRA4NCE for training and preparation'for departure from airdromes in the UNITED KINGDOM.