Document of the World Bank

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR0000638

Public Disclosure Authorized

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-36370)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 356.0MILLION Public Disclosure Authorized (US$442.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF INDIA

FOR A

GUJARAT EMERGENCY EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

Public Disclosure Authorized April 29, 2009

Sustainable Development Department Urban and Water Unit India Country Management Unit South Asia Region

Public Disclosure Authorized CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective September 30, 2008) Currency Unit = Indian Rupees INRe.1.00 = US$ [0.022] US$ 1.00 = [INR 45.00] FISCAL YEAR

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADB Asian Development Bank GoI Government of India APL Above Poverty Line GSDMA Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority BME Benefit Monitoring and Evaluation GSHP Gujarat State Highways Project BPL Below Poverty Line GSSI Gujarat School Safety Initiative CAS Country Assistance Strategy ICB International Competitive Bidding CBO Community Based Organization IDA International Development Association CBDMP Community Based Disaster Management IEC Information, Education and Communication Program CBDRM Community Based Disaster Risk ISR Institute of Seismological Research Management CEO Chief Executive Officer ISR Implementation Status Report CP Community Participation MTR Mid-Term Review DCA Development Credit Agreement M&E Monitoring and Evaluation DEA Department of Economic Affairs NCB National Competitive Bidding DEOC District Emergency Operation Centers NDMA National Disaster Management Authority DM Disaster Management NIDM National Institute of Disaster Management DMA Disaster Management Authority NGO Non Governmental Organization DMCB Disaster Management Capacity Building OP Operational Policy DSRP Dam Safety Review Panels OBC Other Backward Class DRM Disaster Risk Mitigation PAD Project Appraisal Document EA Environmental Assessment PDO Project Development Objective EMF Environmental Management Framework PIP Project Implementation Plan EMP Environmental Management Plan OP Operational Policy EMAP Environmental Management Action Plan R&BD Roads and Buildings Department EOC Emergency Operation Centers SA Social Assessment ERC Emergency Response Center SC/ST Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe GDMA Gujarat Disaster Management Act SEOC State Emergency Operation Centers GDCR General Development Control Regulation TA Taluka Administration GEERP Gujarat Emergency Earthquake TDO Taluka (Sub District) Development Office Reconstruction Project GIDM Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management USAID United States Agency for Institutional Development GoG Government of Gujarat WRD Water Resources Department

Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Country Director: N. Roberto Zagha Sector Manager: Junaid K. Ahmad Project Team Leader: Soraya Goga ICR Team Leader: Soraya Goga INDIA GUJARAT EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT CONTENTS

Data Sheet

A. Basic Information...... i B. Key Dates ...... i C. Ratings Summary ...... i D. Sector and Theme Codes...... ii E. Bank Staff...... ii F. Results Framework Analysis ...... iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ...... v H. Restructuring (if any) ...... v I. Disbursement Profile ...... vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design...... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...... 5 3. Assessment of Outcomes ...... 9 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome...... 15 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ...... 15 6. Lessons Learned...... 17 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners...... 19 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing...... 20 Annex 2: Outputs and Outcomes by Component ...... 22 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ...... 36 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes...... 37 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ...... 39 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results...... 40 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...... 41 Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders...... 52 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...... 53 MAP IBRD 31839

A. Basic Information Gujarat Emergency Country: India Project Name: Earthquake Reconstruction Project Project ID: P074018 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-36370 ICR Date: 05/01/2009 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: INDIA Original Total XDR 356.0M Disbursed Amount: XDR 230.7M Commitment: Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority Government of India for Polio Eradication Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 11/20/2001 Effectiveness: 07/15/2002 12/23/2004 Appraisal: 02/26/2002 Restructuring(s): 02/29/2008 Approval: 05/02/2002 Mid-term Review: 11/01/2003 11/14/2003 Closing: 10/31/2005 10/31/2008

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Satisfactory Performance: Performance:

i C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of No None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Moderately

Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Housing construction 61 54 Irrigation and drainage 13 12 Other social services 2 5 Roads and highways 14 16 Sub-national government administration 10 13

Theme Code (Primary/Secondary) Natural disaster management Primary Primary Other urban development Primary Primary Participation and civic engagement Primary Primary Rural policies and institutions Secondary Secondary Rural services and infrastructure Primary Primary

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Mieko Nishimizu Country Director: N. Roberto Zagha Edwin R. Lim Sector Manager: Junaid Kamal Ahmad Sonia Hammam Project Team Leader: Soraya Goga Shyamal Sarkar ICR Team Leader: Soraya Goga ICR Primary Author: Soraya Goga

ii F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the Project is to assist Gujarat in carrying out the second phase of a program of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the areas affected by the Gujarat earthquake of January 26, 2001, including restoration of housing and public buildings, restoration of basic infrastructure in the roads and irrigation sectors, and development of an institutional framework to allow better disaster mitigation and risk management for future natural disasters.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The Revised objectives of the Project were to assist (a) the Borrower in eradicating poliomyelitis; and (b) Gujarat in carrying out the second phase of a program of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the areas affected by the Gujarat earthquake of January 26, 2001, including restoration of housing and public buildings, restoration of basic infrastructure in the roads and irrigation sectors, and development of an institutional framework to allow better disaster mitigation and risk management for future natural disasters.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Rehabilitation and reconstruction program in the earthquake affected areas Indicator 1 : including restoration of houses, public buildings and basic infrastructure in the roads and irrigation sectors completed. Houses Houses Reconstructed: Houses Reconstructed: 125,000 Reconstructed: 135,000 Hses 125781 Hses Repaired: Repaired: Hses Repaired: 75,000 42,000 41751 Engr Trained: Engr Trained: Engr Trained: 678 1,000 1,000 Mason Trained: Mason Trained: Mason 3832 5,000 Value Trained: 5,000 Dams Dams quantitative or Dams Rehabilitation: 225 Rehabilitation: 222 Qualitative) Rehabilitation: PB: 3701 P Building: 1200 225 PB reconstructed: PB reconstructed: PB: 2000 232 Incl in above PB PB retrofitted: 2848 PB retrofitted: 500 reconstructed: NB construct: NB construct: 200 Constr ISR in Constr for GIDM, PB retrofitted: progress GIDM ISR 2000 Roads Impr: 870km Roads Imprv: NB construct: roads 700km Constr for

iii GIDM, ISR Roads Impr: 800km Date achieved 10/31/2005 10/31/2008 03/31/2009 Comments All original targets achieved or exceeded except houses repaired or reconstructed (incl. % due to lower than assessed demand. All revised targets met or exceeded achievement) Institutional framework to allow better disaster mitigation and risk management Indicator 2 : for future natural disasters developed. Reduced Reduced comm comm Reduced comm vulnerability: 500 vulnerability: vulnerability: DM selfhelp grps DM Committees formed constituted, 100 Committees in 10289 villages GM conducted formed Setup inst Value Setup inst Setup inst framework: Mgmt quantitative or framework: Mgmt framework: Act Leg Qualitative) Act Leg Mgmt Act Leg Imprv DM Imprv DM Imprv DM Capacity: Expert Capacity: State Capacity: Committee on wide Emergency State wide statewide comm com network Emergency was constituted comm network Date achieved 10/31/2005 10/31/2008 03/31/2009 Comments All original and revised targets achieved except some procurement of equipment, (incl. % and works for Regional ERCs and implementation of capacity building in achievement) certain smaller ULBs. These are in progress at closure, financed by GoG

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : Number of reconstructed houses insured - 100% 100 % of the 100 % of the houses 100 % of the houses houses reconstructed Value reconstructed with reconstructed with with financial (quantitative financial assistance financial assistance or Qualitative) from the Project are assistance from the from the insured Project are insured Project are insured Date achieved 10/31/2005 10/31/2008 03/31/2009 Comments (incl. % All original targets fully achieved achievement)

iv G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 06/24/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 12/30/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 66.25 3 06/27/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 88.22 4 11/26/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 137.31 5 06/25/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 170.99 6 12/24/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 189.42 7 06/23/2005 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 235.48 8 12/30/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 275.59 9 06/28/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 289.06 10 12/28/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 299.91 11 06/29/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 306.90 12 12/17/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 313.36 13 06/27/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 325.46 14 10/31/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 330.94

H. Restructuring (if any)

ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions 12/23/2004 Y S S 189.42 Expand support for disaster management activities, enhance the emergency response 02/29/2008 MS MS 318.25 capacity statewide and redefine the dam safety and irrigation component

If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving body) enter ratings below: Outcome Ratings Against Original PDO/Targets Satisfactory Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets Satisfactory Overall (weighted) rating Satisfactory

v I. Disbursement Profile

vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

The Devastating Earthquake: On January 26, 2001 Gujarat experienced a devastating earthquake. At the end of two minutes, 13,000 people were dead and 167,000 were injured. The scale of physical destruction was also immense: 1.2 million homes, 2,000 health facilities, 12,000 schools, hundreds of public and other buildings (including thousands of records), dams, water supply systems, roads, power and telecommunications systems, factories, cottage industries and farms were all destroyed or damaged, effectively crippling the state’s social, public, and municipal services as well as its economy. The earthquake affected 12 districts1 but Kutchh, one of the poorest districts in the state, was most seriously affected with an average of 70% of all buildings destroyed. The earthquake followed two other natural disasters, from which the disaster- prone state was still recovering: a cyclone in 1998 and the start of a drought in 1999.

The Government of Gujarat and the Donors response: The immensity of destruction drove an intense response. The Government of Gujarat (GoG) acted swiftly to move beyond relief towards reconstruction. Recognizing the need for co-ordination of Government, donor agencies, and NGOs, the GoG formed the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA) in February 2001. In parallel, the GoG undertook a damage assessment and then invited the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Government of the Netherlands, and the United States Agency for International Development to review its findings. The assessment estimated sectoral asset losses at US$2.1 billion for the same-standard replacement costs (including household assets) and US$1.8 billion in improved-standard replacement costs (but excluding household assets).

The Response Strategy: The GoG, with the assistance of the World Bank and ADB, subsequently developed an innovative strategy for rebuilding damaged infrastructure and services, supporting the sustained livelihoods of very vulnerable households and building built disaster management capacity. The strategy called for a phased implementation: (i) the Short Term Phase supported priority areas to address basic human needs and begin reconstruction. (ii) the Medium Term Phase continued and completed the reconstruction and recovery efforts, but also initiated a medium-term emergency response management program; and (iii) the Long Term Phase aimed at strengthening the capacity of GSDMA for reducing and managing natural hazards, and piloted implementation of risk management transfer mechanisms. The GoG subsequently developed a Gujarat Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Program, covering all sectors that were damaged by the earthquake, with different sectors financed by different donors2, The program also addressed medium and long-term goals i.e emergency response and risk mitigation.

The Bank Support: Consistent with this approach, the Bank assisted GoG in developing and financing Phase 1 of the Program through reallocating credit proceeds from several other ongoing Bank financed projects (US$ 261.6 M, approved in March 2001). Phase 1

1 Kutchh, Rajkot, Jamnagar, Surendranagar, Ahmadabad, Patan, Banaskantha, Porbandar, Bhavnagar, Surat, Amreli, Junagadh 2 Mainly World Bank, ADB, Government of Netherlands and European Union 1 of the Program supported immediate reconstruction of housing, health, education, dams and irrigation, roads and bridges, public buildings and community participation support. The Bank followed by approving the GEERP (Cr 3637) in May 2002, to reinforce the Phase 1 interventions and to assist the GoG in implementing its medium-term strategy.

Rationale for Bank Assistance: The CAS for India (June 2001) complemented the strategic objectives of India’s Ninth Plan and focused on strengthening the enabling environment for development, sustainable growth and support to critical interventions to benefit the poor. The project contributed to the latter two goals, as natural disasters affect growth and inordinately affect the poor, who lack the capital for quick recovery.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

The objective of the project is to assist Gujarat in carrying out the second phase of a program of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the areas affected by the Gujarat earthquake of 26 January, 2001, including restoration of housing and public buildings, restoration of basic infrastructure in the roads and irrigation sectors, and development of an institutional framework to allow better disaster mitigation and risk management for future natural disasters3.

The key indicators of achievement of the development objectives are the following:

(a) Housing: (i) Number of damaged/destroyed houses rehabilitated/repaired by owners; (ii) Number of engineers/masons trained in hazard resistant construction; (b) Public Infrastructure reconstruction: (i) Number of affected dams strengthened to hazard resistant standards in Kutchh and Saurashtra regions; (ii) Number of Public buildings repaired, rehabilitated, or reconstructed to ensure smooth public administration; (iii) Number of critical undamaged public buildings in seismic Zones IV and V retrofitted to protect against future disasters; (iv) Number of new buildings to strengthen disaster management capacity and; (v) length in km of earthquake affected state road network improved along with structures for ensuring connectivity; (c) Community Participation: (i) Number of self help groups constituted in villages, and (ii) number of gram sabhas conducted to reduce vulnerability of communities against future emergencies and their capacity building through stakeholder participation; (d) Disaster Management Capacity Building: to enhance state’s disaster management capacity through : (i) setting up of two regulatory and research institutions, (ii) preparing state level disaster management plans, (iii) setting up and making functional statewide emergency communication network, and (iv) setting up and making functional statewide control rooms.

1.3 Revised Approved PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

3 The PDO in the original DCA differs from that of the Technical Annex (TA). The original PDO in the TA read as ‘The original objectives of the project were to: (a) promote sustainable recovery in the disaster-affected areas, and (b) lay the foundations for sustainable disaster management capacity in Gujarat. The project is evaluated against the PDO of the DCA as the latter is the legally binding document. 2 In December 2004, the PDO was revised through a first adaptive restructuring as follows: (a) to assist the borrower (GoI) in eradicating poliomyelitis; and (b) same as the original PDO above. The PDO (a) was added to assist GoI to part finance "Polio Eradication" under the Immunization Strengthening Project (Cr. 3340 IN, closed on 12/31/2005) implemented by the Government of India and Credit amount of US$ 20 M equivalent was reallocated from the project’s potential savings to this new component. All activities related to polio eradication were supervised and monitored under that project.

In February 2008, during a second restructuring, the PDOs and the key indicators remained unchanged. However, the team revised the output targets to reflect reduced or increased demands under specific components. This opportunistic restructuring built on existing knowledge to better achieve the project’s PDO, especially as it related to the development of an institutional framework and vulnerability reduction. (See Section 1.6)

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

The project’s direct beneficiaries include: (i) home owners whose homes were destroyed by the earthquake; (ii) farmers and other users of the dams and irrigation infrastructure; (iii) road users; (iv) communities who improved their disaster preparedness; (v) the public administrative services which utilized affected public buildings; and (vi) residents of Gujarat who benefit from an improved state disaster management capacity. Under the 2004 restructuring, the beneficiary list expanded to include the poor, women and children who are primarily affected by polio4.

1.5 Original Components

The original five components included: A. Repairs and Reconstruction of Permanent housing; B. Reconstruction of Public Infrastructure; C. Community Participation; D. Disaster Management; and E. Project Management.

Component A: Repairs and reconstruction of permanent housing (Costs at Appraisal/Actual US$ 197.2 M/ US$ 132 M): This component financed the implementation of owner driven housing construction, initiated under Phase 1, for 75,000 partially damaged and 135,000 fully damaged houses with associated capacity building support and training of masons and engineers.

Component B: Reconstruction of Public Infrastructure (Costs at Appraisal/Actual US$ 236.9 M US$ 245 M): This component included financing of: • Public Buildings o Repair and Reconstruction of 1,200 residential and non-residential buildings in several government departments. o Retrofitting of 500 undamaged critical public buildings located in highly vulnerable seismic zones IV and V.

4 Note that the polio project was not restricted to implementation in Gujarat, but was country-wide 3 o Three new buildings5 for GSDMA, and for the newly conceptualized Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management (GIDM) and the Institute of Seismological Research (ISR). • Dams & Irrigation: Repairs to 222 dams and irrigation infrastructure in Kutch and Saurashtra and technical assistance in carrying out the repairs. • Roads & Bridges : Rehabilitation /strengthening of 700 km of state roads and associated technical assistance

Component C: Community Participation (Costs at Appraisal/Actual US$ 12.5 M/ US$ 4 M): This component included information and communication activities, establishment of village level institutions, strengthening local governments, gender sensitization and community based disaster awareness and preparedness programs.

Component D: Disaster Management (Costs at Appraisal/Actual US$ 51.1 M/ US$ 73.5M): This component supported Gujarat in achieving its long term goals of building institutions to better manage disasters. It built on the recommendations on the (then) Draft Disaster Management Policy and the Disaster Management Bill (enacted into law in 2003). The component included: • Emergency Management Activities including (i) feasibility studies related to the setting up of an emergency response system; (ii) institutional consolidation including an institutional capacity assessment and operationalizing an emergency management system and (iii) setting up of an emergency response system • Hazard Mitigation and Risk Transfer Activities such as studies on digital hazard maps, inventories of hazardous buildings, regulatory studies on building codes, procedures for community based disaster management planning etc. • Development of Disaster Management Institutions: Strengthening the GSDMA and establishing the GIDM and the ISR.

Component E: Project Management (Costs at Appraisal/Actual US$ 6.0 M/ US$ 6.0 M) included GSDMA incremental operating costs for project implementation.

1.6 Revised Components

In the first restructuring, a new component for Polio eradication was added to partly finance a GoI implemented Polio Immunization Project. The second restructuring enhanced/reduced the output targets as follows:

(i) Component A: Reduced number of owner driven houses that the Credit will finance from 135,000 reconstructed houses to 125,000 and from 75,000 rehabilitated houses to 42,000. This reflected reduced overall demand. (ii) Component B: Expanded Dam Safety component to mitigate risk by strengthening 4 vulnerable (but undamaged) dams in earthquake sensitive area. Road network improvement expanded from 700 km to 800 km. (iii) Component D: (i) Expanded Hazard Risk Mitigation Activities from the initial 12 earthquake affected districts to all 25 districts in Gujarat, and (ii) Enhanced Emergency

5 The 3 institutions were formed after the earthquake to build long-term disaster management capacity. 4 Response Capacity to include the fire and rescue services of municipalities and the ambulance services of hospitals -statewide for first response.

1.7 Other significant changes

(a) Project closing date extended three times (2 years, 4 months and 8 months; Total 3 years). An initial extension until October 31, 2007 was required due to the enormity of the implementation challenges (mainly in the Dams and Irrigation component, reconstruction of urban housing and in retrofitting of public buildings). The original unrealistic 3-year implementation period was a contributory factor to the required extension. The second extension (February 28, 2008) and third extension (October, 31 2008) resulted from implementation delays following force majeure (i.e. severe floods in 2005 and 2006) and the third extension allowed the IDA to assess if a GoG proposal to expand the disaster management component could be adequately implemented.

(b) Cancellations: Cancellation of SDR 76.16 M Credit occurred in two installments, first in June 2005 to reallocate funds to the Emergency Tsunami Reconstruction project, and the second in January 2007 because of the potential savings arising out of reduced financing required for housing component and favorable SDR- USD- INR exchange rates. At Project Closing, further SDR 49.02 M Credit remains unutilized.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

Background Analysis, Preparation and Design:

Project Objectives and Design: The Development Objectives and the GoG’s medium term reconstruction strategy were well aligned. Both focused on immediate reconstruction and the initiation of institutional development for disaster management (See Section 1). The projects joint focus (reconstruction and disaster management i.e. hardware and software) distinguishes it from many other post-disaster recovery projects that usually emphasize only reconstruction without disaster risk mitigation. The Bank’s focus on the seemingly disparate components (as far ranging as housing, dams, roads and disaster management) responded to requests by the GoG and also took into account other available financing provided by additional donors.

Lessons Incorporated: The project’s design took lessons from the implementation of the Phase 1 Program, as well as other Bank assisted Emergency Operations in India. The project incorporated a high-powered coordinating authority, GSDMA, in response to earlier project’s findings that implementation performance is directly related to government capacity to co-ordinate multi-sector operations and processes6. This was particularly important in the GEERP, which was implemented by 12 different agencies7

6 This was a lesson of previous Bank assisted projects including the Andhra Pradesh Cyclone Emergency Reconstruction Project, the Maharashtra Emergency Earthquake Rehabilitation Project and the Andhra Pradesh Hazard Mitigation and Emergency Cyclone Recovery project. 7 Director Primary Education Program, Director Technical Education, State Roads and Building Department, Panchayat Roads and Building Department, Capital Projects Roads and Building Department, Home Department, Ahmadabad 5 and 200,000 homeowners. At a technical level, third party quality audits for construction were included in the project design, learning from the experience of the Phase 1 Program. Finally, the project design incorporated a coherent well-targeted information dissemination campaign. This facilitated effective project implementation.

The Project design was also extremely innovative. Some examples include: (i) leveraging the disaster and the reconstruction needs to introduce a medium and long-term disaster risk mitigation strategy (including the formation of institutions8 for disaster management, the strengthening of dams (i.e. not only their immediate repair) to seismic resistant standards); (ii) introducing a home-owner approach to construction, rather than a contractor based approach, and formulating a complex cash-grant system to support the approach; (iii) supporting joint home ownership between the husband and wife; and (iv) including community participation and community based disaster management programs into the overall disaster risk management strategy.

2.2 Implementation

Institutional Readiness: The GSDMA had been formed, staffed and allocated financial resources and had already implemented the Phase1 Program by the start of the project. A Gujarat Disaster Management Bill, which would provide the legal authority for a reconstituted GSDMA and its disaster risk mitigation functions, had been drafted, followed by the promulgation of the Act in 2003.

Implementation Delays: As with many emergency projects, not all components or activities (the dams’ sub-component and the disaster management component, urban housing and retrofitting of public building activities in particular) were adequately prepared at the time of appraisal. It was understood that these would be prepared during the project’s first year. These factors were compounded by technical issues (particularly in the dams sub-component), delays in urban planning (financed by another donor), capacity constraints of line departments (especially in the Dams Sub-Component) GSDMA in managing Bank Procurement.

The multiplicity of reasons for delay affected each component differently: (i) the scale of the housing reconstruction program drove a tight operational plan. Consequently, late starters – mainly in urban housing - (or beneficiaries who experienced problems ‘out of the ordinary’) were severely handicapped in completing their homes within the required period and budget. Furthermore, there was an extensive delay in the completion of urban plans for 4 towns, which, concomitantly, delayed the reconstruction of housing in the affected towns; (ii) the scope of the technical requirements in constructing dams (which included required retroactive engineering designs, approvals from the DSRP and lengthy approval processes) worked against the completion of works in three years9. This was compounded by weak contractor capacity;

Municipal Corporation, Jamnagar Municipal Corporation, Special Project Roads and Building Department, Water Resources Department, GSDMA. 8 Including the GIDM, the ISR, the GSDMA, the ERCs, the EOCs 9 20 large dams required additional time for implementation due to the required safety review process. 6 (iii) the innovativeness of the Disaster Management Program i.e. its design in the absence of any experience both in the state and in India - also militated against timely completion of the component.

In retrospect, the project’s delivery was driven by the immensity of need (as is often the case in emergency projects), based on a rationale that beginning reconstruction on the prepared components/subcomponents (Housing, Public Buildings, Roads, Community Participation) was preferable to simultaneous implementation of, particularly the dams sub-component and the disaster management components, where preparation was yet to be completed. Furthermore, the limited time stipulations of OP 8.5, rather than a realistic assessment of the time required for project implementation, drove the three-year project.

Participatory Processes: The participatory ethos that permeated the program (and also the project) began immediately after the earthquake. The GoG convened a Statutory Advisory Committee (SAC), comprising of sector specialists, to assist with strategy and policy. It also began to collaborate with a network of NGOs, particularly in Kutchh. It continued throughout the program and the project through (i) incorporating participatory process in the housing construction process; (ii) expanding the disaster risk management framework to communities. An information and education framework complemented this. The GSDMA and the GoG monitored the effectiveness of participatory processes through a continuous social impact assessment. A Benefit Monitoring and Evaluation Study (BME) measured the program’s impact (See section 3).

Bank Supervision and Actions Taken: Initial Bank supervision largely reflected the projects’ emergency nature. Consequently, it focused on preparation activities, the resolution of social safeguards concerns and problem-solving in those components/subcomponents experiencing implementation delays (particularly housing)10. At the time of the MTR, the team appeared confident that project would meet its October 2005 closing date. However, the team soon recognized that several components would not be concluded by the closing date and sought a two-year extension until October 31, 2007.

In October 2007, the GoG sought an extension, together with a project restructuring. The extension was required due to force majeure (i.e. floods in 2005 and 2006) which had forced the GSDMA to withdraw temporarily from GEERP to manage the post-flood recovery. The team designed the two-stage extension to ensure that procurement and implementation were proceeding as planned prior to undertaking project restructuring and granting the third extension. The initial four-month extension also allowed the team to evaluate if the expansion of the program to all districts (as requested by the GoG) and procurement of equipment could be completed within the requested period.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

10 (i) the delay in implementation of the dam’s sub-component presents the contradiction between the need for quick action versus quality control. The emphasis of the team/ GoG veered towards ensuring adequate quality rather than meeting unrealistic timeline; (ii) in the Housing Component, although the majority of housing construction was completed in the allotted time, ‘anomalies’ in urban areas and late starters required innovative solutions; (iii) Social safeguards, in response to findings of the CSIA consistently clarified entitlement, focusing especially on Scheduled Caste families, and relocation concerns. 7 The program’s impact (i.e. not only the Bank financed components) was monitored through a Benefit Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. The hypothesis was that the reconstruction program improved the quality of life of earthquake affected communities beyond pre-earthquake levels. Indicators took into account (i) basic minimum service levels suggested by the 9th five year plan; (ii) sectors where investments were substantial.

Sector specific outcomes and indicators were identified and appropriate tools for data collection were designed including 3 surveys covering housing, education, women’s livelihoods (surveys 3 and 4), agriculture (survey 1), cottage and village industries (survey 2), water supply, public buildings, roads and bridges, health and power. Individual studies were also undertaken for dams and irrigation, capacity building and disaster preparedness, community participation and trade and commerce. The findings of the BME were part of a ‘feedback loop’ that the GSDMA used to identify areas where additional resources or remedies were required.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

Social Safeguards: Two social safeguard policies applied to the project: OD 4.30 on Involuntary Resettlement (now O.P. 4.12) and OD 4.20 on Indigenous People (now O.P. 4.10). Compliance is rated as satisfactory. OP 4.12 applied to 'secondary' relocation where persons were dislocated from (i) areas where the GoG located new housing construction financed under the project; (ii) some town planning areas. It did not apply to primary relocation i.e. where the earthquake had dislocated people. The extent of project-affected persons was unknown at the project’s start and the Bank requested the Borrower to report instances of secondary relocation. Only one instance of secondary relocation was identified (at the project’s start) and a methodology and actions to address the relocation based on consultations with the affected people was formulated.

OP 4.10. Tribal people affected by the earthquake received equitable benefits, since the project provided benefits based on the damage assessments. Land alienation did not affect tribal people and there is no evidence that the project affected tribal culture negatively. Indeed, the livelihood interventions, communication campaigns and community participation efforts were built on local cultures and networks.

Environment Safeguards: OP 4.01 on Environmental Assessment, and OPN11.03/OP4.11 on Cultural Resources were applicable and Borrower compliance has been consistent with the requirements and is rated as satisfactory. Environmental Management was systematically integrated into the project using an Environmental Management Framework (EMF) approach11. All implementing agencies used activity specific environmental mitigation checklists developed under the project. Environmental Management Action Plans (EMAP) were prepared for new construction and/or augmentation of infrastructure. All environmental management measures were incorporated in the various contract documents - and contractor compliance was monitored. Quarterly reporting by the GSDMA on the environmental safeguards

11 Included screening criteria to determine if additional environmental work was required, standard mitigation measures as part of design, use of standard codes and environmental management action plans 8 indicates that all implementing agencies followed environmental management guidance of the EMF and EMAP.

Environmental concerns were proactively integrated into the project. Some examples include (i) initial concerns on construction related impacts were immediately addressed (notably by the R&BD, which also benefited from its engagement with the State Highways Project); (ii) the GSDMA, initiated and financed several studies including a flood vulnerability assessment, vulnerability due to climate change in 4 cities and seismic microzonation of a proposed Special Investment Region in Ahmadabad district.

Financial Management and Disbursement is rated as satisfactory and the Borrower has complied with all legal covenants. The financial management arrangements for the project were satisfactory. Audit Reports were received as scheduled, disbursements have also been timely and the finance unit of the GEERP has been effective in coordinating and monitoring the projects financial management status. The submission of details of expenditure incurred and possible recoveries for ineligible expenses claimed for the construction of approximately 19 500 houses remains as an outstanding issue.

Procurement: Procurement under the project was generally satisfactory. However, capacity building of the GSDMA to ensure efficient management of complex ICB procurement processes and procedures could have improved procurement performance.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

The three institutions whose formation was supported by the project (i.e. GSDMA, GIDM and ISR) remain after the project closed, now supported financially by the GoG. Furthermore, the NDMA is collaborating with the GSDMA in implementing the National Cyclone Risk Mitigation Project currently under preparation for Bank financing. Finally, the dams and roads financed by the project have been adequately operated and maintained since their completion.

However, concerns include (i) potential risk that village level disaster preparedness may not be sustained (i.e. no updating of disaster management plans, no continuation of gram sabhas on DM preparedness); (ii) the implementation of the Operations Plan for the Emergency Response Centers (which relies on the co-operation of several levels of Government) will be challenging; and (iii) poor awareness on household insurance negates long term risk mitigation goals.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

The project objectives continue to be highly relevant to Gujarat, India and Bank’s new CAS. The GoI’s 11th five-year plan, 2007-2012, incorporates the aim of consolidating disaster preparedness, prevention and risk mitigation progress by integrating them into the development process. GEERP piloted such integration. The current India CAS (2009- 2012) states that the WBG will assist in increasing the resilience of people and the

9 economy to natural and man-made shocks. This articulates with the GEERP objective of building resilience and reducing the vulnerability of communities to disasters through risk mitigation and preparedness programs.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

The two-part PDO was linked to the PDO Indicators as follows: PDO Indicator #1 related to the rehabilitation of housing, public buildings, roads and dams. PDO Indicator #2 related to institutional development. An assessment of the outputs linked to each PDO Indicator reveals a rating of ‘satisfactory’ as the project met all identified targets.

Assessment of PDO Indicator #1: Rehabilitation and reconstruction program in the earthquake affected areas including the restoration of houses, public buildings and basic infrastructure in the roads and irrigation sector.

Restoration of Housing: The physical targets were met and exceeded. This reflects the GoGs tremendous organizational capacity and motivation to deliver, given the immensity of need and the complexity of the housing program12 (See Annex 2). However, completion rates and technical quality of construction remain as issues of concern. Approximately 19, 500 beneficiaries who received an initial payment or the initial and second installment did not seek / receive final payment and, in theory, did not complete their homes. The GSDMA is currently reviewing each case and taking required action13. These could include late starters in the program (about 7.5%) who experienced difficulties in completing construction to an appropriate standard due to cost inflation of construction materials and the demobilization of Government staff (who supplied technical assistance) allocated to the program. However, this represents a small number and percent of the total beneficiaries. More concerning, and a definite risk to sustainability, is the finding by a post-facto technical audit that suggested that 7% of a sample of houses did not conform to the earthquake resistant structural construction standards. The GSDMA is currently reviewing these cases through a comparison with the third party audit (undertaken during construction) and proposes to assist these homeowners in ensuring their homes are retrofitted to seismic resistant standards.

Non-Physical aspects of the program demonstrated good performance. Efforts to address transparency, participation and voice in housing reconstruction were sound and the housing program did improve access to services, housing conditions and gender equity for beneficiaries. However, the insurance program, although pioneering, reveals mixed results for the long-term intention of transferring risk to the private sector.

Positive Impacts of the Homeowner driven approach:

12 The program included designing mechanisms to ensure community based equitable allocation of grants, transparent and actual financing flows to beneficiaries, monitoring housing construction progress against standards in order to trigger financial flows, ensuring an adequate supply of materials, co-ordination of different levels of Government and different departments particularly in urban areas 13 Note that the GSDMA have found that 478 houses have been completed. A further 7,500 houses are estimated to qualify for the benefit (i.e. have been completed to seismic resistant standards. The recovery process had been initiated where houses have not been completed to seismic resistant standards and thus far, US$ 1.1 m has been recovered. 10

• Beneficiary Satisfaction: The project’s owner driven housing approach empowered beneficiaries so that they ‘owned’ the construction process. Satisfaction levels with this approach exceeded those associated with other approaches (See Annex 2). • Quick Completion: Lengthy procurement processes were avoided; thus ensuring rapid start ups. Also, because a homeowner (rather than a contractor) was undertaking construction, the incentive to rapidly complete the house was extremely strong. • Cost Savings: The approach ensured that all available financing was used towards construction, as there were no intermediary costs (i.e. NGO/contractor fees, profits)

Transparency and Voice: The publication of the beneficiary list (derived from the damage assessment) at village level and on the GSDMA website, coupled with a grievance redressal procedure to challenge the beneficiary allocations, strengthened the goals of transparency, equity and voice. Transparency compliance was high – the BME reported that 93% of sample villages did publish the beneficiary list. A two-tier grievance redressal procedure (village and district), through which beneficiaries could complain against their allocation, accommodated beneficiary voice. Approximately 40,000 claims were received through this procedure with beneficiaries primarily protesting: (i) their belief that they have not received the assistance that they were eligible for (15%); (ii) others with similar damage have received more than they have (60%); and (iii) beneficiaries unaware that they could receive assistance (25%).

Housing Insurance: The insurance aspects of the program – designed to mitigate long- term risk - was pioneering. Payments for insurance premiums were automatically deducted from the final housing installment. The details of the strengths and limitations of the insurance program are in Annex 2. Limitations include poor awareness of the program. Positive consequences include 44% of respondents were willing to buy insurance even though only 18% had actually purchased voluntary insurance (See Annex 2 for details of strengths and limitations of the program)14.

Housing Conditions: The housing program has improved beneficiary access to services and living conditions. The percentage of beneficiaries reporting a formal (pucca) residence has increased, particularly amongst the poorest beneficiaries. Access to sanitation and cooking facilities has also improved. However, actual access differs amongst economic groups (particularly in their improved access to sanitation) with BPL, SC, ST and OBC still lagging behind beneficiaries above the poverty line. (See Table and further details in Annex 2)

Gender Equity: The opening of a Bank account (for transfer of the benefit) and the registration of the house in the names of both the husband and wife was a tremendous step for gender equality, although awareness of joint ownership is low (See section 3.5).

Public Buildings: The project met and exceeded the physical targets for the reconstruction, repair and retrofitting of public buildings. However, the new building for

14 GSDMA report on Capacity Building and Disaster Preparedness, July 2007. Pp 24-30 11 the GIDM was incomplete by the end of the project and there are concerns regarding the operations and maintenance of the engineering schools financed by the project15.

Dams and Irrigation: The project achieved its monitorable indicator for this sub- component and all targeted 225 dams (revised as part of the 2008 restructuring) were strengthened including the 4 additional vulnerable dams (but not damaged) in the earthquake sensitive area. However, the dams and irrigation sub-component did delay project implementation, as its progress lagged the planned program by several months.

Roads: The roads sub-component achieved and exceeded its revised target of 800 km of roads and associated structures rehabilitated/maintained. The impact of the sub- component on the end user appears positive. These include (i) 60 % of urban and 65% of rural residents expresses satisfaction with connectivity to nearby locations; (ii) 62% of rural respondents and 60% of urban respondents noted a decrease in travel times to surrounding locations/villages; (iii) there is also an increased frequency of local travel reported by 63% of rural and 60% of urban respondents.

PDO Indicator 2: Development of Institutional Framework to allow better disaster risk mitigation and risk management for future natural disasters.

Most targets for this indicator, including the legislation of the Disaster Management Act and the subsequent formation of the GSDMA, GIDM and ISR have been achieved. Furthermore, 3-tier control rooms have been set-up and are operational at state, taluka and district headquarter levels. Disaster management plans have been prepared for all districts, and approximately 10,375 villages, 97 urban local bodies and 144 talukas in 14 vulnerable districts. Finally, GEERP positively impacted national and community level disaster management.

An Innovator in India: Integrating Post Disaster Recovery and Risk Mitigation and Initiating a Legal and Institutional Framework. The state (and the projects) disaster management approach was innovative and reflects international best practice. GEERP was the first project in India that incorporated a comprehensive mitigation and community preparedness component into a post-disaster recovery and restructuring program. The project has also significantly and positively affected the legal and institutional framework for disaster management in Gujarat. The promulgation of the Gujarat Disaster Management Act, which conferred powers on the GSDMA, was a significant institutional achievement in itself. The project’s continued support of the GSDMA, the EOCs, the ERCs, the ISR, the GIDM, its capacity building initiatives at the state, district, taluka and community level across all the disaster affected districts, its community awareness programs and its support of improvement in scientific and technical capacity, ensured an overall improvement in disaster management capacity. This comprehensive project design was successfully implemented and, on completion of remaining equipment procurement and sustainable operations of the new institutions, may prove to be an international best practice for post-disaster long-term recovery and building community resilience to future disasters.

15 The final ICRR mission had found that Bhuj Engineering College lacks the finances for the adequate operations and maintenance of the buildings and its grounds. 12

Impact on National Disaster Management: The Gujarat legislation was a precursor to the National Disaster Management Act in 2005 which also allowed for the formation of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in 2006. The NDMA is engaged in prioritizing and building capacity for risk mitigation programs across the country.

Impact on Community Awareness: The project significantly and positively influenced disaster awareness at community level. For example, a survey reveals that 90% of respondents now placed heavy items at low levels, and were aware of the need to move away from tall buildings towards open spaces at the time of an earthquake (See Annex 2).

Concerns: First, some procurement of works and equipment is still outstanding. The delivery of some emergency equipment for the ULB’s is outstanding, although procurement is underway. Construction is also underway (but not complete) for the GIDM, 5 ERCs (4 have started, 1 is yet to begin), 4 (out of 25) district EOCs (21 complete, 3 underway and 1 not started). However, all outstanding procurement of goods and works has been financed by the GoG and are scheduled for completion by the end of 2009. Second, GSDMA will need to ensure the sustainability of some aspects of the program, particularly to ensure continued engagement and interest of local government authorities at the district, taluka and sub-taluka level and with community members trained through earlier CBDRM initiatives. Further, a draft Operations Plan outlining the staffing, training, deployment, operation, and maintenance of emergency management equipment for ERCs is available but its implementation needs to begin urgently.

3.3 Efficiency (Not required for emergency projects)

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

The project is rated as satisfactory for the PDO.

The project did meet and exceed all targets relating to the reconstruction effort. Survey findings reveal that quality of life has exceeded pre-earthquake levels (The baseline of 1 pre-earthquake dropped to 0.36 immediately after the earthquake and is now at 1.178) (See Annex 2). Furthermore, beneficiaries have experienced improved access to formal housing and sanitation. Residents have also benefited from decreased travel times and increased access to surrounding locations. Finally, the improved disaster management framework demonstrated its effectiveness in the states response to the 2006 floods. GoG and GSDMA are proactively addressing potential sustainability issues referred to in Section 3.2 above.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

(a) Empowerment of Women: The Benefit Monitoring and Evaluation Study confirmed the program’s positive impact on women. Of particular importance, women reported a decreased workload, as they no longer had to constantly prepare ‘lipai’ for mud houses.

Women beneficiaries also reported (i) increased confidence, especially in voicing their needs to community officers and government officials; (ii) improved aspirations for their children (including girls). They attribute these changes to increased exposure to outsiders especially during visits to the Bank. (Note that because women were joint account holders, they were required to be present for every banking transaction).

(b) Development of Skills for Youth, and Subsequent Support to Livelihood: The project’s skills training program, aimed at the building construction industry, impacted positively on youth who were the major participants in the program. This allowed for their further employment as masons and builders within the reconstruction program.

(c) Creation of Awareness among School Children and Teachers: A very carefully formulated and implemented pilot school safety program, which included school safety assessments and plans and hazard response drills, was highly successful and the GoG subsequently rolled out the program throughout the state.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

Dams and Irrigation: The projects engagement of two Dam Safety Review panels, comprising highly experienced and reputed specialists in relevant disciplines (e.g. hydrology, earthquake engineering, geology/geotechnical engineering, dam designs and construction) drove an ethos of quality in the reconstruction process. This was enhanced by the introduction of procedures for total quality management16 that are now institutionalized within the GoG. The introduction of a methodology of reverse engineering design in Gujarat, (since the original designs of many of the dams could not be found) allowed for the re-skilling of engineers in Water Resources Department (WRD).

Roads: The project benefitted from work already underway under the GSHP, financed by the Bank. The capacity benefits in engineering design were adequately demonstrated - consultants were appointed to design the original 800 km; but R&BD staff prepared subsequent designs. In addition, R&BD’s efficient project management demonstrated the strengthening of its capacity in the fields of procurement, contract management, quality assurance, environmental management, and in managing consultants.

(a) Support to the banking sector: The project’s cash flow mechanism, which was premised on the opening of a beneficiary bank account, boosted the customer base of local banks; thus supporting their continued development;

(b) Support to the insurance sector: The housing insurance program improved the customer base of the insurance industry.

16Including quality assurance methodologies and checklists, including regular materials testing. Testing was strengthened by procurement and use of three mobile testing laboratories. Technical Assistance and Quality Assurance (TA&QA) consultants were engaged to ensure third party quality audit and technical support during implementation, and for the preparation of completion plans and reports. 14

3.6 Findings of Beneficiary Survey/Stakeholder Workshops Not required

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

The risk to Development Outcome is rated as Modest. The GoG continues to demonstrate financial and institutional commitment to the project objectives, particularly as they relate to the goal of the development of a disaster risk mitigation system. The three institutions, whose formation was precipitated by the earthquake, identified as key institutions for sustainable disaster management, and subsequently supported by the project (i.e. GSDMA, GIDM and ISR), remain after the projects’ close, supported financially by the GoG. The GSDMA will also act as the counterpart to the National Cyclone Mitigation Project, which is under preparation for financing by the World Bank. The GoG further demonstrated its commitment to the projects outcomes through continued financial support (expenditure since project closing is over US$ 2m).

In addition, GoG and GSDMA are proactivly addressing remaining potential risk factors to the development outcome. These include: o Housing Insurance: The demonstrated lack of awareness of beneficiaries towards the project financed insurance program makes it uncertain that beneficiaries will continue payments after the project financed 10-year period. This could negate the long-term goal of transferring risk from individual homeowners to the insurance private sector. o The challenges to implementing the ERC Operations Plan (which relies on intergovernmental co-operation) presents a risk for their effective functioning o Regular monitoring and refresher trainings by the GSDMA are required to effectively sustain community disaster management activities.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

The Bank’s performance during preparation is rated moderately satisfactory. Preparation began immediately after approval of the Phase 1 Program in March 2001 and was speedily completed by February 2002. The project design appropriately drew from the Bank’s extensive experience in disaster related projects and from the lessons of the ongoing Phase 1 Program (refer to section 2.1). Housing reconstruction, roads and community participation was already under implementation, supported by the Phase 1 Program. In response to the GoGs financial challenge, the project was approved with the understanding that some of the components (dam strengthening and DM capacity building) would be further prepared during the first year.

The project design was complex, reflecting the demands of the reconstruction effort, the numerous sectors addressed and the resultant multiplicity of implementing agencies. Several risk mitigation measures addressed this complexity including (i) provision of extensive external consultant support; (ii) capacity building programs at community level

15 and for the advanced technical design inputs; (iii) the continued support of GSDMA to ensure coordination; (iv) development of quality audits for technical/ fiduciary aspects.

The design was consistent with the fiduciary and safeguard policies. However, risks were not fully identified at entry and the short implementation period proved inadequate.

(b) Quality of Supervision

The Bank’s performance during supervision is rated satisfactory. The Bank maintained continuity through the retention of the same experienced team leader and social development specialist throughout the supervision period. Supervision teams were consistently substantial and all fourteen supervision missions (approximately two per year) were well documented. Field visits were numerous and, in addition to the interaction with GoG’s high-level relevant officials and the GSDMA, and desk reviews of reports, the team consciously sought feedback from affected households. Continuous social assessment, consultations with the other donors and NGOs and regular benefit monitoring studies were useful in addressing implementation concerns.

An examination of supervision aide memoirs and Implementation Status Reports (ISR) reveals the team’s attention to PDOs, project implementation progress and monitoring of legal covenants and agreed actions and issues, particularly fiduciary and safeguards issues. ISR ratings appear realistic and the team downgraded the DO and IP ratings as required (mainly due to implementation delays in the Dams and DM component). In addition to reallocations/ cancellations that were effected to support the other projects, the team monitored the utilization of Credit and sought further cancellations when potential savings became clear. Once the emergency reconstruction work neared completion, the Bank encouraged the GoG to expand the DM capacity-building component to the whole state, demonstrating the Team’s foresight in building capacity to better mitigate any future disasters.

Consequently, the overall rating for Bank’s performance has been rated satisfactory.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Borrower (GoG) performance is rated as satisfactory. GoG maintained its commitment to the project objectives throughout the implementation. It ensured early passage of the Gujarat Disaster Management Act, set up the GSDMA during Phase 1 and fully staffed and equipped it during the early period of implementation. The GSDMA was largely autonomous and approved most scheme and procurement decisions. The GoG consistently provided project funds and key project covenants were always in compliance.

Borrower’s performance flagged slightly after the first three years, subsequent to the conclusion of the majority of the emergency reconstruction. This delayed the implementation of the dams and irrigation sub-component and the procurement of some equipment. The hiring of key senior staff in GSDMA was not always timely and this affected the completion of the DM component. However, the GoG always provided adequate financial resources to GSDMA.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Performance of GSDMA and its partner implementing agencies is rated as satisfactory. The GSDMA provided sound leadership and coordination of numerous implementing agencies (with varied implementation capacity), NGOs and donors. The GSDMA also led implementation of the housing, community participation and disaster management capacity building components and these were satisfactorily implemented. The agency received many international awards in recognition of the exemplary work undertaken as part of the project. However, performance in the procurement of equipment could have been better. The performance of the other line local departments and Urban and Rural local bodies was also generally satisfactory and implementation delays and operational issues were resolved. The Dams and Irrigation component experienced a 3-year delay but final implementation was satisfactory.

Therefore, overall borrower performance is rated as satisfactory.

6. Lessons Learned

The integration of long- term goals (e.g. disaster management capacity building, drafting of seismic resistance planning standards, ensuring quality control in dams reconstruction) into a disaster reconstruction project is effective, but requires a longer (and more realistic) implementation period. (This was also a finding of the Andhra Pradesh Hazard Mitigation and Emergency Cyclone Recovery Project). The scale of operations and the need to nurture and restore confidence of the affected population, while ensuring cost effectiveness, is a time consuming activity. Faced with the competing demands of reconstruction versus long-term risk mitigation, implementing agencies focus (rightly) on reconstruction, further delaying the implementation of risk mitigation programs. Consequently, project design should allow for a longer period of implementation (initially focusing on reconstruction, followed by disaster risk mitigation). The current Bank OP 8.0 allows for such flexible design.

Homeowner driven approach is popular and effective in reconstruction; but assumes a pace of implementation that can exclude some beneficiaries. The high levels of satisfaction amongst beneficiaries’ points to the perceived and actual benefits of the homeowner driven program. However, its assumption that all homeowners can build to target within a particular period excludes beneficiaries who were unable to maintain the programs deadlines. These beneficiaries then face increased construction costs (due to

17 inflation) and this affects completion rates. Critical improvements to the housing program would include facilitating co-financing opportunities to mitigate against an increase in the cost of construction, partnerships with humanitarian organizations to support vulnerable families, timely intervention for ‘non starters’.

Transparency and equity interventions work best when incorporated into a program, rather than as stand-alone activities. The repair and reconstruction of over 1,14 million17 houses with minimal grievances/allegations of corruption reflects a successful incorporation of transparency and voice. In particular, (i) the damage assessment, which is a technical exercise, benefits from community participation to ensure transparency and social acceptance; (ii) an effective Grievance Redressal Mechanism complements the community assisted damage assessment by allowing community ‘voice’. Tthe introduction of the ‘lokpal’ that acted as an independent judicial ombudsman/legal appellate greatly improved the projects’ two-tier grievance redressal mechanism system.

Fund disbursement linked to construction progress (for individual construction) facilitates effective use of funds: In the absence of this link, there is a risk that beneficiaries may use funds for purposes other than the intended use.

A legal and institutional framework is key to integrated disaster management. The GoG’s 2003 promulgation of the Gujarat Disaster Management Act, provided for the formation and mandate of the GSDMA. The formation of the GSDMA allowed for quick policy decisions during project implementation, for the co-ordination of a multitude of line departments (without questions of authority) and for the integration of longer-term disaster management into the disaster reconstruction. In the absence of the Act and the GSDMA integrated disaster management would not have been possible.

Post-disaster recovery and reconstruction periods can provide opportunities for disaster risk mitigation and capacity building: This allows a disaster risk mitigation program to capitalize on the institutional resources and organization required in reconstruction (e.g. IEC activities, the village level self-help groups, gram sabhas etc.).

Immediate reconstruction needs often contradicts with long-term sustainability. Disasters require quick reconstruction to meet the needs of affected people. This can contradict with long-term sustainability. For example: (i) the required revision of planning and building codes to ensure earthquake resistant construction delayed the start of housing reconstruction in urban areas; (ii) the compliance rate of construction improved over time as masons, engineers and technical officers were trained and became familiar with the program requirements. However, the urgency of construction precluded against undertaking training prior to construction.

Projects Impact on Bank-Wide Operations: The projects approach to the reconstruction of housing (the homeowner based approach, the cash grant transfer process, the damage assessment, the grievance redressal process, the third part audits) are now standard across South Asia disaster management housing reconstruction programs and has influenced housing reconstruction in Aceh, Indonesia. Lessons learnt from the project (including

17 Includes repair and reconstruction. Reconstruction alone was approximately 200 000 houses. 18 closely linking fund disbursement to construction progress, a more than two tier grievance redressal process etc) have been integrated into those projects.

Size of Disaster Management Projects: After two rounds of cancellation ($20 M for Polio and SDR 76 million for Tsunami), the project is still left with a saving of SDR 49 M. This has also occurred in a subsequent Bank Financed DM project in India. It may be advisable to prepare a smaller project and seek additional financing if required.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

The Borrower received a draft ICR. Their comments clarified concerns identified in that document on the projects extension and the insurance aspects of the housing program. The draft ICR was revised accordingly. The Borrower disagreed with the identified challenges of sustaining community disaster management and implementing the Operations Plan for the ERCs. However, the ICR Team felt that this remains a challenge that requires the continued intervention of the GSDMA for sustained implementation. Finally, the Borrower argued for a project performance rating of Highly Satisfactory.

The Borrowers Evaluation is provided as Annex 7. The finding largely concur those of the ICR. However, the evaluation identifies the Bank’s management of procurement as onerous. The evaluation also refers to a ‘ban’ on the shopping method of procurement. However, the team does not recall this ‘ban’. In some instances, the Bank objected to the ‘splitting’ of packages.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions) * A. REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION OF 197.2 132.00 67% PERMANENT HOUSING B. RECONSTRUCTION OF 236.9 245.00 103.4% PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE C. COMMUNITY 12.5 4.00 32% PARTICIPATION D. DISASTER MANAGEMENT 51.1 73.50 144% E. PROJECT MANAGEMENT 6.0 6.00 100 % F. POLIO ERADICATION 20.00 NA ACTIVITIES

Total Baseline Cost 503.7 480.5 95% Physical Contingencies 42.2 0.00 0.00 Price Contingencies 39.8 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 503.7** 480.5 Project Preparation Fund 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00 Total Financing Required 0.00

*Inclusive of contingencies as per Final ISR dated 10/31/2008 ** Since contingencies have been distributed amongst components A to F above, these are not added again.

(b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Co Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds financing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Borrower 60.90 132.26 217 % International Bank for Reconstruction 0.00 0.00 .00 and Development International Development 442.80 348.24 78.6 % Association (IDA)

Annex 2: Outputs and Outcomes by Component

Output from Revised Output Original Output Status of Indicator each Indicators Indicators (May 2002) as on September 30, 2008 component (February 2008) HOUSING Owner driven 135,000 houses About 125,000 houses Total of 125,781 houses reconstruction, reconstructed and reconstructed to reconstructed, (in addition to repair and 75,000 houses repaired earthquake resistant 16,529 under phase I) and strengthening and strengthened. standards and about 41,751 houses repaired of 42,000 houses repaired destroyed/dama and strengthened. ged housing. 1,000 engineers and 678 engineers, 3,832 masons 5,000 masons trained in 1,000 engineers and trained in hazard resistant hazard resistant 5,000 masons trained in construction. 100 Municipal construction. hazard resistant Engineers trained in reviewing construction. designs, 248 certified through Mason’s Certification Program18 PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE RECONSTRUCTION 37 dams in Saurashtra 221 earthquake-affected 225 affected dams (185 in Dam Safety & and 185 dams in Kutch dams (185 in Kutch and Kutch and 35 in Saurashtra) Irrigation strengthened to hazard 36 in Saurashtra) completed. Rehabilitation resistant standards. strengthened to hazard of dams to resistant standards. hazard resistant standards 4 earthquake vulnerable 4 dams completed. dams in Saurashtra strengthened to hazard resistant standards. At least 1,200 public At least 2,000 buildings 3,701 buildings reconstructed Public buildings repaired and reconstructed and 200 and 232 damaged buildings Buildings strengthened to hazard damaged buildings were repaired and strengthened Repairs, resistant standard. repaired and strengthened to hazard resistant standard. . Rehabilitation, to hazard resistant reconstruction standard. of public buildings to ensure smooth public admin.

18 Since the start of reconstruction 6,200 engineers & 29,000 masons trained in multi-hazard construction

Output from Revised Output Original Output Status of Indicator each Indicators Indicators (May 2002) as on September 30, 2008 component (February 2008) Retrofitting of At least 500 buildings At least 2,000 buildings Retrofitting of 2,848 buildings critical retrofitted to hazard retrofitted to hazard completed. undamaged resistant standards. resistant standards. public buildings in Zones IV & V to protect against future disasters. Setting up of New office buildings New campus constructed ISR: Construction of campus new buildings constructed for Gujarat for Gujarat Institute of completed and is functioning to strengthen Institute of Disaster Disaster management from the new campus. disaster management, Gujarat (GIDM), and Institute of management State Disaster Seismological Research GIDM: is established, but capacities. Management Authority (ISR). construction of its campus is in and Institute of progress. Completion is Seismological expected in Dec-09. Research.

Roads and Around 700 km of Around 800 km of roads Road works: Strengthening Bridges roads and associated and associated structures works for 870 km of roads and Improvement structures rehabilitated/maintained. 101 bridges repaired and 28 of earthquake rehabilitated/maintaine bridges were reconstructed. affected state d. road network, along with associated structures for ensuring connectivity. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION Reduction of At least 500 self-help Disaster Management Disaster Management vulnerability of groups constituted in Committees (a self-help Committees formed in 10,829 communities villages. group) formed in villages in 14 disaster prone against future earthquake affected districts. Members of the emergencies villages and members are DMCs have been trained in and capacity trained in various aspects various aspects of disaster buildings of of disaster management management including response communities including response like like first aid, search and rescue. for disaster first aid, search and management rescue. through stakeholder Disaster Management is Gram Sabhas conducted two At least 1,000 Gram participation. included as a mandatory times in a year in all 18,000 Sabhas conducted. subject in the agenda of villages of the State. Disaster all Gram Sabhas Management is a mandatory subject in the agenda of Gram

Output from Revised Output Original Output Status of Indicator each Indicators Indicators (May 2002) as on September 30, 2008 component (February 2008) Sabhas. Community based Community based projects At least 50 self–help projects, e.g. retrofitting initiated, for example, community based and reconstruction of retrofitting and reconstruction hazard reduction earthquake resistant of earthquake resistant house, projects initiated. house, masons training, masons training, village village development development plans. plans initiated. DISASTER MANAGEMENT CAPACITY BUILDING Enhanced Gujarat Disaster Gujarat Disaster Bill was passed in the disaster Management Act Management Act Legislative assembly on March management legislated. legislated 28, 2003, and made effective on through setting May 13, 2003. up of regulatory and Gujarat Institute of Gujarat Institute of GIDM and ISR have been set- institutional Disaster Management Disaster Management up and functioning. framework (GIDM) and Institute of (GIDM) and Institute of Seismological Research Seismological Research (ISR) set up. (ISR) set up.

Enhanced Process for Taluka and Process for Taluka and A community based process for disaster community level community level disaster disaster management planning management disaster management management planning at village, urban local body and through planning established. established. taluka level established. improved capacities State level disaster State level disaster 3-tier Disaster Management management plans management plans Plans prepared including all prepared. prepared. districts 10,829 villages, 97 urban local bodies and 144 talukas.

State wide emergency State wide emergency Expert Committee on statewide communications communications network communication network network established established and made submitted its final report to and made functional functional GSDMA. Final report on “Hazard Early Warning and Communication System” is available & implementation piloted.

Statewide control Statewide control rooms 3- tier control network rooms set up or updated set up or updated and established and are operational and made operational. made operational. at Taluka Level (Mamlatdar Office), District HQ and at State level (Sachivalaya).

All procurement underway and Adequately equipped t i t h b 24

Output from Revised Output Original Output Status of Indicator each Indicators Indicators (May 2002) as on September 30, 2008 component (February 2008) Regional Emergency most equipment have been Response Centers received. State ERC Civil established works ongoing for 4/5 ERCs.

Emergency response Contracts have been signed for capacity of the municipal procurement of equipment. corporations, municipalities and district hospitals enhanced

The project did meet and exceed all targets relating to the reconstruction effort. Survey findings reveal that quality of life has exceeded pre-earthquake levels (the baseline of 1 pre-earthquake dropped to 0.36 immediately after the earthquake and is now at 1.178).

Quality of Life Index 1. 4 0

1.143 1.178 1.20 1.122 0.021 0.035 1.000 0.122 1.00

0.80

0.60

0.40 0.362

0.20

0.00 B as el ine P os t E Q S urvey 1 S urvey 2 S ur vey 3

Component A: Permanent Housing Reconstruction

Background: The total destruction of approximately 233,660 houses and the partial damage of a further 971,538 house left the GoG with a tremendous financial and operational challenge. The GoG subsequently formulated a housing recovery policy, based on principles of beneficiary contribution and empowerment and community participation. The policy was operationalized primarily using a homeowner driven construction approach. Recognizing the skills constraints in constructing to earthquake resistant standards, the training of masons and engineers was incorporated into the housing program. Third party technical auditing, to ensure building conformity to the seismic resilient and development regulations, provided further quality control. Finally, the transfer of future disaster risks to private sector through housing insurance completed the housing programs’ operational strategy.

IDA responded to the financial challenge of housing reconstruction, targeting 75,000 repairs and the reconstruction of 135,000 fully damaged houses (revised to 42,000 repairs and reconstruction of 125,000 units). The GEERP Housing component built on the Phase 1 Program (closed on March, 31, 2003) which supported temporary shelters, debris removal, housing damage assessment, and initiated the housing reconstruction program by initiating financial assistance to over 500,000 eligible families and completing approximately 300,000 houses. GEERP focused on financing part of the remainder, but

25 supported only those beneficiaries, who were homeowners, and who had received a first installment of payments during the Phase 1 Program. The targets have been satisfactorily achieved.

Implementation: Under the ‘homeowner driven approach’, cash grant entitlements (based on a damage assessment) were paid in installments into a beneficiary bank account based on physical progress and technical quality approvals by project engineers and taluka officers. Key highlights of the process include: • A Damage Assessment was undertaken by a three-member team in each village viz a Government Engineer, revenue officer and NGO Representative/School Teacher. Housing was classified into five damage categories i.e. from G1 (least damaged) to G5 (fully destroyed)1 • Financial Assistance and Eligibility for the Housing Assistance Cash Grant was determined by the assessment and was structured in six packages, including two for landless families and tenants (not Bank Financed). Inclusivity was a key aspect of the program. Criteria determining eligibility included residential use, proof of ownership and residence. • The Cash Grant Management Process was undertaken as follows: - Taluka Administration (TA) prepares list of damaged houses, damage classifications, financial entitlements based on estimated cost of rehabilitating/reconstructing the houses; - Damage assessment list published in public places and grievances accepted; - Grievance Redressal was implemented at village and district levels. Grievances were obtained in writing and ledgers were maintained at districts. Unsatisfied Complainants could seek further legal recourse through a Lokpal/Ombudsman established by the High Court; - TA prepares final list of beneficiaries. Copies of agreement and ‘housing reconstruction guidelines’ are provided to the eligible beneficiaries; - The TA sends the final beneficiary list to the Lead Bank for remitting the fund to the beneficiary bank account (jointly held with the spouse); - Lead bank sends the beneficiary list to the local banks for account verifications. - Local banks send officials (with a photographer) to the villages to assist beneficiaries in opening a bank accounts (if necessary); - TA deposits the total funds estimated for the first installments to the lead bank as an advance. The Lead Bank transfers the funds to the local banks; - Upon the submission of the agreement by the beneficiaries, local banks release the first installment to the beneficiary accounts, - Banks release second and third (i.e final) installments based on approvals provided by TA. - Final payments for the fully damaged houses are paid upon the conformation that the house constructions are technically satisfactory and insured.

• Technical Assistance and Capacity Building included (i) formulation and publication of comprehensive technical guidelines; (ii) appointment and training of about 1,600 project engineers to supervise and certify technical quality of the constructions, upon which payments were made; (iii) training of engineers, masons and artisans on earthquake resistant construction.

• Quality Assurance activities included (i) continuous technical supervision by project engineers; (ii) third party technical audit by the National Council for Cement and Building Materials. • A Mandatory Multi Hazard Insurance of Houses transferred the risks of future disasters to the private sector and covered new houses, including reconstructed units, financed through the World Bank assistance (G5), and NGOs.

Performance: The project has achieved its targets and the following reflect on performance:

• Housing Conditions: The housing program has improved beneficiary access to services and living conditions. The percentage of beneficiaries reporting a formal (pucca) residence has increased, particularly amongst the poorest beneficiaries. Access to sanitation and cooking facilities has also improved. (See Table below) However, actual access differs amongst economic groups (particularly in their improved access to sanitation) with BPL, SC, ST and OBC still lagging behind beneficiaries above the poverty line. (See Table on Improvement in access to service delivery) • Satisfaction with Homeowner Approach (See Table on beneficiary satisfaction) Beneficiaries revealed high level of satisfaction with the homeowner approach, over other construction approaches. • Incompletion Rate: The project experienced a low incompletion rate – 19,51219 are estimated to have not completed construction. • Late starters: Most of the housing program was completed by March 31, 2003. Subsequently, material banks were closed and, by March 31, 2006, project technical staffs were mainstreamed into the regular administrative system. Late starters to the housing program, (nearly 14,260 families constituting 7.5% of the eligible families), subsequently experienced increased cost of construction due to inflation. • Technical Quality of Houses: The concurrent third party technical audit targeted 282,000 visits in 41 talukas and observed vast improvements in the technical compliance as time progressed, but prior March 31, 2006. However, in the absence of a consolidated audit report, it is impossible draw conclusions regarding the overall compliance rate. • Grievance Redressal Mechanism. 40,421 appeals were received and resolved through the project grievance redressal mechanisms. Although each district maintained a grievance ledger, there is no centralized database. Consequently, it is not possible to provide an analysis of the main grievances. • Knowledge Transfer: The transfer of knowledge on best practices in construction proved effective at sustaining and improving the application of seismic resistance techniques during the reconstruction process. However, field assessments suggest that some of these best practices have subsequently been ignored, particularly in rural areas, due to the waning institutional intermediation. The enforcement of GDCR and building plan approval processes established during the project allows for higher levels of sustainability in urban areas.

19 The number may decrease as the GSDMA is currently undertaking a verification process. They estimate that 7,500 beneficiaries of the 19512 have completed their homes to seismic resistant standards. 27

• Disaster Risk Transfer Mechanism: Payments for insurance premiums were automatically deducted from the final housing installment. However, anecdotal evidence points to instances where policy documents were not issued to homeowners. There is also a poor awareness of the insurance program, although the demand for insurance is currently higher than its supply (see Figure below) • Recovery of Unutilized Assistance: The GSDMA is in the process of investigating the reasons for non-completion by approximately 19,500 households. Thus far, they have found that beneficiaries have completed 478 houses. Initial indications are that a further 7,500 houses will qualify for the benefit (i.e. have been completed to seismic resistant standards. The GoG have initiated the recovery process (US$ 1,1m thus far) where homeowners have not constructed to seismic resistant standards.

Table on Improvements in Access to Services % increase Access to % increase in Access to % increase in in Pucca toilets Separate Toilet Cooking separate kitchen Houses Facilities Urban* 13 95 5 6 Below Poverty Line 21 85 27 17 Above Poverty Line 13 90 5 4 Scheduled 20 84 18 13 Caste/Scheduled No Tribe/Other Discernable Backward Caste Difference Rural* 31 76 54 89 7 Below Poverty Line 85 55 189 78 23 Above Poverty Line 40 68 74 83 8 Scheduled 73 60 112 73 10 Caste/Scheduled Tribe/Other Backward Caste *Note that under access data, this refers to the general population

Table on Satisfaction with Housing Approaches20 Assessment Homeowner Driven Model NGO-Contractor Led Model Indicators/ Housing Self Help Co-financing In-situ Relocation Reconstruction Principles Approach Approach Approach Approach Beneficiary Satisfaction Housing Location S S S MS House Size S S S MS Suitable to local lifestyle S S MS NS Adequate storage S S MS NS

20 Self help approach is the classical homeowner driven approach in which houses are reconstructed using the cash grant and TA provided by the government. Under the co-financing approach a co-funding agency ‘tops up’ the government grant. 28

Preferred roofing S S S S Compound wall NS MS NS MS Privacy maintained S S S NS Stakeholder Ownership Beneficiary participation S S Ok - NS NS Program awareness S S MS NS Community participation N/A S NS NS Participation of Panchayat N/A N/A NS S Occupancy S S S MS No preference towards elite S S MS S Opportunity to choose neighbor S S S NS Quality of Construction Use quality materials S S S S Quality workmanship S S S S Basic services provided NS NS S S Meet Seismic Specifications MS S S S Suitable for upgrading MS S S S Organized Development Safe physical extension MS S S S Encroachment of public space S S S NS Land transfer and ownership S S S NS House insurance S S MS MS Community space provided N/A N/A MS S Planned development N/A N/A NS S S – satisfied, MS = moderately satisfied, NS = not satisfied, N/A = not applicable

Insurance - Awareness, know how to claim, duration Gap bet ween des ir ed and act ual and pos s es r el evant document s 40% level of i ns ur ance 34% 35% 32% 50% 44% 45% 30% 28% 26% 40% 25% 21% 35%

20% 30% 25% 15 % 13% 12% 11% 18%

% Respondents 20% 10 % 15 % % Respondents 5% 10 %

0% 5% Rural Urban 0% Voluntary I ns urance Willingnes s to buy I ns urance Awarenes s of I ns urance - G5 Know how to claim ins urance Possess relevant documents Know about Duration of I ns urance Figure 1 Risk Transfer Mechanisms

Component B: Public Infrastructure Reconstruction

Public Buildings:

Background: The subcomponent included (a) reconstruction and repair of residential and non-residential buildings; (b) retrofitting to provide for anti-seismic and anti-cyclone strengthening of undamaged public buildings of critical importance in the highly vulnerable seismic zones IV and V, and in other hazard-vulnerable areas; and (c) construction of new buildings and control rooms for emergency management, the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA), Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management (GIDM) and Institute of Seismological Research (ISR). The targets for this sub-component have been satisfactorily achieved.

Implementation: The program was implemented through affected GoG line departments including the Primary Education Department, Higher and Technical Education Department, Roads and Buildings Department, Police Housing Corporation, and the urban local bodies such as Ahmadabad Municipal Corporation, Jamnagar Municipal Corporation, Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, Surendranagar Municipality and Radhanpur Municipality. Consultants who lent technical assistance in the planning of vital institutional complexes21, in determining solutions for retrofitting of damaged and undamaged buildings and in technical audit and quality assurance for construction activities, also supported the implementing agencies.

Performance: Reconstruction and Repair. All damaged public buildings were repaired and retrofitted or reconstructed, as appropriate. Major repair and retrofitting of 3,933 buildings is complete. (This includes 1,330 buildings by State R&B Department, 2,195 by Police Housing Corporation, 125 by Ahmadabad Municipal Corporation, and 283 education buildings by various owners), and reconstruction of 2,501 buildings (695 by State Roads and Buildings Department, 719 by Panchayat R&B, 562 by Home Department, 1 by Municipal Corporation, and 524 education buildings by various owners). Third Parties supervised all work and quality of construction is sound

Performance: Retrofitting. The program for retrofitting of undamaged public buildings followed subsequent to the rehabilitation/reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure. An assessment of the condition of buildings owned by the Department of State and Panchayat located in vulnerable areas, and the practical consideration of what could be completed by project closing, determined the program’s scope. The program targeted 3,162 public buildings and 2,848 buildings were retrofitted by October 31, 2008. Works are ongoing for 67 panchayat buildings. Contractor poor performance affected progress for 21 panchayat buildings. 226 buildings (110 state buildings and 116 health/education buildings) were dropped for various reasons including works financed by other funding sources, (including government financing).

Performance: Construction of New Buildings. Construction of the Institute for Seismological Research is complete. The GoG have awarded contracts and/or construction is ongoing for the GIDM, State Emergency Operations Centers (SEOC), Emergency Response Centers (ERCs) at Rajkot, Gandhinagar, Surat, Vadodara and Gandhidham. The construction of a new building for the GSDMA was dropped after a

21 such as, Jamnagar Municipal Corporation Building, Government Engineering College at Bhuj Institute of Seismological Research, Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management, State Emergency Operations Center, and Emergency Response Centers 30 decision that the institution would continue to operate from the existing premises. The GoG financed the remaining contracts after the credit closing on October 31, 2008.

Dams and Irrigation:

Background: This subcomponent initially proposed to rehabilitate and strengthen water storage and irrigation infrastructures damaged by the earthquake in Kutchh and Saurashtra regions including technical assistance, and works for strengthening of 222 earthen dams (185 dams in Kutchh and 37 dams in Saurashtra) and appurtenant structures to withstand earthquakes and cyclonic storms22. During project implementation, one dam (Machhu-I) in the Saurashtra region was dropped as the design could not be finalized within the project period. However, four new dams in the vulnerable zone were included, bringing the total number of dams under rehabilitation/strengthening to 225. The IA has completed implementation of dam safety measures for the additional dams in the vulnerable zones. The Borrower was unable to complete the construction of two Phase II dams, (Machhu II and Bhadar) within the project period. The GoG completed the remaining works by March 31, 2009. Overall, the target of strengthening these dams to hazard resistance standard has been satisfactorily achieved.

Implementation Process: The program implementation by the WRD began by immediately undertaking immediate repairs that could be concluded prior to the 2001 monsoon season. 165 dams in Kutchh and 37 dams in Saurashtra fell in this category. Since detailed designs and as-built drawings for most old minor irrigation dams were not available, the IA undertook field surveys to reconstruct the pre-earthquake engineering drawings prior to undertaking designs to ensure the strengthening of the dams. The Dam Safety Review Panels (DSRP-I and DSRP-II) reviewed and cleared all designs following their visits to all dam sites, first during the initial review and then after all drawings and design details were completed23.

Performance: There were significant procurement delays as staff of the IA and local contractors did not have experience in Bank procurement procedures. Furthermore, at times, selection of contractors with inadequate experience or resources did occur as the remote location and small volume of work for most dams made the bid unattractive to larger contractors. By the end of the original project closing date, civil works construction 17 dams was complete in Kutchh, and work had commenced on 32 dams in Saurashtra and 167 dams in Kutchh.

Roads and Bridges:

Background: The project initially targeted the strengthening of approximately 700 km of roads. This was revised to include 800 km of roads. The sub-component built on the Phase 1 Program that had rehabilitated 201 km of roads between. December 2001 and

22 Detailed measures for strengthening the dams were based on the results of preparatory activities (supported by Phase I GEERP) and the guidance/recommendations of the two Dam Safety Review Panels. 23This included review of hydrologic studies, guidelines for revised methods for hydrologic studies, review of hydraulic designs of spillways, gates, stilling basins and waste weirs, examination of their adequacies and recommended improvement measures, review and recommended improvements of structural designs. The DSRPs also recommended basic dam safety features that need to be incorporated in these dams. 31

August 2002. All work on the bridges were initiated under the Phase 1 Program and continued under this Project (Cr. 3637). The targets for this sub-component have been satisfactorily achieved.

Implementation and Performance: The roads and bridges reconstruction, rehabilitation and strengthening program under the Project was managed by the R&BD using the successful project implementation arrangements, staff and practices of the Bank-financed Gujarat State Highways Project (GSHP). The rehabilitation of roads was undertaken under 17 contracts awarded in 2004. 15 contracts covering about 696 km were completed in 2005, 1 contract (approximately 59 km) was completed in December 2006. The Roads and Buildings Department (R & BD) terminated a further contract (46km) in February 2007, because of the contractor’s inability to complete the works within extended time. A different contractor substantially completed the work in March 2008. Rehabilitation and strengthening of an additional 68 km were undertaken under five further contracts in March 2007. The Contractor substantially completed these works by February 2008. The post-works Defects Liability Period (DLP) of one year was over for 17 of these 22 contracts by the credit closing in October 2008. The remaining DLPs will be completed between November 2008 and March 2009.

Component C: Community Participation

Background: This cross cutting component supported information, communication and education activities, the establishment of village-level sub-centers to build capacity for earthquake resistant construction, the formation of self-help groups to monitor construction activities, gender sensitization and a community disaster preparedness program. The targets for this component have been satisfactorily achieved.

Implementation and Performance: Community involvement was high during the relief and reconstruction phase, and through the period of intense activity in both rural and urban areas. The GoG was also open to the involvement of NGOs and indeed a large number participated in the relief as well as reconstruction phases of the program. Some highlights include:

• Housing: (i) The reconstruction program framed a housing assistance policy based on the extent of damage to houses rather than on any social or economic attributes of beneficiaries. (ii) Grievance redressal mechanisms were set up to ensure that houses were appropriately categorized, and that claimants received due assistance. (iii) Owner-driven housing reconstruction helped to increase and internalize knowledge on disaster-resistant reconstruction. (iv) Large numbers of masons and engineers were trained and were available in the villages/towns during construction to pass on their knowledge of disaster-resistant construction. (v) The acquisition of such knowledge was also embedded in the payment schedule – payments were tied to achievement of construction targets with the final payment linked to certification that the house was disaster-resistant. (vi) New houses were registered in the names of both husband and wife to achieve a measure of gender equity in property ownership.

• Disaster Management: (i) The program included active interpersonal communication (e.g. in gram sabhas) and media-based information campaigns to spread knowledge about earthquakes as well as other hazards, including floods, fire, and cyclones. (ii) Special training programs were also carried out, e.g. program to sensitize officials to the special needs of women during disasters. (iii) The program supported efforts to organize people in the villages for future disasters, including the establishment of Disaster Management Committees (at village, block, district, town and state levels) and teams for search and rescue, first aid, providing relief etc. Village disaster management plans were prepared and provide information about the village (relevant topography, ‘escape routes’, vulnerable people, etc.) and its resources (rescue equipment, etc.). (iv) A school safety program focused on improving information and preparedness in schools, as well as potentially making schools ‘safe havens’ in future disasters. The GoG expanded the program throughout the state.

Component D: Disaster Management

Background: The disaster management component assisted in laying the foundation for sustainable disaster management capacity in Gujarat. Initial key activities included (i) emergency management; (ii) hazard mitigation and risk transfer studies and; (iii) development of disaster management institutions including strengthening the capacity of the GSDMA and establishing the GIDM and the ISR. The targets for this component have been satisfactorily achieved.

Implementation and Performance: Disaster Management Institutional Capacity Building: Gujarat has developed a strong institutional framework towards better disaster preparedness, risk mitigation and emergency response for future natural disaster events, as outlined in the Disaster Management Policy for the State. Furthermore, following the earthquake in 2001, the Gujarat Government acted swiftly in strengthening institutional and legal frameworks for disaster management through enacting the Gujarat Disaster Management Act (2003) which also allowed for the legal reconstitution of the GSDMA.

In February 2001, two weeks after the earthquake disaster, the GoG formed the GSDMA, the central planning, coordinating and monitoring body for disaster management and post disaster reconstruction and assessment. In addition to the GSDMA, the GoG also established the Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management, (a first in India) to assist in training of government officials on disaster management. The GoG established the Institute of Seismological Research in 2003 to study and disseminate information related to earthquake prediction, monitoring, computation, and observation network. Permanent seismological observatories have been established in various districts.

Implementation and Performance: Emergency Management: The project assisted the state in strengthening its capacity in better managing and responding to emergencies. The Government has established Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs) in each of the districts. The State EOC has been strengthened through the procurement of additional communications and audio/visual equipment and a new center is under construction. In addition, the GSDMA has established five Regional Emergency Response Centers and have provided essential search and rescue equipment (such as basic fire, search and

33 rescue equipment and ambulances) to Municipal Corporations including Ahmedabad, Surat, Rajkot, Jamnagar, Bhavnagar and Junagarh. Vehicles have been retrofitted to be able to carry all equipments. New mobile communications units have been created for deployment during emergencies. Fire engines have been procured and redesigned to suit specific emergencies. Firefighters have been trained for using the new equipment and in search and rescue techniques. A communication network has been laid to interconnect the control rooms and response centers.

Implementation and Performance: Hazard Mitigation towards Earthquakes and Other Hazards: The project assisted the GoG in reviewing Building Codes. Use of the new codes is now mandatory to ensure hazard resistant building construction. In parallel, the GoG revised the General Development Control Regulation (GDCR) to ensure structural safety of buildings and to streamline the building permission process. Manuals and guidelines for multi-hazard resistant construction and retrofitting of all types of buildings were prepared, followed by a communications campaign on the new regulations.

The GoG has piloted programs emphasizing structural and non-structural School Safety targeting 100,000 students and 3,000 teachers. The non-structural aspects included preparation of disaster management plans (approximately 152 schools), disaster preparedness drills, and teacher and student trainings on disaster management, building seismic safety and retrofitting of damaged structures. Furthermore, over 1,500 teachers from 25 districts of the state were in the basics of DM, and 86 master trainers and 593 district-level trainers have been trained. An audit for seismic safety of all 55,000-school buildings will be undertaken, followed by appropriate retrofitting.

The GoG has revised civil engineering curricula to include disaster resistant design and construction, and this curriculum has been introduced in all polytechnic institutes and technical universities in Gujarat. Ongoing training is also conducted for practicing engineers, architects and masons in public and private sectors. The GoG has introduced a competency based certification program for masons and the Gujarat Professional Civil Engineer’s Act (2006), which has been passed by the Legislative Assembly, will ensure that only qualified structural engineers undertake design of building structures. The states hazard risk profile has been mapped and a vulnerability atlas is available to assist in development planning.

The GSDMA undertook several studies including the Hazard Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, Review of Building Codes, Feasibility of Seismic Microzonation, Establishment of Emergency Response Centres, Establishment of Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management, Establishment of Hazard Early Warning and Communication System, Damage and Loss Assessment methodology, and Flood Vulnerability Assessment of four urban agglomerations in Gujarat partly financed by IDA.

Implementation and Performance: Community Participation. In association with UNDP, a Community Based Disaster Management Program (CBDMP) was launched in over 4,000 villages in 68 talukas of 14 districts selected based on vulnerability. The program aimed at building awareness and capacity in disaster management activities with

attention to differential gender needs and women’s involvement. Training under this program included orientation training programs for officials in districts and sub-districts, preparation of communication materials, training of doctors and paramedics, training in search and rescue operations and early warning and communication systems. Furthermore, a large numbers of volunteers/responders were given Special Flood Rescue Training and emergency rescue kits were provided to more than 2,000 flood-prone villages. A school-safety program was designed, implemented and expanded. The GoG also established a state specific Disaster Resources Network, containing 9 million records. The community based program, together with the newly introduced response system, revealed results and community response during the flood emergency in 2005 and 2006. The figure below adequately demonstrates the results of the awareness program.

Where have you kept heavy S t an d near a t al l bu i l di ng dur i ng If inside a building when an objects in your house? EQ? EQ hits … 120% 12 0 % 96% 95% 120% 10 0 % 100% 99% 100% 99% 98% Move out 100% 80% Higher Yes 80% Heights 80% 60% 60% S tay No 60% Indoors 40% Lower 40% 40% % Respondents Heights

% Respondents Don’t k now 20% 4% 5% 20% 1% % of Respondents 20% 0% 1%0%0% 2% 0% 0% 0% U r ban R ur al Urban Rural Urban Rural If outside, when an EQ hits … Awareness that schools could Use Electric Switches during 12 0 % be used as disaster shelters 99% Get under a 80% 73% EQ? 97% 12 0 % 100% tree 70% 58% 100% 99% Yes 10 0 % 80% 60% Yes Get inside a 50% 42% 80% 60% building 40% No 27% 60% No 40% 30% 40% % Respondents 20% % Respondents 20% Wal k tow ar ds % respondents 0% 0% 1% 2% open pl aces 10 % 20% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Figure 2. Awareness - Dos and Don’ts

Project Sustainability Concerns include: • Completion of Construction and Procurement of Equipment: (i) some essential infrastructure (including the GIDM building and campus, the State EOC and three district EOCs) are still to be completed with financing from the GoG; (ii) procurement of some essential equipment for emergency response and communications is still outstanding and is being financed by the GoG. • Continued Engagement of Local Government: GSDMA will have to ensure continued engagement and interest of local government authorities at the district, taluka and sub-taluka level and of community members trained through earlier CBDRM initiatives. The state will face challenges in operationalising the ERCs, as this requires the integration of several levels of government.

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis)

Not carried out for the Emergency Reconstruction Project

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Shyamal Sarkar Task Team Leader SASDU Robert M. Maurer Lead Urban Specialist SASEI Deepak K. Mishra Sr. Economist SASPR Jelena Pantelic Consultant, Disaster Management SASEI Bilal H. Rahill Lead Environment Specialist SASES Meera Chatterjee Sr. Social Development Specialist SASDI Natarajan Raman Principal Procurement Specialist SARPS Devesh Chandra Mishra Sr. Procurement Specialist SARPS Radhey S. Pathak Sr. Irrigation Engineer SASDA Preeti Kudesia Sr. Public Health Specialist SASHD Sumir Lal External Affairs officer SAREX Vijayasekar Kalavakonda Senior Insurance Specialist GCMNB Tapas Paul Sr. Environmental Specialist SASDI Prema Clarke Sr. Education Specialist SASHD Vandana Rao Sipahimalani Education Economist SASHD Fabio Galli Sr. Financial Specialist SARFM Margaret Arnold Sr. Disaster Management Specialist TUDUR Jaswant Channe Transport Specialist SASEI Narayanan Edadan Consultant, Housing SASEI R. K. Malhotra Consultant, Dam Safety/Irrigation SASEI Kavita P. Rao Consultant, Economic Analysis SASPR Sangeeta Anand Program Assistant SASEI Margaret Anne D’ Costa Program Assistant SASEI

\\ Supervision/ICR Shyamal Sarkar Task Team Leader till 07/31/2008 SASDU Soraya Goga Task Team Leader from 08/01/2008 SASDU Robert Maurer Lead Urban Specialist SASEI Jelena Pantelic Consultant, Disaster Management SASEI Bilal H. Rahill Lead Environment Specialist SASES Devesh Chandra Mishra Sr. Procurement Specialist SARPS Meera Chatterjee Sr. Social Development Specialist SASDI Sujit Das Sr. Transport Engineer SASDT Prabir Joardar Sr. Irrigation Engineer SASDA Radhey S. Pathak Sr. Irrigation Engineer SASDA Margaret Arnold Sr. Disaster Management Specialist TUDUR Santosh Kumar Disaster Management Specialist SASEI ET Consultant, Disaster Saurabh Suresh Dani SASDU Management Sameer Akbar Sr. Environmental Specialist SASES

Tapas Paul Sr. Environmental Specialist SASES Gaurav D. Joshi Environmental Specialist SASDI Manmohan Singh Bajaj Sr. Procurement Specialist SARPS Debabrata Chakraborti Sr. Procurement Specialist SARPS Dara LengKong Young Professional SASEI Sumir Lal External Affairs officer SAREX Raghu Kesavan Sr. Infrastructure Specialist SASDU Vandana Rao Sipahimalani Education Economist SASHD Deepa Sankar Education Economist SASHD Sr. Financial Management Priya Goel SARFM Specialist Sr. Financial Management Atul Bhalchandra Deshpande SARFM Specialist Rajat Narula Financial Management Specialist SARFM Eugene N. Gurenko Lead Financial Sector Specialist GCMNB Sanjay Rastogi Consultant, Financial Management SARFM Harbans Lal Aneja Consultant, Procurement SARPS R. K. Malhotra Consultant, Dam Safety/Irrigation SASEI Narayanan Edadan Consultant, Housing SASDU Sangeeta Anand Program Assistant SASEI Michelle Lisa Chen Program Assistant SASDU Sunita Singh Team Assistant SASDU

(b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY01 2 20.7 FY02 95 299.524 Total: 97 320.2 Supervision/ICR FY03 45.80 98.4 FY04 45.11 103.9 FY05 29.78 95.5 FY06 18.91 54.8 FY07 18.97 50.9 FY08 17.04 63.1 FY09 14.86 86.6 Total: 190.47 553.2

24 Note that staff weeks and expenditures include supervision of Phase 1.

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any) Not applicable

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any)

Not Applicable

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

INDIA: GUJARAT EMERGENCY EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (Credit 36370-IN)

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT AND RESULTS Evaluation by the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA)

1. Window of opportunity: Gujarat has a history of turning adversity into an opportunity and the devastating earthquake of 2001 again provided an opportunity for conceiving a programme with a clear vision in mind i.e. to “Build Back Better”. The relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation in the earthquake affected areas in Gujarat have won universal acclaim. ¾ GSDMA was awarded the Commonwealth Association for Public Administration & Management (CAPAM) GOLD Award for “Innovations in Governance” in the year 2004. Innovations like Owner Driven Construction, role and involvement of community at every stage of implementation, transparency, equity procedures and various capacity building initiatives were recognized and appreciated by CAPAM. ¾ GSDMA was awarded the United Nations Sasakawa Award for Disaster Risk Reduction 2003 for innovative approaches adopted in disaster situations wherein many partners and stakeholders provided knowledge and resources to formulate effective policies and legislation for disaster risk reduction. ¾ GSDMA’s “Gujarat Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Project” and the Task team of the World Bank associated with the Project was awarded the prestigious Green Award by the World Bank in 2004 for successfully integrating environmental concerns and safeguards in the Emergency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Programme.

2.Project Design: Integrating disaster risk mitigation and reconstruction Gujarat being a multi-hazard prone State, the need was to adopt a holistic, integrated and comprehensive approach to disaster management, focusing on risk and vulnerability reduction through policy, legislation, capacity building, education and communication to reduce the impact of disasters and achieve better preparedness. Subsequent to the earthquake of 2001, the State Government, with the assistance of the World Bank and ADB, developed a strategy for rebuilding damaged infrastructure and services, supporting the livelihoods of vulnerable households and building adequate disaster management capacity. The strategy moved beyond reconstruction to disaster risk mitigation following a phased implementation pattern. Phase I of the GEERP supported immediate repair, reconstruction and rehabilitation of assets like housing, health, education, dams and irrigation, roads and bridges, public buildings, whereas Phase II supported reconstruction and recovery efforts to complement and reinforce the achievements of the Phase I interventions and support the implementation of disaster risk mitigation strategies, involving community participation and institutional development.

A massive rehabilitation and reconstruction program (Gujarat Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Program – GEERP) amounting to US$ 1,765 million was launched with GoG funding and assistance from the Government of India, and bilateral and multilateral funding agencies: The World Bank; Asian Development Bank, the Netherlands Government, European Commission etc. Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA) was established to coordinate between international funding agencies and implementing agencies such as government department, NGOs etc. The Gujarat State Disaster Management Policy was framed and the Gujarat State Disaster Management Act, 2003 was enacted.

In order to build the long term capacity in multi-hazard resistant construction, a huge force of engineers and masons were trained. A mechanism for screening of competent engineers and masons was put in place through certification of masons and licensing of engineers. Quality certifications of constructions were carried out by government engineers and third party auditors for compliance with the seismic resistant features. Issues related to building codes and general development control regulations were addressed. Revision of syllabi and training of teachers of technical institutions was undertaken. The Disaster Management component was designed to support the State in achieving its long term goals of building institutions to prevent and manage disasters. It dealt with the main facets of disaster management, including both pre-disaster and post- disaster activities like

– Emergency management, including pre-disaster preparedness and post-disaster response;

– Hazard mitigation and risk transfer activities, comprising both structural and non- structural measures; and

– Development of disaster management institutions including strengthening the GSDMA and establishing the GIDM and the ISR

3.Housing Initiatives: The State Government adopted a two fold approach towards housing reconstruction, one for rural and one for urban areas.

In the rural areas, in-situ reconstruction was encouraged so that minimum relocation of the community took place. As part of the community participation initiative and long term capacity building of stakeholders, owner driven housing reconstruction programme was launched wherein the owners themselves repaired / reconstructed their houses as per their need and pace. To facilitate easy access to quality building materials at controlled prices and to ensure timely completion of procurement by the beneficiaries, the Government established a large number of material banks for supplying cement, steel, etc. in the affected areas at a subsidized rate The Government also actively sought participation of NGOs and other private institutions in the reconstruction program by institutionalizing Public Private Partnership Programme (PPPP) thereby bringing in resources and expertise from diverse civil society groups.

The situation in the urban areas posed many challenges. The situation in the affected urban towns was marked by poor quality of both housing stock as well as accessibility for immediate rescue and relief operations. Interventions were required not only for reconstructing the damaged houses and infrastructure but also to upgrade them in qualitative terms while conforming to the revised seismic standards and the revised development control regulations. In order to address the vulnerability and upgrade the quality of infrastructure in the hitherto unplanned and unregulated four towns of Kutch, development plans and town planning schemes were prepared with a 50 and 20 years growth perspective respectively. About 19 scientific studies and analysis, such as base map preparation, total station survey, land use, contour mapping, geological, seismicity studies, assessment of relocation needs, urban design etc. were conducted to ascertain the safety of rebuilding these towns in-situ.

Some of the highlights of the housing recovery programme are mentioned below:

• Damage Assessment – Damage Assessment Survey was carried out by teams comprising of an engineer, revenue officer and local social worker. The fiscal assistance was determined on the basis of the damage category worked out by the Seismic Advisor to GSDMA. The findings of the survey were placed before the respective Gram Sabhas. A multistage appeals procedure was established to redress grievances related to assessment. The District Judge was designated as the Ombudsman to enquire and dispose grievances by giving directions to the district administration. • Community Participation – In rural areas, under the PPPP, active participation of the affected communities was sought through a participatory process by providing a choice of either complete relocation or in situ reconstruction. In the urban areas, over 180 public consultations were conducted with different stakeholders to ascertain their views and suggestions while finalizing the plans. • Training of masons and engineers - Recognizing the need for improving the skill set of local masons and engineers in earthquake resistant technologies and to build the capacity of the region in terms of trained manpower, a programme of training masons and engineers in seismic resistant reconstruction was initiated. • IEC activities - In order to transfer the technical know-how regarding hazard resistant construction, over 1 million brochures were distributed in the affected areas. A Home Owners Guide outlining safe construction practices was also prepared. IEC materials were publicized through a massive awareness campaign via various medium like local newspapers, state transport buses, posters, magazines, TV and audio-visual shows, folk arts and shake table demonstrations at regular intervals aimed at creating sustained awareness on disaster resistant reconstruction and retrofitting. • Inclusiveness –A flexible approach to housing reconstruction was adopted by formulating 6 special packages considering geographical spread, extent of damage & structural types. A special package was also formulated to address the issues of tenants who were living in rented houses damaged or destroyed by the earthquake. A provision was also made for addressing the reconstruction needs of slum dwellers in the housing packages (2, 3, 4B and 5).

• Material Assistance - 1082 material banks were opened to ensure not only the availability of good quality building material but also as a price control measure in housing reconstruction thereby obviating the necessity of top-ups in terms of fiscal assistance. Approximately, 21.9 million cement bags apart from steel were distributed at subsidized cost. Excise duty/ sales tax exemption was granted for building materials procured in Kutch. • Financial Discipline & Risk Transfer – To ensure financial transparency, payment of housing assistance was made directly to the beneficiary’s bank account. More than 6, 60,000 bank accounts were opened for this purpose. A stage payment system was adopted to ensure that the houses adhered to seismic norms before release of subsequent installments. The reconstructed houses were insured against 14 types of hazards for a 10 year period at a nominal premium of Rs.367/- per house. • Quality Control – The National Council for Cement and Building Material (NCCBM), a reputed agency in India, was appointed as the independent third party technical auditor for conducting quality tests on a variety of building material such as concrete cubes, hollow blocks, cement, soil, water, etc. and also to check compliance with seismic design standards / norms. • Equity – Subsequent to the house to house survey, the quantum of fiscal assistance for housing reconstruction was determined on a pro-rata basis with reference to the extent of damage suffered. The survey essentially aimed at capturing data relevant for determining fiscal assistance and ownership. Extraneous information like caste, religion, community, etc. were consciously not captured thereby ensuring unbiased assistance. As a gender sensitive initiative, it was made mandatory to register the reconstructed houses in the joint name of husband and wife. Further, in case of widows, the houses were registered in their name and not in the name of any relative of the deceased. • As part of the housing reconstruction program, a total of 908,751 houses were repaired and 202,343 houses were reconstructed to hazard resistant standards. The phase wise break-up of repaired and reconstructed houses through various funding sources is given below:

Category WB Funded Houses Other Funded Total Phase-I Phase-II Houses 1st April ’01 to 1st April ’03 to 31st Mar ‘03 31st Oct ‘08 Repair 364797 41751 502203 908751 Reconstruction 16529 125781 60033 202343

4.Public Infrastructure: Status, Built better than what was before The Public Infrastructure component included reconstruction / strengthening of roads and public buildings and restoration of dams.

All the public buildings, taken up for reconstruction incorporated multi-hazard resistant features. Nationally reputed agencies were engaged as Third party quality assurance consultants to ensure both construction quality and incorporation of seismic resistant

44 features. Additionally, an innovative initiative for retrofitting undamaged public buildings in the seismically vulnerable areas was undertaken to ensure long term safety and encouraging the concept through a demonstrative effect.

The road infrastructure including bridges suffered varying damages due to the earthquake. They were not only restored but also strengthened, incorporating earthquake and cyclone resistant features, to address the increased vehicular traffic pursuant to the massive reconstruction task.

Water storage and irrigation infrastructure in Kutch and Saurashtra had been severely affected. The task of emergency repairs of damaged dams before the impending monsoons and their subsequent restoration and strengthening in the absence of original designs / drawings was an immense challenge. In this context, two Dam Safety Review Panels (DSRPs) consisting of experts were constituted to review, evaluate and suggest the approach towards repairs, restoration and strengthening of damaged dams as per design criteria with reference to the latest relevant Indian Standards.

Under the Public Infrastructure component of Phase-II of GEERP, a total of 3418 public buildings were repaired, 1977 buildings were reconstructed and 232 damaged buildings were retrofitted through various line departments. Under the special component of retrofitting of undamaged public buildings, 2912 buildings were retrofitted. Under the roads and bridges component, 885 km of State roads were strengthened, major repairs carried out in 100 bridges and culverts, 129 bridges restored and 28 bridges reconstructed. As part of the Dam Safety component, 225 dams in Kutch and Saurashtra region were strengthened.

5.Community Participation & Disaster Management: Community Participation in a rehabilitation programme is essential for empowering the community to take decisions regarding the implementation of the programme as per their priority and choice thereby ensuring acceptability, satisfaction and capacity building to prepare for disasters. Recognizing its importance, the Government focused on long term capacity building of the community through awareness and training programmes as well as making institutional arrangements for the involvement of the population at large with emphasis on enlisting the participation of the youth and women. Some of the key activities carried out under the community participation component are mentioned below:

School Safety

School Safety is one of the priority areas of GSDMA. As part of the GEERP, GSDMA has been engaged in promoting a culture of safety in schools through structural and non- structural risk reduction measures.

GSDMA has implemented two pilot projects covering both urban and rural areas of the State focusing on school safety initiatives through training of students and teachers. The Gujarat School Safety Initiative –I (GSSI - I) was implemented in the three pilot cities of Ahmedabad, Vadodara and Jamnagar covering 152 municipal and private schools

45 wherein 86,000 students and 1,500 teachers were trained in the basics of disaster management, mock drills, and preparation of school disaster management plan and non- structural mitigation measures.

The Gujarat School Safety Initiative – II (GSSI – II) building on the achievements aimed and was successful in creating a pool of 86 and 679 master trainers at the State and district levels respectively. A draft school syllabus on the basics of disaster management for standards 7th to 10th was also prepared.

Based on the learning’s and experiences of GSSI – I and II and given the potential of the programme in ensuring sustainable and long term capacity building, GSDMA is currently engaged in up-scaling the programme to cover the entire State involve around 55,000 public and private schools and 2.2 million teachers and incorporate both structural and non-structural measures.

Disaster Risk Management Programme (DRMP) The DRMP was launched by GSDMA in 2003 jointly through United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank funding to build long term capacities among stakeholders, especially the communities in preparing for and managing disasters. The program has been highly satisfactory and given its potential is being implemented in 18 most hazard prone districts of the State covering 11,342 villages in 142 talukas.

Benefit Monitoring & Social Impact Assessment GSDMA conducted two studies on a consultancy basis to assess the impact of the reconstruction programme on the beneficiaries with focus on the benefits accruing to the weaker and vulnerable sections of the society in both urban and rural areas viz. - The Social Impact Assessment (SIA), as a concurrent activity and the Benefit Monitoring (BM) Study, as a periodic activity during 2003 – 2007. The findings of the studies played a very important role in assessing the impact of the rehabilitation interventions as well as making necessary corrections in terms of policy and implementation.

The major findings reveal that:

o Considerable amelioration was achieved in the short term initial phase in addressing areas like relief distribution, damage assessment, community participation and grievance redressal o Significant positive differences emerged with regard to livelihood and infrastructure interventions o Considerable improvement has occurred in the area of strengthening the societal capacity with regard to disaster preparedness o Coordination and monitoring procedures for ensuring greater transparency have been effective as highlighted by the access of community group to information o The participation of women in decision making has been greater than before and members of SHGs have been empowered to some extent. Income levels of 72% women have increased.

o Temporary shelters have been demolished or surrendered and residents have moved to permanent houses, especially the vulnerable sections o Reconstructed units are having better unit and community level infrastructure with owners having reconstructed houses as per their requirements. Occupancy levels are a high 93% o The vulnerable sections have better housing stock with improved facilities. 23% Below Poverty Line (BPL) families now live in permanent houses and 82% have toilet facilities as compared to 57% before the earthquake.

6. Disaster Risk Management: ERC, SEOC, GIDM, ISR, Equipments, Studies

The Disaster Management Capacity Building (DMCB) component played an important role in developing and laying the foundations of a strong institutional framework aimed towards better disaster preparedness, risk mitigation and emergency response with respect to disaster events, as outlined in the Disaster Management Policy of the State. Following the earthquake in 2001, the State Government acted swiftly in this direction by enacting the Gujarat Disaster Management Act (2003) establishing the GSDMA and providing a legal framework for disaster management including the roles, functions, responsibilities and duties of various stakeholders. The project assisted the State in strengthening its capacity in managing and responding to emergencies efficiently and effectively through various structural and non-structural measures. Some of the important initiatives under this component are mentioned below:

Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management (GIDM)

The GIDM was established on January 26, 2004 to cater to the theoretical and practical training needs of various stakeholders in disaster management. Construction of new campus of GIDM is ongoing and is expected to function from the new campus towards the end of the fiscal year 2009-2010. Training programs are designed and conducted to manage various types of disasters. GIDM will also be involved in research and applied research activities related to disaster management. Till date, 140 training programmes covering 3,787_participants have been conducted.

Institute of Seismological Research (ISR)

Given the high seismic vulnerability of the State and the requirement of continuous seismic surveillance, the State Government established ISR in July 2004 under the World Bank funded GEERP. ISR is involved in pure and applied research in the field of seismology. It has operationalized a Seismic Network of 22 Observatories and 40 Strong Motion Accelerograph’s (SMAs) along with VSAT connectivity for first time in the country for the purposes of surveillance and research and is capable of determining seismic data within ten minutes of arrival of seismic waves. Additionally, it has been conducting seismic microzonation studies on a project basis which are extremely useful for planning purposes.

State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC)

Control rooms are operational at the State as well as the district and taluka levels. However, in order to bring it at par with the facilities available in EOCs of developed countries, the State has constructed the SEOC and the District Emergency Operation Centers (DEOCs) under the World Bank funded GEERP. State of the art equipments for communication have also been provided to the SEOC and DEOCs under the Disaster Risk Management Programme.

Emergency Response Centers (ERCs)

The experience of the earthquake in terms of scale of damage and scope of spread lead to a realization that there is a need for relevant equipments and trained personnel to respond effectively with minimal time lag. The Government has hence decided to set up five ERCs at strategic locations across the State with trained personnel and adequate sophisticated equipments. The construction of the ERCs is in progress and is likely to be completed by December 2009. Delivery of 80% of the equipments for the ERCs has been taken and the remaining items are likely to be delivered by June 2009.

Emergency Equipment

Recognizing that the immediate responders after any disaster are the local people, local self governments and the district administration, a need was felt to strengthen the existing response capacities of the Municipal Corporations and Municipalities in order to enable them to react quickly and effectively. Three sets of fire and emergency equipments have been provided to six municipal corporations under the GEERP. Emergency response capacity of municipalities has also been strengthened by equipping them with basic fire, search and rescue equipments.

Hazard Mitigation Studies commissioned by GSDMA:

One of the innovative initiatives taken up under the GEERP was the incorporation of a comprehensive hazard risk reduction and mitigation component. The component helped institutionalize the regulatory measures, raised public awareness to natural hazards and launch various structural and non-structural initiatives to support risk reduction measures in a State prone to various hazards. GSDMA undertook several studies including the Hazard Risk and Vulnerability Assessment; Review of Building Codes; Feasibility of Seismic Microzonation; Establishment of Emergency Response Centers; Establishment of Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management; Establishment of Hazard Early Warning and Communication System; Damage and Loss Assessment methodology; and Flood Vulnerability Assessment of four urban agglomerations in Gujarat partly financed by IDA. Some of the important studies completed under this component are mentioned below:

¾ Hazard Risk and Vulnerability Atlas:

A composite Hazard Risk and Vulnerability Atlas, up to the block level, the first of its kind in the World, has been prepared for the State which is being used extensively as a planning tool in disaster management.

¾ Review Of Building Codes & Preparation of handbook and commentary:

The study was undertaken through Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur (IITK). It identified gaps in the existing BIS codes related to Earthquake, Wind and Fire and has recommended changes/ improvements in the above codes to ensure hazard resistant building construction with specific reference to earthquakes, cyclones and fire which is being referred to by the concerned departments.

¾ Feasibility Study for Seismic Microzonation:

Given the high seismic profile of Gujarat, the preparation of seismic hazard and vulnerability maps of appropriate scale is important for disaster management planning. GSDMA therefore conducted a Feasibility Study on Seismic Microzonation at a State level as a precursor to actual seismic microzonation studies. Based on the outcome of the feasibility study and upon the suggestion by a panel of seismic experts, a detailed study on Seismic Microzonation of Gandhidham – Kutch was undertaken given its vulnerability to seismic hazard and risk to assets. The study has been completed and ISR is examining the same and would suggest various mitigation measures including those of a structural and developmental in the light of the findings. Additionally, as a step towards integrating disaster mitigation with development planning, ISR has also taken up the seismic microzonation study of the proposed Special Investment Region near Dholera in Ahmedabad district.

¾ Hazard Early Warning and Emergency Communication System:

The existence and availability of a reliable and effective means of communication capable of operating in disaster situations with redundancy capabilities is imperative for ensuring the effectiveness of disaster warning and response activities. A study to determine the requirement in this context was conducted by GSDMA under the GEERP. The outcome will be used to augment hazard early warning and emergency communication capabilities.

¾ Flood Vulnerability Assessment of Four Major Cities of Gujarat:

GSDMA has initiated a Flood Vulnerability Assessment of four major cities of the State viz. Ahmedabad, Surat, Vadodara and Rajkot aimed at using the findings as an input for future development planning through structural and non-structural measures. The study is expected to be completed by June 2009.

Given the overall objectives of carrying out the second phase of a program of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the areas affected by the Gujarat earthquake of

January 26, 2001, including the restoration of housing and public buildings, restoration of basic infrastructure in the roads and irrigation sectors and development of an institutional framework to allow better disaster mitigation and risk management for future natural disasters, ,the project has performed exceedingly well given the fact that a multi-faceted project of this magnitude and nature is without precedent in the country. The targets were met and in some cases, were even exceeded. Strong commitment and increased awareness about risk mitigation at the local levels has ensured ownership and sustainability of the assets created. The project also significantly and positively influenced disaster awareness at community level. The GEERP initiatives also had a positive impact on disaster management at State and National levels. The State Government continues to demonstrate fiscal and institutional commitment to the project objectives, particularly as they relate to the long-term goal of the development of comprehensive disaster risk mitigation. The three institutions, whose formation was precipitated by the earthquake, identified as key institutions for sustainable disaster management and subsequently supported by the project (i.e. the GSDMA, the GIDM and the ISR), continue to be supported by the State Government, subsequent to project closure.

7.Observation on Bank’s performance: • While it is undeniably true that GSDMA learnt a lot from the World Bank in implementing the project, there are areas where the interface could have been greatly improved. Firstly, we found the initial project period of three years to be misconceived and unrealistic. A programme of this magnitude with large scale inputs of sensitizing stakeholders, NGOs, local functionaries could, ab initio, require time for the programme to be inclusive in all aspects. In our opinion this aspect was lost sight of by the Bank in the initial stages.

• Secondly, we found the Bank’s procurement process to be clumsy and cumbersome especially those related to equipment procurement. While the Bank has been informing country authorities that Bank procedures would be aligned largely with country practices, at least with Middle Income Countries (MIC), this has remained a platitude. Adoption of country practices would have speeded up project implementation. In fact the GSDMA’s interface with the Asian Development Bank on procurement issues was far smoother.

• The ban on contracts awarded on the basis of National Shopping caused unnecessary delay on project implementation. The Bank’s ill-conceived policy on National Shopping, actuated, presumably, by the knee-jerk response of the former management in the light of the RCH-I programme, was incomprehensible and unwarranted. There is need to address such issues with a greater degree of professionalism in the Bank.

• Lastly, all issues detailed above pinpoints to a borrower’s “cost of doing business with the Bank”. In an era when a country has a choice of shopping among other Regional Development Banks, and the market for project funds, it may be in the Bank’s interest to bring down these “costs”.

8.Observation of Borrower’s performance: GOG(Line Dept.) , MHA, GSDMA / The overall objectives of the GEERP have been largely achieved within a stipulated time frame without compromising the quality aspects. Hence the performance of the line departments of the State Government in implementing the project could be termed as satisfactory. The performance of MHA and the DEA was also satisfactory as far as smooth fund flow and continuous / periodic project management is concerned.

9.Lesson learnt: 1) Paradigm shift in disaster management: The most important lesson that emerges is the need of changing the attitude towards disaster management from a traditional relief orientation to a culture of disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness. Another paradigm shift was from a philosophy of restoring assets to their pre-disaster levels to one of planning to reconstruct better multi-hazard disaster resistant assets. 2) Project Duration: A programme of this magnitude with large scale inputs of sensitizing stakeholders, NGOs, local functionaries could, ab initio, require a realistic time frame for the programme to be inclusive in all aspects. 3) Dedicated agency for implementation: Establishment of an independent and dedicated authority in the form of GSDMA, with a legal framework and well defined accounting standards and the continuity of core staff of the implementing and funding agencies is crucial for effective implementation of the reconstruction and rehabilitation programme,. 4) Owner Driven Approach through community participation: Owner Driven Approach and community involvement and participation in housing reconstruction programme has helped in the acceptability and successful implementation of the housing programme across the affected areas having different culture, customs, etc. within the stipulated time frame. The programme was inclusive, gender sensitive and environmentally sustainable. 5) Institutionalization of disaster management: It is important that disaster management activities do not remain as ad-hoc practices. Major initiatives have been taken by Gujarat in this direction by way of establishing the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA), the Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management (GIDM), the Institute of Seismological Research (ISR) and other DRM initiatives. 6) Paving the way for risk transfer: Linking the housing reconstruction programme with insurance will ensure that the cost of future rehabilitation in case of possible calamities will largely be taken care by market forces with the State playing a facilitatory role.

10. Acknowledgement of Bank’s support: The World Bank played a very crucial role in the reconstruction process by sanctioning the first phase assistance in a record time. The continuation of some of the key members of the Banks team associated with the project right from day one played a vital role in execution of the program. Various line departments of the Government appreciated the guidance received from the Bank team in the formulation of proposals, preparation of the consultant’s terms of reference and evaluation of proposals etc. In summary, the association with the World Bank helped Gujarat in capacity building in reconstruction and disaster risk management.

Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Not Applicable

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

(i) Project Implementation Plan (ii) Technical Annex dated April 10, 2002 (iii) Implementation Completion and Results Report and Final Implementation Support Mission Aide Memoire (iv) Development Credit Agreement and Project Agreement, International Development Association Dated June 4, 2002 (v) Supervision/Implementation Support Mission Reports (Aide Memoires and Implementation Status Reports ) (vi) Project Quarterly Progress Reports by GSDMA (vii) Final Report on Benefit Monitoring Evaluation of GEERP (viii) Housing Reconstruction Program - Lessons Learnt (ix) Amendments to legal Documents/Letters/Internal Memos on restructuring in December 2004 and in February 2008 and those related to two cancellations in June 2005 and February 2008 (x) Project Paper, February 2008

68° 69° 70° 71° 72° 73° 74° 75° INDIA This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any DHANFRA GUJARAT EMERGENCY endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. P AKISTAN THARAD EARTHQUAKE RECON- BANASKANTHA VAV Deesa Banaskantha DEESA STRUCTION PROJECT

24° KANKREJ

24° SANTALPUR Patan RAJASTHAN Lakhpat PATAN Shamlaji Visnagar Himatnagar KUTCH SAMI Mehsana LAKHPAT RAPAR SABARKANTHA MEHSANA Modasa BHUJ Harsol NAKHATRANA BHACHAU Nakhatrana Dhansura GANDHINAGAR Bhuj DASADA Gandhinagar ABDASA Viramgam 23° Maliya HALVAD Naroda DHRAN- Ahmedabad Balasinor ANJAR Halvad GADHRA Sarkhej Bajana DASKROI KHEDA PANCH DAHOD MANDVI Dhrangadhra AHMEDABAD MAHALS 23° Kandla MORVI Mahemdabad Dahod MUNDRA SURENDRANAGAR Kheda Umreth Dakor Godhra JODIYA Surendranagar Nadiad WADHWAN Bagodra Dholka MADHYA LIMBDI Vataman DHROL Anand Halol Gulf of Kutch Dhrol WANKANER Tarapur Fedra Borsad PRADESH Jamnagar Okha Dhandhuka Pipri ANAND JAMNAGAR Vadodara OKHA- KHAMBHALIA Rajkot Bodeli Padra MANDAL Khambhalia Dholera VADODARA LALPUR RAJKOT JAMNAGAR 22° Jambusar KALYANPUR Amod Tilakwada Atkot Valbhipur 22° Chavad Rajpipla Dhasa Bhavnagar Jetpur Vartej Dahej Bharuch Sihor BHARUCH Netrang Sagbara Porbandar Amreli BHAVNAGAR Alang Junagadh Trapaj Khant EARTHQUAKE EPICENTER Kim Olpad SEVERELY AFFECTED TALUKAS (SUB-DISTRICTS) Gulf of SURAT Mandvi AMRELI Khambhat Surat Songadh AFFECTED TALUKAS (SUB-DISTRICTS) Kadodara Vyara NATIONAL HIGHWAYS JUNAGADH Sachin Palsana Bajipura 21° OTHER ROADS 21° Navsari RAILROADS THE DANGS Mahuva Bansda Somnath AMERLI NAVSARI SELECTED TOWNS Ahwa Kodinar DISTRICT CAPITALS Valsad Dharampur EARTHQUAKE DATA: Diu Island MAHARASHTRA STATE CAPITAL Date of occurrence: 26/01/2001 DAMAN V ALSAD SELECTED TALUKA BOUNDARIES Time: 8:46 a.m. Daman Vapi Ambheti Magnitude: 6.9 Richter scale ARABIAN DISTRICT BOUNDARIES Latitude: 23.40 N.

STATE BOUNDARIES 0 35 70 Kilometers IBRD 31839 Longitude: 70.28 E. SEA 20° APRIL 2002 INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES Focus: 25 km. deep DADRA & 20° NAGAR HAVELI 03570 Miles 68° 69° 70° 71° 72° 73° 74°