Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Consolidating the Triangle European Policy Functions of German-Polish-French Co-operation

Kai-Olaf Lang and Daniela Schwarzer Co m ments SWP

Twenty years have passed since the launch of the Weimar Triangle. Yet apart from a number of glitzy summits, the German, Polish and French co-operation can hardly be considered as having played an influential role in European politics. Nonetheless, trilateral collaboration could certainly take on a number of useful functions in the EU, providing the community with urgently needed capacities such as leadership, consen- sus building or strategic guidance. In times of crises and turmoil it is certainly the pressing challenges of economic and financial policy where joint Weimar initiatives could be profitable for the EU. But the trio could also play its part in European security and defence policy, one of the few areas, where the Triangle is beginning to produce results, or neighbourhood and energy policy, where current strategies are in need of reassessment. If co-operation between , and is to become more consistent, trilateral consultational structures will have to be strengthened.

Recent events have shown that the Euro- In order to stabilise the integration pean Union needs both more coordination process and to strengthen its political clout, between its member states and stronger the needs additional foot- leadership. The debt crisis, the growing holds and linchpins. Among the structures importance of national interests and politi- which could be instrumental for this are cal tensions between the member states small groups of member states as well as have begun to destabilise the EU. Support loosely structured frameworks for co-oper- for further integration is eroding all over ation, in particular under the terms of the the continent. At the same time the EU is Lisbon Treaty which has significantly facing severe challenges on its doorstep, strengthened the European Council in its including the dictatorship in Belarus and role as a steering and coordinating body. social upheaval in the Arab world. Without The Weimar Triangle has the potential the commitment and close collaboration of to become one of these influential groups its member states, the EU will neither gen- in European politics. It consists of three key erate political momentum for its own devel- countries in the EU and two essential Euro- opment nor play a significant role on the pean bilateralisms: Franco-German and international stage. German-Polish relations. On 1 July 2011

Dr. Kai-Olaf Lang is a researcher at SWP’s EU Integration Division SWP Comments 30 Dr. Daniela Schwarzer is Head of SWP’s EU Integration Division October 2011

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Poland took over the presidency of the ambitious agenda to strengthen trilateral Council of Europe and now has the chance co-operation. In a joint declaration they to prominently co-shape of European policy praised the Triangle as a “forum for dia- for some time. Moreover, Poland currently logue and co-operation” which was worth pursues a proactive approach to Europe developing into a “force capable of provid- and seeks close ties to Germany and France. ing an enlarged Union with new impetus”. Similarly, the German government has committed itself to strengthening German- Polish relations and to upgrade the Weimar The lacking relaunch after 2004 Triangle. , however, would need to be This could have provided a basis for the trio encouraged if trilateral co-operation were to demonstrate its usefulness as a mediator to be strengthened. in conflict resolution, as shortly before Po- land’s accession to the EU strong disagree- ments arose between the three countries. Missed opportunities before Yet the Weimar Triangle did not take up Poland’s accession opportunities such as engaging in the dis- In the past, the Weimar Triangle has had cussion on the Iraq War or ‘double major- far too many expectations attached to it. It ity’ debate (in the course of which Poland was founded in August 1991, during the opposed a reform of the voting weights in first trilateral meeting between the Ger- the Council which it thought were dis- man, French and Polish foreign ministers proportionately beneficial to Germany and in Weimar. In the context of a complicated France). Furthermore, the triangle played European environment, their aim was to no role in the long and difficult negotia- emphasise the shared values between the tions on the reforms of cohesion policy or three countries. Together they hoped their the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) after efforts would consolidate democracy, Poland’s accession. wealth and security on the continent. There are various reasons why the decla- As a result civil and cultural exchange ration of 2003 was to bear no fruit. The between the three countries developed con- main responsibility lies with the three gov- tinuously. But in terms of European policy, ernments themselves. Paris was fundamen- this co-operation fell far from meeting its tally sceptical to eastern enlargement and stated objectives. The Weimar Triangle was showed no genuine interest in closely co- not even able to play a key role in achieving operating with Poland, the largest Central its central objective of the 1990s: Poland’s European accession country. In , am- EU accession. In the end what really paved bitious plans were spelled out which were the way for Poland’s EU entry in 2004 were never to materialise. In Poland, which is ‘hard’ German interests, ’s con- traditionally the most “pro-Weimarian” of tinued efforts as well as the general and the three countries, sometimes the domes- eventually irreversible progress of eastern tic political situation made a strong Euro- enlargement. pean engagement difficult. Especially After 2004, the three countries missed during the government and presidency of their chance to become the ‘new engine’ of the EU-sceptic Kaczyński twins and their an enlarged EU an option some “Weimar party between 2005 and 2007, the Triangle triangle optimists” had ascribed to the passed through a phase of perplexity. group, after Franco-German cooperation Bilateral relations were also to act as a had lost weight and harmony in the bigger brake during the first years after the EU’s Union. At the Wroclaw summit in May eastern expansion. Although intense, 2003, just a year ahead of the Eastern en- German-Polish relations were repeatedly largement of the EU, top level representa- faced with difficulties such as differing tives of the three countries agreed on an approaches towards Russia or squabbles

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about historic questions. The German and on its G20 presidency, and with the excep- French heads of state switched between tions of policy in North Africa and the debt exclusive claims to leadership and mutual crisis in the Euro area, other issues of EU distrust. Franco-Polish relations remained integration are playing a subordinate role. reserved and lacked substance as well as The management of the Euro crisis and the mutual understanding, whether in trans- efforts to strengthen Europe’s competitive- atlantic relations or relations between the ness are key issues in which Paris, Berlin EU and NATO. In France, meetings of the and Warsaw could present themselves as a Weimar Triangle failed to increase interest force for reform and consolidation. This in Eastern Europe. At the same time, Polish should be in Sarkozy’s interest as he has to fears of Franco-German dominance also cope with rising market pressure on French remained, as is clear from the discussions government bonds. regarding the EU’s institutional changes Yet there is only a limited period of time and the related reform of voting rights. available. Given the upcoming elections, Sarkozy will be focussing on his electoral campaign from the end of 2011 onwards. Favourable domestic conditions His European policy is then likely to be- After many years in which the Weimar come more erratic, particularly due to the Triangle only played a minor role, there are popularity of the EU-sceptic right-wing currently several factors which could help candidate, Marine Le Pen. For this upcom- it gain momentum. Firstly, domestic con- ing period and the time after the elections ditions are rather favourable. Re-elected it would be useful if the Weimar Triangle Prime Minister has based would stick to a pre-defined agenda. Poland’s European policy ambitions on Despite the favourable domestic settings co-operation with Berlin and Paris. Since at least in Germany and Poland, it cannot 2010 this approach has been supported by be taken for granted that the Weimar Tri- Bronisław Komorowski, the then elected angle is gaining momentum. Recently, Polish president, who has declared revitalis- high-level meetings between the three ing the Weimar triangle to be one of his countries have certainly become more foremost political goals. frequent. Gatherings of foreign ministers In particular since the change of govern- and state secretaries in charge of European ment in 2009, Germany has emphasised its affairs have brought new motion in the intention to intensify German-Polish co- field of foreign and security policy, such as operation and to place it on a similar level the involvement of eastern partners like as its relations with France. At a meeting on and Russia. Furthermore initiatives 21 June 2011 in Warsaw, the German and have been undertaken to strengthen Com- Polish governments drew up an ambitious mon Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). An programme for bilateral co-operation, in- example of this was the letter signed by six cluding the idea of a German-Polish part- foreign and defence ministers to the High nership for Europe. Co-operation in the con- Representative Catherine Ashton in Decem- text of the Triangle is also to be intensified. ber 2010 and the underlying Weimar initia- In the short-term at least, the conditions tive aiming inter alia at the creation of in France for a re-launch of trilateral co- civil-military planning and conduct capabi- operation are relatively good. Visible suc- lities with permanent character. Parts of cesses achieved through European co-oper- the proposals were incorporated in a report ation would benefit , the of the High Representative from July 2011. French president, ahead of the presidential But on core questions of European elections in April and May 2012 and the policy, for instance the EU’s medium term parliamentary elections in June 2012. financial framework, both Paris and Berlin France’s foreign policy is currently focussed have recently shown little interest in the

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Weimar Triangle. France and Germany, as angle is to be of practical use to the EU, it well as the United Kingdom and other like- will have to develop from a consultative minded countries, all tried to define red body towards a real framework for co-oper- lines before the European summit in Octo- ation. If this were to take place, the Weimar ber 2010. Another example is the Franco- Triangle could go on to take over four cen- German paper on the future of CAP drafted tral functions. in autumn 2010 without Polish involve- Clearinghouse: Trilateral co-operation ment. In addition, the ‘Pact for Competi- would mainly contribute to developing tiveness’, also proposed by Berlin and Paris, compromises, so aiding decision prepara- was initially supposed to improve economic tion and conflict resolution. policy coordination among Euro zone mem- Providing impetus: The three countries to- ber only, before it was later turned into the gether would specifically place issues on “Euro Plus Pact”. the EU’s political agenda. Harsh reactions from Warsaw demon- Political guidance: The EU is finding it strated that the Polish government dis- increasingly difficult to develop long- approves of Franco-German initiatives in term strategies in many policy areas. The which they are not involved. Despite an- Weimar Triangle could help improve the nouncements to the contrary, the close co- EU’s capacity for strategic coordination and ordination between Berlin and Paris has guidance in selected areas. Guidance does only rarely been opened up to Poland. The not mean dominance and control, but shap- fact that Germany had signalled its open- ing of direction that draws its legitimacy ness towards the participation of non-Euro from the involvement of other partners. states in the Pact for Competitiveness from Weimar as a Brace: At the current stage the start, and that it invited Poland to take of integration, and with the new risks part in the new coordinating body at the of divisions, the Weimar Triangle could Weimar summit in February 2011 changed strengthen internal cohesion between the little of Warsaw’s critical view on Franco- old ‘western’ and the young ‘eastern’ EU German co-operation. Similarly, recent member states. It could also bring together Franco-German ideas on tighten Euro zone regional networks and form links between governance presented by the French Presi- the partnerships which each of the triangle dent and the German Chancellor in August members already belong to. 2011 were tabled without even informing the Polish Council Presidency early. At the start of Poland’s EU Presidency, France Limitations and key conditions had been among the member states which for success blocked the participation of Poland’s When discussing these functions the finance minister Rostowski (in his capacity limitations of the trilateral co-operation as ECOFIN-chair) in the meetings of the also have to be taken into account. One Eurogroup to which Eurogroup President such limiting factor is the fact that the Jean-Claude Juncker had invited him. A Weimar Triangle, just like the Franco- Polish response was to gather Non-EMU- German co-operation, is an alliance of members from Central and South Eastern “heavyweights”. If the Triangle wants to Europe which called for more coherence in shape European politics, its agreements economic governance in Europe. require acceptance by smaller EU states. Hence it is essential that the triangle be linked to other groups of countries such as Possible tasks in European policy the Visegrád group (with Poland as the There is hence a tendency in France and respective hub), the Mediterranean coun- Germany to disregard the Weimar Tri- tries (France), the Benelux partners (Ger- angle’s political potential. Yet if the tri- many) or the Baltic Sea region (Germany

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and Poland). The Triangle could also invite “more Weimar” would just mean more EU partner countries (in defence policy coordination – with little political results. such as the United Kingdom) or representa- For all efforts to strengthen the Triangle, tives of the Union (such as the High Repre- it is indispensible to tackle the question sentative) to its meetings. how French engagement can be secured. As The fact that the United Kingdom is not the successful CSDP initiative has shown, part of the Triangle does not necessarily French interest can be aroused best when cause problems in all areas. Yet there are Germany and Poland use the Triangle to several policy areas where the three coun- focus on European policies which are tries would hardly be able to strengthen viewed as particularly important in Paris. European politics without London’s co- operation. Despite the progress in matters related to CSDP it will probably be vital to Guidelines for co-operation link the United Kingdom’s political power Given all these restrictions and open ques- and military capabilities to the Weimar tions, it is necessary to set out how exactly initiatives. British resistance against the the Weimar Triangle can take on a useful creation of a permanent operational head- role in specific policies and issues areas of quarters has shown that progress in CSDP European politics. In doing so it is impor- against Great Britain is hardly possible. The tant to acknowledge the fact that even if defence agreements between Britain and the Weimar Triangle were to become more France could take on a bridge function dynamic politically, it would still not be a here. territorially defined regional grouping. Furthermore there is a certain risk that Instead the triangle should embody a pro- the three Weimar countries could either active and open minilateralism which is neutralise each other in decision-making dedicated to improving the EU. processes, or that their agreements would Co-operation among the three countries be based on the lowest common denomina- can take place on two levels. There are first- tor. If fundamental positions are too distant ly low-politics orientated towards civil from one another and a shared understand- society and culture; and secondly high- ing for initiatives is lacking, it is unlikely politics or the “hard dimension” of Euro- that the Triangle would provide impetus. pean affairs, strategic questions and foreign This would turn it into a forum where the policy. These levels are interrelated and members carefully watch over each other may reinforce each other. But if the three and slow each other down. From a German countries want to sketch out an ambitious point of view the question therefore re- European agenda, they have to focus on mains whether separate bilateral relations high-politics which should be treated sepa- focused on particular policies with Poland rately from “soft” co-operation. on the one hand (concerning questions of There is also some vagueness as to how partnerships with eastern countries for in- the Weimar Triangle relates to the three stance) and with France on the other (based distinct bilateral relations. Even if the Tri- around certain economic and financial angle rises in importance, it will not com- issues for example) would provide better pletely replace bilateral partnerships. results than those produced through the Moreover, its new foreign dimensions (such potentially cumbersome structure of the as relations with Russia or Ukraine in the Weimar Triangle. It is worth remembering framework of the “Weimar Triangle Plus that there are far more complexities in- meetings”) have to be distinguished from volved in managing trilateral arrangements other forms of co-operation in which one than nurturing the tried and tested Franco- or more of the three countries are involved. German and Polish-German relations. With- This includes co-operation between Ger- out a realistic assessment of these problems many, Poland and Russia and the occa-

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sional meetings between Germany, France ty of France, Germany and Poland, joint and Russia. In other words, policy makers declarations and especially trips by the will have to choose the appropriate forum foreign ministers could help encourage to handle specific challenges – is it “Wei- reform in EU neighbouring countries. mar”, is it bilateral relations or is it groups “Democratic neighbourhoods” of the of member states and partners? The Wei- EU is an issue of interest to all three mar group will also have to define a set of countries, even if individually they have policy areas on which to focus. There are focussed on different geographical regions. four main themes of particular relevance. The problematic developments in Belarus and Ukraine could become a focus just as much as could the processes in Tunisia or Foreign and Eastern Policies post-Gaddafi Libya. Weimar efforts could With regard to EU external relations, Ber- include a better political coordination in lin, Paris and Warsaw could particularly dealing with states in transformation or inspire European Neighbourhood Policy a reinforced transfer of democratisation (ENP), where they could balance the Eastern expertise, particularly with the help of and Mediterranean dimension. Poland and Poland. A trilateral ‘Weimar Foundation Germany play leading roles in the co-oper- for Democracy’ could integrate experiences ation with eastern neighbour states, and from civil society and policies of reform in both are also key players in relations with the three countries. Alternatively, the three Russia. Meanwhile, France is mostly active countries could think about common pro- in the southern Mediterranean, where jects in the framework of the “European Germany also retains substantial interests. Foundation for Democracy”, a recent initia- For this reason, the Weimar Triangle has a tive launched by Poland. good chance of leading a stable consensus If a ‘Weimar Fund’ was established to on ENP and to reduce competition between support trilateral initiatives in particular Eastern and Southern member states. The from science and civil society, it could or- meetings of the Weimar Triangle’s foreign ganise visiting and residency programmes ministers with external partners, as in 2010 for representatives of new democratic elites with the Russian and Ukrainian foreign in countries neighbouring the EU. The fund ministers or in 2011 with Moldova’s head could also develop ‘Weimar Fellowship of diplomacy, could also be extended to Programmes’ for scientists, students and other countries, for example from the qualified individuals from the private sec- Southern neighbourhood. This would be a tor and government administrations, offer- chance for France to take the initiative ing work or training stays in all three coun- within the Weimar framework. This ap- tries. proach could also be strengthened at the top level, for instance by inviting the Russian head of state to a Weimar Triangle Security Policy summit (as proposed by Komorowski, the European security and defence policy is one Polish president). of the few areas where the Weimar Triangle At the same time the Triangle’s foreign has actually led to progress. This has been policy dimension would have to be devel- possible despite the three countries’ tra- oped at the practical level: a trilateral ditionally different security approaches: working group from the three foreign Poland has been Atlanticist; the French ministries working on eastern and neigh- attitude has been predominantly European; bourhood policy could develop concrete and Germany has emphasised both trans- project ideas for the EU’s Partnership for atlantic and European components. Modernisation with Russia as well as for the Trilateral co-operation in the field of Eastern Partnership. The combined authori- CSDP buttresses the Europeanisation

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of Poland’s security policy and binds France From a German point of view there is more strongly to Germany and Poland (not- another reason why Poland is an important withstanding the recently relaunched bi- partner: Warsaw governments are follow- lateral Franco-British co-operation). At the ing a philosophy of public spending and same time it offers the possibility for a state budgets, which is oriented towards growing convergence between the three financial stability. Mechanisms such as a countries in the sense of a European-Atlan- constitutional debt ceiling show that the tic security consensus. Recent examples for Polish mainstream budget idea is quite Weimar’s new security and defence co- close to that of Germany’s. Moreover, the operation include the idea of drawing up a Polish economy has recovered more Weimar Triangle Battle Group (i.e. forming dynamically from the economic crises than a European combat unit), the letter by many other European countries. Strength- foreign and defence ministers to the High ening the EU’s internal market and finding Representative mentioned above and joint new areas for economic growth are key proposals to strengthen planning and com- issues during the Polish presidency of the mand structures in EU military inter- Council of the EU. The Weimar group could ventions. play an important role in ensuring these Meanwhile, trilateral discussions on questions are concluded successfully. security issues should not be confined to In order for this to occur, the intensive the CSDP framework. In the past, conflicts co-operation between Germany and France have arisen between Paris and Berlin on in the management of the Euro crisis would one side and Warsaw on the other. This have to be matched with regulatory strat- occurred for instance due to differing views egies which Berlin and Warsaw can agree on transatlantic relations, the post-soviet on. If France were to coordinate economic area and the role of Russia. A regular “secu- and financial policy with Poland, an im- rity trialogue” between high ranking repre- portant partner from outside the Euro sentatives of government headquarters zone, then Franco-German policies could (including security advisors), foreign and gain further legitimacy. This could raise defence ministries, possibly supported by French interest in the Weimar Triangle. a broader forum including other branches Germany’s government could act as a of government, as well as members of par- mediator, and in many issues Berlin would liaments and experts, could enhance the be able to count on the co-operation of strategic exchange between the three both sides. A first step towards would be to partners. organise regular trilateral meetings of the ministers for economy and finance.

Economic policy As far as economic issues concerned, the European energy policy Weimar Triangle has not been significant. In French, German and Polish energy As long as Poland remains outside the Euro policy there are numerous possibilities zone, it will hardly be possible to transform for both co-operation and conflict. In part, the trio into a key policy shaper. However, Germany’s decision to close its nuclear the Weimar Triangle could bridge the gap power plants has made these differences between Euro zone members and non-mem- more relevant. Unlike Germany, France and bers. As a member-country ‘in line’ for EMU Poland plan to expand their nuclear pro- membership, Poland acts differently from grams and co-operation in the field of the United Kingdom, which is a permanent nuclear energy. At the same time Germany Euro-by-stander. The Weimar group could and Poland are investing in the study of help bind candidate countries more closely ‘clean’ coal technologies, as both countries to the process of deepening the Euro zone. have a large coal industry and are affected

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by European climate policy. Meanwhile, should cooperate more closely. This could projects such as the Nord Stream gas pipe- include consultations between the heads of line have been highly controversial, show- European policy departments in both gov- ing the salience and sensitivity of energy ernment headquarters and foreign minis- related issues between the two Weimar tries. In general, these fora need a clear countries. All in all, the three countries’ agenda with common priorities, and plans interests diverge so strongly due to their on their implementation. The results could specific composition of energy mixes, be assessed during trilateral summits or differing approaches to the relationship meetings of “ministers” in charge of Euro- with Russia and due to the particular levels pean integration. Such measures would of dependency in their energy industries. increase continuity in co-operation and An energy summit organised by the Wei- occupy the periods between summits. mar Triangle, and attended by the minis- The parliamentary dimension would also ters for the economy and the environment, have to be given a more prominent role –

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und could help allay differences, but also pro- particularly now that the Lisbon Treaty has Politik, 2011 duce practical ideas for specific projects. made national parliaments increasingly All rights reserved A joint energy efficiency initiative ideally relevant players in European politics. Meet-

These Comments reflect involving further partners could bring to- ings of the three parliamentary presidiums solely the authors’ views. gether companies, public administrations, and the EU committees should be comple-

SWP municipalities and research institutions. Its mented by meetings of other committees. Stiftung Wissenschaft und objective would be to develop innovative A French-German-Polish interparliamentary Politik German Institute for ways of saving energy, and developing sus- group would be an additional link between International and tainability and climate protection primarily the legislative bodies of the three countries. Security Affairs at the local level. Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Leaving empty phrases behind Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Strengthening the co-operation Until now the Weimar Triangle has existed www.swp-berlin.org In order to implement these initiatives, more as an option than as a real framework [email protected] stringent and strong management as well for action. If the three countries fail to use ISSN 1861-1761 as sufficient resources are required. This the opportunities arising now, they should

Translation by Tim Jack does not imply the creation of many new draw the conclusions and give up the idea structures. Yet a small number of new of enhancing the Triangle’s role in the EU. (English version of SWP-Aktuell 31/2011) guiding and coordinating bodies would In this case, an intensification of co- certainly make sense. As a means of raising operation should be avoided to prevent the organisation’s level of efficiency it resources from being wasted. If the idea of would be important to ensure the institu- an important role for the Weimar Triangle tions through which the three partners co- in European policy-making is abandoned, operate are sufficiently networked and are then it should limit its activities to civil provided with adequate funds. The position society and cultural initiatives. of a Weimar coordinator could be estab- European initiatives and harmonisation lished in the three partners’ foreign minis- between the three countries could still be tries, tightly linked to the European policy developed, but mainly bilaterally, that is in decision centre. In order to ensure in-depth Franco-German or Polish-German partner- co-operation between the Weimar partners, ships. The price of this option is that bi- it would be important to involve the work- lateral initiatives have less mobilising ing level of all line ministries tasked with power, less legitimacy and the three coun- implementing trilateral priorities. tries would contribute significantly less to If the Triangle is to take on a stronger the strengthening of the EU. conceptual role in Europe, then the nation- al coordination centres for European affairs

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