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Mosul: Food Security Summary

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Mosul: Food Security Summary Mosul: Food Security Summary HIGHLIGHTS FOCUS ON FOOD SECURITY • Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced the official • Conflict has placed severe strains on the food security start of the offensive to retake Mosul from ISIS on 17 and infrastructure of Mosul and surrounding areas. October 2016. • Civilians remaining in the city lack safe access to • Mosul could be the largest humanitarian operation food with the majority of the population reporting this year. In the worst case scenario, up to 1.5 being unable to afford food and the need to resort to million people could be displaced from the city and negative coping mechanisms.2 surrounding area by the offensive, with 200,000 • Expected displacement figures as well as patterns are displaced in the first weeks of the offensive. still difficult to anticipate, but could reach 1.5 million; • Access to food for civilians that remain in Mosul there is a need to prepare for multiple scenarios to throughout the offensive as well as post-offensive reach displaced population. restoration and management of of supply lines, market • Early patterns show that IDP intentions are diverse access and agriculture are of concern. and that many will not rely on camps; IDPs have left • In response, the humanitarian community’s July with few resources and nearby host communities are appeal for USD 284 million to prepare for the Mosul already severely strained.3 operation has only recently begun receiving significant • In the wake of the conflict, there will be an urgent funds. The appeal has been revised to request an need to restore livelihoods and services to promote additional USD 83 million.1 and support return. A detailed Mosul city map can be found here and on RFSAN.info 2 REACH, Humanitarian Overview: Mosul, October 2016, 1 UNOCHA Iraq, http://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-mosul-humanitarian- 3 UNOCHA Iraq Flash Update 27 October 2016 http://reliefweb.int/ response 17 October 2016 report/iraq/iraq-situation-flash-update-27-october-2016 Focus on Food Security Life under ISIS: The Impact of Occupation on Within the Mosul itself, a recent Rapid Needs Food Security and Agriculture Assessment conducted by REACH initiative confirmed these observations and marked both the livelihoods Since Mosul fell under ISIS control, officially in June 2014, and food security situation in the city as severe. The UN Habitat concluded that “the economy has almost assessment found that although prices were relatively totally collapsed, its infrastructure and services declined, low and food available in markets, the majority of its public institutions are devastated, and its history residents were unable to afford sufficient amounts and cultural heritage was effaced.” 1 Specifically, many of food. Many families were resorting to short-term factories were shut down, bombed, or controlled and coping mechanisms such as skipping meals, relying on repurposed to serve ISIS military needs, causing significant borrowing or aid, selling assets, begging, and living only barriers to livelihoods for Mosul’s citizens. In addition, off of the most basic food items. These effects were Mosul’s agricultural infrastructure (machinery, factories, especially noted among IDP households, of which there bakeries) as well as production (wheat and barley stores) are approximately 1,000 5 residing in the city. Respondents were controlled, confiscated and largely re-routed to also reported malnourished children, stunted growth, and Syria. Farmers were forced to give up or sell their crops a susceptibility to illness among adults-signs of potentially to ISIS at low prices. As the invasion occurred just after chronic food insecurity.6 harvest time, these farmers lost out on a year of labor and investment.2 Food Security during the Offensive: Serving the Displaced, Host Communities, Newly Liberated For surrounding non-ISIS controlled areas, the loss of access to the large Mosul market had a significant Villages, and Those Who Remain negative effect on the region’s agricultural supply chain and related livelihoods. Procurement of large machinery Potential for Mass Displacement and fishing equipment, including boats, has become increasingly expensive and difficult, if not impossible. Given the severe conditions prior to the offensive, the Prices of petrol and diesel also increased throughout humanitarian situation threatens to become dire as the Ninewa due to reduced supplies.3 offensive launches and becomes protracted. In its worst- case scenario, UNOCHA estimates that up to 1.5 million Although ISIS occupation has presented serious individuals could be displaced in a near total civilian challenges to farmers and agricultural supply lines, ISIS evacuation from Mosul city and surrounding villages. has shown an awareness of the political and economic UNHCR estimated that 700,000 people could need urgent importance of sustaining agricultural production. Despite assistance in the form of shelter, food, water, or medical siphoning off up to a million tons of wheat and barley to support.7 The humanitarian response has, so far, planned Syria, in 2015 the group banned grain exports from Mosul for accommodation for 60,000 families, and ready-to-eat in order to promote self-sufficiency. ISIS has attempted to food aid for 220,000 individuals. A displacement on this control food prices to prevent public discontent, reportedly scale would certainly require the largest humanitarian forcing some farmers to continue to produce despite the response of the year. lack of economic incentive, renting out land confiscated from refugee estates to increase production. This focus on In preparation for these displacements, the UN has agriculture is highlighted in documents that are purported determined the most likely escape routes and has set to guide the group’s strategy, which emphasize the vital up a number of intake centers to screen, assess needs, strategic nature of food production.4 and transport families to camps where they will be able to receive food, water, and shelter aid and have access to communal kitchens. As of 26 October, 14,500 have received emergency assistance including IDPs and those in newly liberated villages.8 5 DTM IDP Master List 28-9-2016 1 UN Habitat, Mosul City Profiling, August 2016 6 Reach Rapid Displacement Overview: Nimrod 26 October http://www. 2 http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/FAO-countries/Iraq/ToR/ reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/irq_mosul_ FAO_Assessment1.pdf rapid_assessment_nimrod_area_october_2016.pdf 3 ibid 7 http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/9/57ed34214/mosul-offensive- 4 Agriculture as a Funding Source of ISIS http://www.sciencedirect. approaches-unhcr-planning-intensifies.html com/science/article/pii/S0306919216303219 October 2016 8 UNOCHA Situation Report No. 3 Mosul 26 October 2016 MOSUL: FOOD SECURITY SUMMARY OCTOBER 2016 Factors Influencing the Scale of Displacement Meeting the Needs of the Displaced and Host Communities Newly displaced people wait to receive food supplies at a processing center for displaced people in Qayyara, south of Mosul, Iraq.October A displaced Iraqi boy leads his animals to safety after escaping from 2016 ,21. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra1 Islamic State controlled village of Abu Jarboa during clashed with IS militants near Mosul, Iraq. There are factors that indicate that actual displacement November 2016 ,1. REUTERS/Ahmed Jadallah3 will be lower than the anticipated worst-case scenario of 1.5 million. In the interest of minimizing the chaos of a Meeting the needs of the displaced could strain the mass civilian displacement, the Iraqi forces have dropped resources of humanitarian actors and host communities. leaflets encouraging civilians to remain and has offered For example, a recent assessment conducted by REACH resources such as hotlines and practical information on initiative of a host community in the southeast of Nineva how to avoid conflict areas. Patterns from earlier offensive Governorate found that IDPs were heavily reliant on food in surrounding villages such as Shirqat also indicate aid as only 10% were able to flee carrying money. Others, a tendency for civilians to remain in their homes once anticipating lengthy displacements, a highly destructive fighting begins. offensive, and in the effort of mitigating the likelihood of few livelihood opportunities, some IDPs are fleeing with Anchoring factors include a desire to protect household their livestock in tow.4 assets as well as protection concerns relating to safely leaving the city including IED-lined roads, encountering Current displacement tracking, which has found that only hostile ground forces, and airstrikes. Given these factors, 34% of IDPs are residing in formal camps, has highlighted the largest displacements seem likely to occur either in the concerns over vulnerable populations in host the first weeks of the offensive, when fighting has not communities.5 The slower than expected construction of yet breached the urban center, or in the case of an Iraqi formal camps also indicates that the host burden on local security forces facilitated and encouraged evacuation of communities might be higher than initially intended. A certain parts of the city if deemed necessary by military recent situation overview conducted by REACH initiative of personal. host communities showed that many IDPs wanted to stay as close as possible to their original village, preferring However, even if IDP movements remain well below the severely strained food and livelihood conditions 1.5 million, serious food security
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