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Mosul Offensive Crisis Overview 17 October to 25 November 2016

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Mosul Offensive Crisis Overview 17 October to 25 November 2016 Mosul Offensive Crisis Overview 17 October to 25 November 2016 Overview Methodology Location Map Total # displaced households 11,9061 This factsheet outlines primary displacement trends from Mosul between 17 October and 25 November 2 Total number individuals: 71,436 2016, the needs of IDPs and non-displaced, conflict- affected individuals, and related information gaps. A Date of first displacement: 21/10/2016 mixed-methodology was used, drawing on previous REACH Rapid assessments with 175 Key Informants (KIs), and other secondary data sources, including 1 IOM DTM Emergency Tracking Figures 25 November 2016 IOM DTM, CCCM RASP data, OCHA Situation 2 Ibid Reports and UNCHR Protection Updates. Summary Between 17 October - 25 November, conflict in the conflict is ongoing in their village or neighbourhoods. villages surrounding Mosul and inside Mosul city has led Estimates of the total number of individuals that may be to the displacement of 11,906 families (71,436 individuals) affected by the Mosul offensive, in the worst case scenario, to areas predominantly to the East and South East of are as high as 1.5 million. While it has not been possible Mosul city.1 Half of these IDPs have fled from Mosul sub- to gain accurate figures on the number of individuals district, (53%) followed by Bashiqa (20%) and Al Shura who have remained in villages and neighbourhoods, the sub-districts (7%). 2 The majority of displaced persons are areas identified through REACH rapid assessments and being hosted within camps (77%), while smaller numbers secondary data analysis include Abu Jarbro’a, Fadliyah, are reportedly staying with host community members and Baybokh villages and the Eastern neighbourhoods of (16%) or in critical shelter arrangements (6%).3 Refer Mosul city.5 to map 2 for detailed information on the key phases of 1 IOM DTM Emergency Tracking Figures 25 November 2016 displacement and timelines. 2 Ibid 3 Ibid In addition to populations who have already fled Mosul 4 OCHA: Expected humanitarian impact of Mosul operations - Figures as of 14 October 2016 and the surrounding areas, there is a significant caseload 5 It is assumed that many more locations exist, but due to information gaps it is not possible at this of conflict-affected citizens who have chosen, and may stage to report accurately on them. choose in the future, to remain in their homes while direct Map 1. Population Density of Recently Displaced IDPs from Mosul Population density of IDP Tilkaif families displaced from Mosul Baybokh Zelikan 5700 1001-2500 501-1000 Rahat 0-500 Red Valley Aghawat IDP camp Hasansham U3 No humanitarian access Khazer M1 Mosul urban area Mosul P Major city Hamdaniya ! Village Erbil Governorate border Erbil Ibrahim Mosul ERBIL Khalil NINEWA Al Adla Sulaymaniyah Tubiya Kirkuk KIRKUK SALAH AL-DIN Al Alam Al Hood DIYALA Om Kdor Samarra Qayyarah Ba`aqubah Centre ANBAR Qayyarah Ramadi Jad’ah Hajj 'Ali Makhmur BAGHDAD Bezabize Central 0 25 50 100 150 Kms WASSIT Camp Mosul Offensive Crisis Overview 17 October to 25 November 2016 Displacement Trends (17 October - 25 November) Displaced Population profile Hasansham (U3) confirmed on the 23rd of November Based on REACH rapid assessment findings6,IDPs that IDs had still not been returned. UNCHR Protection predominantly reported leaving in two distinct groups: Monitoring reports identified that approximately 57% of either as whole family units or communities. In some cases IDPs arriving at camps do not have civil identification 13 entire villages fled together after receiving directions from documents. A lack of documentation can hinder access Kurdish or Iraqi forces to vacate their area of origin. to humanitarian and legal assistance, as well as access to livelihoods and public services. In addition, KIs in Khazer Available estimates of demographic data indicate high (MODM) camp reported that IDPs leaving without IDs face dependency ratios7: 50% of the population consists of difficulties at screening centres and require a sponsor minors, with one in five below the age of four.8 Around in the camp to vouch for the individual before they are 5% of the population is above the age of 60.9 Of the granted access to the camp. population displaced since November 18th, around 20% of families were female headed and 73 unaccompanied and/ Push and Pull Factors 10 or separated children were reported. The push factors for displacement for IDPs fleeing The area of origin that IDPs fled from had an impact the Mosul area were direct conflict in their village or on their ability to bring items with them during their neighbourhood, or the threat of airstrikes. In some cases, displacement. IDP families who left from villages to the the trigger for entire villages to flee came after receiving north-east of Mosul, such as Abu Jarbo’A, Umar Qabchi, instructions from the Iraqi forces to leave their homes due Tobwaza, Bazwaya, Bawiza, Gura Kheraba and Talyara to the risk of airstrikes. IDPs from other areas fled while were often able to leave in their cars, limiting the distance the village or neighbourhood was still under AG control, that would otherwise be required to be travelled on foot. exposing them to the risk of being captured or injured by 15 Due to the rapid nature of their displacement, IDPs from Armed Groups (AGs). Mass displacement from Shura Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods like Nimrod, Shura sub-district was predominantly triggered by attempts sub-district, Gugjali village and Hay al Samah in Mosul made by AGs to transfer people from the Shura sub- 16 City predominantly had to flee on foot and had limited district to Hammam Alil town or Mosul city. opportunities to gather assets. It is reportedly not possible A common trend that has been seen throughout the for IDPs from Eastern Mosul to leave by car due to fear displacement so far has been the heavy involvement of of being identified as suicide bombers and targeted by Kurdish and Iraqi forces in transporting and/or directing airstrikes. IDPs fleeing Mosul to screening centres and camps. The ability of IDPs to bring cash with them also varied by Therefore, understanding pull factors to the camps and context however, a severe lack of livelihoods over the last locations that IDPs have moved to is difficult to ascertain two years has meant that many families do not have much due to the lack of choice that most IDPs face when cash to bring with them. The majority of IDPs in Hasansham departing their area of origin. When asked why they chose (U3) and 50% of IDPs in Khazer (MODM) were reportedly a particular route or location to flee too, the vast majority able to bring cash, however only small amounts. This was of IDPs reported that they had no choice and that it was especially the case for IDPs from East Mosul. The vast the only option available to them. majority of IDPs from Shura that arrived in Qayyarah- 6 See REACH Mosul Rapid Assessments – available on the REACH Resource Centre Jad’ah camp left without any cash, while those who did, 7 Dependency ratio is a measure of the portion of a population which is composed of dependents left with very little. Instances of IDPs leaving their area of (people who are too young or too old to work). origin with livestock have been reported, suggesting that 8 Based on CCCM RASP data some IDPs prepared for a potential lengthy displacement 9 Ibid and limited access to livelihoods. 10 UNHCR Mosul Weekly Protection Update, 20 November 2016 11 Human Rights Watch, Children of the Caliphate, November 23 2016 Based on previous REACH rapid assessments, the 12 REACH Initiative data collection, and UNHCR Mosul Weekly Protection Update, 20 November majority of IDPs were able to bring identification papers 2016 with them. This does not include children under the ages 13 UNHCR Mosul Weekly Protection Update, 20 November 2016 14 UNHCR Mosul Weekly Protection Update, 20 November 2016; OCHA Iraq: Mosul Humanitar- of 2-3 as officially recognized birth certificates have not ian Response - Situation Report No. 8 (14-20 November 2016); ACF Multi-sectorial Assessment been provided in the last two years11 Confiscation of ID Report Fadliyah, 6 November 2016 documents at screening centres or camps was reported 15 REACH Mosul Rapid Assessment: Nimrod Area, October 20, 2016; OCHA Iraq: Mosul Humani- tarian Response - Situation Report No. 8 (14-20 November 2016) at the Qayyarah-Jad’ah, Hasansham (U3), and Khazer 16 REACH Mosul Rapid Assessment:: Qayyarah Jadah Camp, November 3 2016 (MODM) IDP camps.12 KIs from Khazer (MODM) and Mosul Offensive Crisis Overview 17 October to 25 November 2016 Remain Factors villages of origin as soon as possible, but also to avoid Many families have, either by choice or force17, stayed in being transported to Khazer (MODM) and Debaga camps their homes while direct conflict is ongoing in their village due to negative perceptions of the screening process and 20 or neighbourhood. Authorities specifically requested conditions present in the camp. that families remain at home where possible, which In villages where part of the population has left, those who was partially communicated through the widespread chose not to leave were primarily the ill, elderly and those 21 dissemination of leaflets encouraging this message by who stayed to look after their assets, including livestock. 18 Iraqi forces. Accurate figures on the locations, population Reported factors that would prompt these populations to size, and needs of individuals who have chosen to stay eventually flee include the risk of airstrikes, increased at home constitute a major information gap. However, conflict in their neighbourhoods, or a serious deterioration available secondary data does provide some indication of of living conditions.
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