Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session

Forum: Fourth General Assembly (Special Political and Decolonization)

Issue: Evaluating the Political

Student Officer: Aryan Totawat

Position: President Chair

Introduction

On January 23rd 2019, at a protest held in against President Nicolas Maduro, Juan Guaido declared himself interim President of Venezuela. Within weeks, Guaido gained the support and recognition of numerous nations opposed to the Maduro regime, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Colombia, among many others. On the other hand, Russia and China reaffirmed their support for the Maduro regime, which labelled Guaido’s actions as “illegal” and as constituting a “coup”.

While it immediately polarized the global community and propelled Venezuelan domestic affairs into the international spotlight, Guaido’s move to assume the presidency was far from a knee jerk action; it was merely another development in Venezuelan politics, an inevitable climax brought about by the actions of the Maduro regime as well as of his dissenters over the past several years. Since succeeding the infamous Hugo Chavez to the Venezuelan presidency in 2013, Maduro has frequently and repeatedly endeavoured to undermine democratic institutions in Venezuelan politics while expanding his own executive authority. These efforts became especially pronounced after the Democratic Union Roundtable (DUR), a political faction consisting of those opposed to the Maduro regime, won a majority in the National Assembly in the 2015 Venezuelan legislative elections. Additionally, the Maduro regime has been accused of human rights abuses and authoritarianism for its oftentimes violent, tyrannical crackdowns on protests and political dissent. All of these factors culminated in the National Assembly (dominated by the democratic opposition since the aforementioned 2015 legislative elections) challenging Maduro’s legitimacy and installing Juan Guaido, a member of DUR and the head of the National Assembly, as interim president. The legal impasse created by this move has remained yet unresolved, as both Maduro and Guaido continue to lay claim to the presidency while regarding the other as illegitimate.

This political standoff is not the only crisis facing Venezuela: the nation’s economy has also tanked over the past few years. Under both Chavez and Maduro, the state began to play an increasingly interventionist role in economic affairs, but its corrupt and inefficient management of the economy has resulted in a severe economic malaise characterized by low economic output, rampant rates of unemployment and Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session inflation, and shortages of critical commodities (including food, medical supplies, and energy). As it turns out, the deadlock between Guaido and Maduro for the presidency has created further socioeconomic problems for Venezuela; while Guaido has solicited aid from his backers in the international community (namely the United States), the Maduro regime has alleged that these nations are using aid as an excuse to intervene unethically in Venezuelan domestic affairs and strengthen the opposition led by Juan Guaido. Maduro’s security forces have clashed violently with Guaido supporters attempting to bring foreign aid into the country, further depriving Venezuelans of basic necessities that are in severe shortage due to poor economic management by the government. Thus, it is clear that, the political crisis in Venezuela also has major humanitarian fallout; ultimately, as a first step in tackling the ‘bigger picture’ socioeconomic issues facing Venezuela’s suffering citizens, it is vital for the international community to resolve this political crisis as expediently as possible.

Definition of Key Terms

Bolivarian Revolution

The political revolution initiated by Hugo Chavez following his election to the Venezuelan presidency in 1998 has been termed the ‘,’ since many of Chavez’s revolutionary reforms and political ideologies (such as nationalism and state control of the economy) were inspired by Simon Bolivar, a 19th century Venezuelan revolutionary leader who fought Spanish colonialism in Latin America. Chavez’s political revolution has been continued by his successor, Nicolas Maduro, the current controversial President of Venezuela.

Authoritarianism

A political system that prioritizes government control over society and enforcement of the government’s orders, at the expense of democracy and individual rights and freedoms. Bolivarian Venezuela has been deemed by many of its critics to be an authoritarian state, due to the suppression of political opposition, crackdown on protest activity, and disregard for human rights, among other reasons.

Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution

This article states that “when the president-elect is absolutely absent before taking office, a new election shall take place (…) And while the president is elected and takes office, the interim president shall be the president of the National Assembly.”

In January 2019, the opposition-led National Assembly invoked this article in order to declare Juan Guaido as interim President of Venezuela. They contend that invoking this article is justified since Maduro’s Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session swearing-in ceremony took place illegally in the Supreme Court, instead of in the National Assembly, as it is legally required to (see ‘Alleged Coup’ in the Key Issues section below).

Article 333 of the Venezuelan Constitution

This article says that the constitution “shall not lose validity if it ceases to be observed by an act of force or its appeal”, and “every citizen will have the duty to collaborate for the re-establishment of its effective validity”.

This article allows the National Assembly to disregard the changes made to the constitution by the Constituent Assembly, a pro-government legislature established by President Maduro in 2017 to rival the opposition-led National Assembly (see ‘Creeping Authoritarianism’ in the Key Issues section below), and invoke Article 233 to declare Guaido as the interim president of the country.

Coup d’état

A coup d’état is an illegal seizure of power from the existing government. After Juan Guaido, the President of the National Assembly, declared the Maduro regime illegitimate and proclaimed himself President of Venezuela, the government of President Maduro accused him of staging a coup against Maduro.

Sanctions

Economic and financial sanctions entail limiting business activity with a particular nation. These are typically imposed with the aim of depriving the sanctioned nation of finances or economic resources, as a form of punishment or pressure.

In recent years, the Maduro regime has been the subject of a multitude of sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union, who have accused the Venezuelan government under President Maduro of abusing human rights and suppressing democratic institutions in the country. By using sanctions to deprive the Maduro regime, the U.S. and EU have sought to force the Maduro regime to mellow its authoritarian policies or step down from power.

Key Issues

State Mismanagement of Economy

Both Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro have been consistently elected on heavily socialist policy platforms, which emphasized government intervention and direct management of the economy. During Chavez’s 14-year-tenure as President of Venezuela, over 1,000 companies in various economic sectors were nationalized; this put the bonus of producing various commodities on the government. However, due to Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session bureaucratic inefficiency and mismanagement, domestic production fell drastically. Besides nationalizing entire industries, the Venezuelan government has also taken control of hundreds of thousands of acres of land. The issue of inefficiency applies to the management of this public land as well, and has resulted in diminished food production and hence food shortages.

The most notable example of economic mismanagement in Venezuela can be seen in the country’s oil industry, which is by far the most critical sector of the Venezuelan economy; according to OPEC (The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), “Venezuela’s oil revenues account for about 99 percent of export earnings.” When Hugo Chavez was elected to the Venezuelan presidency in 1998, the country produced 3.5 million barrels of oil per day. Chavez replaced the leadership of PDVSA, the state-owned oil company, with his political acquaintances and other such personnel loyal to his regime. These new personnel were relatively inexperienced and lacked the expertise needed to handle operations in the Venezuelan oil industry. Additionally, in 2007, Chavez began renegotiating agreements with private multinational corporations, attempting to impose greater taxes on these companies while giving them less control over oil industry projects. Numerous companies, such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, refused to accept these one-sided terms demanded by Chavez, and so their assets were seized illegally by the Venezuelan government. This further drove away expertise and foreign capital investment desperately needed in the sophisticated Venezuelan oil industry. Production of oil in the country has, unsurprisingly, nosedived; according to OPEC, Venezuelan crude oil production is currently about 1.5 million barrels per day, which is less than half of what it was two decades ago when Hugo Chavez became president.

Another policy of the government that contributed to economic failure is the Fair Price Law, which fixes the retail prices of products. This adversely impacted producers; according to Professor Félix Seijas of the Central University of Venezuela, many companies ceased to enjoy profits because of the prices fixed by the government, and hence halted production.

This economic mismanagement by the state lies at the heart of the socioeconomic issues facing Venezuelan citizens. According to local polling agency “Datanalisis”, Venezuela is experiencing a shortage of 80% in goods, including everyday necessities such as foodstuffs and toiletries. Provision of basic services, such as electricity and healthcare, has degraded heavily and their infrastructure has crumbled. Since the central bank has printed large amounts of excess currency in order to finance imports, the annual inflation rate has ballooned from 21.1% in 2012 to 929.0% in 2018. Unemployment has also proliferated; the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts that the unemployment rate will reach an estimated 47.9% in 2020. Crime, especially profit-driven criminal activity (for instance kidnappings to solicit ransom payments), has become widespread as disaffected and unemployed Venezuelans seek to sustain their livelihoods. Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session

These social problems resulting from economic mismanagement have, in turn, fostered political resentment and dissent against the Maduro regime, who have pointed to the government’s socialist policies and poor execution of economic affairs as being the root cause of their troubles with rife shortages, inflation, unemployment, crime, and generally deteriorating quality of life.

Rampant Corruption

Corruption is rife among Venezuelan governmental institutions and officials. Given the increased role the government has undertaken in organizing the economy and society under the socialist regimes of Chavez and Maduro, corruption is an issue that is fundamentally linked with most, if not all, of the other issues mentioned in this section.

As described earlier, companies across the country have been nationalized and international corporations have seen their assets seized by the Venezuelan government. These firms (namely PDVSA in the oil industry and Corpoelec in the energy industry, among others) and resources have been placed under the inefficient control of military leaders and government loyalists, leading to inadequate production and distribution of goods and services (see ‘State Mismanagement of Economy’ above).

Besides these aforementioned incidences of corruption, ill-intentioned political priorities and corrupt objectives have also adversely impacted the process of food distribution, which is supervised by the military. Maduro has attempted to weaponize the food distribution process in order to stifle political opposition and secure votes in elections; an example of this is the Local Food Production and Provision Committees (abbreviated as CLAPS), a program initiated in 2016. As part of this program, officials distribute food and other benefits to civilians under the condition that they continue to elect Maduro and allies of his regime and, through the civilians’ identity cards, their voting participation patterns are tracked to ensure their compliance with the conditions. When there isn’t another election on the horizon, CLAPS handouts arrive late and half- empty; during election season, these boxes are distributed much more frequently and contain generous rations. The government’s manipulation of a necessity like food in order to suppress opposition and secure election victories is a crystal-clear example of the kind of corruption plaguing the country.

As of 2018, Venezuela ranks 168th on the Corruption Perceptions Index, out of the 180 countries listed, indicating that corruption levels in Venezuela are among the worst in the world (Transparency.org).

Human Rights Abuses and Political Violence

The Chavez and Maduro regimes have consistently violated their citizens’ human rights and socio- political liberties in efforts to strengthen their grip on power. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) alleges that the government frequently imprisons political figures opposed to the socialist regime and disqualifies other Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session candidates from elections. Furthermore, according to the HRW, security forces, along with militant pro- government groups, (called “colectivos”) have violently suppressed largely peaceful protests and demonstrations with riot control gear; more than 12,500 people have been arrested (some of them without any arrest warrant) merely based on suspicion of association with these protests. Detainees are subject to severe torture and abuse when in custody, and many have been prosecuted in military courts.

In 2015, the government launched “Operation People’s Liberation” (abbreviated as OLP) in order to address individuals and entities they perceived as threats to national security. Security forces participating in the operation have allegedly engaged in extrajudicial killings, mass detentions and deportations, and vicious abuse of detainees. As of November 2017, the Venezuelan attorney general stated that over 500 people have been killed in OLP operations; however, the government maintains that many of these victims were killed in confrontations with armed mobs and gangs, even though these victims were last seen and publicly known to be in police custody.

According to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), security forces who had engaged in extrajudicial killings and abuse of detainees as part of OLP operations largely got off scot-free, despite detention orders from the judiciary and arrest warrants from prosecutors.

The government has extensively regulated freedom of expression, a fundamental human right. The Law Against Hatred, adopted in November 2017, outlaws “messages of intolerance and hatred” and political factions that “promote fascism, hatred, and intolerance”. This law, with its extremely vague provisions, has been utilized by the government to prosecute civilians for simply speaking out against the government on social media.

Emblematic of the current regime’s stance on human rights, Venezuela withdrew from the American Convention on Human Rights in 2013.

Creeping Authoritarianism

A functional democracy requires the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, such that a system of checks and balances is in place to avoid tyranny or authoritarian rule by any one branch of government. In Venezuela, however, democratic institutions have been frequently and repeatedly undermined by Chavez and Maduro, who have sought to eliminate opposition and implement executive policy more directly.

Back in 2004, President Chavez and his allies in the National Assembly (the legislative branch of the Venezuelan government) orchestrated a takeover of the Supreme Court. This meant the judiciary ceased to Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session exist as an independent branch of the government and became a tool to propel Chavez’s, and later Maduro's political agenda.

In December 2015, a coalition of politicians opposed to the Maduro regime won a majority in the legislative elections. The Venezuelan Supreme Court (as mentioned earlier, a partisan body allied with the Maduro regime) accused 3 of the coalition’s representatives of having won through electoral fraud. The opposition coalition, however, refused to withdraw the 3 representatives.

In March 2017, the Supreme Court usurped the powers and duties of the National Assembly, effectively rendering it purposeless and stripping it of its ability to prevent Maduro from implementing his agenda. This sparked widespread protests across the country as well as international backlash; it was regarded as a clear subversion of democracy and an authoritarian attempt by Maduro to remove obstacles to his regime and political agenda. Due to pressure from protestors and the international community, the Supreme Court reversed its decision, returning the powers and duties that rightfully belonged to the National Assembly.

However, Maduro continued endeavouring to make the opposition-led National Assembly redundant. In July 2017, he created a new body called the Constituent Assembly, which was to draft a new constitution and act as the new Venezuelan legislature. The opposition coalition boycotted the election, and hence the new legislature became stacked with pro-Maduro politicians, who usurped the parliamentary powers and duties of the National Assembly.

In 2018, talks were held between the government and the opposition in order to schedule presidential elections later that year. However, these talks broke down and Maduro preponed the elections from later in the year to an earlier date in May. The opposition once again boycotted the elections and Maduro won in an election that was deemed illegitimate and fraudulent by many international observers.

The disregard for democratic institutions, lack of negotiation and compromise with opposition parties, and attempts at stripping power from opposing political bodies have all led many nations and international organizations to label the current Venezuelan regime as authoritarian, autocratic, and even dictatorial.

Alleged Coup

The escalating fallout between the government and the opposition (see ‘Creeping Authoritarianism’ above) reached a climax in January 2019, when the opposition-led National Assembly proclaimed its own President of Venezuela, putting into question the legitimate head of state of the nation.

On January 5th 2019, Juan Guaido, a member of the opposition coalition, became the leader of the National Assembly. On January 10th, when Maduro was sworn in following his arguably fraudulent re-election Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session to the presidency in May 2018, Guaido labelled him a “usurper” because Maduro’s swearing-in ceremony took place in the office of the Supreme Court, despite the fact that the constitution dictates that it must take place in the office of the National Assembly. This effectively makes his swearing in and oath of office illegitimate. On January 23rd, Guaido proclaimed himself interim president, citing Articles 233 and 333 of the Venezuelan constitution. Guaido’s legitimacy was quickly recognized by a number of nations around the world, most notably the United States.

The Maduro regime responded by accusing the National Assembly of attempting a coup. Défense Minister Vladimir Padrino declared that “a coup d’état is taking place against the constitutionality of our democracy, against our Constitution, against President Nicolas Maduro, the legitimate president”. Maduro himself denounced “the illegal actions that seek to install a parallel government in our country” and also accused foreign governments of “gross acts of interference” in Venezuelan politics, after many nations announced their support for and recognition of Juan Guaido as the legitimate head of state.

Key Parties Involved and Their Views

Chavismo United Socialist Party of Venezuela

As the political party spearheaded by President Maduro, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela is colloquially referred to as the “government” political party or faction in Venezuelan politics. Until 2015, this party enjoyed unrivalled control of all three branches of government; first Hugo Chavez and later Nicolas Maduro continuously won presidential elections, members of the party dominated the legislative body called the National Assembly, and the Supreme Court was also stacked with pro-government justices since 2004.

In 2015, however, the opposition (see “Democratic Union Roundtable (DUR)” below) won a majority in the National Assembly following parliamentary elections. Hence, President Maduro established the Constituent Assembly in 2017, as a pro-government legislative body that would replace the opposition- dominated National Assembly and maintain the Chavismo United Socialist Party’s control over all branches of government.

Relations between the government party and the democratic opposition remain overtly hostile, especially following the National Assembly’s alleged coup in January 2019, when opposition leader Juan Guaido was proclaimed interim President of Venezuela. Under the reign of the Chavismo United Socialist Party, opposition leaders and groups have been targeted and suppressed as the government has turned increasingly authoritarian. Protests, regardless of whether they are peaceful or riotous, have been targeted by crackdowns conducted by security forces as well as pro-government citizen militant groups, known as “colectivos”. Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session

Overall, allegations of rampant corruption and authoritarianism plague the Chavismo United Socialist Party of Venezuela, the party of President Maduro. Many prominent members of this party are the target of international sanctions, which have revoked their visas and blocked their assets abroad.

Democratic Union Roundtable (DUR)

The DUR comprise the faction in Venezuelan politics colloquially referred to as the “opposition”. This party has enjoyed a majority in the National Assembly since 2015. However, since the establishment of the pro-government Constituent Assembly in 2017, the National Assembly has vied with the pro-government Constituent Assembly for legislative power. Since 2019, leader of the DUR and National Assembly member Juan Guaido has also laid claim to the Presidency of Venezuela in accordance with Articles 233 and 333 of the Venezuelan constitution.

In recent years, the DUR has been targeted and suppressed by the authoritarian government. They have played an increasing role in mobilizing citizens for political protests, and have also boycotted elections (such as the parliamentary election for the Constituent Assembly in 2017 and the presidential election in 2018) as a form of political protest.

United States of America

The United States has maintained an explicitly hostile outlook towards the Maduro regime, and was among the first nations to recognize opposition leader Juan Guaido as the legitimate head of state in Venezuela in January 2019.

In 2015, President Obama implemented the first U.S. sanctions targeting the Venezuelan government due to allegations of authoritarianism and corruption. The severity and scope of these economic sanctions have been ramped up in recent years under President Trump, and have been broadened to also target Venezuela’s state-owned oil and gold companies; in total, 115 individuals have been sanctioned by the United States, with their U.S. visas revoked and/or assets in U.S. jurisdiction blocked or frozen. Furthermore, financial sanctions implemented by President Trump have prohibited the Venezuelan government’s access to U.S. financial markets “with certain exceptions to minimize the impact on the Venezuelan people and U.S. economic interests”. In recent months, U.S. sanctions have also sought to punish non-American entities that continue to do business with Venezuela. These tightening and toughening sanctions constitute a clear strategy intended to restrict the Maduro regime’s access to finances and sources of income from outside Venezuela.

Rhetoric from the U.S. government, especially under President Trump, has remained firm and uncompromising. In November 2018, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton mentioned Venezuela as one of three Latin American nations part of the “Troika of Tyranny”, along with Cuba and Nicaragua, and Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session advocated fervently for the downfall of the Maduro regime. In March 2019, following widespread and sustained power cuts across Venezuela, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted “Maduro’s policies bring nothing but darkness. No food. No medicine. Now, no power. Next, no Maduro.”

The Russian Federation

The Russian Federation has remained a steadfast ally of the Maduro regime, providing relief in a number of sectors, ranging from economic and financial to matters of national defence. Russian investment in Venezuela since 2005 totals around $17 billion, much of which is in the nation’s oil industry. Russia has also deployed troops to Venezuela to protect the government against cyberattacks and help improve the government’s maintenance of systems such as military equipment and the power grid. The deployment of these troops has been described by the U.S. government as a “reckless escalation” of Russo-American tensions over the Venezuelan crisis.

Russia has been overtly critical of the United States’ sanctions on Venezuela, accusing the U.S. of waging “economic terrorism” against the government of President Maduro “in customary ‘cowboy’ manner.” Statements by Russian officials, notably Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, maintain that American actions against Venezuela are illegal and unjustified, and that they will only serve to aggravate the crisis while undermining what they view as a legitimate government led by President Maduro.

China

In the wake of escalating sanctions from the United States, the People’s Republic of China has emerged as one of Venezuela’s closest economic partners. China has, over the past decade, become a notable patron of the Venezuelan government, making investments and providing much-needed loans to the cash-strapped regime, especially in the oil industry.

China’s support for the Maduro regime has placed it at clear odds with the foreign policy of the United States. As the U.S. has escalated sanctions against Venezuela, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying labelled U.S. actions and anti-Maduro rhetoric “gross interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs.” She also called for the United States to “immediately stop the bullying behaviour of wantonly suppressing another country.”

Colombia

As a Latin American nation that geographically borders Venezuela, Colombia has been significantly impacted by the Venezuelan crisis. It is the most common destination for Venezuelans who have sought to escape the crises facing their home country; as of 2018, 1.3 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants had fled to Colombia. Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session

The Colombian government is vehemently opposed to the Maduro regime in Venezuela and has aligned its stance on the crisis with that of the U.S. and most of Europe. In January 2019, Colombia recognized Juan Guaido as the legitimate Venezuelan head of state. In February 2019, after Colombia cooperated with the United States to organize the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Venezuelan opposition, Maduro severed diplomatic ties with Colombia and closed the bilateral border in order to prevent the delivery of any aid. The border was ultimately reopened after four months, in June 2019.

Lima Group

The Lima Group is a multinational organization consisting of various member nations from across the Americas, including Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. On August 8th 2017, representatives from the national governments of these nations met in Lima, the Peruvian capital, and adopted the Lima Declaration. This agreement sought to “address the critical situation in Venezuela and explore ways of contributing to the restoration of democracy in that country by means of a peaceful and negotiated solution.”

Since then, the Lima Group has collaborated closely and negotiated multiple agreements seeking to devise solutions to the Venezuelan crisis. The agreements adopted over the past couple of years by the member nations of the Lima Group are decidedly critical of the Maduro regime and supportive of the democratic opposition in Venezuela, which adequately reflects the foreign policy with regard to Venezuela of most of the member nations that constitute the organization.

European Union (EU)

The EU has made clear its condemnation of the Maduro regime. In January 2019, the EU Parliament voted in favour of a non-binding resolution recognizing Juan Guaido as the legitimate Venezuelan head of state.

The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Spain gave Maduro an eight-day deadline to announce a presidential election. When this demand went unheeded, these nations, in addition to other EU member nations, officially announced their unilateral recognition of Guaido as head of state. However, a joint EU statement publicly recognizing Guaido was blocked by nations such as Italy, Greece, and Ireland. While not overtly supportive of Maduro, some of these nations were hesitant to legally recognize a self-proclaimed leader like Guaido, and instead maintained their calls for the organization of a free and fair presidential election. Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session

The European Union has also implemented economic sanctions against the Venezuelan regime; in total, 18 individuals affiliated with the Maduro regime have been sanctioned with travel bans and frozen assets by the EU. Furthermore, the EU has placed an arms embargo on Venezuela.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

President Maduro has typically rebuffed certain nations’ attempts at bringing aid to Venezuela; he alleges that many of the countries sending aid have malevolent political agendas and are in fact endeavouring to strengthen the democratic opposition through their aid supplies. However, after negotiations with the ICRC in April 2019, his government has allowed the humanitarian organization to deliver aid on the grounds that these shipments will be made with political neutrality and impartiality in mind.

Later that month, the Red Cross sent its first aid shipment to Venezuela. A second aid shipment was sent in June 2019. Each of these shipments consisted of 24 tons of medical supplies as well as power generators for medical facilities.

Although these supplies were received by the Maduro regime and will be distributed by government agencies, opposition leader Juan Guaido welcomed aid efforts by the Red Cross. Nonetheless, he expressed reservations regarding whether or not the government would distribute the aid impartially and without political agenda; President Maduro has, in the past, weaponized the distribution process of necessary commodities like food (see “Rampant Corruption” in the Key Issues section above) and wielded it strategically in order to reward supporters of the government and stifle political opposition.

Timeline of Issue

Date Event Outcome

1998 Presidential elections Hugo Chavez elected as president. New constitution held in Venezuela. enacted the following year, rebranding Venezuela as a “Bolivarian Republic.”

2013 Hugo Chavez dies; Chavez is succeeded to the presidency by Nicolas presidential elections Maduro. In a presidential election that soon followed, held in Venezuela. Maduro was re-elected in a close vote, but the opposition claimed that election was marred by fraud.

Decembe Legislative elections Democratic Union Roundtable (DUR, the opposition r 2015 held in Venezuela. coalition) defeat Maduro’s Chavismo United Socialist Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session

Party, winning control of the Venezuelan National Assembly.

March Pro-Maduro The move sparked protests across Venezuela. This, 2017 Venezuelan Supreme coupled with international pressure on the Maduro Court attempts to usurp government, led the Supreme Court to back down and powers of the reverse its attempt to seize legislative power. opposition-led National Assembly.

July 2017 Venezuelan Constituent This represented yet another attempt by the Maduro Assembly established government to seize legislative power from the to replace opposition- opposition. This new pro-Maduro legislature was led National Assembly. regarded as fraudulent by the opposition.

August Lima Declaration Nations across the Americas condemn the pro-Maduro 8th 2017 adopted. Constituent Assembly while reaffirming their recognition of the opposition-led National Assembly.

May 2018 Presidential elections The democratic opposition boycott the election. held in Venezuela. Maduro wins easily, but his victory is regarded as fraudulent by most of the international community.

January Maduro sworn in for The Venezuelan constitution states that the swearing in 10th 2019 another term as ceremony must be held in front of the National President in front of the Assembly, not the Supreme Court. As a result of this, Supreme Court. the opposition-led National Assembly asserted that Maduro’s presidency was constitutionally illegitimate.

January Opposition-led Opposition leader Juan Guaido proclaimed President 23rd 2019 Venezuelan National of Venezuela, resulting in legal standoff between Assembly invokes Maduro and Guaido. Guaido’s legitimacy was Articles 233 and 333 of immediately recognized by Colombia and the United the Venezuelan States. The European Parliament voted to recognize constitution, Guaido as interim leader, but stopped short of adopting announcing takeover of a resolution affirming the result of the vote. Over the executive power. course of a few weeks, several EU member nations, Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session

such as the UK, Spain, and France, individually recognized Guaido as Venezuela’s legitimate leader.

February Aid shipment organized Violent clashes broke out between Guaido’s supporters 2019 by Juan Guaido, in and government security forces, who destroyed the aid coordination with the shipments at the border. United States, arrives at the Colombo- Venezuelan border.

April 2019 First Red Cross aid Maduro’s government receives the shipment of medical shipment to Venezuela supplies. Guaido welcomes aid, but raises question of arrives. whether aid will be humanely and honestly distributed by Maduro’s government.

August U.S. President Donald Besides expanding existing sanctions on Venezuela 5th, 2019 Trump signs Executive and restrictions on U.S. citizens and corporations from Order 13884. engaging in business in Venezuela, this policy also sanctions non-U.S. entities who engage with the Venezuelan government, comprising a significant escalation in anti-Maduro sanctions.

Previous Attempts to solve the issue

International Sanctions

Venezuela has frequently and repeatedly been the target of international sanctions, which have been implemented with the objective of eventually forcing the regime to step down and give power to the democratic opposition. The severest of sanctions have been implemented by the United States. The U.S. government has openly supported the overthrowing of the Maduro regime, and to this effect, they have implemented and gradually escalated a range of economic and financial sanctions intended to restrict the government’s access to finances abroad. Sanctions have also been placed by the European Union, albeit much more limited in scope and severity.

However, the desired effect of these sanctions has been undermined by international allies of the Maduro regime, such as Russia and China. Chinese efforts to prop up Venezuela’s oil industry and import oil Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session products from Venezuela (see “China” in the Key Parties section above) will help boost Venezuelan oil production and revenues and ultimately allow the Maduro regime to secure a degree of economic stability, effectively mitigating the financial pressure exerted on Venezuela’s treasury by American and European sanctions. Russian supply of oil and military personnel helps the Maduro regime salvage some financial stability and national security, further cushioning the government against sanctions.

Besides being condemned from allies of the Maduro regime, American and European sanctions have also been criticized by some anti-Maduro factions for their ability to potentially worsen the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. The economic sanctions implemented by the U.S. explicitly exempt “humanitarian goods, mail, food, medicine, and the internet” from the list of sanctioned goods and services, but some critics believe that such stringent sanctions will nonetheless cause greater practical difficulties in adequately providing these necessary commodities to the people of Venezuela. Hence, sanctions would worsen food and medical shortages and exacerbate humanitarian issues facing the country. Additionally, critics of sanctions point to Cuba, which has been embargoed by the United States, as an example of how economic sanctions fail to significantly weaken authoritarian regimes in power. Among the most notable critics of economic sanctions on Venezuela include United Nations human rights commissioner Michelle Bachelet, a former President of Chile who herself is strongly opposed to the Maduro regime.

Furthermore, the Venezuelan regime has sought repeatedly to circumvent American and European sanctions through obscure work-arounds. For instance, in 2018, the Venezuelan government devised a new cryptocurrency, called Petro, which can be purchased from the Venezuelan treasury or acquired by exchanging other cryptocurrencies (notably Bitcoin and Ethereum) for Petro. Petro can then be used to import oil products from Venezuela.

Many of these issues limit the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool to expedite regime change or to force the Venezuelan government to mellow its authoritarian policies and comply with the demands of the international community.

Humanitarian Aid

After proclaiming himself interim president in January 2019, Juan Guaido called for the international community to deliver food and other aid to Venezuela to help offset the country’s humanitarian troubles. His call was heeded by several nations that have recognized him as the legitimate leader of the country, such as the United States and Colombia. Many of these nations have coordinated to try and supply aid to the crisis- ridden Latin American nation.

In February 2019, the United States sent the first shipments of aid for Venezuela. These arrived in Colombia, near the country’s border with Venezuela. President Maduro promptly sealed the Colombo- Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session

Venezuelan border in an attempt to prevent the aid shipments from being transported into Venezuela. This led to a confrontation between anti-government protestors and Guaido’s supporters at the border, who were attempting to organize the transportation of aid across the Colombo-Venezuelan border, and Venezuelan security personnel attempting to restrain the protestors from breaching the border. Violent clashes ensued; security forces fired tear gas and rubber bullets, and possibly also live ammunition, at the protestors. Several hundred were reportedly injured, and at least two were killed by gunfire. Amnesty International declared the actions of the security forces as serious human rights violations, criminal under international law. Additionally, there were reports of Venezuelan security forces burning the trucks carrying aid across the border, an act which is in purported violation of the Geneva Convention.

President Maduro has justified blocking this aid by alleging that these shipments constitute a threat to Venezuela’s security and sovereignty. Since these aid shipments are being delivered by nations overtly hostile to his regime (most notably the U.S.) upon the solicitation of Juan Guaido, Maduro ostensibly perceives that these aid shipments are politically motivated attempts to undermine his authority over the nation and bolster Guaido’s position as the nation’s leader. Hence, these aid shipments are not politically neutral and impartial in nature; this violates the key tenets of humanitarian aid missions, which stipulate that aid shipments should not be driven by political agendas. On these grounds, Maduro has alleged that the delivery of aid shipments is simply being used by the U.S. as an excuse to interfere in Venezuela’s internal affairs and strengthen their own interests.

Maduro has, on the other hand, welcomed aid from several of his allies, namely China. In May 2019, China sent its first aid shipments, consisting of 65 tons of medical equipment, which would be then distributed to citizens and medical institutions by government agencies. He has also notably allowed politically non- partisan international organizations, like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to send aid to the country.

Possible Solutions

Promoting Impartial and Neutral Aid Programs

President Maduro has blocked aid shipments from nations hostile to his regime, most notably the United States; he has accused these nations of attempting to utilize aid as an excuse to interfere in Venezuela’s internal affairs and strategically bolster self-proclaimed President Juan Guaido’s authority and popularity. But Maduro can at least be commended for accepting and receiving aid from politically non-partisan organizations, such as the Red Cross, although, he did accept aid from countries that are politically aligned with his regime. Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session

The importance of political neutrality and impartiality in humanitarian aid projects, especially for a situation like the Venezuelan crisis, must not be understated. It is, after all, one of the core tenets of ethical humanitarian aid, and thus all nations delivering aid to Venezuela, regardless of their stance on the Maduro regime, should strive to comply with these core tenets. This will encourage the Venezuelan government to accept and distribute more of the aid that it receives, more effectively solving the key socioeconomic problems facing hardship-stricken Venezuelans and also putting a damper on political polarization and divisive rhetoric between different factions involved in the crisis.

A novel solution to separate political tensions and agendas from the humanitarian aspect of the crisis is to form a joint aid management and distribution committee, comprising members of the Guaido-led democratic opposition as well as Maduro’s government. Forming such a committee in order to supervise the distribution of all the humanitarian aid shipments received by Venezuela could have plenty of profound benefits for Venezuela’s polarized political atmosphere.

For one, it would reduce altercations between the government and opposition that could result in the destruction or denial of humanitarian aid, such as incident at the Colombo-Venezuelan border in February 2019, when aid shipments organized by the Guaido-led democratic opposition were reportedly burned by Venezuelan security forces under the direction of President Maduro (see ‘Humanitarian Aid’ in the Past Solutions section above). If a joint committee were to be set up, humanitarian aid would no longer be solicited and organized by Juan Guaido’s democratic opposition coalition or by Nicolas Maduro’s government, but rather by this joint Venezuelan aid committee.

Secondly, it would allow each of the factions (the government as well as the opposition) to keep a check on the other, discouraging either of them from hoarding aid or corruptly attempting to distribute it strategically for political purposes. For instance, when the Red Cross sent aid shipments to the Venezuelan government for distribution to the public, opposition leader Juan Guaido expressed concerns that Maduro would attempt to distribute it strategically in order to reward supporters and punish political opponents (see ‘International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’ in the Key Parties section above). If a joint aid committee were established, it would help settle such suspicions, as each party would ensure that the other does not engage in any deceit or corruption.

Thirdly and finally, it would rekindle dialogue and diplomacy between the government and the opposition. In recent years, negotiations between the two factions have broken down as the democratic opposition coalition has accused the government of undermining democracy and indulging in authoritarianism, while the government has suppressed political activity organized by the opposition such as protests. Far- fetched as it may seem, a joint aid committee could potentially open a window of opportunity for political conciliation in Venezuela. The government and the opposition could diplomatically resolve differences, form Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session compromises, organize new elections, and ultimately elevate Venezuela’s political climate from its currently dystopian state of affairs.

Relaxing Economic and Financial Sanctions

The drastic escalation of economic and financial sanctions by the United States under the administration of President Trump has dealt much damage to the Maduro regime’s finances. Besides having many of their overseas assets blocked and visas revoked, the government’s access to the global financial and trading system has been almost completely eliminated. This has taken a severe toll on socioeconomic conditions faced by Venezuelans, and also jeopardized the personal fortunes of many prominent figures in the Venezuelan government including Maduro himself.

These stringent sanctions can therefore be used by the United States and other nations opposed to the Maduro regime as a bargaining chip; if the Maduro regime implements certain reforms and laws as demanded by the international community, the U.S. may pledge to relax sanctions against the Venezuelan government.

To strive for such a solution is certainly ambitious, however. Participating in negotiations and striking compromises with each other will reflect poorly on the reputations of both the American and the Venezuelan governments, since each has relentlessly demonized the other through overtly hostile political rhetoric.

Furthermore, this course of action will allow for Maduro to maintain his position as the head of state of Venezuela. With many European nations and the United States having already recognized his rival, Juan Guaido, as the legitimate leader of Venezuela, it is likely that any solution that keeps Maduro in power will be politically unpalatable for most of these nations; it would require them to renege on their support for Guaido and acknowledge the legitimacy of Maduro, who they have deemed to be guilty of human rights offenses.

Reinforcing and Gaining International Support for Further Sanctions

The alternative is to continue to ramp up economic and financial sanctions on Venezuelan government entities, with the aim of expediting the collapse of the Maduro regime and the accession to power of Juan Guaido.

While sanctions have already been implemented and gradually escalated, their use as a solution to the political aspect of the Venezuelan crisis has been hampered by a number of issues, the most significant of which is the lack of global participation in these sanctions (see ‘International Sanctions’ in the Past Solutions section above). Foreign allies of the Maduro regime, namely Russia and China, continue to engage in business with Venezuela and have billions of dollars’ worth of loans and investments in the country. Dubai International Academy Model United Nations 2020| 12th Annual Session

In recent months, the U.S. has widened the scope of their sanctions such that foreign entities engaging in business with Venezuela can also be punished by the United States. This effectively coerces entities around the world to cease dealing with the Latin American nation. But there are also other ways, more collaborative instead of coercive, through which countries like Russia and China can be persuaded to participate in international sanctions against Venezuela.

For instance, Rosneft (a Russian state-owned oil company) currently holds a considerable stake in Citgo, a joint venture between Russian oil companies and the PDVSA (Venezuela’s state-owned oil company). This company is active in the U.S. oil industry. The U.S. government and Venezuelan opposition leader Guaido can try and assure Russia that their stake in Citgo will not be seized by the new Venezuelan government if Guaido accedes to power, but if they continue to back Maduro, the U.S. can threaten to block all Citgo assets within American jurisdiction. Also, Guaido can pledge to uphold loan repayment obligations to Russia, and not simply write off the Maduro government’s debts to Russia if Guaido comes to power. By reassuring Russia of the safety of their economic and financial interests, Guaido can quickly gain the backing of Maduro’s foreign allies and persuade them to partake in international sanctions against the Maduro regime.

While Russia at the moment is a key backer of the Maduro regime, a reversal in their position is not completely implausible. According to many analysts, Russia’s support for Maduro is mainly driven by economic and financial interests instead of geopolitical agendas; their primary concern is that if a new regime comes to power, their shares in PDVSA subsidiaries will be seized and their investments and loans will not be paid back. Guaido can negotiate with these foreign governments and position himself to appease their economic interests, corroding their financial support for the Maduro regime and increasing the efficiency of international sanctions.

A major drawback of reinforcing sanctions, however, is the possibility of aggravating humanitarian issues facing the country. Economic sanctions have been criticized for exacerbating shortages of critical commodities and necessities like foodstuffs, toiletries, and medicines, increasing the suffering of crisis- impacted Venezuelan civilians.

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Appendix

I. Draft Resolution “S/2019/186” submitted to the United Nations Security Council by the United States (9 votes in favor, 3 votes against, and 3 abstentions; vetoed by Russia and China) https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/059/34/pdf/N1905934.pdf?OpenElement

II. Draft Resolution “S/2019/190” submitted to the United Nations Security Council by Russia (4 votes in favor, 7 votes against, and 4 abstentions) https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/059/50/pdf/N1905950.pdf?OpenElement

III. Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018