• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

89 Ejcrvgt""7 Vjg"Gvjkeu"qh"Uggmkpi"Dqf{" Rgthgevkqp."ykvj"Eqpvkpwcn" Tghgtgpeg"vq"Jgkfk"Oqpvci Brett Lunceford Independent Researcher, USA CDUVTCEV In an increasingly visual society, beauty may seem only skin deep. This chapter considers the ethics of cosmetic surgery through the lens of posthumanism, a stance that suggests that defects of the body can be overcome through technology. Cosmetic surgery, with its reliance on prostheses and promise of reshap- ing the body, is, at its heart, a posthuman enterprise. Although many have engaged in cosmetic surgery, actress Heidi Montag became an exemplar of reshaping the body by undergoing ten different plastic surgery procedures in one day. Using Montag as foil, this chapter examines four ethical dimensions of cosmetic surgery: the ethics of the medical professionals who perform and advertise these procedures, the ethics of the individual making the decision, the ethics of the media structures that promote a ho- mogenous ideal of beauty, and the ethics of those who tacitly approve of such procedures. KPVTQFWEVKQP (if you have the money, the technology is there) to the very dilemma posed by the way capitalism In his essay “Definition of Man,” Kenneth Burke manages femininity by simultaneously commodi- (1966) described humanity as “rotten with perfec- fying it, idealizing it, and insisting on its native tion” (p. 16), an ironic observation of how people defects” (p. 110). Jordan (2004) likewise observes often miss the mark as they seek that perfection. that “over the course of the last century, plastic Such a description seems prescient in today’s surgery advocates have engaged in a concerted, cosmetically enhanced world in which teenage commercial effort to redefine the human body girls may receive breast implants or liposuction as a plastic, malleable substance which surgeons as high school graduation presents (see Cassidy, can alter and people should want to alter in order 2010). Blum (2005) argues that cosmetic surgery to realize their body image ideals” (p. 328). In “holds out a technological and economic solution short, there is little that cannot be corrected; one can truly have the perfect body. DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6010-6.ch005 Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. " Vjg"Gvjkeu"qh"Uggmkpi"Dqf{"Rgthgevkqp Even in cases where the ethics may seem Although many have gone under the knife in clear, there can be controversy. For example, the pursuit of beauty, actress Heidi Montag stands some portions of the deaf community have out as an exemplar of this move toward cosmetic fought vehemently against cochlear implants in surgery as a means of recreating the body. Montag deaf children (for more on this controversy, see underwent 10 different plastic surgery procedures Balkany, Hodges, & Goodman, 1996; Lane & in one day, stating, “I had a little bit of Botox, Bahan, 1998). Indeed, Murphy (2009) describes an eyebrow lift, my ears tucked, I had my nose one same-sex couple who sought out a deaf re-aligned, fat injections put into my cheeks, my sperm donor to increase the chances that their lips done and I had my chin shaved down” (Ber- child would be deaf. The distinction between man, 2010, p. C4). Of course there is more to be therapeutic intervention and enhancement is not done, as she heaps plastic surgery upon plastic always clearly delineated (Hogle, 2005). This is surgery: “I would like to get my breasts redone. also the case in aesthetic enhancement. Plastic Because I couldn’t get them the size I wanted surgery is generally described as procedures used because they couldn’t fit” (“Heidi Says,” 2010, to correct some defect or disfiguration, such as p. 31). After her barrage of surgeries, she told in the case of birth defects or burn victims, while People magazine: “I see an upgraded version of cosmetic surgery describes those procedures that me. It’s a new face and a new energy. It’s a new are not medically necessary. Still, the question of person and I feel like almost all of the things I what constitutes a defect and what is medically didn’t want to be and who I turned into kind of necessary can be subjective. For example, an got chiseled away” (Garcia, 2010, p. 84). The only individual may become so self-conscious of a way that Montag could be herself, it seems, was particular bodily attribute that he or she becomes by removing parts of her flesh. But Montag has depressed or suicidal. As such, one must proceed no intention of resting on her surgically-enhanced with caution when considering the ethics of body laurels. Says Montag, “Let’s just say there’s a lot modification and enhancement. One thing seems of maintenance. Nobody ages perfectly, so I plan clear: the question of what can be accomplished to keep using surgery to make me as perfect as I through medical technology may be outpacing our can be. Because, for me, the surgery is always so ability as a society to answer what should be done. rewarding” (Garcia, 2010, p. 88). McLuhan (1994) noted that the “outering or In this chapter, I will use Heidi Montag as a lens extension of our bodies and senses in a ‘new inven- through which to explore the ethical considerations tion’ compels the whole of our bodies to shift into of cosmetic surgery. I suggest that Montag and new positions in order to maintain equilibrium. others like her draw on a posthumanist perspec- A new ‘closure’ is effected in all our organs and tive, which suggests that the body is intrinsically senses, both private and public, by any new in- flawed and must be corrected through technology. vention” (p. 252). But Graham (2002) argues that Montag’s case illustrates four specific ethical “technologies are not so much an extension or ap- questions: the ethics of the medical profession- pendage to the human body, but are incorporated, als who perform and advertise these procedures; assimilated into its very structures. The contours the ethics of the individual making the decision; of human bodies are redrawn: they no longer the ethics of the media structures that promote end at the skin” (p. 4). The body can be shaped a homogenous ideal of beauty; and the ethics of through technology in almost any way we wish. those within society who tacitly approve of such Such technologies have significant implications procedures. Some questions that naturally arise for how we as a society view the body. include how, or if, such procedures should be regulated and who should regulate them? What 8: " Vjg"Gvjkeu"qh"Uggmkpi"Dqf{"Rgthgevkqp standards should be used in making such regula- While affluent western feminists may see them- tions? How much modification is too much, and selves as “cyborgs” as they use digital technolo- what kinds of modifications should be available? gies for creative and professional purposes, less advantaged women—such as those who assemble computer equipment or enter data—experience RQUVJWOCPKUO"CPF" “cyborg” life in a profoundly different and ex- DQF["OQFKHKECVKQP ploitative way. (p. 62) Much as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra came to teach Dietrich (1997) likewise notes that “women people the Übermensch, cyberfeminists have stand to gain little as quasi-disembodied subjects come to teach people the cyborg. There is a strik- within a network environment without reference ing parallel between these approaches. Where to the material conditions of their subjectivity” (p. Nietzsche (1978) commands men and women to 178). Technology is not always libratory; it can “break the old tablets” that prescribe good and be used to free or enslave, and there are always evil (pp. 196-215), Haraway (1991) finds salva- unintended consequences of technology adoption tion in “blasphemy,” stating that “at the centre of (Lunceford, 2009). my ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of Technology alone cannot be the only answer. the cyborg” (p. 149). Haraway suggests that “the After all, technology is culturally bound. Dyens cyborg is a kind of disassembled and reassembled, (2001) argues that “To reflect upon technologi- postmodern collective and personal self. This is cal culture is thus not simply to think about the the self feminists must code” (p. 163). For both impact of technologies on our world, but also to Nietzsche and Haraway one must destroy the old examine the emergence of new strata of reality, and rebuild the new from the rubble in the hope where living beings, phenomena, and machines of creating a better world. Although the means by become entangled” (p. 11). People and societies which this change is to be brought about differ, the shape technology and technology shapes people impulse seems similar—the suspicion that utopia and societies. But still there is a persistent belief could be brought about if only people could destroy that technology can alter the human condition the things holding them back from attaining that for the better. As Graham (1999) writes, “New goal. For Nietzsche it was an outdated sense of digital and biogenetic technologies—in the shape morality and the desire to cling to the old gods; for of media such as virtual reality, artificial intel- Haraway, it is the binaries such as those between ligence, genetic modification and technological male and female or heaven and earth that promote prosthetics—signal a ‘posthuman’ future in which systems of domination. the boundaries between humanity, technology and The question, then, is whether technology is nature have become ever more malleable” (p. 419). the answer to solving these problems. Haraway It seems clear that technologies have infiltrated (1991) argues that “communication technologies not only our perceptions of reality, but also our and biotechnologies are the crucial tools recraft- perceptions of self, of whom and what we are.

Load more

  29

Copy Link