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CHAPTER 10 World War II and the Czechoslovak Exile, 1938–1945

One of Hitler’s identity-forming experiences was the united struggle of his native Austria- and in . As ’s leader he reassembled of the Central Powers of World War I to form the Axis coalition of World War II. Thus the European distribution of the pow- ers largely repeated itself: Britain and fought against Germany/Austria and Hungary. In both wars the United States emerged as the deus-ex-machina that saved Britain and France, while Russia or the Soviets ‘changed sides’ both times in the middle of the war (although in opposite directions). By the end of the largest war in history, an estimated 50,000,000 people had lost their lives around the globe, about half as soldiers killed in battle, and half as civilians or POWs who died as ‘collateral damage’ or were deliberately mur- dered, a significant portion of which in the Nazi genocide (see Chapter 9).1 The collapse of the military onto the civilian spheres was evident in the physical erasure of entire cities along with much of their populations. The two nuclear bombs, which the United States dropped onto a collapsing Japan in August 1945, marked the beginning of a new and perhaps last era of human history. Like Hitler, Beneš frequently projected World War I onto World War II. The resistance network, he maintained in Prague was modeled after his World War I “Maffia,” and he even maintained some personal continuities.2 Most impor- tantly, Beneš’s goal was the same: the (re-)establishment of a Czechoslovak state. But as the war escalated into ‘Total War,’ and Nazi Germany was losing, Beneš’s policies were increasingly radicalized. According to Beneš’s private secretary during the war years, Eduard Táborský, the undoing of the Agreement in five steps stood at the center of the ex-president’s strategy:3

1 Encyclopaedia Britannica CD-ROM 2003 ed., s.v. “World War II” (by John Graham Royde-Smith). 2 This has been observed by: Brandes, Tschechen unter deutschem Protektorat, 1: 54–55; Zeman and Klimek, Life of Edvard Beneš, 144. 3 Taborsky, “Politics in Exile,” 324.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004301276_011 World War Ii And The Czechoslovak Exile, 1938–1945 213 • The first step was the recognition of Beneš as ’s only legiti- mate representative, which was not easy considering that he had offi- cially abdicated as president after the Munich Agreement, and given that Czechoslovakia had been dissolved. • The second challenge was the legal voiding of the Munich Agreement, again quite daunting, if we consider that this was a signed and implemented inter- national treaty. • The third point was the “solution of the Sudeten German problem,” alleg- edly the root cause of the Munich Agreement. This was the most formidable task, because to Beneš it meant mass expulsion. • The fourth goal was securing strong security guarantees from the for the case of a German war of revenge after the expulsion. • The fifth task was making peace with the Czechoslovak Communist Party in order to clear the way for a long-term Prague-Moscow alliance.

After the fall of France in July 1940, Beneš in immediately set up a parliament-in-exile, the Státní rada [Czech: State Council]. Britain soon recog- nized the State Council as a legitimate government-in-exile, and after Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union in July 1941, Moscow and Washington followed suit. The Soviet Union was the first great power to call for a cancellation of the Munich Agreement, followed by Britain and France after the Heydrich- assassination in August and September 1942. In late 1943, Beneš traveled to Moscow to sign a pact with Stalin, and thereafter he also won the consent for a mass expulsion of Czechoslovakia’s German-speakers from British Prime Minister and US-President Franklin D. Roosevelt.4

Familiar Exiles

It is sufficient to take a quick glance at the composition of Beneš’s State Council to understand how he envisioned re-constituted Czechoslovakia. Peter Heumos calculated that there were a total of some 44,000 Czechoslovak in Western Allied countries during World War II, 80% of whom were Jewish (including some German and Austrian emigrants via Czechoslovakia). Of the remaining 9,000 or so, 5,000–6,000 were Christian Czech-speakers and the rest Christian German-speakers. The number of was negligible. Journalist and historian Hubert Ripka, later Beneš’s propaganda chief, tellingly

4 For further reading see: Glassheim, “National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing,” 472; Rothkirchen, Facing , 169, 172; Taborsky, “Politics in Exile,” 324, 338–40.