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2.7 The international response to German aggression, 19331940 Conceptual understanding Key concepts Continuity Consequence Signifcance Key question Examine the international communitys response to German aggression. The international reaction to the actions o Germany, 1 93539, has been the subject o much criticism and debate amongst historians. A cartoon by David Low, Whats Czechoslovakia to me, anyway? As you read this next section, consider the 18 July 1938 options available to Britain and France at each stage o German expansion, and the extent to which the decisions that Britain and France took encouraged German aggression. What was the international reaction to German rearmament? As we have seen, there was sympathy in Britain towards Germanys desire to reverse certain aspects o the Treaty o Versailles. Following Germanys withdrawal rom the Disarmament Conerence and the League o Nations in 1 933 (see page 1 57) , Britain worked hard to get Germany back into the conerence. It proposed that Germany should be allowed to have an army o 200,000 (rather than the 1 00,000 stipulated in the Treaty o Versailles), that France should also reduce its army to 200,000, and that Germany should be allowed an air orce hal the size o the French air orce. However, the realization in 1 935 that Germany was introducing conscription and already had an air orce ended attempts by the British and French to bring Germany back into the League o Nations and to establish new conditions or rearmament. Germanys actions blatantly contravened the terms o the Treaty o Versailles. This was obviously a concern to the other powers, who could see that Germany was now catching up militarily. German military expenditure increased rom 2.7 billion marks in 1 933 to 8 billion marks in 1 935; while this was still a relatively low proportion o the gross national product (GNP) , it was nonetheless a worry to Britain and France. It was clear that such rearmament would strengthen German demands or urther treaty modifcations and that, indeed, Germany would be able to achieve these by orce i it could not get them by peaceul means. 213 2 In response to German rearmament, and ollowing Hitlers threatening moves over Austria in 1 934, a conerence was held at Stresa in Italy, and was attended by the prime ministers and oreign ministers o France, B ritain and Italy. The ministers drew up a ormal protest at Hitlers disregard o the Versailles provisions regarding disarmament, and they rearmed their commitment to Locarno and to Austrian independence. This collective action, as you have read in Chapter 2.3, was known as the Stresa Front, and it could have acted as a deterrent to Hitlers plans. However, three developments now took place that undermined this united ront. First, France concluded the FrancoSoviet Mutual Assistance Treaty with Russia, in 1 935. This coincided with Russias entry into the League o Nations; with Poland in a pact with Germany (see page 1 59), it was important to keep Russia on side. However, Italy was unwilling to conclude any pact with a communist government. Britain was also worried about using a communist country to contain Germany and opposed Frances idea o surrounding Germany with alliances, believing that this would lead to Germany eeling encircled. The second development was initiated by Britain and it oended both the French and Italian governments. Britain was unwilling to enter a naval race with Germany at a time when its naval strength was already stretched to capacity; there was also a concern that Japan might want to renegotiate the terms o the naval treaties o Washington and London (see page 22) . This made it tempting to respond to Hitlers oers to limit the German feet to 35% o the British feet, which in act gave the opportunity or the German navy to triple its size. On 1 8 June, this percentage was agreed in the AngloGerman Naval Agreement. The agreement also allowed a German submarine feet equal to Britains. The Versailles restrictions on the German navy had thus been completely set aside. Ruth Henig summarises the eect o this treaty in Source A below. Source skills Source A eld o arms limitation. But they had, in the Ruth Henig. The Origins of the Second World process, condoned German violation o the War (1985). Treaty o Versailles by agreeing to a German navy considerably in excess o that stipulated While such an agreement may have been by the treaty, and they had not attempted to militarily desirable rom a British point secure the prior agreement o the other major o view, it was politically inept. It drove a signatories, France and Italy. What was now wedge between Britain on the one hand to stop Hitler repudiating other provisions and the French and Italians on the other, at o the treaty, ortied by the knowledge that a time when it was vitally important or the the British government was, i not tacitly three powers to work together. The British supporting him, most unlikely to oer government could claim that it was possible strenuous opposition? to do business with Nazi Germany in the 214 C H AP T E R 2 . 7 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N AL R E S P O N S E TO G E R M AN AG G R E S S I O N , 19 3 3 19 4 0 Source B A cartoon by David Low, 24 June 1935 (with added annotations), depicting French prime minister Pierre Laval, Italian prime minister Benito Mussolini and British prime minister Ramsay MacDonald in a boat labelled Collective isolation. The text reads 3 wise men of Stresa went to sea in a Barrel. If the Barrel had been stronger, my story would have been longer. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement Mussolini furious Germany watching: Rough also a seas reference indicating to the tricky terms of international the Anglo- situation naval Treaty? Collective The Stresa boat isolation totally inadequate for opposite of the rough seas collective security First question, part a 3 marks First question, part b 2 marks According to Source A what were the key What is the message o the cartoon in Source B? limitations o the AngloGerman Naval agreement? The third development which undermined the Stresa Front was Examiners hint: Use the Mussolinis invasion o Abyssinia in October 1 935. In act, this let annotations on the cartoon to the Stresa Front in ruins. Ater this, Hitler was able to pursue his help you write your answer. aims with greater confdence. Here is a starting sentence: What was the international reaction to the remilitarization The overall message of this of the Rhineland? cartoon is that the Stresa Front is weak and unlikely When Hitler marched into the Rhineland in 1 936, violating both the to last long. This is shown Treaty o Versailles and the Locarno Treaties, he aced no opposition by the fact that (use the rom either Britain or France. details of the cartoon to back up your points) 215 2 The French government at the time was only a caretaker government and thus was not in a position to consider war. The divisions in French society made a clear response impossible and neither let nor right wanted to propose a war against Germany with orthcoming elections. In addition, the general sta o the French army had exaggerated the number o German orces marching into the Rhineland, putting them at 265,000 when in act there were only 30,000. To deal with an invasion o such supposed size, the French would have to mobilize its army and General Gamelin, the Chie o Sta, told French ministers that this would lead to a long, drawn-out war or which there was little support in France. The French thus looked to Britain or a response, but Prime Minister Stanley Baldwins government made it clear that they, too, were unwilling to contemplate war over the Rhineland. One reason or this was Britains overstretched military commitments, and in 1 936 the Chie o the Imperial General Sta made it clear that the armed orces were not in any position to fght a successul war against Germany (see page 1 68) . Signifcantly, the British also did not see Hitlers action as particularly threatening. As the British politician Lord Lothian put it, The Germans are only going into their own back garden. Hitler o course, had also oered negotiations at the same time as invading (see page 1 63), a move that historian William Craig calls a diplomatic smokescreen; this made it easier to aim or a settlement rather than to conront Hitler directly. Foreign Minister Anthony Eden wrote: It seems undesirable to adopt an attitude where we would either have to fght or the [demilitarized] zone or abandon it in the ace o a German reoccupation. It would be preerable or Great Britain and France to enter into negotiations or the surrender on conditions o our rights in the zone, while such a surrender still has got a bargaining value. Eden, 1 936 The ailure to stop Hitler at this point, especially given that his troops had instructions to turn back i conronted, is oten seen as a turning point: the last chance to stop Hitler without war. Harold Macmillan, a Conservative politician, wrote in the Star newspaper, There will be no war now. But unless a settlement is made now a settlement that can only be made by a vigorous lead rom this country there will be war in 1 940 or 1 941 .