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INDEX1 A Adani clan, 271, 277, 304, 305, 310, Abd el-Kadir al-Gilani, 278 315n74, 318n106 Abd Shams, 284, 296, 314n59 Adi, Abu Sa’d ‘Abd al-Karim Abdoka, Ano, 225, 229, 232, 235, al-Sam’ani, 261 250n46 Adi ibn Musafir, Sheikh, 75, 261–264, Abdul Hamid II, 265 272, 273, 276–279, 293–295, Abdulla, Qasang, 126 303, 304, 310, 316n80, 317n105 Abdulrahman, Kareem, 96n33 ADM, see Assyrian Democratic Abnaa al-Nahrain Party (ANP, The Movement Descendants of Mesopotamia), Aflakadian, Kavine, 204 218, 225, 230, 231 Afrin, 3, 26, 31, 174 Abraham, 304 Aghajan, Sarkis, 221, 225, 228, Abu Firas ‘Abd Allah ibn Shibl, 294 229, 232 Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, 316n88 Aghas, 161 Abu Sufyan, 284, 296, 304 Ahle Haqq, 12, 13, 31n1, 43, 74, 135 Academics for peace, 159 Ahmad, Kajal, 76, 79 ACE, see Assyrian Church of the East Ahmed, Osman, 131 Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, Ahmadzadeh, Hashem, viii, 8, 37, 47, Justice and Development Party), 65, 95n29 18, 110, 158, 161 Aid to the Church in Need, 249n30 Adam, 74, 280, 281, 287–292, 302, Ain Sifni, 289 304, 305 Akito holiday, 236 1Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes. © The Author(s) 2018 327 J. Bocheńska (ed.), Rediscovering Kurdistan’s Cultures and Identities, Palgrave Studies in Cultural Heritage and Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93088-6 328 INDEX AKP, see Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi 229, 233, 241, 245, 248n14, (AKP, Justice and Development 261, 262, 264, 269, 282, 293, Party) 304, 305, 318n106 Alevi, 12, 13, 43, 135 Arab Spring, 25 Ali ibn Abi Talib, 284, 296 Arakelova, Victoria, 270, 273, Alî, Abdul Xaliq Muhammad, 251n58 281, 302 Ali, Bakhtiyar, 67–69, 73, 89, 90, Aramaic, 9, 220–222, 233, 235, 95n29, 96n34, 97n35 236, 239 Alinia, Mino, 60, 61, 155, 158 Aramaic-speaking Christians, 217, 219 Allison, Christine, 269 Arameans, 218 Alqush, 192, 225, 315n70 Aram Tigran Conservatoire (Aram Amed, 9, 111, 121, 133, 134, 159 Tigran Konservatuarı), 122, 140, Amedî, Mela Îbrahim Xelîl, viii, 134 145n23 American Bible Society, 188, 202, 203 Ararat (Agirî), rebellion, 155 American Board of Commissioners for Armenia, 26–29, 123, 137, 267, 281, Foreign Missions, 188, 202 294, 306, 314n53 American Mesopotamia Armenian genocide of 1915, 13, 15, Organisation, 230 27, 82, 175, 220, 235, 248n13 American University of Iraq Armenians, 7, 11, 13, 15, 19, 27, 137, Sulaimania (AUIS), 141 169, 174, 176, 191, 193, 197, Amirkhanian, Bedros, 204 200–208, 218, 219, 224, Amnesty International, 159 248n13, 265, 270 Amoev, Kerim, 29, 266, 270 Armenian Youth, 137 Anastase Marie, 287, 315n64 Arpee, Leon, 201, 203 Anderson, Benedict, 213 Asatrian, Garnik, 209n6, 270, Andrus, Alpheus, 204, 208 273, 281 Anfal genocide, 20, 131 Asayiş, 240, 241 Anglican missionaries, 194, 220 Aşiret, 242 Ankara, 17, 123, 155 Association for the Revival of Ankawa, 13, 136, 219, 226–229, 231, Kurdistan (Komeley Jiyanewey 232, 234–238, 240, 241, 250n46 Kurdistan), 22 Anker, Elisabeth, 5, 38–40, 44–46, 49, Assyria, 219, 224 51, 54, 71 Assyrian Academic Society, 228 Ankosi, Kerim, 29, 270 Assyrian Aid Society, 249n17 ANP, see Abnaa al-Nahrain Party Assyrian Church of the East (ACE), Ansar al-Islam, 240 197, 217, 243, 244, 248n1, Anter, Musa, 121, 170 248n3 APP, see Assyrian Patriotic Party Assyrian Democratic Movement Appiah, Kwame Anthony, 36, 38, (ADM), 221, 222, 224, 225, 40–44, 48, 49, 86 227–231, 246, 250n36 Arabs, 7, 11, 12, 19, 30, 49, 79, 137, Assyrian Love and Unity, 221 169, 208, 217, 220, 221, 225, Assyrian National Party, 224 INDEX 329 Assyrian New Year, 236 Bandura, Albert, 49 Assyrian Patriotic Party (APP), 221, Bane, 98n47, 111, 127, 132, 230, 231 139, 141 Assyrians, 4, 13, 16, 22, 133, 137, Bar Hebraeus, 262 197, 198, 200, 207, 213, 216, Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP, 218–220, 222, 228, 233, 235, Peace and Democracy Party), 236, 238, 242–246, 248n1, 122, 139 248n8, 248n14, 263, 267, 270, Barker, Benjamin, 193 305, 307 Barth, Fredrik, 214, 222, 235, Assyrian Women’s Union, 249n17, 242, 243 250n36 Barton, James, 204, 207, 208 Assyro-Arameans, 218 Barzani family, 12 Assyro-Chaldeans, 218, 244, 245 Barzani, Mela Mustafa, 19, 20, Assyro-Chaldean-Syriacs, 218 23, 222 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 15, 17 Barzani, Mesud, 20, 21, 93n6, 114, Atoraya, 219 144n11, 221, 229, 230, 232, AUIS, see American University of Iraq 236, 269, 312n20 Sulaimania Barzani, Nechirvan, 236 Azerbaijan, 21, 26–28, 267, 294 Barzani uprising, 20, 222, 231 Aziz, Jalal Habib, 250n46 Barzinji family, 12 Aziz, Tarik, 222 Basel Mission, 188, 195–197, 199 Bashique, 228, 310 Basra, 225, 250n33, 297 B Başur, Southern Kurdistan, 16, 19–21, Ba’athists, 293 67, 88, 107, 113, 116, 118, 128, Ba’ath regime, 20, 30, 218, 220, 131, 134, 140, 142, 214, 242, 222, 232 246, 247 Baba Sheikh, 303, 308–310, 318n108 Battle of Chaldiran, 14 Babanzade, 113 Baxtiyar, Ciwan, 139 Babylon Brigade, 227 Baxtiyar, Mela, 113, 138 Babylonia, 219 Baydemir, Osman, 145n24 Badini, 124 Bazi, Douglas, 249n29 Baghdad, 13, 20, 21, 113, 218, 221, BDP, see Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi 225–228, 250n33, 261, 277, 293 (BDP, Peace and Democracy Bahzani, 310 Party) Baito, Nimrud, 225 Bebek Seminary, 202 Baku, 196 Bedirxan, see Celadet Alî Bedirxan Bakur, North Kurdistan, 16–19, 47, Bedlîsî, see Şerefxanê Bedlîsî 59, 72, 78, 107, 111, 119, 121, Bedros Effendi, 204 124, 125, 127, 129, 130, 139, Begard, Rauf, 128 142, 154, 157, 161, 179n3 Begikhani, Nazand, 61, 138, 139 Balkans, 180n10 Bêkes, Şêrko, 77 330 INDEX Bello, Basim, 225 Cewerî, Firat, 77, 78, 89 Berger, Peter, 108 Chaldean Catholic Church (ChCC), Beth-Nahrain Democratic Party, 230 217, 218, 243, 244, 248n1 Beth-Nahrain Patriotic Union, 230 Chaldean Church, 159, 187, Beyoğlu district, 172 192–194, 229, 234, 237 Bhabha, Homi, 4, 191 Chaldean Cultural Centre, 228 Bible, 7, 92n4, 187–208 Chaldean Democratic Forum, 230 Binkey Jîn bo Bûjandinewey Kelepûrî, Chaldean National Council, 230 Belgenamey û Rojnamewanî Chaldeans, 16, 136, 192–195, 201, Kurdî (Institute of Life for 216, 218–220, 222, 230, 233, Revitalisation of Heritage, 235–237, 241, 243–246, 248n1, Documentation and Journalism), 248n14, 292, 305, 307 see Jîn Institute Chaldean-Syriac-Assyrian, 218 Binkey Ronakbirî Gelawêj (Gelawêj Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Cultural Institute), 118 Council (CSAPC), 224, 225, Bitlis, 171, 203, 264, 265 230, 251n60 Black Sea, 173, 180n16 Chaldo Ashor Organisation, 230 Bliss, Isaac G., 202, 203 Chaldo-Assyrian identity, 7, 213 Blumhardt, Christian T., 196 Chaldo-Assyrian people, 214 Bookchin, Murray, 18 Chaldo-Assyrians, 11, 19, 214–216, Bosnians, 129, 137, 162 218–247, 248n1, 249n17, Bourdieu, Pierre, 4, 108, 133, 249n21, 249n25 143, 144n4 Chaldo-Assyrian Student and Youth Boyajian, Hagop, 202 Union, 249n17 Bradost, 198 Chaldo-Assyrian-Syriacs, 218, 244 Brennert, Kai Tom, 115 Chaldo-Syriac-Assyrian, 246 British and Foreign Bible Society ChCC, see Chaldean Catholic Church (BFBS), 187, 188, 191–196, Chechens, 180n10 199, 202 Christian millets, 217, 218 British Missions’ Aid Society, 203 The Church of England, 192 Brussels, 31, 141 Cigerxwîn Centre (Cigerxwîn Gençlîk Byzantine Empire, 151 ve Kültür Merkezi, CGKM), 122, 140, 145n23, 170 Cinayeta namûsê, 40 C Circassians, 129, 137, 162, 179n5, Calîl, Calîlê, 94n18 180n10 Canton, William, 192, 195, 196 Cizîra Botan principality, 24 Catholic missionaries, 192, 219 Cizre province, 24, 289 Celadet Alî Bedirxan, 8, 14, 25, 81, Çoban-Aga, 263 113, 153, 220 Constantinople, 187, 191–196, 200, Cemal Îrfan Institute, 113, 117, 202, 204, 317n90 118, 127 Constitution of Iraq, 2005, 223 INDEX 331 Cormick, John, 193 Dicle Culture and Art Centre and Coup, 1980, 17, 156 Youth Academy (Dicle Kültür ve Coup d’état of July 2016, 19 Sanat Merkezi ve Gençlik Çözüm Süreci, 178 Akademisi), see Dicle Kültür ve CSAPC, see Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Sanat Merkezi ve Gençlik Popular Council Akademisi (Dicle Culture and Art Culture of Peace, Centre and Youth Academy) The (Ferhengî Aşitî), 126 Dicle, Mehmet, 10, 11, 37, 52, 80, 82, 129, 164, 175, 176 Dicle, Tigris, 10, 123 D Dicle-Firat Centre (Dicle-Fırat Kültür Dabashi, Hamid, 49 Merkezî), 119, 123, 129, Damascus, 153, 297–299, 317n91 130, 140 Dasagirkê Kurmanci, 206 Dicle Kültür ve Sanat Merkezi ve Dehumanisation, 4, 39, 44, 45, 50, Gençlik Akademisi (Dicle Culture 53–55, 79, 84, 168, 172 and Art Centre and Youth Demir, Silêman, 52 Academy), 123 Democratic Confederalism, 26, 175 Dietrich, August, 196 Democratic Federation of Northern DiMaggio, Paul J., 108, 109, 144n4 Syria (DFNS), see Federaliya Dimdim, 58 Demokratîk a Bakurê Suryê Dionysus, 300 (Democratic Federation of Diyarbekir, 9, 48, 77, 111, 119–123, Northern Syria) 126, 127, 129–131, 133, 139, Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan 140, 143, 146n40, 146n42, (KDP-I), 22 146n43, 146n45, 146n49, 159, Democratic Union Party, 25 171, 172, 180n10, 180n17 Dengbêj House, 130, 159 Diyarbekir City Museum, 122 Dengbêj û Kevneşopiya Dengbêjiyê, 129 Diyarbekir City Walls, 133 Dengbêjs, 129, 172 Donskis, Leonidas, 51 Dersim, 13, 156 Dost, Jan, 52, 78, 95n30 Dersim rebellion, 155 Dostoyevski, Fiodor, 44, 70, 77 Descendants of Mesopotamia, 218 Duhok, 19, 112, 115, 119, 123, 135, Desteya Bilind a Pêgehê Laliş Yê 144n14, 220, 223, 226–228, Rewşenbirî û Komelayetî Duhok 231, 233–236, 238, 239, 241, (High Committee of Cultural and 243, 244, 246, 251n68, 251n82 Social Centre Duhok or Laliş Duhok Gallery, 117, 118, 141 Centre), 135 Dur-Sharrukin, 228 Dezgay Çap û Pexşî Serdem, Düzgün, Cevahir Sadak, 145n24, 117, 128 145n25, 146n40 Dezgay Roşenbîrî Cemal Îrfan, see Dwekh Nawsha, 227 Cemal Îrfan Institute Dwight, Harrison, 192, 194, 195 332 INDEX
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  • Kurdish Oppression Against Assyrians

    Kurdish Oppression Against Assyrians

    Oppression, Assassination, Torture, Harassment, Unfair, and Undemocratic Acts by Kurds and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Against the Assyrians (also known as Chaldeans and Suryan) in North of Iraq. Compiled by Fred Aprim (ZINDA) After the 1991 uprising, Assyrians had good working relations with the various political groups in North Iraq. All the same, elections in the spring of 1992 would be a harbinger of problems to come - ultra-nationalists among some Kurdish parties tried and succeeded in exerting their influence over any Assyrian involvement in North Iraqi politics by creating a puppet "Christian Kurdish" party linked to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the so-called United Kurdistan Christians (UKC). (http://www.zindamagazine.com/html/archives/2002/6.3.02/index.php#ZindaSays) (ATOUR) In 1992 some intellectual Assyrians published a communiqué, in it they warned against the continuous process of the Kurdification of the Iraqi people in north of Iraq. Then the ethnic and linguistic map of northern Iraq was not as it is today; some ten years after the no-fly zone has been established. For its importance, here is a passage from that communiqué: “The Kurdish leadership, and in a well-planned program, had begun to settle Kurds and in large numbers around Assyrian regions like Sarsank, Barwari Bala and others. This Kurdish housing project was naturally to change the demographic, economic, and civic structure of the Christian regions in only few short years; a process that forced the Christian to emigrate as the vacant homes were overtaken by the Kurds.” (http://www.atour.com/news/assyria/20030617a.html) (ATOUR) Francis Yusuf Shabo: born 1951 in Mangesh (Duhok Province), married with four children.
  • Games Without Frontiers: Renegotiating the Boundaries of Power in Iraqi Kurdistan

    Games Without Frontiers: Renegotiating the Boundaries of Power in Iraqi Kurdistan

    GAMES WITHOUT FRONTIERS: RENEGOTIATING THE BOUNDARIES OF POWER IN IRAQI KURDISTAN THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE MIKE FLEET AND MEGAN CONNELLY JUNE 2021 WWW.MEI.EDU Photo above: Kurdistan parliament speaker Rewaz Faiq (top C), leads a parliament session in Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s northern autonomous Kurdish region, on May 25, 2021. Photo by SAFIN HAMED/AFP via Getty Images. Introduction Over the past year, intensifying political and economic conflicts between the Kurdistan Region’s two hegemonic parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of The parties’ efforts Kurdistan (PUK), have challenged the legal and institutional order to renegotiate their in which the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) operates. While financial entitlements power has always been concentrated in an exclusive coalition of and the scope of their partisan elites, the KDP and PUK had each tacitly acknowledged administrative control the other’s de facto autonomy over the territories they governed have so far produced independently from the civil war of the 1990s until the reunification no consensus. of the KRG. But a new generation of leadership within the parties, a fraught relationship with the federal government, and a prolonged economic crisis exacerbated by collapsing oil prices and the global pandemic have strained the KDP-PUK relationship to its breaking point. While the KDP has claimed a majoritarian mandate to govern on a reform platform that eliminates consociational entitlements, the PUK has issued an ultimatum: respect local autonomy and 2 A new generation of leadership, a fraught relationship with [Baghdad], and a prolonged economic crisis exacerbated by collapsing oil prices and the global pandemic have strained the KDP-PUK relationship to its breaking point.” restore an equitable division of power within the KRG or it will in consumer demand during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, withdraw from the governing coalition.