POLICY BRIEFING 11
China in Africa Project
November 2009
China’s Engagement with the Nigerian Oil Sector
Gregory Mthembu-Salter1 RECOMMENDATIONS
• In countries such as Nigeria, where political power rotates via EXECUTIVE SUMMARY elections between rent-seeking elites, neither their governments hina used to access Nigerian oil exclusively through long-term nor potential Chinese investors contracts and purchases on the spot market, but its economy’s rapidly should attempt ‘oil for C growing demand for oil has led the Chinese government to seek increased infrastructure’ agreements, but should rather simply trade oil Chinese ownership of Nigerian oil reserves. China’s interest in Nigerian assets for cash. oil was strongly encouraged by the Nigerian government during the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007), which demanded of it ‘oil • Where ‘oil for infrastructure’ for infrastructure’. Obasanjo’s government auctioned oil blocs in bidding agreements are attempted rounds that required Chinese bidders to commit themselves to providing between African governments Nigeria with major infrastructural projects. After initial hesitation, Beijing and Chinese investors, African responded positively, coupling its investments with substantial involvement governments should anticipate in Nigerian construction projects. that the cash component of The Obasanjo government held three bidding rounds under ‘oil for these agreements will be low. infrastructure’ rules, with Chinese companies securing oil blocs in return Accordingly, if an African for Chinese commitments to rehabilitate the Kaduna oil refi nery, construct government wants a significant a railway from Lagos to Kano, build a hydroelectric power station in up-front cash payment for oil Mambilla, and provide the bulk of the fi nance. But Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, assets, an ‘oil for infrastructure’ who replaced Obasanjo in 2007, put all these projects on hold. The new agreement with Chinese government has cited a variety of concerns, but the key issues are that it investors is unlikely to be wants to trade oil blocs for cash and not infrastructure, and that the new appropriate. political elite will delay infrastructural projects, no matter how important, • If ‘oil for infrastructure’ until its members (rather than its predecessors) receive the bulk of the agreements are secured between benefi t. African governments and Despite offi cial denials, ‘oil for infrastructure’ died with the passing of Chinese investors, the latter Obasanjo’s administration, forcing Chinese oil companies to change tack should take into account and acquire Nigerian oil assets for cash instead. The China Petroleum and the possibility of substantive Chemical Corporation is leading the way, in mid-2009 buying Addax of renegotiation or even Canada, which has substantial Nigerian oil assets, for $7.2 billion. cancellation in the event of a For future major infrastructural projects for the Nigerian federal change of government. government by Chinese companies to succeed, both these companies and the Chinese government need to take greater account of the far-reaching
AFRICAN INSIGHTS. GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES. CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE NIGERIAN OIL SECTOR
implications of Nigeria’s elite change via the to bid, mistakenly believing that they had already electoral process. secured the blocs during earlier negotiations with the Nigerian government. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINO– In April the following year the Chinese NIGERIAN RELATIONS UNDER president, Hu Jintao, visited Nigeria and signed PRESIDENT OLUSEGUN OBASANJO a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that committed Chinese companies to playing a Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha invited Chinese role in the planned rehabilitation of Nigeria’s state-owned companies into the country in the much decayed rail network in the expectation mid-1990s, but it was not until the election of of receiving oil blocs in future bidding rounds. Olusegun Obasanjo as president in 1999 that Chinese companies were given responsibility for relations between the two countries began the 1 315-kilometre Lagos–Kano section, the plan measurably to deepen. ‘Oil for infrastructure’ being to install a double-track, standard gauge was the central element of Obasanjo’s economic railway line. policy towards China. His government auctioned The next oil bidding round a month later oil blocs in bidding rounds that required Chinese allowed only companies prepared to make and other Asian preferred bidders to commit significant downstream or infrastructural themselves to providing Nigeria with major investments in Nigeria to take part. The China infrastructural projects.2 This new approach National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), using was motivated by the Nigerian government’s RFR, won two blocs (OPLs4 471 and 298) in the disillusionment with the paltry impact on national Niger Delta and two (OPLs 732 and 721) in the infrastructure of fi fty years of co-operation with Chad basin. In return, CNPC promised to invest the West, impatience with the conditionalities of $2 billion to rehabilitate the northern Nigerian Western aid, and by Obasanjo being personally city of Kaduna’s failing oil refi nery. so impressed with the infrastructure he saw on However, in May 2006 the Nigerian Senate visits to China.3 Following persistent lobbying rejected government-backed constitutional by the Nigerian government, Beijing opted to amendment that would have allowed Obasanjo engage with Obasanjo’s plan, believing it created a third presidential term. This was despite opportunities both to increase China’s presence Obasanjo’s backers spending millions of US in Nigeria’s oil sector and secure lucrative new dollars trying to persuade Senate members to Nigerian construction contracts for Chinese back the change. companies. In October 2006 the Nigerian government awarded the Lagos–Kano railway construction OBASANJO’S CHINESE PROJECTS contract without tender to the China Civil Engineering and Construction Corporation Obasanjo enticed nervous Chinese companies (CCECC). CCECC’s initial quote was $15.4 into Nigeria by offering them the right of fi rst billion, which was eventually reduced to $8.3 refusal (RFR) on oil blocs at discounted rates billion, but was still double World Bank estimates or with signature bonus waivers in return for of the job. While the bulk of it was to be fi nanced their commitment to invest in downstream and by the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank), infrastructure projects. The fi rst bidding round with the loan backed by Nigerian oil blocs, there held under these rules was in 2005, with 77 was also a cash requirement from the Nigerian blocs on offer and with most Western companies government and a down payment of $250 million staying away, protesting RFR and the requirement was made to CCECC in January 2007. that bidders acquire local partners. Only 44 of In his next major ‘oil for infrastructure’ the blocs were awarded and, of these, nearly half project, in November 2006 Obasanjo secured the were withdrawn because the winners defaulted agreement of the Chinese government to build a on payments. Worse, Chinese companies failed huge 2 600-megawatt hydroelectric power station
SAIIA POLICY BRIEFING 11 2 CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE NIGERIAN OIL SECTOR
at Mambilla in Taraba State. Obasanjo explicitly the Lagos–Kano railway and the construction of linked the Mambilla project to China National the Mambilla power station were placed on hold, Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) acquiring and so too was the rehabilitation of the Kaduna oil blocs in a promised new bidding round the refi nery.7 following year. In November 2006 the Nigerian In addition, Yar’Adua has still not signed the government signed an agreement with Exim required MOU to activate Exim Bank’s promised Bank for a $2.5 billion loan to fi nance both the $2.5 billion loan and his government has said Lagos–Kano railway and Mambilla. In early 2007 that while it still wants the Mambilla project to Obasanjo unilaterally awarded a $1.5 billion proceed, it must be with entirely different funding contract for Mambilla to China Gezhouba Group arrangements. Corporation, despite never signing the required In May 2009 the Nigerian minister of transport documentation to activate the Exim Bank loan. declared that it was wrong for CCECC alone Presidential elections were held in Nigeria to be responsible for the design, construction in late April 2007, which were won by Umaru and supervision of the Lagos–Kano railway. He Musa Yar’Adua. Although from the same party as suggested that if the CCECC deal is to survive Obasanjo, Yar’Adua comes from a different ethnic at all, it will require substantial renegotiation.8 group (Fulani/Hausa) from the Muslim north, CCECC has apparently diverted much of the with the result that a sea change in personnel equipment it was going to use on the railway to and policies ensued. Two weeks before Yar’Adua other projects in Nigeria and elsewhere.9 took office, Obasanjo’s administration held its Just as the main Chinese infrastructural next oil bloc bidding round. A total of 45 blocs projects agreed under Obasanjo’s ‘oil for were placed on offer, with 24 pre-assigned to 12 infrastructure’ terms have been stalled by companies on RFR terms. Among the 12, CNPC Yar’Adua’s government, so too have the oil was given RFR on one bloc, again in return for its blocs won by Chinese companies in the ‘oil for promised Kaduna refi nery investment. CNOOC infrastructure’ bidding rounds come under threat. was given RFR on four blocs as settlement for the In early 2009 an Ad Hoc Committee of the House anticipated $2.5 billion loan from Exim Bank for of Representatives recommended that OPL 298 be the Lagos–Kano railway and the Mambilla power taken away from CNPC, although it appeared to station. The closeness of this round to a far- be prepared to allow CNPC to retain OPLs 471, reaching change of government, however, proved 721 and 732. to be too much for CNPC and CNOOC, which declined to bid.5 THE TRIUMPH OF ‘OIL FOR CASH’ Meanwhile, outside the three formal bidding rounds, in 2006 the China Petroleum and In a dramatic new development that dwarfed Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) bought a 29% CNOOC’s 2006 purchase, in June 2009 it stake in bloc 2 of the Nigeria–São Tomé Joint was announced that Sinopec would purchase Development Zone and CNOOC paid $2.3 billion Canada’s Addax Petroleum for CAD10 $8.3 billion for a 45% stake in OML6 130 in the Akpo offshore ($7.2 billion). Addax has two offshore and one fi eld, fi nanced by Exim Bank. onshore oil operations in production in Nigeria and two in Gabon, plus exploration rights across THE DEATH OF ‘OIL FOR the Gulf of Guinea, as well as in Iraq.11 Sinopec INFRASTRUCTURE’ was badly affected by the suspension of the ‘oil for infrastructure’ agreements, and the proposed It had been audacious for Obasanjo to hold an agreement, if all proceeds as planned, will hugely oil bloc bidding round so near to Yar’Adua’s increase the company’s and China’s exposure to inauguration and few were surprised when the the Nigerian oil sector. The move clearly signals new president demanded a formal investigation. that China has accepted that to gain access to Thereafter, the agreements for the rehabilitation of Nigerian oil, it must buy reserves rather than offer
SAIIA POLICY BRIEFING 11 3 CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE NIGERIAN OIL SECTOR
to fi nance and construct national infrastructure, acquire their oil assets there with cash. And and there may be more similar deals to come. even then, it may not always be that simple. Chinese companies purchasing oil assets would CONCLUSION also be wise to factor in the possibility that they may have to pay extra for their acquisitions The Yar’Adua government’s policy, as Sinopec’s when the next elite assumes control of the Addax deal underscores, is ‘oil for cash’. In future, Nigerian state and begins a new round of it seems, oil blocs will be awarded to the highest rent collection. bidders.12 According to one seasoned Western diplomat: ENDNOTES
When it comes to ‘oil for infrastructure’, I 1 Gregory Mthembu-Salter is a researcher, author think the Angolans understood the point that and journalist on Africa’s political economy, and you either get the infrastructure or the money. has served on the UN Panel of Experts on the The Nigerians thought you got both …. But it Democratic Republic of Congo. turns out that, forced to choose, in the end the 2 Wong L, The Impact of Asian National Oil Companies Nigerians want the cash. ... The political elite in Nigeria. London: Chatham House, 2008, p. 1. works on a short-term, four-year basis, dictated 3 Interview with Sir Elvis Emecheta, head of the by the electoral cycle. I don’t think the Chinese Nigerian–Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Lagos, fully understood this. But they do now.13 April 2009. 4 Oil production licences. According to one senior Nigerian government 5 Most of the information here comes from Wong L, source, while some of China’s stalled ‘oil for op. cit. infrastructure’ contracts may eventually be 6 Oil mining licence. revived, this will only happen if the contracts 7 Interview with Igo Aguma, chair of the Ad Hoc are restructured to take account of the changed Committee on Oil and Gas Deals of the Obasanjo political realities since Yar’Adua became president. Presidency, House of Representatives, Abuja, March Yar’Adua’s northern supporters will not let 2009. Obasanjo’s deals proceed unless they, rather than 8
The China in Africa Project is funded by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DfID) and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). SAIIA gratefully acknowledges this support.
© SAIIA 2009 All rights reserved. Opinions expressed are the responsibility of the individual authors and not of SAIIA.
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