Duke University Dissertation Template
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Unfolding Ambition: Strategic Candidacy Decisions in Senate Primary Elections by Aaron Scott King Department of Political Science Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ David Rohde, Supervisor ___________________________ John Aldrich ___________________________ Michael Munger ___________________________ Jason Roberts Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2013 i v ABSTRACT Unfolding Ambition: Strategic Candidacy Decisions in Senate Primary Elections by Aaron Scott King Department of Political Science Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ David Rohde, Supervisor ___________________________ John Aldrich ___________________________ Michael Munger ___________________________ Jason Roberts An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2013 Copyright by Aaron Scott King 2013 Abstract Theories of ambition have taught us that higher offices are valuable commodities to certain politicians, and under the right circumstances, the benefits of running for an office outweigh the associated risks. Yet some ambitious politicians emerge as candidates while others do not. In this dissertation, I present a Theory of Strategic Candidacy Decisions to explain how primary elections unfold. With new comprehensive data on the timing of candidacy decisions, I test several hypotheses regarding the determinants of electoral and fundraising success, the timing of strategic candidacy decisions, the interactions of prospective officeholders, and the impact of strategic retirements on primary races for the United States Senate. Using both qualitative and quantitative tools, including event history techniques to capture the complex dynamics of primaries, I find that potential candidates interact with one another and the unique political context within each race and emerge from the pool of potential candidates in systematic ways. In the end, the strategic behavior of ambitious politicians has implications for the slate of candidates available to the electorate and ultimately, on the quality of representation between legislators and constituents. iv Contents Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... x List of Figures ................................................................................................................... xii Chapter 1 - Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 2 - Previous Research .......................................................................................... 12 2.1 – Theoretical Issues – Ambition and the Electoral Timeline ................................ 15 2.2 – Data Issues – Constructing the Pool of Potential Candidates ............................ 18 2.3 – Methodological Issues – Accounting for Strategic Decisions Making .............. 20 Chapter 3 - Theory of Strategic Candidacy Decisions...................................................... 22 3.1 - Candidate Decisions-Making and Campaign Potential ...................................... 26 3.2 – Candidate Decision-Making and Uncertainty .................................................... 29 3.3 – Strategic Interactions Between Potential Candidates ........................................ 31 3.3.1 – Higher Quality Candidates and Earlier Candidacy Decisions ...................... 34 3.3.2 – Lower Quality Candidates and Later Candidacy Decisions ......................... 37 3.3.3 – Motivations from Game Theoretic Models ................................................... 39 3.3.3.1 – The Chicken Game and Early Candidacy Decisions.................................. 39 3.3.3.2 – The Chain Store Game and Late Candidacy Decisions ............................. 42 Chapter 4 - A Dynamic Data Collection Strategy ............................................................ 45 4.1 – General Motivations and Goals ......................................................................... 45 4.2 – Constructing Pools of Potential Candidates: An Exercise in Backward Induction ..................................................................................................................................... 48 v 4.3 – Assumptions of Data Collection Strategy .......................................................... 51 4.4 – Brief Summary of Data ...................................................................................... 55 4.5 – The 2010 Race for Senate in Florida ................................................................. 56 Chapter 5 - Candidate Quality and Success in Primary Elections .................................... 59 5.1 – Identifying Candidate (and Potential Candidate) Quality .................................. 64 5.1.1 – Several Hypotheses ....................................................................................... 64 5.1.2 – Data on Candidate Experience and Fundraising ........................................... 67 5.1.2.1 – Candidate Experience and Rate of Entering Primary Races ..................... 67 5.1.2.2 – Candidate Experience and Winning Primary Races .................................. 73 5.1.2.3 – Candidate Experience and Fundraising in Primary Races ....................... 75 5.1.3 – Data on the Timing of Candidacy Entry ....................................................... 81 5.2 – Analysis of Electoral and Fundraising Success in Primary Elections ............... 84 5.2.1 – Model Design and Empirical Implications ................................................... 84 5.2.2 – Results with Standard Measure of Electoral Experience .............................. 86 5.3 – Alternatives Specifications of Electoral Experience .......................................... 94 5.3.1 – Current vs. Former Electoral Experience ...................................................... 96 5.3.2 – Four Ordinal Levels of Experience ............................................................... 99 5.4 – Implications for Understanding Candidate Quality in Primary Elections ....... 102 Chapter 6 - The Timing of Candidacy Decisions ........................................................... 104 6.1 - Dual Influence of Strategic Decision Timing ................................................... 109 6.2 – Experience and the Timing of Candidacy Decisions ....................................... 111 6.2.1 – Several Hypotheses ..................................................................................... 112 vi 6.2.2 – Comparing Decision Timing Across Races and Time ................................ 114 6.3 – Preliminary Analysis ........................................................................................ 116 6.4 – Challenges in Modeling Candidacy Decisions ................................................ 121 6.5 – A Simple Example of Survival Analysis and Candidacy Decisions................ 122 6.6 – Non-Parametric Estimators of Candidacy Decisions in Senate Primaries ....... 126 6.7 – Alternative Models of Candidacy Decisions ................................................... 136 6.7.1 – Parametric Models ...................................................................................... 136 6.7.2 – Semi-Parametric Models with Surviving Fractions .................................... 139 6.8 – Accelerated Failure Time Mixture Cure Models of Candidacy Decisions ...... 142 6.9 – Recapitulation of Impact of Experience on Candidacy Decisions ................... 147 Chapter 7 - Strategic Interactions of Potential Candidates ............................................. 149 7.1 – Inside the Black Box: The 2010 Race for the Senate in Florida ...................... 150 7.1.1 – Setting the Stage: Martinez Retires ............................................................. 151 7.1.2 – The Road to the Democratic Primary ......................................................... 151 7.1.3 – The Road to the Republican Primary ............................................................ 157 7.1.4 – Reflections on the Florida Primaries............................................................. 161 7.2 – A Bird’s Eye View of Strategic Interactions in Candidacy Decisions ............ 162 7.2.1 – Asymmetric Influence of Potential Senate Candidates ............................... 163 7.2.2 – Several Hypotheses ..................................................................................... 164 7.3 – Empirical Strategy ........................................................................................... 169 7.3.1 – Data Manipulations ..................................................................................... 169 7.3.2 – Survival Methods with Time-Dependent Covariates .................................. 172 vii 7.4 – A Dynamic Analysis of the Timing of Candidacy Decisions .......................... 174 7.4.1 – Using High Quality Candidates in Race as a Linear Covariate .................. 174 7.4.2 – Using the Number of High Quality Candidates in Race as a Quadratic ..... 181 7.5 – Reflections on the Strategic Interactions of Potential