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Hegel's Philosophy of Science in Light of the Question of Naturalism

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Hegel's Philosophy of Science in Light of the Question of Naturalism Metascience as Self-Knowledge: Hegel’s Philosophy of Science in Light of the Question of Naturalism von der Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften und Philosophie der Universität Leipzig genehmigte D I S S E R T A T I O N zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doktor der Philosophie Dr. phil. vorgelegt von M.A. Roi Bar geboren am 28.05.1978 in Aschkelon, Israel Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Neuser Tag der Verleihung: 21.07.2017 Contents Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... 6 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 7 1. IS THERE A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN HEGEL’S ‘SYSTEM’? .............. 18 1.1 The formal hermeneutical problem ......................................................................... 19 1.1.1 The absence of an explicit ‘philosophy of science’ .......................................... 19 1.1.2 Two meanings of philosophy of science ........................................................... 21 1.2 The conceptual-historical problem .......................................................................... 26 1.2.1 The pseudoproblem of anachronism ................................................................. 26 1.2.2 The anti-Hegelian philosophy of science .......................................................... 29 1.3 The concrete research problem ............................................................................... 38 1.3.1 The young ‘anti-scientific’ Hegel ..................................................................... 39 1.3.2 Phenomenology of Spirit does not seem to be philosophy of science .............. 43 1.3.3 The Logic does not seem to be philosophy of science ...................................... 48 1.4. Transition: Hegel’s “theory of knowledge” and “science theory” ....................... 49 2. THE DEBATE ON HEGEL’S NATURALISM ....................................................... 54 2.1 Hegel’s ‘naturalistic turn’ ........................................................................................ 55 2.2 Hegel as a naturalist: nature lover and natural historian ..................................... 56 2.3 Refutation of naturalism in Hegel ........................................................................... 57 2.3.1 Ontological naturalism ...................................................................................... 58 2.3.2 Methodological naturalism ............................................................................... 62 2.3.3 Epistemological naturalism ............................................................................... 66 2.3.3.1 The psychologistic approach: science as a natural phenomenon (Quine) . 68 2.3.3.2 The behaviorist approach: knowledge as a natural kind (Kornblith) ........ 76 2.4 Naturalistic readings of Hegel and their deficiencies............................................. 84 2.4.1 Naturalism about the mental ............................................................................. 84 2.4.1.1 Spirit as “powers within nature” (Beiser) ................................................. 84 2.4.1.2 The “biological needs” of self-consciousness (Westphal) ........................ 88 3 2.4.1.3 “Disenchanted” naturalism: natural freedom of natural mind (Pinkard) .. 93 2.4.2 Social naturalism (Tesla) .................................................................................. 98 2.4.3 A note on Husserl’s critique of Hegel ............................................................. 102 2.5 Hegel’s non-naturalistic concept of nature ........................................................... 104 2.5.1 Nature as the idea ............................................................................................ 105 2.5.2 The natural as the initial and the common ...................................................... 110 2.5.3 Nature as a riddle ............................................................................................ 112 2.6 In between conclusions ........................................................................................... 115 2.7 What is not science? Transition to Hegel’s non-naturalistic concept of science through his critique of physiognomy and phrenology ............................................... 117 3. APPROACHING HEGEL’S CONCEPT OF SCIENCE ...................................... 120 3.1 What science is not .................................................................................................. 120 3.1.1 Science is not knowledge by acquaintance: the case of anatomy ................... 120 3.1.2 Science is not purely empirical: against Baconian and Humean empiricism . 127 3.1.3 Science is not rationalizing: alteration in Hegel’s concept of science ............ 131 3.2 Overcoming the Kantian concept of science ......................................................... 133 3.3 Science as Geist ........................................................................................................ 140 3.3.1 Science as the “crown of a world of Spirit” .................................................... 140 3.3.2 The twofold meaning of the science of Geist ................................................. 144 3.3.3 On the translation of Geist .............................................................................. 147 3.4 On the translation of Wissenschaft ........................................................................ 149 3.4.1 A preliminary note on the problem of translating Wissenschaft as science .... 149 3.4.2 The translation of Wissenschaft as Science in upper case............................... 151 3.4.3 The synecdoche of science: from ‘knowledge’ to ‘natural knowledge’ ......... 153 3.5 What is science? ...................................................................................................... 156 3.5.1 Self-knowledge ............................................................................................... 156 3.5.2 System ............................................................................................................. 160 3.5.3 Becoming ........................................................................................................ 162 3.5.4 Truth................................................................................................................ 166 3.5.5 Form of concept .............................................................................................. 169 3.5.6 Science of god? ............................................................................................... 174 3.6 How to begin in science? ......................................................................................... 177 4 3.6.1 No fear ............................................................................................................ 178 3.6.1 Antifoundationalism ....................................................................................... 183 3.6.3 The ladder ....................................................................................................... 190 3.7 On Hegel’s realism .................................................................................................. 193 3.8 Hegel’s possible response to Kuhn’s concept of science ..................................... 198 4. HEGEL’S TASK OF SCIENTIFYING PHILOSOPHY ....................................... 206 4.1 Hegel’s task: scientism? .......................................................................................... 206 4.2 On the origin of Hegel’s task: episteme as noesis noeseos .................................... 213 4.2.1 Scientifying philosophy begins in Plato ......................................................... 213 4.2.2 Scientifying philosophy is completed in Aristotle .......................................... 217 4.3 The triggers for the task ......................................................................................... 221 4.3.1 Fichte’s unsatisfactory “doctrine of science” .................................................. 224 4.3.2 Two romantic conceptions of knowledge ....................................................... 229 4.3.2.1 Jacobi’s faith in “immediate knowledge” ............................................... 229 4.3.2.2 Schelling’s “intellectual intuition” and his “Sunday’s children” ............ 234 4.4 On the realization of the task ................................................................................. 241 4.4.1 First realization: the renewed concept of phenomenology ............................. 241 4.4.2 Second realization: “pure” and “real” science ................................................ 247 4.5 Criticisms of Hegel’s task ....................................................................................... 249 4.5.1 Philosophy is not science ................................................................................ 250 4.5.2 Humanities is not science ................................................................................ 255 4.5.3 Some philosophers are not professors ............................................................. 258 4.5.4 Hegel’s Eurocentrism...................................................................................... 259 4.5.5 The death of philosophy.................................................................................. 262 5. FINAL THOUGHTS .................................................................................................
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