Board Meeting: September 2020 Agenda Number: 12 (i) Record Number: ED20/7852
LORD HOWE ISLAND BOARD BUSINESS PAPER
OPEN SESSION
ITEM
Lord Howe Island biosecurity update.
RECOMMENDATION
That the Board: 1. Note the update and PMQ/LHI Biosecurity Audits.
BACKGROUND
The last positive fresh rodent sign was found on LHI on 9th October 2019. Biosecurity procedures, practices, and resources were not fully developed at this time. Substantial progress has since been made on improving biosecurity delivery. An emphasis has been placed on those actions which most directly relate to rodent biosecurity – however many of these actions encapsulate other pest species. Although being actively addressed, biosecurity vulnerabilities still exist.
This update encompasses the period from Feb/March – mid August 2020. Significant changes to LHI biosecurity have taken place across this time.
An external consultant conducted audits of LHI biosecurity practices and procedures (April 2020), and Birdon Shipping Port Macquarie practices and procedures (July 2020). These audits assessed the likelihood of pest introduction to LHI as ‘almost certain’ (has a >90% chance of occurring in the budgeted period if the risk is not mitigated) at the time (Attachment A & B).
SUMMARY OF ACTIONS AND DATA
1) Rodent sighting/sign reports and follow up. • Sighting/sign report follow up/evidence collection processes have been formalised. o Expert process and decision making guidance document produced for use. • 26 suspected rodent sightings/sign reports have been made in 2020. • 9 reports were progressed to further monitoring/evidence collection activities. o These activities are conducted by biosecurity dog handlers and staff. o Led to over 250 additional hours of field work duties and reporting beyond regular work duties for detection dog handlers. • Rodent incursion plans have been produced for LHIB use/reference. • Rodent incursion kits and equipment have been purchased and are ready for use.
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2) Arrivals Process for Vessels and General Aviation • The arrivals process for entering Lord Howe Island for vessels and aircraft has been updated. An application for entry to LHI is now applicable. • All vessels and flights need to complete pre-departure biosecurity actions. • The LHIB website has been updated with relevant new information. • All internal processes have been updated to reflect these changes. • As of 7th September 2020 LHI aerodrome requirements have been updated to require pre-notification of arrival –will assist with ensuring biosecurity staff are made aware of incoming flights and best able to allocate resources for inspections.
3) Shipping a) Birdon Freight • A significant rate of pest transport to LHI has been associated with shipping in 2020 (summary below). • Birdon Port Macquarie audit was conducted in July 2020. o Has informed the creation of a staged approach to biosecurity improvements which address the whole shipping and supplier biosecurity chain. • Birdon was issued with a Biosecurity Notification (under the NSW Biosecurity Act 2015) on 18th June 2020. • Birdon have been actively engaged re: significant biosecurity improvements. o Currently being undertaken via collaborative and staged approach. Expected to meaningfully reduce ease of pest access to most cargo.
b) Other visiting vessels • Visiting vessel biosecurity guidelines and pre-departure requirements have been developed and are in place. o Vessels must meet requirements in order to attach to LHI mooring. • Communications and educational materials for visiting vessels prepared for publication and distribution to East Coast Marinas, Yacht Clubs, etc.
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4) Flights • Due to the effects of COVID-19, flight schedules have been greatly reduced since March. • Improved data collection procedures have facilitated improved reporting and record keeping – this will assist future decision making. • One significant interception was made of freshwater fish, and aquatic plants, which had been transported to LHI without the proper permits (species listed below) - 1 x Bristlenose Catfish – Ancistrus cirrhosis - 8 x Neon Tetra - Paracheirodon innesi - 5 x Assorted Male Guppy - Poecilia reticulate - 4 x Rosy Barb - Pethia conchonius - 1 x Blue Stricta live plant - Hygrophila Corymbosa - 2 x Aluminium live plant - Pilea cadierei o These species pose a risk of establishing in the wild and degrading LHI fresh systems/waterways. o The freight provider was provided with information regarding the transport of such goods and the requirement for permits to be provided prior to transport. o The consignee was issued with a Biosecurity Notification.
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Flights met for Biosecurity inspection - 2020 120
100
80
60 Flights total Flights met 40 56 Numbers in chart Number of flight arrivals represent 20 52 84 percentage of flights met 0 0 Total Flights Passenger flights Cargo flights Other/Unknown flights
5) Suppliers of goods/freight • Major suppliers of cargo visited for initial biosecurity discussions and awareness building. • Communications for suppliers containing biosecurity obligations and practical checklists prepared. o Further educational materials will be prepared over time.
6) Permanent rodent surveillance network • Checking, maintenance, and network refinement continues – no significant finds. • Network will be expanded to include Dawson’s Point (due to proximity to yacht moorings). • Routine checks have doubled in efficiency.
7) Capital works update
Biosecurity Jetty biosecurity inspection room Construct $ 75,000 Biosecurity Pallet stands Purchase $ 20,000 Biosecurity Biosecurity airport Goods $ 15,000
• Jetty Biosecurity Inspection Room - Research is being done into feasible options for the LHI Biosecurity inspection room, including a mobile option. The required specifications of this are currently being investigated. • Pallet Stands – Cantilever pallet stands have been reviewed and approved for installation at Birdon. Installation should be complete by end of September. • Biosecurity Airport – Details of this upgrade have been discussed with IES and we are awaiting further advice to move forward to quote.
8) Biosecurity dog handlers/staff • General duties have significantly expanded since role creation (see below). o Role description and title will likely be updated at next contract renewal. • Training in snake handling and firearms use being undertaken – core capabilities of role. • Data collection, management, and GIS training delivered. • Will be conducting wider LHIB staff rodent monitoring network training.
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LHI Biosecurity Dog Handler Duties Pre REP Current Dog husbandry Dog husbandry Dog training Dog training Ship freight inspections – majority of cargo Ship freight inspections – all cargo Air freight/luggage inspections – highest number Air freight/luggage inspections – as possible possible with resourcing Port Macquarie freight inspections Port Macquarie freight inspections Permanent surveillance network checking Permanent surveillance network maintenance Private aircraft inspections Visiting vessel inspections Port Macquarie freight inspection reporting LHI freight inspection reporting Rodent sighting follow up (interview, analysis, etc.) Evidence collection network establishment Evidence collection network servicing/data management Weekly jetty/airport monitoring network checks
PPP walking track detection dog searches Detection dog activity data management Detection dog activity GIS mapping and analysis
Stakeholder communications creation/input Delivery of field training to other LHIB staff Maintenance of incursion preparedness Testing and refinement of data collection apps Input and refinement of reporting documentation Input into creation of policies/guidelines Maintenance of approvals and permits register
9) Priority Biosecurity Actions Update
Progress on priority actions identified in 2020 LHIB biosecurity audit. The 2020 biosecurity audit contained many recommended actions for the improvement of biosecurity practises, procedures, policies, etc. Of these, 45 actions were identified as ‘priority 1’ actions. LHIB staff worked with SP consultants to formulate the previously presented and accepted budget – this budget attempted to best address these priority actions.
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The below table and outputs summarise current progress in fulfilling these priority actions. As this is a summary, it does not wholly convey the relative complexity of, or resources required to achieve each recommendation. The ‘met’ (and several of the ‘in progress’) actions have already contributed to the delivery of significant biosecurity improvements for LHI. Although many of the ‘not met’ actions are not budgeted for (and therefore unlikely to be achieved), several ‘not met’ and almost all ‘in progress’ actions would be fully deliverable if adequately resourced/staffed for delivery within the current financial year. The likely impediment that any actions which are not met will impose to effective biosecurity delivery ranges from significant (e.g. fencing of the Birdon freight yard, initiation of actions to replace detection dog when required, development on pest monitoring and incursion plans), to moderate (e.g. Island Trader gangway modification).
Action Status Count Met 6 Partially Met - Unlikely to be fully met this financial year 2
In Progress - On track for delivery in this financial year 3 In Progress - May possibly be delivered in this financial year 5 In Progress - Already past ideal delivery deadline (BTL position) 1
Not Met - May possibly be delivered with current resourcing, commitment, etc. 5 Not Met - Unlikely to be delivered given current resourcing, commitment, budget, etc. 7 Not Met - Not on track to be delivered - not budgeted, resourced, etc. 16
Priority 2020 Audit Recommendations progress
6 9 2
28
Met Partially Met - unlikely to be fully met Not Met In Progress
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Breakdown - 'In Progress'
1 3
5
In Progress - On track for delivery in this financial year
In Progress - May possibly be delivered in this financial year In Progress - Already past ideal delivery deadline (BTL position)
Breakdown - 'Not Met'
5
16 7
Not Met - May possibly be delivered with current resourcing, commitment, etc. Not Met - Unlikely to be delivered given current resourcing, commitment, budget, etc. Not Met - Not on track to be delivered - not budgeted, resourced, etc.
10) Fees and Charges update – Biosecurity
Development and update of biosecurity related fees and charges Several newly developed processes and procedures relate to visiting recreational and commercial vessels, and visiting private aircraft - there will be new requirements for LHIB biosecurity staff to conduct compliance checks, extra administrative duties, and additional reporting actions. As such, a schedule of relevant fees and charges is currently being developed. All fees and charges will aim to achieve ‘cost-recovery’ for the actions required by LHIB staff in relation to visiting vessels/aircraft. The specifics of the type of arrival (e.g. time of arrival, cargo type/volume, etc.) will affect the fee charged, however fees are not anticipated to be significant. As indicative examples:
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- The administrative processing and biosecurity inspection for a small private aircraft is anticipate to require 1 resource and 2 hours in its entirety and attract a fee of $100 – $200. - The administrative processing and biosecurity inspection for a standard visiting yacht is anticipated to require 2 resources, and additional LHIB resources (boat), and take 4 hours in its entirety. This will attract a fee of approximately $250-$450.
Final fees and charges will be determined after further investigation and will be presented to the Board for approval. Additional fees will be charged if pre-arrival requirements have not been met which, in turn, will necessitate extra inspection and/or treatment upon arrival. Fees and charges do not, and are not intended to account for lost staff time in relation to conducting other work duties.
SUMMARY
Significant improvements to LHI biosecurity have been realised or instigated since March 2020. The likelihood of pest introduction to LHI is likely to be lowered from ‘almost certain’ to ‘possible/likely’ (has a 40 – 90% chance of occurring in the budgeted period) as a result of these improvements.
Several challenges still remain, many of which will not be addressed in this financial year.
Biosecurity staff workload has increased markedly. Resourcing remains an ongoing issue and non-priority tasks are regularly forgone or delayed.
RECOMMENDATION
That the Board: 1. Note the update and the PMQ/LHI Biosecurity Audits.
Prepared: Darcelle Matassoni - Acting Biosecurity Team Leader 25/08/20
Endorsed: Justin Sauvage – Acting Chief Executive Officer
Attachments: Attachment A: ED20/6527 Report - Pahor Simon - SP Expeditions - LHIB Biosecurity Audit – Lord Howe Island - LHI Attachment B: ED20/5433 Report - Pahor Simon - SP Expeditions - LHIB Biosecurity Audit - Port Macquarie - PMQ
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Board Meeting: September 2020 Agenda Number: 12 (i) Rec No: ED20/7852.01 OPEN Attachment: A
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report Audit and review findings with recommendations for Lord Howe Island biosecurity measures, procedures, and processes – April 2020
Prepared by: SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. Simon Pahor ABN: 47 623 639 243
Prepared for: The Lord Howe Island Board ABN: 33 280 968 043
Disclaimer
SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. has prepared this report based on the agreed scope of work and acts as an advisor to the Client/Principal (“Client”). All reasonable skill and care has been exercised in the provision of these services.
This report was commissioned by and prepared for the exclusive use of the Client. To the maximum extent permitted by relevant governing law SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. is not responsible and will not be liable to the Client or any person or organisation for, or in relation to, any matter dealt within this report. This exclusion of liability extends to any real or perceived loss or damage suffered by the Client or any person or organisation arising from matters dealt with or conclusions expressed in this report (including without limitation matters arising from any negligent act or omission of SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. or for any loss or damage suffered by any party relying upon the matters dealt with or conclusions expressed in this Report).
Except where expressly stated, SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. has not verified the validity, accuracy or comprehensiveness of any information supplied to SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. in relation to the preparation of this report and/or any associated advice or recommendations.
Where site inspections, work observations, testing, or fieldwork have taken place, this report is based on the information made available by the Client or their nominees during the visit, visual observations and any subsequent discussions with relevant parties. The validity and comprehensiveness of supplied information has not been independently verified and, for the purposes of this report, it is assumed that the information provided is both complete and accurate. It is further assumed that normal activities were being undertaken at the site during any site visit(s), unless explicitly stated otherwise.
This Report or any part thereof cannot be copied or reproduced in whole or part for any purpose without the prior written agreement of SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd.
This report should be cited as: Pahor, S. (2020). Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – Audit review findings with recommendations for Lord Howe Island biosecurity measures, procedures, and processes – April 2020. Internal Lord Howe Island Board report. Unpublished
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Contents ...... i Executive summary ...... iv Introduction ...... 1 General ...... 1 Biosecurity ...... 1 The Lord Howe Island context ...... 1
Part 1: High level biosecurity factors Costs and funding ...... 3 General ...... 3 Risk Assessment ……...... 5 Risk pathways …………………………...... 6 Justification of biosecurity actions to board, management and community ...... 6 Federal and State legislation ...... 7 World Heritage Listing ...... 8 Protection and uncertainty ...... 8
Part 2: Community and stakeholder engagement and messaging Community and stakeholder engagement on Lord Howe Island ……………………………………………………. 9 Engagement on LHI ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...9 Building community engagement …………………………………………………………………………………………9 LHIB website ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..………………….. 11 Key external stakeholder engagement and communication …………………………………………………….….. 13 Birdon …………………………………………………….………………………………………………………………………... 13 Airlines …………………………………………………….……………………………………………………………………….. 13 Suppliers of goods …………………………………………………….…………………………………………………….... 13 Tourism operators, booking agencies, and tourists.….…………………………………………………………14 Inter-island and inter-organisation knowledge sharing and relationship building ………………………. 14 Research partnerships and facilitation ……………………………………………………………………………… 15
Part 3: Staffing – resourcing and proficiencies Staff resourcing ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…….16 General …………………..……………………..……………………………………………………………..……………..……16 Biosecurity dog handlers …………………..……………………..……………………..…………………………..…….16 Communications and human resources ……..……………………..…………………………..…………………..17 Field staff training and certification requirements …………………………………………………………………………18 Rodent trapping …………………………………..…………………………………………………………………………….18 Rodent/small mammal identification (mainland Australia) ………………………………………………..18 Reptile and Amphibian sign and identification ……………………………………………………………………19 Firearms licensing ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………19 Firearm capacity …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………20 Venomous snake handling ……………………………………………………………………………………………..…..20 Metrics and professional performance indicators …………………………………………………………………..…….20 Metrics …………………………………………………………………..…………………………………………………………..20 Performance indicators and evaluation ………………………………………………………………………………20
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Part 4: Policies, contracts, and agreements Vehicle policy, treatment and importation ……………………………………………………………………………….…..22 Policy – Vehicles………………………………………………………………………………………………..……………..…22 Policy – Other ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..23 Shipping biosecurity requirements ………………………………………………………………………………………………..23 Aircraft biosecurity requirements ………………………………………………………………………………………………....24 Qantas ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………....24 Eastern Air ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….25 Private aircraft ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………25 Private vessel biosecurity requirements ………………………………………………………………………………………..25 Biosecurity zone establishment ……………………………………………………………………………………………………..26
Part 5: Field activities and on-ground biosecurity Data recording and management …………………………………………………………………………………………………..27 Biosecurity detection dogs ……………………………………………………………………………………………..……………..27 General ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………27 Dog handling ……………..………………………………………………………………………………………………………28 Utilisation of detection dogs in communications and engagement …………………………………….28 Uniform standardisation …………………………………………………………………………………………………….29 Kennel and run facilities ……………………………………………………………………………………………………..29 Vehicle ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….30 Dog replacement planning …………………………………………………………………………………………………30 REP success check preparation ……………………………………………………………………………………………31
Point of departure biosecurity inspections and capacity ……………………………………………………………….31 Birdon freight facilities and M/V Island Trader ……………………………………………………………………32 Australia Post ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..38 Eastern Air ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….39 Suppliers and other stakeholders ………………………………………………………………………………………..40
Point of arrival biosecurity inspections and capacity ………………………………………………..…………………..40 M/V Island Trader ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………40 Aircraft ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….41 Small private vessels ………………………………………………………….……………………………………………….43 Other vessels ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………44 Capacity to handle of risk cargo on LHI ……………………………………………………………………………….45 Post entry quarantine receiving station ………………………………………………………….…………………..46
Provision of Port Macquarie biosecurity inspection services ………………………………………….……………..46 General ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………46 LHIB staff provision of services ……………………………………………….………………………………………….47 Mainland contractor provision of services ………………………………………………………………………….47 Proposed system ……………………………………………….……………………………………………………………….49
Current monitoring and surveillance on LHI ……………………………………………….………………………………….50 Rodents ……………………………………………….…………………………………………………………………………....50 Reptiles ……………………………………………….……………………………………………………………………………..50 Invertebrates ……………………………………………….…………………………………………………………………….51
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Amphibians ……………………………………………….……………………………………………………………………….53
Incursion response plans and preparedness …………………………………………..……………………………………..54 Rodents ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………54 Reptiles, amphibians, and invertebrates ……………………………………………………………..……………..55
Part 6: Conclusions and recommendations Component health report ………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………..56
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………57
Recommendations …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………58 Priority recommendations …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..….58 Complete recommendations ……………………………………………….………………………………………………………….61
References ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….….67
Part 7: Appendices Appendix A – Risk assessment
Appendix B – LHI Wharf Shipping Observations – 27/3/20 (Provided to LHIB 29/3/20)
Appendix C – Short term Post Entry Quarantine Receiving Station supporting document (Provided to LHIB 14/4/20)
Appendix D – Summary and assessment of previous report recommendation progress.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Executive Summary The Lord Howe Island Board commissioned this audit to review and make recommendations relevant to biosecurity measures, procedures, and stakeholders following the 2019 Rodent Eradication Project. As islands are global biodiversity hotspots with high levels of endemism, they have a lot to lose should biosecurity measures be inadequate or fail. The Lord Howe Island biosecurity pathway is comprised of quarantine, surveillance, and response actions. Although significant improvements to biosecurity practises and procedures have been enacted over recent years, current Lord Howe Island biosecurity protection could be summarised as barely adequate. Generally, biosecurity quarantine measures that aim to prevent invasion are economically more cost-effective that responding to any invasion. This, however, does not negate the need to maintain robust surveillance, and capacity to respond to an incursion. Improvements are required in order to minimise the risk of pest species introduction, and to build incursion response preparedness and capacity on Lord Howe Island. Increased quarantine capacity at key Port Macquarie supply and freight departure points, adequate resourcing, key infrastructure upgrades, and improved stakeholder engagement and communication activities are all required. Key recommendations of this report relate to: decreasing the likelihood of pest introduction to Lord Howe Island, ensuring monitoring and surveillance activities are able to detect any potential incursion, that suitable incursion actions are planned, and improved stakeholder and community engagement in order to build the profile and acceptance of biosecurity actions.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Introduction General The terms of this review and audit were:
- Audit biosecurity measures, procedures and stakeholders (Lord Howe Island (LHI)); - Audit biosecurity measures, procedures and stakeholders (Port Macquarie, NSW); - Review LHI monitoring and reporting procedures; and, - Review biosecurity dog handler team processes and procedures.
In conducting this review and audit observations were made across all relevant facets of biosecurity delivery and management with the exception of a Port Macquarie site visit. Multiple site visits were conducted to the LHI wharf and airport facilities, the primary points of entry for freight and people. Field staff and Biosecurity Dog Handlers (BDH) were accompanied across all activities which could reasonably be considered to be part of routine biosecurity fieldwork and monitoring practises, and detection dog duties. Where possible conversations and interviews were held with relevant stakeholders however these were somewhat limited due to restrictions on personal interaction imposed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. All relevant Lord Howe Island Board (LHIB) strategies, plans, etc. were accessed and considered in the preparation of this report.
The author wishes to extend a thanks to all Lord Howe Island Board (LHIB) staff, Birdon staff, and those LHI residents interviewed for their input and engagement with the review and audit process.
Biosecurity The introduction and establishment of vertebrates, invertebrates, plants, plant pathogens, fungi, bacterial disease, and other ecological pathogens to insular or island ecosystems has led to widespread global biodiversity loss and extinctions (Atkinson 1989; Lockwood & McKinney 2001). Additionally, pest species are the most common threat to mammals, reptiles, and amphibians on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list. They have been cited as a contributing cause to species extinction for 54%, and the primary cause of extinction for 20% of investigated species extinctions that have sufficient data for such analysis (25% of all recorded extinctions to 2005) (Clavero & Garcia-Berthou 2005).
Biosecurity refers to those actions which are taken with the aim of preventing the introduction and establishment of pest species. These actions encompass quarantine (prevention), surveillance (detection), and response to incursions (contingency) (Broome, 2007).
Offshore islands are uniquely positioned within a biosecurity context. Their distance from the nearest large landmass makes natural introduction of pest species unlikely, and they have a defined and defendable border. However, as islands are global biodiversity hotspots with high levels of endemism (Kier et. al. 2009), they also have a lot to lose should biosecurity measures be inadequate or fail.
The Lord Howe Island context The Lord Howe Island Biodiversity Management Plan (2007) opens with: “The rich biodiversity of the Lord Howe Island Group (LHIG) supports a high level of endemic and significant species and communities. In addition, due to its isolated geographic location, small size and limited access, there are a number of identifiable and common threats to biodiversity on the LHIG." (pg 1).
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Of the fourteen and nine Key threatening processes to Lord Howe Island listed under the NSW Threatened Species Conservation Act (1995) (TSC Act) and the Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (1999) (EPBC Act), ten and five are directly related to invasive species invasion, establishment, and/or effects (71% and 55% respectively).
In light of the 2019 Lord Howe Island (LHI) Rodent Eradication Project (REP), biosecurity measures must now aim to effectively prevent the re-introduction and re-establishment of rodents – a level of biosecurity protection that has not previously needed to be achieved. Effective biosecurity as a whole is also now arguably of greater importance due to the potential social repercussions of the introduction and establishment of other novel pest species.
“The rise of eradication as a restoration tool argues for a closely correlated strengthening of biosecurity functions (Russell, et al., 2007). These two lines of work define the mutually dependent parts of the pest-free equation. Without effective quarantine, surveillance and invasion response in place to minimise the likelihood of pests recolonising, it is reckless at best, and futile at worst, to proceed with eradication. If island stewardship lacks good biosecurity, defence of very substantial resource investments and biological pay-offs becomes a lottery in which pest organisms dictate the odds.” (Kennedy and Broome in Veitch et.al. 2019)
Although the REP included the creation of an REP Biosecurity Plan, and improvements to biosecurity practises and procedures, current Lord Howe Island biosecurity protection, as evidenced by the available data, could be summarised as barely adequate.
In the 20 months leading up to this audit (during which comparable to current biosecurity practises were in place), six MV Island Trader voyages arrived at LHI with fresh rodent sign and/or bait take in on-board bait stations. Additionally, between January and mid-May 2020, the following biosecurity events occurred on LHI: - The separate capture of one male and one female Green tree frog (Litoria caerulea) on LHI; - The capture of one Asian house gecko (Hemidactylus frenatus) aboard the MV Island Trader; - The discovery of one very recently decreased Long eared bat (Nectophilus sp.) in cargo offloaded from the MV Island Trader; and, - The confirmed presence of at least one House mouse (Mus musculus) aboard the MV Island Trader whilst berthed and offloading cargo.
This suggests a very high level of permeability of current quarantine facilities and activities.
The likelihood of accidental introduction or re-introduction of new or previously eradicated species is considered to be likely/almost certain for both rodents and other pest species. Lord Howe Island does however have the potential to become a leader in effective biosecurity of inhabited Islands. This will require key infrastructure upgrades, minor increases to resourcing, refinement of operational processes, and institutional attitudinal and procedural changes to be introduced and maintained.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Part 1: High level biosecurity factors Costs and funding General This report acknowledges the financial pressures faced by the LHIB. It is, however, imperative that all members of the LHI community understand and appreciate the inherent level of biosecurity risk that is present when suitable biosecurity tasks/actions are not effectively implemented.
The economic assessment of the recent Rodent Eradication Project completed by Gillespie Economics (2016) estimated this project to yield $68 million in value to the community in biodiversity improvements and $57 million in tourism benefits over 30 years. This figure provides some broad indication of the extent of financial ROI which can be associated with programs and actions that preserve biodiversity - a key goal of biosecurity - but does not provide useful input for day-to-day decision making or strategic planning.
Lord Howe Island Board (LHIB) LHIB management expressed the understandable desire to obtain an indication of the economic Return On Investment (ROI) in relation to both current and potential future changes to biosecurity activities and resourcing. As many biosecurity actions are aimed at protecting Island biodiversity and World Heritage Values with inherent non-market values (excluding tourism), accurate estimates of the financial benefit derived from specific biosecurity actions are difficult to deduce. These limitations have long been recognised by biosecurity decision makers. There is a growing body of modelling and research which aims to address these issues.
Detailed modelling of biosecurity risks, costs, and benefits as they relate to Lord Howe Island are possible. A range of specialised modelling techniques that integrate ROI measures or Cost Benefit Analyses (CBA) exist to facilitate robust decision making. These methods include (but are by no means limited to): - Qualitative modelling and Bayesian network analysis (Dambacher et. al. 2007); - Stochastic dynamic programming (Rout et. al. 2011); - Participatory multi-criteria analysis (Review: Kompas and Liu 2013); - Risk return resource allocation (with Bayesian network sub-models) (Mascaro 2014); and, - Partially observable Markov decision process (Rout et. al. 2014).
The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES) also conducts similar research, although they typically focus on industries such as agriculture, fisheries, and forestry (e.g. Arthur et. al. 2015 - A Comparison of the Costs and Effectiveness of Prevention, Eradication, Containment and Asset Protection of Invasive Marine Species Incursions).
The development or application of any such models are well beyond the scope or skills of this consultancy and would require the engagement of specialised contractors.
Any references to or inferences of ROI or CBA in this report are approximate and general only. They may assist in the decision making process but should not be cited as full nor robust analyses.
The absence of applicable modelling and analysis means that effective biosecurity implementation will, for the immediate future, be reliant on the successful integration of robust in-house risk based decision making and qualitative and/or relative assessments based on expert advice and local experience, coupled with an understanding of real-world operational constraints and trade-offs.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Generally, biosecurity measures that aim to prevent invasion (quarantine) are economically more cost-effective that responding to any invasion (Leung et al., 2002; Craik et. al., 2016) (Figure 1). This, however, does not negate the need to maintain robust surveillance (detection), and response to incursion (contingency) capacity. This is especially true for systems such as that currently in place for LHI in which current quarantine measures alone cannot be expected to prevent the introduction of pests.
In the absence of detailed research and modelling, managers are effectively required to make decisions around funding and resourcing for activities (e.g. rodent surveillance network maintenance) which, if insufficiently resourced may limit the efficacy of the system (ability to detect introduced rodent at a suitable temporal scale) and lead to an unlikely but severe outcome (e.g. re- introduction and establishment of rodents).
Given this operating environment, detailed, careful, and critical examination of ‘low return activities’ may help to determine if they are needed, or can be reduced or phased out over time but only as key improvements and upgrades are made elsewhere in the biosecurity chain. An example of such a change may be reducing the frequency of rodent monitoring network checks as quarantine measures are improved.
Figure 1: The generalised (or biological) invasion curve. From: Craik et. al. 2016
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Risk Assessment Standard risk assessment methodology which utilises a likelihood and consequence matrix (see Appendix A) can be well suited to help guide planning and operational priorities and activities. Managers must however be aware of the difficulties and limitations of any such approach when used in the biosecurity context.
Effectively accounting for uncertainty and the subjectivity of some assessments is a key difficulty in the process (e.g. a decision that the likelihood of pest introduction is unlikely as it has ‘a 10-30% chance of occurring based on the evidence presented’ without robust reference data). Risk matrixes can be an effective risk assessment tool, but only if they incorporate all relevant local information/input, incorporate expert knowledge, and are rigorously investigated and applied.
The absence of species specific and/or ecosystem modelling and analysis specific to Lord Howe means that effective biosecurity implementation will, for the immediate future, be reliant on in- house risk based decision making. This process must be informed by the engagement of experts with experience in: island biosecurity, invasive species introductions and management, general ecology, and operating within an inhabited island context (see recommendation 1.1).
In reality, limited resources mean a triage approach, where biosecurity efforts are focused towards priority pests, will often need to be adopted. The formulation of informed but hypothetical priority pest curves can be a useful visualisation tool and exercise in the decision making process. Figure 2 shows a hypothetical priority pest curve – expected consequences may incorporate approximations of ecological, social and/or managerial consequences.
Figure 2: Hypothetical distribution of adverse consequences of a pest species. From: Walshe et. al. 2012.
It is important for managers, staff, and the wider community to remain aware that effective biosecurity must be maintained even as the percentage risk of species introduction decreases to very low levels over time as infrastructure, practises, and procedures improve. Attention to maintaining robust ongoing biosecurity must not be confused with paranoia or begin to be seen as luxury expenditure.
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Risk pathways Rodent risk pathways for LHI were identified within the LHI rodent eradication biosecurity plan (EPBC-19) and detailed in AECOM 2016. The risk ratings provided in the summary below (table 1) provide a reviewed risk rating for all pest species rather than just rodents. For all intents and purposes many ratings remain the same with two key exceptions:
- ‘Flights – regular passenger transport (QANTAS)’ has been upgraded from a low to moderate rating. o This revision was made in light of the ease with which invertebrate and small reptile species can stow away on the aircraft itself or within passenger’s luggage coupled with the current lack of pre-departure communications and engagement to help mitigate this pathway; and, - ‘M/V Island trader freight and operations’ has been upgraded from high to very high. o This revision was made in light of the available data. These suggest a high pest species introduction rate (3 confirmed instances in 2020, and an average rate of one rodent present aboard per 3.3 months from September 2018 – June 2020).
It is important to note that these risk ratings do not follow standard risk assessment protocol in that they do not incorporate the consequence rating (potential impacts of species introduction) in their formulation. Rather, they only refer to and incorporate the likelihood of each pathway physically transporting a pest organism to LHI.
Table 1: Potential risk pathways for the introduction of pest species to LHI.
Pathway Risk of introduction via pathway Flights – Regular passenger transport (QANTAS) Moderate Flights – Freight Moderate Flights – Other Moderate M/V Island Trader freight and operations Very High Private yachts/small vessels Moderate Shipwrecks Low Storm enhanced dispersal and rafting Low Deliberate release by public Low
Justification of biosecurity actions to board, management and community The reasoning or justifications for implementing robust biosecurity generally relate to any mix of three broad categories:
- Protecting the intrinsic or inherent values of an ecosystem; - Meeting legislative or legal obligations; and/or, - Protecting any current or potential future economic value that is derived from the ecosystem.
It was noted that a small number of community, LHIB staff, and LHIB members may query the underlying requirement for biosecurity or the aim to prevent the introduction and establishment of some pest species (e.g. various ant species or reptiles such as the Asian house gecko (H. frenatus)). It was reported that attitudes such as “we didn’t care about these species previously, why should we care now?” and “they wouldn’t do anything here anyway”, although limited, exist. It is therefore important that biosecurity managers and staff are not only aware of why they undertake biosecurity
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activities, but feel confident enough to have discussions related to biosecurity across multiple audiences and stakeholders and are able to effectively convey why biosecurity is important to LHI.
Federal and State legislation Current LHI biosecurity managers are already well aware of obligations under various pieces of State and Federal legislation in relation to biosecurity and associated activities. Rather than aiming to re- hash all relevant legislation, table 2 and the below information are presented as brief indicative references to legislation and requirements that tie-in with LHI biosecurity actions. From these examples it should be clear that there are legislative requirements that relate to the implementation and ongoing maintenance of robust biosecurity on LHI.
The primary overarching pieces of relevant legislation are the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (EPBC Act) (1999), New South Wales Threatened Species Conservation Act (TSC Act) (1995), and the NSW Biosecurity Act (2015).
The Lord Howe Island biodiversity management plan (Department of Environment and Climate Change 2007, pg. 5) notes: “The TSC Act requires that a government agency must not undertake actions inconsistent with a Recovery Plan. The EPBC Act additionally specifies that the Australian Government must not take any action that contravenes a Recovery Plan. The actions identified in this plan […] are the responsibility of the LHIB, the Lord Howe Island recovery team and the DECC […]”. This links to the approved recovery plan for the Lord Howe Woodhen which includes: “Action 8: Ensure that the quarantine plan being prepared for the island addresses issues of avian disease and the introduction of plants or animals that may impact on the Lord Howe Woodhen” (NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service 2002, pg. 22). Table 2: Relevant key threatening processes under the New South Wales Threatened Species Conservation Act (1995), and the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (1999).
TSC Act EPBC Act Importation of Red Imported Fire Ants Predation by exotic rats on Australian Solenopsis invicta. offshore islands of less than 100km2 (100,000 ha). Invasion and establishment of the Cane Toad The Reduction in the Biodiversity of Bufo marinus. Australian Native Fauna and Flora due to the Red Imported Fire Ant (Solenopsis invicta). Invasion of the Yellow Crazy Ant Anoplolepis Dieback Caused by the Root-rot Fungus gracilipes. Phytophthora cinnamomi. Predation by the Ship Rat on Lord Howe The biological effects, including lethal toxic Island. ingestion, caused by Cane Toads (Bufo marinus). Infection of Native Plants by Phytophthora cinnamomi. Invasion and establishment of exotic vines and scramblers. Invasion, establishment and spread of Lantana (Lantana camara). Invasion of Native Plant Communities by Bitou Bush and Boneseed. Invasion of Native Plant Communities by Exotic Perennial Grasses.
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World Heritage Listing The Lord Howe Island Group was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1982. Criteria for listing included criterion vii and criterion x: “[LHI] is an outstanding example of the development of a characteristic insular biota that has adapted to the island environment through speciation. […] The diversity of landscapes and biota and the high number of threatened and endemic species make these islands an outstanding example of independent evolutionary processes” (UNESCO). A failing in biosecurity could potentially lead to the establishment of pest species which may compromise listing under this criterion.
Protection and uncertainty The ecological and/or economic effects of the establishment of different pest species on the environment and World Heritage values of Lord Howe Island will often not be fully known. This can present difficulties for managers in terms of justifying actions taken and/or expenses related to reducing the likelihood of pest species introduction.
In the absence of robust ecological studies as to the effects that novel species introductions may have on native species and/or the broader ecology of Lord Howe Island, both Federal and State environmental legislation, and biosecurity best practise instruct managers to adopt the precautionary principle. “The precautionary principle is that lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing a measure to prevent degradation of the environment where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage.” (Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s. 391).
In this context the precautionary principle dictates that a lack of robust knowledge relating to the potential effects of a novel species becoming established should be reason enough to aim to prevent the introduction of that species. In reality this reasoning is likely to be met with retort by many of those to whom biosecurity is seen as unnecessary. It is, however, an important concept for managers to understand, appreciate, and apply in their decision making processes. LHIB guidance documents should be updated to incorporate the inclusion of the precautionary principle as a guiding or key principle in the making of those decisions that relate to the environment, ecology, biodiversity, or biosecurity of LHI (see recommendation 1.2).
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Part 2: Community and stakeholder engagement and messaging Although community and local stakeholder engagement with LHI biosecurity exists, it is currently somewhat limited in both extent and efficacy. Biosecurity as a whole stands to benefit from increased engagement activities and communications. The capacity to provide LHIB driven communications, education, and awareness building has thus far been constrained. The consequential shortfalls have cumulative effects which ultimately limit awareness of and/or engagement with biosecurity from both the resident community and visitors to LHI. This limits the profile of biosecurity and perpetuates preventable barriers to more effective biosecurity implementation (e.g. voluntary compliance following education campaigns and release of communication products).
Community and stakeholder engagement on Lord Howe Island Engagement on LHI Successful biosecurity relies upon shared responsibility between government, industry, and community (Nair et. al. 1996; Kruger et. al. 2009; Thompson et. al. 2009; Kruger 2011). The overall level of community engagement on LHI in relation to biosecurity could be considerably increased from current levels. This would both build the ongoing profile of biosecurity, and assist in the delivery of effective biosecurity on Island.
The LHI community appears to be somewhat aware of what biosecurity is in theory and means in practise. Although there are several notable individuals who are highly engaged, wider community interest and engagement with biosecurity generally appears to stem from ‘what does this mean for me?’, or ‘what does enforcement mean for me?’, type questions, and/or in preventing the introduction of rodents, rather than a developed understanding of what biosecurity is aiming to achieve overall and why protection is important. This disconnect suggests that improved communication, education, and community capacity building over time would be beneficial. Discussions with community members suggested that further communications and education are likely to be well received if delivered in a strategic way.
During the main 6 week period of this consultancy community members made two reports to the ‘rat on a rodent’ rodent sighting campaign (four other reports were made by LHIB staff). Early 2020 saw three cases of suspected myrtle rust being reported to the Manager Environment/World Heritage (MEWH) (three rodent sightings and all myrtle rust cases were found to be negative results, one rodent sighting is currently in the ‘evidence collection’ phase).
Post-hoc analysis of 47 ‘rat on a rodent’ reports showed nearly 50% of reports were made second or third-hand. Although the examples of direct communication of matters of biosecurity concern from the public are excellent (and must be actively encouraged), these data suggest that current engagement levels could be considerably improved. Further communications and community education aimed at building biosecurity awareness and engagement are likely to be of considerable benefit.
Building community engagement In recognition of biosecurity being a shared responsibility, ABARES has developed the Engaging in Biosecurity (EiB) project- a proposed national framework for engaging the community about biosecurity issues – along with several useful tools and resources (see Kruger 2012; https://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/research-topics/biosecurity/biosecurity-engagement).
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Although motivations for national biosecurity actions are often based in asset/crop protection, there are many parallel lessons, resources, and tools that are available to assist with community engagement and communications on LHI.
ABARES research has identified several key themes which were categorised into eight ‘strategic pillars’ and grouped under three ‘cornerstones’ that underpin effective community engagement for biosecurity purposes (figure 3):
- A motivated community 1. Raising the profile of biosecurity 2. Engaging effectively
- A resourced community 3. Finding and optimising resources 4. Making the most of technology 5. Capitalising on existing information
- An enabling environment 6. Monitoring engagement progress 7. Enabling sound governance 8. Building and maintaining scientific capability
Figure 3: Representation of the relationship between the strategic pillars and cornerstones of effective community engagement in biosecurity. From: Kruger 2012.
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A dedicated work program that has specific aims relating to increasing community engagement with biosecurity would be of great benefit to LHI (see recommendation 2.1). In order to prevent this work from falling into the cycle of ‘lots of talking, not much doing’, this work must be directed by clear goals, deliverables, and outcomes that those undertaking the program can work towards and be empowered to deliver. Work would likely need to begin at the base level of elucidating the current understanding of, and attitudes towards biosecurity of the community before progressing (see recommendation 2.2). Ultimately, any such work program should aim to:
- Establish and maintain effective community engagement with biosecurity activities; - Establish ongoing biosecurity communication strategies; - Standardise and align biosecurity messaging across information providers (e.g. LHIB and LHI Tourism Association (LHITA)); - Present biosecurity messaging in a relevant and engaging way; - Foster a culture of custodianship of LHI protection among residents and visitors; and, - Actively engage community members in biosecurity knowledge sharing, activities, and updates.
Interviews of Island residents, lodge owners, and tour operators were planned to help inform this audit. Due to the nature of the developing COVID-19 pandemic these interactions were greatly limited. Although a comprehensive survey effort was not possible, some interviews and discussions were still able to be conducted.
- 4 Lodge owners were interviewed. All expressed that they would support the creation of (and would actively disseminate) increased pre-arrival biosecurity information to guests and those who send through booking enquiries in general; and, - Informal discussions were had with several residents (approximately twenty). There was general acceptance and support of current biosecurity actions. Most people saw biosecurity actions and concerns primarily in relation to potential rodent re-introduction and investment protection. Many residents acknowledged that biosecurity protects the LHI environment in general and is inherently important. Almost all residents expressed a view that further and/or more frequent communications and the dissemination of biosecurity related information and education would be welcomed.
LHIB website The current LHIB website is not user friendly in relation to finding biosecurity related information. The website fails to utilise well-recognised approaches to boost user engagement and useability and is not intuitive should visitors or residents wish to obtain practical biosecurity related information. Box 1 contains a hypothetical example that briefly describes a hypothetical current website interaction by a resident (which could be extrapolated to a visitor seeking information).
The ‘environment’ section of the website currently has:
- Over 6000 plain text written words; - Three references to biosecurity; - Three references to quarantine; - One FAQ (African big-headed ant eradication); - Over 22 references/links to plans, regulations, assessments, meeting minutes, etc.; - Three small photos (weed eradication program); - One video (bottom of a weed eradication page); and,
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- Numerous pieces of out of date information (e.g. proposed rodent eradication).
Although certain regulations, plans, assessments, etc. need to be published on relevant sections of the LHIB website, this should not be at the expense of overall website engagement and useability.
Re-design and content update of the environment section of the website to provide useable, engaging content would be of great benefit to the implementation and profile of LHI biosecurity (see recommendations 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5). LHI managers should aim to develop a website that showcases why LHI is worth protecting and provides useful ‘how to protect LHI’ information.
BOX 1 – Hypothetical LHIB website interaction A new resident wishes to learn if there are any biosecurity requirements for packing and shipping their goods to LHI. After navigating to the ‘environment’ section of the website I navigate to the ‘protection of the environment’ page. This page has two links and no further information. I navigate to ‘plant and animal importation’ thinking it may be of most relevance. I learn that import of plant material requires prior approval. I am directed to the raw LHI Regulation 2014 which does not provide practical, accessible advice for my move. I am then directed to the ‘policy’ page. This page contains 29 individual policies. I cannot find anything of practical use beyond the plant import policy which tells me that I cannot pack the bag of soil I dug from my veggie patch (although I do peruse the cruise ship policy out of interest).
I use the search bar to search ‘moving to Lord Howe’ and am directed to three COVID-19 updates. I then search ‘biosecurity’ and am directed to a page that tells me the revised Draft Biosecurity Strategy 2016 will be placed on public exhibition for a period of 28 days, from Friday 15th January 2016 and invites me to make a submission.
I conclude that there are unlikely to be any limitations or responsibilities when it comes to what I pack and how it is packed for shipment. I pack my belongings into large, sealed plywood boxes that I have made to ship my belongings. Into one of these I pack a large toolbox that I’ve had stored undisturbed in the shed for years and have never really empty out. I notice some mouse faeces on the floor as I move it and some green/fresh grass scattered around the floor, but close it up and pack it.
These large, sealed plywood boxes are not able to be effectively inspected by biosecurity officers and are unlikely to allow any scent to escape, but as far as I know this is of no consideration and the way I pack my goods is of no real importance.
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Key external stakeholder engagement and communication Birdon Effective engagement with Birdon management, staff, and crew is varied. BDH have good relationships with staff and crew and effectively utilise these relationships in the conducting of their work and to the benefit of LHI biosecurity.
The MEWH has a good relationship with Birdon management. Quite regular communications were observed in which the MEWH was able to obtain verbal commitments and agreements in relation to biosecurity activities, improvements, and upgrades. There was, however, a pattern of non-delivery from Birdon management on commitments which were made via e-mail/telephone. An annual scheduled face-to-face meeting would be of benefit to help progress any such upgrades and to further strengthen this relationship (see recommendation 2.6).
The consultant was not directly involved in communications between LHIB senior management and Birdon management over the course of this consultancy.
The development and provision of suitable biosecurity training and refresher materials for delivery to Birdon management, staff, and crew would be of benefit in managing this risk pathway. Training emphasis should be placed on why protection of LHI through robust biosecurity is important, the high risk nature of shipping and freight operations, and the key role that all Birdon staff play in LHI biosecurity through their day-to-day work (see recommendation 2.7).
Airlines BDH were observed actively engaging with airline crews on LHI. The efficacy of these relationships appeared to vary: some were seen to assist with the delivery of routine biosecurity activities, whilst other interactions (especially with Eastern air staff) suggested that working relationships would benefit from formalisation and clarification as to expectations, authorities, search procedures, etc.
The MEWH actively engaged with Eastern Air management over LHI based biosecurity inspection activities and appeared to have a good and open working relationship with this key stakeholder.
The building and maintenance of relationships at all levels with key airlines that service LHI is of vital importance. Due to the frequency of flight arrivals (several per day in tourist season) and the nature of the cargo (general cargo, food items, private luggage), any risk mitigation measures that can be taken by operators and/or in a proactive way are likely to greatly reduce biosecurity risk to LHI. In order for proactive measures to be implemented, good relationships built on a solid understanding of biosecurity are required.
The development and provision of suitable biosecurity training and refresher materials for airline managers, staff, and crew would be of benefit in managing this risk pathway (see recommendation 2.8).
Suppliers of goods Regular suppliers of goods (e.g. Bunnings) appear to have a general appreciation of LHI biosecurity. As a site visit to Port Macquarie was not possible, no direct interactions with suppliers were observed.
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There appears to be a general lack of proactive engagement with key suppliers such as grocery, hardware, nursery, and building material suppliers as no information products, training packages, or face-to-face engagement strategies have been effectively developed or implemented. The further back in the supply chain biosecurity intervention can begin, the better. This lack of engagement appears to be a consequence of resourcing limitations for both communications preparations and Port Macquarie based operations - see section ‘Point of departure biosecurity inspections and capacity - Suppliers and other stakeholders’ for further discussion.
Tourism operators, booking agencies, and tourists. BDH conduct a weekly biosecurity dog show during tourist season which is reportedly well received by tourists. The potential for more effective utilisation of biosecurity detection dogs is discussed in ‘biosecurity detection dogs - Utilisation of detection dogs in communications and engagement’. Beyond this, very little structured engagement with tourists, tourism operators/providers, and booking agencies was observed.
There appears to be a general lack of engagement between the LHIB and tourism operators, providers, and booking agencies in relation to the dissemination of biosecurity educational/communication tools and pre-departure awareness building. The lost engagement opportunities with tourists leads to avoidable biosecurity risks (e.g. tourists unknowingly failing to self-inspect luggage for seeds/soil prior to departure from home).
Opportunistic conversations relating to biosecurity were had with approximately ten tourists over the course of this consultancy. All tourists were engaged and wanted to know more about how LHI biosecurity protects the Island from the introduction of pest species. Unsurprisingly there was a keen interest in the work done by the biosecurity detection dogs. Although these tourists were aware of handouts provided on commercial flights, none had independently found, or been provided with what they thought to be detailed information relating to biosecurity and how they could help/what they should do. Although this is a small sample size, and conversations were opportunistic, it appears to summarise the general situation: Tourists are interested and willing to engage, but they are not actively provided with the means to do so, especially before leaving home.
A robust tourism industry and tourist engagement strategy should be developed, resourced, and implemented (see recommendation 2.9). This should include the creation and publication of suitable information materials which are provided to tourists before or at the time of their booking. Information materials should include why LHI biosecurity is important, and easy to follow guidelines as to what tourists can do to help manage the risk they pose.
The further back in the ‘supply chain’ biosecurity intervention can begin, the better. Current information dissemination practises such as on-flight pamphlets, top of descent messaging, and arrivals information are good, however they are provided too late in the tourist ‘supply chain’ to facilitate the early application of meaningful biosecurity risk reduction activities by individual tourists.
Inter-island and inter-organisation knowledge sharing and relationship building The MEWH has a good network of contacts within NSW Department of Primary Industries which are well utilised. There are however no formal meeting or review schedules as part of these relationships.
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Improved Inter-island and inter-organisation engagement in relation to island biosecurity would likely provide tangible benefits to LHI biosecurity practises and protection. Numerous options for outreach to other Islands and invasive species/island conservation organisations exist. The formulation of knowledge sharing networks and professional working relationships with other islands and organisations would build the profile of LHI biosecurity and likely lead to tangible benefits for local biosecurity delivery (see recommendation 2.10).
Identification of potential key partners/relationships should be undertaken. Obvious starting points are other pest free islands, the Australian Antarctic Division, Tasmania Parks and Wildlife Service, Biosecurity Tasmania, Department of Conservation (NZ), Island Conservation (USA), Invasive Species Council (Aust), Manaaki Whenua – Landcare Research (NZ), Global Wildlife Conservation (USA), etc.
Staff and management should collaborate and prepare a brief overarching engagement strategy that clearly outlines potential partners, what each potential relationship may offer each party, an approach and engagement strategy, and a communications and knowledge sharing strategy. Almost all aspects of any such approach or relationship will be ‘living’ and will need to be treated accordingly.
Planning should include opportunities for LHI biosecurity staff to attend conferences, workshops, or other knowledge sharing sessions with other island biosecurity practitioners and authorities (see recommendations 2.11, and 2.12). This will offer ‘bring home’ benefits in the form of knowledge and practises learnt from other organisations and the establishment of strong biosecurity networks and relationships. Such tangible benefits were observed over the course of this consultancy in relation to a current BDH who attended a single relevant conference in New Zealand in 2019 and worked alongside a visiting NZ dog handler in 2019. A number of learnings and practises were observed to have been actively and successfully applied to many facets of her work including the drafting of the Biosecurity Operations Manual.
Less tangible benefits to wider engagement are also likely. These may include increased staff morale, the fostering of a work culture where staff feel engaged in the ongoing evolution of LHI biosecurity practise, and the continued professional development of staff in their field.
Research partnerships and facilitation Research partnerships which actively inform on-ground conservation currently exist on LHI. Continued and expanded engagement and partnership with research organisations, schools, and bodies should be investigated and pursued (see recommendation 2.13). Research projects that focus on ecosystem modelling and biosecurity/invasive species studies would likely lead to directly implementable findings that would benefit the biosecurity decision making process.
Studies that aim to address specific management questions would be of considerable benefit. For example, a number of New Zealand based researchers are now occasionally releasing neutered, radio collared rodents onto pest free islands. These studies aim to inform managers regarding detection probability on permanent surveillance networks, the efficacy of current or proposed intervention/detection activities, and general rodent behaviour at low densities. Such studies would be of incredible value to LHI biosecurity planning and managers (as well as the global biosecurity and eradication community) as they would provide real-world, site specific data (see recommendation 2.13b). Such studies would also place LHI at the forefront of global biosecurity research.
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Part 3: Staffing – resourcing and proficiencies Staff resourcing General A significant amount of work, such as the deployment of the permanent rodent monitoring network, has been achieved with the current resourcing. This has, however, required the unofficial full time secondment of at least one staff member without biosecurity expertise or experience into a team managerial and strategic planning role and several field staff from other LHIB work units. To date, there has also been no capacity to develop various biosecurity plans such as the rodent incursion response plan to the point that they are implementable and practical documents.
Additionally, capacity has not allowed time for the critical thinking and research that needs to occur before effective work can begin in relation to other pest species. There are currently no:
- Monitoring plans for reptiles, amphibians, or invertebrates; - Active monitoring programs or deployed devices for reptiles, amphibians, or invertebrates; - Finalised Incursion response plans for rodents; - Incursion response plan drafts for reptiles, amphibians, or invertebrates; or, - Incursion response and training manuals and quick reference guides.
Current resourcing does not allow managers and staff critical ‘what if?’ thinking time. This, in turn, means that should ‘what now?’ be asked (e.g. a live rodent is detected on board the M/V Island Trader whilst aground at the LHI wharf) there is no clear, ready to implement response plan or procedure ready to be referred to and/or followed. For rodents, the time elapsed between first detection and the implementation of actions is likely to relate to potential dispersal distance from the point of detection (Russell et. al. 2008a). This means that any prior efforts that decrease effective mobilisation time (e.g. robust planning, maintaining a trained/semi-trained workforce) are likely to pay disproportionate dividends towards the likelihood of successful incursion intervention.
To help ameliorate these resourcing strains the BTL role must be resourced and filled and biosecurity staff/BDH hours maintained if not increased (see recommendations 3.2, and 3.3)
Biosecurity dog handlers BDH hours should be increased to allow proper resourcing of all associated activities. Consultation with BDH as to resourcing requirements is an obvious way to elucidate real-world resourcing requirements but a minor (0.2 – 0.5 FTE) increase may be sufficient (see recommendation 3.3). This recommendation would still remain relevant should other recommendations aimed at increasing efficiency and/or BDH availability on LHI be adopted – daily work efficiency increases are unlikely to avail sufficient time alone.
Consideration must be given to known upcoming work-load increases. These include:
- Scheduled checks of the rodent monitoring network (which may be expanded again to include monitoring and surveillance activities for other pest species); - Improved/new data capture and management activities; - New/increased reporting activities and responsibilities; and, - Increased stakeholder, community, and/or partner engagement activities.
The process around sufficient resourcing for these resources is likely to be ‘chicken and egg’ as work roles evolve along with associated activities and reporting.
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The setting of clear expectations in regards to work expectations (such as percentage flights met and specific community/stakeholder engagement activities) will help to inform the hours or resourcing required. Current guidance is quite vague which often leaves staff unclear of priorities/priority actions.
A significant lack of resourcing and biosecurity capacity exists when a single BDH is on leave or sick and another is performing work duties in Port Macquarie. Current resourcing often results in the remaining handler being able to perform dog husbandry and basic work tasks without capacity for much else. Staff and managers need to give strong consideration to the work effects of any approved leave and plan accordingly. This, however, is unlikely to fully ameliorate the current situation. Consideration should be given to training of another BDH to provide additional skilled capacity to fill these specific gaps and/or other operational gaps as required (see recommendation 3.4). This role could feasibly be split between dog handling and other general biosecurity duties.
The current duration of contracts should be reviewed and extended (see recommendation 3.5). Current contract duration results in the need for regular renewal. The uncertainty associated with pending contract expiry was noted to be a discussion point between staff and appeared to be contributing to decreased team morale. Should BDH get tired of this situation and seek other employment the LHIB would lose a substantial level of corporate knowledge and training investment.
Although not reflected/applied throughout this report, the BDH job titles and position descriptions should be updated to ‘Biosecurity Officer’ and staff referred to accordingly. Although such changes may seem minor, they actively reflect the true duties and responsibilities of these roles, of which dog handling is one part and contribute to personal and community perception of the work role (see recommendation 3.6).
Communications and human resources Many existing biosecurity shortfalls and recommendations included in this audit are linked to, or involve the improvement of, general communications (e.g. public and stakeholder communications, training materials, etc.) or human resourcing/administrative capacity. The establishment and maintenance of robust communications will pay a significant role in building the profile, acceptance of, and engagement with biosecurity actions throughout the entirety of the biosecurity pathway.
The proper resourcing of a dedicated communications and human resources role would likely be of great benefit (see recommendation 3.7). This would facilitate the preparation and release of required materials and also alleviate the human resources burden/routine duties currently on biosecurity staff (and other staff such as weed team supervisors). Improvements to general work efficiencies, staff morale, and the efficacy of biosecurity delivery are all likely to be seen as staff see progress on outstanding communications back-logs, feel supported in their work, and are ‘freed up’ to focus on work which is directly related to the implementation of biosecurity.
A specific work-plan and statement of duties would need to be created, but a part time role of approximately three days per week may prove to be sufficient.
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Field staff training and certification requirements Field staff have a good understanding of their work requirements. They are all familiar with rodent sign, and monitoring and baiting tools/activities. It will be important to maintain the current skill set, attention to detail and pest sign familiarity through ongoing training and skills refreshing (see recommendation 3.10). The implementation of a quality control system would be of benefit and would help to ensure that work standards are maintained as the time since rodent presence grows, and to identify areas that may require clarification or re-training (see recommendation 3.11). Additional training in the identification of other pest species and sign would be of assistance and will be required. This should include other pest species/sign and also other species/sign which may be confused for pest species/sign (see recommendation 3.10).
Existing field staff members are likely to be crucial in any incursion response activities. It is therefore imperative that their training is maintained and that they are confident enough in their work to lead small teams who may require supervision and/or on the job training.
Rodent trapping Staff have very little practise in snap-trap setting and the observed standard was generally low. Elliot trap-setting (which occurs in Port Macquarie) was not directly observed.
Steps were taken during the course of this consultancy to remove snap trapping from the LHI permanent rodent monitoring network (existing snap traps were replaced with quick-set models).
Effective snap trapping will, however, be vital should a rodent incursion be detected. Trap setting can easily be carried out poorly resulting in not only missing an individual once, but potentially creating trap avoidant behaviour making the likelihood of ever trapping it much less.
Dedicated trapping training must be conducted and periodically refreshed for all types of traps used by staff (see recommendation 3.10).
Relevant staff: EFO, BDH, BTL, MEWH, Other staff identified for incursion response.
Rodent/small mammal identification (mainland Australia) No direct identification activities were able to be observed during this consultancy.
Staff have received little training and therefore have little familiarity with the identification of rodents and small mammals that they may encounter when working on mainland Australia.
Port Macquarie work operations include live trapping for invasive rodents. It is likely that native species will be encountered during these activities. Staff must be trained in, and provided with reference material for the identification of those native species which they could be expected to encounter (see recommendation 3.12).
Relevant staff: BDH, BTL, MEWH.
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Reptile and Amphibian sign and identification There are currently gaps in reptile and amphibian identification training and knowledge. This makes the likelihood of correctly identifying, and therefore responding to the finding of an individual, low.
The creation and distribution of ID guides and delivery of reptile ID training should be carried out. This training should focus on those species which are most likely to be introduced via both shipping and aircraft movements and those that pose the greatest threat to LHI (see recommendation 3.13).
Relevant staff: BDH, EFO, BTL.
Firearms licensing Relevant staff do not hold firearms licenses and the existing processes to get a firearm to site (should it be required) are slow.
Currently, only one BDH has the correct licencing and permissions to access LHIB firearms. This is a significant shortfall in firearm proficiency within the biosecurity team. Current arrangements rely on the one BDH being on-hand or contactable, or one other LHIB approved licensed individual being available. There is, however, no on-call roster or standing formal arrangements that are adhered to. The current system is very much based on a “we’ll get whoever is around” approach which is far from reliable and presents a significant, easily avoidable operational weakness.
The current lack of regular training and maintenance of proficiency is a significant limiting factor on current operational capacity. This is highlighted by a current firearms officer not feeling fully confident in their proficiencies and training in regards to the responsibility of, or pressure associated with, potentially needing to utilise certain firearms in an incursion situation where their shot may mean the difference between removing an individual or not.
Although the need for firearms use is rare, when it is required it is likely to be critical in both importance and urgency. Although no instances of firearm requirement occurred during the period of this consultancy, one such event was observed during the Rodent Eradication Project (2019). In this instance a live adult rat was found during daylight hours, well within firearm range (at a distance of approx. two meters), in a safe shooting area, and remained this close for a prolonged period of time. In this instance it took over fifteen minutes for a suitable LHIB staff member to be located and for a firearm to arrive. Visual contact with the rat was lost two minutes before the firearm arrived on site.
The above example occurred when eradication baiting activities were still taking place. Regardless, considerable additional effort needed to be invested on trapping, extra bait deployment, and over 30 additional biosecurity dog searches of the area. This significant extra effort and resourcing was directly attributable to the removal of one individual rodent that could easily have been shot if the process was workably efficient.
Should a similar situation occur in the future, it would necessitate the enacting of a full incursion response. Having the capacity to rapidly dispatch the individual would only necessitate smaller scale monitoring and evidence collection activities to be undertaken.
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All relevant staff should be licensed for firearms use and engage in regular practise. Should a staff member not prove to be suitably proficient in firearms use, they should be provided with further training and practise opportunities before being actively engaged in the use of firearms for the removal of any pest species (see recommendations 3.14, and 3.15).
Relevant staff: BDH, BTL, MEWH, other current firearms officers.
Firearm capacity In order for firearms to be used effectively against potential pest incursions, the correct type of firearm needs to be on hand for each species. Although the LHIB has a suite of firearms the lack of a .410 shotgun is an obvious omission, especially for rodent related work within approximately 25 meters. This firearm should be double barrelled or magazined in order to provide an immediately available second shot opportunity (see recommendation 3.16).
Venomous snake handling There are currently no LHIB staff with recognised venomous snake handling certifications or training. Should any snake be introduced to Lord Howe Island, the LHIB would be required to rely on untrained staff to appropriately capture and handle the individual. This presents obvious health and safety, and legal risks if the animal happens to be venomous, and potential permit or licensing infringements should any snake be handled by an unqualified individual.
This lack of training also presents limitations in work capacity when BDH are conducting inspections in Port Macquarie. Although there is the option of calling local snake catchers when working in Port Macquarie, this should not be used as justification for not delivering staff training as it does not address the potential need to handle snakes when BDH are performing their wider work duties nor build staff capacity.
All relevant staff should receive venomous snake handling training and engage in biennial refreshment. Refreshment may be obtained through a training organisation or by organised accompaniment of a Port Macquarie based operator (see recommendations 3.17, and 3.19).
Relevant staff: BDH, MEWH, BTL.
Metrics and professional performance indicators Metrics The collection of useable data that can be incorporated into useful planning and/or performance metrics has thus far been poor. It is anticipated that data collection will improve drastically should procedures put in place either during, or recommended by, this consultancy be maintained or enacted.
The development of simple baseline metrics will help to inform future biosecurity actions, resource allocation and performance evaluation.
Performance indicators and evaluation The introduction of a simple Professional Development Scheme (PDS) type process that relates to day-today work would likely be of benefit (see recommendation 3.20). The existing LHIB work plan and performance review process is likely to be sufficient however does not appear to be regularly or
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consistently utilised. This was observed across multiple LHIB staff members who expressed levels of uncertainty regarding work priorities, current performance appraisal, and expectations of managers.
Such processes are used to best benefit when they aim to make job roles and expectations clear, highlight deliverables and/or actions for both staff and managers, include potential pathways of staff development and/or training, and are used as a point of dialogue between managers and staff. Such schemes often lose relevance and buy-in from ground based field staff when they are abstract rather than direct and/or do not give them an opportunity to highlight areas in which they could reasonably expect further development or training. An example template was provided for consideration during this consultancy.
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Part 4: Policies, contracts, and agreements This audit does not provide a comprehensive review of all policies, contracts, and agreements that relate to LHI biosecurity. Instead time and attention was dedicated to those which are most relevant to on-ground biosecurity delivery at present.
Vehicle policy, treatment and importation Vehicle importation is subject to approval under a LHIB process which involves application, justification for import, and cleanliness (biosecurity) requirements. Although this policy helps to achieve a good level of biosecurity risk reduction some minor improvements would be of substantial benefit.
Policy - Vehicles Under Section 11 Approval Conditions: “[…] any vehicle (including a trailer, plant and equipment) to be imported, the importer must provide a statutory declaration stating that the vehicle has been inspected and cleaned with a high pressure hose […]”. This requirement is not reflected in the Lord Howe Island Board Application to Import a Vehicle: “NOTE: If the vehicle is second hand it will be necessary for you to provide a statutory declaration stating that the vehicle has been inspected and cleaned with high pressure […]” (emphasis added).
Inconsistencies such as the above, although minor, introduce uncertainty amongst community members and amongst biosecurity staff and managers regarding expectations and requirements.
There is currently no requirement for vehicle treatment that effectively targets invertebrates or cryptic pest species. Current practises are also weak in relation to mitigating the risk of soil, plant matter, seeds, or plant/soil pathogen introduction. The LHIB should reserve the right to treat any vehicle for which it is deemed necessary (including new vehicles) in the following ways:
- Any external surfaces of any vehicle including undercarriage and engine bay with insecticide, herbicide, and/or anti-fungal treatment to be applied through the use of a high pressure gurney wash-down, or other appropriate means, at the discretion of the BDH or relevant staff member (see recommendation 4.1); and, - Use of an insecticide fogger to treat vehicle internals and undersides. This should be mandatory for all second hand vehicles with the treatment of new vehicles being at the discretion of by the BDH or relevant staff member (see recommendation 4.2).
Consideration will need to be given to how vehicle treatment may effect vehicle rust-proofing and associated treatments, however effective biosecurity treatment must remain the priority action at all times.
A locked and baited rodent bait station should be placed within the passenger side foot-well before loading onto the M/V Island Trader in Port Macquarie and inspected/removed upon arrival on LHI (see recommendation 4.3). As this baiting should utilise second generation anticoagulants which usually have label restrictions that limit their use to within 2m of a dwelling or structure, investigation into the classification of the vessel as a dwelling or structure may be worthwhile. Should it not be deemed so, appropriate off-label permits will be required.
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Policy - Other Section 4.7(a) Plant and Equipment excludes “Ride-on Lawn Mowers, Dingo Diggers and similar plant” from treatment requirements. This items pose a very high level of risk of introducing soil, plant matter, seeds, plant/soil pathogens, and invasive invertebrates such as fire ants (Solenopsis invicta). The definition is also in-exact and leaves avoidable room for differences in interpretation.
The policy should be updated to require the proper cleaning of such equipment pre-delivery to Port Macquarie, inspection of such items by a BDH, and reserve the right for further cleaning and/or refusal of loading for transport to LHI to the same standard as vehicles. The definition under 4.7 should also be expanded to encompass lawn mowers, whipper snippers, hedge trimmers, chainsaws, pole saws, and other equipment which may reasonably be expected to pose a potential biosecurity risk through the attachment of organic matter (see recommendation 4.4). The nature of this equipment may require the development of a stand-alone garden tools and equipment import policy, guidelines, or similar (see recommendation 4.5).
These requirements should be made clear to importers pre-purchase. Any treatment could be carried out on a cost-recovery basis should LHIB managers wish.
Although minor, the policy does not contain reference to biosecurity as a reason or justification for any requirements being met. This omission separates the required actions from the biosecurity context and fails to link the two in the minds of the audience/applicants. Updating the wording of the policy would assist with normalising biosecurity on LHI (see recommendation 4.6).
Shipping biosecurity requirements Shipping services to LHI are provided by Birdon Pty. Ltd. (Birdon) (contract LHIB 2016-18). Birdon took on all roles and responsibilities in relation to this contract following their acquisition of Lord Howe Island Sea Freight (LHISF).
Under section 15 - rodent management and biosecurity measures - of the conditions of tender, and section 2 – biosecurity requirements – of Part E, specification and special conditions for contract LHIB 2016-18: “The contractor must maintain an effective biosecurity system […] in a way that effectively maintains isolation from contamination by pests and diseases. […]” (pgs. 276 and 295). These same sections include: “The recommendations [from Hoffman 2016] on the improvements to be made to this facility would be expected to be carried out by any future contractor at this site or matched at another site.” These requirements are not currently being met (see section ‘Birdon freight facilities and M/V Island Trader’).
The tender response from the supplier notes: “[the supplier] have reviewed the recommendations made by the CSIRO in its draft “Biosecurity assessment of the premise of Lord Howe Island Sea Freight at Port Macquarie” (Hoffmann, 2016), and we commit to maintaining the mainland wharf at Port Macquarie, the MV Island Trader, and all goods awaiting departure to Lord Howe Island in a way that effectively maintains isolation from contamination by pests and diseases” (pg. 101). The same is included in the supplier’s biosecurity risk management document. These commitments are not currently being realised (see section ‘Birdon freight facilities and M/V Island Trader’).
Although a biosecurity risk management plan has been prepared, it lacks prescriptive detail and direction in relation to biosecurity measures and activities that will be undertaken. By way of example, section 9.1 – 4 states “Inadequately packed cargo will not be received by LHISF mainland
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staff” however no guidance as to adequate or inadequate packing is provided. Vague guidance such as this is open to interpretation and non-instructive and often results in it not (or not properly) being enacted.
The biosecurity risk management plan requires review and updating (see recommendation 4.7). This should be undertaken collaboratively and incorporate Birdon staff and management, LHI biosecurity staff and management, expert input, and current best scientific knowledge. The new plan must aim to outline specific actions that are to be undertaken with different types of cargo, specific treatments and handling procedures, and specific action and communication pathways that are to be followed should any pest sign or species be detected.
Improvements to shipping related biosecurity measures are required and are discussed throughout this audit.
Aircraft biosecurity requirements Despite aircraft related risk introduction pathways consistently being assessed as moderate, aircraft biosecurity requirements vary from non-existent, to, unlikely to mitigate the risk. The likelihood of pest stow away on aircraft and/or in luggage/cargo is currently not adequately addressed through contractual or service agreements requirements.
Qantas No evidence of specific LHI biosecurity related contractual obligations were provided or found as part of this audit.
Aircraft that service LHI were (and have previously been) observed sitting open on the tarmac at the Sydney airport terminal by the consultant. Although Sydney airport undertakes rodent management, baiting general utilises multi-feed, first generation anti-coagulants which provide less effective rodent control. The extent and quality of the control measures were not able to be reasonably ascertained. As aircraft are open, and no pest monitoring or control measures are associated with the aircraft themselves, there is a chance of direct pest stow-away occurring.
Of greater concern is the biosecurity risk posed by passenger luggage. This is not in specifically addressed by Qantas and luggage is not subject to any special handling or inspection requirements/activities. Biosecurity detection dog inspections of cargo and luggage are sometimes carried out on arrival at LHI, however this intervention is post-bored. Aircraft are not currently directly inspected.
This risk introduction pathway has consistently been assessed as moderate, however little appears to have been done to actively management the assessed risk. The formulation and implementation of suitable pest monitoring and/or control activities, in addition to passenger targeted information, should be undertaken in consultation with biosecurity experts and Qantas (see recommendation 4.8). Any agreements would greatly benefit from the inclusion of requirements for Qantas to disseminate biosecurity related information with any tickets/ticketing information issued.
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Eastern Air No evidence of specific LHI biosecurity related contractual obligations were provided or found as part of this audit.
Rodent baiting of Eastern air Port Macquarie facilities are included in the BDH Port Macquarie inspection duties and activities. Biosecurity detection dog inspections of cargo and luggage are generally carried out on arrival at LHI but aircraft are not inspected.
This risk introduction pathway has consistently been assessed as moderate, however little appears to have been done to actively manage this risk pathway. The formulation and implementation of suitable pest monitoring and/or control activities should be undertaken in consultation with biosecurity experts and Eastern air (see recommendation 4.8).
Private aircraft Private aircraft are not currently subject to any specific biosecurity requirements or inspection. Some private aircraft are regularly flown to LHI with food produce and cargo. Biosecurity detection dog inspections of cargo and luggage are sometimes carried out on arrival at LHI but aircraft are not inspected.
This risk introduction pathway has consistently been assessed as moderate, however little appears to have been done to actively manage this risk pathway. The formulation and implementation of suitable pest monitoring and/or control activities and communication materials for private aircraft operators should be undertaken (see recommendation 4.9).
Current aerodrome management does not require pre-arrival notification to be filed for private aircraft. This has reportedly led to aircraft not being met for biosecurity inspection upon arrival. The introduction of mandatory pre-arrival notification would help to ensure BDH are available to inspect private aircraft and cargo. Any aircraft that land without giving suitable pre-arrival notification should at very least have to remain fully closed on the tarmac until a BDH is available to meet and inspect the aircraft and cargo (see recommendation 4.10).
Private vessel biosecurity requirements No specific, enforceable requirements are currently placed on visiting private vessels. This risk introduction pathway has consistently been assessed as moderate, however little appears to have been done to actively manage the risk.
Visiting yachts are known to originate from marinas, wharfs, and areas at which numerous highly invasive pest species such as Ship rats (Rattus rattus), Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus), House mice (Mus musculus), Cane toads (Bufo marinus), Yellow crazy ants (A. gracilipes), and Asian house geckos (H. frenatus), amongst other pest species, are known to occur. Yachts anchored or moored near to pest free islands have also been directly linked to rodent introductions on other Islands (e.g. Chicken/Marotere Islands in 2009).
There is a clear need for this risk pathway to be addressed. See section ‘Point of arrival biosecurity inspections and capacity - Small private vessels’ for further discussion.
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Biosecurity zone establishment Investigations and work towards the establishment of LHI as a biosecurity zone under the NSW Biosecurity Act (2015) are currently underway. Continued collaboration and support of NSW DPI staff who are working in collaboration with LHI staff to best enhance LHI biosecurity risk management under the Biosecurity Act (2015) must remain a priority of LHI biosecurity managers (see recommendation 4.11).
The next milestone in the investigation of the establishment of a biosecurity zone has been identified by both NSW DPI and LHI biosecurity managers is the delivery of the draft discussion paper with a covering brief on options to the September 2020 LHIB meeting. The declaration of a biosecurity zone is likely to greatly increase the biosecurity of LHI and may avail significant resources for infrastructure development, inspections, and enforcement.
The establishment of LHI as a biosecurity zone is an inherently complex matter which, if progressed, will need to be carefully and proactively managed. This must include early and transparent communications and consultation with the LHI community and stakeholders. Should this establishment progress, a small LHIB working group consisting of a nominated BTL, MEWH, communications/community officer, two community representatives, and a relevant member of senior management, should be established (see recommendation 4.12). The tasking of this group should include the identification of any potential policy or implementation issues that may need to be addressed, the identification of communications for preparation, and the formulation of a coherent message to be distributed to LHIB staff, the community, and stakeholders ahead of time.
The LHIB must break from current patterns of poor communication and community engagement. Failure to do so is likely to lead to the spread of miss-information and confusion through the community and add avoidable difficulty to any potential declaration process. Specific, engaging communications will need to be prepared prior to the September LHIB meeting and maintained throughout the process.
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Part 5: Field activities and on-ground biosecurity Data recording and management Effective data recording and management is crucial in order to make informed on-ground management decisions and provides summary statistics and data for presentation to managers and stakeholders. There has been an overall lack of robust data recording and management across most biosecurity activities and programs pre 2020. Recent and ongoing improvements to these processes have been and will continue to be greatly beneficial.
The adoption of the Fulcrum smart phone based data collection app and engagement of suitably qualified expert has greatly improved data collection and management across the LHI rodent detection and monitoring network, and M/V Island Trader vessel and Port Macquarie facility rodent baiting activities. Biosecurity managers are actively working to refine the various data collection processes with the goal of outputs being useable for both field and reporting requirements.
Data collection and management for other work activities such as the pest reporting and interview process, aircraft arrivals and inspections, and rodent incursion response activities are also undergoing active improvement.
Continued maintenance/troubleshooting of digital data collection systems will be required. These systems are also likely to evolve and change over time whilst ensuring that any future changes do not prohibit integration with/comparison to current or past data. An ongoing relationship with, and engagement of, a suitable expert/ support technician should be maintained. It will be imperative that this person is consulted and engaged. Additionally, a suitable expert will be required to assist with any future succession planning as it relates to data collection systems, processes, or technologies (see recommendation 4.13).
Improvements to data recording and management practises should be reflected in increased regular reporting of biosecurity activities and outcomes to management.
Biosecurity detection dogs General There is a strong and obvious need for biosecurity related activities on LHI to incorporate at least two capable biosecurity detection dogs.
Two English spring spaniel biosecurity dogs are currently utilised for pest scent detection. They are currently trained to detect and indicate on rodent, reptile, and amphibian scent. The dogs were trained and provided under contract by Steve Austin (Australia) and are approximately three (Zuma) and six (Sebbi) years old.
During this consultancy both dogs were observed to perform extremely well on rodent and reptile scent. No amphibian training or detection activities were witnessed. This performance suggests that quality initial training has been generally maintained for rodent and reptile scent by all BDH. Improvements in advanced techniques such as distance indications must be actively worked towards.
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Dog handling Dogs are handled to an acceptable standard by all BDH. Observed search activities were generally conducted in a mostly consistent way as were the giving of rewards to the dogs, although some variation was observed. Consistency in all aspects of dog handling is a vital aspect of dog efficacy and must be maintained by all handlers.
Some inconsistencies exist in the handling of the detection dogs in relation to exercise, training, and husbandry activities, and bush/residential block search techniques and comprehensiveness. During this consultancy, a process of establishing and reviewing detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) with the BDH for each task related to dog handling commenced. The completion of this work, and the adoption (and continued review) of these SOPs, combined with improved inter-team communications and record keeping, will be beneficial to dog and BDH performance (see recommendation 4.14).
Annual handler re-validation and training troubleshooting should be considered. This will provide a regular opportunity to ensure dog training and handling is consistent and maintained to the highest standard (see recommendation 4.15). Consideration would have to be given to any such arrangement over time should future dogs be provided by a different party.
Utilisation of detection dogs in communications and engagement A free biosecurity detection dog talk and demonstration is presented each week for tourists and interested locals. Outreach such as this is a well-recognised excellent use of the resource and utilises the abilities and benefits for detection dog teams to increase community awareness of, and engagement with, biosecurity. These activities must be directed/guided by management to ensure consistency and professionalism.
Increased utilisation of the detection dogs in communications and engagement would be of benefit. Simple features such as pictures on the LHIB website, video clips of the dogs working, and ‘personalised’ information about each dog are all easily achievable yet missed outreach and engagement opportunities (see recommendation 4.16). The building of the social profile of the detection dogs is likely to have follow on effects which increase and help to maintain wider engagement with biosecurity activities. Although they will likely be responsible for their implementation, these activities should not be for the BDH to establish.
An excellent example of the use of detection dogs to raise the profile of a conservation program can be found in Ajax, the Kea detection dog (New Zealand) and his handler Corey Mosen. Ajax’s profile includes, an internationally selling book (see figure 5), online videos, numerous press appearances, and a controlled/managed social media presence. This profile has been effectively used in conservation publicity, funding, and crowd- funding related activities. Although such lengths and publicity may not all be applicable to the LHIB, they illustrate the potential for effective public engagement through better utilisation of detection dogs.
In order to be most effective, any such publicity needs to be strategically Figure 5: Ajax the Kea planned and managed. This is especially true for social media publications dog’s internationally which can very easily be miss-managed and/or misinterpreted by available book. intended/unintended audiences. The formulation of general guidelines that Source: Corey Mosen
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relate to social media publication of work related duties and/or activities may be of benefit to the LHIB (see recommendation 4.17).
Uniform standardisation BDH currently have relatively wide scope in uniform selection and standard. The selection of consistent uniform options that handlers can choose from that are suitable for job tasks, working environments, and weather would help to foster an image of professionalism amongst the community and stakeholders (see recommendation 4.18).
The uniform should be aligned with the general appearance and standard of other biosecurity operations. This will have the benefit of facilitating the conscious or subconscious association of LHI biosecurity operations with those of others states and countries and therefore bolstering the overall impression of biosecurity operations on LHI.
Uniforms should be of predominantly dark/blue colours, clearly printed/embroidered with biosecurity identification, and include options suitable for job roles such as field work, greeting of aircraft arrivals, and dog exercise/training activities. All BDH should be required to be in uniform whenever performing any biosecurity related activities and/or any dog handling duties. As well as highlighting biosecurity activities to the community, this requirement will assist BDH by delineating those times when they are/are not at work/on duty, a distinction that is easily confused by community members due to the nature of the work and roster.
Although issues such as these may seem trivial, the image projected by staff contributes to public perception and attitudes towards biosecurity operations over time.
Kennel and run facilities Dog kennel and run facilities are in good order and are generally well tended to. Minor improvements to the area and facilities would be beneficial for dog and handler daily work and hygiene (see recommendation 4.19). Improvement works identified in consultation with BDH include:
- Minor alteration of dog kennels to avoid faeces, fur, etc. becoming trapped between corrugated iron and mesh walling when being washed out; - Alteration of floor/wall join or installation of scuppers to improve wash-out drainage; - Gutter/drain area immediately around kennels to remove washed out faeces and urine from immediate area; - Planting of shade trees and turf in dog run; - Installation permanent water access in run; and, - Upgrade of dog run gate latch and general area gate.
Consideration should be given to the construction of a third secure kennel facility to accommodate any visiting dogs in the case of a potential incursion search effort. The lack of such capacity was highlighted during the 2019 LHI REP when visiting dogs were required to be kept off-site – an arrangement that was noted by visiting professional handlers as reflecting poorly on the LHIB and one that may be at odds with accommodation providers in the future (see recommendation 4.20).
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Vehicle In order to ensure timely response to any suspected pest presence and efficient completion of regular biosecurity related checks, BDH should have a designated vehicle available at all times (see recommendation 4.21).
The vehicle allocated to the BDH should be upgraded at the next scheduled replacement. Current arrangements have standard plastic dog carry/transport cages loosely secured to the ute tray. Although driving speeds on LHI are low, the current arrangement presents a risk of the cage moving in, or falling from, the tray whilst a dog is in transit. Dog injury and/or loss will cost significant more than the fitting of purpose built dog transport cages. These should be fit to any future dog transport vehicles and general cargo storage arrangements should be made more weather proof (see recommendation 4.22). Any future vehicle should be suitable for the secure storage of a firearm.
Consideration should be given to fitting dedicated biosecurity and/or biosecurity detection dog sign- writing to future vehicles. This will assist in adding a level of visible professionalism to the team and biosecurity activities, and also provide space for the display of any future potential detection dog or biosecurity program partners or sponsors logos etc. (see recommendation 4.23).
Dog replacement planning There is currently no plan in place or funding allocated for the replacement of any dog should they need to be retired due to age or injury.
English spring spaniels have an average life-span of 11.5 years (Lewis et. al. 2018). Common health ailments that may affect detection work duties include elbow dysplasia, canine hip dysplasia, and otitis externa and a realistic working life expectancy may be 8-11 years (S. Austin and K. Springer. pers. coms.).
Delivery of a detection dog from the time of ordering may take between six months and three years depending on breed selection, availability of suitable puppies, and training required (S. Austin, A. Newport, and S. Robinson. pers. coms.). Selection of any potential replacement dog breed and supplier should be undertaken with sufficient lead time to avoid a gap in capacity and/or a last minute scramble which will inevitably add cost to the exercise (see recommendation 4.24).
The replacement of one springer spaniel (after retirement) with a detection dog of a different breed would be prudent. The selection of any breed is a trade-off across multiple factors. Given this, consideration should be given to a terrier breed (e.g. Fox terrier/Border terrier cross) (figure 6) as this would add variety to the current compliment of strengths and weaknesses inherent within the detection dog team.
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Figure 6: Nui the Foxy/Border terrier cross, and handler Sue Robinson inspecting cargo before it is sealed and loaded for shipment to Macquarie Island. Note: Cargo cages are also lined to make them pest proof. Photo: Sue Robinson/Australian Antarctic Division
Potential breeders and training providers exist in both Australia and New Zealand. Although the purchase of a dog from New Zealand will require quarantine standards and measures are met, the extra costs associated with these are unlikely to be prohibitive.
REP success check preparation In consideration of upcoming REP success checks and the likely requirement for BDH and LHI dogs to be utilised for PPP searches, a training and familiarisation program should be put in place (see recommendation 4.25). Following suitable training and standards setting, this work would involve BDH and dog(s) spending full days transiting to areas of the PPP, conducting an area search, and returning. Such work will build dog fitness and staff proficiency prior to success check activities and will also provide valuable work-rate information for any related planning. This dog work must utilise GPS collar tracking in order to keep robust records relating to search effort and build BDH familiarity with the associated systems and processes. BDH hours are likely to require a slight increase to facilitate any such work however this may be facilitated should other recommendations in this report be adopted. This work will also see ad-hoc biosecurity detection dog monitoring of the PPP occur.
Point of departure biosecurity inspections and capacity Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and associated travel restrictions, the visit scheduled to observe biosecurity related activities in Port Macquarie during this consultancy was not possible. Information for this section was collected from personal familiarity with the process, LHI biosecurity staff and Port Macquarie based staff. Figure 7 provides an overview of the grounds.
An on-ground audit of all LHI related biosecurity measures, activities, and associated facilities in Port Macquarie should be taken at the earliest possible allowance to help inform priority recommendations (see recommendation 4.26).
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LHI based biosecurity activities can be reviewed as point of departure biosecurity measures and infrastructure are improved. As the risk of introduction is reduced some LHI based on-going monitoring activities may be able to be undertaken at slightly reduced frequencies. It is important that any such revisions do not occur until after biosecurity upgrades are in place and proven in their efficacy and are done so in a reasonable and robust way.
Birdon freight facilities and M/V Island Trader General Increases to shipping point of departure biosecurity have been made in the time since previous biosecurity audits were conducted which have contributed to increased biosecurity of LHI. Maintenance and refinement of existing processes, and implementation of new measures must be undertaken to further reduce the risk posed by this introduction pathway. The very high rate of recorded pest introduction to LHI via this pathway indicates that current quarantine facilities and activities are not able to sufficient to mitigate the risk of introduction via this pathway.
Current biosecurity detection dog searches, rodent baiting, rodent trapping activities, ant treatment, and site clean-up activities are excellent practise and must be maintained. Further improvements to data collection practises, and communication between Port Macquarie operations and LHI based staff will be of benefit (improvements are currently being implemented). Routine communications related to search effort, monitoring, trapping and baiting results, and specific cargo related observations should become standard practise and will help inform reporting requirements (see recommendation 4.27) (recommendation currently being implemented).
Reptile and amphibian monitoring currently relies primarily on the use of biosecurity detection dogs and no formal invertebrate/insect monitoring is undertaken beyond visual inspection. Periodic ant baiting occurs across the site.
The engagement of an experienced ecologist to conduct a faunal survey of the general area surrounding the Birdon facility would be of benefit (see recommendation 4.28). This data would provide a snapshot of both native Australian and invasive species present within the area and assist with control planning and the training of LHI BDH and biosecurity staff in the identification of mainland Australia fauna. Any such survey may need to be conducted/repeated in suitable seasons to obtain an accurate record of species presence and abundance and should be repeated approximately every 3 years.
Birdon utilises a dedicated freight shed and yard for the storage of LHI bound freight. The shed has reportedly been retrofitted to be made rodent proof whilst the yard has incredibly few effective measures in place to exclude pests from cargo. These measures have proven to be insufficient and significant biosecurity risks still exist, many of which can easily be mitigated.
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Figure 7: Aerial overview of the Birdon Port Macquarie facility. A – LHI freight shed; B – Hardstand; C – M/V Island Trader; D – Lawn and established vegetation; E – Areas of unsealed ground. Note: positions are approximate. Source: https://www.google.com/maps/
Of the eight recommendations made in Hoffman 2016 which the service provider committed to implementing, five are not currently being fully/consistently met. The brief explanations below are expanded on further throughout this audit.
- “Recommendation 2 – Seal all remaining unsealed ground […]. If the large lawned area to the northwest of the hardstand isn’t considered viable to seal, then consideration should be given to maintaining the area as baron ground.” o Unsealed ground still exists. The large lawned area is not consistently maintained nor baron. - “Recommendation 4 – Removal of redundant material […].” o The site has been significantly cleaned however redundant material, equipment, and goods that offer suitable rodent and reptile habitat still accumulate intermittently. - “Recommendation 6 – Establishment of a wash-down facility […] the facility should at the very least be sufficient to prevent cross contamination of other cargo […].” o No wash-down facility exists. Birdon has made a high pressure water washer available but this does not fulfil the full requirements of this recommendation. - “Recommendation 7 – Consider establishing a fence on the northwestern side of the premise to prevent the movement of biota from the surrounding area onto the premise […].” o No fence has been constructed. Discussions relating to fencing the site were begun during the course of this consultancy. It is not clear if the site is classified as a flood control lot under state environmental planning policy. Birdon have expressed a willingness to fence the site if it is possible but progress has not been made.
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- “Recommendation 8 – Do not place any cargo on or near unsealed ground. Cargo should be placed well back from the edge of the hardstand to reduce the risk of biotic contamination […].” o Cargo is stored on unsealed ground in front of the facility and is regularly stored immediately adjacent to the edge of the hardstand which also has long (up to 30cm) grass.
A number of recommendations made by LHI BDH staff in document ‘ED19 5256 Report – Biosecurity – Port Macquarie Inspection – Island Trader Voyage B0024’ have also not been fully implemented.
Internal/shed facilities During the course of this consultancy significant rodent bait take was recorded within the freight shed and several rodents were captured within the shed immediately adjacent to cargo. Additionally, rodent faeces were found within the shed. This evidence suggests that the shed is not able to prevent or sufficiently mitigate the risk of rodents or other smaller pest species encountering and entering cargo bound for LHI. Upgrades to the rodent proofing of the shed must be undertaken to a standard that sufficiently mitigates this risk (see recommendation 4.29).
Real world operational constraints (such as leaving roller doors open during daylight operating hours) will always introduce vulnerabilities that need to be accepted and accounted for. However, discussions with Birdon management revealed the belief that total rodent proofing of the building structure was not practically possible (pers coms.). This base attitude is concerning. Numerous guides exist that can assist with this process (e.g. Baker et. al. 1994, rodent-proof construction and exclusion methods; and, Hoddenbach et. al. 1997, rodent exclusion techniques – a training guide for National Park Service employees). A professional contractor should be sought to review and upgrade this facility (see recommendation 4.29).
Consideration should be given to periodically changing (swinging) bait types made available to rodents, and presenting multiple bait types at any one time within the shed (see recommendation 4.30). The presentation of different baits and lures may help to control for potential differences in individual rodent preference and behaviour. Other second generation anticoagulant baits such as (but not limited to) Ditrac®, Storm®, and Generation® should be considered. First generation anticoagulant based baits should not be used within the facility.
Current storage practises result in cargo being stored tightly together and/or hard-up against internal walls (see figures 8 and 9). Such practises do not allow for adequate access for trapping and detection dog searches before the cargo is loaded onto the vessel. Birdon staff need to be made aware of requirements relating to cargo storage and update their practises accordingly. A line should also be painted on the shed floor that is to act as a false permitter over which cargo cannot be stored (approximately 300mm away from all internal walls) (see recommendation 4.31). The shed should also be kept totally free from all items and equipment that are not cargo or related to the handling of cargo (see recommendation 4.32).
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Figure 8: Cargo stored in a configuration that Figure 9: Fully sealed plywood boxes stored hard- impedes thorough inspection. up against shed wall. Photo: Tim Solomon Photo: Tim Solomon
There is currently a lack of information and monitoring regarding reptile and invertebrate presence/activity with the shed. Monitoring/trapping devices that are capable of detecting these species should be installed and utilised (see recommendation 4.33). Such equipment may include (but is not limited to):
- Reptile detection: Ink cards - both horizontal and vertical surfaces (near lights) to detect various species; and, - Invertebrate detection: Light-trap inside - used intermittently and captured invertebrates keyed/identified to level suitable for purpose. Lured (potentially pheromone lured) sticky traps for key species. Engagement of either a mainland or LHI based entomologist is likely to be required for sufficient identification.
External facilities and cargo storage The installation of an external hardstand has greatly improved the suitability of this cargo storage area. This area, however, still presents a significant and critical biosecurity risk. The hardstand area is immediately adjacent to excellent rodent, reptile, and invertebrate habitat and within easy dispersal distance of excellent amphibian habitat and the vessel is berthed <25m from this habitat (see figure 10). There are currently no physical barriers to dispersal to any of these species present and adjacent lawns are not consistently maintained in a manner suitable to act as a barrier to dispersal. Contrarily, the lawn area is often in a state where it acts as excellent rodent, invertebrate, and reptile habitat.
Hardstand cargo is placed directly on the ground and often immediately adjacent to the edge of the hardstand which abuts long grass (see figure 10). This presents a real risk of easy pest introduction to cargo and effectively means that the only barrier to pest dispersal into the M/V Island Trader is BDH detection dog search activities. Several key improvements are required to bring this area and cargo storage activities up to a suitable standard:
- The relevant external cargo storage area is to be fenced in such a way as to prevent rodent movement. Should fencing of the entire yard not be possible due to yard operation requirements, the north-western side of the facility should be fenced. Any fence must be designed by, or in consultation with, a rodent expert to ensure it limits rodent movement to the highest possible degree – standard fencing alone is not suitable (see recommendation 4.34);
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o Over the course of this consultancy initial discussions have been had with Birdon management on this matter. The flood zoning of the site may preclude fence installation however no confirmation on this matter has yet been received. Should this be the case recommendations 4.35, 4.36, and 4.37 must be pursued as a priority. - Wherever possible, all cargo must be stored on purpose built pallet stands to exclude rodent access (see recommendation 4.37). o Over the course of this consultancy two potential pallet stand designs were provided to Birdon management however no progress has been made on this issue. - Cargo is not to be stored within one meter of the edge of the hardstand where it meets unsealed ground of any type. A bold line should be painted on the hardstand to provide a clear demarcation point (see recommendation 4.35); - The adjacent grass area must either be kept mown to a height <20mm at all times, be made baron, or concreted/sealed (see recommendation 4.36); and,
Figure 10: View of hardstand freight storage area and ship. A) Area where mice were trapped during consultancy. B) Dense clumps of long grass. C) Irregularly maintained grass area with high seed loading (note: length of grass reportedly fluctuates from mown to long). D) Excellent rodent, reptile, and insect refuge space within hardstand bounds (space under stacked containers). E) Wooded area provides excellent habitat – immediately adjacent to freight. Note proximity of ship (background) to high risk habitat (approx. 20 meters). Photo: Tim Solomon
Cargo items often include building and plumbing materials. Import regulations control timber import and are best practise (e.g. no second hand timbers). The wrapping of building materials is generally undertaken however numerous loads were observed to be received on LHI without wrapping and the nature of some cargo makes wrapping impractical (see figure 11). Although not crucial, wrapping facilitates visual inspection of cargo for pest interference (figure 12). Any wrapped materials that are received by the Birdon facility should be handled in such a way as to best avoid tearing or
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destruction of the wrapping (see recommendation 4.38). PVC piping should be inspected by the BDH, cleaned accordingly, and then have plastic wrap or PVC caps placed on each end of each pipe to seal each unit. The capping should remain in place until removal by BDH staff on recept of the load on LHI (see recommendation 4.39).
Figure 11: A load of construction materials that Figure 12: Well wrapped building materials would not reasonably be considered for wrapping facilitating visual inspection being landed on LHI being landed on LHI wharf. wharf.
Periods of increased rodent activity around the freight facility have been noted (generally associated with uncontrollable factors such as grass seeding events). Investigations should be made into obtaining the proper permits and permissions to undertake intermittent pulse baiting for rodents on the external grounds of the facility (see recommendation 4.40). Any such program would reduce the biosecurity risk associated with freight which is stored in any outside area. Any external baiting program will likely need to utilise first generation anticoagulant bait.
Due to workplace health and safety requirements, the vessel gangway must be left down whenever crew are on-board and the vessel is in port (including overnight). The vessel is berthed within meters of pest habitat including excellent rodent habitat. Measures must be taken to retrofit and/or re- design the gangway to ensure it presents a barrier to rodents from dispersing onto the vessel (see recommendation 4.41).
The freight yard currently lacks an adequate wash-down facility and capacity to properly clean or treat any contaminated vehicles or cargo that in delivered for shipping. The installation of a facility which meets all environmental requirements to allow wash-down that may utilise fungicides, herbicides, insecticides, etc. should be carried out (see recommendation 4.42). This would facilitate proper treatment of any cargo deemed to pose a risk to a level where it is made safe for transport.
Although the installation of a Port Macquarie wash-down facility has been identified by previous biosecurity audits, been talked about between managers, and been committed to by Birdon (under the adoption of recommendation 6, Hoffman 2016), there has been very little action taken and no progress made. The appointment of a dedicated project manager would likely be required for successful progression (see recommendation 4.43).
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Cargo containers/cages A significant amount of cargo is currently stored and transported in large mesh steel cages (see figure 13). These cages present no barrier to pest entry. Such cages can easily be retro-fit to be pest proof using pvc sheeting, thin metals (e.g. Colourbond®), plywood, Perspex, or any other such material (see figure 14). Any joins must be adequately sealed and any doors/opening sides must see the sheeting mate up flush against a dense foam or similar compound to ensure a robust seal. Aftermarket options are also available, however consultation with Birdon would be required to ensure that any potential design is suitable for handling and shipment. After cargo is packed into each cage it is inspected by a biosecurity detection dog and then sealed. It remains sealed until arrival at the destination port.
This arrangement mitigates the current risk of a pest animal entering into this cargo after the time of inspection but before it is loaded onto the transporting vessel. This arrangement can however prohibit rapid and easy inspection at the arrival port as the cage must be opened for inspection. Providing the initial packing and storage procedures are stringent and adhered to, this is of little concern. Should re-inspection at the receiving end prove to add an unacceptable time burden, a workable sub-sample of such cages can be inspected.
There are clear benefits to the adoption of such containers for LHI shipping operations, especially in relation to food and Australia Post cargo and should be adopted for this priority cargo. Consideration should also be given to wider adoption where possible (see recommendations 4.44, and 4.45).
Figure 13: LHI cargo packed in transport cages. Figure 14: AAD pest-proof cargo cages landed on Macquarie Island – awaiting transport to base and final inspection. Photo: Kim Kliska
Australia Post Australia Post cargo is currently transported in non pest-proof containers. These containers have previously been identified as harbouring insects and organic matter as a consequence of their design and construction. This presents a biosecurity risk which could be easily rectified but is yet to have been so. Additionally, they are generally unloaded stacked two high which makes fully effective detection dog searching at LHI difficult (figures 15 and 16). The arrival of material such as this should be prevented through thorough inspection at Port Macquarie, however due to workload and resourcing occasional omissions or misses such as these are not surprising.
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Legislative and legal limitations exist around the opening of Australia Post cargo. This introduces potential difficulties should such cargo be associated with a suspected biosecurity risk. These limitations are in themselves enough to warrant special handling and packing of this cargo into pest- proof containers following biosecurity detection dog checks in Port Macquarie. This will minimise the likelihood of pests entering the cargo. These cargo loads should be clearly marked for easy identification upon arrival at LHI (see recommendation 4.44).
Figure 16: Invertebrate and organic material attached to an Australia Post container on arrival at LHI. Figure 15: Australia Post containers being landed Photo: Angela Newport. on LHI wharf.
Eastern Air Eastern air facilities are currently incorporated into Port Macquarie based BDH activities. Activities include biosecurity detection dog searches, maintenance of a permanent rodent baiting network within the hangar facility, and rodent trapping. Routine communications related to search effort, monitoring, trapping and baiting results, and specific cargo related observations should become standard practise and will help inform reporting requirements (see recommendation 4.27) (recommendation currently being implemented).
Reptile and amphibian monitoring currently relies primarily on the use of biosecurity detection dogs and no formal invertebrate/insect monitoring is undertaken beyond visual inspection.
Hangar inspections only occur when BDH are in Port Macquarie to inspect shipping based activities (approximately every 2 weeks). This results in a majority of flights departing from Port Macquarie without direct inspection and during large gaps in bait station and rodent activity checks.
Although inclusion in the inspection regime is good, the frequency and intensity of activities is not sufficient to mitigate the risk of pest introduction to LHI via this pathway. Sufficient time needs to be made available via increased Port Macquarie biosecurity resourcing to facilitate the development and implementation of further mitigation measures. Until any such measures are in place and deemed to be suitable, the meeting of all Eastern air flights on arrival for thorough biosecurity inspection should be mandatory and properly resourced (see recommendations 4.46, and 4.47).
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The engagement of an experienced ecologist to conduct a faunal survey of the general area surrounding the Eastern air facility would be of great benefit (see recommendation 4.28).
Biosecurity activities should generally be expanded to monitor for, and where possible control other pest species such as reptiles and invertebrates.
Suppliers and other stakeholders No active biosecurity control or monitoring activities were observed to have been carried out on the premises of any major suppliers or stakeholders and no relevant communications were distributed. The importance of, and lack of capacity to undertake such work is recognised by current biosecurity staff and the MEWH
The opportunities to directly engage with suppliers that regularly ship goods to LHI are key potential benefits of having BDH conducting Port Macquarie operations. The provision of relevant information, information products, training, and guidance in relation to LHI biosecurity should be undertaken as a matter of routine. Current resourcing does not allow for the effective implementation of these activities.
A key supplier/stakeholder engagement and communications plan should be developed and actions should be properly resourced (see recommendation 4.48). All relevant LHI staff must be engaged in any such process – it is not currently realistic to expect BDH to pick this work up and effectively develop and deliver these engagement activities with current Port Macquarie work-loads and resourcing.
A potential solution to the current resourcing constraint is discussed below in section ‘provision of Port Macquarie biosecurity inspection services’. In short, should a portion of the BDH duties be contracted to a mainland provider, BDH may still be deployed to Port Macquarie in all or some of their ‘off weeks’ to undertake these key stakeholder engagement duties.
The further back in the supply chain biosecurity intervention can begin, the better. A system that provides for the awarding of suppliers with an ‘accreditation’ that recognises their level of proactive biosecurity engagement (e.g. gold accreditation for robust and proactive actions, silver accreditation for moderate actions, etc.) should be created and utilised. These suppliers should then be made known on the relevant LHI websites and publications as ‘preferred’ suppliers from which to purchase goods for shipment to LHI (see recommendation 4.49). This will likely provide active incentive for suppliers to undertake actions which benefit LHI biosecurity and facilitate more effective and efficient delivery of Port Macquarie biosecurity activities and tasks.
Point of arrival biosecurity inspections and capacity M/V Island Trader LHI based interactions with M/V Island Trader crew indicated a good understanding of the need for biosecurity requirements. Although in-depth discussions weren’t had, crew members expressed and displayed a willingness to comply with BDH duties and inspections and invited the consultant on- board the vessel (pre COVID-19 isolation requirements). Unloading and forklift activities generally accommodated the pace of biosecurity inspection although few instances of inspection limiting the pace of the unload operation were encountered overall.
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Rat guards were generally utilised however they are unable to be effectively fitted to all lines used to secure the vessel. Their regular breakage also led to crew being less attentive to fitting them in a timely manner. Time should be allocated towards the investigation and development of suitable and effective rat lines or line sleeves (see recommendation 4.50). Although the efficacy of rat guards is likely to be somewhat limited, their absence is conspicuous and portrays poor biosecurity imaging to the public.
The proximity of the vessel to the wharf makes rodent dispersal from any point of the vessel to the wharf very easy. As vessel movements within the area of the wharf are draft constrained and the vessel often sits aground, options available to mitigate this risk are few. This limitation adds significant importance to Port Macquarie based operations – if a pest is present on-board at the time of departure then the vessel is effectively directly connected to LHI for the duration of its stay with no functional ability to limit pest dispersal from the vessel. Specific plans should be prepared and agreed to that address potential on-board pest detection scenarios and what actions will/must be undertaken at various states of tide, cargo unload, etc. (recommendations 4.51, and 4.52). Any such decision is likely to lead to the incursion of costs by the operator which, when combined with the absence of such plans, currently makes timely decision making and action unlikely.
BDH inspections of bait stations, deck cargo, and accessible ship spaces all happened immediately after vessel berthing and appeared to be well conducted. Hold cargo is inspected on the wharf following unloading from the vessel. These inspections were generally conducted to a high standard. A small percentage of checks sometimes appeared cursory or not fully thorough. These checks were generally correlated with those times when the BDH was trying to catch up on data entry, juggle dog husbandry requirements, and/or when day duration and weather exposure started to lead to fatigue.
LHI cargo inspections during vessel unload require attention to detail and focus of both the handler and detection dog. There is currently a lack of shade/weather shelter on the wharf and the work is consistent across the day. As BDH generally need to perform data entry, vessel checks, and/or dog husbandry activities during vessel unload break times, there are often only very limited (or no) opportunities to take lunch or bathroom breaks. These factors lead to fatigue and potential slippage1. During this consultancy one vessel arrival saw staff exchange half-way through the day but with little overlap time for an effective hand-over. Suitable shelter must be made available at the wharf and rostering and work hours should allow for handler swap-over with a suitable hand-over time (see recommendations 4.53, and 4.54). (1 Slippage refers to the small gaps or failure points in existing practises or processes that introduce avoidable risk. This is different to the introduction or creation of a specific stand-alone, or identifiable specific risk. Continued slippage can lead to cumulative impacts and a ‘death by a thousand cuts’ scenario.)
Aircraft A number of aircraft service LHI in passenger, freight, and private capacities. General inspection activities incorporate the biosecurity detection dog inspections of cargo and checked luggage before release for collection. No inspections of the aircraft themselves were observed.
Cargo is loaded onto trolleys and then moved approximately 30 meters into a biosecurity inspection room. Although this is good practise there are several key implementation weaknesses. These include:
- The inspection room can only accommodate one luggage trolley at a time.
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o This results in one or more luggage trolleys sitting loaded in the open without any inspection or measures that will prevent pest dispersal from the luggage. This luggage may be left in this way for an extended period of time if the biosecurity officer is required to conduct thorough investigations of other items of concern; and, - The inspection room is in not bio-secure and fails to meet basic best practise standards. o The room has an open ceiling which joins to a large shared ceiling space and the outside environment. This presents no effective barrier to dispersal for many reptile and invertebrate species. o The roller doors are not adequately sealed. Easy dispersal of any pest species from the room is not unlikely.
Extension of the current inspection room to accommodate all unloaded luggage should be undertaken (see recommendation 4.55). Any extensions should incorporate upgrades to bring the facility up to best practise standards and capacity.
Failing alteration to the existing building, an outside pest-proof cargo holding area must be designed and constructed as a matter of priority (see recommendation 4.56). This area would hold loaded cargo trolleys whilst the inspection room is in use. Any such area must be able to accommodate an entire aircraft worth of luggage/trolleys (should the inspection room still be in use after a previous flight arrival), should be double fenced, must utilise best-practise pest-proof fencing designs, and be designed in such a way as to allow individual trolleys to be isolated from one-another. Draft design/concept ideas were provided to LHI biosecurity managers during this consultancy.
Key improvements to the existing facility and processes should be implemented immediately. These include:
- The unloading of only one baggage trolley at a time from the aircraft – the aircraft cargo door is re-closed between trolley loads (see recommendation 4.57); - The inspection room is fitted with a sealed ceiling (see recommendation 4.58); - The inspection room is retro-fit to be fully sealed around all doors, roller doors, and structural joins (see recommendation 4.59); and, - The inspection room is upgraded to allow BDH and dog entry/exit without introducing the risk of a pest dispersing from the room – this should be via an ‘airlock’ type entry or, at very least, the fitting of one rapid roller door (see recommendation 4.60).
Current cargo/luggage handling arrangements pose a high level of risk of pest dispersal into excellent adjoining habitat. Should this occur a full incursion response (potentially for a species with no current incursion plan) would be triggered with no guarantee of success.
Current BDH resourcing does not allow for all flights to be met. Should resourcing remain as such, priority to minimise biosecurity risk should be given to freight/cargo flights, followed by flights with unknown cargo (e.g. private flights that may be carrying food items), and passenger flights.
Considering the above, the need to meet passenger flights is still very high and all possible flights should be met. In addition to posing a biosecurity risk, the meeting of such flights is an excellent opportunity for public engagement with biosecurity activities. Such engagement (e.g. briefly talking about LHI biosecurity whilst inspecting hand luggage during passenger luggage collection) should be required of the BDH when meeting these flights.
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Small private vessels Private vessels regularly visit LHI but do not generally undergo biosecurity related checks or inspections. All moorings are within easy rodent swimming distance and invertebrate/insect dispersal distance from land. As crews often come ashore there is also a risk of bag/luggage stow away of small reptiles, rodents, and invertebrates. A suitable plan and set of guidelines should be developed to mitigate the risk associated with these vessels with any requirements being captured in the mooring application process. Suitable accompanying communications would need to be created and made readily available pre-departure (see recommendations 4.61, and 4.62).
Independent of the plan, the permanent rodent monitoring and kill network should be expanded to include Dawson’s point with the inclusion of any adopted reptile and invertebrate monitoring (figure 17) (see recommendation 4.63). These monitoring points should be checked monthly during peak visitation seasons.
Figure 17: Suggested minimum extent of Dawson’s Point rodent and other pest species monitoring network. Yellow points indicate suggested monitoring/kill box locations. Source: Google Maps
Any plan may include the following easily implementable actions which will greatly assist with addressing the risk associated with this introduction pathway:
- Relevant communications should be made available to private vessel operators pre- departure. Avenues for information dissemination can include (but are not limited to): LHIB website (linked from biosecurity and mooring information pages), online sailing/cruising websites and resources, sailing publications, yacht clubs, marinas, and cruising guide authors/publishers;
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- Visiting vessels should be asked to place an off the shelf bait station that utilises off the shelf brodifacoum based wax-block type baits in a suitable area of the vessel for their voyage to LHI (the requirement for a brodifacoum based bait would likely need to be stressed); o Stations could include (but are not limited to): Ratsak® professional rodent bait station, and The Big Cheese® 100g ultra power rat kill bait station. Baits may include (but are not limited to): Ratsak® fast action wax blocks – 6 pack, and The Big Cheese® 540g all-weather block bait. - Visiting vessels should be asked to place a suitable ant bait product in a suitable area of the vessel pre-departure. - Visiting vessels should be met by a BDH and provided with an overview of LHI biosecurity and relevant information/publications; - If not previously placed, a rodent bait station should be placed in the cabin of each vessel on arrival. Stations should be checked after the first night of deployment and then after every 7 nights; and/or, o Any confirmed rodent bait take should trigger the installation of monitoring equipment and ashore (grid extent to be detailed in incursion response planning). - If not previously placed, a suitable ant bait product in a suitable area of the vessel on arrival. - A reptile and insect sticky trap should be placed in the cabin of each vessel on arrival. These should be checked after the first night of deployment and then after every 7 nights. o Any confirmed capture or detection should trigger the relevant monitoring and/or removal actions from the relevant incursion response plan(s).
The preparation and distribution of communications outlining the above requirements (as they relate to vessel skippers) would be of immediate benefit and should be undertaken independent of the preparation and finalisation of any such plan.
Other vessels Larger vessels occasionally visit LHI. A suitable plan and set of guidelines should be developed to mitigate the biosecurity risk associated with these vessels (see recommendation 4.64).
Should their intent to visit be known prior to their departure from their previous port, rodent baiting and invertebrate control activities should take place en-route. Rodent bait and bait station types could be the same as above, however a suitable bait station distribution would need to be achieved according the specifics of each vessel.
As Norway rats (R. norvegicus) are present at likely domestic and international departure ports, and are capable of swimming up to 1km across open ocean (Russell et. al. 2008b), should any vessel intend to enter or be found to enter within 1km of any LHI landmass, they should be met by a BDH and be inspected for rodents and other pest species, and baited/trapped appropriately (see recommendation 4.65) (note: a Norway rat was captured at the Birdon facility during this consultation).
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Capacity to handle of risk cargo on LHI The current approach to biosecurity correctly emphasises inspection and risk reduction at the cargo’s point of origin rather than on the LHI end of the chain. There is, however, no functional capability to safely isolate any cargo that may pose potential risk once it arrives on Island. This is a critical weakness to the biosecurity of LHI.
Currently, items of biosecurity concern are not meant to leave the hold of the vessel and/or are to be re-loaded for further inspection with the possibility of being return shipped should they be deemed to be of unacceptable biosecurity risk. In reality, as inspections of the packed hold are not possible, the likelihood of identifying cargo to be of any risk before it lands on the LHI wharf is near zero. Similarly, the likelihood of suspicious cargo being re-loaded is low – if an item has a clear and obvious risk this is not the case, however pieces of cargo that present difficult to confirm biosecurity risk are rarely considered for re-loading and return.
Current processes (i.e. inspecting cargo after it is placed on the LHI wharf) and facilities mean that should a piece of cargo be deemed suspicious but not present an obvious, easily identifiable biosecurity risk, further inspection is generally carried out on the wharf – this presents a risk to Island biosecurity. By way of example, should a rodent flush during the inspection of suspicious cargo it is likely to disperse from the wharf into any of the immediate areas of suitable habitat. This would trigger a full incursion response with no guarantee of success.
The reticence towards re-loading cargo would be partially alleviated following more detailed investigation into potential ‘fall-out’ should a decision to re-load and/or return cargo. This includes (but is not limited to) the liability for any associated costs and claims resulting from un-received, damaged, or perished cargo, loss of business/project capacity, etc. These conclusions must then be communicated to the BDH, all Birdon staff, and also be made available to LHI residents and stakeholders (see recommendations 4.66, 4.67, and 4.68). This was identified as a priority action in AECOM 2016, and numerous times from March 2020, however no meaningful progress has yet been observed.
During the period of this consultancy several freight items of biosecurity concern from three M/V Island Trader voyages were not able to be inspected by LHI biosecurity staff to a sufficient standard. These items included a number of Tesla batteries and three large, custom built and fully sealed plywood boxes packed for a home relocation to LHI from a regional area of Australia with known mouse and reptile activity (see figures 8 and 9), and another large fully sealed custom made wooden shipping crate (see Appendix B for more detailed report regarding Tesla shipment).
There is no wash-down equipment or facility on-site at either the LHI wharf or airport. This makes cleaning of physical matter such as attached dirt or insect nests at the point of unload impossible. Should the proper facilities be made available at the point of cargo loading/departure this would be a more acceptable state of affairs, however having a high pressure washer on-site for any water based wash-down of any unloaded cargo would be advisable regardless (see recommendation 4.69).
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Post Entry Quarantine Receiving Station A room within the building at the LHI wharf is currently signed as a quarantine room but is totally unfit for purpose (see figure 18). The sign should be removed from the door to this room due to the message that it portrays regarding the seriousness of, and approach to, LHI biosecurity.
Figure 18: Current quarantine room showing: clutter and stored goods, gap under door, and easy access to large shared roof space.
A Post Entry Quarantine Receiving Station (PEQRS) allows the implementation of robust post entry inspection procedures for any goods where the biosecurity risk extends beyond border controls. The establishment of a PEQRS is considered best practise in Island biosecurity (Sharma et. al. 2014).There is currently no functional capability to safely isolate any cargo that may pose a potential biosecurity risk once it arrives on Island.
The construction of a suitable bio-secure handling/storage facility, or the retro-fitting of existing building to a suitable standard, would provide a final chance for pest removal after cargo arrives on LHI. This would address a current major weakness in LHI biosecurity. A suitable short-term PEQRS should be immediately be placed/constructed whilst a long-term permanent PEQRS is established (see recommendations 4.70, and 4.71). Appendix C contains draft detail and justification for the installation of a short-term PEQRS on LHI which was prepared for more detailed consideration during this consultancy (note: facets were superseded by the completion of this consultancy).
The establishment of a short-term PEQRS has made progress over the period of this consultancy and efforts must be maintained until it is fully implemented.
Provision of Port Macquarie biosecurity inspection services General Port Macquarie inspections are currently conducted by LHI based BDH (note: during the period of COVID-19 related travel restrictions these services are being provided by a mainland contractor). As part of this consultancy a comparison was undertaken that considered the options of continuing under the current arrangements or changing to the use of a mainland based contractor.
As LHIB management expressed a commitment to retaining the current BDH staffing resources, comparisons relating to costs related to LHI Port Macquarie operations were made with the wage component removed from LHI BDH costs.
Any decision to alter current arrangements must give consideration to factors beyond cost alone.
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LHIB staff provision of services The undertaking of these inspection duties was identified as a key job role during the creation and filling of the BDH roles on LHI. The current average total for LHI BDH provision of services (after the removal of wages) is $2440.00 per week of deployment. The average of expenses claimed over a four trip duration ($350) were used in these calculations.
The utilisation of LHI BDH for Port Macquarie operations includes (but is not limited to) the following benefits:
- BDH are intrinsically invested in LHI biosecurity delivery and outcomes; - Boosts public perception of importance of biosecurity (note: see below and recommendation 4.72 to further enhance this benefit); - Provides continuity throughout the inspection process; - BDH are Authorised Officers under the NSW Biosecurity Act (2015); - BDH are familiar with the LHI environment and threat profiles of pest species; - LHI dogs routinely leave the Island and encounter fresh pest scent; - Presence of BDH at Birdon helps to maintain strong working relationship with staff and crew; - LHI BDH have a clear passion and commitment to the effective delivery of LHI biosecurity outcomes; and, - BDH are able to provide managers with direct feedback in relation to facility standards and maintenance.
The utilisation of LHI BDH includes (but is not limited to) potential draw-backs and/or limitations. These include:
- Decreased on-island work capacity when BDH is deployed to Port Macquarie; and, - Limited extent of negative public perception in relation to sending local staff off-island regularly (note: see below and recommendation aa to address);
Current resourcing when in Port Macquarie does not allow for proactive engagement or regular visitation of key suppliers and stakeholders. See section ‘proposed system’ for further discussion.
It was reported that, although few in number, some members of the LHI community see the utilisation of LHI BDH for Port Macquarie operations to be a “holiday” or as some type of junket. The provision of engaging and relevant biosecurity communications to the community would help to educate the local community regarding the extent of biosecurity activities undertaken in Port Macquarie. These communications should include data such as rodent bait take, captured/trapped pest species, hours spent searching cargo before loading onto the M/V Island Trader, and potential pest species information, etc. etc. (see recommendation 4.72). This would have the added benefit of engaging members of the community with a key ‘quarantine’ phase of biosecurity delivery to LHI.
Mainland contractor provision of services Mainland based detection dog handler services generally range from $550 to $2000/day. Current arrangements are secured for $825 (incl. GST)/day until June 30th 2020. For a three day working week this totals $2475.00. The LHIB has no pricing guarantee beyond this point.
The LHIB must be aware that the number of available mainland detection dog handlers is quite limited. This pool is further reduced when an available handler with a dog that is trained on the required target scents is sought. This is especially true for general rodent scent as many mainland dogs are actively trained off of invasive rodents so as not to lead to potential confusion when
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searching for native rodent species. Effectively, this means the potential pool to recruit from which to recruit for Port Macquarie operations is very small should current arrangements change in the future. Although some handlers may be willing to switch their dog’s target scents, this is not a given and willingness varies greatly.
The utilisation of the current mainland contractor includes (but is not limited to) the following potential benefits:
- ‘Fresh eyes’ in terms of inspection regimes and practises; - Locally based so likely to be familiar with local native species; - Encompassed redundancy: the handler has other qualified staff who could deliver the bare minimum requirements of the role in an emergency; - Use of different dogs compared to those that will be checking the cargo on LHI; and, - The ability for LHI BDH to conduct more LHI based work as they are not deployed to Port Macquarie.
The utilisation of the current, or any locally available mainland contractor includes (but is not limited to) several potential draw-backs and/or limitations. These include:
- Price volatility/vulnerability; - Lack of biosecurity specific experience and expertise; - Not registered as an Authorised Officer under the NSW Biosecurity Act (2015); - No existing relationship with Port Macquarie stakeholders; - No familiarity with the LHI environment; - Remote management and no provision for quality control; - No inherent or personal investment in the protection of LHI beyond their own work ethic and standards; - Three day working week is ‘bare minimum’ and does not allow time for other duties such as stakeholder engagement, inspection of suppliers, etc.; and, - Contractor is unlikely to provide training to Birdon staff.
The interplay of these and social factors is likely to be complex. By way of example, a portion of the LHI resident community may see the provision of these services by an off-island contractor as a good idea whereas others may see it as putting the biosecurity of the Island at risk and taking jobs away from locals. Comparing any positive or negative community perception to any cost savings or incursions is likely to be incredibly subjective.
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Proposed system The below system is proposed as a potential ‘real-world’ provision of services that aims to address some of the current limitations to resourcing addressed in other sections of this report (see recommendation 4.73). All discussions, reasoning, and costs are based on the average Port Macquarie inspection schedule which sees one inspection occur each fortnight and does not include micro-scale detail such as three week ship turn-around or special/charter voyage inspections.
The proposed system (table 3):
- Sees the continued deployment of LHI BDH to Port Macquarie; - Integrates the current mainland contractor; - Provides occasional but recurrent extra capacity in Port Macquarie to address current limitations in relation to key supplier and stakeholder engagement; - Provides BDH with extra time on LHI to complete additional reporting and data collection duties, and contribute to the creation of communications and monitoring/incursion plans that are currently under-resourced; - Ensures the LHI detection dogs remain familiar with fresh/live target scent; - Allows for skill and knowledge sharing between LHI and mainland detection dog handlers; - Maintains mainland redundancy for the delivery of LHI biosecurity inspections; and, - Provides the LHI community with continuity and assurance of biosecurity delivery.
Taking the provision of Port Macquarie services by either option alone to be the same price per week of work ($2440 vs. $2475), the relative cost increase of this system to the LHIB in comparison to the provision of services by any one option alone for all visits is $9900/year. The likely benefits to the biosecurity of LHI are far greater than this dollar value and, importantly, will occur at the beginning of the biosecurity ‘supply chain’ (key suppliers), facilitate increased reporting of biosecurity activities and data to senior management, and facilitate improved communications and stakeholder engagement activities – all of which are current program weaknesses.
Table 3: Proposed schedule of Port Macquarie biosecurity inspections.
Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6 Week Week Week Week Week Week 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 x L x L x LC x C x C x L x L x L x LC x C x C x L
Key x No visit L LHI BDH C Contractor LC Both
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Current monitoring and surveillance on LHI Rodents Following the cessation of REP baiting operations, a comprehensive rodent monitoring and trapping network was installed throughout the settlement area and most areas that pose the highest risk of rodent introduction. The significant effort and personal investment associated with the planning and deployment of this network against a backdrop of inadequate planning and limited resourcing is to be commended.
Areas which pose the highest introduction risk (LHI wharf, airport, lodges/commercial kitchens, and sites of regular higher-risk cargo deliveries) utilise a mixture of permanent bait stations, monitoring devices, and kill-traps. Other areas utilise monitoring and kill devices in a variety of rodent box type stations. This approach, which utilises a variety of proven methods, is best practise.
Current checking schedules depend on the risk profile of each site and generally occur weekly, fortnightly, or monthly. As other biosecurity measures and facilities are improved these check schedules may be revised slightly. For example, the monthly check network could be reviewed into zones, with those nearest to of risk sites remaining on the current check schedule whilst others move to every second or third month. Any such changes to check schedules must only be considered following the potential declaration of eradication success in 2021.
No active rodent monitoring currently occurs in the Permanent Park Preserve (PPP). Given the scale of the PPP, current resourcing, and the relatively low risk of direct introduction to this area, this is understandable. Future consideration could be given to the periodic deployment of monitoring devices by weed eradication staff should they be visiting a site multiple times over a one week period (post any potential success declaration). Any such work would need to avoid being overly onerous and would require a suitable data capture and management process to be in place. This work is not vital in an ongoing monitoring context but may prove beneficial in terms of community assurance and perception.
Current rodent monitoring activities and efforts could be summarised as sufficient. As these activities are directly linked to the likely detection of any potential incursion, and time elapsed between incursion detection and action influences removal effort outcomes, any reduction to these activities should only be undertaken after critical analysis and expert input.
Current monitoring practises and processes would benefit from extra staff training, standardisation, and periodic quality checking processes.
Reptiles No formal monitoring or surveillance for or of native or invasive reptiles is currently undertaken. Consequently, there is a lack of baseline data in relation to the abundance and distribution of native species and already introduced reptiles including the skink, Lampropholis delicate, and a low likelihood of timely detection of any further invasive reptiles. A robust monitoring and surveillance plan should be created in collaboration with reptile and biosecurity experts (see recommendation 4.74).
The recently deployed rodent monitoring network incorporates ink-cards which may detect the presence of some reptiles such as small lizards and certain geckos by chance. The current monitoring program, however, is not designed or set-up to effectively survey for these species so the likelihood
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of any such detections is very low. General targeted reptile surveys that utilise suitable methodologies for the target species (e.g. drift-fenced pit-fall trapping, and light-attracted ink-card placements) should occur on a biannual basis (see recommendation 4.75). This will provide indicative baseline population and distribution data. Once a sufficient data-set has been obtained consideration could be given to decreasing the general survey frequency.
More frequent targeted reptile surveys should be conducted and maintained over time at and near potential introduction sites such as the LHI wharf, airport, and lodges/residences that receive direct bulk cargo deliveries (see recommendation 4.76). These activities will increase the likelihood of detecting any invasive reptiles in a somewhat timely manner.
Reptile identification training and the creation of reptile identification guides should also be undertaken (see recommendation 4.77). This will assist biosecurity staff and interested residents with reptile identification. Any such training should initially focus on the most common native/naturalised species and those reptile species that pose the highest risk of invasion.
Invertebrates The Australian Museum conducted a successful LHI survey expedition in 2017. This work highlighted many interesting finds. By way of example, in relation to Coleoptera (beetles) one species was recorded for the first time since its original collection in the early 1880s. Additionally, nine of the thirty two species records were new records for LHI, “almost all of which appear[ed] to be relatively recent invasives”. The survey also “found several other [previously recorded] species in considerably reduced ranges compared with previous surveys.” (Reid et.al. 2018 pg. 67). These results suggest that invertebrate introduction has been occurring to LHI.
Currently, targeted annual African big-headed ant (Pheidole megacephala) monitoring and surveys are undertaken to inform final removal efforts/confirm eradication success. Beyond these activities, no ongoing formal invertebrate monitoring is currently conducted. Overall, there is a lack of general routine invertebrate monitoring. This is of concern and requires timely attention.
A robust monitoring plan should be created in collaboration with invertebrate and biosecurity experts (see recommendation 4.78). Current resourcing will likely facilitate only targeted surveys around key potential introduction sites. Larger scale surveys should however be specifically resourced to occur on a suitable time-frame to assist with maintaining baseline data-sets and to help ensure early detection of any introduced species. Due to the nature of insect monitoring (i.e. relatively simple methodologies, equipment, and collection protocols), consideration should be given to engaging community volunteers in these activities as a way to build practical community engagement with biosecurity (see recommendation 4.79).
The recently released report: ‘invasive insects – risks and pathways project preliminary results’ (Monash University and Invasive Species Council 2020) provides an excellent summary of the biosecurity risks posed by insects in an Australian context and should be read and understood by all LHI biosecurity staff and managers. The report highlights the difficulties and costs associated with controlling or eradicating introduced insects and the associated importance of preventing their introduction.
Of particular relevance to LHI are those species from the Hymenoptera family which includes ants, bees, sawflies, and wasps. This family includes tramp ant species such as: Red imported fire ant (S.
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invicta), Yellow crazy ant (A. gracilipes), African big-headed ant (Pheidole megacephala), Argentine ant (Linepithema humile), Electric ant (Wasmannia auropunctata), and Tropical fire ant (Solenopsis geminate). These species are highly invasive and a majority occur in those areas of Australia from which cargo and/or visitors to LHI originate (see figure 19). Figure 20 highlights how suitable to human assisted introduction and invasion these species are. Targeted ant surveys at both Birdon and LHI sites should be planned and resourced as a priority (see recommendation 4.80).
Figure 19: Distribution of tramp ants in Australia (note: excl. S. megacephala on LHI). Produced by the Environmental Resources Information Network, Australian Government, Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities (DSEWPaC), Dec 2011. From: DSEWaC 2012.
Further invertebrate monitoring and sampling could make effective and efficient use of periodic light-trapping, pheromone lured sticky trapping, canopy fogging, malaise trapping, and pitfall trapping. Subsequent identification of collected specimens would provide valuable species presence and abundance data to LHI biosecurity and environmental managers. The anticipated work load for a relatively simple but potentially sufficient monitoring/collection regime is approximately 2-3 weeks per year (note: any program should be designed with expert input). Such work could potentially be conducted as part of regular work duties or by a suitably skilled contractor with samples sent for expert identification and classification.
Early detection of any invasive invertebrates will be crucial in ensuring any required removal and eradication efforts are affordable and successful and that environmental damage is avoided or minimised.
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Figure 20: Use of introduction pathways by invasive insects. Only the most prevalent pathways and insect orders are shown. Circles and their sizes represent the relative contribution (%) of each insect order to the number of species using a particular pathway. For example, an insect on the food contaminant pathway is more likely to be a Hymenopteran than a Dipteran. Circle sizes (from smallest to largest) represent 1–10%, 11–20%, and so on up to 60%. Note that the figure does not provide information on the relative importance of pathways per se. From: Monash University and Invasive Species Council 2020
Amphibians No formal monitoring for or of amphibians is currently undertaken. Consequently, there is a lack of baseline data in relation to the abundance and distribution of the already introduced bleating tree frog (Litoria dentate) and a low likelihood of timely detection of any further invasive amphibians. A robust monitoring plan should be created in collaboration with amphibian and biosecurity experts (see recommendation 4.81).
Current resourcing will likely facilitate only targeted surveys around key potential introduction sites. Larger scale surveys should however be specifically resourced to occur on a suitable time-frame to assist with maintaining baseline data-sets and to help ensure early detection of any introduced species.
Although all invasive amphibians would likely have ecosystem level impacts to LHI, the most publicly recognised amphibian pest threat is likely the Cane toad (Bufo marinus). There is now well accepted evidence that native species such as Pied currawongs (Strepera graculina) have shown adaptive behaviour allowing individuals to prey on Cane toads without lethal effects (Bekker 1985). It is incredibly important, however, to recognise the inherent difference between the mainland and LHI populations of currawongs: the mainland population is very large and could “afford” to lose a large
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number of individual birds whilst this behaviour was being learnt whereas the LHI population is very limited in number.
Early detection of any invasive amphibians will be crucial in ensuring any required removal and eradication efforts are affordable and successful and that environmental damage is avoided or minimised.
Incursion response plans and preparedness Rodents A draft rodent incursion response plan has been prepared along with a supporting Fulcrum app to assist with incursion response activities and data capture (note: app is yet to be field tested). Resourcing to date has necessitated the triaging of the development of a robust pest sighting and evidence collection process and not allowed for crucial further development of the incursion plan, training delivery, and a field trial.
Four potential rodent sighting/detection reports were made over the course of this consultancy. Following the now established process two were progressed to the ‘evidence collection’ phase. Although minor refinements to the process will be ongoing (as should be the case), the process appears to be robust and well implemented. All involved with the development and implementation of this process should be commended, especially given the context of operating with a lack of sufficient resourcing and expertise. It will remain important that this process is adapted and updated as needed, that the process is followed by all staff and managers, and that the existence of such a process is made known to the wider community.
A draft rodent incursion response plan has been prepared and those involved should be commended – the plan has been progressed as far as could realistically be expected given current constraints. A lack of resourcing and expertise has however, not allowed for the development of the rodent incursion response plan to the point that it is realistically implementable and able to be used as a practical incursion manual or guide. Consequently, should an incursion be suspected or detected, an efficient, timely, and effective response is unlikely.
Significant work remains in relation to key basic aspects of this plan. This includes critical thinking and consultation regarding baiting and trapping grid sizing and extent, servicing and resourcing of incursion activities, and incursion response activity cessation or expansion given key criteria being met/not met.
The development of a real-world plan that attempts to balance likely incursion response success with real-world resource constraints is a technically complex undertaking. The resourcing of the BTL position, allocation of sufficient time for the input of key staff, and engagement with key experts, are likely to greatly assist with the development of this plan. This plan must be developed, trialled, and refined as an absolute priority (see recommendation 4.82). This is especially true given the likelihood of rodent incursion occurring against the backdrop of current limitations to the efficacy of quarantine actions.
Existing off-label permits that allow for the use of X-verminator® rodent bait in an incursion response are prescriptive to this single bait type – the availability of which is likely to be severely limited. The relevant permits and exemptions should be updated to be made more general and allow for the use of any suitable second generation anticoagulant bait containing 0.01 - 0.05g/kg of
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brodifacoum, and/or 0.01 - 0.05g/kg of difenacoum, and/or 0.01 - 0.05g/kg flocoumafen (see recommendation 4.83). This will ensure that suitable, effective bait is available and permitted for use.
All equipment that would be required to mount an incursion response must be stored together, in clearly labelled kits, separate from all other field and works equipment, and is only be accessed for auditing, servicing, and incursion use (see recommendation 4.84). Although this may require minor investment in extra stocks and stores, such an arrangement would ensure that all required equipment is available should it be required. This would prevent a scenario in which suitable monitoring equipment or the like is not on hand, traps are not in a serviceable condition, and/or equipment such as bait station pegs have been moved to an unknown storage area.
Reptiles, amphibians, and invertebrates No formal incursion response plans exist for reptiles, amphibians, or invertebrates. This makes the likelihood of timely and effective incursion response very low. The interception of an invasive Asian house gecko (H. frenatus) by a BDH aboard the M/V Island Trader when berthed at the LHI wharf in 2020 highlights the currently high likelihood of pest introduction to LHI. Incursion response plans must be prepared for these species (see recommendations 4.85, 4.86, and 4.87).
The likelihood of incursion occurring given current limitations to the efficacy of quarantine actions, combined with a lack of active monitoring and incursion planning for these species, currently makes timely, cost-effective and successful incursion response unlikely.
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Part 6: Conclusions and recommendations Component health report
Figure 21: Health report of individual LHI biosecurity components.
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Conclusion The introduction and establishment of vertebrates, invertebrates, plants, plant pathogens, fungi, bacterial disease, and other ecological pathogens to insular or island ecosystems has led to widespread global biodiversity loss and extinctions. Islands are uniquely positioned in relation to their overall contribution to global biodiversity, levels of endemism, historic extinction rates, and opportunities for effective biosecurity to limit the introduction of pest species.
Significant improvements to LHI biosecurity have been made since the 2003 audit. Current biosecurity practice achieves a great deal with the available resources. These efforts, however, are only able to provide barely adequate protection to Lord Howe Island against the introduction or re- introduction of pest species.
Current quarantine practises mean the transport of a pest species to LHI is a matter of when, not if; the capacity to intercept and effectively remove an individual at the point of arrival is limited; the likelihood of surveillance activities providing early detection of an invader post-border are low or non-existent (apart from rodents); and, current preparedness and incursion response planning makes removal of a species before it becomes widespread and/or established unlikely.
Recommendations within this report aim to address all aspects of the biosecurity pathway; quarantine (prevention), surveillance (detection), and response to incursions (contingency). Although the financial return on investment is generally considered to be higher in the earlier stages of the pathway, effective biosecurity planning must account for potential failings at any point. Capacity to detect and respond to introductions must be increased and maintained.
LHI is uniquely positioned to define the world standard for inhabited island biosecurity post eradication of both invasive rodents and tramp ants. This opportunity is combined with the international obligation and responsibility to protect and maintain the World heritage values of the Island.
Rather than aim for the bare minimum, every effort should be made to offer the highest possible level of protection to the natural values and ecosystem of Lord Howe Island.
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Recommendations The below recommendations are compiled from this audit and review. In order to assist with establishing priority actions, each recommendation is assigned a priority class (with 1 being the highest priority). Managers should aim to enact/adopt all recommendations. The priority classes should be interpreted as:
- 1 – Failure to deliver these recommendations greatly limits the delivery of effective biosecurity to LHI and perpetuates inherent/current biosecurity risk, contributes to a high likelihood of pest introduction to/establishment on LHI, and/or, addressing these recommendations addresses recognised risk pathway weaknesses/gaps. - 2 – Delivery of these recommendations is likely to lead to significantly increased biosecurity protection, greater efficiency, and/or much greater community and stakeholder engagement. Failure to deliver these recommendations will lead to/not address existing significant biosecurity weaknesses. - 3 – Delivery of these recommendations will actively support the delivery of other recommendations and/or the effective delivery of biosecurity. Failure to deliver these recommendations may limit the efficacy of other improvements to biosecurity and/or lead to decreased overall protection. - 4 – Delivery of these recommendations will assist the effective delivery of biosecurity.
It is important to note that these priorities are relevant at the time of writing. The implementation of certain priorities would likely effect the subsequent ratings of others. For this reason managers should avoid attempting to merely work their way through priority actions and should view each recommendation within the context of attempting to significantly improve the current biosecurity of LHI. Priority class ratings do not take any anticipated ROI measures or assessments into account.
Priority recommendations REF Recommendation Priority Class 3.2 The Biosecurity Team Leader position is resourced and filled. 1 3.3 Biosecurity Dog Handler hours are increased to sufficiently accommodate all work duties. This must include time for report, plan, and training 1 material preparation, procurement, community engagement, and extended monitoring duties. 3.7 A dedicated communications and human resources role is created and resourced. This may require part-time engagement for Environment 1 related activities only. 3.9 A regular scheduled team meeting is organised and adhered to between MEWH and BDH (and BTL when resourced). 1 3.14 Training, certification, and appropriate licencing of biosecurity dog handlers (or equivalent level staff) in firearms use and handling. 1 3.15 Regular scheduled firearms practise should be carried out at least every 3 months. Minimum proficiencies should be set and met in order for a 1 firearms officer to be engaged in the use of firearms for pest species removal. 3.17 Provision of appropriate venomous snake handling to relevant staff. 1 3.18 Purchase of two suitable snake handling kits and first aid equipment for use on LHI and in Port Macquarie. 1
4.1 Prior to shipment from Port Macquarie, any external surfaces of any vehicle including undercarriage and engine bay should be treated with 1 insecticide, herbicide, and/or anti-fungal treatment through other appropriate means at the discretion of the biosecurity dog handler or relevant staff member.
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REF Recommendation Priority Class 4.3 A locked and baited rodent bait station be placed within the passenger side foot-well of every vehicle before loading onto the M/V Island Trader 1 in Port Macquarie and inspected/removed upon arrival on LHI. 4.4 Definition 4.7 of the vehicle importation policy be updated to include other equipment which may reasonably be expected to pose a potential 1 biosecurity risk through the attachment of organic matter. 4.7 The Birdon (LHISF) biosecurity risk management document is to be reviewed and re-written to include specific actions that are to be undertaken 1 with different types of cargo, and specific treatments and handling procedures. 4.9 The formulation and implementation of suitable pest monitoring and/or control activities and communication materials for private aircraft 1 operators. 4.13 The ongoing engagement of a digital data collection systems and GIS expert to provide technical support. 1 4.33 Suitable reptile and invertebrate monitoring devices are installed appropriately in the Birdon freight shed. 1 4.34 The Birdon external cargo storage area should be fenced to the maximum possible extent in such a way as to prevent rodent movement onto 1 the site. 4.36 The area of grass adjacent to the external hardstand should either be kept mown to a height <20mm at all times, be made baron, or 1 concreted/sealed. 4.37 All possible cargo should be stored on purpose built pallet stands to exclude rodent access when stored outside of the Birdon freight shed. 1 4.41 Implement measures to effectively retrofit and/or re-design the M/V Island Trader gangway to ensure it presents a barrier to rodents from 1 dispersing onto the vessel whilst berthed in Port Macquarie. 4.42 The installation of a wash-down facility which meets all environmental requirements to allow wash-down that may utilise fungicides, herbicides, 1 insecticides, etc. at the Birdon Port Macquarie yard. 4.44 Pest-proof cargo containers/cages are utilised for the shipping of all Australia Post cargo to LHI and are specifically marked/flag for inspection 1 upon arrival on LHI. 4.45 Pest-proof cargo containers/cages are utilised for the shipping of all possible cargo to LHI. 1 4.46 Resourcing is adjusted to allow sufficient time for BDH to conduct more robust Port Macquarie based Eastern Air pest monitoring and control 1 activities. 4.51 The preparation of specific plans that address potential pest detections on-board the M/V Island Trader and what actions will/must be 1 undertaken at various states of tide and cargo unload. 4.55 Extension of the current LHI airport biosecurity inspection room to accommodate all unloaded luggage trolleys. 1 4.56 Failing recommendation 4.55 being met in a timely manner (<3 months), an outside pest-proof cargo holding area be designed and constructed 1 as a matter of priority. 4.57 The unloading of only one baggage trolley at a time from any aircraft until either recommendation 4.55 or 4.56 are met. 1 4.58 The LHI airport biosecurity inspection room is fitted with a sealed ceiling. 1 4.59 The LHI airport biosecurity inspection room is retro-fit to be fully sealed to prevent pest dispersal from the room. 1
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REF Recommendation Priority Class 4.60 The LHI airport biosecurity inspection room is upgraded to allow BDH and dog entry/exit without introducing the risk of a pest dispersing from 1 the room. 4.70 A short-term implementable post-entry quarantine receiving station is placed/constructed at the LHI wharf. This should occur within two 1 months of this audit. 4.73 The proposed working arrangements in section ‘Provision of Port Macquarie biosecurity inspection services – proposed system’ (or a close 1 variant) are adopted. 4.74 Development of a robust reptile monitoring plan in collaboration with reptile and biosecurity experts. 1 4.75 General targeted reptile surveys that utilise suitable methodologies for the target species occur on a biannual basis. Survey frequency may be 1 reviewed after a sufficient data-set has been obtained. 4.76 Targeted reptile surveys be conducted at and near to potential introduction sites such as the LHI wharf, airport, and lodges/residences that 1 receive direct bulk cargo deliveries. 4.78 Development of a robust invertebrate/insect monitoring plan in collaboration with reptile and biosecurity experts. 1 4.80 Targeted ant surveys at both Birdon and LHI sites should be planned and resourced. Surveys should target at least Red Imported Fire Ant 1 (Solenopsis invicta), and Yellow Crazy Ants Anoplolepis gracilipes. 4.81 A robust amphibian monitoring plan and schedule is be created in collaboration with amphibian and biosecurity experts. 1 4.82 The LHI rodent incursion response plan is completed, resourced, and trialled. 1 4.83 Relevant permits and exemptions are updated (and maintained) to be made more general and allow for the use of any suitable second 1 generation anticoagulant bait containing 0.01 - 0.05g/kg of brodifacoum, and/or 0.01 - 0.05g/kg of difenacoum, and/or 0.01 - 0.05g/kg flocoumafen, in the case of an incursion response being enacted. 4.84 All equipment that would be required to mount a rodent incursion response be stored together, in clearly labelled kits, separate from all other 1 field and works equipment, and only be accessed for auditing, servicing, and incursion use. 4.85 A robust reptile incursion response pathway and plan is developed in consultation with relevant experts, and properly resourced. 1 4.86 A robust amphibian incursion response pathway and plan is developed in consultation with relevant experts, and properly resourced. 1 4.87 A robust invertebrate incursion response pathway and plan is developed in consultation with relevant experts, and properly resourced. 1
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Complete recommendations REF Recommendation Priority Class 1.1 Commission of expert LHI species specific and ecosystem modelling for priority biosecurity risk/pest species impacts. 3 1.2 Update LHIB guidance documents to incorporate the precautionary principle as a guiding principle in the decision making process. 3 2.1 Creation of a biosecurity community/stakeholder engagement strategy which incorporates clear goals, deliverables, and outcomes. 2 2.2 Creation and conducting of a dedicated/specific community survey and interview process to elucidate the current of and attitudes towards 2 biosecurity. 2.3 Update of existing LHIB, LHITA, and REP website content in relation to environmental and biosecurity information. 2 2.4 Professional revision of LHIB website design to improve user engagement, useability, and intuitive information finding. 3 2.5 Creation of engaging and useable web-based pre-arrival/pre-shipping information for relevant audiences. 2 2.6 An annual face-to-face meeting is held between relevant Birdon management and the MEWH/BTL. 4 2.7 Suitable biosecurity training/training refreshment is prepared and delivered to Birdon staff and crew approximately biennially. 3 2.8 Suitable biosecurity training/training refreshment is prepared and delivered to airline staff and crew that service LHI approximately biennially. 3 2.9 A tourism industry and tourist engagement strategy should be developed, resourced, and implemented. This may be part of a larger general 2 communications strategy (recommendation 2.1) 2.10 Preparation of an overarching biosecurity partnership/engagement strategy that clearly outlines potential partners, what each potential 2 relationship may offer each party, an approach and engagement strategy, and a communications and knowledge sharing strategy. 2.11 Initiate planning of an inter-island/inter-organisation biosecurity workshop and/or knowledge sharing session. 4 2.12 Facilitate staff attendance at existing relevant conferences and/or workshops. 2 2.13 Investigate and pursue effective engagement and partnership possibilities and actions with research organisations, schools, and bodies. 3 2.13b Engage researchers to conduct specific rodent release experiments to test existing rodent surveillance methods and inform management. 2 3.1 MEWH and MECS role descriptions are reviewed and clarified, and role titles adjusted accordingly. 2 3.2 The Biosecurity Team Leader position is resourced and filled. 1 3.3 Biosecurity Dog Handler hours are increased to sufficiently accommodate all work duties. This must include time for report, plan, and training 1 material preparation, procurement, community engagement, and extended monitoring duties. 3.4 Recruitment and training of an additional Biosecurity Dog Handler to provide role redundancy. 4 3.5 The duration of BDH contracts is reviewed and the period between renewals extended to provide continuity of service and staff confidence in 3 ongoing employment. 3.6 BDH job titles are be updated to ‘Biosecurity Officer’ and staff referred to accordingly. 3 3.7 A dedicated communications and human resources role is created and resourced. This may require part-time engagement for Environment 1 related activities only. 3.8 Clear work and handover procedures are developed for specific BDH job tasks and activities. 2 3.9 A regular scheduled team meeting is organised and adhered to between MEWH and BDH (and BTL when resourced). 1
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REF Recommendation Priority Class 3.10 Preparation of training materials, training/refresher schedule, and field reference materials suitable for current biosecurity related staff. 2 Training should include: bait station installation/checks, trap setting, pest sign interpretation, sign which may be confused for that of pest species, etc. 3.11 Inclusion of quality check rodent monitoring network random/spot checks. 2 3.12 Provision of native species identification training and preparation of field reference materials for LHI biosecurity staff who perform work duties 3 on mainland. 3.13 Reptile identification training is conducted and field identification guides are created. This training should focus on those species which are 2 most likely to be introduced via both shipping and aircraft movements and those that pose the greatest threat to LHI. 3.14 Training, certification, and appropriate licencing of biosecurity dog handlers (or equivalent level staff) in firearms use and handling. 1 3.15 Regular scheduled firearms practise should be carried out at least every 3 months. Minimum proficiencies should be set and met in order for a 1 firearms officer to be engaged in the use of firearms for pest species removal. 3.16 The LHIB acquires a double barrelled .410 shotgun or similar suitable firearm. 2 3.17 Provision of appropriate venomous snake handling to relevant staff. 1 3.18 Purchase of two suitable snake handling kits and first aid equipment for use on LHI and in Port Macquarie. 1 3.19 Provision to allow for/facilitate venomous snake handling refreshment training. 3 3.20 Introduction of a relevant and useful Professional Development Scheme and/or effective and regular utilisation of the existing process. 4 4.1 Prior to shipment from Port Macquarie, any external surfaces of any vehicle including undercarriage and engine bay should be treated with 1 insecticide, herbicide, and/or anti-fungal treatment through other appropriate means at the discretion of the biosecurity dog handler or relevant staff member. 4.2 Prior to shipment from Port Macquarie, an insect fogger should be used to treat vehicle internals and undersides. This should be mandatory for 1 all second hand vehicles and at the discretion of by the biosecurity dog handler or relevant staff member for new vehicles. 4.3 A locked and baited rodent bait station be placed within the passenger side foot-well of every vehicle before loading onto the M/V Island 1 Trader in Port Macquarie and inspected/removed upon arrival on LHI. 4.4 Definition 4.7 of the vehicle importation policy be updated to include other equipment which may reasonably be expected to pose a potential 1 biosecurity risk through the attachment of organic matter. 4.5 A policy, and supporting guidelines and information for users, are prepared in relation to the import of garden tools and equipment. 2 4.6 Inclusion of explicit biosecurity reference in vehicle import policy and application paperwork. 4 4.7 The Birdon (LHISF) biosecurity risk management document is to be reviewed and re-written to include specific actions that are to be 1 undertaken with different types of cargo, and specific treatments and handling procedures. 4.8 The formulation and implementation of suitable pest monitoring and/or control activities be undertaken in consultation with biosecurity 3 experts and Qantas/Eastern Air for all aircraft used to service LHI.
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REF Recommendation Priority Class 4.9 The formulation and implementation of suitable pest monitoring and/or control activities and communication materials for private aircraft 1 operators. 4.10 The introduction of mandatory aerodrome pre-arrival notification of at least 24 hours. Any aircraft that land without giving suitable pre-arrival 1 notification at very least remain fully closed on the tarmac until a BDH is available to meet and inspect the aircraft and cargo. 4.11 Continue collaboration with, and support of NSW DPI staff who are working with LHI staff to best enhance LHI biosecurity risk management 1 under the Biosecurity Act (2015) 4.12 Establishment of a biosecurity zone working group to facilitate the effective introduction of the LHI biosecurity zone (should progress on the 2 establishment be made). 4.13 The ongoing engagement of a digital data collection systems and GIS expert to provide technical support. 1 4.14 Standard operating procedures are created for each specific biosecurity dog handling task/duty and compiled into a reference manual for BDH. 1 4.15 Annual biosecurity dog handler re-validation and training is conducted opportunity to ensure dog training and handling is consistent and 3 maintained to the highest standard 4.16 Incorporate the utilisation of biosecurity detection dogs into community engagement planning and activities. 2 4.17 General guidelines that relate to social media publication of work related duties and/or activities are produced for LHIB staff and work 4 activities. 4.18 Allocation of a biosecurity specific uniform which includes options suitable for all work tasks and duties. 3 4.19 Improvements to dog kennel and run facilities are implemented as required to provide more fit for purpose facilities. 4 4.20 Due consideration is given to the construction of a third secure kennel facility to accommodate any visiting dogs. 4 4.21 The ongoing allocation of a dedicated biosecurity/biosecurity dog handler vehicle for the sole use of this team. 1 4.22 The vehicle allocated to the BDH is upgraded at the next scheduled replacement and includes purpose built dog transport cages. 2 4.23 Consideration be given to fitting dedicated biosecurity and/or biosecurity detection dog sign-writing to future vehicles. 4 4.24 Selection of any potential replacement dog breed and supplier be undertaken with sufficient lead time to avoid a gap in capacity. Discussions 1 should begin in the next 12 months with potential providers for replacement in the next 2-4 years. 4.25 A training and familiarisation program be put in place to prepare BDH and dogs for REP success check activities. 3 4.26 An on-ground audit of all LHI related biosecurity measures, activities, and associated facilities in Port Macquarie be taken at the earliest 2 possible allowance. 4.27 Formalisation of routine communications related to biosecurity dog handler activities and findings in Port Macquarie back to LHI aircraft and 2 vessel inspection staff. 4.28 The engagement of an experienced ecologist to conduct a faunal survey of the general area surrounding the Birdon, Eastern Air, and Qantas 3 facilities. To be repeated every approximately 3-5 years. 4.29 Upgrades to the rodent proofing of the Birdon Port Macquarie shed are undertaken to a standard that sufficiently mitigates current rodent 1 access to the shed. A professional contractor should be sought to review and upgrade this facility.
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REF Recommendation Priority Class 4.30 Types of rodent bait used in Birdon Port Macquarie shed and M/V Island Vessel are periodically swung between bait types. 2 4.31 A bold line is painted on the Birdon freight shed floor that is to act as a false permitter over which cargo cannot be stored. Line to be spaced 2 300mm from internal walls. 4.32 The Birdon freight shed is kept totally free from all items and equipment that are not cargo or related to the handling of cargo. 2 4.33 Suitable reptile and invertebrate monitoring devices are installed appropriately in the Birdon freight shed. 1 4.34 The Birdon external cargo storage area should be fenced to the maximum possible extent in such a way as to prevent rodent movement onto 1 the site. 4.35 A bold line is painted on the Birdon hardstand that is to act as a false permitter over which cargo cannot be stored. Line to be spaced 1000mm 1 inwards from the hardstand/sealed ground edge. 4.36 The area of grass adjacent to the external hardstand should either be kept mown to a height <20mm at all times, be made baron, or 1 concreted/sealed. 4.37 All possible cargo should be stored on purpose built pallet stands to exclude rodent access when stored outside of the Birdon freight shed. 1 4.38 Cargo handling practises aim to minimise tearing or destruction of any cargo wrapping. 2 4.39 PVC piping be inspected by the BDH, cleaned accordingly, and then have plastic wrap or PVC caps placed on each end of each pipe to seal each 2 unit. 4.40 Investigations be made into obtaining the proper permits and permissions to undertake intermittent pulse baiting for rodents on the external 2 grounds of the facility. Such baiting to be implemented during periods of observed local increased rodent activity. 4.41 Implement measures to effectively retrofit and/or re-design the M/V Island Trader gangway to ensure it presents a barrier to rodents from 1 dispersing onto the vessel whilst berthed in Port Macquarie. 4.42 The installation of a wash-down facility which meets all environmental requirements to allow wash-down that may utilise fungicides, 1 herbicides, insecticides, etc. at the Birdon Port Macquarie yard. 4.43 A project manager is appointed to oversee the process of wash-down construction at the Birdon freight yard. 2 4.44 Pest-proof cargo containers/cages are utilised for the shipping of all Australia Post cargo to LHI and are specifically marked/flag for inspection 1 upon arrival on LHI. 4.45 Pest-proof cargo containers/cages are utilised for the shipping of all possible cargo to LHI. 1 4.46 Resourcing is adjusted to allow sufficient time for BDH to conduct more robust Port Macquarie based Eastern Air pest monitoring and control 1 activities. 4.47 All Eastern Air flights are met and thoroughly inspected upon arrival at LHI until recommendation 4.46 is sufficiently met. 1 4.48 A key Port Macquarie supplier/stakeholder engagement and communications plan is be developed and actions should be properly resourced. 2 4.49 Creation and utilisation of a ‘preferred supplier’ accreditation that recognises a suppliers level of proactive biosecurity engagement. 3 4.50 Sufficient time is dedicated to the investigation and development of suitable and effective rat lines or line sleeves for the M/V Island Trader. 3
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REF Recommendation Priority Class 4.51 The preparation of specific plans that address potential pest detections on-board the M/V Island Trader and what actions will/must be 1 undertaken at various states of tide and cargo unload. 4.52 The presentation of these plans to all relevant stakeholders for input and agreement. 1 4.53 Suitable weather shelter on the LHI wharf is made available to biosecurity staff whilst conducting vessel and/or inspections. 2 4.54 Biosecurity dog handler hours and rostering facilitate suitable work-day lengths and hand-over overlap during vessel/cargo inspections. 2 4.55 Extension of the current LHI airport biosecurity inspection room to accommodate all unloaded luggage trolleys. 1 4.56 Failing recommendation 4.55 being met in a timely manner (<3 months), an outside pest-proof cargo holding area be designed and constructed 1 as a matter of priority. 4.57 The unloading of only one baggage trolley at a time from any aircraft until either recommendation 4.55 or 4.56 are met. 1 4.58 The LHI airport biosecurity inspection room is fitted with a sealed ceiling. 1 4.59 The LHI airport biosecurity inspection room is retro-fit to be fully sealed to prevent pest dispersal from the room. 1 4.60 The LHI airport biosecurity inspection room is upgraded to allow BDH and dog entry/exit without introducing the risk of a pest dispersing from 1 the room. 4.61 Development of a small private vessel biosecurity risk management plan and suitable, audience appropriate guidelines and communications. 1 4.62 Inclusion of relevant requirements in the mooring application process for private vessels. 2 4.63 Expansion of the permanent rodent monitoring network to incorporate Dawson’s Point. 2 4.64 Development of a large vessel biosecurity risk management plan and guidelines. 1 4.65 Any vessel intending to enter, or that is found to enter within 1km of any LHI landmass, is to be met by a biosecurity dog handler (and dog) and 2 be inspected for rodents and other pest species, and baited/trapped appropriately. 4.66 Investigation into all potential ‘fall-out’ should a decision to re-load cargo onto the M/V Island Trader be made on the LHI wharf. 1 4.67 Creation of easy to follow, real-world guidelines for on-ground biosecurity staff in relation to actions and communication channels under 2 recommendation 4.66. 4.68 Communication of all relevant decisions under recommendation 4.66 to LHI residents and stakeholders. 2 4.69 A high-pressure washer be made available for use on the LHI wharf during cargo unloading activities. 1 4.70 A short-term implementable post-entry quarantine receiving station is placed/constructed at the LHI wharf. This should occur within two 1 months of this audit. 4.71 A purpose designed post-entry quarantine receiving station is built that will fully facilitate cargo handling, inspection, and treatment in line with 2 new Birdon ship design specifications and operations. 4.72 Creation and publication of 6 monthly general biosecurity newsletter which includes monitoring activity/results, Port Macquarie activities, pest 3 species information, updates to processes/procedures, etc. 4.73 The proposed working arrangements in section ‘Provision of Port Macquarie biosecurity inspection services – proposed system’ (or a close 1 variant) are adopted.
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REF Recommendation Priority Class 4.74 Development of a robust reptile monitoring plan in collaboration with reptile and biosecurity experts. 1 4.75 General targeted reptile surveys that utilise suitable methodologies for the target species occur on a biannual basis. Survey frequency may be 1 reviewed after a sufficient data-set has been obtained. 4.76 Targeted reptile surveys be conducted at and near to potential introduction sites such as the LHI wharf, airport, and lodges/residences that 1 receive direct bulk cargo deliveries. 4.77 Reptile identification training and the creation of reptile identification guides be undertaken for biosecurity staff. 2 4.78 Development of a robust invertebrate/insect monitoring plan in collaboration with reptile and biosecurity experts. 1 4.79 Development of invertebrate/insect monitoring plan incorporates community and volunteer involvement with data/specimen collection 4 activities. 4.80 Targeted ant surveys at both Birdon and LHI sites should be planned and resourced. Surveys should target at least Red Imported Fire Ant 1 (Solenopsis invicta), and Yellow Crazy Ants Anoplolepis gracilipes. 4.81 A robust amphibian monitoring plan and schedule is be created in collaboration with amphibian and biosecurity experts. 1 4.82 The LHI rodent incursion response plan is completed, resourced, and trialled. 1 4.83 Relevant permits and exemptions are updated (and maintained) to be made more general and allow for the use of any suitable second 1 generation anticoagulant bait containing 0.01 - 0.05g/kg of brodifacoum, and/or 0.01 - 0.05g/kg of difenacoum, and/or 0.01 - 0.05g/kg flocoumafen, in the case of an incursion response being enacted. 4.84 All equipment that would be required to mount a rodent incursion response be stored together, in clearly labelled kits, separate from all other 1 field and works equipment, and only be accessed for auditing, servicing, and incursion use. 4.85 A robust reptile incursion response pathway and plan is developed in consultation with relevant experts, and properly resourced. 1 4.86 A robust amphibian incursion response pathway and plan is developed in consultation with relevant experts, and properly resourced. 1 4.87 A robust invertebrate incursion response pathway and plan is developed in consultation with relevant experts, and properly resourced. 1
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References ABARES. Report to client prepared for the Biosecurity Animal Division of the Department of Agriculture, Canberra. ISBN 978-1-74323-247-7
Arthur, T., Summerson, R., and Mazur, K. (2015). A comparison of the costs and effectiveness of prevention, eradication, containment and asset protection of invasive marine pest incursions.
Atkinson, I.A.E. (1989) Introduced animals and extinctions. Conservation for the Twenty-First Century (eds D. Western & M.C. Pearl), pp. 54 –75. Oxford University Press, New York
Australian Government, Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities (2012). Fact Sheet: Tramp Ants. Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia
Baker, R.O., Bodman, G.R., Timm, R.M. (1994). Rodent-proof construction and exclusion methods. The Handbook: Prevention and Control of Wildlife Damage, 27.
Bekker, R. 1985. Predation on cane toads (Bufo marinus). Herpetofauna, 16(2), pp. 52-53.
Clavero, M., and Garcı ́a-Berthou, E. (2005) Invasive species are a leading cause of animal extinctions. Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 20, p. 110
Criack, W., Palmer, D., and Sheldrake, R. (2016). Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity – Discussion Paper: Is Australia’s national biosecurity system and the underpinning Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity fit for the future?
Department of Environment and Climate Change (NSW) (2007). Lord Howe Island Biodiversity Management Plan. Department of Environment and Climate Change (NSW), Sydney.
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.
Gillespie Economics (2016). Economic Evaluation of the Lord Howe Island Rodent Eradication Project – Final Report.
Hoddenbach, G., Johnson, J., Disalvo, C. (1997). Rodent exclusion techniques – A training guide for National Park Service Employees. National Park Service, Washington, D.C., USA.
Kier, G., Kreft, H., Ming Lee, T., Jetz, W., Ibisch, P. L., Nowicki, C., Mutke, J., and Barthlott, W. (2009) A global assessment of endemism and species richness across island and mainland regions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 23.
Kruger, H., Thompson, L., Clarke, R., Stenekes, N., and Carr, A. (2009). Engaging in Biosecurity: Gap analysis. Bureau of Rural Sciences. Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia.
Kruger, H. (2011). Engaging the community in biosecurity issues. Extension Farming Systems Journal, 7(2), pp 17-21.
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Kruger, H. (2012). Biosecurity engagement: Proposed national action plan for community involvement in plant biosecurity, Consultation summary report, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences, Canberra, Australia.
Leung, B., Lodge, D.M., Finnoff, D., Shogren, J.F., Lewis, M.A., and Lamerti, G. (2002). An ounce of prevention or a pound of cure: Bioeconomic risk analysis of invasive species. Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences, 269, pp 2407-2413.
Lewis, T.W., Wiles, B.M, Llewellyn-Zaidi, A.M., Evan, K.M., and O’Neill, D.G. (2018). Longevity and mortality in Kennel Club registered dog breeds in the UK in 2014. Canine Genetics and Epidemiology, 5.
Lockwood, J.L. & McKinney, M.L. (eds) (2001) Biotic Homogenization. Kluwer Academic Publishers, New York
Lord Howe Island Board (2010-a). Strategic Plan for the Lord Howe Island Group World Heritage Property. Caring for Our Country (2010).
Monash University and Invasive Species Council (2020). Invasive Insects – Risks and Pathways Project – Preliminary results and biosecurity implications. Invasive Species Council (Aust).
Nairn, M.E., Allen, P.G., Inglis, A.R. and Tanner, C. (1996) Australian Quarantine: a shared responsibility. Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Canberra.
NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service (2002). Approved Recovery Plan for the Lord Howe Woodhen. NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service, Hurstville NSW.
New South Wales Biosecurity Act 2015.
New South Wales Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995.
Reid, C.A.M, Jenkins Shaw, J., Jensen, A.R. (2018). The Australian Museum Lord Howe Island Expedition 2017 – Coleoptera. Technical Reports of the Australian Museum, 26, pp. 53-67.
Rout,T.M., Moore, J.L., Possingham, H.P., and McCarthy, M.A. (2011). Allocating biosecurity resources between preventing, detecting, and eradicating island invasions. Ecological Economics, 71, pp 54-62.
Rout, T.M., Moore, J.L., and McCarthy, M.A. (2014). Prevent, search or destroy? A partially observable model for invasive species management. Journal of Applied Ecology, 51, pp 804-813.
Russell, J.C., Towns, D.R., and Anderson, S.H., Clout, M.N. (2005). Intercepting the first rat ashore. Nature, 437, p 1107.
Russell, J.C., Clout, M.N., and Towns, D.R. (2007). Early Detection and Eradication of Invading Rats, in Witmer, G. W., W. C. Pitt, and K. A. Fagerstone (eds) Managing vertebrate invasive species: proceedings of an international symposium. USDA/APHIS Wildlife Services, National Wildlife Research Center, Fort Collins, Colorado, USA
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Russell, J.C., Beaven, B.M., MacKay, J.W.B., Towns, D.R., Clout, M.N. (2008a). Testing Island Biosecurity Systems for Invasive Rats. Wildlife Research, 35, pp 215 – 221.
Russell, J.C., Towns, D.R., Clout, M.N. (2008b). Review of rat invasion biology: implications for island biosecurity. Science for Conservation, 286. Department of Conservation, Wellington.
Sharma S., McKirdy S., Macbeth F. (2014) The Biosecurity Continuum and Trade: Tools for Post- border Biosecurity. In: Gordh G., McKirdy S. (eds) The Handbook of Plant Biosecurity. Springer, Dordrecht
Thompson, L., Stenekes, N., Kruger, H., and Carr, A. (2009) Engaging in Biosecurity: Literature review of Community Engagement Approaches. Bureau of Rural Sciences. Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia
UNESCO. Lord Howe Island Group. Accessed on 30/03/2020. https://www.whc.unesco.org/en/list/186
Veitch, C.R., Clout, M.N., Martin, A.R., Russell, J.C. and West, C.J. (eds.) (2019). Island invasives: scaling up to meet the challenge. Occasional Paper SSC no. 62. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN.
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Part 7: Appendices Appendix A - Risk Assessment
Standard risk assessment methodology which utilises a likelihood and consequence matrix (Table A1) can be well suited to help guide biosecurity priorities and activities. Difficulties exist in effectively accounting for uncertainty and the subjectivity of some assessments in the process.
It is often useful to apply an extra layer of analysis or thought to matrix findings to attempt to categorise the risk. Although subjective, this thought process often helps to apply a ‘real world’ filter to matrix results. The broad categories are:
- Generally acceptable. o Risks have little or no impact and/or are unlikely to occur. They do not pose an immediate threat to the goals, project, or organisation. Risks categorised as ‘low’ often fall into this category; or, - As low as reasonably possible. o Risks are tolerable or not significantly damaging. Work/decisions can proceed without immediately addressing these risks. Risks categorised as ‘low’ and ‘medium’ may fall into this category. Note: Caution must be applied when attempting to interpret/integrate uncertainty when looking to move risks into this category; or, - Unacceptable. o Risks in this region are damaging, likely to occur, and/or would threaten the goals, project, or organisation. Risks categorised as ‘high’ or ‘extreme’ often fall into this category. Within the biosecurity context some ‘medium’ risks are often considered for inclusion.
Tables A2 and A3 are included to provide assistance during the decision making process.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Table A1: Risk assessment matrix
Consequence Rating Likelihood Severe Major Moderate Minor Negligible Rating 1 6 11 16 21 Almost Certain Very High Very High High Medium Low 1 2 7 12 17 22 Likely Very High High Medium Medium Low 3 4 9 14 19 24 Possible Very High High Medium Medium Low 5 6 11 16 21 26 Unlikely High Medium Medium Low Low 7 8 13 18 23 28 Rare High Medium Low Low Low 9 10 15 20 25 30
Table A2: Risk likelihood table
Likelihood of entry, establishment, and spread Rating Description Very high probability of occurring within the budgeted period. Almost Has happened several times in the past year and in at least 4 of the previous 5 years, OR, has a Certain >90% chance of occurring in the budgeted period if the risk is not mitigated. High probability of occurring within the budgeted period. Likely Has happened at least once in the past year and in 3 of the previous 5 years, OR, has a 60-90% chance of occurring in the budgeted period if the risk is not mitigated. Even probability of occurring during the budgeted period. Possible Has happened at least once during the past 5 years but not in every year, OR, has a 40 - 60% chance of occurring in the budgeted period if the risk is not mitigated. Low but not negligible probability of occurring during the budgeted period. Unlikely May have occurred once in the last 5 years, OR, has a 10 - 30% chance of occurring in the future if the risk is not mitigated. Very low probability of occurring during the budgeted period. Rare Has not occurred in the past 5 years, OR, may occur in exceptional circumstances.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Table A3: Consequence table
Consequence of entry, establishment, and spread Consequence Description Example Significant or permanent impact to World Heritage values or Local extinction of, or internationally significant decline of, a protected conservation outcomes of a significant species. species due to introduction of, or lack of proper management of, Severe Detrimental international media campaign and severe reputational introduced species. damage. E.g. Unsuccessful incursion response to introduced rodents. Adverse impact to World Heritage values or conservation outcomes for Increased cost of attempted incursion response due to late/untimely a significant species. Will require significant resources to reverse, detection of pest species introduction due to poor monitoring and survey eradicate, or remediate with unknown likelihood of success. programs. Major Major impacts to endemic and/or protected species through the introduction and establishment of an invasive pest. Significant community protest and detrimental national/state media attention. Reversible impact to World Heritage values or endemic/protected Cost of eradication of newly introduced weed species following moderate species impacts. Will require commitment of significant resources to spread/establishment as opposed to investing in pre-departure wash reverse, eradicate, or remediate with a high likelihood of success. down facility. Moderate Sustained community protest and short-lived national/state media attention. Reversible small scale impact to World Heritage values or a native Eradication of constrained population of an introduced tramp ant species species. Will require currently achievable commitment of resources to from one localised area following timely detection which was facilitate reverse, eradicate, or remediate with a high likelihood of success. through regular targeted survey activities. Activities require increased Minor work hours from already available staff for a limited time and annual survey effort. Sporadic/short-lived community protest and minor state level media attention. Minor, localised impact to World Heritage values or common native Declared weed species is unknowingly approved for import and planted. species. Restoration of full health/population is easily possible It is detected and removed before it reproduces and/or spreads. following minor intervention. Negligible
Some community protest - short lived.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Appendix B - LHI Wharf Shipping Observations – 27/3/20 Provided to LHIB 29/3/2020
LHI Wharf Shipping Observations – 27/3/20 - Interim report and recommendations Special Voyage – Photon Energy Project Vessel Arrived: Approx 9am Friday 27th March
General Observations: - Of risk cargo was unable to be adequately handled and inspected. - A number of shipping related recommendations made since the commencement of this consultancy are now in place. - Cargo was well packed. - Rat lines are still of limited efficacy – due to human and technical reasons. - The Biosecurity Dog Handler (BDH) was present for the berthing of the vessel and all unloading operations. - The implementation of the COVID-19 quarantine zone saw cargo being inspected <5m from excellent rodent and reptile habitat with no way to stop potential dispersal into these areas (figure 1).
Of risk cargo - ‘Cargo’ refers to Tesla Lithium Ion battery units of which 16 were unloaded. The total value of these units was stated to be approx. $2 million or approx. $120,000 each by those delivering the project.
Cargo history The cargo had been stored in the Birdon freight facility for a number of weeks and at its previous place(s) of storage for an unknown amount of time. The Birdon facility is meant to have been made rodent proof however the recent trapping of one mouse, and the bait take recorded from all bait stations within the facility indicate that it is not. The mouse was trapped adjacent to the cargo discussed in this section on the night of Monday 16th March. In this same week, strong dog indications were made on this cargo. It was, however, stored in such a way that prevented proper handler and detection dog access to all of the units (figure 2).
Inspections made during the week of 23rd March again yielded strong dog indications on this cargo. The cargo was able to be re-arranged prior to loading and the handler found Rat faeces on two pallets (figure 3). Although the faeces appeared to be old, it is difficult to say with any certainty as to how old it was at the time of discovery. Factors such as airflow, humidity, and the faeces being left on unsealed timber would all effect the desiccation rate – the primary means to estimating how long faeces have been present. The handler attached an extra Roban bait block to each pallet. She was also able to open and access approx. 3 of the battery units themselves that had the strongest indications and place bait inside of each unit (figure 4).
It is important to note that the units are not sealed from the outside environment and have a number of approx. 25mm diameter holes in the bottom plate. Baiting of the cargo for rodents would have no effect on the survivability of any other potential pest species that the dog may have been scenting on (reptiles or amphibians).
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
LHI inspections The biosecurity detection dog made strong indications on five of sixteen battery units on the LHI wharf. Two of these units had old rodent faeces still located on the pallet which had been previously detected during inspections in PMQ (note: new practise is to remove any sign discovered in PMQ and to treat the area to best remove residual scent).
Three units had strong dog indications without any clear pest sign being found visually. The units were opened up under Photon management supervision for further inspection. Due to the nature of the contents (approx. 960V, 75A Lithium battery banks), construction of the units, and lack of proper equipment being available to the BDH (e.g. high quality borescope), thorough visual inspection was not possible. Therefore little confirmation of pest presence or absence was able to be ascertained through visual inspection.
No obvious visual pest sign was found within any unit and no further meaningful investigation of the cargo was possible. The cargo was released for its destination.
Risk assessment Risk assessment is carried out using a standard risk assessment methodology which utilises a likelihood and consequence matrix.
Using this matrix cargo was assessed as medium to high risk. Risk matrixes are, however, often poorly suited to decisions relating to items of biosecurity concern. This is a consequence of their inability to effectively integrate uncertainty, and the subjectivity of some assessments used in the process due to the inability to obtain proper data (e.g. a decision that the likelihood of pest introduction is unlikely as it has a 10-30% chance of occurring based on the evidence presented).
Of interest was the apparent role played by human psychology in the decision to release the cargo. It was obvious that the financial value and the importance of the cargo to a large infrastructure project played a part in the decision to release the cargo. Project staff were also present at the point of inspection, and the importance of the cargo was being constantly made known to the BDH. The inability to perform a thorough inspection after a strong dog indication would usually have been enough to, at the very least, begin internal biosecurity staff discussions around potentially re-loading the cargo onto the vessel. In this instance, biosecurity staff were required to make a decision in the presence of the consignee without being able to obtain what may (if not in this case, then in the future) prove to be vital information regarding the presence or absence of any pest species within the cargo.
Capacity to handle of risk cargo The above highlights that biosecurity risk assessment is often comprised of numerous additive factors, and that the inability to deal with any one of these factors at any one time is rarely significant in itself. This cargo was identified of being a risk to the biosecurity of LHI, but not sufficiently so to prevent loading in Port Macquarie; there was no obtainable evidence of pest presence through visual inspection, however the ability to perform such an inspection was effectively zero; and, the biosecurity dog was showing strong indications, however there was no way to confidently decide if this was on old/residual scent or perhaps a stowed away live animal.
The current approach to biosecurity correctly emphasises inspection and risk reduction at the cargo’s point of origin rather than on the LHI end of the chain. There is, however, no functional
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
capability to safely isolate any cargo that may pose any potential risk once it arrives on Island. This is a critical weakness to the biosecurity of LHI.
The current approach to suspicious cargo is to load it back onto the ship. It appears, however, that no discussions with those connected to such an action (persons sending and receiving cargo, ships staff, stevedores) have resulted in concrete guidelines or procedures that BDH are to follow should such a decision be made. This adds a barrier to confident decision making by the BDH, especially for high value (be it financial or project importance) cargo. Potential issues such as who is liable for shipping costs and/or spoiled cargo, lost business revenue due to return of goods, etc. are not clear to BDH staff.
The lack of a quarantine receiving station within immediate proximity of the LHI wharf is a critical biosecurity weakness. If such a facility was available, the cargo described here could have been easily isolated and handled. Holding of the cargo for a number of nights would have allowed lures, motion sensor cameras, and other monitoring devices to be placed around the cargo and for greater confidence of their pest free status on release. Currently Lord Howe Island BDH and managers have no functional capability to safely isolate any cargo that may pose any potential risk once it arrives on Island.
Immediate recommendations Please note that further recommendations will be included in any final reporting. These recommendations only capture those which should be actioned in the short term (i.e. 14 days).
Action PRIORITY ACTION: Investigation into potential ‘fall-out’ should a decision to re-load cargo onto the Island Trader be made on the wharf. This includes (but is not limited to) who is liable for any associated costs and claims from un-received, damaged, or perished cargo, loss of business/project capacity, etc. Consultation with Birdon management as to potential designs for the vessel which will be replacing the Island Trader to help inform quarantine facility design and placement on LHI. Identification of which permits and approvals would be required to build and operate a quarantine facility on LHI. Pre-preparation of as many/much of these documents as is possible with current information. Obtaining any permissions and approvals required for the placement 1x 40ft high cube shipping container or 2x 20ft high-cube shipping containers near to the wharf facility to act as a stop-gap quarantine inspection room. Investigating if the Island Trader is able to transport 1x 40ft high cube shipping container or 2x 20ft high-cube shipping containers. Obtaining quotes for the purchase of 1x 40ft high cube shipping container or 2x 20ft high-cube shipping containers and delivery to Birdon shipping. Investigation of off-the shelf borescopes and the immediate purchase of two borescopes for biosecurity use Develop and implement new procedures aimed at removing any already discovered pest scent from cargo in Port Macquarie – a robust cargo marking/identification and recording process will need to be developed in tandem.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Figures
Figure 1: Cargo being inspected <5m from excellent rodent and Figure 2: Cargo stored in such a way that prevents proper handler reptile habitat with no way to stop potential dispersal into these and detection dog access. areas.
Figure 3: Rat faeces on the cargo in PMQ.
Figure 4: An opening unit into which rodent bait was placed.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Attachment 1 Biosecurity dog handler inspection report from relevant Port Macquarie pre-departure inspection
Birdon Shipyard 24-26 March 2020 Tuesday 24/3
24 x insect bombs let off in Birdon – LHI Sea Freight Storage shed. o Recommendation: This should happen every 2-3 months; Cost: ~ $100 per treatment = $400-600 per year
2 x Elliot traps baited and set 3 x Rat traps baited and set Traps set in adjacent swamp/bush area (not around shed itself). Could not find the other traps at the time. Dog did a check over all solar freight. Some interest around batteries, as observed by Tim on previous ship. Access makes a thorough inspection difficult.
Wednesday 25/3
7am - Sebbi completed a thorough search of the ship including the hull first thing in the morning before any freight was loaded. I also ran three blinds inside the hull using a mouse caught and frozen on previous trip. 6 x bait stations inside hull checked for pest sign. All clear Visual inspection of hull – note that it was very clean and generally free of any debris/invertebrates. Trap check – 1 mouse caught in Elliot trap. No others set off. Undertook visual and dog inspection of all cargo prior and during loading. Wooden pallets of solar panels were visually inspected and appeared relatively clean of debris and invertebrates. Mark (Turner) advised they had been sprayed with insecticide previously (date uncertain). Solar panels themselves were in large cardboard boxes and wrapped in plastic. As Solar batteries were moved to hardstand for loading I asked the forklift drivers to ensure their was ample space for Sebbi to inspect. He indicated moderately on 3 of the batteries. Initial visual inspection showed rat poo on top of the wooden pallets holding the batteries.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
I then removed the foam protector sheet and unlocked and opened the batteries up to look for rodent sign. No sign (nesting/poo/smell) was observed inside the batteries however Sebbi did indicate again on the inside of the batteries.
Two roban blocks were placed inside the three batteries in question and these were wrapped several times in quarantine tape for easy identification on LHI.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Following discussion with Simon and Hank, these will be inspected on the island with a photon team member present. A single Roban block was screwed into the wooden pallet of each of the other batteries and marked with either pink flagging tape or a yellow quarantine tape.
Undertook thorough dog search of cabins/galley etc. on-board island trader. o Sebbi indicated on one location in the upstairs wheelhouse that I marked with pink flagging tape for Zuma to inspect on-island. I pulled as much of the area apart and visually inspected but found no evidence of rodent/pest. Likely to be air coming up from the engine room that Sebbi is picking up on. All bait stations on Island Trader entered into Fulcrum app with the exception of the 6 inside the hull (could not access at the time). To differentiate records I made the barcode ID the barcode number_bait station ID. This is easily changed if required. Using the birdon wifi I was able to bring up a map of the Birdon shipyard including island trader, and place each bait station in the appropriate location on the map of the ship.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
I did not have enough barcodes to enter the bait stations in the Birdon shed into the Fulcrum app.
Searched for remaining live traps. Labelled each with a trap number and documented location (see attachment 1). A map might be easier. Appear to be missing a number of traps?
Recommendation: It would be good to get some more Elliot and Rat traps in PMQ.
Set live traps inside shed and around hardstand (8 x Elliot trap + 4 x Rat trap) Ship departed at approximately 15:45
Thursday 26/3
Checked live traps. 1 mouse caught (E5)
Location of live traps in situ at Birdon Shipyard.
ID Type Location E1 Elliot Trap Inside Birdon shed, next to chest freezer at entrance E2 Elliot Trap Inside shed, back-right where old work bench used to be E3 Elliot Trap Inside shed, back-left under new work bench R1 Rat Trap Outside shed along outer wall parallel to swamp E4 Elliot Trap Outside shed along outer wall parallel to swamp E5 Elliot Trap Outside on edge where hardstand meets grass – along pallets R2 Rat Trap Outside on edge where hardstand meets grass – along pallets E6 Elliot Trap Outside on edge where hardstand meets grass – at yellow bunding E7 Elliot Trap Outside on edge where hardstand meets grass – behind white refrigerated shipping container E8 Elliot Trap Outside on edge where hardstand meets grass – behind far shipping container R3 Rat Trap Inside shed, back-right where old work bench used to be. R4 Rat Trap Outside shed, back right along outer side of door.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Appendix C - Short term Post Entry Quarantine Receiving Station supporting document Provided to LHIB 14/4/2020
PEQRS Development Application – Supporting Document Executive summary Since 27th March 2020 a number of freight items have not been able to be inspected after their arrival on Lord Howe Island (LIH) to a sufficient standard by LHI biosecurity staff. LHI biosecurity staff and managers currently have no functional capability to safely isolate any cargo that may pose any potential risk once it arrives on Island. This is a critical biosecurity weakness.
Existing LHI biosecurity processes are good. The expectation that these processes can be made infallible is, however, not realistic. This means that the landing of cargo on LHI that has a pest organism associated with it is a matter of when, not if.
Having a post-entry quarantine receiving station is considered best practise in Island biosecurity. The construction of a suitable bio-secure handling/storage facility or retro-fitting of existing building to a suitable standard would address this weakness. This is likely to take a significant amount of time to reach the stage of implementation.
The temporary placement of a new 20ft high cube shipping container (retro-fitted with lighting and ventilation) to act as a quarantine facility is proposed. This facility can be placed quickly and would provide a robust bio-secure facility in which suspicious cargo can be thoroughly inspected and/or stored until the absence of pest species can be confirmed. It will be unable to accept all types of transported cargo but is likely to provide a robust solution whilst a long-term alternative is discussed.
The landing of cargo on LHI that has a pest organism associated with it is a matter of when, not if.
Background Since 27th March 2020 a number of freight items have not been able to be inspected after their arrival on Lord Howe Island (LIH) to a sufficient standard by LHI biosecurity staff. These items included five Tesla batteries and three large, custom built and fully sealed plywood boxes packed for a home relocation to LHI from a regional area of Australia with known mouse and reptile activity.
Tesla batteries A biosecurity detection dog made strong indications on five of sixteen Tesla battery units on the LHI wharf. Three units had strong dog indications without any clear pest sign being found visually. The units were opened under Photon management supervision for further inspection. Due to the nature of the contents (approx. 960V, 75A Lithium battery banks), and construction of the units, thorough visual inspection was not possible. Therefore little confirmation of pest presence or absence was able to be ascertained through visual inspection. Following a risk assessment process the cargo was released for delivery.
Plywood boxes The boxes were custom built to transport large volumes of household, garage, and shed items as part of a house move. The boxes were fully sealed and LHI biosecurity staff were not able to open the boxes for thorough inspection in such a way as to guarantee that any potential pest would not flush from the unit and disperse away from the wharf site.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Post entry quarantine receiving station (PEQRS) A PEQRS acts as a final line of defence in the quarantine phase of the Island biosecurity chain. Although all other existing LHI biosecurity actions are good, they are not infallible. The expectation that the existing processes can be made infallible is not realistic. This means that the landing of cargo on LHI that has a pest organism associated with it is a matter of when, not if.
A PEQRS may be utilised for the following reasons:
- Containment of imported goods that require further screening or investigation for potential pests that cannot be conducted on the LHI wharf; - Opening or investigation of goods in a facility that, should a risk (e.g. gecko, mouse, or infected plant) be found, completely isolates it from the external LHI environment and prevents dispersal; and, - Following the detection of pests, mitigation of risk by application of appropriate measures.
The design specifics of any PEQRS will be influenced by cargo to be received, location, site constraints, and planning/approval factors. Best practise dictates that the PEQRS should be:
- Located on land owned or long-term leased by the operator; - Available to quarantine (biosecurity) officers at all times (24/7) without impediment; - Located within a single operational entity that does not serve as an access way to other buildings or activities; - Structurally physically separated from all other operations and be dedicated solely to the holding of the shipment/goods/cargo; - Independent of any other purpose or use other than the placement, storage, and investigation of quarantine goods; - Weatherproof and maintained in a good state of repair; - Secure and lockable; and, - Built to have a holding capacity that is commensurate with the proposed quantities and types of goods to be inspected/held.
Biosecurity risk Having an on-island bio-secure PEQRS is part of Island biosecurity best practise. Currently, Lord Howe Island biosecurity staff and managers have no functional capability to safely isolate any cargo that may pose any potential risk once it arrives on Island.
The current approach to LHI biosecurity correctly emphasises inspection and risk reduction at the cargo’s point of origin rather than on the LHI end of the chain. Although mainland and M/V Island Trader based biosecurity measures are good, they are not infallible and nor could they be expected to realistically become so. This is especially true given factors such as the proximity of the external Birdon hardstand to excellent rodent and reptile habitat in PMQ and the occurrence of rodent bait take in bait stations located inside the rodent proofed shed facility in Port Macquarie. These issues are being addressed, but even so they will not provide 100% reliable biosecurity protection 100% of the time and there is currently no contingency at the point of entry.
The lack of a PEQRS within immediate proximity of the LHI wharf is a critical biosecurity weakness. If such a facility was available, the cargo described above could have been easily isolated, handled, and investigated. Holding of the difficult to inspect cargo for a number of nights would have allowed lures, motion sensor cameras, and other monitoring devices to be placed around the cargo and for
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
greater confidence of their pest free status on release. Placement of the moving boxes inside the facility would have allowed for them to be opened and inspected in a bio-secure room that would prevent any potential pest species dispersing.
Currently Lord Howe Island biosecurity staff and managers have no functional capability to safely isolate any cargo that may pose any potential risk once it arrives on Island.
There are currently no monitoring or incursion response plans for reptile, amphibian, or insect species. This makes successful eradication of any introduced individuals extremely unlikely.
Rodent incursion response planning is not yet fully developed and refined. The estimated cost of mounting a rodent incursion response is approximately $320,000. This does not account for lost work from those sections of LHIB staff on which an incursion response would draw nor does it guarantee successful removal of any individual rodent(s).
Addressing this risk This Development Application is related to the placement of a new 20ft high cube shipping container near to the LHI wharf to act as a temporary on-island PEQRS. The container measures 6m long, 2.4m wide, and 2.9m high with a floor area of 14.8m2 and would be fitted with lighting and power outlet(s) which will require connection to the LHI power grid.
Either a standard double entry, or a 50:50 side-opening container would be suitable. Photos of new (one trip) 20ft high-cube shipping containers are provided below. Technical drawings (courtesy of Cleveland Containers) are provided below.
20ft high cube shipping container. Benefits:
- Will meet a majority of the best practise general requirements of a PEQRS. - Quotes for container, shipping, and ancillary equipment have already been received. - Would significantly raise profile of biosecurity operations. - Could be fumigated or likewise treated for insect or plant pathogen risks. - Offers cost effective biosecurity protection to LHI. o Estimated cost of from purchase to implementation: $30,000. - External modification possible to decrease any perceived visual impact (extra cost).
Limitations:
- Unable to accommodate all types of shipped cargo. - Potential community ‘push-back’ over shipping container placement in LHI wharf precinct (raised by MECS). - Potential low likelihood of LHIB approving development application (raised by MECS).
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Other options considered Four further options were proposed to meet the need for a biosecurity quarantine facility near to the LHI wharf.
1) Upgrading the existing Birdon freight shed to be fit for purpose; 2) Negotiating a co-use agreement with Marine Rescue to have their new facility built to spec and made accessible; 3) Construction of the proposed plant storage shed to be moved to the wharf area and have the building built to spec; or, 4) Construction of a dedicated biosecurity/quarantine facility.
Although each of these options could be considered as a potential long-term solution, none provide a realistic short to medium-term solution. The currently recognised benefits and limitations are explained below. All have an unknown time-frame attached to completion and potential utilisation.
1) Upgrading the existing Birdon freight shed to be fit for purpose.
This shed currently exists and is in close proximity to the LHI wharf. It is used for storage of trucks and forklifts that are used during ship unloading operations and is used as a freight handling shed for the re-packing of freight for distribution on LHI. A significant amount of ancillary equipment and goods (e.g. spare wheels, tarps, pallets, etc.) are stored in the shed. It is in a poor state of repair and is currently in no way able to act as an effective PEQRS. Upgrades to the shed are due to take place - there is not commencement date to these works.
Benefits:
- Large size. - The facility is already affiliated with the Birdon shipping operations. - Upgrades to the existing shed are due in the future. - May be potential for cost-sharing of upgrades to bring construction up to bio-secure specifications. - May build profile/awareness of biosecurity with Birdon and LHI shipping staff. - Trucks and equipment which are stored in the shed are moved as part of shipping operations thus vacating the space for use. - Unlikely to require changes to the existing building footprint.
Limitations:
- Fails to meet a majority of the best practise general requirements of a PEQRS. - Nature of existing structure means retro-fit could be significant. - Internal layout would require partitioning and false ceiling installation to ensure that a section of the shed can be kept secure should cargo need to be inspected or stored. - Current slab thickness and load capacity is not known – may not be suitable for heavy/high density loads. - Access via standard roller door may limit cargo that can enter shed. o Alterations to door/facade may not be possible due to heritage listing. - Shed is currently used for storage of pallets, tarps, wheels, etc. Bio-secure area would need to be kept very clean at all times. - Shared use agreement and protocols would need to be very thorough. Would need to be developed and maintained ad infinitim.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
2) Negotiating a co-use agreement with Marine Rescue to have their new facility built to spec and made accessible. A new Marine Rescue facility is due to begin construction within the LHI wharf precinct. It will incorporate office and storage spaces including a boat/trailer storage area. The facility has obtained the approvals required to commence construction.
Benefits:
- Utilisation as a PEQRS would require retrofit rather than new construction. - Building has development approvals. - Likely to be clean and secure as it will be a new facility. - May be potential for cost-sharing of upgrades to bring construction up to bio-secure specifications. - Unlikely to require changes to the existing building footprint.
Limitations:
- Fails to meet a majority of the best practise general requirements of a PEQRS - Internal layout would require partitioning and false ceiling installation over entire boat storage area to ensure that a section of the shed can be kept secure should cargo need to be inspected or stored. - Standard height roller door may limit cargo that can enter shed. o May be able to be altered but this is not yet clear. - Design currently incorporates a floating slab which may not be suitable for heavy/high density loads - Discussions are yet to be had with the operators of the facility regarding co-use permissions and arrangements. - Shared use agreement and protocols would need to be very thorough. Would need to be developed and maintained ad infinitim.
3) Construction of the proposed plant storage shed to be moved to the wharf area and have the building built to spec. A new large plant (crane, etc.) storage shed is scheduled for construction in the future. The final placement of the building is not yet finalised and it has been suggested that this could be within the LHI wharf precinct. It is unclear when this facility is due to begin construction.
Benefits:
- Large size. o Will likely be able to accept all types of cargo. - High weight capacity slab. - Likely to be clean and secure as it will be a new facility. - Unlikely to require changes to the existing building footprint.
Limitations:
- Fails to meet a majority of the best practise general requirements of a PEQRS - Is not yet designed or approved for construction in LHI wharf precinct. o Unlikely to gain approvals if container also proves unlikely.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
- Internal layout would require partitioning and false ceiling installation over entire storage area to ensure that a section of the shed can be kept secure should cargo need to be inspected or stored. - A large amount of ancillary equipment would likely be stored in the shed. - Discussions are yet to be had with the operators of the facility regarding co-use permissions and arrangements. - LHI biosecurity staff do not have correct licences to move plant equipment from shed. - Shared use agreement and protocols would need to be very thorough. Would need to be developed and maintained ad infinitim.
4) Construction of a dedicated biosecurity/quarantine facility. Construction of a dedicated PEQRS within the LHI wharf precinct has been discussed. Any such building would be purpose and built and designed in such a way as to accommodate potential new ship designs and unloading procedures. This proposal has not yet been discussed with LHIB management or board members and does not yet have any designs, approvals, etc.
Benefits:
- Purpose built facility which would meet best practise PEQRS requirements. - Large size. - Design to accommodate new ship/unloading process would increase useability and efficiency. - Would significantly raise profile of biosecurity operations. - Offers most effective biosecurity protection to LHI.
Limitations:
- Is not yet designed or approved for construction. o Unlikely to gain approvals if container also proves unlikely. - Significant cost. - Likely to require significant community consultation and support. - Associated time-frame.
Conclusion The likelihood of any of the above four options being either constructed in the short to medium term and/or have suitable agreed use arrangements made within this time is low. Although a 20ft high-cube container has limitations these are outweighed by the benefits of the design, the potential immediacy of installation, and the fact that it significantly increases the level of biosecurity protection to LHI.
As each freight voyage is an independent event (i.e. the pest risk of previous voyages do not directly influence the pest risk of any subsequent voyage), and the potential outcomes are major (i.e. re- introduction of rodents and/or introduction of novel pest species) there is clear justification for the installation of a PEQRS as soon as is possible. The approximate cost of performing a rodent incursion response in $320,000 and does not guarantee removal success. The estimated cost of the 20ft high cube container from purchase to implementation is $30,000.
Recommendation That the purchase, transport, fit-out, and placement of a 20ft high-cube shipping container within the LHI wharf district is supported and approved by the LHIB without needless delay.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
New (single use) 20ft high cube shipping containers
Figure 1: 20ft high cube standard double entry container. Figure 2: 20ft high cube 50:50 side opening container. (www.containeroptions.com.au) (www.containeroptions.com.au)
Figure 3: 20ft high cube standard double entry container. Figure 4: 20ft high cube 50:50 side opening container. (www.connexdepot.com) (www.abccontainers.com.au)
Figure 5: Side-by-side standard height vs. high-cube containers. (www.indiamart.com)
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Technical drawings
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Appendix D Summary and assessment of previous report recommendation progress.
Recommendation from Newport 2019 Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority Priority recommendations A building facility specifically constructed for the Actioned - Birdon shed is built – rodent take and sign in Minor – Upgrading of rodent proofing of Critical storage of freight bound for Lord Howe Island is Incomplete shed bait stations indicates it is not rodent shed. proof. required. This should be secure from rodents and Low/Moderate – extension of hardstand and larger reptiles, with raised shelving situated a Regular storage of a significant amount of sealing of unsealed ground. distance away from the walls (potentially on freight on external hardstand which is not casters), where interior services are kept clean and adequately pest proofed. Moderate – Construction of rodent proof are light coloured. fence (if permissible).
Low/Moderate – Construction of rodent proof pallet stands. A visit to the AAD facility at Macq 4 in Hobart Not actioned Cost of staff visit vs. perceived benefit. Low – Transport to and accommodation in Medium should be organised for appropriate LHIB and Hobart Lack of provision of justification for visit and Birdon shipping staff, to investigate options for other potential biosecurity community facility upgrade to similar standards outlined engagement activities to LHIB managers. above. This facility was purpose built for quarantine storage of cargo destined for Macquarie Island.
A dedicated Biosecurity lead role within the LHIB Actioned - Position has been created but requires funding. BTL resourcing Critical should be established and resourced, in addition to Incomplete Potential lack of understanding/appreciation by the three part- time biosecurity roles currently in management of benefits to be gained by filling place. the role. Protocols for berthing at the wharf need to be Not actioned Physical limitations of vessel movement near N/A Very High developed and implemented to mitigate the risk of the wharf (draft and laying aground).
a pest dispersing from the ship while in port. i.e. Formulation of, and agreement to, protocols maintain a minimum distance from the wharf, rope should pest animal be found on vessel. guards.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Rodent surveillance and detection devices need to Actioned – No devices aimed at lizards, invertebrates, or Minor - Gecko tracking boxes near lights, Very High be in place on the wharf and on the adjacent Partial any other species installed. periodic pit-fall trapping near wharf/habitat, etc. shoreline. These should also include devices for
the detection of lizards and invertebrates.
Authority and prioritisation of the biosecurity Actioned – Biosecurity Officers have the authority however Time – creation of engaging awareness Critical checking process needs to be maintained during the Partial are not confident in their application of it. training and delivery to Birdon staff.
unloading process. Lack of agreement and understanding with Time – High level discussions with Birdon Birdon related to prioritisation of biosecurity management re authority for them to during some aspects of ship operations communicate to staff. Implement adequate standards for cargo and Actioned – Although guidelines are in place they are not Minor – Plastic wrap for use at Birdon High freight packaging to best mitigate the biosecurity Partial always adhered to. Needs to become part of BDH roles. Minor – Stock of PVC pipe end caps for fitting risk posed. i.e. sealing pipe ends, wrapping bulky at Birdon/removal at LHI. items and pallets securely.
Replace the current Australia post pods used to Not actioned Discussion with Australia Post and LHI Post Minor – PVC sheeting and labour to retro-fit Very High transport Australia post, with a robust well-sealed Office staff. suitable number of existing Birdon shipping cages. container design. These containers need to be Discussion with Birdon staff will need to occur stored and kept clean in between shipping weeks. as this may add to work-load. This may require double handling of goods once post is delivered to the Birdon shipping yard. Alteration of existing freight cages to exclude pests and contamination. Front line staff conducting biosecurity inspections Actioned – Lack of clear LHIB process regarding stoppages Time – Engagement with Birdon (as above). Critical are supported to carry out actions to shut down Partial to cargo operations, associated cost effects, etc. etc. and isolate operations, when required. This could Time – Refreshing LHIB BDH training (in- in the case of detection or interception of Biosecurity Officers have the authority however house). unwanted organisms while loading at Port are not always fully confident in their Macquarie, in transit, and on arrival and application of it. distribution to Lord Howe Island.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
A specific biosecurity plan for LHI should be Actioned – Current resourcing (i.e. limited hours, lack of Time/Minimal – Staff to finish preparing plan. Critical developed from current strategies for post- Partial BTL) means planning is incomplete. Minimal – Short term engagement of expert eradication - identifying audience, risks and Lack of expert engagement to finalise/refine contractor(s) to review and refine. pathways, how island biosecurity protocol will be plan. implemented, species that will be surveyed for and targeted, public and stakeholder engagement actions and measures for gauging success and delivery of actions in the plan.
Communication to stakeholders and the LHI Not actioned Lack of stakeholder engagement. Time – Staff to prepare website copy and High community importing personal goods needs to information materials. Lack of dedicated communications role, improve -highlighting the risks and reminding materials, strategy, etc. Minimal – Improved LHIB website design or people of the importance to clean packaging and linking to external site. state of any second hand goods to be brought to Lack of engaging and/or dedicated information the island. portal/website. Minimal – Production and printing of physical information guides. Engagement with stakeholders bringing freight in Not actioned Lack of stakeholder engagement As above. High on private vessels/ aircraft should be a priority; Lack of dedicated communications role, Minimal – provision of returnable bait aiming towards establishing biosecurity protocol materials, strategy, etc. stations/equipment to private operators. where bait stations and monitoring for target
species at departure points and with the goods Lack of engaging and/or dedicated information arriving on island can be implemented. portal/website.
Feasibility of pre-departure baiting. Every voyages’ cargo manifest is checked and Actioned – Inspections are currently occurring to a good Minimal – alteration of staffing hours to allow Very High inspected with the biosecurity dog and handlers at Partial standard. for extra staff or staff overlap.
Port Macquarie pre-departure and upon arrival at Staff resourcing and roster arrangements. LHI. It is recommended that the biosecurity dog
handler is supported by a second biosecurity officer during the off-loading checking process at Lord Howe Island.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
4.1.1 Birdon shipping yard, PMQ -Recommendations Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority Surveillance devices should be deployed inside the Actioned – Devices able to detect lizards, invertebrates, or Minimal – Installation and checking of Very High facility. Devices should be designed to detect Partial amphibians are not deployed. additional monitoring devices to detect reptiles and invertebrates. rodents, lizards and invertebrates; The aim is to Storage facility has significant issues and is not have the storage facility as sterile as possible. rodent proof. Ideally, all freight including bulk stores such as Actioned - Birdon freight facility is not of sufficient size to Low/Moderate – extension of hardstand. Critical building materials should be stored inside a secure Partial accept large freight. Low/Moderate – Construction of rodent facility, however, if bulky cargo such as water tanks External hardstand area requires proof fence (if permissible). are required to be stored outside in the additions/upgrades. environment, they need to be stored off the Low/Moderate – Construction of rodent ground, preferably on concrete substrate with all proof pallet stands. openings sealed off.
Every voyages’ cargo manifest is checked and Actioned - See above. - - inspected with the biosecurity dog and handlers at Partial Port Macquarie pre-departure and upon arrival at LHI. It is recommended that the biosecurity dog handler is supported by a second biosecurity officer during the off-loading checking process at Lord Howe Island. 4.1.2 Island Trader Vessel and the unloading process - Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority Recommendations A paper trail of compliance should be implemented Actioned – Lack of compliance related Time – formation of paperwork and Very High to keep record of biosecurity protocols followed, Partial paperwork/reporting. templates. *currently from the port of departure through to arrival to being more Formulation of robust data recording island. This information needs to be accurately fully actioned. procedures. passed on to the receiving biosecurity officer on Lord Howe Island.
Deploy devices for the detection of lizards and Not actioned Lack of reptile and invertebrate monitoring Time (moderate) – Preparation of monitoring Critical invertebrates on board the island trader, to add to plans and procedures. plans which incorporate vessel surveillance.
the surveillance regime for rodents (bait stations). Minimal – Installation and checking of additional monitoring devices to detect reptiles and invertebrates.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
A safe access route should be maintained in the Not actioned Not currently feasible with ship design and hold Significant – Alteration of cargo storage and Medium hold at all times. packing. capacity on ship.
Rodent surveillance and detection devices need to Actioned None – proper resourcing of related positions Time – staffing levels must be maintained to - be in place on the wharf and on the adjacent will ensure robust checking regime is in place ensure capacity to conduct routine checks. and maintained. shoreline.
4.1.3 Lord Howe Island wharf facility - Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority Recommendations Upgrade the wharf building to accommodate a secure Not actioned – Historical lack of recognition of significant risk Low/Modetate – Purchase, fit-out and use of Critical quarantine room for the further investigate of high-risk Preliminary introduced by not having this capacity. temporary post-entry quarantine receiving items. This store should be designed to be able to internal station. accommodate a forklift and the space required by the dog discussions Planning and development constraints. handler team to effectively search. underway Deploy rodent control and detection devices on the Actioned – Rodent control and detection network is Minimal - Gecko tracking boxes near lights, Very High wharf. Have lizard and invertebrate detection devices Partial deployed and active. lured insect sticky traps, etc. deployed on the wharf during the unloading process, around the landing zone for each crane load. Surveillance Some reptile detection devices are now of these can be routinely done throughout the unloading deployed on the wharf during unloading – do process. not provide complete coverage.
Investigate the ability for the biosecurity officer to obtain Actioned – Lack of clear LHIB process regarding stoppages Time – Engagement with Birdon (as above). Critical an authority to search, in this context. Partial to cargo operations, associated cost effects, etc. etc. Time – Refreshing LHIB BDH training (in- Regulatory constraints re searching mail. house) (as above).
4.1.4 Lord Howe Island Airport – incoming freight Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority Not actioned None. Minor/Low – materials and labour. Very High Seal off the ceiling of the garage area to secure the site. Not actioned None. Minor – suitable monitoring equipment. Very High Deploy rodent trap lizard and invertebrate devices inside the receiving area at the terminal building. Surveillance of these needs to be incorporated into the unloading and checking process. Deploy rodent detection devices at the airport Actioned – Rodent control and detection network is Minor – suitable monitoring equipment. Very High surrounds; deploy rodent, lizard and invertebrate Partial deployed and active (outside only).
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
detection devices inside the rest of the airport terminal building. Devices able to detect lizards, invertebrates, or amphibians are not deployed.
Not actioned Will require negotiation with flight operators to Time – Consultation with aircraft operators to High Implement an unloading process where only one alter unload process. alter unload process and/or to allow trolley load of cargo is dispatched from the aircraft inspection of cargo as unloaded from aircraft to the garage store at any one time, and the rest is Biosecurity inspection room not able to onto trolley. secured in the hold until ready to be unloaded. accommodate all luggage/freight.
100% of cargo flights should be checked upon arrival, Not actioned Current resourcing does not make this Moderate – Increase to BDH hours or High including private aircraft carrying freight. At least 80% of recommendation achievable. employment and training of extra staff. passenger flights should be met for biosecurity inspection with emphasis on baggage inspections. 4.2 Biosecurity leadership and stakeholder engagement - Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority Recommendations Continue to actively participate in biosecurity roles and Actioned – BTL role has not been resourced and filled. BTL resourcing – approx. $105,000 p/a. Critical procedures, and build on this to demonstrating leadership Partial and a strong commitment to delivering good biosecurity Leadership from island’s authority needs to be practice as the island’s authority. A dedicated ‘Biosecurity more proactive. officer’ role within the LHIB should be established and resourced. Work in partnership with Birdon shipping to Actioned – Contractual obligation is somewhat weak and Time – Creation of engaging awareness Very High increase their ability to deliver their obligations Partial rodent focused. training and delivery to Birdon staff.
under their contractual agreement in regard to Time – High level discussions with Birdon biosecurity responsibilities. management. Deliverable actions with objectives for outreach Actioned – Plan is not complete. Time – Staff time to complete plan. Critical and public engagement need to be included in the Partial LHI Island Biosecurity plan; separate from the Draft plan does not include actions and Minor – Engagement of expert(s) to assist rodent eradication plan documents. The public are deliverables. with writing and review. stated as a core deliverer of biosecurity actions and a target audience and the mechanisms for communicating ‘how’ they will do this should be part of a biosecurity plan.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Recommendation from AECOM 2015 Status Impediment(s) to implementation Relative cost/cost estimate Priority Pre Border Education and Awareness Undertake research on what matters to Not actioned Lack of resourcing – Biosecurity Team Time – in-house interview and Very High stakeholders to develop targeted biosecurity Leader and Communications roles. outreach based research and branding and messages and drive behavioural information gathering. change “Community Based Social Marketing”. Lack of appreciation of importance of stakeholder relationships and engagement. Low/Moderate – engagement of external consultants to conduct professional research. Investigate using social research initiatives such as Not actioned Lack of appreciation of importance of As above. Very High Community Based Social Marketing to give effective stakeholder relationships and engagement. behaviour-change tools. Continue awareness for Stevedores/freight handlers Actioned – Partial Lack of resourcing – Biosecurity Team Time – Discussions with Very High at Port Macquarie wharf and Port Macquarie Airport Leader and Communications roles. Qantas/Eastern Air around provision • Erection of specific stevedore signage at Port of pre-departure signage and Macquarie Lack of strategic communication and information. • Ongoing awareness training – biennially stakeholder engagement planning. • Focus on highest risks such as weeds, plant Low – Development of signage and pathogens (e.g. Myrtle Rust), reptiles/amphibians pre-departure information. and invertebrates • Investigate options for passenger and crew awareness information at Sydney, Brisbane & Port Macquarie airports. Continue awareness of residents, lodges, Not actioned Lack of resourcing – Biosecurity Team Time – in-house interview and Very High restaurants and operators, travel agents and Leader and Communications roles outreach based research and suppliers about LHI requirements, what to look for information gathering. and what to do Lack of appreciation of importance of • Develop poster series for distribution stakeholder relationships and engagement. Minor – development and distribution • Focus on highest risks such as plant pathogens e.g. of relevant information myrtle rust, weeds, reptiles/amphibians and ants/insects. Increase awareness for visitors (air and sea) through Actioned – Partial Lack of resourcing – Biosecurity Team Time – Engaging various information Very High - Wider distribution of the established iPad guide Leader and Communications roles providers (e.g. LHITA and LHIB) to http://www.naturetourismservices.com.au/LHI- develop consistent messaging and Userguide/LHI-Userguide.pdf Lack of appreciation of importance of language use. • Erection of previously developed signs at LHI stakeholder relationships and engagement. airport and Jetty Time – Website updates to convey up to date and relevant information.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
• Upgraded biosecurity message and branding Lack of strategic communication and through LHIB and LHI Tourism Association and travel stakeholder engagement planning – Low – Re-development of LHIB agents website inconsistent messaging and language use. website into more engaging and • Brochures for airlines, travel agents useable format for biosecurity related • Biosecurity in-flight announcement information. • Focus on highest risks such as myrtle rust, weeds and marine pests.
Increased reporting of goods arriving i.e. better Not actioned Lack of resourcing – Biosecurity Team BTL resourcing – approx. $105,000 High manifests and identification Leader. Current staffing does not allow time p/a. • Air and sea freight to effectively develop and trial new • Identification of mandatory reported items on procedures. Time – development of efficacious manifest and physically via sticker or paint on goods. system and implementation Lack of formal processes and procedures to be followed by freight providers. Regulatory/Contracts Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority Pursue legislative declaration of “Special Biosecurity Actioned – In Will require robust community engagement Time – see community engagement Very High Zone” (i.e. Myrtle Rust, rodents (post eradication) or progress and messaging to build profile of biosecurity related recommendations. tramp ant free zone) under the Biosecurity Act and before social buy-in is likely to support potentially the Marine Estate Management Act. This declaration. Time – WHEM/BTL capacity with is critical during early stages of the legislative current workload. rollout. This should include consideration of mailed Continued dialogue with DPI to develop items and focus on highest risks such as plant information and proposals Low – see community engagement pathogens e.g. myrtle rust, reptiles/amphibians related recommendations. toads and tramp ants/insects.
Ensure LHI regulations match current risk profile. Actioned – In Regulations, policies, contract agreements BTL resourcing. Very High progress etc. require on-going revision Time – continued analysis and discussions leading to review Consider further use of penalties for noncompliance Not actioned Lack of community buy-in to biosecurity due Time – significant progress must first Low for residents especially for repeat offenders. to lack of messaging and education be made in building of community support and understanding of Culture of concern relating to social biosecurity consequences of issuing infringement penalties. Ensure all contractual or other agreements on Actioned – Partial Lack of clear requirements and actions post- Time – development of robust Critical biosecurity include unequivocal rules on what vessel pest detection and/or lack of agreed requirements. and aircraft operators must do if they detect or
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
suspect an unwanted organism on board or transit processes around consequences (e.g. cost Time – High level discussions between to LHI. of spoiled or returned freight, etc.). providers and LHIB management Establish biosecurity Compliance Agreement or Actioned – Partial LHISF agreement exists and is implemented. Time – Review of current compliance Very High contractual obligations with LHISF, Qantas and Lack of clear requirements and actions post- agreement. Macquarie Air. pest detection and/or lack of agreed processes around consequences. Time – Establishment of suitable compliance agreements for airlines. No formal agreement or contracts with airlines.
Establish preferred supplier scheme / compliance Not actioned Lack of community and stakeholder buy-in Time – see community engagement Medium agreement / pest free warrant with suppliers. to biosecurity due to lack of messaging and related recommendations. education and low profile of biosecurity. Low – see community engagement Limited BDH community engagement in related recommendations. PMQ. Time – better engagement and Lack of LHIB derived preferred supplier education of mainland suppliers. criteria, guidelines, etc. Low – training and provision of information to mainland suppliers. Build biosecurity requirements into all major LHIB Actioned - - - contracts including major projects. Formalise arrangements with other agencies, re Not actioned Aerodrome pre-arrival notification Time – discussions and agreements. High incoming vessels and aircraft including international requirements need to be discussed and and Defence. agreed with other department(s). Establish formal biosecurity working group with Actioned – Partial - Time – establishment of working Medium Govt. stakeholders. Annual meetings. group. Investigate options for mail screening / declaration Not actioned Legislative complexities. Time – LHIB senior management Medium at Port Macquarie i.e. x-ray and random detector discussions and development of plans dogs. Lack of resourcing towards issue. with relevant authorities.
Lack of community and stakeholder buy-in Low/moderate – Resourcing of mail to biosecurity. inspections.
Progress options with gas bottle supplier for supply Not actioned Discussions resulting in change/solution yet Time – Relevant discussions. Medium of clean rimmed bottles. to be had.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Minor – Purchase or fabrication of suitable gas bottle boots. Point of Departure Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority Progress with LHISF for options to reduce risk at Actioned – Partial Low drive on PMQ based upgrades from Time – development of strategic site Critical LHISF via habitat modification. Options include LHIB and Birdon management. plans and upgrades. Discussions with combination of: LHISF management. • Ongoing baiting, weed or insect treatment Lack of resourcing – Biosecurity Team • Fencing based on 500mm solid lower section, Leader. Current staffing does not allow time Low to Moderate – Infrastructure mowing strip / footing for length, HD Galva 3 rail to effectively drive projects. upgrades. fence approx. 2100h + 3 strand cranked barbed wire top. Assume 500m to be fenced (extra over for Potential planning restrictions (fence double vehicle gate = $4500) installation). • Additional Hardstand - heavy duty concrete • Inspection pallet stand Birdon engagement with pallet stand • Mobile wash-down including trailer, pumps, multi process. sprays, filter and water recycle • Increase vessel hygiene (de-ratting/ hull Lack of wash-down project manager and maintenance) commitment. • Permanent Wash-down Bay.
Establish biosecurity Compliance Agreement or Actioned – partial Lack of contract requirements with servicing Time – discussions and contract Very High contractual obligations with LHISF and Macquarie airline(s). formulation. Air. Trial paid inspection of high risk cargo at LHISF (NSW Actioned - - - DPI or LHIB board) assume $130/ hr for two days load inspection + travel expense. Trial use of detector dogs for various risks at Port Actioned - - - Macquarie. Suggest fee for service “hire” from other sources initially. At the border Education and Awareness Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority Increase capability and capacity for key LHIB staff via Actioned - - - inspection, containment and response training on island. This should include Manager Environment/World Heritage, Flora Management Officer and Ranger. Continue awareness for Stevedores at LHI through: Actioned – Partial Lack of audience appropriate training and Time – development of audience Very High • Erection of previously developed signs. presentation materials. appropriate training and information • Ongoing awareness training – biennially. materials and their delivery.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Increase awareness for visitors (air and sea) through Actioned – Partial Lack of finalised response plans/protocols. BTL resourcing. Critical - Response airport signage and foot scrubs. This could include protocols. information on high risk myrtle rust areas on the Visitor access is not restricted – increased Time – drafting and completion of mainland and steps to limit the spread communications and awareness may be plans. High – Other. - Supplement foot scrubs with personal sufficient. decontamination sprays e.g. with 70% methylated Minor/Low – Purchase of required spirits/Quatsan at all walking trail heads equipment - Continue and expand foots scrubs to all lodges and erect at airport and jetty. - Increase inspection at airport - Finalise response protocols - Consider restricting visitor access to high risk areas for myrtle rust. Detection and Response Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority - Increase current LHI wharf and airport inspection Actioned – Partial Aircraft treatment/need for treatment has Time – Investigation of issue. Medium regime including dedicated biosecurity staff and not been investigated trained LHIB staff Minor – Aircraft treatment - Include disinfection of aircraft on arrival through negotiation with airlines. Undertake pathway management planning. - This recommendation is very non- - - prescriptive. Essence should be captured in other recommendations and actions Plan for emergency shipments to LHI. Actioned – Partial Definition and occurrence of emergency - Unknown shipments (protocols currently in place for special voyages). Develop Incident Management System in case of Actioned – Partial Lack of resourcing - LHI Biosecurity Time – Preparation of incursion Critical breach of quarantine. Operations Manual is in development for response plans for potential pest potential rodent incursion but not species. complete. Minor – Engagement of expert(s) for input and review
Minor – Equipment to have on-hand for potential incursions. - Develop protocol to have NSW Police open Not actioned Legislative complexities. Time – LHIB senior management Medium suspicious mail on behalf of the LHIB discussions and development of plans - Enforce compliance with penalties for Lack of resourcing towards issue. with relevant authorities. noncompliance.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Lack of community and stakeholder buy-in Minor/Low – Resourcing of mail to biosecurity. inspections.
- Increase inspection / containment infrastructure Actioned - Partial Overall little progress on LHI end resources Low/moderate – facility upgrades. Very High and equipment at Jetty and Airport and facilities. High – construction of dedicated post • pallet inspection stand, Airport quarantine room is not fit for entry quarantine receiving station. • bunded cleaning area, purpose – requires minor upgrades. • Quarantine room at Airport, • response equipment (tarps, chemical sprayers, Lack of LHI wharf facilities and capability to wash down equipment and biosecurity kits manage of risk cargo. • Boot scrub stations at airport and jetty. - Trial use of detector dogs for various risks at LHI. Actioned - - - - Suggest fee for service “hire” from other sources initially. - Then undertake Detailed Business Case for Feasibility of Detector Dogs - Develop targeted surveillance programs for high Actioned - Partial Lack of resourcing - Lack of strategic reptile BTL resourcing – approx. $105,000 Very High risk species such as weeds, reptiles/amphibians, and amphibian monitoring plan p/a. tramp ants/insects, and plant pathogens e.g. myrtle development. rust Time – development of reptile and - Implement marine pest surveys with Marine Parks. amphibian monitoring and incursion plans.
Minimal – Installation and checking of additional monitoring devices to detect reptiles and amphibians. - Formalise arrangement for vessels with LHI govt. Not actioned Lack of LHIB plans relating to pest detection Time – scenario and response Critical Stakeholders. on board vessels. planning. Post Border Education and Awareness Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority - Increase biosecurity awareness for residents, Actioned – Partial REP Rat on a Rodent campaign was well Time – Development of relevant and Very High tourism operators, tradies and visitors. “What to received but publicity is now low – due to effective communications. look for, What to do” lack of communications and LHIB attitude - Poster and brochure series / iPad guide . Minor – Creation and printing of materials. - Formalise protocols for working in infested areas Actioned - - - etc. Wash-down, area closures - Increase boots scrub
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
- Supplement boot scrubs with personal decontamination sprays e.g. with 70% methylated spirits at all walking trail heads - Consider restricting access to high risk areas - Continue eradication programs wherever realistic and achievable.
- Continue surveillance and monitoring particularly Actioned – Partial See previous related recommendations - - for high risks such as plant pathogens e.g. myrtle rust, weeds, reptiles/amphibians, tramp ants/insects and marine pests - Develop response plans for high risks species - Prepare for inevitable breaches of quarantine through development of a Co-ordinated Incident Management System - Formalise protocols with other agencies (i.e. Marine Parks) - Formalise pest surveys at high risk areas such as LHI wharf and airport - Continue engagement and incursion reporting through Friends of Lord Howe Island and dive visitors - Trial use of detector dogs for detection at LHI Suggest fee for service “hire” from other sources initially.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Recommendation from Landos 2003 Status Impediment(s) to implementation Relative cost/cost estimate Priority Structural Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority That any approach to extending quarantine Actioned – Partial Further development and expansion of Time – Development of relevant Critical arrangements on Lord Howe Island should be stakeholder engagement and relationships. communications and publications. based on a partnership approach with all stakeholders. Minor – Facilitation of stakeholder engagement meetings and activities. That a meeting is convened on the Island in the - - - - context of moving this report forward that includes as participants, the Executive Managers of Biosecurity Australia and AQIS, key policy oriented EA executives and key Executives of NSW NPWS and NSW Agriculture. That the new position of Environment/World Actioned - - - Heritage Officer should have specific quarantine responsibilities and these should be reflected in the Corporate and Operational plans of the Board. That the new position of Actioned Biodiversity Management Plan working - Environment/World Heritage Officer should group is used as a defacto to this establish and Chair a Quarantine Working Group group. that meets quarterly and includes appropriate stakeholder representation. That the Board should continue to press for Actioned – Partial Continued commitment to ongoing Time. High balance in terms of the recognition of the value of biosecurity actions and activities. Australia’s biodiversity in terms of national and State quarantine arrangements and related risk analysis activities. That in conjunction with a broadly based Actioned – Partial Lack of LHI specific priority pest species list. Time – Formulation on list. Very High quarantine strategy that a priority list of pests and diseases be established for the Island. Biosecurity plan is not complete Time – Completion of plan. That AQIS be asked to consider whether mentoring Actioned – Partial Little engagement from AQIS Time – facilitating and establishing Low arrangements currently provided might be better engagement. provided by an officer located in Brisbane.
Legislation and Contractual Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority That the following legislative changes be Actioned - - - considered:
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Providing the Board with the power to enter into formal compliance arrangements with individuals or businesses which have the effect of delegating the power to undertake specific inspection (and related) functions; Providing the Board with the power to appoint “Authorised Officers” who would not necessarily be LHIB staff who might for example be crew members of the Island Trader with the power to inspect goods (as best as they are able) at Goodwood Island wharf and to refuse to load any goods found to be carrying an unwanted pest or disease; Provide for a permit system to be introduced on a cost recovery (to users) basis and inter alia to provide for all imports of plants to be labelled accurately; Having an offence provision in respect of any false or misleading declaration.
That future contractual arrangements for the Actioned - - - movement of goods to the Island include: Quarantine related standards for both the vessel and the departing (and arriving) wharf; Appropriate surveillance, fumigation (possibly in transit, depending on specialist advice being received as to the effectiveness and safety of such operations) and baiting/trapping provisions;
The power for goods to be refused boarding at the ports of departure and arrival in the event that an infestation is found. Training and Mentoring Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
That training be provided to LHIB staff (on a train Actioned - - - the trainer basis) in the following areas: Threat identification, assessment and management in the context of biodiversity and potential threats to the Kentia palm industry;
Deratting and rat inspection and baiting trapping activity; Inspection techniques that can be used with cargo. That suitable surveillance training be developed Actioned – Partial Provision of ongoing and updated training. Time – Training development and Very High and delivered to all LHIB staff and contractors. delivery.
Minor – Formulation and printing of relevant materials. That suitable training be developed and delivered Not Actioned Development and provision of suitable Time – Training development and Very High to all participants in the tourist and transport to training. delivery. the Island industries for example owners/managers of accommodation places, tour Minor – Formulation and printing of operators, pilots and captains. relevant materials. That the Board explore with the appropriate Not Actioned Identification of authorities and outreach. Time – identification, outreach, and Low authorities the establishment of a specialised establishment of services. biodiversity related email based mentoring service. Surveillance/Contingency Planning Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority No unloading of cargo from the Island Trader to Actioned - - - take place after dark. That a central repository for digital information be Actioned - Movement of data - established to facilitate the reviewing and addition collection/management into Fulcrum is of key information. currently being undertaken. That formal risk analysis be undertaken where any Actioned - - - new plant or animal is to be introduced to the Island. That baseline surveys be undertaken as is possible Actioned – Partial 2017 holistic survey (Aust. Museum). And Time – development of relevant plans. Very High for priority pests and diseases. annual African big-headed ant surveys – no other formal surveying. Minor/Moderate – staff resourcing to complete relevant monitoring. Establishment of pest species survey/monitoring plans and programs
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
That visiting scientists be encouraged to Actioned - - - communicate specific findings to a nominated Officer. Inspection and Treatments Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority That the NSW Agriculture Regulatory Officer be Actioned - - - used for specific inspection activity related to Goodwood Island wharf. That LHIB staff be encouraged to conduct regular Actioned - - - random intuitive inspections of cargo arriving at the LHI wharf That the capacity be developed of the existing Actioned - - - Island Trader crew and wharf staff and labourers at Goodwood Island wharf to undertake inspection of product (and shipping pallets) as it is loaded without unduly lengthening the loading process. That key personnel who are at Goodwood Island Actioned - - - wharf at the time of loading be appointed as “Authorised Officers” and a Senior person at the wharf be provided with the power to refuse to load any goods that show obvious evidence of unwanted pests and diseases. That the Island Trader be asked to advise in Actioned - - - advance of any high quarantine cargo observed during loading, with the intention of this cargo being inspected on arrival either at Lord Howe Island wharf or at the point where the cargo is broken down. That specialist advice (from AFFA) be sought as to Not actioned Engagement with relevant department. Time – engagement. High whether it is advisable to treat regular arriving vessels and aircraft with a residual insecticide. Minimal – treatment costs. That specialist advice be sought on the safety and Not actioned Engagement with relevant experts and Time – engagement. High practicality of in transit fumigation of the cargo Birdon. hold of the Island Trader. Minimal – treatment costs. That LHI residents (particularly those who receive Actioned - Partial Formulation and distribution of relevant Time – Preparation of communications Very High cargo direct to their residences) be encouraged to and effective messaging and information materials. observe, treat and notify any signs of unwanted products. pests or diseases. Minor – Printing costs. That Goodwood Island and Lord Howe Island Actioned - Partial On-going ground maintenance of Birdon. Time – BDH inspections of Critical wharfs, the airport and associated buildings and properties/grounds.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
surrounds be made as inhospitable as is practical Permissions and possibility of airport based for pests. activities – unknown. Time – Discussions between management groups re: ground maintenance. That sealed “Amnesty” bins be provided at the Not actioned Provision of bins and signage along with Minor – Bins, signage, and information Medium airport and seaport and labelled accordingly. suitable pre-arrival information. products. That disposal procedures be developed for any Actioned - - - seized or confiscated goods. Public Awareness Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority That public awareness be based on a partnership Actioned – Partial Decision and consistency relating to Time – Preparation of communications Very High approach and have a specific theme adopted for theme/branding (e.g. ‘Protecting Paradise’). materials. LHI. That to the extent possible assistance be sought from established organisations such as Poor community and stakeholder Minor – Printing costs. State and Federal agencies and groups like the engagement and information Interstate Quarantine Publicity Committee. dissemination. That the QF link laminated seat pocket brochure Actioned - - - be replaced with a take away brochure that incorporates quarantine and waste messages as well as general visitor information. This brochure could also incorporate the current widely used “red” island map and information sheet. That either a specific “top of descent” quarantine Actioned - - - message be broadcast on all incoming QF Link flights or a brief quarantine message be added to the current arrival boarding message. The LHIB arrange the production of a short “first Not actioned Poor community and stakeholder Minor/Low – Preparation of suitable Medium nighters” video that encapsulates key tourist engagement and information communications. features of the Island and key quarantine dissemination. messages. Copies of this video to be made available to the visitor’s centre and accommodation houses that have TV/Video facilities. That a range of posters be produced suitable for Not actioned Poor community and stakeholder Minor – Preparation of suitable High display at the visitors centre, Sydney and Brisbane engagement and information communications. airports and accommodation houses. dissemination. That specific high quality brochures to be Actioned - Partial Poor community and stakeholder Minor – Preparation of suitable High developed for: engagement and information communications. General tourists; dissemination. Hikers;
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Visiting scientists. That the LHIB school be encouraged to draw on Actioned - Partial Ongoing engagement between school and Time/Minor – Updating of existing Critical existing AQIS schools’ program resources. biosecurity/LHIB management. school related materials and guidance. That the LHI radio broadcast and newspaper be Not actioned Poor community and stakeholder Time – formulation and provision of Low utilised on a regular basis to deliver and update engagement and information suitable messaging to radio show quarantine awareness messages. dissemination. hosts. That an annual quarantine award be introduced Not actioned Poor community and stakeholder Time/Minor – Formulation, Medium that recognises an outstanding contribution to engagement and information assessment, and awarding of prize. protecting the biodiversity of LHI dissemination. That the LHI tourism web site include a Not actioned Poor community and stakeholder Time/Minor – Formulation of suitable Very High “Quarantine Page”. engagement and information web content and provision to LHIT. dissemination. That the producers of glossy LHI package holiday Not actioned Poor community and stakeholder Time/Minor – Formulation of suitable Very High brochures be approached with a view to engagement and information web content and provision to LHIT. incorporating an appropriate quarantine message dissemination. in future brochures. Specific Issues - Rats Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority That regular structured baiting and trapping will Actioned - - - need to be maintained at key areas such as: On board all vessels and planes; Around the wharf and airport; Around accommodation houses and residences. That measures be introduced for moored vessels Not actioned Lack of moored/visiting vessel inspection Time – Formulation of plan(s). Very High that minimise the chances of any rats finding their and treatment plan(s). way ashore. Minor – Inspection and baiting activities. That all vessels visiting LHI have current deratting Not actioned Not currently included in mooring Time – update of procedure. Very High certificates. application procedure. Minimal – production and distribution of relevant communications. That with regular vessels and planes that specific Actioned - - - tailored programs be developed according to the need. That all wharf and airport areas including buildings Actioned - - - be maintained in a clean state. That measures be taken to ensure that any waste Actioned - - - being returned to the mainland is in sealed rat and vermin proof containers.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Specific Issues - Reptiles Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority That specialist advice be sought on the availability Not actioned Engagement of expert(s). Time/Minor – Engagement of experts Very High of baiting and trapping for specific threats. and conducting of relevant field Capacity to conduct work with current activities. resourcing. Animals Generally Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority That all introductions of animals not presently Actioned - - - found on the Island be subject to risk analysis from animal and plant health (weeds), and biodiversity impact perspectives. This risk analysis should be over and above any NSW NPWS licensing provisions. That the LHIB seek advice on a specific case basis Actioned - - - for the safe and humane transport of animals to the Island. No straw, hay or green feed be imported to LHI Actioned - - - That NSW Agriculture (and Fisheries as Actioned - - - appropriate) be asked to examine the issue of animal feedstuffs imported to the Island and controls that should be applied to such goods. All animals to be imported in containers using Actioned - - - clean sawdust and all waste to be appropriately destroyed on arrival. Cattle Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority That NSW Agriculture be requested to draw up a Actioned - - - general set of health conditions for the importation to LHI and that this be supplemented by advice from the NSW Agriculture District Veterinarian and any market assurance programs that are relevant. Plants Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority All plants be required to be imported bare rooted Actioned - - - or in soil less medium or from an accredited supplier. All plants to have identification labels Actioned - - - A holding compound to be built at the airport and Actioned – Partial Lack of PEQRS at LHI wharf. Minimal – Airport facility upgrades. Critical seaport and all plants beheld in this area until cleared by LHIB staff. Airport biosecurity facility is not biosecure. Minor/Low – Construction of LHI wharf PEQRS
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
All plant imports be subject to permit. Actioned - - - Weeds Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority That specialist advice be sought on the survivability Actioned - - - of weed seeds in the VCU and that current compost distribution be amended as appropriate. Timber and building materials Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority All second-hand and untreated timber be Actioned - - - prohibited unless accompanied by a current fumigation certificate. No bark on timber to be imported to LHI. Actioned - - - If at all practical pallets used for Norfolk Island and N/A LHI should be segregated. Hardwood pallets and other dunnage should be Actioned - - - the subject of regular inspection both at Goodwood Island and Lord Howe wharf. All pavers and the like are subject to inspection Actioned - - - prior to boarding at Goodwood Island. Gas bottles Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority That gas depots be requested to inspect and only Not actioned Discussions resulting in change/solution yet Time – Relevant discussions. Medium supply bottles with clean undersides to LHI. to be had. Minor – Purchase or fabrication of suitable gas bottle boots. That inspection and knock down treatment be Not actioned Inclusion of knock down treatment in Minor – Implementation of routine Very High encouraged at each point in the delivery chain. treatment protocols/SOPs knock-down activities. Road base Status Impediment(s) to implementation Estimated relative cost Priority That contractual specifications include quarantine Actioned - - - related considerations such as the inclusion of soil and extraneous matter. In addition consideration be given to the use of local materials where appropriate given broader environmental considerations.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Audit Report – April 2020
Board Meeting: September 2020 Agenda Number: 12 (i) Rec No: ED20/7852.02 OPEN Attachment: B
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Birdon - Port Macquarie Audit findings with recommendations for biosecurity measures, procedures, and processes – July 2020
Disclaimer
SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. has prepared this report based on the agreed scope of work and acts as an advisor to the Client/Principal (“Client”). All reasonable skill and care has been exercised in the provision of these services.
This report was commissioned by and prepared for the exclusive use of the Client. To the maximum extent permitted by relevant governing law SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. is not responsible and will not be liable to the Client or any person or organisation for, or in relation to, any matter dealt within this report. This exclusion of liability extends to any real or perceived loss or damage suffered by the Client or any person or organisation arising from matters dealt with or conclusions expressed in this report (including without limitation matters arising from any negligent act or omission of SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. or for any loss or damage suffered by any party relying upon the matters dealt with or conclusions expressed in this Report).
Except where expressly stated, SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. has not verified the validity, accuracy or comprehensiveness of any information supplied to SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. in relation to the preparation of this report and/or any associated advice or recommendations.
Where site inspections, work observations, testing, or fieldwork have taken place, this report is based on the information made available by the Client or their nominees during the visit, visual observations and any subsequent discussions with relevant parties. The validity and comprehensiveness of supplied information has not been independently verified and, for the purposes of this report, it is assumed that the information provided is both complete and accurate. It is further assumed that normal activities were being undertaken at the site during any site visit(s), unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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Prepared by: SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. Simon Pahor ABN: 47 623 639 243
Prepared for: The Lord Howe Island Board ABN: 33 280 968 043
This report should be cited as: Pahor, S. (2020). Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – Audit findings with recommendations for biosecurity measures, procedures, and processes – July 2020. Internal Lord Howe Island Board report. Unpublished.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Contents Executive summary ...... ii Introduction ...... 1 Lord Howe Island shipping overview ...... 2 Risk pathways...... 3 Relevant legislation ...... 4 Protection and uncertainty ...... 5 The biosecurity supply chain ...... 6 Shipping biosecurity data ...... 7 Site observations ...... 11 Site assessment ...... 18 Biosecurity responsibilities and approaches...... 20 Contract ...... 21 Recommendations ...... 22 References ...... 26 Appendix A - Risk Assessment ...... 27 Appendix B - Contract Observations ...... 30 Appendix C - Rodent Exclusion Guidance ...... 35
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Executive summary Biosecurity refers to those actions which are taken with the aim of preventing the introduction and establishment of pest species. Reliable and effective quarantine plays a crucial role in Island biosecurity delivery. Under the New South Wales Biosecurity Act (2015), biosecurity is a shared responsibility and there is a general obligation on people to take action to prevent the introduction and spread of pests, diseases, weeds and contaminants.
Birdon Pty. Ltd. provides freight shipping services to LHI under contract with the Lord Howe Island Board. Birdon freight receiving and handling facilities are located in Port Macquarie, New South Wales, Australia, and include a dedicated freight shed, external cargo storage area. The likelihood of shipping operations transporting a pest organism to LHI has been assessed as ‘almost certain’. The available data indicate that transport of pest species has happened several times in the past year.
Of the 10 most recent inspections/voyages:
- 9 have recorded rodent activity inside the Birdon shed; - 8 have recorded rodent captures from within/immediately adjacent to the hardstand; - 10 have recorded rodent bait take around the externals of the Birdon shed; and, - 6 have resulted in the transport of a pest species to Lord Howe Island.
Current cargo storage facilities and arrangements do not effectively inhibit pest access to cargo stored in the freight shed or externally prior to vessel loading.
Further engagement with, and education of suppliers and other key stakeholders regarding biosecurity expectations, obligations, and processes is likely to provide operational and biosecurity benefits.
The processes, procedures, and liabilities regarding potential scenarios should a live pest be detected on board the vessel en route or on arrival to LHI are not clear.
Key infrastructure upgrades including adequate rodent proofing of the shed via mechanical means, and storing external cargo in such a way as to inhibit pest access are recommended. Other recommendations address processes and procedures, the refinement or implementation of which would likely assist with biosecurity delivery.
Recommendations do not aim to bring the relevant facilities and processes up to the standards delivered by of other biosecure fright/cargo handling facilities which service other pest free Islands. Rather, they aim to provide practical and achievable recommendations which will offer improved biosecurity delivery. As such, the recommendations within this report should be seen as a minimum standard should managers wish for prevention to play a meaningful role in the biosecurity of Lord Howe Island.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Introduction Observations and conclusions contained within this audit were informed by experience working on Lord Howe Island (LHI) in 2019/20, and a Port Macquarie site visit from Saturday 27th June to end of Wednesday 1st July 2020 (Island Trader Voyage 50). Conversations and interviews were held directly with relevant Birdon Pty. Ltd. (Birdon) and biosecurity staff over the course of the site visit. Many key Port Macquarie stakeholders were also met with over this time. The author wishes to extend a genuine thank you to all who were engaged as part of this audit.
Biosecurity Biosecurity refers to those actions which are taken with the aim of preventing the introduction and establishment of pest species. These actions encompass quarantine (prevention), surveillance (detection), and response to incursions (contingency) (Broome, 2007). Effective quarantine eliminates the potential for pest introduction; surveillance facilitates timely detection should quarantine measures fail; which in-turn greatly increases the likelihood of response measures proving effective.
“The prevention of incursions through pre-departure quarantine is the first and most powerful step in island biosecurity”. (Russell et. al. 2008)
Only those actions which fall under ‘quarantine’ actively aim to prevent pest introduction. All three aspects must however be maintained and regularly tested/audited to ensure that they are effective; failure to maintain adequate island biosecurity systems and processes inevitably leads to the introduction of novel pest species or reinvasions or previously removed species (Russell et. al. 2008).
The adage that ‘prevention is better than cure’ is apt when considering all facets of the Island biosecurity chain. The role played by robust and reliable quarantine in Island biosecurity cannot be overstated. Any assumption that increased surveillance or response actions can effectively offset limited quarantine actively tips the odds in favour of the pest species. Following rodent reinvasion of previously eradicated Islands, removal/re-eradication efforts have proven to be only 61 – 85% effectivei. This means that in 15 – 39% of cases, the entirety of the eradication investment has been lost.
The available data indicate a very high level of permeability of Birdon quarantine facilities and activities. The likelihood of accidental introduction or re-introduction of new or previously eradicated species is currently considered to be almost certain for rodents and other pest species. Relatively minor improvements to facilities and practises would most likely result in significant benefits to LHI biosecurity delivery. It is important to note that, although there is a strong prioritisation of rodent biosecurity by all parties, all pest species should be treated with the same seriousness.
This audit aims to provide practical and achievable recommendations, the delivery of which will offer improved biosecurity delivery. As such, the recommendations within this report should be seen as a minimum standard should managers wish for prevention to play a meaningful role in the ongoing biosecurity of Lord Howe Island.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Lord Howe Island shipping overview Birdon provides an overwhelming majority of freight shipping services to LHI under contract with the Lord Howe Island Board (LHIB). This service was previously operated by Lord Howe Island Sea Freight (LHISF) which has since been acquired by Birdon under contract LHIB 2016-18 (28th March 2018). Cargo receiving and handling facilities, and the dedicated freight vessel (M/V Island Trader) are located at the Birdon facility, Port Macquarie, New South Wales, Australia. A majority of cargo is sourced and delivered from local suppliers.
The vessel has a hold capacity of approximately 400m3. Both palletised and non-conforming cargo are transported in the hold. Deck cargo such as water tanks, vehicles, skip bins, and other large freight are also transported. The vessel has an overall cargo capacity of approximately 300 tonnes.
Voyage length is approximately 330nm (~610km) and generally 36-48 hours in duration. Entry to the LHI lagoon and manoeuvring within the lagoon are restricted by tide and the vessel spends a majority of the tide cycle sitting aground whilst alongside the LHI wharf (figure 1). Voyages are generally undertaken every two weeks with three to four week ‘turn-arounds’ also occurring.
A number of rodent bait stations and monitoring devices are aboard the vessel. Access to the hold is severely constrained once cargo is loaded and thorough inspection of the cargo hold (and associated biosecurity devices) is not possible until approximately half to two-thirds of the cargo is unloaded. All cargo is unloaded directly onto the LHI jetty or trucks where it is inspected by a biosecurity detection dog and officer before being released for delivery.
Figure 1: M/V Island Trader aground whilst unloading cargo onto the LHI jetty.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Risk pathways Rodent risk pathways for LHI were identified within the LHI rodent eradication biosecurity plan (EPBC-19) and detailed in AECOM 2016.
The ratings provided in the summary below (table 1) provide a likelihood of each identified pathway transporting any pest organisms to LHI.
It is important to note that the ratings below are not full risk assessment ratings in that they do not incorporate the consequence rating (potential impacts of species introduction) in their formulation. Rather, they only refer to and incorporate the likelihood of each pathway physically transporting a pest organism to LHI. Appendix A details the risk and likelihood assessment process.
Table 1: Potential pathways for the introduction of pest species to LHI.
Pathway Likelihood of introduction via pathway Flights – Regular passenger transport (QANTAS) Possible Flights – Freight Possible Flights – Other Possible M/V Island Trader freight and operations Almost certain Private yachts/small vessels Possible Shipwrecks Rare Storm enhanced dispersal and rafting Unlikely Deliberate release by public Rare
The likelihood of shipping operations transporting a pest organism to LHI has been assessed as ‘almost certain’. The available data indicate that introduction has happened several times in the past year, and has a >90% chance of occurring in the budgeted period if the risk is not mitigated. These data are presented and discussed in the body of this audit (see section shipping biosecurity data).
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Relevant legislation Numerous pieces of Federal and NSW State legislation relate to biosecurity delivery. These include but are not limited to:
- Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC) Act (1999); - New South Wales Biodiversity Act (2016); and, - New South Wales Biosecurity Act (2015).
Table 2 is presented as brief indicative reference to key threatening processes (identified by the legislation) that relate to LHI and associated shipping operations.
Table 2: Examples of relevant key threatening processes under the New South Wales Biodiversity Conservation Act (2016), and the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC) Act (1999). Biodiversity Conservation Act EPBC Act Importation of Red Imported Fire Ants Predation by exotic rats on Australian Solenopsis invicta. offshore islands of less than 100km2 (100,000 ha). Invasion and establishment of the Cane Toad The Reduction in the Biodiversity of Bufo marinus. Australian Native Fauna and Flora due to the Red Imported Fire Ant (Solenopsis invicta). Invasion of the Yellow Crazy Ant Anoplolepis Dieback Caused by the Root-rot Fungus gracilipes. Phytophthora cinnamomi. Predation by the Ship Rat on Lord Howe The biological effects, including lethal toxic Island. ingestion, caused by Cane Toads (Bufo marinus). Infection of Native Plants by Phytophthora cinnamomi. Invasion and establishment of exotic vines and scramblers. Invasion, establishment and spread of Lantana (Lantana camara). Invasion of Native Plant Communities by Bitou Bush and Boneseed. Invasion of Native Plant Communities by Exotic Perennial Grasses.
Under the New South Wales Biosecurity Act (2015), there is a general obligation on people to take action to prevent the introduction and spread of pests, diseases, weeds and contaminants. Section 22 of the Act provides: “Any person who deals with biosecurity matter or a carrier and who knows, or ought reasonably to know, the biosecurity risk posed or likely to be posed by the biosecurity matter, carrier or dealing has a biosecurity duty to ensure that, so far as is reasonably practicable, the biosecurity risk is prevented, eliminated or minimised.”
The NSW Department of Primary Industries website provides useful information and fact sheets relating to various aspects of biosecurity (https://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/biosecurity/managing- biosecurity/legislation). As shipping operations have dealings with, and are a carrier of biosecurity matter, it would be of significant benefit for all LHIB and Birdon management and staff to ensure they are familiar with the relevant legislation, definitions, and their roles and responsibilities under the NSW Biosecurity Act (2015).
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Protection and uncertainty Given the absence of detailed modelling, the ecological and/or economic impacts of the transport of different pest species to LHI on the environment, World Heritage values, and economy, will often not be fully known to managers and decision makers. This can present difficulties in terms of justifying actions taken and/or expenses related to reducing the likelihood of pest species transport and introduction to LHI.
In relation to imperfect operating knowledge, both Federal and State environmental legislation, and biosecurity best practise instruct managers to adopt the precautionary principle. “The precautionary principle is that lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing a measure to prevent degradation of the environment where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage.” (EPBC Act 1999, s. 391).
In this context the precautionary principle directs that a lack of comprehensive knowledge relating to the effects of a novel species becoming established should be reason enough to aim to prevent the introduction of that species. In reality this reasoning is likely to be met with retort by many of those to whom robust biosecurity is seen as unnecessary or difficult to justify. It is, however, an important concept for managers to understand, appreciate, and apply in their decision making processes.
From a purely economic point of view, the further back in the ‘biosecurity supply chain’ effective invasive species intervention occurs, the lower the cost and the higher the efficacy of biosecurity delivery (figure 2). This same model/curve can be adapted in scale: I.E. The return on investment is likely to be greater the further back in the supply chain of goods that Birdon is able to instigate preventative measures (e.g. placing requirements on suppliers relating to the condition of goods accepted for shipping).
Figure 2: The generalised (or biological) invasion curve. From: Craik et. al. 2016
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
The biosecurity supply chain The LHI biosecurity supply chain is broadly comprised of:
- State governance - Island governance - Freight service providers - Suppliers of goods - Members of the public
Generally, individuals or LHI based companies place freight orders with mainland suppliers; suppliers then pack goods and deliver them to the relevant freight provider (in this case, Birdon); who ships them for delivery. The roles and duties that each party has in terms of biosecurity delivery are somewhat determined by where in the supply chain they sit.
Figure 3 shows:
- The central role played by governance; o Governance makes use of legislation, regulations, and import requirements to address biosecurity risk. - The interconnectedness of freight providers with governance; o Governance may require freight providers to provide a certain service/level of service. - The interconnectedness of freight providers and suppliers; o Freight providers may require suppliers to achieve a certain level of service/deliver goods in a certain state in order to meet their obligations for carriage. - The interconnectedness of suppliers and the public; o Suppliers and/or the public can inform each other of their requirements. o Suppliers may use business practises to introduce cost recovery via the public for requirements that must be met in order to provide those goods. - Changes to governance may be made over time to address public expectation. - The potential for governance to assist suppliers through providing education.
It is important to note that how businesses and individuals meet their general biosecurity duty and other biosecurity obligations whilst achieving other commercial or business oriented outcomes is very much the responsibility of those individuals and businesses.
Governance
Freight Public Suppliers providers
Figure 3: A simplified schematic of relationships within the biosecurity supply chain.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Shipping biosecurity data Lord Howe Island end vessel inspections have been occurring since August 2018, and Birdon Port Macquarie inspections since May 2019. Data collection by the LHIB regarding shipping operations was conducted sporadically and somewhat inconsistently from August 2018 (Birdon voyage B004) to early February 2020 (Birdon voyage B041). As part of identified priority improvements to their practises, LHIB biosecurity has since greatly improved data collection and management practises.
For the terms of this report, all data collected prior to Birdon voyage B042 is referred to as ‘historic data’. This period covers 38 individual voyages of which data is available for 9 LHI end inspections. LHI biosecurity staff began inspections in Port Macquarie in May 2019. Of these 18 voyages, data is available for 6. Table 3 presents a summary of available historic data. As data collection was inconsistent, these data are seen to be indicative only, however they do provide interesting information and, assuming all non-recorded voyages did not have pest sign, a bare minimum measure of pest occurrence over this period.
‘Recent data’ includes all voyages from B042 (mid-February 2020) to B050 (early July 2020). During this time data collection practises are known to have been more robust and generally well organised. Data is available for 10 of 10 voyages for Birdon Port Macquarie end inspections, and 8 of these 10 voyages for LHI end inspections. Tables 4 & 5, and figures 4 & 5 present a summary and more detailed breakdown of recent data.
Importantly, the dedicated survey effort applied by the LHIB for pest species at the point of cargo unloading on LHI beyond basic visual inspection and detection dog searches is limited. This means that those data presented here are the ‘best-case’ scenario as an unknown hidden rate of introduction is likely to also be occurring.
Table 3: Summary of available historic data. PMQ – Inspections at Port Macquarie end, LHI – vessel/freight inspections at LHI end/unload. PMQ LHI Number of voyages with 6 9 inspection data Number of inspections 5 5 recording rodent sign Percentage of voyages (for which inspection 83% 56% data is available ) with n=6 n=9 rodent sign Percentage of total voyages recording rodent 28% 13% n=18 n=38 sign
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Table 4: Summary of recent biosecurity data (Voyages B042 – B050 inclusive).
Number Percentage of inspected voyages Voyages with rodent sign inside Birdon shed 9 90% – PMQ (n = 10) Voyages with rodent bait take outside 10 100% Birdon shed – PMQ (n = 10)
Voyages with rodent trap captures 8 80% on/adjacent to hardstand – PMQ (n = 10) Voyages with pest transport to LHI (n = 8) 6 75%
Summary of recent biosecurity data 100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0% Voyages with rodent sign Voyages with rodent bait take Voyages with rodent trap Voyages with pest transport inside Birdon shed - PMQ outside Birdon shed - PMQ captures on/adjacent to to LHI hardstand - PMQ
Figure 4: Graphical summary of recent biosecurity data (Voyages B042 – B050 inclusive).
Rodents trapped at Birdon Port Macquarie facility per voyage 6
5
4 Rodent captures – 3 inside shed
2 Rodent captures – outside shed
NumberRodents of Trapped 1
0 Special B043 B044 B045 B046 B047 B048 B049 BO50 Birdon Voyage Number Figure 5: Summary of recent rodent trapping data. Note: No trapping data for B042 (not presented) - External trapping data for special voyage provided by verbal report only.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Of additional interest are the findings of the 2017 Australian Museum Expedition to LHI: “Among beetles larger than or equal to 10 mm in size, 31 species were found. Remarkably, nine of these were previously unrecorded from the island, almost all of which appear to be relatively recent invasives. The effect of introduced beetle species on the island is unknown and perhaps unknowable, but unlikely to be positive.” (Reid et. al. 2018, pg. 67.) Although the source of introduction cannot be accurately determined post-hoc, it is highly likely that at least a portion of these introductions would be attributable to shipped goods over time.
Figure 6: Examples of mice trapped on the hardstand and within the shed. Photos: LHIB
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Table 5: Recent biosecurity data (Voyages B042 – B050 inclusive).
PMQ LHI Rodent sign inside Rodent sign outside Pest detection Voyage Species (common name) Notes shed (Y/N) shed (Y/N) (Y/N) B042 N Y Y Asian House Gecko Detected & intercepted on board Special Y Y Y Ant (nests in/on cargo) Treated on site & delivery location B043 Y Y No LHI inspection data B044 Y Y B045 Y Y N - - B046 Y Y Y Long eared bat Found very recently deceased on pallet B047 Y Y Y House mouse Bait take in hold - Body found on return to PMQ B048 Y Y N - - B049 Y Y Y Skink (species unknown) Intercepted and killed on wharf by stevedore B050 Y Y Y Climbing Nightshade (weed) Intercepted on wharf
Figure 7: Recently deceased long eared bat Figure 8 : Climbing nightshade (Solanum (Nectophilus sp.) intercepted from cargo on LHI. seaforthianum) intercepted from cargo Photo: LHIB on LHI. Photo: LHIB
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Site observations Information to inform these findings has been collated from discussions and interviews with site staff, biosecurity staff, and a site visit which was conducted in conjunction with the receiving and loading of cargo for voyage B050, 2020.
The Lord Howe Island fright receiving area, shed, hardstand, and MV Island Trader wharf are located on the north-western extremity of the greater Birdon Port Macquarie facility. Cargo is received and stored in/on either of a dedicated freight shed or external storage area prior to loading onto the vessel (figure 9).
Figure 9: Aerial overview of the Birdon Port Macquarie facility. A – LHI freight shed; B – Hardstand; C – M/V Island Trader; D – Lawn and established vegetation; E – Areas of unsealed ground. Note: positions are approximate. Source: https://www.google.com/maps/
Freight shed The freight shed is highly permeable and easily accessed by effectively all pest species of concern. Although some attempts at excluding rodents have been made (e.g. filling some gaps with coarse steel wool, attachment of extra sheeting to some large gaps in walls), the shed, as a whole, is inadequately sealed and does not provide effective pest exclusion from the cargo stored within it.
Significant gaps which require proper and effective addressing were noted along all walls. The internal dividing wall (south/south-east wall) appeared to be in particularly poor condition (figure 10). This is of concern as this wall separates the LHI freight shed from the rest of a larger structure which is not in any way effectively rodent proofed. Effectively, this provides free access from a non- rodent proofed structure to the LHI freight shed.
Several other areas of concern were also noted. These include, but are not limited to: The sides and tops of roller doors (figure 11), the bathroom, and the roof flashing. Numerous holes were also
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
noted on the shed walls outside of inspection range (I. E. at height) which appeared to be large enough to avail access by pest species such as geckos.
Figure 10: Examples of external wall gaps (left) and internal wall gaps (centre and right).
Figure 11: A ground up view of a Figure 12: A well-treated external Birdon roller door showing down-pipe at Birdon to exclude significant gap along top edge and internal pipe access. open wall sheeting corrugations.
External downpipes appeared to be generally well treated to prevent rodent access to pipe internals. The fitting of effective ‘double exclusion’ measures via bottom outlet fittings and also a mesh screened overflow box is excellent practise (figure 12). All external pipes that are connected to the entire structure should be treated in this manner. Routine inspection and maintenance would also be of benefit to ensure that bottom outlet flaps/valves fully close under their own weight and are not jammed open by gravel/detritus, and that overflow box meshing is in good condition.
No rodent collars or guards were seen to have been fitted to the externals of any downpipes of other external shed fittings. Rats are adept climbers and are known to be able to utilise pipe exteriors and the corners formed by pipes with walls. The current arrangement does not effectively inhibit rodent climbing and may allow access to the shed through unsealed roof flashing, or other high-level access points.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Shed utility connections, ventilation fixtures/systems, and toilet waste pipes were not fully inspected as part of this audit.
In its current state, the shed is determined to be ineffective in limiting pest access to stored cargo – this includes rats and mice.
External cargo storage areas All external cargo storage areas are immediately adjacent to excellent rodent, reptile, invertebrate, and amphibian habitat. This includes an open lawn area, mixed vegetation, mangrove habitat, and a river. Although a portion of the cargo storage and handling area is concreted hardstand, unsealed ground is utilised. Cargo is stored on the ground and no fencing or physical exclusion devices are in place.
Large rocks and rock stacks are utilised to demarcate portions of the cargo storage and handling area from the adjacent habitat. These rocks provide excellent pest species habitat and refuge, especially when stacked and/or grouped tightly together (figure 13). Of notable concern was the proximity of a large skip bin (which is likely to be highly attractive to rodents) to stored cargo. Additionally, a line of large rocks directly connected this bin to excellent pest habitat effectively forming a habitat corridor to an appealing food source, and appealing pest refuge space immediately adjacent to stored cargo (figure 14). Of the ‘recent data’, invasive rodents have been trapped from within this area during almost all inspection weeks.
Figure 13: Rock stacks which provide excellent pest habitat, refuge, and breeding locations.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Figure 14: A - Skip bin; B - Cargo stored on unsealed ground (bottom of cargo was not wrapped); C - Rocks joining habitat to bin where rodents are regularly trapped; D – Excellent pest habitat and rock stacks.
A majority of externally stored cargo was noted to be unloaded from delivering trucks onto unsealed ground that was immediately adjacent to the above described bin and habitat. This cargo was stored in this location for a number of nights before re-handling onto the hardstand prior to loading onto the vessel (note: most cargo was not wrapped/poorly wrapped) (figure 15). It was noted that many of these cargo items were handled multiple times before their final loading onto the vessel. The concreted hardstand was utilised for a minimal amount of cargo storage over this observed period.
Figure 15: Cargo stored on unsealed ground (left) and cargo stored on hardstand across the same time-frame (right). Note unwrapped cargo.
It was reported that the external storage area had recently been tidied and cleaned after a prolonged period. Several accumulations of unused/rarely used goods were noted immediately adjacent to the hard-stand. These accumulations appeared likely to provide high quality pest refuge space and included pallets, strops, timbers, and pipes (figure 16). The hardstand itself was clean and in good condition.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Figure 16: Accumulated goods providing pest refuge adjacent to hardstand.
The external cargo storage areas and cargo storage techniques do not present any barriers or deterrents to pest species access to, or interaction with cargo. Conversely, the creation of multiple areas of suitable habitat and the placement of an attractive food source near to/amongst stored cargo is likely to actively attract several pests of various species to these areas.
Received cargo A large variety of cargo types are received and handled. All cargo was observed to be received regardless of integrity of packaging, wrapping, etc. No biosecurity related consignment note handover or delivery declaration was observed to be in place or utilised.
The quality of cargo wrapping on those externally stored items which could reasonably be expected to be wrapped ranged from excellent to non-existent with most being wrapped in a way that did not prohibit pest access. One received plumping pipe was fitted with end caps and/or tapped to prevent pest access and some building materials were fully wrapped with the wrapping material being in good condition (figure 17). Other piping was unsealed and building materials were either not fully wrapped, had damaged wrapping, or were not wrapped at all (figure 18). A septic tank with multiple openings was not sealed or closed to the outside environment.
Figure 17: Examples of well wrapped/capped cargo. Note unwrapped timbers in background of left image.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Figure 18: Examples of non/poorly wrapped cargo. Note that black items on left did not have bottom wrapping.
The condition of received cargo would not be expected to provide a barrier to pest interaction with a majority of received cargo.
Australia Post freight arrived on site in plastic corflute cargo units which do not prohibit pest access. Several Australia Post mail containers were accepted for shipment with biosecurity matter attached. This matter included: organics such as leaves, insects, spider webs, and a desiccated gecko egg.
A significant amount of food items are transported on the vessel including unrefrigerated, refrigerated, and frozen goods. Bulk orders generally arrived palletised and generally well wrapped, however no pallet bottom sheet (e.g. colourbond, or PVC) was utilised; the wrapping therefore does not prevent pest access to this cargo via the open slats of the pallet. Other cargo is treated as break- bulk and is packed into cargo cages following delivery to Birdon. Cargo cages are open and not pest proof.
Birdon staff Most staff seemed generally aware of what biosecurity was and why it was important. It was noted that staff have previously put items aside or pointed out items that they think need biosecurity inspection to the biosecurity officer. Although staff were understanding and cooperative, the running of the operation and associated freight handling duties appeared to take precedent over biosecurity measures (e.g. some last minute deliveries were forklifted directly to the vessel from the delivering truck without informing biosecurity staff).
No clear guidance as to what constituted biosecurity matter, or processes or procedures for checking cargo and/or refusing delivery of cargo were found or observed over the course of this site visit.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Vessel Rat guards were fitted to all mooring lines however they were not fitted in such a way as to be effective across all states of tide. A high capacity power cable used to connect the vessel to shore-power was not fitted with any rodent exclusion measures (figure 19). Similarly, the gangway was not fitted with any effective rodent exclusion measures. The presence of the baron hard-stand and the distance of the vessel from pest habitat likely provide a low level of protection against the dispersal of some pest species to the vessel, however current measures are unlikely to wholly or reliably prevent pest access to the vessel. Figure 19: Rat guard and untreated
power cable. Access to the vessel hold is greatly limited once cargo loading operations begin. Effective inspection of the hold once fully loaded is, due to the configuration of cargo storage and the lack of access amongst the cargo, impossible. Some bait stations and monitoring devices are accessible when the hold is fully loaded however these are the minority. The installation and trial of a remotely (Bluetooth) accessible motion triggered wildlife camera was previously suggested but after being met with resistance from the vessels crew was not progressed.
Biosecurity officer inspections The biosecurity officer/dog handler was present across all days. All possible pieces of cargo were inspected multiple times. Vessel checks were thorough and well conducted as were all baiting and trapping activities. The officer conducted opportunistic cleaning of the vessel forepeak and installed a variety of rodent visual deterrent devices around the vessel and hardstand.
Bait station rodent bait take was recorded (figure 20) and one Black rat was trapped externally by the officer during the period of these observations.
The officer was present on the hardstand during effectively all cargo loading operations to conduct final visual and detection dog searches at the point of loading (figure 21).
Figure 20: Extensive rodent bait take and sign in a Figure 21: Detection dog searches of cargo during bait station. loading process.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Site assessment Current cargo storage facilities and methods do not limit or impede pest access to cargo that is stored or handled in either the Birdon LHI freight shed or the relevant external/hardstand areas.
The cargo storage configuration of the vessel’s hold prevents full access to the cargo for inspection of the hold and associated cargo once it is loaded. Proper access for inspection is also not possible on the LHI end prior to the hold being opened and a significant amount of cargo being unloaded.
The permeability of the shed is a clear obstacle to the ability of the site to store goods in a way that effectively maintains isolation from contamination by pests.
Similarly, the practises of storing external goods directly on the ground and on unsealed ground, do not preclude pest access to these items. The lack of any physical obstacles preventing or in any way limiting pest access to cargo (e.g. rodent proof fence, rodent proof shelving, and/or purpose built pallet stands) presents a fundamental shortfall in biosecurity delivery. In the absence of any such mechanisms, the site relies solely on the variability of individual behavioural traits and luck to prevent pests accessing this cargo.
The shed facilities were somewhat clean however detritus, stored goods and redundant material were noted along walls and in corners. The hardstand itself was clean and well kept, however accumulations of unused equipment and rubbish as well as pieces of machinery were stored immediately adjacent and/or very near to the hardstand and external cargo storage areas.
Effectively, the cleaning and maintenance of the site, and the biosecurity officer and dog activities and inspections provided by the LHIB are the only real preventative biosecurity measures that are in place at the site. Although officers and dogs all undertake high quality work, they are for all intents and purposes fighting the odds. Current arrangements and practises result in each piece of cargo needing to be checked:
- Upon arrival to ensure it is pest free; - Multiple times whilst in storage to determine if pests have accessed the cargo since delivery; and, - Immediately before loading to confirm that no pest organism has accessed the cargo since the last inspection.
As detection dogs are not trained to indicate on the scents of all possible pest species, no one inspection measure is 100% reliable 100% of the time, and no-too-little proactive treatment for non- rodent pest species occurs due to current officer workload, it is highly unlikely that cryptic non- target pests experience any significant barriers to transport to LHI.
Staff appeared to be understanding and cooperative in relation to biosecurity activities and procedures. As those who handle the cargo are invaluable links in the biosecurity chain, the delivery of additional training and production and provision of additional educational materials would likely be of benefit.
The Australia Post cargo containers are in no way pest proof. As the inspection of mail items is subject to various pieces of legislation, the packing of Australia Post freight into pest-proof containers would be of significant benefit.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
The inability to effectively check the hold prior to a large portion of cargo being unloaded on the LHI end presents an additional significant obstacle to robust biosecurity delivery. LHIB biosecurity staff are currently trialling the installation of more accessible monitoring equipment in the hold, however these processes alone are unlikely to wholly address the issue. Failing the installation of motion triggered wildlife cameras to assist with monitoring of the hold prior to it being opened, serious consideration must be given to re-arranging how the hold cargo is packed as to facilitate biosecurity officer and detection dog access – an alteration to processes which would have clear significant operational impacts.
Specific recommendations are detailed later in this audit. Biosecurity delivery would greatly benefit from the addressing of the following broad areas:
- Adequate pest proofing of the freight shed; - The installation/fabrication and use of suitable cargo storage systems and practises to limit pest access to externally stored cargo; - The removal of pest attractants and habitat to the maximum possible extent from those areas adjacent to cargo storage areas; - The development and implementation of standards and processes for receiving and refusing delivered cargo; and, - Engagement with suppliers regarding expected/required condition of delivered goods.
Additionally, current arrangements see the biosecurity officer effectively being ‘chained to the site’ in order to attempt to perform repeated cargo clearances and other biosecurity duties. This greatly limits or entirely prevents the officer from being able to effectively engage with other stakeholders which, if done, would somewhat decrease the current strain on Port Macquarie biosecurity systems.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Biosecurity responsibilities and approaches The LHIB has begun the process of engaging key suppliers, community members, and stakeholders in relation to their general biosecurity duty and the steps which they can/must take to assist with effective biosecurity delivery. Although severely resource constrained, it is intended that this process will lead to the production of relevant educational communications and information for various stakeholders. The rates of voluntary compliance with biosecurity requests and requirements are generally found to be quite high when suitable information is provided. Basic requirements rapidly become normalised and assist with effective biosecurity delivery, thus providing a high return on investment for relatively little effort.
Several key suppliers were met with over the course of this audit and all expressed an understanding of the need for specific biosecurity measures to be undertaken for cargo destined for LHI. All expressed a keenness to receive more information and communications and a willingness to comply with additional measures.
Given this climate, and the shared responsibility of biosecurity, it is likely that Birdon may be able to utilise the good will of suppliers to good effect to assist with ensuring that cargo is delivered in a pest free and suitable state. Additionally, as a freight provider, it is likely that Birdon is in a position to directly determine the standard that they expect or require from suppliers of various goods.
The adoption of a collaborative approach to cargo preparation and delivery would likely be of benefit. The provision of pest-proof cargo cages to key suppliers of break-bulk cargo is one possible practical way that Birdon could facilitate the delivery of certain goods in a proper state that, in turn, assists them with fulfilling their own biosecurity duty without the need to expend extra time re- packing cargo.
Increased engagement (by all parties) with the public and those that order goods is also likely to be of significant benefit. As the public are generally the first point of contact with suppliers of goods, ensuring that these stakeholders are aware of their biosecurity requirements/those biosecurity measures that relate to the types of cargo they are ordering is a crucial component of effective biosecurity delivery. The creation and provision of educational and information materials for these audiences which include practical ‘how-to’ or ‘what to ask for’ type guides could likely be used to good effect.
Specific recommendations are detailed later in this audit. Biosecurity delivery would greatly benefit from the addressing of the following broad areas:
- The production and distribution of communications and education/educational material to suppliers of goods and public stakeholders; - The development and implementation of minimum standards of cargo packaging/condition as a condition of their acceptance and shipping by Birdon; - The creation of a supplier engagement strategy by the LHIB and Birdon; - The creation and use of a consignment note/other declaration to create a formalised receiving process by Birdon; and/or. - The engagement of NSW Department of Primary Industries to provide advice on biosecurity delivery expectations and standards.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Contract Birdon provides shipping services to the Island under contract LHIB 2016-18 (28th March 2018). This audit is not intended to serve as a comprehensive contract review, however general observations are presented in Appendix B. Birdon was contacted with requests for clarifying information (requests sent 15/4/20, 9/6/20, and 9/7/20), although some information was received, not all requests for further information were addressed in time to inform this audit.
General observations suggest that improving on-site biosecurity measures, procedures, and processes would assist with the effective delivery of several contract commitments.
The processes, procedures, and liabilities regarding potential scenarios should a live pest be detected on board the vessel en route or on arrival to LHI are not clear. It would likely be of significant benefit for all parties to discuss and determine such processes and liabilities for potential pest detection scenarios aboard the MV Island Trader.
Such scenarios, for example, may include the detection of a live rodent in the cargo hold of the MV Island Trader before the commencement of unloading procedures on LHI. Such thought experiments are likely to yield pertinent questions relating to potential actions or directions such as the vessel being instructed to stand-off until pest absence/removal can be confirmed, or vessel unload refusal. Any such scenarios would clearly result in costs and associated liabilities amongst numerous other complexities. The thorough examination of such scenarios is likely to benefit all parties whilst also being likely to put the relative costs of upgrades and improvements into some form of context for all involved. As the current level of pest exclusion from cargo is not robust, it may prove pertinent to initiate these discussions and reach agreed conclusions as a priority.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Recommendations It is important to note that the recommendations contained in this report aim to be real-world implementable rather than directing those involved purely towards theoretical best practise standards. These recommendations generally only aim to address the ‘prevention’ aspect of the biosecurity chain. Site visits to best-practise cargo biosecurity facilities are likely to assist with putting both the LHI shipping operation and the recommendations contained within this audit into context.
A recent audit has provided the LHIB with 123 biosecurity related recommendations. Although some recommendations may be repeated here, these recommendations are to be seen as standing alone from those previously supplied and do not demote or promote any previously identified priority actions.
An approximate priority class is provided for each recommendation. The priority classes should be interpreted as:
- 1 - The immediate delivery of these recommendations will greatly assist in addressing the inherent/currently very high biosecurity risk and is likely to decrease the likelihood of pest transport to LHI in the short term. - 2 - Delivery of these recommendations is likely to assist the relevant parties in effective biosecurity delivery and facilitate increased efficiencies in this delivery; and/or, these recommendations are likely to require a longer temporal scale in order to be fully implemented/effective but should be initiated at the earliest possible opportunity.
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Infrastructure and cargo storage areas Ref Recommendation Priority The Birdon LHI freight shed is made at least rodent proof via mechanical exclusion methods - works are to utilise 1.1 an expert contractor and/or expert advice. 1 The S/SE dividing wall within the shed has an additional suitable concrete kick-step/barrier poured on both sides 1.1b of the wall after gaps are suitably addressed. 1 Suitable shelving/racking is installed and utilised to store as much cargo as is possible off-of the ground in 1.2 external areas. 1 1.3 External shelving/racking is fitted with rodent exclusion measures such as rodent collars/guards. 1 A pest exclusion fence is constructed along the entire N/NW boundary of the hardstand/cargo storage area and 1.4 LHI freight shed. 2 The process of investigating and obtaining approvals to install a suitable pest exclusion fence along the entire 1.4b N/NW boundary of the relevant area is begun. Fence design to be undertaken by/with expert consultation. 1 Pallet stands which limit pest access to cargo are to be designed by/with expert consultation, fabricated, and 1.5 trialled for refinement and wider adoption - stands to be utilised at least until an effective fence is constructed. 1 1.6 The skip bin and any other refuse bins are moved away from the LHI cargo storage and handling areas. 1 1.7 The piles and groups of rocks are broken down and spread away from the site. 1 The rocks leading to and around the stormwater drain valve are removed - bollards or other suitable devices are 1.8 installed around valve. 1 1.9 No cargo is stored on unsealed ground overnight. 1 A bold line is painted 800-1000mm in from the edge of the hardstand area and no cargo is stored over this line 1.10 (i.e. towards the grass/vegetated area). 1 1.11 The gangway has effective rodent exclusion measures fitted and utilised whenever it is down. 1 All lines, leads, cables, etc. that connect the vessel to the wharf are correctly fitted with suitable rodent guards 1.12 at all times. 1 1.13 Accumulations of unused equipment, rubbish, etc. are cleared from the area adjacent to the hardstand. 1 All cargo stored in the freight shed is arranged in such a way as to allow detection dog and biosecurity officer 1.14 access to at least two sides of the cargo. 1 All cargo is stored at least 300mm off of any shed walls to facilitate inspection of wall integrity, trapping, and 1.15 inspection. 1
1.16 The area of grass adjacent to the external hardstand is kept mown to a height <20mm at all times or made 1 baron. The installation of a wash-down facility which meets all environmental requirements to allow wash-down that 1.17 may utilise fungicides, herbicides, insecticides, etc. 2 1.18 An infrastructure and storage area pest proofing inspection and repair process and schedule is developed. 2 1.19 The cargo hold of the MV Island Trader is fitted with remotely accessible motion triggered wildlife cameras. 1 1.19a These cameras are accessed and checked prior to the cargo hold being opened on the LHI end. 1
1.20 Failing upgrades to systems and processes that facilitate improved hold inspection access, cargo storage 1 configuration and capacity is reviewed to facilitate proper hold access prior to the opening of the hold.
Notes Guidance regarding recommendations 1.1/1.1b has recently been provided to Birdon and is attached in Appendix C. The demonstrated quality of those works previously undertaken suggests that an expert contractor and/or an expert consultant will need to be engaged to undertake these works.
Although the site is in a designated flood effected area and therefore subject to the Port Macquarie- Hastings Council Flood Policy (2018), this does not immediately preclude the construction of an effective pest exclusion fence. Similar fences have been approved and constructed in other flood
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Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
effected areas. These gained approval by utilising fences fitted with lockable breakaways which are opened under certain conditions/forecast conditions. The design process will need to utilise a suitable expert to ensure that any fence is fit for purpose.
The installation and trialling (before wider adoption) of a remotely accessible motion triggered wildlife camera to assist with proper inspection of the cargo hold before it is opened on the LHI end has previously been suggested to Birdon. It was reported that this was met with reticence by the crew of the vessel. The current inability to perform proper inspection of the hold for live rodents prior to the hold being opened presents a significant and fundamental departure from basic biosecurity principles. The re-configuration of the hold to allow biosecurity officer and detection dog access presents the next possible robust option available to managers.
Processes and procedures Ref Recommendation Priority 2.1 Prescriptive cargo condition delivery standards are developed and implemented. 1 2.2 A biosecurity consignment note/declaration is developed and implemented. 2 2.3 Cargo rejection/refusal guidelines, processes and procedures are developed and implemented. 1 A 'user pays' cargo treatment and packaging service/option for on-site treatment of any inadequately 2.4 packaged/treated cargo is developed and implemented. 2 Relevant training and educational/communications products are updated or developed for Birdon staff in 2.5 relation to cargo standards, handling and storage, etc. with training being delivered once every 12 months. 1 All cargo is set down and made available for biosecurity inspection regardless of when it is delivered (I.E. no 2.6 cargo is transported directly from the delivery vehicle to the vessel without inspection). 1 Birdon employees are officially directed to set aside any items of biosecurity concern and alert the relevant 2.7 biosecurity officer of the items requiring inspection. 1 All palletised cargo is packed on a solid sheet of sheet metal, colourbond, PVC, etc. to prevent pest access 2.8 through the pallet slatting. 1
2.9 A subset of the cargo transport cages are retro-fit to be made pest-proof and/or pest proof cargo containers are 1 purchased. All cargo cage transported cargo that is not stored/shipped in the freezer is packed into pest proof 2.10 containers/cargo cages. 1 2.11 All Australia Post cargo is stored and transported in pest-proof cargo containers/cages. 1 2.11a Australia Post is supplied with a stock of pest proof containers/cages and pack mail freight directly into the units. 2
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Notes Existing cargo cages are able to be retro-fit in such a way as to make them effectively pest-proof when properly used. The inside of cages can be lined with properly joined/sealed sheet metal, or 3- 4mm PVC, and purpose built lids constructed. Similar retro-fitting has successfully been undertaken by other shipping operations which deliver to pest free-islands. Commercially available plastic pest- proof shipping containers are also available, however care must be taken to ensure they are fit for purpose. The provision of such cargo cages to priority suppliers (in addition to the release of relevant communications and education materials) would likely see stock packed directly into these units at its point of origin. Following inspection upon receiving of the goods, the operator can have confidence that no pests are able to access the cargo whilst it is stored prior to shipment.
Figure xx: Pest proof cargo cages being inspected Figure xx: Cargo cages landed on Macquarie Island in the Australian Antarctic Division facility. awaiting transport to base and final inspection. Photo: Sue Robinson Photo: Kim Kliska
Other Ref Recommendation Priority The communication and reporting pathway between the LHIB and Birdon regarding biosecurity delivery, 3.1 incidents, etc. is formalised and updated to include relevant routine reporting. 1 Birdon and the LHIB discuss and agree on potential scenarios and liabilities regarding pest detection on/in cargo 3.2 and/or the vessel prior to unloading at LHI. 1 Relevant Birdon and LHIB staff organise a site visit to the Australian Antarctic Division's Hobart Cargo and 3.3 Biosecurity Centre. 2 The Birdon (LHISF) biosecurity risk management document is reviewed and re-written to include specific actions 3.4 that are to be undertaken with different types of cargo, and specific treatments and handling procedures. 1
Creation of a Birdon biosecurity stakeholder engagement strategy which incorporates clear goals, deliverables, 3.5 and outcomes. 2 The design of future vessels/future cargo hold arrangements allows for sufficient access for a biosecurity officer 3.6 and detection dog to access the cargo for inspection prior to the hold being opened. 2 Future cargo facility designs and upgrades incorporate a fully rodent proof fenced external storage yard or a 3.7 pest proof shed which can accommodate all received and stored cargo. 2 LHIB and Birdon continue to trial and adopt new pest detection methods and technologies as they become 3.8 available. 2
3.9 An ongoing audit and review schedule is developed for both Birdon and LHIB biosecurity measures and 2 processes.
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References AECOM (2016). Lord Howe Island Biosecurity Strategy. Lord Howe Island Board document.
Broome, K. (2007). Island Biosecurity as a Pest Management Tactic In New Zealand. Managing Vertebrate Invasive Species: Proceedings of an International Symposium (G. W. Witmer, W. C. Pitt, K. A. Fagerstone, Eds). USDA/APHIS/WS, National Wildlife Research Center, Fort Collins, CO, USA.
Craik, W., Palmer, D., and Sheldrake, R. (2016). Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity – Discussion Paper: Is Australia’s national biosecurity system and the underpinning Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity fit for the future?
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.
New South Wales Biosecurity Act 2015.
New South Wales Biodiversity Act 2016.
Reid, C. A. M., Jenkins Shaw, J., and Jensen A.R. (2018). The Australian Museum Lord Howe Island Expedition 2017—Coleoptera. Technical Reports of the Australian Museum, Online, 26: 53–67. https://doi.org/10.3853/j.1835-4211.26.2018.1706
Russell, J.C., Towns, D.R., Clout, M.N. (2008). Review of rat invasion biology: implications for island biosecurity. Science for Conservation, 286. Department of Conservation, Wellington. iVariation due to metrics used: 61% = those re-eradications where trapping/searching produced a body/bodies. 85% = those re-eradications which relied on a certain period of absence data indicating success.
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Appendix A Risk Assessment
Standard risk assessment methodology which utilises a likelihood and consequence matrix (Table A1) can be well suited to help guide biosecurity priorities and activities. Difficulties exist in effectively accounting for uncertainty and the subjectivity of some assessments in the process.
It is often useful to apply an extra layer of analysis or thought to matrix findings to attempt to categorise the risk as:
- Generally acceptable. o Risks have little or no impact and/or are unlikely to occur. They do not pose an immediate threat to the goals, project, or organisation. Risks categorised as ‘low’ often fall into this category; or, - As low as reasonably possible. o Risks are tolerable or not significantly damaging. Work/decisions can proceed without immediately addressing these risks. Risks categorised as ‘low’ and ‘medium’ may fall into this category. Note: Caution must be applied when attempting to interpret/integrate uncertainty when looking to move risks into this category; or, - Unacceptable. o Risks in this region are damaging, likely to occur, and/or would threaten the goals, project, or organisation. Risks categorised as ‘high’ or ‘extreme’ often fall into this category. Within the biosecurity context some ‘medium’ risks are often considered for inclusion.
Tables A2 and A3 are included to provide indicative assistance during the decision making process.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Table A1: Risk assessment matrix
Consequence Rating Likelihood Severe Major Moderate Minor Negligible Rating 1 6 11 16 21 Almost Certain Very High Very High High Medium Low 1 2 7 12 17 22 Likely Very High High Medium Medium Low 3 4 9 14 19 24 Possible Very High High Medium Medium Low 5 6 11 16 21 26 Unlikely High Medium Medium Low Low 7 8 13 18 23 28 Rare High Medium Low Low Low 9 10 15 20 25 30
Table A2: Risk likelihood table
Likelihood of entry, establishment, and spread Rating Description Very high probability of occurring within the budgeted period. Almost Has happened several times in the past year and in at least 4 of the previous 5 years, OR, has a Certain >90% chance of occurring in the budgeted period if the risk is not mitigated. High probability of occurring within the budgeted period. Likely Has happened at least once in the past year and in 3 of the previous 5 years, OR, has a 60-90% chance of occurring in the budgeted period if the risk is not mitigated. Even probability of occurring during the budgeted period. Possible Has happened at least once during the past 5 years but not in every year, OR, has a 40 - 60% chance of occurring in the budgeted period if the risk is not mitigated. Low but not negligible probability of occurring during the budgeted period. Unlikely May have occurred once in the last 5 years, OR, has a 10 - 30% chance of occurring in the future if the risk is not mitigated. Very low probability of occurring during the budgeted period. Rare Has not occurred in the past 5 years, OR, may occur in exceptional circumstances.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Appendix B Contract Observations
Birdon Contract Section Contract Wording Requested information Observations Conditions of Tender d) Demonstrated understanding and capacity to meet NA Very high rate of pest interaction with 11.3.2 – Evaluated Criteria. biosecurity requirements cargo storage areas and pest transport to LHI. Conditions of Tender “The contractor must maintain an effective biosecurity NA Rate of pest interaction with the wharf 15 – Rodent Management system to ensure that the mainland wharf site, vessel site, and goods demonstrates that and Biosecurity Measures. and all goods awaiting departure to LHI are managed in a current biosecurity systems does not way that effectively maintains isolation from effectively maintain isolation from contamination by pests and diseases.” contamination by pest organisms. Conditions of Tender “As a minimum this will require a biosecurity regime and - Training log or other relevant records that No evidence of delivered biosecurity 15 – Rodent Management plan to be approved by the LHIB prior to the contract show timing(s) and attendance of training provided. and Biosecurity Measures. being signed and including: biosecurity training delivery. Biosecurity training for stevedores and vessel No evidence of detailed vessel pest crew - Site and vessel pest control plan. control plan provided. A site and vessel pest control plan that details the use, location and frequency of use of - Records/proof of relevant pest No records of treatments provided. insecticides, fumigation, rodenticides and treatments for past 24 months. mandatory inspection and replenishment of Rodent baiting is undertaken by baits and/or traps - Relevant records/proof of 6 monthly LHIB/contractors. Records of treatment providers, dates and inspections by qualified SSC inspector for details must be kept and made available to the past 24 months. No evidence of SSC inspection LHIB on request certificates provided. Rodent baiting using a bait approved by the LHIB must occur Rat guards observed to be inconsistently - At the mainland wharf facility. Around the used at LHI end and improperly used at facility perimeter, cargo storage, transit PMQ. and loading areas and near gangways. Bait stations should be located at no further Requests for relevant documentation apart than 20 metres along those areas. sent to Biron 15/4/20, 9/6/20, and Specific details to be provide in the site 9/7/20. pest control plan
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
- On-board the vessel. Bait stations should be maintained on the vessel particularly in high risk areas such as cargo holds, galley (inc pantry and dry goods store), living quarters, laundry room, engine room and rope lockers. Specific details to be provide in the vessel pest control plan The vessel must meet the vector (rodent and mosquito) aspects of the international Ship Sanitation Certification (SSC) regime and must undergo 6 monthly inspections by a qualified inspector. Certificates must be provided to the LHIB Rat guards approved by the LHIB must be applied to all mooring ropes used when berthing on the mainland or on LHI. Options for the gangway are to be approved by the LHIB”
Conditions of Tender “The Contractor will be required to pay the costs - Records/receipts that provide indicative LHIB currently pays biosecurity 15 – Rodent Management associated with the rodent control measures.” reference/examples of biosecurity related detection dog related costs, rodent and Biosecurity Measures. expenditure for past 24 months. baiting and trapping, etc.
- Records/receipts that indicate how the LHIB obtained grant funding was approx. $20 - 25,000 paid to Birdon by the provided to Birdon 26/6/2018 for LHIB on 26/6/2018 for biosecurity Biosecurity upgrades. Birdon committed upgrades was utilised in terms of $3,465 for upgrades. $6,435 was biosecurity upgrades. committed from LHIB grant funding. $18,565 of the grant funding remains - Records/receipts that indicate how available. Birdon’s matched contribution to the above was utilised in terms of biosecurity $16,060 paid by Birdon for works to activities/upgrades. prevent rodent access to freight shed (~25/8/19). These works were demonstrably ineffective.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
“A biosecurity practices audit will be undertaken by the NA No previous LHIB biosecurity practices LHIB at least 2 weeks before the first vessel departure audit of PMQ operations found. under this contract and 6 monthly for the duration of the contract.” Conditions of Tender “The mainland cargo storage area and vessel must be NA All being met/facilitated by Birdon. 15 – Rodent Management made available for inspection by LHIB staff or and Biosecurity Measures. contractors, including a certified pest detection dog upon reasonable request.
The LHIB retains the right to undertake rodent / pest monitoring around the mainland cargo storage area / departure wharf using a variety of methods i.e. tracking tunnels, wax blocks etc.
The LHIB maintains the right to undertake inspection of the vessel and cargo upon arrival, prior to and during unloading at LHI including the use of a pest detection dog.”
Conditions of Tender “Attachment A is a report prepared by the CSIRO on a - “Recommendation 6 – Establishment of a Several recommendations not being met 15 – Rodent Management Biosecurity Assessment of the mainland facility where wash-down facility […] the facility should at or not being fully met. and Biosecurity Measures. the existing shipping services operates from. The the very least be sufficient to prevent cross recommendations on the improvements to be made to contamination of other cargo […].” this facility would be expected to be carried out by any - Any plans, quotes, evidence of future contractor at this site or matched at another site.” progress etc. that relate to progressing this recommendation.
- “Recommendation 7 – Consider establishing a fence on the north-western side of the premise to prevent the movement of biota from the surrounding area onto the premise […].” - Any plans, communications regarding obtaining approvals, site inspection records, quotes, etc. that relate to progressing this recommendation.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
- “Recommendation 8 – Do not place any cargo on or near unsealed ground. Cargo should be placed well back from the edge of the hardstand to reduce the risk of biotic contamination […].” - SOPs, operating guidelines, etc. that address storing cargo on unsealed ground. - Rationale/justification for the observed and reported practises of storing cargo on unsealed ground.
Part E – Section 1, - Repeated from above in contract - - Specification and special condition for the transport of general cargo. 2 – Biosecurity Requirements. LHISF – Tender Response. “The working area is ideally suited to address the island’s NA Rate of pest trapping from cargo storage Provision of Shipping biosecurity requirements.” areas (both shed and hardstand), rodent Services for Lord Howe bait take and trapping inside the shed, Island. pest interaction with cargo, and known LHIB 2016-18. pest transport to LHI indicate that the “Mainland Facilities” area may not be ideally suited.
LHISF – Tender Response. “Staff check for damage and biosecurity hazards, and - Birdon guidelines as to what constitutes No clear or enforced definitions or Provision of Shipping ensure the freight is suitably packed for shipping.” ‘suitably packed’ for various types of cargo. procedures relating to ‘suitably packed’ Services for Lord Howe or unsuitably packed freight observed. Island. - Any Birdon training or guidance LHIB 2016-18. documentation/training materials that are “Processing Orders to provided to staff to inform/assist with ensure efficiency” checking for biosecurity hazards. LHISF – Tender Response. Generally repeats and acknowledges biosecurity related NA - Provision of Shipping measures/requirements from Conditions of Tender. Services for Lord Howe See above.
Lord Howe Island Biosecurity – Birdon Port Macquarie Audit Report – July 2020
Island. LHIB 2016-18. Biosecurity Risk “Any breach is to be documented and corrective action - Documentation of previous breaches over Documentation of previous breaches Management Document – taken to ensure that a further breach does not occur” last 12 months and completed/upcoming corrective Section 4 – Management action not provided. responsibilities. - Records of completed corrective actions. Biosecurity Risk 6.1 – “Customer consignment note advice including a - Copy of example/blank customer Existence or use of customer Management Document – declaration by freight delivery personal [sic]/suppliers consignment note advice and declaration. consignment note was not Section 6 – Reference stating that goods being shipped meet Biosecurity observed/provided. documents. regulations” Biosecurity Risk 8.2.1 – “Ongoing weed control throughout the year” - Records of weed management activities Vegetation management has reportedly Management Document – from last 12 months. been sporadic. No official Section 8 – Site/premise information/records provided. details. - Lists of any specific weed species targeted.
- Any relevant training materials if not provided as part of previous request for information. Biosecurity Risk 9.1.3 – “Consignment Note declaration to be completed - Copy of example/blank customer Existence or use of customer Management Document – by the customer/customer’s supplier declaring the goods consignment note advice and declaration. consignment note was not Section 9 – Operational being shipped do not contain BRM” observed/provided. procedures. Biosecurity Risk 9.1.4 – “Inadequately packed cargo will not be received - Definition and/or training material No clear or enforced definitions or Management Document – by LHISF mainland staff” related to the definition of procedures relating to ‘suitably packed’ Section 9 – Operational ‘inadequately/adequately packed cargo’ or unsuitably packed freight observed. procedures. - Records of any refused cargo deliveries Goods with biosecurity matter and for last 12 months. inadequate packaging observed being received and transported. Biosecurity Risk 9.1.7 – “Cargo that has any evidence of BRM will not be - Records of any refused cargo deliveries Cargo with ‘Biosecurity Related Matter’ Management Document – received” for last 12 months. was received for shipping. Section 9 – Operational procedures.
Appendix C Rodent Exclusion Guidance
Rodent Exclusion Guidance
Disclaimer
SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. has prepared this report based on the agreed scope of work and acts as an advisor to the Client/Principal (“Client”) (Lord Howe Island Board). All reasonable skill and care has been exercised in the provision of these services.
This report was commissioned by and prepared for the exclusive use of the Client. To the maximum extent permitted by relevant governing law SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. is not responsible and will not be liable to the Client or any person or organisation for, or in relation to, any matter dealt within this report. This exclusion of liability extends to any real or perceived loss or damage suffered by the Client or any person or organisation arising from matters dealt with or conclusions expressed in this report (including without limitation matters arising from any negligent act or omission of SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. or for any loss or damage suffered by any party relying upon the matters dealt with or conclusions expressed in this Report).
Except where expressly stated, SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. has not verified the validity, accuracy or comprehensiveness of any information supplied to SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. in relation to the preparation of this report and/or any associated advice or recommendations.
Where site inspections, work observations, testing, or fieldwork have taken place, this report is based on the information made available by the Client or their nominees during the visit, visual observations and any subsequent discussions with relevant parties. The validity and comprehensiveness of supplied information has not been independently verified and, for the purposes of this report, it is assumed that the information provided is both complete and accurate. It is further assumed that normal activities were being undertaken at the site during any site visit(s), unless explicitly stated otherwise.
This Report or any part thereof cannot be copied or reproduced in whole or part for any purpose without the prior written agreement of SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd.
Prepared by: SP Expeditions Pty. Ltd. Simon Pahor ABN: 47 623 639 243
Contents Scope ...... 1 Rodent physical capabilities ...... 2 Basics ...... 3 Exclusion screening ...... 4 Doors ...... 4 Filler materials ...... 5 Sealants, caulking, and gap fillers ...... 6 Expanding foam ...... 6 Site specific advice ...... 7 Northern wall ...... 7 All external walls ...... 7 Internal wall ...... 8 Doors ...... 9 Office ...... 10 Downpipes and external utilities ...... 10 Toilet ...... 11 Ventilation and other openings ...... 11 Summary tables ...... 13 Aspects to address ...... 13 Example suitable materials and technologies ...... 14 References ...... 15
Scope This document is intended to act as general guidance in relation to excluding and/or limiting rodent access to the Birdon Pty Ltd (Birdon) Lord Howe Island (LHI) freight shed, Port Macquarie, New South Wales, Australia.
This guidance is intended to provide an indication of minimum acceptable standard for any works that are undertaken with the intention of excluding or limiting rodent access. Any omission of detail or lack of particular examples/situations does not negate the need for rodent access via these means to be addressed. This document does not in itself provide a scope of works.
At the determination of the Lord Howe Island Board, all works should employ the expertise of a contractor experienced in professional rodent exclusion and/or be conducted under the direction of a suitably experienced consultant to achieve an acceptable standard of mechanical/physical rodent exclusion.
All advice and guidance contained within this document had been compiled from the cited sources and is not to be reproduced, distributed or released to any parties for commercial or professional benefit without the express written consent of the original authors.
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Rodent physical capabilities Rodent biology and physical capabilities influence how they can access buildings and structures. A basic understanding and appreciation of these capabilities will help those conducting any works to better exclude access. In undertaking these improvements, it is important to “think like a mouse” – especially one that is motivated by the appealing smells and nature of the shed, and has the luxury of ample time to try and gain access by any possible means.
The species of concern are primarily: House mouse (Mus musculus), Black rat (Rattus rattus), and Norway rat (R. norvegicus). For the purposes of this document, the term “rat/rats” refers to either/or species of rat listed above.
Rodents have front incisor teeth that grow continuously and are extremely well adapted for gnawing. They have keen smell, touch, taste and hearing senses and have been proven to be able to memorise access (and escape) routes following complex paths. As a consequence of evolving as a prey species, individuals are generally nocturnal, however, daytime activity also occurs when food or other resources are limited (this activity is generally indicative of very high population densities).
Rats Rats are extremely agile, able to climb and burrow, can swim large distances, and are extremely hardy. They can:
- Crawl/squeeze through or under any opening greater than 1.3cm (1/2 inch) wide/high; - Perform a standing jump of up to 91cm high from a flat surface; - Perform a horizontal leap of up to 120cm; - Climb smooth (including plastic) piping up to 7.6cm (3 inch) in diameter; - Can ‘shimmy’ up the externals of larger pipes and bracings by wedging themselves between the pipe and wall junction; - Can ‘chimney’ up the inside of pipes up to 11cm in diameter; - Walk on swinging/loosely secured wires and lines; - Drop 15m without being seriously injured; and - Burrow straight down for 90cm.
Mice Like rats, mice are extremely agile, able to climb, and are hardy. Mice are also much bolder than rats and will actively investigate new items in their environment. Mice can:
- Crawl/squeeze through or under openings greater than 0.65cm (1/4 inch) wide/high; - Perform a standing jump of 46cm from a flat surface; - Use walls and other vertical structures as a vertical springboard to increase total jump height; - Climb almost any textured or rough vertical surface; - Walk on swinging/loosely secured wires and lines; - Walk upside down along screen-wire, wire, etc.; and, - Drop 2.4m meters without being seriously injured.
Effectively, these capabilities coupled with a high drive to find food and secure shelter mean that if a weakness exists, it is a matter of when, and not if, a rodent finds and exploits it.
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Basics - The overall goal is to mechanically prevent rodent access. - Any opening that is 6.5mm in diameter or larger has to be suitably addressed. o A standard pencil is approximately 6-7mm in diameter. - Any measures taken must be durable and able to withstand gnawing. o Some ongoing routine inspection and maintenance will be required. - Some methods and approaches need careful installation and attention to detail to ensure they are effective. - LHI currently appears to be rodent free, a single pregnant female rodent or pair of rodents could repopulate the entire island within 2 years of being introduced.
Figure 1: Photos of mice actively squeezing through small gaps to gain building access. Source: https://www.thecitypestcompany.com
Exclusion can utilise screening, filling, plugging, etc. The specifics of the location, nature and size of the opening will dictate the best method
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Exclusion screening Screening must utilise 6.5mm x 6.5mm or smaller galvanised welded hardware mesh. Wire should be at least 0.63mm gauge, however heavier weight/thicker mesh will last for longer. Lighter gauge mesh is not to be used as it can be gnawed through.
Screening can be screwed into place or affixed in another robust way that prevents the mesh from being worked loose, pulled off, or lifted/deformed to allow access.
Figure 2: Galvanised ¼” x ¼” (~6mm x 6mm) wire mesh. Source: USA NPS
Other screening materials such as expanded metal grating, and perforated metal sheeting can also be used – however these are generally less easy to work with. All screening materials must meet the minimum specified size/dimension criteria.
Doors All general entry doors (i.e. not roller doors) should be self-closing. It is important that any self- closing system fully latches the door so that it is not left ajar. These systems will need routine inspection and servicing as required.
Door sweeps Well maintained, good quality door sweeps are an integral part of effective rodent exclusion. Rodents are known to gnaw on accessible door sweeps and will often target the edges of door sweeps where they meet the rest of the building/door frame.
Common door bottom sweeps that utilise felt, rubber, etc. are acceptable – however care must be taken if installed on slightly uneven ground. A poor mating of the sweep to the ground can allow rodent access without or with only very minimal gnawing. Brush style door sweeps are preferred – the higher initial cost is generally offset by a much longer effective product lifespan. Specialised Xcluder® door sweeps are also acceptable and recommended.
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Installing metal kick-plates on the external side of door sweeps with less than 6mm ground clearance can effectively prevent rodent access to the door sweep, extend the effective life of the door seep, and prevent gnawing.
Vertical sweep/brush style seals are to be fitted to all roller door vertical tracks and sweep/brush style seals are to be fitted as top seals on all roller doors. These seals prevent rodent access after climbing any doors/corners.
Filler materials The Birdon shed currently utilises steel-wool to plug corrugations in the sheet metal. Although this is well intended, the weight of steel wool used and lack of further sealing limits its effectiveness.
Steel wool can be used as a gap filler, however only ‘00’ (zero zero) sized steel wool is to be used. Heavier gauge wool can be pulled out or moved around by rodents and allow access. Several commercial products similar to 00 steel wool are available which incorporate woven polymers or fibres (e.g. Pestrol® steel wool rodent control DIY roll). These are acceptable as their construction is effectively the same as that as 00 steel wool.
An alternative to steel wool that will not rust is compressible copper mesh. An example of such a product is Stuf-fit®.
All filler materials must be tightly pressed and packed into any gap or void. It is not sufficient to loosely place or only lightly pack the material as a rodent can easily drag, lift, or otherwise remove the material. Applying sealant or caulking over the filler material is highly recommended and expected – doing so can totally prevent rodent interference with the filler material.
Figure 3: Stuf-fit® copper mesh being used to fill building holes. Source: https://www.copper-mesh.com/
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Figure 4: 00 gauge steel wool (left) and coarse steel wool (right) as is currently used.
Sealants, caulking, and gap fillers These can be used alone to patch and fill any small (0.6cm and smaller) gaps or cracks. Any gaps which can have any filler material packed into the void must be treated as such before any type of gap filler is applied. The type of sealant used will depend on if the material needs to expand and contract with the joined surfaces and appearance considerations.
Elastomeric sealants such as silicone and polyurethanes can be used where expansion and contraction is expected to occur. Although these can be expected to be long lasting, regular inspection will ensure damage is detected and rectified early.
Epoxy and fiberglass resins provide excellent gap filling characteristics. Epoxies can be thinned and poured into horizontal gaps that have been filled with suitable filler material to provide a long- lasting impervious plug. Roofing cement, cement patching powders, asphalt sealants, and cement mortar are also acceptable to use.
Cement can be poured within formwork that has been constructed alongside existing walls or structures. Any poured cement should be at least 5cm thick. Expert consideration will need to be given to any reinforcing/engineering requirements in relation to concrete structures.
It is highly desirable to have any gaps into which filler material has been tightly packed also capped with a suitable sealant. This makes rodent interference with the filler material difficult, can prevent rusting/staining, and extend the effective life of the material.
Expanding foam Expanding foam products are widely used for DIY rodent exclusion. Although the use of foam is acceptable as a stop-gap measure, rodents are easily able to gnaw through these products and they are not a standalone long-term solution.
Should a specific gap or crack prove difficult to access and treat with another sealant, expanding foam may be used, however a suitable amount of filler material must be packed into the void before it is applied. As expanding foams generally degrade and become brittle when exposed to UV, any excess must be trimmed flush after it has set. Any accessible areas of expanding foam must then also have an additional sealing/caulking compound applied over the top where possible.
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Figure 5: An external wall with protruding expanding foam and coarse steel wool.
Site specific advice Northern wall The north/north-west wall of the freight shed currently utilises coarse steel wool to seal gaps formed by the corrugations of the steel sheeting/walling. Although well intentioned and somewhat effective, this is to be replaced with a more suitable filler material. Following the installation of this material, the application of a suitable caulking compound along the entire length of this wall from at least the inside of the shed would be of significant benefit and increase the longevity of the product used.
It is likely that a viscous mix of epoxy, or asphalt sealant could be well employed here as it could be poured into the internal runnels formed by the structure and allowed to set as a plug over the filler material.
Figure 6: Internal photos of N/NW wall showing coarse steel wool and runnel for sealing.
All external walls All external walls will need significant attention – numerous large gaps were observed along most walls.
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Figure 7: Examples of gaps along shed walls.
Figure 8: Example of wall/roof flashing that would require additional sealing. Source: https://www.shedblog.com.au
The junction between any roof flashing and walling panels needs to be adequately sealed. This may be able to be achieved by either fitting additional sheeting/mesh which can be attached to prevent access, or the filling of the gap with suitable filling material and a viscous caulking compound.
Any other openings in the external walls need to be treated in the same manner. Examples may include the corrugations in wall sheeting above roller door frames (figure 9), and any patches or repair sheeting that has been added to the shed walls.
Internal wall The internal dividing wall has a significant number of large gaps which must be addressed. It is most likely that sheet metal and/or mesh will need to be securely fitted to begin addressing this wall. The pouring of a concrete kick-step on at least the south/south-east side of this wall (that is, the side that is not in the LHI fright shed) that is at least 50mm thick and at least 150mm high is highly recommended (potentially required) to address this wall. The concrete must mate closely with the wall sheeting. Pouring of a kick-step on the LHI freight shed side of this wall is likely to assist in improving the durability and longevity of any rodent proofing measures.
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A concrete kick-step poured over the additional retro-fitting will help to ensure that the entire length of this wall is well sealed. As there was some obvious physical damage to this wall, concreting will also add some durability to the fix. This entire wall needs to be thoroughly inspected and treated.
Doors All doors, including roller doors, will need their door sweeps and seals thoroughly inspected. Standard compressible rubber sweeps on roller doors are acceptable however these will need to be closely monitored and repaired/replaced as needed. Brush style bottom sweeps are preferred.
Attention is to be given to the edges of all doors and their junctions with any wall/frame structures – achieving a gapless seal when each door is closed is of great importance.
The top side and vertical channels of each roller door will need addressing as significant gaps exist. The corrugated texture of the door, combined with the ability for rats to climb using corners, means that these potential access points cannot be left in their current state. Specific inspection of the gaps at height will need to be carried out. It is likely that the fixing of additional tight fitting brush/sweep style roller door top seals and vertical channel brush/sweep seals will be required.
Figure 9: Gaps under the internal wall.
Figure 10: A ground up view of a Birdon roller door showing significant gap along top edge and open wall sheeting corrugations.
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Office It would be of benefit to treat all office walls and doors with the same attention to detail as the other walls and structures. Any internal piping or utilities which pass through the shared S/SE wall will need to be adequately addressed and sealed.
Figure 11: Example of bottom and vertical sweep seal (left) and a top sweep seal (right). Note: the image to the right shows gap at top and track join, and unaddressed gaps in wall sheeting corrugations. Source: https://www.cleverseal.com/ - https://www.busybee.com.au
Downpipes and external utilities All downpipes must have suitable mechanical exclusion attachments that prevent rodents from accessing the internals of the piping. These may either be external mesh/grating, or internal one- way non-return valves (see toilet notes).
Figure 12: An example of a well-treated external down-pipe at Birdon to exclude internal pipe access. Note: External rodent collar/guard would still be required.
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External downpipes, utilities, and other fittings must have suitable external rat guards/collars installed. These guards are to be installed above rodent jumping height. Collars are to:
- Be constructed of galvanised steel, hard alloys/metals, or colourbond, etc. - Be conical/cone shaped. o The base (open end) of the cone must extend to a radius of at least 30cm from the vertical structure. - Be made of material at least 30cm (approx. 12”) wide (to give appropriate angle of overhang). - Base of the collar must be above rodent jumping height.
Other points/specifications:
- Should a conical shape not be desirable or achievable, a flat disc of suitable material can be fitted. This disc must extend to a radius of at least 45cm (approx. 18”) from the vertical structure. - Any supporting hardware, anchoring arms, etc. must be attached to either style of collar from a point/points above the collar. - If the join of the collar cannot fit flush to the vertical structure, a gap of less than 6mm (approx ¼”) is acceptable however this must be thoroughly caulked and inspected regularly.
Figure 13: Example schematic illustrating rodent excluding collar and disc fittings (left) and fitted collars (right) - note the collar tightly conforms to the wall to prevent rodent shimmying up wall. Source: Baker et. al. 1994.
Toilet The toilet located in the shed is to have a suitable one-way non-return valve fitted to the waste pipe to prevent access via sewerage/septic system piping. These same valves could be considered for fitting to any other pipes/drains that cannot be otherwise mechanically sealed.
Ventilation and other openings Roof ventilation such as whirly birds or any other fittings, any internal drains, and any other openings into the shed are to have suitable exclusion fitted. In these examples, the fitting of suitable
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mesh is likely to allow for the designed purpose of the fitting/fixture to be fulfilled whilst effectively excluding rodent access.
Figure 15: Crawl space vent fitted with ¼” x ¼” mesh behind metal grill.
Source: USA NPS
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Summary tables The below tables are intended to serve as reference guides and suggestions only. Although they incorporate information contained elsewhere within this document, they are not to be utilised as a stand-alone reference or scope of works. Lists are not comprehensive in terms of works required to fulfil any contractual or otherwise agreed obligations between any parties. Any products, brands, and technologies included are for reference and/or to act as examples only.
Aspects to address Area to address Issues Potential method to address issues North/north-west wall where steel - Gaps left by corrugations of - Fill gaps with suitable filler material profile meets concrete floor slab. wall sheeting metal. and then apply/pour sealant from - Current use of coarse steel inside shed until flush with concrete wool and expanding foam, floor slab. and lack of sealant. - Treat external side of filled gaps with suitable sealant. Bottom edges of all external walls. - Gaps left by corrugations of - As above. wall sheeting metal. - Retro-fitting of mesh/sheet metal to - Areas of significant gaps close large gaps. where wall sheeting does - Filling of any remaining gaps after not meet slab. additional mesh/sheeting added. Top of wall profile and roof flashing - Potential gaps between - Attachment of additional junction. wall sheeting and roof mesh/sheeting to wall and flashing to flashing allowing rodent prevent access to gap. access. - Filling of gap with suitable filler material and sealant. Other openings/gaps in external - Other gaps and openings. - Attachment of mesh/sheeting or walls. E.G. gaps in corrugations of suitable filling as required. wall sheets above roller doors. Internal (south/south-east) wall - Significant gaps formed by - Fitting of mesh/sheeting as required where steel profile meets concrete both corrugations of wall to cover large gaps. floor slab. sheeting and by wall - Filling and sealing of smaller gaps. sheeting not extending - Pouring of concrete kick-step along to/meeting with slab. both sides of entire length of wall to - Vulnerability of wall/slab prevent future join integrity due to floating movement/compromise. join. Door seals/sweeps. - Gaps left under doors. - Fitting of suitable door seals and - Gaps around edges of all sweeps under each door (sweep style doors. preferred). - Gaps at top of roller doors. - Fitting of external kick-step to further limit rodent access and increase bottom seal longevity. - Fitting of vertical sweeps along roller door tracks. - Fitting of sweeps at top of roller doors.
Services/utilities that enter shed. - Potential gaps around - Fill all gaps with suitable filler areas where services and material and sealant. utilities enter shed. E.G. wash-basin pipes, electrical cables, etc.
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Area to address Issues Potential method to address issues Downpipes. - Rodent access to internals - Fitting of suitable mesh to prevent of downpipes access to internals. - Installation of one way valve inside pipe.
Downpipes and external - Rodents climbing externals - Installation of suitable rodent collars utilities/fittings. of piping. around pipes/fittings. Toilet. - Rodent access to shed via - Fitting of one-way valve to waste waste pipe. pipe. Ventilation and other openings. - Gaps in vents, whirlybirds, - Fitting of mesh behind/under etc. ventilation and other openings.
Example suitable materials and technologies Material Application Example ‘00’ Steel wool. - Filler material for stuffing https://www.bunnings.com.au/rocket-100g- Note: finer grade steel wool into gaps, joins, cracks, etc. grade-00-very-fine-steel-wool-trade- is acceptable. - Must be tightly packed. pack_p1661304
https://www.pestrol.com.au/buy-online/steel- wool-rodent-deterrent/ Copper wool (e.g. Stuf-fit®). - As above. https://www.fishpond.com.au/Electronics/Stuf- fit-Copper-Mesh-For-Mouse-Rat-Rodent- Control-as-well-as-Bat-Snell-Control-91m- Roll/6790840099558 Silicone sealants. - Sealing of <6mm gaps. https://www.selleys.com.au/products/sealants/ Polyurethane sealants. - Sealing after filling gap with selleys-roof-and-gutter-silicone/ Asphalt sealants. filler material. Epoxies. https://www.sami.com.au/products/crack-joint- sealants/samifilla-ec/
https://www.epoxymix.com.au/collections/conc rete-repair/products/concrete-epoxy-hv Exclusion mesh. - Blocking large openings. https://www.thefencingstore.com.au/welded- - Preventing access to drains. wire-mesh-galv-parent.html - Screening ventilation points. https://www.discountlandscapesupplies.com.au /product/mouse-and-snake-mesh/ Door sweep. - Fitting to underside of doors. http://www.crlaurence.com.au/crlapps/showlin e/offerpage.aspx?ProductID=10493&GroupID=2 8960&History=39325:4940:26566:28958:49774: 28958&ModelID=28960&pom=0
https://www.busybee.com.au/product/4mm- garage-door-brush-seal-nylon66/ Roller door vertical sweeps. - Fitting to vertical tracks. https://cleverseal.com/roller-door-side-seals/ Roller door top - Fitting to top of roller door https://cleverseal.com/industrial-door-top- seals/sweeps. to seal gaps. seals/ One way non-return valve. - Preventing rodents climbing https://ratflap.com/#product downpipes. - Fitting to toilet waste pipe to https://www.snake-rat-frog-in-toilet.com/ prevent rodent access from sewer. Galvanised steel sheet. - Fabrication of rodent https://robotbuildingsupplies.com.au/product/g Colourbond steel sheet. collars/pipe guards. alvanised-steel-flat-sheet/
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References Acheta Consulting Ltd. (2018). The importance of building design and proofing in the management of rodent and insect pests in food premises
Badzik, B., DiSalvo, C. L. J., Buttke, D. E., and Chase, M.F. (2014). Rodent Exclusion Manual, Mechanical Rodent Proofing Techniques: a training manual for National Park Service Employees. Natural Resource Report September 2014. National Park Service, Fort Collins, Colorado.
Baker, R. O., Bodman, G.R., and Timm, R. M. (1994), "Rodent-Proof Construction and Exclusion Methods". The Handbook: Prevention and Control of Wildlife Damage. 27.
Hoddenbach, G., Johnson, J., Disalvo, C. (1997). Rodent exclusion techniques – a training guide for National Park Service employees. National Park Service, Public Health Program, Washington, D.C., USA.
U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency. (1991). Guide to commensal rodent control – technical guide 138.
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