Evidence and Formal Models in the Linguistic Sciences
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University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2016 Evidence and Formal Models in the Linguistic Sciences Carlos Gray Santana University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Linguistics Commons, and the Philosophy of Science Commons Recommended Citation Santana, Carlos Gray, "Evidence and Formal Models in the Linguistic Sciences" (2016). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 1989. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1989 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1989 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Evidence and Formal Models in the Linguistic Sciences Abstract This dissertation contains a collection of essays centered on the relationship between theoretical model- building and empirical evidence-gathering in linguistics and related language sciences. The first chapter sets the stage by demonstrating that the subject matter of linguistics is manifold, and contending that discussion of relationships between linguistic models, evidence, and language itself depends on the subject matter at hand. The second chapter defends a restrictive account of scientific vidence.e I make use of this account in the third chapter, in which I argue that if my account of scientific evidence is correct, then linguistic intuitions do not generally qualify as scientific vidence.e Drawing on both extant and original empirical work on linguistic intuitions, I explore the consequences of this conclusion for scientific practice. In the fourth and fifth chapters I examine two distinct ways in which theoretical models relate to the evidence. Chapter four looks at the way in which empirical evidence can support computer simulations in evolutionary linguistics by informing and constraining them. Chapter five, on the other hand, probes the limits of how models are constrained by the data, taking as a case study empirically- suspect but theoretically-useful intentionalist models of meaning. Degree Type Dissertation Degree Name Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Graduate Group Philosophy First Advisor Michael Weisberg Subject Categories Linguistics | Philosophy | Philosophy of Science This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1989 EVIDENCE AND FORMAL MODELS IN THE LINGUISTIC SCIENCES Carlos Gray Santana A DISSERTATION in Philosophy Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2016 Supervisor of Dissertation Michael Weisberg Professor and Chair of Philosophy Graduate Group Chairperson Samuel Freeman, Avalon Professor of the Humanities and Graduate Chair of Philosophy Dissertation Committee Daniel J. Singer, Assistant Professor of Philosophy Elisabeth Camp, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University EVIDENCE AND FORMAL MODELS IN THE LINGUISTIC SCIENCES COPYRIGHT 2016 Carlos Gray Santana ABSTRACT EVIDENCE AND FORMAL MODELS IN THE LINGUISTIC SCIENCES Carlos Santana, Author Michael Weisberg, Supervisor This dissertation contains a collection of essays centered on the relationship between theoretical model-building and empirical evidence-gathering in linguistics and related language sciences. The first chapter sets the stage by demonstrating that the subject matter of linguistics is manifold, and contending that discussion of relationships between linguistic models, evidence, and language itself depends on the subject matter at hand. The second chapter defends a restrictive account of scientific evidence. I make use of this account in the third chapter, in which I argue that if my account of scientific evidence is correct, then linguistic intuitions do not generally qualify as scientific evidence. Drawing on both extant and original empirical work on linguistic intuitions, I explore the consequences of this conclusion for scientific practice. In the fourth and fifth chapters I examine two distinct ways in which theoretical models relate to the evidence. Chapter four looks at the way in which empirical evidence can support computer simulations in evolutionary linguistics by informing and constraining them. Chapter five, on the other hand, probes the limits of how models are constrained by the data, taking as a case study empirically-suspect but theoretically-useful intentionalist models of meaning. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. III LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................... VII PREFACE .................................................................................................................................. VIII CHAPTER 1: WHAT IS LANGUAGE? ..................................................................................... 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 Criteria for a conception of language ....................................................................................................... 2 Language as psychological........................................................................................................................ 5 Language as social .................................................................................................................................... 9 Language as abstract .............................................................................................................................. 18 Why a plural ontology? .......................................................................................................................... 21 Two strictures on pluralism .................................................................................................................... 22 References ............................................................................................................................................. 26 CHAPTER 2: NOT ALL EVIDENCE IS SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ..................................... 29 A puzzle about scientific epistemology .................................................................................................. 29 Evidence and Incentive .......................................................................................................................... 36 Cognitive bias and evidence-gathering ................................................................................................... 40 Evidence and the social structure of science .......................................................................................... 44 Further discussion .................................................................................................................................. 52 References ............................................................................................................................................. 54 CHAPTER 3: LINGUISTIC INTUITIONS ARE NOT SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ............. 57 iv Sources of evidence in syntax and semantics ......................................................................................... 58 Intuitions about acceptability and truth ................................................................................................. 62 The evidential role of linguistic intuitions .............................................................................................. 67 Fruitfulness ............................................................................................................................................ 69 Apt etiology and the ontology of language ............................................................................................ 70 The etiological defense—social .............................................................................................................. 71 The etiological defense—psychological .................................................................................................. 77 Reliability ............................................................................................................................................... 92 The non-evidential role of linguistic intuitions ..................................................................................... 101 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 107 References ........................................................................................................................................... 110 Appendix—Experimental Design .......................................................................................................... 116 CHAPTER 4: SIMULATION IN EVOLUTIONARY LINGUISTICS ............................... 121 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 121 Reasons for Skepticism ........................................................................................................................ 122 Simulation to the rescue? ...................................................................................................................