MSC 64th Student Conference on National Affairs Extinguishing the Flames of Fury: US Strategy and Response in the Face of Global Terror

Texas A&M University

Delegate Research Information

Round Table

Crops, Cattle, and Catastrophe: Securing America’s Food Supply

Facilitator: Dr. Christine Blackburn

------This delegate research information is not intended to be a comprehensive assessment of your assigned round table topic but rather a starting point to help launch your own personal investigations into the various associated issues. It is encouraged, if not expected, that your policy proposals will be inclusive of aspects pertaining to your round table topic that are not covered in this research compilation. You, your facilitator, your round table host, and your fellow roundtable delegates are all responsible for crafting a policy proposal that takes this into consideration.

Example Policy Proposal - SCONA 61 Winner ------

To: The Honorable Susan Rice Office Held: National Security Advisor From: Spencer Allen, Christopher Beveridge, John Breland, Karch Calkins, Johnny Childers, Rachel Clink, Zachariah Fares, Brian Fuentes, Adel Hussain, Sebastian King, Isaac Lee, Emily Otto, Joni Taylor Facilitator: COL Chris Albus Subject: Counteracting the Allure of Jihad Date: 20 February 2016

Introduction The allure of Jihad is a growing national security problem. There is an increased ability of terrorist groups to inspire those living within the U.S. to commit acts of domestic terrorism. This complex problem requires the development of a counter-narrative policy, based on American values, to limit the allure of Jihad. This is done by partnering with the Muslim community and interest groups and initiating a proactive, timely, and relevant informational campaign.

Background Combating Jihad within the United States is a key tenet of the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS). Key NSS components for combating the allure of Jihad include: ● “… collective action with responsible partners, and increased efforts to prevent the growth of violent extremism and radicalization that drives increased threats.” ● “... address the underlying conditions that can help foster violent extremism …” 1 ● “... supporting alternatives to extremist messaging.”

Together, these points offer a foundation to build a feasible, acceptable, and suitable strategy based on partnerships and a comprehensive informational campaign. A 2007 New York Police Department investigation identified a four step process describing how 2 a person progresses from an average citizen to a Jihadist (Figure 1). The progression moves through pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and finally into jihadization. Pre-radicalization occurs before the individual is exposed to radical Islam. In self-identification, the individual begins to relate more with the radical Islamic ideology than with an ideology of moderation and peace. Indoctrination occurs when the individual believes their anti-Western violent radical Islamic ideology is justified. Finally, jihadization occurs when the individual

1 "National Security Strategy." (2015): 9. The White House. Feb. 2015. Web. 19 Feb. 2016. ​ ​ 2 Precht, Tomas. Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalisation in Europe. Publication. Danish Ministry of ​ ​ Justice, 2007. Web. 19 Feb. 2016. 3 begins to act on those beliefs.

4 Figure 1: Four-step process of Radicalization. Salafism is a form of radical Islam ​ Supporting Argument Analysis The allure of Islamic inspired homegrown terrorism stems from an exploitation of the human 5 need for personal significance and cognitive closure . Individuals seeking a sense of certainty and the desire to gain a “larger-than-life” significance are susceptible to an extremist ideology that provides a black and white view of the world. Extremist ideology purports the notion that it holds all the answers. The proponents of such an ideology advertise themselves as heroes and martyrs. Dr. Kruglanski, a professor from the University of Maryland and a social psychologist, has conducted intensive research regarding the psychology behind terrorist recruitment. He concluded that combating terrorism requires replacing the glamour of Jihad with an alternative glamour. This involves enacting a policy that focuses on turning the psychological tables on 6 Islamic-inspired extremism. This research indicates a psychological vulnerability that can be exploited. As such, this policy targets that vulnerability which is located in between the steps of pre-radicalization and self-identification. Through counter-narrative initiatives the U.S. can supplant Jihadist narratives.

Recommendations The first step of providing a counter-narrative involves partnerships with Muslim community leaders and interest groups. Political leaders will engage in open dialogue with the Muslim community and build strong working relationships, creating a unified front addressing the issues. Muslim leaders will be invited to address governing bodies and have a role in the

3 ibid. ​ 4 England. Youth Justice Board. Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. By Kris Christmann. ​ ​ ​ 2012. Web. 19 Feb. 2016. 5 Kruglanski, Arie W. “Psychology Not Theology: Overcoming ISIS’ Secret Appeal.” E-International Relations. 28 ​ ​ Oct. 2014. Web. 19 Feb. 2016. 6 Sagl, Lauren. "Dr. Arie Kruglanski Discusses Psychology Behind Terrorist Recruitment." National Consortium of ​ ​ the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism. 29 Oct. 2014. Web. 19 Feb. 2016. ​ implementation of counter-narratives strategies. In reaching out to Muslim community leaders, the United States will develop a counter-narrative that builds a stronger position for Muslims in the fabric of the American Story. This will lessen the possibility of those who would feel disenfranchised with society, making them more susceptible to the Jihadist message. Similarly, a partnership with American interest groups for educational outreach should be created to promote public education of the tenets of Islam to the rest of the American public. Doing so mitigates stereotypes and creates a more educated and accepting public that effectively integrates Muslims into American society. The second step of this policy involves implementing a widespread and timely informational campaign to counter the Jihadist message of an inevitable clash between Islam and the West. Using cutting edge social media and other informational vehicles, the U.S. administers an informational campaign which disrupts the Jihadist decision-making process. By getting in front of the news media cycle or “beating them to the punch”, the U.S. will counter the extremist claim that a cultural and religious war is justified between Islam and the West. In order to defeat the inflammatory rhetoric of extremist ideology, public leaders need to unite and develop a common stance. Socio-cultural differences can be distorted to feed extremist propaganda. This united stance must be communicated early and often at all levels, from federal to local. Furthermore, the United States should exert its influence in the proactive messaging of the American narrative. Extremists use the media to incite fear and project their message. The United States needs to counter these messages by communicating events that highlight success, rather than those that focus on purely negative subjects. Leaders must also reach out to media outlets and project these messages to the public at every possible occasion. In conjunction with news media influence, the United States needs to implement a more prominent presence on social media. Such objectives are achieved through adapting counter-narratives to the specific messages from extremist accounts. By monitoring the public activity of the extremists, the United States ensures the Jihadists do not have an uncontested platform. Lastly, humor is a very powerful tool utilized to present extremist messages and ideology as ridiculous. This helps delegitimize their messages and undermines their ability to influence. There is a degree of risk associated with these options. Table 1 presents several of these risks, prioritized from high to low. These should be taken into consideration by decision makers before implementation.

Table 1: Risk Assessment

Risk Context Risk Level

Ineffective An ethnocentric anti-jihad campaign may High anti-Jihad become counterproductive and lead to an campaign attraction towards Jihad.

Mixing Church Developing programs that deal with educating Medium and State the public or developing relations within a specific sect of Islam may be infringing on the separation of church and state.

Negative An information campaign could be Medium connotation of misconstrued as negative propaganda which propaganda may lower public opinion of those who are distrustful of government influence.

Reduction of Liberal Muslim leaders cooperating with US Medium legitimacy of strategy may be seen as being Muslim Leaders overly-influenced or controlled by government

Public Backlash An emphasis of pro-Muslim programs may Low-Medium create an upset by some Americans which may lead to public unrest.

Inadequate Sponsoring an improper Muslim community Low screening for leader may create a platform for him/her to leadership exploit for personal gain.

Conclusion With this strategy, the United States Government can begin to counteract the allure of Jihad, a rising issue in Western society. This policy is feasible because the required informational and relational platforms are already in place, acceptable due to the potential benefits outweighing the risks determined in Table 1, and suitable due to the interconnectedness of the target audience via social networks, community ties, and other mediums. Partnering with Muslim communities and interest groups, as well as initiating an information campaign, will build an effective counter-narrative policy based on American values to limit the allure of Jihad.

Terms & Actors Terms Zoonotic– a disease that can be transmitted between animals and humans ​ Vectors– agents that can transmit or carry infectious pathogens to living organisms ​ Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)– Aphthae epizooticae; a highly contagious, viral disease that ​ causes blistering and lameness in cloven-hoofed animals. This disease is endemic to two-thirds of the world and is known to cause significant economic loss.

Food Security– state of food available in terms of quantity, affordability, and nutrition. ​ HACCP– Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points; systematic preventive approach to food ​ safety from biological, chemical, and physical hazards in production processes that can cause the finished product to be unsafe and designs measures to reduce these risks to a safe level.

FAD – Foreign Animal Disease; high-risk animal and/or zoonotic diseases and pests with sever ​ economics and animal and often public health consequences that are not normally present in a country or have been previously eradicated.

Exotic Plant Disease– high-risk disease, noxious weeds, and pests of crops, grassland, and ​ forests with severe economic consequences that are not normally present in a country or have been previously eradicated.

Emerging Disease– Newly identified disease resulting from the evolution or change of an ​ existing pathogen, a known infection spreading to a new area or population, or a previously unrecognized disease.

Anthrax - Bacillus anthracis; a bacterium that has been used in various biological attack. This ​ ​ disease affects humans and animals, causing skin ulcers and lacerations.

Glanders - Burkholderia mallei; a bacterium that primary affects horses and mules by creating a ​ ​ pulmonary infection. Salmonella - Salmonella typhimurium; bacterial infection that weakens the immune system. Is ​ ​ commonly found as a foodborne pathogen.

Epidemiology - refers to study and aspects of disease including incidence, distribution, possible ​ ​ control, and other factors relating to health.

Incubation period - the time between exposure to a disease and the first symptoms. ​ ​

Stamping-out - depopulation of a given group of species. This is a term used by the U.S. ​ government in their emergency management plans for the outbreak of foreign animal disease.

(FAD PReP) - Foreign Animal Disease, Preparedness & Response Plans ​ Concepts

Agroterrorism– The deliberative introduction, use, or threatened use, of a chemical, biological, ​ radiological, nuclear, or explosive agent against one or more components of the food and agriculture sectors, with the goal of causing mortality and morbidity, generating fear, precipitating economic loss, or undermining sector stability and confidence in government

Biosecurity - protecting animals, plants, humans, and the various aspect of their life cycles from ​ disease or harmful biological agents.

Biosurveillance - detection of biological/bioterrorism threats ​ Biodefense - protecting and restoring biosecurity to an entity that is susceptible to a biological ​ threat

Fictional worst-case scenario - scenarios initially used by the FBI’s Chemical Countermeasures ​ ​ Unit in order to identify weaknesses in the preventative and emergency planning. Emergency Management– strategies and steps taken after an incident in order to mitigate ​ further risk, identify areas of need, and address these areas appropriately.

Actors

MI5 - the United Kingdom’s security and counterintelligence system ​

FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation, domestic security and intelligence system for the United ​ States

RAND Corporation in the United States - research organization that develops possible ​ solutions to public policy issues in order to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous.

United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs - ​ ​ oversight committee in the United States Senate that is responsible for working with the

Department of Homeland Security and numerous aspects that affect security in the United States.

FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, specialized agency that leads ​ international efforts to defeat hunger by achieving food security.

Plum Island Animal Disease Center - current federal research building for animal diseases ​ located on the east coast of New York.

NABF - National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, Will be America's foremost animal disease ​ ​ research facility. It's being constructed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This is a

$1.25 billion facility is a biosafety level-4 laboratory and will replace Plum Island Animal

Disease Center. NBAF is expected to be operational by 2022-2023. Located in Manhattan,

Kansas.

Analysis Overview

Agricultural production and distribution systems supporting Americans are dependable.

Most citizens in this country do not worry about where their next meal will come from, and food insecurity is often a matter of personal economics, not that of true availability. Agriculture impacts our economy at a value of one trillion dollars. Exports account for an additional $68 billion. As Americans, we spend only 11 percent of our income on food. In addition to that, one in eight people in the country are employed within an agricultural supporting role. It is easy to see that the stability of a nation and its security is tied to food, water, and other agricultural products/aspects (clothing, housing materials, animal/plant byproducts, soil, etc.) as it is heavily intertwined into daily life, economics, and international affairs.

Unfortunately, a common proverb states that society is only three meals away from anarchy. MI5, the UK’s security and counterintelligence system, has done research and stated that their country’s infrastructure would crumble after only four meals. Food, however, is not the only agricultural product that the United States’ must consider when envisioning possible biological threats to national security. The FBI has also identified numerous possible national threats steaming from the agricultural industry. This is an offset of bioterrorism known as agroterrorism. An attack involving agroterrorism would have effects throughout the U.S. economy, national security, domestic and foreign affairs.

Infamous acts of agroterrorism can be found throughout the 20th century. These acts have taken on several forms from affecting work animals to poisoning food supplies. For example,

Germany launched attacks in the United States, Russia, Romania, and France where anthrax was ​ ​ introduced to draft horses, hindering the opposing sides ability to utilize large machinery and carry supplies during World War I. The horse/mule disease, glanders, was also introduced to horses being shipped to Britain as well as French cavalry horses and many of Russia’s mules and ​ horses on the Eastern Front, thus hindering troop and supply movement. Non-livestock related plans included the introduction of typhoid and other bacteria into the Chicago water system in ​ ​ 1972, yet these plans were never seen through, and the suspected group fled the country.

Furthermore, 11 restaurants, produce in grocery stores, doorknobs, and other public domains were contaminated with Salmonella typhimurium in Oregon in 1984. The attack infected 751 ​ ​ ​ ​ people with severe food poisoning and was meant to disrupt the elections going on at the time. ​ ​ This was the first and largest bioterrorism attack on the United States, to this day.

To better explain and prepare for these situations, the FBI has produced fictional worst-case scenarios. They have, over the last two decades, taken an interest in is the intentional introduction of the foreign animal disease called Aphthae epizooticae; also known as Foot and ​ ​ Mouth Disease (FMD). The intentional release of a serious pathogen upon the agricultural industry would severally burden food and resource supplies, thus manifesting into a tsunami of fear. In this worst-case scenario, the FMD disease could potentially affect 94.5 million cattle, 67 million swine, and 8.5 million sheep and goats and would halt the transport of livestock as a result of current emergency management practices. Furthermore, containment will require all traffic through the infected area to be stopped, even if the affected farm or ranch is near interstate highways. According to data collected by the FBI, an outbreak of this magnitude in California would cost between $6 to $14 billion while a nation-wide outbreak could range from $15 to $100 billion. FMD is endemic to two-thirds of the world and could easily be transported by people that are not on a government watch list and can obtain papers to travel. They could find cloven-hoofed animals carrying the disease and can contaminate clothing to transport the disease. FMD is non-zoonotic, so people contacting the contaminated clothing would not be harmed. If packed in their carry-on baggage, the clothing would attract no attention or cause suspicion. Their bags would also be protected from temperature extremes in the cargo hold. No bells or sirens would be set off, and no lights would flash.

These people then would fly directly to selected regions of the United States where they can travel to nearby locations. Targeted livestock facilities will be those that ship livestock or have people who regularly come in contact with animals. Stock shows drawing state or national exhibitors will be a target; conspirators may walk the aisles wearing shoes that last touched the ground in a diseased pen, and they would want to touch the animals. Auction barns along interstate highways would be valuable targets, as well as college farms where students leave for long weekends traveling to homes with even more livestock. These terrorists could enjoy the catwalks overlooking the auction and accidentally drop a handkerchief into the crowded pens below. At the college farms, they would ask for tours as they want to learn how to be more efficient in their country.

This scenario also accounts for specific epidemiology as FMD’s incubation period is anywhere from one to fourteen days before signs of illness, and animals may shed (spread) the virus for up to four days before clinical symptoms. If simple blisters or lameness are not recognized, the spread of the disease will continue unchecked. Animals will not die but be weakened to the point that production potential will never be achievable in their lifetime. Vaccines for this disease would require time to develop as it mutates easily. In response, early efforts will be directed to “stamping-out” the disease. The total de-population of cloven-hoofed animals in the infected zone and the surrounding control area would result in news media filled with images of euthanized animals being disposed of.

Ultimately, this worst-case scenario ends with the red meat supply being threatened, causing prices to increase exponentially, and jobs becoming vulnerable. The U.S.’s economic structure and stability would be at greater risk as tension, apprehension, fear, and desperation occur throughout the population.

Thankfully, emergency management plans exist, and they are well practiced. Disease specialists and law enforcement officers shield citizens from those around the world who wish harm to our way of life. The USDA maintains detailed FAD PReP or Foreign Animal Disease,

Preparedness & Response Plans for such scenarios. Yet, true biosecurity requires proactiveness and vigilance. Technology and potential targets in the United States shall continue to shift in direction and complexity. Thus biosurveillance and biodefense must do the same to protect citizens.

Based off of the research conducted by the United States government and the many soft spots in the agricultural industry, it obvious that there is potential harm which could affect agricultural products and their distribution. Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly was the title of a report by Peter Chalk, an adjunct senior analyst with the RAND Corporation in the United

States, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Chalk testified before the Government

Affairs Committee of the United States Senate. According to his testimony, “agriculture and food industries remain vulnerable to deliberate disruption.”

Media links

Plum Island Animal Disease Center Web Page https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/plum-island-animal-disease-center

This link provides access to information regarding the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, including their projects, history, and responsibilities.

Homeland Security | United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Web Page https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/banner/aboutaphis

The description and responsibilities of USDA APHIS are covered in this Media Link. Furthermore, their strategic plans and accomplishments can be accessed on this page.

Homeland Security | National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Web Page https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/national-bio-and-agro-defense-facility

Questions regarding the NBAF are addressed here, including the timeline for when this facility will be available to use. These laboratories will be used in place of Plum Island as it has exceeded it time of use. There is a plethora of controversy surrounding this facility as animal disease will be much closer to many areas of production agriculture.

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin | Agroterrorism - Threats to America’s Economy and Food Supply | Olsen, Dean | 2012 https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/agroterrorism-threats-to-americas-economy-and-food -supply Specific areas of concern and diseases are outlined in this online article. They also discuss preparedness and provide numerous publications that support their findings.

National Institute of Justice | Agroterrorism—Why We’re Not Ready: A Look at the Role of Law Enforcement | Schmitt, Glenn | 2007 https://www.nij.gov/journals/257/pages/agroterrorism.aspx

Areas of concern in the agricultural and law enforcement sectors of the United States are evaluated. They also break down the role of law enforcement into three parts: prevention, response, and resources.

RAND Cooperation | Agroterrorism - What Is the Threat and What Can Be Done About It? https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB7565/index1.html

The RAND Cooperation bring to light situations that must be accounted for in order to protect the food chain. Consequences of such an attack as well as key weaknesses inherent in the agricultural sector and the food chain are assessed. Potential ways to improve agricultural emergency response and management are also suggested.

Center for Food Security and Public Health | Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response (FAD PReP) http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Emergency-Response/fad-prep.php

Contains a description of FAD PReP and also has training materials for a variety of incidents. These range from specific locations, diseases, animals, prevention, response, and safety measures. These are the official guidelines for many situations that may arise because of acts of agroterrorism.

News Articles

Food Safety News | President Trump Likely to Sign Popular Agro-Terrorism Bill | 2017 ​ ​ https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2017/06/president-trump-likely-to-sign-popular-agro-terrorism -bill/

Recent news on the “Securing our Agriculture and Food Act” which proposes amendments to the ​ ​ Homeland Security Act of 2002 in order to better protect the food, agriculture, and the veterinarian system.

Scholarly articles

Historical Perspective on Agroterrorism: Lessons Learned from 1945 to 2012 | Haralampos, ​ Keremidis | 2013 https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/bsp.2012.0080

Historical timeline of acts of agroterrorism.

Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations | Anti-Crop Agricultural Bioterrorism | Elibüyük, Ö.İ. | 2008 http://agris.fao.org/agris-search/search.do?recordID=TR2010000823

The vulnerability of anti-crop agroterrorism is evaluated through an extensive review of cost and impact of plant diseases. To supplement this, a brief history of anti-crop agroterrorism and related allegations, drug control programs, potential pathogens including risk analysis are provided. While this is an evaluation for Turkey, topics can apply to the United States.

Videos

Public Health Preparedness Grand Round Series | Agroterrorism: Managing Foreign & Emerging Animal Diseases | 2016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QvJjIcZJgLc&t=972s

Dr. Faires (DVM, MS - Prof. and Extension Program Leader, Veterinary Med. TAMU) discuss the serious implications of an outbreak of FMD. He also gives a holistic view of how foreign animal disease can affect the United States, in the event that an act of agroterrorism is committed.

Agricultural and Stormwater Program | Understanding the Threat of Agroterrorism and the Introduction of Zoonotic Diseases | Flory, Gary | 2016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZyWT0AQ8bc

This lecture discusses the interaction of human and animal health. This is a unique outlook on another area of agroterrorism. Gary Flory also looks into response to outbreaks and refers to the avian influenza outbreak that occurred 2015. One health is another aspect that he bring to light during his presentation.

PBS News Hour | Disease Damage: A 2001 Report on Foot and Mouth Disease in Britain | Author | 2011 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1PtSTo0Sb-o

A news report covering the outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom. This shows the type of news broadcasting that covers disease outbreak and provides a rancher's perspective during this difficult times. They also cover illegal transfer of meat products that contribute to the issue and the depopulation of livestock that occured. Another aspect that should draw attention, is the closure of business and halt of transportation in infected control areas.