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Informal Meetings in Foreign Policy Anu Master of Arts, International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University Anudhull3@Gmail.Com No. 90 March 2020 Informal Meetings in Foreign Policy Anu Master of Arts, International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University [email protected] Narendra Modi in Wuhan in May 2018, was Dynamism has been the characteristic feature claimed as a major breakthrough in India- of India-China relations, yet foreign policy China relations. It was seen as a harbinger of achievements of both countries are very few. developing mutual trust between the two. This Keeping the dynamism in practice, both ‘spirit’ was carried forward at “Chennai countries have had two successive summits Connect” – the second informal summit where both are acclaiming these meetings as between the two leaders, which was in fact successful and unique. This may be an held at Mamallapuram, over 50 kilometers unprecedented step between the two Asian away from Chennai – to invigorate people-to- giants, but there are several precedents of such people and civilizational connect. The present meetings where Heads of States have met year 2020, marking 70th anniversary of India- informally. China relations, would jointly be celebrated by holding 70 events highlighting this “connect”. With this understanding, this article questions the efficacy of Wuhan and Chennai Summits Contextually, the period between the two by analyzing it against the background of two summits has witnessed several cold such informal interactions – the Kissinger- expressions from both sides. For example, Zhou meeting in 1971 and series of North China’s stand of bringing abrogation of Article Korea-South Korea informal meetings in 2018- 370 at multilateral platforms, its reluctance to 19. Naturally, the circumstances, actors, listing Masood Azhar in United Nations intentions and mood were all unique and Security Council (UNSC) Terrorists’ list, its cannot be compared, but nonetheless, they official reactions questioning Indian leaders’ provide a framework to analyze these meetings visits to Arunachal Pradesh claiming it as for what they really are: ‘soft’ instruments of threat to its territorial sovereignty etc. foreign policy. This paper also dwells on the Denouncing these attempts by China as an circular dilemma of formal and informal intrusion in its internal matters and alleging choices considering institutionalizing these China of siding with terror-funding Pakistan, informal summits. India has also shown discontent towards China. Introduction The second round of informal talks was heralded by both leaders as a significant The “Wuhan Spirit”, in the backdrop of the 1st success as it signaled the informal summit between Xi Jinping and regularization/institutionalization of the The ICS is an interdisciplinary research institution, which has a leadership role in the promotion of Chinese and East Asian Studies in India. The ICS Analysis aims to encourage debate and provide informed and balanced inputs for policy formulation and is based on extensive research and interactions with a wide community of scholars, experts, diplomats and military personnel in India and abroad. practice of Informal Summits. President Xi recognized diplomatically by the US. However, invited PM Modi for a 3rd informal summit and after the Sino-Soviet split in late 1950s the latter accepted it immediately (MEA- GOI, geopolitics and security concerns started 2019). All these developments necessitate the changing, especially in Asia. Owing to these analysis of these informal meetings as they changes Asia witnessed the emergence of post- play out in Sino-Indian bilateral relations. colonial nation-states, marking its policies through the Balance of Power. Keeping this in An objective assessment of these informal context, both the US and China opted for a meetings requires looking at some parameters prudential approach, focusing on their against which their diplomatic efficacy and respective national interests. Both tried to foreign policy objectives can be analyzed. expand their foreign policy horizons by Considering the gap in existing foreign policy creating a common platform for interactions, literature on the definition, role and nature of thereby leading to the Kissinger-Zhou meeting these informal meetings; there is a need to in 19711.While the U.S. sought an opportunity understand their mechanisms and how they for a deeper engagement in Asia through China, impact, and/or influence the conduct of foreign the latter viewed this as an escape from policy. The main feature of these being isolationism it had been experiencing after the informal is with regard to the conduct: absence Sino-Soviet split. of any formal set of frameworks, which in turn is expected to enhance the spontaneity of actors to maneuver through the discussions. This The main feature of these being informal then widens the scope of interaction without is with regard to the conduct: absence of any institutional blueprints. any formal set of frameworks, which in turn is expected to enhance the This article attempts to analyze the role of spontaneity of actors to maneuver informal meetings in carrying forward foreign through the discussions policy objectives. It also seeks to understand the motivating or enabling factors in choosing the mode of informal interactions by India and The U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger China, despite having formal relations. In this and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai on 17th July regard, cues are taken from two related 1971 met in Beijing without any prior informal interactions to defuse tensions, as a announcement or formal arrangements. In fact, precedent – the Henry Kissinger-Zhou Enlai this meeting set the ground for formalization of meeting in 1971, and meetings between leaders relations between the two (McDuffee, 2017). of the North and South Korea in 2018-19. Despite long driven mutual distrust and antagonism, both leaders amended their Kissinger-Zhou Meeting in 1971 demands as per conditions put forth by the other. They effectively conveyed the messages The “Kissinger-Zhou” secret meeting in 1971 of their respective Countries - to have a formal provides a good example of opening avenues meeting between both the Heads of States in and creating channels of communication, the immediate future. This formal meeting was which was later hailed by the then US actualized in the visit of President Nixon to President, Richard Nixon as a “diplomatic China in 1972, which initiated the process of success” (USC-U.S. China Institute 2011). rapprochement between the two. The 1971 This meeting was facilitated by the then meeting was successful owing to the manner it President of Pakistan, Yahya Khan (Phillips was conducted, the prudence and capacity of and Keefer 2006). Kissinger and Zhou, the balanced approach with clear objectives and flexibility in ways. In the second half of the twentieth century, the tensions of the Cold War and the staunch ideological differences between the U.S. and China illustrated the lack of any convergence between the two, with China not being 2 INSTITUTE OF CHINESE STUDIES, DELHI ● MAR 2020 While the Kissinger-Zhou interaction provides by 2018, were all time high. In such some reference points for analyzing informal circumstances, both the Korean countries meetings/interactions, achievement of foreign extended their willingness to negotiate with policy objectives cannot be hinged merely on each other (The Conversation 2018). While the nature of any bilateral initiative. The ROK was aiming for a settlement between US outcome, inter alia, depends on the willingness and DPRK in order to have peace in the region, of the leaders involved, and this segues into the DPRK had sought mediatory role of ROK as next case study - a series of informal significant in defusing its tensions with the U.S. interactions between North and South Korea- Both leaders through this manner, stressed on two countries which are technically at war for the need for efforts without any third power 60 odd years. mediation; in effect, shaping “their own destiny themselves” (Panmunjom Declaration 2018). Inter-Korean Informal Meetings During During the first US-DPRK summit in June 2018-19 2018, both leaders stressed on the forthcoming meetings to be “informal” in order to build Despite having the same culture, race and confidence. For DPRK, this legitimate history, the Korean Peninsula still stands diplomatic move was significant due to Kim’s divided by 38th Parallel Line into Democratic meeting in the Singapore summit with Republic of Korea (DPRK) or North Korea, President Trump, scheduled for July 2018. For and Republic of Korea (ROK) or South Korea. ROK, denuclearization of the Korean Both countries have long been trying for the Peninsula was the foremost objective. Through normalization and reconciliation of relations these informal summits, it had achieved the but without any significant achievements. first step of bringing DPRK on same table to Constrained by power politics in the larger discuss such a serious issue. geopolitical realm, DPRK and ROK have been reticent to engage in any bilateral dialogue on Despite having three inter-Korean meetings, their own. Be it the 1991 Basic Agreement on this initiative could not produce tangible results Reconciliation, “Sunshine Policy” of Republic belying all reconciliatory hopes, thus bringing of Korea in 1998, first Presidential summit of the relations back to stalemate. Since the two leaders in 2000 in Pyongyang or “Policy collapse of the Hanoi summit in February 2019, for Peace and Prosperity” in 2003, the initial efforts of Moon Jae-in to bring U.S. and countries are unable to have a lasting
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