October 5, 1999 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H9315 honor, and it was created by this Con- Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I thank COMMENDING VETERANS OF THE gress in 1861. Senator James Grimes of the ranking member of the committee, Iowa, chairman of the Senate Naval the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I move to Committee, proposed legislation to re- EVANS), for all his help in bringing this suspend the rules and pass the joint quire that a medal of honor, similar to to the floor; and also the gentleman resolution (H.J. Res. 65) commending the Victoria Cross of England, be given from California (Mr. CALVERT), the the World War II veterans who fought to naval personnel for actions of brav- chief sponsor, for bringing this bill to in the Battle of the Bulge, and for ery in action. His legislation, which us and for working so closely with the other purposes, as amended. was signed into law by President Lin- Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. The Clerk read as follows: coln on December 21, 1861, established a Mr. BUYER. Mr. Speaker, I rise H.J. RES. 65 Medal of Honor for enlisted men of the today in strong support of H.R. 1663, Whereas the battle in the European the- U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Subse- the National Medal of Honor Memorial ater of operations during World War II quently, legislation was enacted ex- Act. known as the Battle of the Bulge was fought tending eligibility for the medal to As the 20th Century draws to a close, from December 16, 1944, to January 25, 1945; Army-enlisted personnel as well as offi- many veterans wonder if the nation Whereas the Battle of the Bulge was a cers of the Armed Services. German offensive in the for- has lost sight of the sacrifices which est region of and which Senator Robert F. Kennedy once have been made to preserve freedom. said, ‘‘It is from numberless diverse took Allied forces by surprise and was in- This bill, loudly states that we the tended to split the Allied forces in Europe by acts of courage and belief that human Congress, who represent the people of breaking through the Allied lines, crippling history is shaped. Each time a man this great nation, have not lost sight of the Allied fuel supply lines, and exacerbating stands up for an ideal or acts to im- the heroic sacrifices made in the name tensions within the alliance; prove the lot of others or strikes out of freedom. We appreciate the great Whereas 600,000 American troops, joined by 55,000 British soldiers and other Allied against injustice, he sends forth a tiny contributions of these brave individ- ripple of hope.’’ forces, participated in the Battle of the uals who knowingly placed themselves Those extraordinary Americans who Bulge, overcoming numerous disadvantages in harm’s way, ready to sacrifice life have won the Medal of Honor have, in the early days of the battle that included through their acts of remarkable cour- and limb so that their comrades may fewer numbers, treacherous terrain, and bit- live and this nation’s values remain ter weather conditions; age, certainly shaped the history of our Whereas the Battle of the Bulge resulted in country and our world. We are doing strong. Over this last Memorial Day week- 81,000 American and 1,400 British casualties, the right thing today by honoring of whom approximately 19,000 American and these courageous citizens. end, I had the distinct pleasure to as- 200 British soldiers were killed, with the re- I am proud to be a cosponsor of H.R. semble with nearly 100 Medal of Honor mainder wounded, captured, or listed as 1663 and urge my colleagues to support recipients to dedicate the Congres- missing in action; this legislation. sional Medal of Honor Memorial site at Whereas the worst atrocity involving Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 the White River State Park in Indian- Americans in the European theater during ´ minutes to the gentleman from Texas apolis, . It was truly an inspir- World War II, known as the Mas- ing gathering, and at the same time, sacre, occurred on December 17, 1944, when 86 (Mr. REYES). unarmed American prisoners of war were Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the proved a very humbling experience. gunned down by elements of the German 1st gentleman for yielding me this time. These individuals epitomize the true SS Panzer Division; Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. meaning of selfless sacrifice and per- Whereas American, British, and other Al- 1663, the National Medal of Honor Me- sonal commitment. lied forces overcame great odds throughout morial Act. This is a good bill because While many have answered the call the battle, including most famously the ac- it honors the incredible courage and to duty, they have answered a higher tion of the in holding valor of our most distinguished vet- calling. A calling that is spiritual in back German forces at the key Belgian erans. Moreover, it ensures that future nature and bigger than one’s self. For crossroads town of , thereby pre- venting German forces from achieving their generations of Americans will know of love of God, country, family and the great sacrifices made by these men main objective of reaching Antwerp as well friends. Their significant contributions as the River line; and women who answered the call to have helped secure a more democratic Whereas the success of American, British, national service for their country. and peaceful world over the last cen- and other Allied forces in defeating the Ger- Medal of Honor winners have shown tury. More importantly, their actions man attack made possible the defeat of Nazi that they were willing to defend our serve as a testament to all Americans four months later in April 1945; liberty no matter what the price. Their about serving and caring for others. Whereas thousands of vet- erans of the Battle of the Bulge have trav- heroism in battle has become Recognizing these Congressional legendary. eled to Belgium and Luxembourg in the Medal of Honor memorials sites in years since the battle to honor their fallen Since the Civil War, our country has California, Indiana, and South Carolina recognized their outstanding acts of comrades who died during the battle; as National Medal of Honor memorials Whereas the peoples of Belgium and Lux- courage and bravery through the Con- continues our commitment to these embourg, symbolizing their friendship and gressional Medal of Honor. As there gallant and heroic men and women and gratitude toward the American soldiers who have been only 3,429 award winners in I urge my colleagues to support H.R. fought to secure their freedom, have gra- the history of our Nation, these vet- 1663. ciously hosted countless veterans groups erans truly occupy a very special place over the years; in the hearts of all Americans. There- Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I have no Whereas the city of Bastogne has an an- fore, I think that it is important that further requests for time, and I yield nual commemoration of the battle and its we designate sites around the country back the balance of my time. annual Nuts Fair has been expanded to in- as national memorials for our Medal of The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. clude commemoration of the legendary one- word reply of ‘‘Nuts’’ by Brigadier Honor winners. SUNUNU). The question is on the mo- tion offered by the gentleman from Ar- Anthony McAuliffe of the 101st Airborne Di- With this bill, we recognize memo- vision when called upon by the opposing Ger- izona (Mr. STUMP) that the House sus- rials in Riverside, California; Indianap- man commander at Bastogne to surrender olis, Indiana; and Mount Pleasant, pend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. his forces to much stronger German forces; South Carolina, to honor the contribu- 1663, as amended. Whereas the Belgian people erected the tions to our freedom and to our coun- The question was taken. Mardasson Monument to honor the Ameri- try of these brave, fine Americans. I Mr. CALVERT. Mr. Speaker, on that cans who fought in the Battle of the Bulge as therefore strongly endorse this legisla- I demand the yeas and nays. well as to commemorate their sacrifices and tion, and I urge all my colleagues to The yeas and nays were ordered. service during World War II; The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursu- Whereas the 55th anniversary of the Battle join in unanimously approving this of the Bulge in 1999 will be marked by many bill. ant to clause 8 of rule XX and the commemorative events by Americans, Bel- Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I have no Chair’s prior announcement, further gians, and Luxembourgers; and further requests for time, and I yield proceedings on this motion will be Whereas the friendship between the United back the balance of my time. postponed. States and both Belgium and Luxembourg is H9316 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE October 5, 1999 strong today in part because of the Battle of Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support organization that was formed back in the Bulge: Now, therefore, be it of H.J. Res. 65 and urge the Members of 1981. They now have about 10,000 mem- Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep- the House to approve this measure. I bers. And the idea behind it is to per- resentatives of the United States of America in also salute the gentleman from New Congress assembled, That Congress— petuate the memory of the sacrifices (1) commends the veterans of the United Jersey (Mr. SMITH), the vice chairman involved during the battle, to preserve States Army, the , and military of the committee, for his leadership on historical data and sites relating to the forces of other Allied nations who fought this issue. battle, and to foster international during World War II in the German Ardennes This measure, Mr. Speaker, com- peace and good will, and to promote offensive known as the Battle of the Bulge; mends those veterans who fought and friendship among the battle survivors (2) honors those who gave their lives dur- died during World War II in the offen- as well as their descendants. ing that battle; sive known as the Battle of the Bulge. I also want to thank Stan Wojtuski, (3) authorizes the President to issue a proc- It also authorizes the President to the National Vice President of Military lamation calling upon the people of the issue a proclamation calling upon the United States to honor the veterans of the Affairs for the Veterans of the Battle Battle of the Bulge with appropriate pro- people of the United States to honor of the Bulge for his work on this reso- grams, ceremonies, and activities; and the veterans of this battle with appro- lution, and Mrs. Edith Nowels, a con- (4) calls upon the President to reaffirm the priate programs, ceremonies, and ac- stituent of mine living in Brielle, New bonds of friendship between the United tivities. Jersey. She has worked very closely in States and both Belgium and Luxembourg. 1999 marks the 55th anniversary of crafting this resolution, and I am very The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursu- the Battle of the Bulge, a costly and grateful for that. ant to the rule, the gentleman from Ar- important victory for the United I think it is very important to point izona (Mr. STUMP) and the gentleman States. It is fitting that we as a Nation out that Edith Nowels’ brother, Bud from Illinois (Mr. EVANS) will each con- honor the sacrifices and service of Thorne, was killed in action during the trol 20 minutes. America’s veterans who fought and battle, and was awarded the Medal of The Chair recognizes the gentleman sacrificed during this battle. H.J. Res. Honor along with 17 others who re- from Arizona (Mr. STUMP). 65, as amended, is an excellent bill; and ceived that highest of medals for their GENERAL LEAVE I urge my colleagues to support this valor and bravery. There were also 86 Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I ask legislation. servicemen who were awarded the Dis- Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of unanimous consent that all Members tinguished Service Cross for their valor my time. during this vital battle. may have 5 legislative days within Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I yield which to revise and extend their re- According to the citation presented such time as he may consume to the to his family, Corporal Thorne single- marks and include extraneous material gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. on House Joint Resolution 65. handedly destroyed a German tank. SMITH), the vice chairman of the com- And in the words of the citation, ‘‘Dis- The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there mittee and the chief sponsor of this played heroic initiative and intrepid objection to the request of the gen- resolution. fighting qualities, inflicted costly cas- tleman from Arizona? Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. There was no objection. Speaker, I want to thank my good ualties on the enemy and insured the Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I yield my- friend, the gentleman from Arizona success of his patrol’s mission by the sacrifice of his life.’’ self such time as I may consume. (Mr. STUMP), the chairman of our full I would like to take just a very brief (Mr. STUMP asked and was given committee, for yielding me this time moment, Mr. Speaker, to provide a permission to revise and extend his re- and for being a cosponsor and also ex- brief overview of the battle so that my marks.) tend my thanks to my good friend, the Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, this coun- colleagues will gain a better under- gentleman from Illinois (Mr. EVANS) as try is justifiably proud of the role its well for cosponsoring and for the bipar- standing as to why this chapter in armed forces played during World War tisanship that he brings to the com- World War II deserves special recogni- II. A few minutes ago, we recognized mittee. tion today. One of the most decisive the relatively few Americans who have I also want to thank a number of battles in the war in Europe, the Battle been awarded the Medal of Honor for other Members. There are 42 cospon- of the Bulge began on December 16, extraordinary acts of gallantry. How- sors of this resolution, including the 1944, when the German Army, in an ef- ever, Americans performed hundreds of gentleman from (Mr. GIL- fort to trap the allied forces in Belgium thousands of courageous acts wherever MAN), the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. and Luxembourg, launched an attack they were committed to battle during HYDE), the gentleman from Michigan against what were perceived as a weak World War II. (Mr. DINGELL), and several other Mem- line of American and allied troops. The actions of Americans who fought bers who are deeply committed to re- Their goal was to submit the allied in the Battle of the Bulge are some of membering all veterans, but in par- forces in Belgium and Luxembourg and the best examples of everyday tena- ticular those who fought in the Battle race to the coast towards Antwerp. ciousness and bravery of American of the Bulge. Adolf Hitler and his generals knew fighting men. Throughout this battle, Mr. Speaker, today the House will the German Air Force could not main- the largest pitched battle ever fought rightly honor the Americans and allied tain regional air superiority, so they by Americans, tens of thousands of forces who fought in the Battle of the were banking on bad weather and rel- Americans and British troops exhibited Bulge. As the son of a World War II atively green and a fatigued American great courage and determination. Their combat infantryman who fought in the troops, who were greatly outnumbered. heroism and willingness to endure other major theatre in World War II, he At the outset of the battle, the German great hardship resulted in the defeat of fought in New Guinea, the Philippines, troops, forming three armies, num- a desperate, powerful and well-trained and several islands in the Pacific, I bered approximately 200,000 versus German army. urge all Members to enthusiastically 83,000 Americans. Their goal was to It is fitting, Mr. Speaker, that we re- support House Joint Resolution 65, capture bridges over the Meuse River call today the service of over 600,000 which was introduced to recognize the in the first 48 hours of the attack and American combat troops who eventu- 55th anniversary of the largest battle then press on to Antwerp. ally beat back the last bold thrust of in the history of U.S. modern warfare, At the time of their initial attack, Hitler’s war machine. This resolution the Battle of the Bulge. the Germans had more than 13 infantry commends all veterans who served or H.J. Res. 65, as amended, was marked and 7 panzer divisions, with nearly gave their lives during the Battle of up in the Committee on Veterans’ Af- 1,000 tanks and almost 2,000 larger guns the Bulge, and I urge my colleagues to fairs as well as the Committee on deployed along the front of about 60 support it. International Relations, and, hope- miles. Five more divisions were soon to Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of fully, will get the unanimous support follow, with at least 450 more tanks. my time. of this body. Although the Americans were caught Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I yield my- Let me also thank the veterans of by surprise, they tenaciously fought self such time as I may consume. the Battle of the Bulge Association, an back in those early days of the attack October 5, 1999 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H9317 in December, holding the line in the Gettysburg. In the words of British ARDENNES- north while the Nazis pushed through Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and 16 December 1944–25 January 1945 in the middle of the bulge towards the I quote, in addressing the House of In his political testament Mein Kampf Meuse River. Commons, he said, ‘‘This is undoubt- (‘‘My Struggle’’) Adolf Hitler wrote, One incident which particularly edly the greatest battle of the war and ‘‘Strength lies not in defense but in attack.’’ hardened the Americans and allied will I believe be regarded as an ever-fa- Throughout World War II, attempts to gain forces as to the intent of the German or regain the initiative had characterized mous American victory.’’ Hitler’s influence on military operations. Army was the . Mr. Speaker, I hope all Members will Thus, when the military situation in late Eighty-six American POWs were mur- support this resolution. The veterans 1944 looked darkest on the Western Front, an dered by the Nazis as they moved to- of the Battle of the Bulge every year enemy offensive to redress the balance of the wards the capture of the Meuse River. travel to Europe and reacquaint them- battlefield—and thereby cripple or delay the The same German unit which was re- selves with those with whom they Allied advance—should have come as no sur- sponsible for this infamous massacre fought side by side and those that they prise. eventually killed at least 300 American Hitler’s great gamble began during the liberated. They will be meeting again nights of 13, 14, and 15 December, when the POWs and over 100 unarmed Belgium soon in both Luxembourg and Belgium. initial assault force of German armor, artil- civilians. News of these horrific events I hope we will go on record supporting lery, and infantry gradually staged forward outraged and further galvanized the their efforts, their valor and this reso- to attack positions along the Belgian-Ger- will of American forces to prevail. lution puts all of us on record in that man-Luxembourg border. This mustered Recognizing what they were up regard. force, with more than 200,000 men in thirteen against, General Eisenhower trans- Mr. Speaker, I include a list of Medal infantry and seven panzer divisions and with nearly 1,000 tanks and almost 2,000 guns, de- ferred the command of all American of Honor recipients for the RECORD, as troops north of the bulge to British ployed along a front of 60 miles—its oper- follows: ational armor holdings equaling that on the General Montgomery. Those south of RECIPIENTS OF THE MEDAL OF HONOR— entire Eastern Front. Five more divisions the bulge were under the command of ARDENNES CAMPAIGN moved forward in a second wave, while still General Bradley. Meanwhile, the Ger- Arthur O. Beyer Jose M. Lopez others, equipped with at least 450 more mans were being slowed down by the Melvin E. Biddle Vernon McGarity tanks, followed in reserve. dogged defense of the town at St. Vith Paul L. Bolden Curtis F. Shoup On the Allied side the threatened Amer- by Brigadier General Hasbrouck. St. Richard E. Cowan William A. Soderman ican sector appeared quiet. The 15 December Vith was strategically important due Francis S. Currey Horace M. Thorne daily situation report for the VIII Corps, Peter J. Dalessondro Day G. Turner which lay in the path of two of Hitler’s ar- to the number of key roads which met mies, noted: ‘‘There is nothing to report.’’ in the town and were essential to the Archer T. Gammon Henry G. Turner James R. Hendrix Henry F. Warner This illusion would soon be shattered. German drive towards Antwerp. Truman Kimbro Paul J. Wiedorfer STRATEGIC SETTING General Patton’s Third Army, under In August 1944, while his armies were being the command of General Bradley, was Mr. Speaker, I include the following destroyed in Normandy, Hitler secretly put proceeding north to cut through the brochure regarding the Ardennes-Al- in motion actions to build a large reserve southern flank of the German bulge in sace Campaign for the RECORD: force, forbidding its use to bolster Germany’s the lines and provide relief to Brigadier ARDENNES-ALSACE beleaguered defenses. To provide the needed manpower, he trimmed existing military General Anthony McAuliffe, whose re- INTRODUCTION forces and conscripted youths, the unfit, and fusal to surrender to his German coun- World War II was the largest and most vio- terparts at Bastogne on December 22 is old men previously untouched for military lent armed conflict in the history of man- service. Panzer divisions were rebuilt with forever known in history with that fa- kind. However, the half century that now the cadre of survivors from units in Nor- mous phrase, when he just said back to separates us from that conflict has exacted mandy or on the Eastern Front, while newly the Germans, ‘‘Nuts.’’ He would not its toll on our collective knowledge. While created Volksgrenadier (‘‘people’s infantry’’) surrender. He just said nuts to them, World War II continues to absorb the inter- divisions were staffed with veteran com- and they wondered what that meant. est of military scholars and historians, as manders and noncommissioned officers and well as its veterans, a generation of Ameri- b the new conscripts. By increasing the num- 1100 cans has grown to maturity largely unaware ber of automatic weapons and the number of He was not going to give in. As more of the political, social, and military implica- supporting assault gun and rocket battalions American reinforcements arrived, tions of a war that, more than any other, in each division, Hitler hoped to make up for united us as a people with a common pur- hurried training and the lack of fighting fit- eventually totaling 600,000 troops, they pose. assisted in holding up the northern and ness. Despite the massive Allied air bom- Highly relevant today, World War II has bardment of Germany and the constant need southern flanks of the Nazi advances. much to teach us, not only about the profes- to replace destroyed divisions on both the Hitler’s generals found that they were sion of arms, but also about military pre- Eastern and Western Fronts, where heavy running out of fuel and that their hope paredness, global strategy, and combined op- fighting continued, forces were gathered for of seizing allied fuel supplies was be- erations in the coalition war against fas- use in what Hitler was now calling Operation coming a pipe dream and their race to cism. During the next several years, the U.S. Wacht am (‘‘Watch on the Rhine’’). the Meuse river slowed down to a Army will participate in the nation’s 50th In September Hitler named the post of anniversary commemoration of World War crawl. While Adolph Hitler insisted on Antwerp, Belgium, as the objective. Select- II. The commemoration will include the pub- ing the Eifel region as a staging area, Hitler pressing with air strikes against ad- lication of various materials to help educate intended to mass twenty-five divisions for an vancing allied reinforcements, his gen- Americans about that war. The works pro- attack through the thinly held Ardennes erals knew that they had been beaten, duced will provide great opportunities to Forest area of southern Belgium and Luxem- and he eventually authorized the re- learn about and renew pride in an Army that bourg. Once the Meuse River was reached treat of his armies at the end of Janu- fought so magnificently in what has been and crossed, these forces would swing north- ary. called ‘‘the mighty endeavor.’’ west some 60 miles to envelop the port of Mr. Speaker, the cost in lives from World War II was waged on land, on sea, Antwerp. The maneuver was designed to this engagement is astronomical and and in the air over several diverse theaters sever the already stretched Allied supply of operation for approximately six years. The absolutely staggering. The American lines in the north and to encircle and destroy following essay is one of a series of campaign a third of the Allies’ ground forces. If suc- armies had more than 81,000 casualties; studies highlighting those struggles that, cessful, Hitler believed that the offensive and of these, 19,000 men were killed in with their accompanying suggestions for fur- could smash the Allied coalition, or at least action. The British had 1,400 casualties ther reading, are designed to introduce you greatly cripple its ground combat capabili- with 200 killed. Both sides lost as many to one of the Army’s significant military ties, leaving him free to focus on the Rus- as 800 tanks each, and the Germans lost feats from that war. sians at his back door. 1,000 planes. All told, it was one of the This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Timing was crucial. Allied air power ruled largest pitched battles in history with Army Center of Military History by Roger the skies during the day, making any open Cirillo. I hope this absorbing account of that concentrations of German military strength more than three times the number of period will enhance your appreciation of on the ground extremely risky. Hitler, there- troops from both the North and the American achievements during World War II. fore, scheduled the offensive to take place South that engaged in the Battle of GORDON R. SULLIVAN, when inclement weather would ground Allied Gettysburg. Three times the size of General, Chief of Staff. planes, or at least limit their attacks on his H9318 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE October 5, 1999 advancing columns. Because the requisite long and well, the same terrain that guaran- tinued Allied belief that the Germans would forces and supplies had to be assembled, he teed surprise would become a trap. not attack, a belief held up to zero hour on postponed the starting date from November The Ardennes held little fascination for 16 December—designated by the Germans as until mid-December. This additional prepa- the Allies, either as a staging area for their Null-tag (‘‘Zero-Day’’). ration time, however, did not ease the minds own counterattacks or as a weak spot in BATTLE PLANS of the few German generals and staff officers their lines. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Field Marshal Model’s attack plan, called entrusted with planning Wacht am Rhine. the Supreme Allied Commander, had con- Herbstnebel (‘‘Autumn Fog’’), assigned Lt. Both the nominal Commander-in-Chief centrated forces north and south of the area West Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt and where the terrain was better suited for oper- Gen. Josef ‘‘Sepp’’ Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer commander Field Marshal ations into Germany. Field Marshal Sir Ber- Army the main effort. Dietrich would attack , who had primary responsi- nard L. Montgomery’s 21 Army Group to the Hodges’ First Army along the boundary sep- bility for Wacht am Rhine, questioned the north began preparations for the planned arating Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow’s V scope of the offensive. Both argued for a crossing of the Rhine in early 1945. Lt. Gen. Corps in the north from Maj. Gen. Troy H. more limited attack, to pinch out the Amer- Omar N. Bradley’s 12th Army Group to the Middleton’s VIII Corps to the south, brush- ican-held salient north of the Ardennes south and Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers’ 6th ing aside or overrunning the ’ 99th around Aachen. Borrowing a bridge-players Army Group in the Alsace region would also Infantry Division and a cavalry squadron of term, they referred to Hitler’s larger objec- launch attacks and additional Rhine cross- the VIII Corps’ 14th Cavalry Group before tives as the grand slam, or big solution, but ings from their sectors. driving for the Meuse and Antwerp. South of proposed instead a small solution more com- Located in the center of Bradley’s sector, the Sixth Panzer Army, Lt. Gen. Hasso von patible with the limited force being raised. the Ardennes had been quiet since mid-Sep- Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army would hit Rundstedt and Model believed that Hitler’s tember. Referred to as a ‘‘ghost front,’’ one the VIII Corps’ 106th Infantry Division and legions were incapable of conducting a blitz- company commander described the sector as part of its 28th Infantry Division, tearing krieg, or lightning war, campaign. The twin a ‘‘nursery and old folk’s home. . . .’’ The open Middleton’s thin front and adding a sec- swords that had dominated the field during 12th Army Group’s dispositions reflected ondary effort. Farther south, Lt. Gen. Erich the 1940 drive across , tanks and air Bradley’s operational plans. Lt. Gen. Wil- Brandenberger’s Seventh Army would attack power, no longer existed in the numbers nec- liam H. Simpson’s Ninth Army and most of the remainder of the 28th as well as the VIII essary to strike a decisive blow, nor was the Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges’ First Army oc- Corps’ 4th Infantry Division and then cover hastily conscripted infantry, even when led cupied a 40-mile area north of the Ardennes, the advance of the panzers as far as the by experienced officers and sergeants, up to concentrating for an attack into the Ruhr Meuse River. An airborne drop and infiltra- the early war standards. Supply columns, industrial region of Germany. Lt. Gen. tion by small teams disguised in American too, would be prone to interdiction or break- George S. Patton, Jr.’s Third Army was in a uniforms were added to create havoc in the down on the Eifel’s limited roads. To Hitler’s 100-mile sector south of the forest, preparing American rear. generals, the grand slam was simply asking a thrust into the vital Saar mining region. North of the Sixth Panzer Army, the six di- for too much to be done with too little at In between, the First Army hold 88 miles of visions of Lt. Gen. Gustav von Zangen’s Fif- hand. the front with only four divisions, two teenth Army had a dual role. In addition to The determining factor was the terrain ‘‘green’’ units occupying ground to gain ex- fighting and thereby holding American divi- itself. The Ardennes consists of a series of perience and two veteran units licking sions in the crucial Aachen sector, Zangen parallel ridges and valleys generally running wounds and absorbing replacements; an ar- would attack southward on order after from northeast to southwest, as did its few mored infantry battalion; and two mecha- Dietrich’s panzers had broken the American good roads in 1944. About a third of the re- nized cavalry squadrons. Behind this thin line, a variation of the pincers attack origi- gion is coniferous forest, with swamps and screen was one green armored division, nally preferred by Hitler’s generals. marshes in the northlands and deep defiles whose two uncommitted combat commands The Sixth Panzer Army was to attack in and gorges where numerous rivers and straddled two separate corps, as well as a two waves. The first would consist of the streams cut the ridges. Dirt secondary roads cavalry squadron and an assortment of artil- LXVII Corps, with the newly organized 272d existed, making north-south movement pos- lery, engineer, and service units. and 326th Volksgrenadier Divisions, and the sible, with the road centers—Bastogne and Bradley judged his decision to keep the I SS , with the 1st and 12th SS Houffalize in the south, and Malmedy and St. Ardennes front thinly occupied to be ‘‘a cal- Panzer, the 12th and 277th Volksgrenadier, Vith in the north—crucial for military oper- culated risk.’’ Nor was he alone in not seeing and the 3d Parachute Divisions. The 150th ations. After the winter’s first freeze, tanks danger. Probability, not capability, domi- Special Brigade and a parachute contingent could move cross-country in much of the nated Allied thinking about the would seize terrain and bridges ahead of the central sector. Fall 1944, however, brought Wehrmacht’s next moves on the Western main body after the two corps broke through the promise of mud, because of rain, and the Front in mid-December 1944. Commanders the American defenses. Dietrich planned to advancing days of December, the promise of and intelligence officers (G–2) at every commit his third corps, the II SS Panzer snow. Either could limit the quick advance level—from the Supreme Headquarters, Al- Corps, with the 2d and 9th SS Panzer Divi- needed by Wacht am Rhine. Once the Meuse lied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), to the di- sions, in the second wave. The Sixth Panzer River, west of the Ardennes, was gained, the visions holding the line—judged that the Army’s 1,000-plus artillery pieces and 90 wide river itself and cliffs on the east bank Germans were too weak to attempt regain- Tiger tanks made it the strongest force de- presented a significant obstacle if the ing the initiative by a large-scale offensive. ployed. Although Dietrich’s initial sector bridges were not captured intact. Since the Despite their awareness that enemy units frontage was only 23 miles, his assault con- roads and terrain leading to Antwerp there- were refitting and concentrating across the centrated on less than half that ground. Re- after were good, the German planners fo- line, they concluded exactly what Hitler had lying on at least a 6:1 troop superiority at cused on the initial breakthrough and the intended them to conclude. Knowing that the breakthrough points, he expected to run west to the Meuse. The terrain, which the Germans were concerned with major overwhelm the Americans and reach the made so little sense as an attack avenue threats to both the Ruhr and the Saar, Ei- Meuse River by nightfall of the third day. northwestward, guaranteed the surprise senhower’s G–2 believed that they probably According to Dietrich’s plan, the LXVII needed. would use the uncommitted Sixth Panzer Corps would secure the Sixth Panzer Army’s Previous offensives through the Ardennes Army, suspected to be in the northern Eifel, northern flank. By sidestepping Monschau to in and early in World War II had to bolster their weakening northern de- seize the poorly roaded, forested hills and up- followed the major roads southwestward, and fenses, or at least to cripple the impending land moors of the Hohe Venn, the LXVII’s had been made in good weather. The defenses Allied push toward the Ruhr. Both Hodges’ two divisions would block the main roads then had always been light screens, easily and Patton’s G–2s viewed the enemy as a re- leading into the breakthrough area from the pushed away. In 1940 the weakly opposed flection of their own operational plans and north and east. Simultaneously, the I SS German armor needed three days to traverse thus assessed the German buildup as no more Panzer Corps to the south would use its the easier terrain in the southern Ardennes than preparations to counterattack the First three infantry divisions to punch holes in in good weather, on dry roads. For Wacht am and Third Armies’ assaults. the American line and swing northwesterly Rhine, the American line had to be broken With only enough troops in the Ardennes to join the left flank of the LXVII Corps. To- and crushed immediately to open paths for to hold a series of strongpoints loosely con- gether, the five divisions would form a solid the attacking panzers; otherwise, the offen- nected by intermittent patrols, the Ameri- shoulder, behind which the panzers of the I sive might bog down into a series of fights cans extended no ground reconnaissance into and II SS Panzer Corps would advance along for roads and the numerous villages on the the German sector. Poor weather had the Sixth Panzer Army’s routes leading west way to the Meuse. Precious fuel would be masked areas from aerial photography, and and northwest. used to deploy tanks to fight across fields. the Germans enforced radio silence and Three terrain features were critical to More importantly, time would be lost giving strict countersecurity measures. Equally im- Dietrich’s panzer thrust: the Elsenborn the defenders the opportunity to position portant, the Allies’ top secret communica- ridge, the Losheim Gap, and the Schnee Eifel blocking forces or to attack enemy flanks. tions interception and decryption effort, ridge. The Elsenborn ridge, a complex series Only surprise, sheer weight of numbers, and code-named Ultra, offered clues but no defin- of fingers and spurs of the southern Hohe minimal hard fighting could guarantee a itive statement of Hitler’s intentions. Yet Venn, controlled access to two of the west- chance at success. If the Americans fought Wacht am Rhine’s best security was the con- erly panzer routes; a third passed just to the October 5, 1999 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H9319 south. The 277th Volksgrenadier Division idea of the American forces opposing them. tions available for dealing with enemy would attack into the east defenses of the Facing Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army was threats. ridge, and to the south the 12th SS Panzer the V Corps’ 99th Infantry Division. Newly OPENING ATTACKS, 16–18 DECEMBER Division would debouch from its forest trail arrived, the 99th occupied a series of forward At 0530 on 16 December the Sixth Panzer approaches into the hard roads running positions along 19 miles of the wooded Bel- Army’s artillery commenced preparation through and south of the ridge. gian-German border, its 395th, 393d, and 394th fires. These fires, which ended at 0700, were Further to the south the Losheim Gap ap- Infantry regiments on line from north to duplicated in every sector of the three at- pears as open rolling ground between the south, with one battalion behind the divi- tacking German armies. At first the Amer- Elsenborn ridge to the northwest and the sion’s deep right flank available as a reserve. ican defenders believed the fires were only a long, heavily wooded Schnee Eifel ridge to Gerow, the V Corps commander, was focused demonstration. Simultaneously, German in- the southeast. Measuring about 5 miles wide at the time on a planned attack by his 2d In- fantry moved unseen through the dark and at the German border and narrowing fantry Division toward the Roer River dams morning fog, guided by searchlight beams throughout its roughly 14-mile length as it to the north and had given less attention to overhead. Yet, despite local surprise, runs from northeast to southwest, the gap is the defensive dispositions of the 99th. This Dietrich’s attack did not achieve the quick an unlikely military avenue, subdivided by small operation had already begun on 13 De- breakthrough planned. The LXVII Corps’ at- lesser ridges, twists, and hills. Its roads, cember, with the 2d Division passing through tack north and south of Monschau failed im- however, were well built and crucial for the the area held by the 99th Division’s north- mediately. One division arrived too late to German advance. Over its two major routes ernmost regiment. Two battalions of the attack; the other had its assault broken by Dietrich intended to pass most of his armor. 395th Infantry joined the action. Slowed by determined resistance. The 277th The Sixth Panzer Army shared the pillboxes and heavy defenses in the woods, Volksgrenadier Division’s infiltrating at- Losheim Gap as an avenue with its southern the 2d’s attacks were still ongoing when the tacks followed the preparation fires closely. neighbor, the Fifth Panzer Army. Their enemy offensive begin on the sixteenth. The Germans overran some of the 99th Divi- boundary reflected Hitler’s obsession with a To the south of the 99th Division the First sion’s forest outposts, but they were repulsed concentrated attack to ensure a break- Army had split responsibilities for the attempting to cross open fields near their ob- through, but the common corridor added a Elsenborn ridge—Losheim Gap area between jectives, the twin villages of Krinkelt- potential for confusion. The Sixth Panzer Gerow’s V Corps and Middleton’s VIII Corps, Rocherath. By nightfall the Americans still Army was to attack with the 12th with the corps boundary running just north contested the woods to the north and east of Volksgrenadier and the 3d Parachute Divi- of the village of Losheim. Middleton’s major the villages. The 99th’s southern flank, how- sions through the northern portion of the worry was the Losheim Gap, which poten- ever, was in great peril. The 12th gap, while the Fifth Panzer Army’s northern tially exposed the Schnee Eifel, the latter Volksgrenadier Division had successfully corps, the LXVI, would open its southern held by five battalions of the newly arrived cleared the 1st SS Panzer Division’s main as- portions. Additionally, the LXVI Corps had 106th Division. When Bradley refused his re- sault avenue, taking the village of Losheim to eliminate the American forces holding the quest to withdraw to a shorter, unexposed in the early morning and moving on to sepa- Schnee Eifel on the southern flank of the gap line, the VIII Corps commander positioned rate the VIII Corp’s cavalry from its connec- and seize the crucial road interchange at St. eight battalions of his corps artillery to sup- tion with the 99th. Vith about 10 miles further west. Manteuffel port the forces holding the Losheim Gap— South of the American corps boundary the wanted part of the 18th Volksgrenadier Divi- Schnee Eifel region. Germans were more successful. Poor commu- sion to push through the southern part of the South of the corps boundary the 18th Cav- nications had further strained the loosely co- gap and hook into the rear of the Schnee alry Squadron, belonging to the recently at- ordinated defense of the 106th Division and Eifel, the remainder of the division to com- tached 14th Cavalry Group, outposted the the 14th Cavalry Group in the Losheim Gap. plete the encirclement to the south of the 9,000-yard Losheim Gap. Reinforced by a The German predawn preparation fires had ridge, and the 62d Volksgrenadier Division to company of 3-inch towed tank destroyers, targeted road junctions, destroying most of anchor the LXVI’s flank with a drive toward the 18th occupied eight positions that gave the pole-mounted communications wire St. Vith. good coverage in fair weather but could be interchanges. With their major wire com- To the south of the Losheim Gap—Schnee easily bypassed in the fog or dark. To rem- mand nets silenced, the American defenders Eifel area, along the north-south flowing Our edy this, Middleton had assigned an addi- had to rely on radio relay via artillery nets, River, the Fifth Panzer Army’s major tional cavalry squadron to reinforce the which the mountainous terrain made unreli- thrusts devolved to its LVIII and XLVII Pan- gap’s thin line under the 14th group. The cav- able. zer Corps, aligned north to south with four of alry force itself was attached to the 106th Di- The attack in the Losheim Gap, in fact, their five divisions in the assault wave. Each vision, but with the 106th slowly settling was the offensive’s greatest overmatch. The 3d Parachute Division ran up against only panzer corps had one designated route, but into its positions, a coordinated defense be- one cavalry troop and a tank destroyer com- the Fifth Panzer Army commander did not tween the two had yet to be decided. As a re- pany holding over half the sector, and its plan to wait for infantry to clear them. sult, the reinforcing squadron was quartered southern neighbors, the two reinforced regi- Manteuffel intended to commit his armor 20 miles to the rear, waiting to be ordered ments of the 18th Volksgrenadier Division, early rather than in tandem with the infan- forward. hit four platoons of cavalry. Although some try, expecting to break through the extended South of the Schnee Eifel Middleton’s American positions had been bypassed in the American line quickly and expedite his ad- forces followed the Our River with the 106th dark, the attacking Germans had generally vance to the west. The LVIII’s 116th Panzer Division’s 424th infantry and, to the south, cleared the area by late morning. Poor com- and 560th Volksgrenadier Divisions were to the 28th Division. After suffering more than munications and general confusion limited penetrate the area astride the Our River, 6,000 casualties in the Huertgen Forest bat- defensive fire support to one armored field tying the 106th and 28th Divisions together, tles in November, the 28th was resting and artillery battalion. More importantly, the and to capture the three tank-capable training replacements in a 30-mile area cavalry’s porous front opened the American bridges in the sector before driving west to along the Our. Its three regiments—the rear to German infantry; by dawn some of the Meuse. To the south the XLVII’s 2d Pan- 112th, 110th, and 109th Infantry—were on line the defenders’ artillery and support units be- zer and 26th Volksgrenadier Divisions were from north to south. Two battalions of the hind the Schnee Eifel encountered the to seize crossings on the Our and head to- 100th Infantry held 10 miles of the front and enemy. Subsequently, many guns were lost, ward the key Bastogne road interchange 19 the division’s center while their sister bat- while others hastily clogged the roads to find miles to the west. The Panzer Lehr Division talion was kept as part of the division re- safer ground. would follow, adding depth to the corps at- serve. The 110th had six company-sized The uncoordinated defense of the 106th Di- tack. strongpoints manned by infantry and engi- vision and 14th Cavalry Group now led to Covering the Fifth Panzer Army’s southern neers along the ridge between the Our and tragedy. The cavalry commander quickly re- flank were the LXXXV and LXXX Corps of Clerf Rivers to the west, which the troops alized that his outposts could neither hold Brandenberger’s Seventh Army. The called ‘‘Skyline Drive.’’ Through the center nor survive. After launching one abortive LXXXV’s 5th Parachute and 352d of this sector ran the crucial road to Bas- counterattack northward against 3d Para- Volksgrenadier Divisions were to seize cross- togne. chute Division elements with his reserve ings on the Our River, and the LXXX’s 276th South of the 28th Division the sector was squadron, he secured permission to withdraw and 212th Volksgrenadier Divisions, feinting held by part of Combat Command A of the before his road-bound force was trapped toward the city of Luxembourg, were to draw newly arrived 9th Armored Division and by against the wooded heights to his rear. This American strength away from Manteuffel’s the 4th Infantry Division, another veteran opened the V and VII Corps boundary and main attack. The 276th would attack south unit resting from previous battles. These separated the cavalry, Middleton’s key infor- of the confluence of the Our and Sauer Riv- forces, with the 4th’s northern regiment, the mation source on his northern flank, from ers, enveloping the 3-mile defensive sector 12th Infantry, positioned as the southern- the Schnee Eifel battle. Throughout the day held by an American armored infantry bat- most unit in the path of the German offen- of 16 December the 3d pushed north, ulti- talion, and to the south the 212th, after sive, held the line of the Sauer River cov- mately overrunning the cavalry’s remaining crossing at Echternach, would push back the ering the approaches to the city of Luxem- outposts and capturing a small force of the large concentration of American artillery in bourg. Behind this thinly stretched defensive 99th Division. But all of these scattered the sector and anchor Army Group B’s south- line of new units and battered veterans, Mid- forces fought valiantly so that by dark the ern flank. The Germans had a fairly good dleton had few reserves and even fewer op- Sixth Panzer Army’s route was still clogged H9320 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE October 5, 1999 by units mopping up bypassed Americans Armored Division from the Ninth Army and His was the first of thirty-two such awards and their own supply and support rains. To the 10th Armored Division from the third during the Ardennes-Alsace Campaign. the south the 18th Volksgrenadier Division’s Army to reinforce Middleton’s hard-pressed Ordered to withdraw under the 2d Divi- attack in the Losheim Gap had slid by the VIII Corps. In addition, shortly after mid- sion’s control, the 99th Division, whose ranks cavalry, but failed to clear the open ridge be- night, Hodges’ First Army began moving had been thinned by nearly 3,000 casualties, hind the Schnee Eifel. South of the Schnee forces south from the Aachen sector, while pulled back to the northern portion of a Eifel the rest of the 18th was unable to push the Third Army headquarters, on Patton’s horseshoe-shaped line that blocked two of through the defenders to catch the 106th’s initiative, began detailed planning to deal the I SS Panzer Corps’ routes. Although the units on top of the Schnee Eifel in a pincer. with the German offensive. line was anchored on the Elsenborn ridge, Further south the 106th’s 42th Infantry had Within the battle area the two corps com- fighting raged westward as the Germans blocked the path of the 62d Volksgrenadier manders struggled to respond effectively to pushed to outflank the extended American Division across the Our River. By dark the the offensive, having only incomplete and defense. 106th had thus lost little ground. It had com- fragmentary reports from the field. Gerow, During the night of the seventeenth the mitted its reserve to block the enemy threat the V Corps commander in the north, re- Germans unveiled additional surprises. They to its south and was expecting Combat Com- quested that the 2d Division’s Roer River attempted to parachute a 1,000-man force mand B, 9th Armored Division, shifting from dams attack be canceled; however, Hodges, onto the Hohe Venn’s high point at Baraque V Corps reserve, to conduct a relieving at- who viewed the German action against the Michel. Although less than half actually tach via St. Vith toward the Schnee Eifel. 99th Division as a spoiling operation, ini- landed in the area, the scattered drop occu- But while the defenders moved to restore tially refused. Middleton, the VIII Corps pied the attention of critical U.S. armored their positions, the 18th, by searchlight and commander in the south, changed his plans and infantry reserves in the north for several flare, continued to press south from the gap. for the 9th Armored division’s Combat Com- days. A companion special operation, led by South of the 106th Division, the 28th Divi- mand B, ordering it to reinforce the southern the legendary Lt. Col. Otto Skorzeny, used sion fended off the Fifth Panzer Army’s flank of the 106th Division. The newly prom- small teams of English-speaking soldiers dis- thrusts. In the north the 112th Infantry held ised 7th Armored Division would assume the guised in American uniforms. Neither the back the LVIII Panzer Corps’ two divisions, CCB’s original mission of relieving troops on drop nor the operation gained any appre- while the 110th Infantry blocked the paths of the Schnee Eifel via St. Vith. Thereafter, ciable military advantage for the German the XLVII Panzer Corp’s three in the center. mixed signals between the VIII Corps and the panzers. The Americans, with their resist- The 110th’s strong points, which received 106th Division led to disaster. Whether by ance increasing along the Elsenborn ridge some tank reinforcement from the division poor communications or misunderstanding, and elsewhere, were undaunted by such reserve, held firm throughout the sixteenth, Middleton believed that the 106th was pull- threats to their rear. Further south, however, along the V and blocking the route westward. By dark, al- ing its men off the Schnee Eifel and with- VIII Corps boundary, the Sixth Panzer Army though German infantry had crossed the Our drawing to a less exposed position; the achieved its breakthrough. In the Losheim and started infiltrating, American road- 106th’s commander believed that Middleton Gap the advanced detachment of the 1st SS blocks still prevented any armor movement wanted him to hold until relieved and thus Panzer Division, Kampfgruppe Peiper, moved toward Bastogne. left the two defending regiments in place. forward through the attacking German in- South of the fifth Panzer Army, By the early morning hours of 17 December fantry during the early hours of the seven- Brandenberger’s Seventh Army also failed to Middleton, whose troops faced multiple teenth. Commanded by Col. Joachim Peiper, break through the American line. The 28th enemy threats, had selected the dispositions the unit would spearhead the main armored Division’s 109th Infantry managed to hold on that would foreshadow the entire American assault heading for the Meuse River cross- to its 9-mile front. Although the LXXXV response. Already ordered by Hodges to de- ings south of Liege at . With over 100 Corps’ two divisions had seized crossings on fend in place, the VIII Corps commander de- tanks and approximately 5,000 men, the Our and achieved some penetrations be- termined that his defense would focus on de- Kampfgruppe Peiper had instructions to ig- tween the regiment’s company strong-points, nying the Germans use of the Ardennes nore its own flanks, to overrun or bypass op- they failed to advance further. Similarly, roadnet. Using the forces at hand, he in- position, and to move day and night. Tra- the Germans’ southernmost attack was held tended to block access to four key road junc- versing the woods south of the main panzer by the 4th Division’s 12th Infantry. The tions: St. Vith, Houffalize, Bastogne, and the route, it entered the town of Buellingen, LXXX Corps’ divisions met with heavy re- city of Luxembourg. If he could stop or slow about 3 miles behind the American line. sistance, and by nightfall the Americans still the German advance west, he knew that the After fueling their tanks on captured stocks, held their positions all along the Seventh 12th Army Group would follow with massive Peiper’s men murdered at least 50 American Army front, despite some infiltration be- flanking attacks from the north and south. POWs. Then shortly after noon, they ran That same morning Hodges finally agreed tween company strongpoints. head on into a 7th Armored Division field ar- Hitler responded to the first day’s reports to cancel the V Corps’ Roer dams attack. tillery observation battery southeast of with unbridled optimism. Rundstedt, how- Gerow, in turn, moved the 2d Division south Malmedy, murdering more than 80 men. ever, was less sanguine. The needed break- to strengthen the 99th Division’s southern Peiper’s men eventually killed at least 300 through had not been achieved, no major ar- flank, with reinforcements from the 1st In- American prisoners and over 100 unarmed mored units had been committed, and the fantry Division soon to follow. The First Belgian civilians in a dozen separate loca- key panzer routes were still blocked. In fact, Army commander now realized that Gerow’s tions. Word of the Malmedy Massacre spread, the first day of battle set the tone for the en- V Corps units held the critical northern and within hours units across the front real- tire American defense. In every engagement shoulder of the enemy penetration and began ized that the Germans were prosecuting the the Americans had been outnumbered, in to reinforce them, trusting that Middleton’s offensive with a special grimness. American some sectors facing down tanks and assault armor reinforcements would restore the cen- resistance stiffened. guns with only infantry weapons. Darkness, ter of the VIII Corps line. Following a twisted course along the fog, and intermittent drizzle snow had fa- While these shifts took place, the battle Ambleve River valley, Kampfgruppe Peiper vored the infiltrating attackers; but, despite raged. During the night of 16–17 December had completed barely half of its drive to the inroads made around the defenses, the Ger- the Sixth Panzer Army continued to move Meuse before encountering a unit from 9th mans had been forced to attack American armor forward in the hopes of gaining the Armored Division and then being stopped by positions frontally to gain access to the vital breakthrough that the infantry had failed to an engineer squad at the bridge. roads. Time had been lost and more would be achieve. The Germans again mounted at- Unknown to Peiper, his column had passed spent to achieve a complete breakthrough. tacks near Monschau and again were re- within 15 miles of the First Army head- In that sense, the grand slam was already in pulsed. Meanwhile, south of Monschau, the quarters and was close to its huge reserve danger. 12th SS Panzer Division, committed from fuel dumps. But the Peiper advance was only American senior commanders were puzzled muddy logging trails, overwhelmed 99th Di- part of the large jolt to the American com- by the situation. The Germans apparently vision soldiers still holding out against the mand that day. To the south the 1st SS Pan- had attacked along a 60-mile front with 277th and 12th Volksgrenadier Divisions. zer Division had also broken loose, moving strong forces, including many new units not Outnumbered and facing superior weapons, just north of St. Vith. identified in the enemy order or battle. Yet many U.S. soldiers fought to the bitter end, As Kampfgruppe Peiper lunged deep into no substantial ground had been lost. With the survivors surrendering only when their the First Army’s rear, further south the VIII many communications links destroyed by munitions had run out and escape was im- Corps front was rapidly being fragmented. the bombardment and the relative isolation possible. Individual heroism was common. The 18th Volksgrenadier Division completed of most defensive positions, the generals During the Krinkelt battle, for example, T. its southern swing, encircling the two regi- were presented with a panorama of numerous Sgt. Vernon McGarity of the 393d Infantry, ments of the 106th Division on the Schnee small-unit battles without a clear larger pic- 99th Division, after being treated for wounds, Eifel. While a single troop of the 14th Cav- ture. returned to lead his squad, rescuing wounded alry Group continued to resist the German Nevertheless, command action was forth- under fire and single-handedly destroying an spearheads, the 106th’s engineers dug in to coming. By nightfall of the sixteenth, al- advancing enemy machine-gun section. After block the crucial Schoenberg road 2 miles though response at both the First Army and two days of fighting, his men were captured east of St. Vith, a last ditch defense, hoping 12th Army Group headquarters was guarded, after firing their last bullets. McGarity re- to hold out until the 7th Armored Division Eisenhower had personally ordered the 7th ceived the Medal of Honor for his actions. arrived. October 5, 1999 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H9321 St. Vith’s road junctions merited the pri- troop overrun; others, who were both seg- First Army moved the 30th Infantry and 3d ority Middleton had assigned them. Al- mented and surrounded, surrendered. By 1600 Armored Divisions south to extend the though the I SS Panzer Corps had planned to most of the two regiments and their at- northern shoulder of the penetration to the pass north of the town and the LVIII Panzer tached support has thus been captured. Nev- west. Although Bradley remained the least Corps to its south, the crossroad town be- ertheless, one battalion-sized group evaded concerned, he and Patton explored moving a came more important after the German fail- captivity until the twenty-first, and about three-division corps from the Third Army to ure to make a breakthrough in the north on 150 soldiers from the 422d ultimately escaped attack the German southern flank. 16–17 December. There, the successful defense to safety. The confused nature of the final Allied intelligence now began to discern of the Elsenborn ridge had blocked three of battles made specific casualty accounting German strength objectives with some clar- the Sixth Panzer Army’s routes, pushing impossible, but over 7,000 men were captured. ity. The enemy’s success apparently was tied Dietrich’s reserve and supply routes south- The tragedy of the Schnee Eifel was soon to gaining the Meuse quickly and then turn- ward and jamming Manteuffel’s Losheim eclipsed by the triumph of St. Vith. Every ing north; however, most of the attacking di- route. South of the Losheim Gap the Amer- senior German commander saw the ‘‘road oc- visions were trapped in clogged columns, at- ican occupation of St. Vith and the Schnee topus’’—the omnidirectional junction of six tempting to push through the narrow Eifel represented a double obstacle, which roads in the town’s eastern end—as vital for Losheim Gap and enter the two panzer neither Dietrich nor Manteuffel could afford. a massive breakthrough, freeing up the Sixth routes then open. The area, still controlled With thousands of American soldiers still Panzer Army’s advance. For the Americans, by the VIII Corps, seemed to provide the key holding desperately along the Schnee Eifel holding St. Vith would keep the V and VIII to stabilizing the defensive effort. Somehow and its western slope village, the Germans Corps within a reasonable distance of each the VIII Corps, whose center had now been found vital roads still threatened. Further other; without the town the enemy’s spear- destroyed, would have to slow down the Ger- west, the possibility of American counter- heads would widen into a huge salient, fold- man drive west, giving the Americans time attacks from the St. Vith roadnet threat- ing back toward Bastogne further south. to strengthen the shoulders north and south ened Dietrich’s narrow panzer flow westward With intermittent communications, the St. of the salient and to prepare one or more as well as Manteuffel’s own western advance. Vith defenders thus operated with only one major counterattacks. And from St. Vith, the Americans could not order from Middleton: ‘‘Hold at all costs.’’ Middleton committed his only reserves, only choke the projected German supply ar- Despite a ‘‘goose-egg’’ position extending Combat Command R of the 9th Armored Di- teries but also reinforce the now isolated 12 miles from east to west on tactical maps, vision and seven battalions of corps and Schnee Eifel regiments. the St. Vith defense literally had no depth. army engineers, positioning the units at For the 106th Division’s men holding the Designed to fight on the move in more favor- critical road junctions. Teams formed from Schnee Eifel, time was running out. The 7th able terrain, the four combat commands of tank, armored infantry, and engineer units Armored Division’s transfer south from the the 7th and 9th Armored Divisions found soon met the 2d Panzer Division’s lead ele- Ninth Army had been slowed both by coordi- themselves moored to muddy, steep sloped ments. Outgunned in a frontal fight and dis- nation problems and roads clogged by with- hills, heavily wooded and laced with mud advantaged by the wide-tracked German drawing elements. Led by Combat Command trails. The first action defined the defense’s tanks’ cross-country capability in the driz- B, the 7th’s first elements arrived at St. Vith pattern. Unengaged commands sent tanks zle-soaked fields, Middleton’s armored forces in midafternoon of 17 December, with the di- and halftracks racing laterally across the pe- were soon overwhelmed, even though the vision taking command of the local defense rimeter to deal with penetrations and infil- fighting continued well into the night. By immediately. That night both sides jockeyed trators, with the engaged tanks and infantry dawn on the eighteenth no recognizable line in the dark. While the 18th Volksgrenadier holding their overextended lines as best they existed as the XLVII Panzer Corps’ three di- Division tried to make up lost time to mount could. After two days of sporadic attacks, visions bore down on Bastogne. an attack on the town from the northeast the German commanders attempted to con- Late on 17 December Hodges had requested and east, the 7th, whose units had closed centrate forces to crush the defense. But the commitment of SHAEF reserves, the 82d around St. Vith in fading daylight, estab- with clogged roads German preparations for and 101st Airborne Divisions. Promised to lished a northerly facing defensive arc in a coordinated assault encountered contin- Middleton by the morning of the nineteenth, preparation for its attack toward the Schnee uous delays. the VIII Corps commander intended to use Eifel the next day. Although the VIII Corps’ northern flank them at Houffalize, 17 miles south of St. South of St. Vith the 106th Division’s had been at least temporarily anchored at Vith, and at Bastogne, 10 miles further southernmost regiment, the 424th Infantry, St. Vith, its center was in great danger. south, as a solid block against the German and Combat Command B, 9th Armored Divi- There, the 28th Division’s 110th Infantry was advance to the Meuse. But until the airborne sion, had joined up behind the Our River. being torn to bits. After failing repeatedly to divisions arrived, the VIII Corps had to hold From the high-ground positions there they seize crossing on the Our, Manteuffel had its sector with the remnants of its own were able to continue blocking the 62d passed some of the 116th Panzer Division’s forces, mainly engineers, and with an ar- Volksgrenadier Division, thereby securing armor through the 2d Panzer Division to mored combat command from the 10th Ar- the southern approaches to St. Vith. But un- move up the Skyline Drive ridgeline and mored Division, which was beginning to known to them, the 28th Division’s 112th In- enter its panzer route. Thus by 17 December enter the battle for the corps’ center. fantry was also folding rearward and eventu- the 110th had elements of five divisions bull- Middleton’s engineer ‘‘barrier line’’ in ally joined the 424th and the 7th Armored Di- dozing through its strongpoints along the front of Bastogne slowed the German ad- vision, completing a defensive perimeter ridge, forcing back the 28th’s northern and vance and bought critical time, but the ar- around the town. During the night of 17 De- southern regiments that were attempting to rival of Combat Command B, 10th Armored cember, with these forces combining, Mid- maintain a cohesive defense. The 2d entered Division, at Bastogne was crucial. As it dleton and the commanders in St. Vith be- Clervaux, in the 110th’s center, by a side road moved forward, Middleton dispatched three lieved that the VIII Corps’ northern flank and rolled on westward toward Bastogne; armored teams to the north and east during would be restored and the 106th trapped regi- holdouts in Clervaux continued to fight from the night of the eighteenth to cover the road ments relieve. within an ancient castle in the town’s east- junctions leading to Bastogne. A key fight On 18 December Middleton’s hopes of ern end. To the south some survivors of the took place at Longvilly, just a few miles east launching a counterattack toward the ridge battle had fallen back to join engineers of Bastogne, where the remnants of the 9th Schnee Eifel faded as elements of three Ger- defending Wiltz, about 4 miles to the rear, Armored Division’s Combat Command R and man divisions converged around St. Vith. Al- and the southern approach to Bastogne. the 10th’s Team Cherry tried to block the though situation maps continued to mark Even though the 110th has suffered over 80 Germans. Three enemy divisions converged the last-known positions of the 106gh Divi- percent casualties, its stand had delayed the there, trapping the CCR force west of the sion’s 422d and 423d Infantry on the Schnee XLVII Panzer Corps for a crucial forty-eight town and annihilating it and then sur- Eifel, the massive weight of German num- hours. rounding Team Cherry. But even as this oc- bers ended any rescue attempts. Commu- The southern shoulder provided VIII Corps’ curred, the lead elements of the 101st Air- nicating through a tenuous artillery radio only clear success. The 4th Division has ab- borne Division passed through Bastogne to net, both regiments believed that help was sorbed the folded back defenses of the 109th defensive positions along the villages and on the way and that their orders were to Infantry and the 9th Armored Division’s low hills just to the east of the town. Joining break out to the high ground behind the Our Combat Command A, thus effectively jam- with the CCB’s three armor teams and the River, a distance of between 3 and 4 miles ming the Seventh Army’s attack. With the two battalions of engineers from the barrier over difficult enemy-held terrain. arrival of the 10th Armored Division, a provi- line, the 101st formed a crescent-shaped de- The following day, 19 December, brought sional corps was temporarily formed to block fense, blocking the five roads entering Bas- tragedy for the 106th Division. The two any advance toward the city of Luxembourg. togne from the north, east, and south. stranded regiments, now behind the Schnee The events of 17 December finally dem- The enemy responded quickly. The German Eifel, were pounded by artillery throughout onstrated the gravity of the German offen- commanders wanted to avoid being en- the day as the Germans drew their circle sive to the Allied command. Eisenhower meshed in any costly sieges. So when tighter. With casualties mounting and am- committed the theater reserve, the XVIII Manteuffel saw a hole opening between the munition dwindling, the 423d’s commander Airborne Corps, and ordered three American American defenses at St. Vith and Bastogne, chose to surrender his regiment to prevent divisions training in England to move imme- he ordered his panzer divisions to bypass its annihilation. The 422d had some of its diately to north-eastern France. Hodges’ both towns and move immediately toward H9322 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE October 5, 1999 their planned Meuse crossing sites some 30 diers in numerous ‘‘blocks’’ and positions in reserves to extend the First Army line miles to the northwest, leaving the infantry unlocated on any command post map. These westward. Much of the Sixth Panzer Army’s to reduce Bastogne’s defenses. Although Mid- men knew nothing of Allied operational strength was thus tied up in road jams of dleton had planned to use the 82d Airborne plans or even the extent of the German of- long columns of vehicles. But American suc- Division to fill the gap between Bastogne fensive, but in the next days, on their shoul- cess was still far from certain. The V Corps and St. Vith, Hodges had been forced to di- ders, victory or disaster rested. was holding four panzer divisions along the vert it northwest of St. Vith to block the One unavoidable decision on overall battle- northern shoulder, an elbow-shaped 25-mile Sixth Panzer Army’s advance. Thus only the field coordination remained. Not one to line, with only parts of four U.S. divisions. few engineers and support troops defending move a command post to the rear, General To the west of the V Corps the 30th Infan- the road junctions and crossings along the Bradley had kept his 12th Army Group head- try Division, now under Maj. Gen. Matthew narrow River west of Bastogne lay in quarters in the city of Luxembourg, just B. Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne Corps, marched the path of Manteuffel’s panzers. south of the German attack. Maj. Gen. Hoyt south to block Kampfgruppe Peiper at Malmedy and, along the Ambleve River, at COMMAND DECISIONS, 19–20 DECEMBER S. Vandenberg’s Ninth Air Force head- quarters, which supported Bradley’s armies, Stavelot, Stoumont, and . To the Wacht am Rhine’s timetable had placed stayed there also, unwilling to sever its di- south of Peiper the XVIII’s other units, the Dietrich’s and Manteuffel’s panzers at the rect ties with the ground forces. But three 82d Airborne and 3d Armored Divisions, Meuse four days after the attack began. The German armies now separated Bradley’s moved forward to the area between the Salm stubborn American defense made this impos- headquarters from both Hodges’ First Army and Ourthe Rivers, northwest of St. Vith, sible. The Sixth Panzer Army, the des- and Simpson’s Ninth Army in the north, which was still in danger of being isolated. ignated main effort, had been checked; its making it difficult for Bradley to supervise a By 20 December the Peiper force was almost attacks to open the Hohe Venn’s roads by di- defense in the north while coordinating an out of fuel and surrounded. During the night rect assault and airborne envelopment had attack from the south. Nor would commu- of the twenty-third Peiper and his men de- failed, and Kampfgruppe Peiper’s narrow ar- nications for the thousands of messages and stroyed their equipment, abandoned their ve- mored spearhead had been isolated. To the orders needed to control and logistically sup- hicles, and walked out to escape capture. south the Fifth Panzer Army’s northern port Bradley’s two northern armies and Dietrich’s spearhead was broken. corps had been blocked at St. Vith; its center Vandenberg’s two northern air commands be North of St. Vith the I SS Panzer Corps corps had advanced nearly 25 miles into the guaranteed. pushed west. Part of the LVIII Panzer Corps American center but was still meeting re- Eisenhower, therefore, divided the battle- had already bypassed the defenders’ southern sistance; and its southern corps had been un- field. At noon on 20 December ground com- flank. Standing in the way of Dietrich’s pan- able to break the Bastogne roadblock. The mand north of the line from Givet on the zers was a 6-mile line along the Salm River, southern flank was in no better straits. Nei- Meuse to the high ground roughly 5 miles manned by the 82d Airborne Division. ther the Seventh Army’s feint toward the south of St. Vith devolved to Montgomery’s Throughout the twenty-first German armor city of Luxembourg nor its efforts to cover 21 Army Group, which temporarily assumed attacked St. Vith’s northwestern perimeter Manteuffel’s flank had gained much ground. operational control of both the U.S. Ninth and infantry hit the entire eastern circum- Hitler’s key requirement that an over- and First Armies. Shifting the ground com- ference of the line. Although the afternoon whelming force achieve a quick break- mand raised a furor, given the strained rela- assault was beaten back, the fighting was re- through had not occurred. Six divisions had tions Montgomery had with senior American newed after dark. To prevent being trapped held twenty, and now the American forces, commanders. Montgomery had been success- from the rear, the 7th Armored Division either on or en route to the battlefield, had ful in attacking and occupying ‘‘ground of began pulling out of its advanced positions doubled. Nevertheless, the Sixth Panzer his own choosing’’ and then drawing in around 2130. The other American units Army’s II SS Panzer Corps had yet to be enemy armored reserves where they could be around the town conformed, folding into a committed, and additional divisions and destroyed by superior artillery and air tighter perimeter west of the town. armor existed in the German High Command Ridgway wanted St. Vith’s defenders to power. He now intended to repeat these tac- reserve. The unspoken belief among Hitler’s stay east of the Salm, but Montgomery ruled tics, planning to hold his own counter- generals now was that with luck and contin- otherwise. The 7th Armored Division, its am- attacks until the enemy’s reserves had been ued poor weather, the more limited objec- munition and fuel in short supply and per- spent or a decisive advantage gained. The tives of their small solution might still be haps two-thirds of its tanks destroyed, and American generals, however, favored an im- possible. the battered elements of the 9th Armored, mediate counteroffensive to first halt and Eisenhower’s actions had also undermined 106th, and 28th Divisions could not hold the then turn back the German drive. Equally Hitler’s assumption that the Allied response extended perimeter in the rolling and wood- disconcerting to them was Montgomery’s would come too late. When ‘‘Ike’’ committed ed terrain. Meanwhile, Dietrich’s second persistence in debating command and strat- two armored divisions to Middleton on the wave of tanks entered the fray. The II SS egy, a frequent occurrence in all coalitions, first day of fighting and the theater reserve Panzer Corps immediately threatened the but one that by virtue of his personal ap- on the next, a lightning German advance to Salm River line north and west of St. Vith, proach added to the strains within the Allied the Meuse became nearly impossible. Meet- as did the LVIII Panzer Corps circling to the command. ing with his commanders at Verdun on 19 De- The British 2d Tactical Air Force similarly south, adding the 2d SS Panzer Division to cember, Eisenhower, who had received the took control of the IX and XXIX Tactical Air its drive. Ordering the St. Vith defenders to latest Ultra intelligence on enemy objec- Commands from Vandenberg’s Ninth Air withdraw through the 82d Airborne Division tives, outlined his overall operational re- Force. Because the British air commander, line to prevent another Schnee Eifel dis- sponse. Hodges’ First Army would break the Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur ‘‘Maori’’ aster, Montgomery signaled them that ‘‘they German advance; along the southern flank of Coningham, had long established close per- come back with all honor.’’ the German penetration Patton’s Third Mud threatened to trap much of the force, sonal relations with the concerned American Army would attack north, assuming control but nature intervened with a ‘‘Russian air commanders, the shift of air commands of Middleton’s VIII Corps from the First High,’’ a cold snap and snowstorm that passed uneventfully. Army; and Middleton’s Bastogne positions turned the trails from slurry to hard ground. would now be the anvil for Third Army’s FIRST ARMY BATTLES, 20–27 DECEMBER While the Germans seemed temporarily pow- hammer. Eisenhower and Montgomery agreed that erless to act, the St. Vith defenders on 23 De- Patton, content that his staff had finalized the First Army would establish a cohesive cember, in daylight, withdrew across the operational planning, promised a full corps defensive line, yielding terrain if necessary. Salm to reform behind the XVIII Airborne attack in seventy-two hours, to begin after a Montgomery also intended to create a corps- Corps front. Ridgway estimated that the suc- nearly 100-mile move. Devers’ 6th Army sized reserve for a counterattack, which he cessful withdrawal added at least 100 tanks Group would take up the slack, relieving two sought to keep from being committed during and two infantry regiments to his corps. of Patton’s corps of their frontage. In the the defensive battle. The First Army’s hasty The St. Vith defense purchased five critical north Montgomery had already begun mov- defense had been one of hole-plugging, last days, but the situation remained grave. Mod- ing the British 30 Corps to backstop the First stands, and counterattacks to buy time. Al- el’s Army Group B now had twelve full divi- Army and assume defensive positions behind though successful, these tactics had created sions attacking along roughly 25 miles of the the Meuse astride the crossings from Liege organizational havoc within Hodges’ forces northern shoulder’s east-west front. Hodges’ to Namur. as divisional units had been committed army was holding with thirteen divisions, Eisenhower began his Verdun conference piecemeal and badly jumbled. Complicating four of which had suffered heavy casualties saying, ‘‘The present situation is to be re- the situation even further was the fact that and three of which were forming in reserve. garded as one of opportunity for us and not the First Army still held the north-south Montgomery had designated Maj. Gen. J. disaster.’’ That opportunity, as his generals front, north of Monschau to Elsenborn, while Lawton ‘‘Lightning Joe’’ Collins’ VII Corps knew, hung not on their own operational fighting Dietrich’s panzers along a nearly as the First Army’s counterattack force, po- plans but on the soldiers on the battlefield, east-west axis in the Ardennes. sitioning its incoming divisions northwest of defending the vital St. Vith and Bastogne Blessed with excellent defensive ground Hodges’ open flank, hoping to keep them out road junctions, holding on to the Elsenborn and a limited lateral roadnet in front of V of the defensive battle. He intended both to ridge, and blocking the approaches to the Corps positions, Gerow had been able to roll blunt the enemy’s assault and wear down its city of Luxembourg, as well as on the sol- with the German punch and Hodges to feed divisions by withdrawing the XVIII Airborne October 5, 1999 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H9323 Corps to a shorter, defendable line, thus on 22 December, the corps commander’s em- the Marne-Rhine Canal. If successful, a sec- knitting together the First Army’s frag- issary arrived at the 101st Division’s com- ond operation, called Zahnartz (‘‘Dentist’’), mented defense. Above all, before launching mand post, demanding surrender or threat- would pursue objectives westward toward the a major counterstroke, Montgomery wanted ening annihilation. The acting division com- area between Luneville and Metz and into to cripple the German panzers with artillery mander, Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, re- the Third Army’s southern flank. Lt. Gen. and with constant air attacks against their plied ‘‘Nuts,’’ initially confounding the Ger- Hans von Obstfelder’s First Army would lines of supply. mans but not Bastogne’s defenders. The de- launch the XIII SS Corps as the main effort The Russian High that blanketed the bat- fense held. down the Sarre River valley, while to the tlefield brought the Allies one tremendous For four days bitter fighting raged in a southeast four divisions from the XC and advantage—good flying weather. The week of clockwise rotation around Bastogne’s south- LXXXIX Corps would attack southwesterly inclement weather promised to Hitler by his ern and western perimeter, further con- down the Low Vosges mountain range meteorologists had run out—and with it the stricting the defense within the low hills and through the old Maginot Line positions near ability to move in daylight safe from air at- patches of woods surrounding the town. The Bitche. A two-division panzer reserve would tack. The Allied air forces rose to the occa- infantry held ground, with the armor scur- be held to reinforce success, which Hitler be- sion. Night bombers of the Royal Air Force’s rying to seal penetrations or to support local lieved would be in the Sarre River sector. Bomber Command had been attacking those counterattacks. Once the overcast weather Reichsfuehrer ’s Army rail yards supporting the German offensive had broke, the defenders received both air Group Oberrhein, virtually an independent since 17 December. In the five days of good support and aerial resupply, making it im- field army reporting only to Hitler, was to weather following the Russian High, Amer- perative for Manteuffel to turn some of his pin the southern flank of the Seventh Army ican day bombers entered the interdiction ef- precious armor back to quickly crush the with holding attacks. The new offensive was fort. As Allied fighter bombers patrolled the American defense, a large deadly threat planned for the thirty-first, New Year’s Eve. roads throughout the Ardennes and the Eifel, along his southern flank. However, its target, the U.S. Seventh Army, the Ninth Air Force’s medium bombers at- Meanwhile, as Bastogne held, Patton’s was neither unready nor unwarned. tacked targets west of the Rhine and the Third Army units streamed northward. Maj. Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch’s Seventh Eighth Air Force’s heavy bombers hit rail Gen. John B. Millikin’s newly arrived III Army, part of Devers’ 6th Army Group, yards deeper into Germany. Flying an aver- Corps headquarters took command of the 4th which also included the French First Army, age of 3,000 sorties daily during good weath- Armored and 26th and 80th Infantry Divi- had been among the theater’s unsung heroes. er, the combined air forces dropped more sions, in a move quickly discovered and mon- After conducting assault landings on the than 31,000 tons of bombs during the first ten itored by the Germans’ effective radio inter- coast of southern France in August 1944, the days of interdiction attacks. cept units. In response, Brandenberger’s Sev- small army had chased a significantly larger The effects on the ground battle were dra- enth Army, charged with the crucial flank force northward; but, much to the chagrin of matic. The sluggish movement of fuel and guard mission in Hitler’s offensive, rushed his commanders, Patch had been ordered not vehicles over the Ardennes’ few roads had al- its lagging infantry divisions forward to to cross the Rhine, even though his divisions ready slowed German operations. The added block the expected American counterattack. were among the first Allied units to reach its strain on resupply from the bombing and Jumping off as promised on 22 December banks. In November the Seventh Army had strafing now caused halts up and down the some 12 to 15 miles south of Bastogne, III been the Western Front’s leading Allied German line, making coordinated attacks Corps divisions achieved neither the surprise ground gainer. Yet, when Patton’s Third more difficult. Still, panzer and infantry nor momentum that Bradley and Patton had Army found its offensive foundering, Patch, units continued to press forward. hoped. No longer a lunge into an exposed again following orders, had sent a corps From Christmas Eve to the twenty-sev- flank, the attack became a frontal assault northward to attack the Siegfried Line’s enth, battles raged along the First Army’s along a 30-mile front against infantry hold- southern flank, an operational lever designed entire front. The heaviest fighting swirled ing good defensive terrain. With Bastogne’s to assist Patton’s attack. around the positions held by Ridgway’s garrison totally surrounded, only a quick On 19 December, at the Verdun conference, XVIII Airborne Corps and Collins’ VII Corps, Third Army breakthrough could prevent the the 6th Army Group was again relegated to a the latter having been piecemealed forward brilliant holding action there from becoming supporting role. Eisenhower ordered Devers to extend the First Army line westward. a costly disaster. But how long Bastogne’s to assume the front of two of Patton’s corps While the XVIII Corps battled the Sixth Pan- defenders could hold out was a question that were moving to the Ardennes, and then zer Army’s last attempts to achieve a north- mark. on the twenty-sixth he added insult to injury ern breakthrough, the VII Corps’ 3d Armored To the east, as Millikin’s III Corps moved by telling the 6th Army Group commander and 84th Infantry Divisions held the line’s against hardening enemy resistance along to give up his Rhine gains by withdrawing to western end against the LVIII and XLVII the Sure River, Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy’s the Vosges foothills. The switch to the de- Panzer Corps. These units had become Mod- XII Corps attacked northward on a front al- fense also scrapped Devers’ planned attacks el’s new main effort, swinging wide of most as wide as the III Corps’. Taking con- to reduce the , the German Dietrich’s stalled attack, and they now had trol of the 4th Infantry and 10th Armored Di- foothold stretching 50 miles along the elements about 5 miles from the Meuse. visions and elements of the 9th Armored Di- Rhine’s western banks south of . Upon finding the 2d Panzer Division out of vision, all units of Middleton’s former south- Held in check by two corps of General Jean gas at the German salient’s tip, Collins on ern wing, Eddy met greater difficulties in de Lattre de Tassigny’s French First Army, Christmas Day sent 2d Armored Division, clearing the ridges southeast of Bastogne. this area was the only German bridgehead in with heavy air support, to encircle and de- Meanwhile, the 35th and 5th Infantry Divi- Devers’ sector. But by Christmas Eisenhower stroy the enemy force. sions and the 6th Armored Division moved saw a greater threat than the Colmar Pocket The First Army’s desperate defense be- northward to strengthen the counterattacks. opening on his southern front. Allied intelligence had confirmed that a tween the Salm and Meuse Rivers had Millikin finally shifted the main effort to new enemy offensive in the Alsace region stopped the Sixth and Fifth Panzer Armies, the west, where the 4th Armored Division was imminent. Eisenhower wanted the Sev- including six panzer divisions. The fierce was having more success. Following fierce enth Army to meet it by withdrawing to battles—at places as Baraque de Fraiture, village-by-village fighting in frigid tempera- shortened lines to create reserves, essen- , , and Marche—were epics of tures, the 4th linked up with Bastogne’s de- tially ceding northern Alsace back to the valor and determination. Hitler’s drive for fenders at 1650 on 26 December, lifting the Germans, including the city of Strasbourg. Antwerp was over. siege but setting the stage for even heavier Not surprisingly, Devers, Patch, and de fighting for the Bastogne sector. THIRD ARMY BATTLES, 20–27 DECEMBER Lattre objected strongly to the order. In the The 20 December boundary shift trans- NORDWIND IN ALSACE, 31 DECEMBER–5 JANUARY end, rather than withdraw, Devers shifted ferred Middleton’s VIII Corps and its Bas- By 21 December Hitler had decided on a forces to create a reserve to backstop the togne garrison to Patton’s Third Army, new offensive, this time in the Alsace region, key enemy attack avenues leading into his which was now moving forces from as far in effect selecting one of the options he had front and ordered the preparation of three away as 10 miles to attack positions south of disapproved earlier in favor of Wacht am intermediate withwrawal lines forward of the German salient. Bastogne had become an Rhine. With the Fifteenth Army’s supporting the defensive line designated by Eisenhower. armed camp with four airborne regiments, thrust canceled due to Dietrich’s failure to By New Year’s Eve, with two U.S. divisions seven battalions of artillery, a self-propelled break the northern shoulder, and with no withdrawn from the Seventh Army and tank destroyer battalion, and the surviving hope of attaining their original objectives, placed in theater reserve, the 6th Army tanks, infantry, and engineers from two ar- both Hitler and Rundstedt agreed that an at- Group’s front resembled the weakened de- mored combat commands—all under the tack on the southern Allied front might take fense that had encouraged the German 101st Airborne Division’s command. advantage of Patton’s shift north to the Ardennes offensive. Patch’s six divisons cov- Manteuffel had ordered the Panzer Lehr Ardennes, which Wehrmacht intelligence had ered a 126-mile front, much of it along poor and the 2d Panzer Divisions to bypass Bas- identified as under way. The first operation, defensive ground. Feeling that the Saree togne and speed toward the Meuse, thus iso- called Nordwind (‘‘Northwind’’), targeted the River valley just north of the Low Vosges lating the defenders. As the 26th Saverne Gap, 20 miles northwest of would bear the brunt of any attack, Patch Volksgrenadier Division and the XLVII Strasbourg, to split the Seventh Army’s XV assigned Maj. Gen. Wade Haislip’s XV Corps Paner Corps’ artillery closed in for the kill and VI Corps and retake the Alsace north of a 35-mile sector between Sarreguemines and H9324 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE October 5, 1999 Bitche, with the 103d, 44th, and 100th Infan- and throwing in Task Force Herren, combat German assault westward, Montgomery try Divisions holding from northwest to engineers converted to infantry, and units of ruled out a direct attack to the south at the southeast, backed by the experienced French the 45th and 75th Infantry Divisions to plug base of the bulge. As December waned, Rund- 2d Armored Division. Maj. Gen. Edward H. holes or block routes out of the Low Vosges. stedt’s remaining armored reserves were cen- Brooks’ VI Corps took up the balance of While units fought for twisted roads and tered near St. Vith, and the roadnet there of- Patch’s front from the Low Vosges southeast mountain villages in subfreezing tempera- fered inadequate avenues to channel the four to on the Rhine and then south- tures, Obstfelder’s First Army committed U.S. armored divisions into an attack. Un- ward toward Strasbourg. Brooks’ corps had the 6th SS Mountain Division to restart the willing to weaken his western flank now that the veteran 45th and 79th Infantry Divsions advance on the Saverne Gap. In response, his reserve had been committed, Mont- and the 14th Armored Division in reserve. Patch shifted the 103d Infantry Division gomery seemed more prone to let the VII Patch inserted Task Force Hudelson, a two- eastward from the XV Corps’ northwestern Corps attack from its present positions squadron cavalry force, reinforced with in- wing to hold the southeastern shoulder of northwest of St. Vith. Eisenhower raised the fantry from the uncommitted 14th Armored the Vosges defense. By 5 January the SS issue of committing the British 30 Corps. But Division at the boundary joining the two troopers managed to bull their way to the having deactivated units to rebuild the corps American corps. town of Wingen-sur-Moder, about 10 miles for use in his projected Rhineland offensive, The deployment of three additional units— short of Saverne, but there they were Montgomery agreed to move it across the Task Force Linden (42d Infantry Division), stopped. With the Vosges’ key terrain and Meuse to assume Collins’ vacated front, a Task Force Harris (63d Infantry Division), passes still under American control and the transfer that would not be completely ac- and Task Force Herren (70th Infantry Divi- German advance held in two salients, complished until 2 January. From there, the sion)—demonstrated how far Devers and Nordwind had failed. 30 Corps would conduct limited supporting Patch would go to avoid yielding ground. Meanwhile, the original SHAEF with- attacks. Although Hodges, as First Army Formed from the infantry regiments of three drawal plan, especially the abandonment of commander, would select the precise coun- arriving divisions and led by their respective Strasbourg, had created an Allied crisis in terattack axis, he knew Montgomery’s re- assistant division commanders, these units confidence. Supporting Devers’ decision not peated preference for the VII Corps to con- went straight to the Seventh Army front to withdraw, the Free French government of duct the main effort and also Bradley’s pref- minus their still to arrive artillery, engi- General Charles de Gaulle enlisted British erence for a quick linkup at Houffalize. neer, and support units that comprised a Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s support Hodges’ decision was thus predictable. The complete division. By late December Patch to amend Eisenhower’s orders. Fortunately, VII Corps would constitute the First Army’s had given the bulk of Task Force Harris to Patch’s successful defense temporarily main effort, aimed at Houffalize. Ridgway’s Haislip’s XV Corps and the other two to shelved the SHAEF withdrawal plan, but Al- XVIII Airborne Corps would cover the VII’s Brooks, who placed them along the Rhine be- sace was not to be spared further German at- northeastern flank, and, like Millikin’s III tween Lauterbourg and Strasbourg. tacks. Hitler’s armored reserve and Himm- Corps, its advance would be pointed at St. Despite knowledge of the impending Alsace ler’s Army Group Oberrhein had not yet en- Vith. The Germans would thus be attacked offensive, the exact location and objectives tered the battle. head on. were unclear. Troop buildups near Timing the counterstrokes also raised dif- Saarbruecken, east of the Rhine, and within ERASING THE BULGE ficulties. The American generals wanted the the Colmar Pocket pointed to possible North of the Alsace region the Allied com- First Army to attack immediately, claiming thrusts either southwestward down the Sarre manders were concerned with reducing the the Germans had reached their high-water River valley or northward from the Colmar enemy’s Ardennes salient, now called the mark. Montgomery demurred, citing intel- region, predictions made by the Seventh ‘‘Bulge.’’ From the beginning of Wacht am ligence predictions of an imminent offensive Army’s G–2 that proved to be remarkably ac- Rhein they had envisioned large-scale coun- by the II SS Panzer Corps—an assault he curate. terattacks. The decisions as to where and welcomed as it fit his concept of weakening On New Year’s Eve Patch told his corps how the attacks would be launched, however, enemy armor further rather than conducting commanders that the Germans would launch underscored their different perspectives. The costly attacks. Contrary to Montgomery’s their major offensive early the next day. Ac- theoretical solution was to attack the sa- tactics, Eisenhower preferred that the First tually, first combat began shortly before lient at its base. Patton had in fact planned Army attack immediately to prevent the midnight all along the XV Corps front and to have the Third Army’s right flank corps, Germans from withdrawing their panzers and along both the southeastern and south- the XII, attack further eastward toward shifting them southward. western approaches from Bitche toward the Bitburg, Germany, along what he referred to Patton’s renewed attacks in late December Low Vosges. The XIII SS Corps’ two rein- as the ‘‘honeymoon trail.’’ Bradley, however, caused the Third Army to learn firsthand forced units, the 17th SS Panzergrenadier as the commander responsible for the south- how difficult the First Army battles had and 36th Volksgrenadier Divisions, attacked ern attack, wanted to cover the shortest dis- been. In the Third Army sector the relief of the 44th and 100th Division, whose prepared tance to relieve Hodges’ beleaguered First Bastogne had not changed the intensity of defense in depth included a regiment from Army units. Overruling Patton, he des- combat. As Manteuffel received panzer rein- Task Force Harris. The Germans made nar- ignated Houffalize, midway between Bas- forcements, he threw them into the Bastogne row inroads against the 44th’s line near togne and St. Vith, as a primary objective. salient before it could be widened and ex- Rimling during fighting characterized by Middleton’s reinforced VIII Corps, the west- tended northward toward the First Army. constant American counterattacks sup- ernmost force, would drive on Houffalize; the Patton’s Third Army now encountered pan- ported by French armor and Allied air at- middle force, Millikin’s III Corps, would re- zers and divisions in numbers comparable to tacks during clear weather. After four days main on Middleton’s right flank heading for those that had been pressing against the of vicious fighting the XIII SS Corps’ initial St. Vith; and Eddy’s XII Corps would serve as northern shoulder for the previous 10 days. offensive had stalled. an eastern hinge. Bradley’s choice made the In the week after Bastogne’s relief the num- The XC and LXXXIX Corps attacked near best use of the existing roads; sending ber of German divisions facing the Third Bitche with four infantry divisions abreast. Millikin’s IIII Corps along advantageous ter- Army jumped from three to nine around Bas- Advancing through the Low Vosges, they rain corridors avoided the favorable defen- togne and from four to five in the III and XII gained surprise by forgoing artillery prepara- sive ground on the successive ridges east of Corps sector of the front. tions and by taking advantage of fog and Bastogne. Once linked with the First Army, The fighting during the 9-mile American thick forests to infiltrate Task Force the 12th Army Group’s boundary would re- drive from Bastogne to Houffalize became a Hudelson. As in the Losheim Gap, the de- vert to its original northern line. Only then series of bitter attacks and counterattacks fending mechanized cavalry held only a thin would Bradley send the First and Third Ar- in worsening weather. Patton quickly added line of strongpoints; lateral mobility mies east into the Eifel toward Pruem and the 17th Airborne, the 87th and 35th Infantry, through the rough snowladen mountain Bitburg in Germany. Bradley further solidi- and the 11th and 6th Armored Divisions to roads was limited. The light mechanized fied his plan by committing newly arriving his attacking line, which stretched 25 miles forces were soon overrun or bypassed and reinforcements—the 11th Armored, 17th Air- from the Ourthe River to the Clerf. While the isolated by the 559th, 257th, 361st, and 256th borne, and 87th Infantry Divisions—to the III Corps continued its grim attacks north- Volksgrenadier Divisions. The Germans west of Bastogne for Middleton’s VIII corps. eastward against the forested ridges of the gained about 10 miles during Nordwind’s first Montgomery had eyed Houffalize earlier, Wiltz valley leading toward German escape four days, heading directly for the Saverne viewing the approaches to the town from the routes eastward out of the salient, VIII Corps Gap that linked the XV and VI Corps. northwest as excellent for a corps-sized at- forces added some width to the Bastogne sa- Both American corps commanders re- tack. His own extended defensive line on the lient but gained no ground northward before sponded quickly to the threat. Haislip’s XV northern shoulder of the bulge and the piece- New Year’s Day. Both sides reinforced the Corps plugged the northwestern exits to the meal entry of Collins’ VII Corps into battle sector with every available gun. In a nearly Low Vosges with Task Force Harris, units of further west did not shake his original con- week-long artillery duel Patton’s renewed the 14th Armored and 100th Divisions, and a cept. Much like Bradley, he saw an interim attacks collided with Manteuffel’s final ef- regiment from the 36th Infantry Division, solution as best. Concerned that American forts to eradicate the Bastogne bridgehead. which Eisenhower had released from theater infantry losses in Gerow’s V Corps had not During the same week German attacks reserve. Brooks’ VI Corps did the same, been replaced, and with the same terrain and continued along the First Army line near the stripping its Lauterbourg and Rhine fronts roadnet considerations that had jammed the Elsenborn ridge and in the center of the October 5, 1999 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H9325 XVIII Airborne Corps line before a general Group. Almost immediately Bradley began during the successful attacks of August 1870 quiet descended upon the northern front. In what he had referred to in planning as a under Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke. many areas the fields, forests, and roads ‘‘hurry-up’’ offensive, another full-blooded Moltke’s successors, however, made no were now covered with waist-high snow- drive claiming the Rhine as its ultimate ob- breakthrough. In the two Alsatian towns of drifts, further impeding the movement of jective while erasing the Bulge en route. On Hatten and Rittershoffen, Patch and Brooks both fighting men and their resupply vehi- the twenty-third Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne threw in the Seventh Army’s last reserve, cles. Corps, now the First Army’s main effort, and the 14th Armored Division. Assisted by a Climaxing Wacht am Rhein’s efforts, the the 7th Armored Division took St. Vith. This mixture of other combat, combat support, Luftwaffe launched its one great appearance action was the last act of the campaign for and service troops, the division halted the of the campaign during the early morning the First Army. Hodges’ men, looking out Germans. hours of New Year’s Day. Over 1,000 aircraft across the Losheim Gap at the Schnee Eifel While the VI Corps fought for its life in the took off before dawn to attack Allied air- and hills beyond, now prepared for new bat- Forest, the enemy renewed at- fields in Holland and Belgium, with the ob- tles. tacks on both flanks. During an intense bat- jective of eliminating the terrible scourge In the Third Army sector Eddy’s XII Corps tle between units of the 45th Division and that the Allied air forces would again be- leapt the Sure River on 18 January and the 6th SS Mountain Division in the Low come once the skies cleared over the entire pushed north, hoping to revive Patton’s plan Vosges, the Germans surrounded an Amer- battle area. The Germans destroyed roughly for a deep envelopment of the German escape ican battalion that had refused to give 300 Allied machines, but their loss of more routes back across the Belgian-Luxembourg- ground. After a week’s fighting by units at- than 230 pilots was a major blow to the German borders. Intending to pinch the es- tempting its relief, only two soldiers man- Luftwaffe, whose lack of trained aviators cape routes via the German tactical bridges aged to escape to friendly lines. was even more critical than their fuel short- on the Our River, the 5th Division crossed Although gaining ground, the enemy had ages. the Sauer at night, its main body pushing achieved no clear-cut success. Hitler never- Casualties mounted, bringing on a man- theless committed his last reserves on 16 power shortage in both camps. Although the northward to clear the long Skyline Drive ridge, where the 28th Division had faced the January, including the 10th SS Panzer and Germans continued to commit fresh divi- the 7th Parachute Divisions. These forces fi- sions until late December, the Americans, first assaults. By the campaign’s official end on the twenty-fifth the V, XVIII, VIII, III, nally steamrolled a path along the Rhine’s with only three uncommitted divisions in west bank toward the XIV SS Corps’ theater, were forced to realign their entire and XII Corps had a total of nine divisions holding most of the old front, although the Gambsheim bridgehead, over-running one of front. Many units moved from one combat to the green 12th Armored Division’s infantry another without rest or reinforcement. De- original line east of the Our River had yet to be restored. battalions at and destroying one cember’s battles had cost the Americans of its tank battalions nearby. This final NORDWIND REVISITED, 5–25 JANUARY more than 41,000 casualties, and with infan- foray led Brooks to order a withdrawal on try replacements already critically short, In early 1945, as Operation Wacht am Rhein the twenty-first, one that took the Germans antiaircraft and service units had to be in the Ardennes started to collapse, Oper- by surprise and was completed before the stripped to provide riflemen for the line. ation Nordwind in the Alsace was revived. enemy could press his advantage. Black soldiers were offered the opportunity On 5 January, after Nordwind’s main effort Forming a new line along the Zorn, Moder, to fight within black platoons assigned to had failed, Himmler’s Army Group and Rothback Rivers north of the Marne- many white battalions, a major break from Oberrheim finally began its supporting Rhine Canal, the VI Corps commander previous Army policy. thrusts against the southern flank of Brooks’ aligned his units into a cohesive defense with Despite the shortage of replacements, both VI Corps, with the XIV SS Corps launching a his badly damaged but still game armored Patton’s Third Army and Hodges’ First cross-Rhine attack north of Strasbourg. Two divisions in reserve. Launching attacks dur- Army attacked on 3 January. Collins’ VII days later, south of the city, the Nineteenth ing the night of 24–25 January, the Germans Corps in the north advanced toward the high Army launched Operation Sonnenwende ground northwest of Houffalize, with two ar- found their slight penetrations eliminated by (‘‘Winter Solstice’’), attacking north, astride vigorous counterattacks. Ceasing their as- mored divisions in the lead. Meeting stiff op- the Rhone-Rhine Canal on the northern edge position from the LXVI Corps, VII Corps in- saults permanently, they might have found of the German-held Colmar Pocket. These irony in the Seventh Army’s latest acquisi- fantry soon replaced the tanks as difficult actions opened a three-week battle, whose terrain, icy roads, and a tenacious defense tion from SHAEF reserves—the ‘‘Battling ferocity rivaled the Ardennes fighting in vi- Bastards of Bastogne,’’ the 101st Airborne Di- using mines, obstacles, antitank ambushes, ciousness if not in scope and threatened the and armored counterattacks took their toll. vision, which arrived on the Alsace front survival of the VI Corps. The XVIII Airborne Corps moved its right only to find the battle over. Sonnenwende sparked a new crisis for the Even before Nordwind had ended, the 6th flank south to cover Collins’ advance, and in 6th Army Group, which had too few divisions the far west the British 30 Corps pushed east- Army Group commander was preparing to to defend every threatened area. With ward. Under intense pressure Hitler’s forces eliminate the Colmar Pocket in southern Al- Brooks’ VI Corps now engaged on both pulled back to a new line, based on the sace. Five French divisions and two Amer- flanks, along the Rhine at Gambsheim and Ourthe River and Houffalize, with the bulk ican, the 3d Infantry and the rebuilt 28th Di- to the northeast along the Low Vosges of the SS panzer divisions withdrawing from vision, held eight German infantry divisions mountain exits, Devers transferred responsi- the battlefield. Poor weather restricted Al- and an armored brigade in a rich farming bility for Strasbourg to the French First lied flyers to intermittent close support for area laced with rivers, streams, and a major Army, and de Lattre stretched his forces to only three days in the nearly two weeks that canal but devoid of significant hills or cover both the city and the Belfort Gap 75 VII Corps units fought their way toward ridges. Devers wanted to reduce this frozen, miles to the south. their juncture with the Third Army. snow-covered pocket before thaws converted South of the Bulge the Third Army inten- But the real danger was just northeast of the ploughed ground to a quagmire. General sified its attacks northward to meet the Strasbourg. There, the XIV SS Corps had de Lattre’s French First Army would write First Army. Still counting on Middleton’s punched out a 10-miles bridgehead around finis to the Germans in the Colmar Pocket, VIII Corps to break through, Patton sent the town of Gambsheim, brushing off small but it would be a truly Allied attack. Millikin’s III Corps northeastward, hoping to counterattacks from Task Force Linden. To draw the German reserves southward, enter the roadnet and follow the terrain cor- Patch’s Seventh Army, reinforced with the plans called for four divisions from the ridors to link up with Ridgway’s XVIII Air- newly arrived 12th Armored Division, tried French I Corps to start the assault. This ini- borne Corps attacking St. Vith. Despite hav- to drive the Germans from the Gambsheim tial foray would set the stage for the French ing less than fifty-five tanks operational, the area, a region laced with canals, streams, II Corps to launch the main effort in the I SS Panzer Corps counterattacked the III and lesser watercourses. To the south de north. The defending Nineteenth Army’s Corps’ 6th Armored Division in ferocious Lattre’s 3d Algerian Division defended eight divisions were low on equipment but tank fights unseen since the fall campaign in Strasbourg, while the rest of the French well provided with artillery munitions, small Lorraine. While the III Corps’ 90th Division First Army kept the Colmar Pocket tightly arms, and mines, and fleshed out with what- infantrymen broke through to the heights ringed. But the fate of Strasbourg and the ever manpower and materiel that Himmler, overlooking the Wiltz valley, the VIII Corps northern Alsace hinged on the ability of the the overall commander, could scrounge from to the west struggled against a determined American VI Corps to secure its besieged the German interior. Bad weather, compart- force fighting a textbook withdrawal. By 15 flanks. mentalized terrain, and fear of Himmler’s SS January Noville, the scene of the original Having driven several wedges into the Sev- secret police strengthened the German de- northern point of the Bastogne perimeter, enth Army, the Germans launched another fense. was retaken. Five miles from Houffalize, re- attack on 7 January. The German XXXIX On 20 January, in the south, Lt. Gen. sistance disappeared. Ordered to escape, the Panzer Corps, with the 21st Panzer and the Emile Bethouart’s French I Corps began its remaining Germans withdrew, and on the 25th Panzergrenadier Divisions, attacked the attack in a driving snowstorm. Although its sixteenth the Third Army’s 11th Armored Di- greatly weakened VI Corps center between gains were limited by armored-infantry vision linked up with the First Army’s 2d Ar- the Vosges and Lauterbourg. Quickly gain- counterattacks, the corps drew the Nine- mored Division at Houffalize. ing ground to the edge of the Haguenau For- teenth Army’s armor southward, along with The next day, 17 January, control of the est 20 miles north of Strasbourg, the German the arriving 2d Mountain Division. Two days First Army reverted to Bradley’s 12th Army offensive rolled along the same routes used later, in the north, Maj. Gen. Amie de H9326 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE October 5, 1999 Goislard de Monsabert’s French II Corps no less an Allied victory. Hitler spent his 26th Infantry Division, 28th Infantry Divi- commenced its attack, led by the U.S. 3d Di- last reserves in Alsace—and with them the sion, 30th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry vision. Reinforced by one of the 63d Infantry ability to regain the initiative anywhere. Division, 36th Infantry Division, 42d Infantry Division’s regiments, the 3d advanced over Like the Normandy Campaign, the Ardennes- Division, 44th Infantry Division, 45th Infan- the first of several watercourses and cleared Alsace struggle provided the necessary attri- try Division, 63d Infantry Division,* 70th In- the Colmar Forest. It met resistance on the tion for the mobile operations that would fantry Division, 75th Infantry Division, 76th Ill River but continued to fight its way for- end the war. The carefully husbanded enemy Infantry Division, 78th Infantry Division, ward through enemy counterattacks, subse- reserves that the Allies expected to meet in 79th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Divi- quently crossing the Colmar Canal and open- their final offensive into Germany had been sion, 83d Infantry Division, 84th Infantry Di- ing an avenue for the French 5th Armored destroyed in December and January. vision, 87th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division. The Allies pushed further eastward Some thirty-two U.S. divisions fought in Division, 94th Infantry Division, 95th Infan- in deepening snow and worsening weather, the Ardennes, where the daily battle try Division, 99th Infantry Division, 100th In- with the 28th and 75th Divisions from the strength of U.S. Army forces averaged twen- fantry Division, 103d Infantry Division, 106th Ardennes following. On the twenty-fifth Maj. ty-six divisions and 610,000 men. Alsace Infantry Division. Gen. Frank W. Milburn’s XXI Corps joined added eleven more divisions to the honors 2d Armored Division, 3d Armored Division, the line. Assuming control of the 3d, 28th, list, with an average battle strength of 4th Armored Division, 5th Armored Division, and 75th Divisions, the 12th Armored Divi- 230,000. Additionally, separate divisional ele- 6th Armored Division, 7th Armored Division, sion, which was shifted from reserves, and ments as well as divisions arriving in sector 8th Armored Division, 9th Armored Division, the French 5th Armored Division, the corps at the end of the campaign granted partici- 10th Armored Division, 11th Armored Divi- launched the final thrust to the Vauban pation credit to three more divisions. But sion, Armored Division, 12th Armored Divi- Canal and Rhone-Rhine Canal bridges at the cost of victory was staggering. The final sion, 14th Armored Division. Neuf-Brisach. Although the campaign was of- tally for the Ardennes alone totaled 41.315 17th Airborne Division, 82d Airborne Divi- sion, 101st Airborne Division. ficially over on 25 January, the American casualties in December to bring the offensive and French troops did not completely clear to a halt and an additional 39,672 casualties ARDENNES-ALSACE 1944–1945 the Colmar Pocket until 9 February. How- in January to retake lost ground. The Further Readings ever, its successful reduction marked the end SHAFE casualty estimate presented to Ei- A number of official histories provide care- of both the German presence on French ter- senhower in February 1945 listed casualties fully documented accounts of operations dur- ritory and the Nineteenth Army. And with for the First Army at 39,957; for the Third ing the Ardennes-Alsace Campaign. U.S. the fighting finally concluded in the Army at 35,525; and for the British 30 Corps, Army operations are covered in Hugh M. Ardennes and Alsace, the Allies now readied which helped at the end, at 1,408. Defeating Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge their forces for the final offensive into Ger- Hitler’s final offensive in the Alsace was also (1965); Charles B. MacDonald, The Last Of- many. costly; the Seventh Army recorded its Janu- fensive (1973); and Jeffrey J. Clarke and Rob- ANALYSIS ary battle losses at 11,609. Sickness and cold ert Ross Smith, Riviera to the Rhine (1991), three volumes in the United States Army in Hitler’s last offensives—in December 1944 weather also ravaged the fighting lines, with the First, Third, and Seventh Armies having World War II series. Air operations are de- in the Ardennes region of Belgium and Lux- tailed in Wesley F. Craven and James L. embourg, and in January 1945 in the Alsace cold injury hospital admissions of more than 17,000 during the entire campaign. No official Cate, eds., Europe: Argument to V–E Day, region of France—marked the beginning of January 1944 to May 1945 (1951), the third vol- the end for the Third Reich. With these final German losses for the Ardennes have been computed, but they have been estimated at ume in the Army Air Forces in World War II attacks, Hitler had hoped to destroy a large series, and the British perspective and oper- portion of the Allied ground force and to between 81,000 and 103,000. A recently pub- lished German scholarly source gave the fol- ations are covered in L. F. Ellis, Victory in break up the Allied coalition. Neither objec- the West: the Defeat of Germany (1968). tive came close to being achieved. Although lowing German casualty totals: Ardennes— 67,200; Alsace (not including Colmar Pock- Among the large number of books that de- perhaps the Allies’ victory in the spring of scribe the fighting in the Ardennes are Ger- 1945 was inevitable, no doubt exists that the et)—22,932. Most of the figures cited do not differentiate between permanent losses ald Astor, A Blood-Dimmed Tide (1992), John costs incurred by the Germans in manpower, S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (1969), (killed and missing), wounded, and non-bat- equipment, supplies, and morale during the Charles B. MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets tle casualties. Ardennes-Alsace battles were instrumental (1985), S. L. A. Marshall, The Eight Days of Analysts of coalition warfare and Allied in bringing about a more rapid end to the Bastogne (1946), Jean Paul Pallud, Battle of generalship may find much to criticize in the war in Europe. Eisenhower had always be- the Bulge Then and Now (1984), Danny S. Ardennes-Alsace Campaign. Often common- lieved that the German Army on the Western Parker, Battle of the Bulge (1991), and Rob- place disputes over command and strategy Front had to be destroyed west of the Rhine ert F. Phillips, To Save Bastogne (1983). At were encouraged and overblown by news- River to make a final offensive into Ger- the small-unit level Charles MacDonald’s paper coverage, which reflected national bi- many possible. When added to the tremen- Company Commander (1947) is still the ases. Predictably, Montgomery inspired dous contributions of the Soviet Army, standard classic. Fighting in the Alsace re- much American ire both in revisiting com- which had been fighting the majority of Ger- gion has been sparsely covered, but Keith E. mand and strategy issues, which had been many’s armed forces since 1941, the Bonn’s When the Odds Were Even (1994) is debated since Normandy, and in pursuing Ardennes-Alsace victory set the stage for valuable. methodical defensive-offensive tactics. Germany’s rapid collapse. Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 With little hope of staving off defeat, Ger- Devers and de Lattre, too, strained coalition amity during their successful retention of minutes to the gentleman from Mis- many gambled everything on achieving a sissippi (Mr. Shows). surprise operational decision on the Western liberated French terrain. But in both cases the Allied command structure weathered the Mr. SHOWS. Mr. Speaker, today I Front. In contrast, the Allied coalition pur- rise to address my colleagues and the sued a more conservative strategy. Since the storm, and Eisenhower retained a unified Normandy invasion Eisenhower’s armies had command. Preservation of a unit Allied com- American people about a moment in neither the combat power necessary to mand was perhaps his greatest achievement. American history that stands out in mount decisive operations in more than one In the enemy camp the differences between my family as one of the most crucial sector nor the reserves; more importantly, Hilter and his generals over the objectives of there ever was. It is one of those mo- their logistical capability was insufficient to the Ardennes offensive were marked, while ments in our history where the larger the uncoordinated efforts of Obstfelder’s fully exploit any major successes. The re- story of the American experience be- sulting broadfront Allied advance steadily First Army and Himmler’s Army Group Oberrhein for the Alsace offensive were comes intertwined with the personal wore away the German defenses; but, as in legacy of an American family. the case of the Ardennes and Alsace fronts, appaling. The Ardennes-Alsace battlefield proved to The Battle of the Bulge began on De- the Allied lines had many weak points that be no general’s playground, but rather a cember 16, 1944, and ended on January could be exploited by a desperate opponent. place where firepower and bravery meant Moreover, once Hitler’s attacking legions 25, 1945. This enemy offensive was more than plans or brilliant maneuver. Al- had been stopped, the Allies lacked the com- staged to split our forces in half and lied and German generals both consistently bat power to overwhelm the German divi- cripple our supply lines. Of course came up short in bringing their plans to sat- sions defending their recently acquiring there were 600,000 American troops par- isfactory fruition. That American soldiers gains. In the Ardennes, terrain and wors- ticipating in the Battle of the Bulge, as fought and won some of the most critical ening weather aided the Germans in holding battles of World War II in the Ardennes and we have heard awhile ago. 810,000 off Allied counterattacks for an entire the Alsace is now an indisputable fact. Americans were casualties, of whom month, ultimately allowing them to with- U.S. DIVISIONS IN THE ARDENNES-ALSACE 19,000 were killed; 33,400 were wounded; draw a sizable portion of their initial assault and there were 2,000 who were either force with perhaps one-third of their com- CAMPAIGN mitted armor. 1st Infantry Division, 2d Infantry Division, captured or listed as missing. The battle in the Alsace appeared to be 3d Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, less dramatic than in the Ardennes, but was 5th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, *Elements only October 5, 1999 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H9327 One of these 2,000, I want to talk Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. do so now in honor of all of those who about this morning. My father, Clifford Speaker, just to point out during have served, to remind this Congress Shows, was one of those captured as a markup, and this was extraordinary, at that the grave sacrifices they made to prisoner of war. Today in Mosselle, least four Members came forward to win the war, we may be losing the Mississippi, my father is a veteran. He speak as the gentleman from Texas peace. stands tall when the national anthem just pointed out, his father-in-law, the Last week, they celebrated 50 years is played, enjoys his family and neigh- gentleman from Mississippi, his dad, of communism in China, parades, bors, and lives out a most American and so many others. Few battles have tanks, missiles, floats, parties. What life. It is hard for me to talk about it. touched more people than the Battle of bothers me is with a $70 billion trade We must remember the actions of my the Bulge. The gentleman from Arizo- surplus they enjoy from Uncle Sam, father and the thousands of others who na’s uncle also fought. He is a combat they paid for that parade last week fought then that we might be free now. veteran himself, but his uncle fought with our cash. Ronald Reagan’s great This year is the 55th anniversary of the at the Battle of the Bulge, was there. fight was to make sure that com- Battle of the Bulge. Let us pause, let And Joe McNulty, one of our key munism did not spread, and, by God, I us remember, and let us be thankful. staffers on the majority side, he just am not so sure we are living up to the Please support H.J. Res. 65. came up and whispered to me that his great task and challenge and the exam- Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 father got the purple heart, was wound- ple set by those who fought in the Bat- minutes to the gentleman from Texas ed in both legs. There are few battles tle of the Bulge; I am not so sure we (Mr. REYES). that have touched more people and few are passively turning our back and tak- Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the battles that have done more to save ing for granted our great freedoms that gentleman for yielding me this time. freedom and liberty than the Battle of they protected. I think we better look Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.J. the Bulge. It is amazing how many peo- at it. They won the war. Let us not lose Res. 65 which commends our World War ple in this Chamber have relatives and the peace. I am proud to support this II veterans who fought in the Battle of close relatives and perhaps themselves resolution. I commend the authors. the Bulge. This is a great bill because actually fought in that very, very fa- Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in it honors the determination and the mous battle. strong support of H.J. Res. 65, a resolution courage of these veterans in stopping Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 commending our veterans of the Battle of the the last great Nazi counteroffensive of minutes to the gentleman from Wis- Bulge. I urge my colleagues to join in sup- World War II. consin (Mr. BARRETT). porting this worthwhile measure. History tells us that the fighting in Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. This year marks the 55th anniversary of the Belgium sealed the victory for the al- Speaker, I thank the gentleman from German Ardennes offensive of December lies in Europe. Without this victory, Illinois (Mr. EVANS) for yielding me 1944, more commonly known as the Battle of many additional months of fighting this time. I rise in support of House the Bulge. In the weeks leading up to the would have been necessary before Nazi Joint Resolution 65. I want to pay spe- Christmas of 1944, it appeared to the Western Germany’s surrender. Our troops over- cial tribute to a man who was killed in Allies that victory over the German army was came superior numbers of Nazi troops that fight, Bob Kuehn of Rhinelander, near at hand. Many thought that one final and harsh weather to repel and turn Wisconsin. Bob Kuehn was raised in push was all that was needed to force a total back this last great offensive of World Rhinelander, Wisconsin. After grad- collapse of German resistance on the Western War II. uating from high school, he attended front. Victory, however, came at a terrible St. Norbert College in De Pere, Wis- What the Allied commanders were not price, with about 81,000 American cas- consin, where he was a member of the aware of was the fact that the German dictator ualties, 19,000 of which were killed. ROTC program. He graduated in June was planning one final, desperate offensive Each and every veteran of the Battle of of 1944 and later that month was mar- through the Ardennes Forest, in the hopes of the Bulge witnessed the horrors of war. ried to Gertrude Kuehn of Sturgeon splitting the Allied lines. One of those was my own father-in-law, Bay. The German attack came as a total sur- Victor Gaytan, who today is a disabled They traveled to Camp Fannin in prise, and achieved initial success. Poor veteran who lives with the wounds he Tyler, Texas; but he was called into weather prevented Allied air superiority from suffered defending our freedom against Patton’s Third Army, and he was killed being brought to bear, and the German Pan- that threat in Belgium that winter. December 17, 1944, leaving a 23-year-old zers took full advantage of the respite. Yet, in Today, my wife and I are honored to widow back in Wisconsin. That widow the end, their offensive failed. have him live with us. Yes, at 79 he was my mother. Fortunately, my The offensive failed because American sol- walks a little slower, moves at times mother was able to move on and at- diers shook off their initial shock and fought hesitantly and with great pain; but tended school at the University of Wis- with a stubborn tenacity to prevent a German when you look into his eyes, there is consin where she met my father, who breakthrough. The Allied lines gave way, no doubt about his role in saving our also fought in World War II and earned hence the ``Bulge'' description, but refused to country and our way of life. He is a the Distinguished Flying Cross for his break. After several days, the weather cleared, hero to us and was one of those great service. and the overwhelming Allied advantage in tac- Americans that courageously turned My father, of course, was fortunate tical air power was finally brought to bear in a back the last desperate attempt of the to meet my mother, and my two sisters concentrated counterattack. Nazis to stop Allied momentum toward and I are fortunate enough to have The resolution honors those courageous Germany. them as parents. But Bob Kuehn has veterans who fought in the Battle of the Bulge, Mr. Speaker, I believe that we can never been forgotten. I pay tribute to resulting in a tenacious defense, under hor- never sufficiently express our gratitude him and the thousands of other Ameri- rible conditions, against an enemy with supe- to these veterans, America’s greatest cans who gave their lives to protect rior armored forces. Their success in halting generation. But this legislation is a our freedoms. the German Ardennes offensive preserved the proper and fitting way to honor them Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 Allied lines, and helped to maintain the offen- and their service to their country. minutes to the gentleman from Ohio sive pressure on Germany. With this legislation, we honor these (Mr. TRAFICANT). The efforts of our veterans in the Battle of American soldiers and we ensure that Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, it is the Bulge, like those of all Americans who future generations of Americans re- fitting that we pay tribute to those fought against tyranny in World War II, de- member the price of freedom in Europe who gave of their lives and served at serve our recognition and respect. Accord- and around the world during World War the Battle of the Bulge and to every ingly, I urge my colleagues to join in sup- II. I strongly support this legislation soldier, every man and woman who par- porting this measure, which memorializes the and urge the House to unanimously ticipated in the Great War to protect significant contributions of the veterans of the pass this great bill. our freedoms, protect the independence Bulge to the ultimate victory of freedom over Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 of this Nation, and to promote freedom tyranny during the Second World War. minute to the gentleman from New and democracy in the world. I did not Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in Jersey (Mr. SMITH). plan to speak on this resolution, but I strong support of House Joint Resolution 65 H9328 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE October 5, 1999 which commends United States Veterans for Over 600,000 American troops participated in Whereas Hurricane Floyd continued up the their heroism in the Battle of the Bulge during the Battle of the Bulge, sustaining 81,000 cas- eastern seaboard, causing flooding and tor- World War II. The resolution also reaffirms our ualties. nadoes in Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, I am proud of my many family members and New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut; bonds of friendship with our Allies we stood Whereas Hurricane Floyd is responsible for together with during that noble cause. constituents who served this country in the 66 known deaths, including 48 confirmed dead I commend the bill's sponsor, Mr. SMITH of last world war. In so doing, I especially think in North Carolina alone, as well as 3 in New New Jersey, and the Chairman and Ranking about my cousin John Henry Woodson, Jr., Jersey, 2 in New York, 6 in Pennsylvania, 4 Members of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, who not only fought in World War II but was in Virginia, 2 in Delaware, and 1 in Vermont; Mr. STUMP and Mr. EVANS for their support. I actually left for dead behind enemy lines. He Whereas hundreds of roads along the east- am proud to be a cosponsor of this resolution. was reported as missing in action for almost ern seaboard remain closed as a result of I would like to take this time to pay tribute three weeks, before he found his way back to damage caused by Hurricane Floyd; in particular to two of the 600,000 American the American troops. Although he was fortu- Whereas waters contaminated by millions of gallons of bacteria, raw sewage, and ani- troops who served in the German Ardennes nate to be among those who returned home, mal waste have flowed into homes, busi- offensive, known as the Battle of the Bulge. that terrible experience and others during the nesses, and drinking water supplies due to These two heroes who risked their lives to de- war left an indelible memory and mark on the septic, pipeline, and water treatment system fend our freedom come from my home state of rest of his life. damage caused by the flooding associated Connecticut. John served the Virgin Islands Community with Hurricane Floyd, a situation that poses One is Bob Dwyer of Vernon, Connecticut. exceptionally for many years, first at the De- considerable health risks for individuals and After serving his country in World War II, he partment of Health and later as a public families in affected States; now continues to serve his nation in peace- school science teacher and principal. He is re- Whereas areas in 10 States were declared time by working for the Veterans' Coalition in Federal disaster areas as a result of Hurri- membered by the Virgin Islands through the cane Floyd—Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Connecticut. Mr. Dwyer plays a central role in Junior High School, on St. Croix, which bears Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North this group which provides crucial services and his name. Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and assistance for veterans and advocates on their Today, as we remember those veterans Virginia; behalf. who fought at the Battle of the Bulge for their Whereas individuals registering for Federal Another hero is Gerald Twomey of Norwich, service and sacrifice, I lovingly remember my assistance in States hit by Hurricane Floyd Connecticut. Mr. Twomey served in a World cousin Johnny, and the other Virgin Islanders totalled 68,440 as of September 26, 1999, with War II reconnaissance unit that had already who also served there. 39,265 in North Carolina, 11,121 in New Jer- fought in North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I have no sey, 4,582 in New York, 3,222 in South Caro- lina, 3,153 in Virginia, 371 in Delaware, 6,479 before he made his way to this momentous further requests for time, and I yield in Pennsylvania, 173 in Connecticut, and 74 battle. In an interview with Bob Hamilton of the back the balance of my time. in Maryland; New London Day last year, Mr. Twomey de- Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, once again Whereas thousands of individuals and fami- scribed his service in Africa and as dif- I would like to thank the gentleman lies have been displaced from their homes ficult but nothing like the organized resistance from Illinois, the ranking member of and are now taking refuge in temporary he and his comrades met in Ardennes. ``That the committee, for all of his assistance housing or shelters; was brutal,'' said Twomey. ``It was very, very on this bill, as well as the gentleman Whereas over $2 million in temporary cold weather, a lot of snow. It was tough. from New Jersey who brought the bill housing grants have been issued in New York and New Jersey and the residential loss esti- They kept bringing over replacements, and to us in the committee. mates are over $80 million in North Carolina they were knocking them off as fast as they Mr. Speaker, I have no further re- alone; and could bring them over . . . It was much worse quests for time, and I yield back the Whereas the nature of this disaster de- than North Africa, much worse.'' balance of my time. serves the immediate attention and support Anyone who has studied the accounts of The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. of the Federal Government: Now, therefore, this battle is struck by the resilience and cour- SUNUNU). The question is on the mo- be it age of our troops at the Battle of the Bulge. tion offered by the gentleman from Ar- Resolved, That the House of Their bravery withstood Hitler's last ditch of- Representatives— izona (Mr. STUMP) that the House sus- (1) expresses its deepest sympathies to ev- fensive to prevent the Allies from closing in on pend the rules and pass the joint reso- eryone who suffered as a result of Hurricane Berlin. A passage from the book Citizen Sol- lution, House Joint Resolution 65, as Floyd; and diers by Stephen Ambrose serves as a testa- amended. (2) pledges its support to continue to work ment to the courage of American fighting men The question was taken. on their behalf to restore normalcy to their in recovering from a withering German attack Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. lives and to renew their spirits by helping and summoning the strength to respond: Speaker, on that I demand the yeas them recover, rebuild, and reconstruct. From the Supreme Commander down to and nays. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursu- the lowliest private, men pulled up their The yeas and nays were ordered. ant to the rule, the gentleman from socks and went forth to do their duty. It sim- The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursu- New Jersey (Mr. FRANKS) and the gen- plifies, but not much, to say that here, there, ant to clause 8 of rule XX and the tleman from Ohio (Mr. TRAFICANT) everywhere, from top to bottom, the men of Chair’s prior announcement, further each will control 20 minutes. the U.S. Army in northwest Europe shook The Chair recognizes the gentleman themselves and made this a defining moment proceedings on this motion will be in their own lives, and the history of the postponed. from New Jersey (Mr. FRANKS). Army. They didn’t like retreating, they f Mr. FRANKS of New Jersey. Mr. didn’t like getting kicked around, and as in- Speaker, I yield myself such time as I dividuals, squads, and companies as well as SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SYM- may consume. at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expedi- PATHY FOR VICTIMS OF HURRI- In communities up and down the tionary Force, they decided they were going CANE FLOYD East Coast, including many in my own to make the enemy pay. Mr. FRANKS of New Jersey. Mr. congressional district, Hurricane Floyd Mr. Speaker, I have nothing more to add ex- Speaker, I move to suspend the rules left a path of unprecedented destruc- cept to once again thank these American he- and agree to the resolution (H. Res. tion, hardship, and tragedy. It has been roes on behalf of my constituents in Con- 322) expressing the sense of the House more than 3 weeks since the storm hit, necticut and citizens across this nation. of Representatives in sympathy for the and still thousands of families are un- Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise victims of Hurricane Floyd, which able to return to their homes. In com- today to join my colleagues in paying tribute to struck numerous communities along munities throughout our area, down- the courageous Americans who fought during the East Coast between September 14 towns have become ghost towns. World War II, especially those who fought at and 17, 1999. Several of the towns I represent have the Battle of the Bulge. The Clerk read as follows: suffered through floods before, but past The Battle of the Bulge, as you and my col- H. RES. 322 storms were nothing in comparison to leagues know, Mr. Speaker, was a major Ger- Whereas on September 16, 1999, Hurricane what happened on the evening of Sep- man offensive in the Ardennes forest region of Floyd deposited up to 18 inches of rain on tember 16. In the small community of Belgium and Luxembourg that was fought sections of North Carolina only days after Bound Brook, New Jersey, flood waters from December 16, 1944 to January 25, 1945. the damaging rains of Hurricane Dennis; as high as 12 feet turned the downtown