“Pashtunistan”: the Afghan-Pakistan War

Home , Baghlan, Gardez, Helmand province, Jalalabad, Nuristan Province, Paktika Province

The Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, NW • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: +1-202-775-3270 • Fax: +1-202-457-8746 Web: www.csis.org/burke

The Struggle for “Pashtunistan”: The Afghan-Pakistan War

Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

October 2007 Looking Beyond the Borders

Fight against Taliban and Other Islamist extremists in Afghanistan.

Fighting against Taliban and other Islamist extremists in Eastern Pakistan (Waziristan and Tribal Agencies).

Greater Pashtun and Ethnic/Sectarian struggles.

Al Qa’ida, Bin Laden and Neo-Salafi extremist Elements; sanctuary in Pakistan.

Broader instability in Pakistan; Islamist struggle for control.

Outside interests and influence: Iran, Russia, China, Central Asia, Narco-trafficking

60 Ethnicity Language 50 50 42 40 35

30 27

20 9 9 11 10 4 3 2 4 4 0

. ra k r ) ) e e n h Tajik za th c shtun O a Ha Uzb Aimak Baloch rsia lo P e a Turkmen urkmen) T r (B ri (P o Da Pashto (Official) 0 Min 80% Sunni, 19% Shi'a, (Uzbek, 3 1% Other Turkic

80%

70% Ethnic and Sectarian Differences Greatest Danger: Taliban 60% ABC News/BBC World Service poll 74%

50% 61%

40% 46%

30%

20%

10%

0% Pashtuns Tajiks Hazaras

About four in 10 Afghans are Pashtuns, concentrated in the East and South, a bit fewer are Tajiks, mostly in the center and North, and just over one in 10 are Hazaras, in the central Hazarjat region. Pashtuns dominate the Taliban; indeed 18 percent of Pashtuns express a favorable view of the Taliban, compared with four percent of other Afghans. Far fewer Pashtuns describe the Taliban as the country’s greatest danger – 46 percent, compared with 74 percent of Hazaras and 61 percent of Tajiks. Pashtuns also are more conservative socially – seven in 10 call it unacceptable for women to supervise men at work – and less optimistic than other Afghans. Afghanistan is not riven by the Sunni/Shiite sectarian divisions seen in Iraq; one difference is that Afghanistan’s population is more homogenous – 87 percent Sunni, 12 percent Shiite. Shiites, naturally, express greater concern about the Taliban, a fundamentalist Sunni movement. Shiites are 22 points more likely than Afghan Sunnis to call the Taliban the country’s biggest threat – and concomitantly 26 points more apt to call the U.S.-led invasion that overthrew the Taliban five years ago a “very good” thing for the country.

Source: Adapted from Gary E. Langer, ABC News and ABC News/BBC Copyright Anthony H. Poll, December 2006 Cordesman, all rights reserved 5 Copyright Anthony H. Source: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/art/pak-map.jpgCordesman, all rights reserved 6 42% Pashtun

8-10% Pashtun

Copyright Anthony H. Source: http://fata.gov.pk/_theme/images/fata_map_big.jpg Cordesman, all rights reserved 7 Copyright Anthony H. Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2006/09/09/GR2006090901435.html Cordesman, all rights reserved 8 Pakistani National Public Opinion and Support for Islamic Extremism

70 Only 18% see defeating Al Qa'ida, Taliban, and 60 Other Jihadis as very important priority for 50 their government.

0 Osama Osama Al Al Local Local George George . Taliban Taliban . . Bin Bin . Qa'ida Qa'ida Jihadis Jihadis Bush Bush Laden Laden Oppose 43 38 29 26 70 Favor 33 38 49 46 9

•Response for support of local radical Pakistani, Jihadi/extremist groups was 37- 49% in favor and 24-29% opposed. Source: Terror Free Tomorrow, “Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Copyright Anthony H. Survey of Pakistan,” August 2007, www.TerrorFreeTomorrow.org Cordesman, all rights reserved 9 Pakistani Public Opinion and Support for the War 80% Nationally: 26% somewhat unfavorable to 70% US; 46% very unfavorable 60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% Support for US Pursuit Pakistani Military Action- Pakistani Military Action- Support for Bin Laden in US Motivation for of Taliban and Al Qaida National Northwest Frontier Northwest Province GWOT Inside Pakistan Favor 13% 49% 20% 70% Oppose 74% 50% 67% Support/Positive 4% Anti-Muslim/Islamic 66%

•2%% support Pakistani Army working with US forces in side Pakistan, 63% oppose.. Source: Terror Free Tomorrow, “Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Copyright Anthony H. Survey of Pakistan,” August 2007, www.TerrorFreeTomorrow.org Cordesman, all rights reserved 10 Pew Poll on Pakistani Public Opinion and Issues Impacting on War 80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% US Could Shi'ite-Sunni Support Suicide Confidence in Little Confidence Greatest Threat Become a Tension Growing Favor Hamas Favor Hezbollah Bombing Bin Laden in Karzai Military Threat Problem in 2003 - 33% 46% 2007 64% 73% 9% 38% 67% 35% 43% 45%

•41% saw as justified in 2004, 25% in 2005, and 14% in 2006... Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007, July 24, Copyright Anthony H. 2007, www.pew.org Cordesman, all rights reserved 11 Al Qa’ida’s Role

Major recovery and sanctuary in Pakistan. Supports, but does not control Taliban. Source of funding and foreign volunteers. Significant ideological force. May help coordinate Taliban and other insurgents groups. Narcotics source of financing.

BADAKHSHAN

BALKH KONDUZ Mazar-EMazar-E ShSharifarif KonduzKonduz JOWZJAN TAKHAR BaghlBaghlaann MaimMaimananaa

SAR-E POL SAMANGAN

FARYAB NURISTAN Bari Kowt BAGHLAN Bari Kowt X KONAR X Nangalam KEPISA Nangalam QaQalala NaNaww BADGHIS X BagBagrramam LAGHMAN AsAsaaddababadad BaBammiiananPARVAN CChaghhaghccharaharann Herat KabulKKabulABUL Herat JalaJalallabaabadd WARDAK GAR Peshawar LOWGA NANGARHAR Peshawar HERAT PaParachrachinarinar ORUZGAN PAKTIA GarGarddeezz ShindandShindand GhGhaazznini SaSalerlernnoo

GHAZNI KhoKhowwsstt

Sharona ZormZormaatt ChapmChapmaann X Sharona BaghBaghrraann Oruzgan Oruzgan Orgun-EOrgun-E MiramMiram ShShahah DehDeh RRaawwoodd LwLwaarraa FaFarraahh FARAH TaTarinrin KoKowwtt DehDeh ChopChopanan PAKTIKA ZABOL ShkinShkin XMMuusasa QaQalahlah Wana QaQalalatt Wana GereskGeresk ShinkayShinkay GGhheckoecko TB presence or influence = LLaasshhkarkar GaGahh KandKandaahharar Zaranj Zaranj SpinSpin BuldakBuldak HiG presence or influence = Chaman HELMAND Chaman QANDAHAR AQAM presence or influence = MRUZ QuQuettaetta NIMR HQN presence or influence =

BADAKHSHAN

BALKH KONDUZ Mazar-EMazar-E ShSharifarif KonduzKonduz JOWZJAN TAKHAR BaghlBaghlaann MaimMaimananaa

SAR-E POL SAMANGAN

GHAZNI KhoKhowwsstt

JacoJacobabababadd High Criminal presence = (population centers excluded) Distance in Kilometers Anti-Gov ElementCopyright presen Anthonyc eH. or 0 75 150 influenceCordesman, = all rights reserved 14 Increase in Threat Activity: 2005 vs. 2006 Area with high levels of threat activity more than six times larger, some though a result of expanded NATO operations and presence. Suicide attacks up more than six times: 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006. (Kill 15 coalition soldiers and kill 206 Afghan civilians and wound 460.) Nearly threefold increase in direct fire attacks: 1,558 to 4,542 Indirect fire and IED attacks more than double. IEDs up from 783 to 1,677 - although kill 250+ IED operators (50 cell leaders). Indirect up from 599 to 1,511. Other attacks up from 295 to 635. Attacks on Coalition forces 2 1/2 times up from 1,1,077 to 2,891. Attacks on Afghan forces up four times: 830 to 3,549. Major increase in local fighters (GoA’s lack of influence in remote areas resulting in more locally recruited fighters and greater support for the insurgency).

Activity for Period Type of Activity 2005 2006 Suicide Attacks * 27 139 School Attacks 98 129 Direct Fire 1558 4542 Indirect Fire 599 1511 IEDs 783 1677

No. of Incidents 0 1 – 15 16 – 30 31 – 45 2005 2006 46 +

4000 3549 3500 5000 4542 2891 3000 Insurgent Targets 4000 Method of Attack 2500 3000 2000 2005 2006 2005 2006 1677 1500 1077 2000 1558 1511 830 692 1000 476 783 635 281 459 365 307 1000 599 500 118 76 57 98 129 195 295 0 0 ANSF ISAF GoA Tgt NGO/UN Non- School Other Unknown Direct Fire IED Indirect Fire Other Combatant Copyright Anthony H. Note: Does not include land mine strikes * Direct Fire includes SAFIRE events Cordesman, all rights reserved 16

Rise in Afghan Violence: 2006 vs. 2007 Average Annual Monthly Incidents

600 548

500 425

400

300

200 30% Rise in 100 2007

0 2006 2007

Adapted from DOE/EIA, IEO 2007, Table A2.Reference Case. In Quadrillions of Btus.

Trend in Afghan IEDs Incidents by Year

1600 1,370 1400

1200 1,069

1000 782 800

600

400 325

200 22 83 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 (8- 1-07)

Adapted from Washington Post, 9-30-07, p. A1..

140 --Attacks 93% successful in 2006 & 94% in 2007 123 120 --76 dead in 2006 and 193 dead in 2007(to 30 June) 100 --121 civ, 10 Int Mil, 62 ANSF in 2006 (to 30 June); 77 80 63% veh, 37% body

60 --57 civ, 2 Int Mil, 17 ANSF in 2007 (to 30 June); 53% veh, 47% body

40 17 20 1 0 2 3 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 (7-1- 07)

Adapted from UNAMA, “Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, 2001- 2007,” September 1, 2007

The security situation in Afghanistan is assessed by most analysts as having deteriorated at a constant rate through 2007. Statistics show that although the numbers of incidents are higher than comparable periods in 2006, they show the same seasonal pattern. The nature of the incidents has however changed considerably since last year, with high numbers of armed clashes in the field giving way to a combination of armed clashes and asymmetric attacks countrywide. The Afghan National Police (ANP) has become a primary target of insurgents and intimidation of all kinds has increased against the civilian population, especially those perceived to be in support of the government, international military forces as well as the humanitarian and development community. …the more significant change in 2007 is the shift from large-scale armed clashes in the field to asymmetric or terror-style attacks. The former do still take place and as air support is often used, casualty figures are still high. On average however these clashes are fewer and smaller than in 2006. Possible reasons include the high numbers of Taliban fighters killed during summer 2007 including many mid-level and senior commanders. Another reason must be the realization that these types of attacks are futile against a modern conventionally equipped military force supported by a wide range of air assets. The Afghan National Army (ANA) has also been improving throughout 2007

UN Department of Safety and security, Afghanistan, Half-Year Review of the Security situation in Afghanistan, Topic Assessment, 02/07, August 13, 2007 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved 23

Extreme Risk Areas

Extreme Risk/Hostile Environment classification (pink… now makes up about one third of the surface area of the country.

Main areas… affected, i.e. areas where the deteriorating security situation has been assessed as an Extreme Risk/Hostile Environment thereby causing less accessibility to programs, are:

¾ The southern and extreme northern parts of Helmand Province, most of Kandahar Province, a portion of northern Nimroz Province and most of Zabul and Uruzgan Provinces.

¾ The rest of Paktika Province not previously colored pink.

¾ The “Tora Bora” area of southern Nangahar Province.

¾ The extreme northern area of Nuristan Province.

Medium Risk/Unstable Environments added include parts of Farah, Badghis and Faryab Provinces.

Low Risk/Permissive Environments (i.e. improved) include parts of Maydan Wardak, Badakshan (northern tip), Takhar and Baghlan Provinces.

These improved areas are insignificant when seen against the large areas which deteriorated. It is also possible that some of these “improved” areas may soon revert back to previous assessments.

UN Department of Safety and security, Afghanistan, Half-Year Review of the Copyright Anthony H. Security situation in Afghanistan, Topic Assessment, 02/07, August 13, 2007 Cordesman, all rights reserved 28