The Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, NW • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: +1-202-775-3270 • Fax: +1-202-457-8746 Web: www.csis.org/burke The Struggle for “Pashtunistan”: The Afghan-Pakistan War Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy October 2007 Looking Beyond the Borders Fight against Taliban and Other Islamist extremists in Afghanistan. Fighting against Taliban and other Islamist extremists in Eastern Pakistan (Waziristan and Tribal Agencies). Greater Pashtun and Ethnic/Sectarian struggles. Al Qa’ida, Bin Laden and Neo-Salafi extremist Elements; sanctuary in Pakistan. Broader instability in Pakistan; Islamist struggle for control. Outside interests and influence: Iran, Russia, China, Central Asia, Narco-trafficking Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved 2 Major Ethnic Divisions Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved 3 Ethnic & Linguistic Diversity Percent of Population and Language Speakers 60 50 40 42 30 Ethnicity 20 27 10 0 Pashtun 9 Source: CIA World Factbook 2007 Tajik 9 80% Sunni, Ha19%za Shi'a,ra Language 4 1% Other Uzbek 50 3 Aimak 2 Turkmen 4 35 Baloch Other . Dari (Persian) 11 Pashto (Official) Turkic (Uzbek, Turkmen) 4 30 Minor (Baloch) Cordesman, all rights reserved Copyright Anthony H. 4 Ethnic and Sectarian Differences 90% Greatest Danger: Taliban ABC News/BBC World Service poll 80% 74% 70% 61% 60% 50% 46% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Pashtuns Tajiks Hazaras About four in 10 Afghans are Pashtuns, concentrated in the East and South, a bit fewer are Tajiks, mostly in the center and North, and just over one in 10 are Hazaras, in the central Hazarjat region. Pashtuns dominate the Taliban; indeed 18 percent of Pashtuns express a favorable view of the Taliban, compared with four percent of other Afghans. Far fewer Pashtuns describe the Taliban as the country’s greatest danger – 46 percent, compared with 74 percent of Hazaras and 61 percent of Tajiks. Pashtuns also are more conservative socially – seven in 10 call it unacceptable for women to supervise men at work – and less optimistic than other Afghans. Afghanistan is not riven by the Sunni/Shiite sectarian divisions seen in Iraq; one difference is that Afghanistan’s population is more homogenous – 87 percent Sunni, 12 percent Shiite. Shiites, naturally, express greater concern about the Taliban, a fundamentalist Sunni movement. Shiites are 22 points more likely than Afghan Sunnis to call the Taliban the country’s biggest threat – and concomitantly 26 points more apt to call the U.S.-led invasion that overthrew the Taliban five years ago a “very good” thing for the country. Source: Adapted from Gary E. Langer, ABC News and ABC News/BBC Copyright Anthony H. Poll, December 2006 Cordesman, all rights reserved 5 Copyright Anthony H. Source: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/art/pak-map.jpgCordesman, all rights reserved 6 42% Pashtun 8-10% Pashtun Copyright Anthony H. Source: http://fata.gov.pk/_theme/images/fata_map_big.jpg Cordesman, all rights reserved 7 Copyright Anthony H. Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2006/09/09/GR2006090901435.html Cordesman, all rights reserved 8 Pakistani National Public Opinion and Support for Islamic Extremism 70 Only 18% see defeating Al Qa'ida, Taliban, and 60 Other Jihadis as very important priority for 50 their government. 40 30 20 10 0 Osama Osama Al Al Local Local George George . Taliban Taliban . Bin Bin . Qa'ida Qa'ida Jihadis Jihadis Bush Bush Laden Laden Oppose 43 38 29 26 70 Favor 33 38 49 46 9 •Response for support of local radical Pakistani, Jihadi/extremist groups was 37- 49% in favor and 24-29% opposed. Source: Terror Free Tomorrow, “Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Copyright Anthony H. Survey of Pakistan,” August 2007, www.TerrorFreeTomorrow.org Cordesman, all rights reserved 9 Pakistani Public Opinion and Support for the War 80% Nationally: 26% somewhat unfavorable to 70% US; 46% very unfavorable 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Support for US Pursuit Pakistani Military Action- Pakistani Military Action- Support for Bin Laden in US Motivation for of Taliban and Al Qaida National Northwest Frontier Northwest Province GWOT Inside Pakistan Favor 13% 49% 20% 70% Oppose 74% 50% 67% Support/Positive 4% Anti-Muslim/Islamic 66% •2%% support Pakistani Army working with US forces in side Pakistan, 63% oppose.. Source: Terror Free Tomorrow, “Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Copyright Anthony H. Survey of Pakistan,” August 2007, www.TerrorFreeTomorrow.org Cordesman, all rights reserved 10 Pew Poll on Pakistani Public Opinion and Issues Impacting on War 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% US Could Shi'ite-Sunni Support Suicide Confidence in Little Confidence Greatest Threat Become a Tension Growing Favor Hamas Favor Hezbollah Bombing Bin Laden in Karzai Military Threat Problem in 2003 - 33% 46% 2007 64% 73% 9% 38% 67% 35% 43% 45% •41% saw as justified in 2004, 25% in 2005, and 14% in 2006... Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007, July 24, Copyright Anthony H. 2007, www.pew.org Cordesman, all rights reserved 11 Al Qa’ida’s Role Major recovery and sanctuary in Pakistan. Supports, but does not control Taliban. Source of funding and foreign volunteers. Significant ideological force. May help coordinate Taliban and other insurgents groups. Narcotics source of financing. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved 12 Major AQAM Areas of Influence BADAKHSHAN BALKH KONDUZ Mazar-EMazar-E ShSharif arif KonduzKonduz JOWZJAN TAKHAR Baghlan MaimMaimananaa Baghlan SAR-E POL SAMANGAN FARYAB BAGHLAN X NURISTAN BaBariri KoKowwtt QaQalala NaNaww BADGHIS X KONAR KEPISA NangNangaallamam BagBagram LAGHMAN Asadabad BaBammiianPARVAN X ram Asadabad CChaghhaghcharan an HeHerraatt charan KabulKKabulABUL JalaJalallabaabadd HERAT WARDAK LOWGAR NANGARHAR PesPeshhaawwarar ORUZGAN PaParachrachinarinar ShindandShindand PAKTIA Gardez PAKTIA GhGhaazznini Gardez SaSalerlernnoo GHAZNI Khowst Sharona Zormat Khowst BaghBaghran X Sharona Zormat ChapmChapmaan ran OruOruzzggaann n Deh Rawo Orgun-E FaFarah Deh Rawodd Orgun-E MiramMiram ShShah FARAH rah LwLwaarraa ah Tarin Ko Tarin Kowwt DehDeh ChopChopan PAKTIKA t ZABOL an PAKTIKA XMMuusasa QaQalahlah ShkinShkin QaQalalatt WanWanaa GereskGeresk ShinkayShinkay GGhheckoecko LLaasshhkarkar GaGah h KandKandaahhar ZaZarraanjnj ar TB presence or influence = SpinSpin BuldakBuldak HiG presence or influ HELMAND Chaman ence = QANDAHAR Chaman NIMRUZ AQ QuQuettaetta AM presence or influence = HQN presence or influence = JacoJacobabababadd High Criminal presen Distance in Kilometers ce = (population centers excluded) Anti-Gov Element presen 0 75 150 Copyright Anthonyc eH. or influenceCordesman, = all rights reserved 13 Enemy Elements By Area of Influence BADAKHSHAN BALKH KONDUZ Mazar-EMazar-E ShSharif arif KonduzKonduz JOWZJAN TAKHAR Baghlan MaimMaimananaa Baghlan SAR-E POL SAMANGAN FARYAB BAGHLAN X NURISTAN BaBariri KoKowwtt QaQalala NaNaww BADGHIS X KONAR KEPISA NangNangaallamam BagBagram LAGHMAN Asadabad BaBammiianPARVAN X ram Asadabad CChaghhaghcharan an HeHerraatt charan KabulKKabulABUL JalaJalallabaabadd HERAT WARDAK LOWGAR NANGARHAR PesPeshhaawwarar ORUZGAN PaParachrachinarinar ShindandShindand PAKTIA Gardez PAKTIA GhGhaazznini Gardez SaSalerlernnoo GHAZNI Khowst Sharona Zormat Khowst BaghBaghran X Sharona Zormat ChapmChapmaan ran OruOruzzggaann n Deh Rawo Orgun-E FaFarah Deh Rawodd Orgun-E MiramMiram ShShah FARAH rah LwLwaarraa ah Tarin Ko Tarin Kowwt DehDeh ChopChopan PAKTIKA t ZABOL an PAKTIKA XMMuusasa QaQalahlah ShkinShkin QaQalalatt WanWanaa GereskGeresk ShinkayShinkay GGhheckoecko LLaasshhkarkar GaGah h KandKandaahhar ZaZarraanjnj ar TB presence or influence = SpinSpin BuldakBuldak HiG presence or influ HELMAND Chaman ence = QANDAHAR Chaman NIMRUZ AQ QuQuettaetta AM presence or influence = HQN presence or influence = JacoJacobabababadd High Criminal presen Distance in Kilometers ce = (population centers excluded) Anti-Gov Element presen 0 75 150 Copyright Anthonyc eH. or influenceCordesman, = all rights reserved 14 Increase in Threat Activity: 2005 vs. 2006 Area with high levels of threat activity more than six times larger, some though a result of expanded NATO operations and presence. Suicide attacks up more than six times: 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006. (Kill 15 coalition soldiers and kill 206 Afghan civilians and wound 460.) Nearly threefold increase in direct fire attacks: 1,558 to 4,542 Indirect fire and IED attacks more than double. IEDs up from 783 to 1,677 - although kill 250+ IED operators (50 cell leaders). Indirect up from 599 to 1,511. Other attacks up from 295 to 635. Attacks on Coalition forces 2 1/2 times up from 1,1,077 to 2,891. Attacks on Afghan forces up four times: 830 to 3,549. Major increase in local fighters (GoA’s lack of influence in remote areas resulting in more locally recruited fighters and greater support for the insurgency). Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved 15 Enemy Activity Snap-shot (Weeks 1 – 52 for 2005 & 2006) 01 January – 31 December (2005 & 2006) Activity for Period Type of Activity 2005 2006 Suicide Attacks * 27 139 School Attacks 98 129 Direct Fire 1558 4542 Indirect Fire 599 1511 IEDs 783 1677 No. of Incidents 0 1 – 15 16 – 30 31 – 45 2005 2006 46 + 4000 3549 3500 5000 4542 2891 3000 Insurgent Targets 4000 Method of Attack 2500 3000 2000 2005 2006 2005 2006 1677 1500 1077 2000 1558 1511 830 692 1000 476 783 635 281 459 365 307 1000 599 500 118 76 57 98 129 195 295 0 0 ANSF ISAF GoA Tgt NGO/UN Non- School Other Unknown Direct Fire IED Indirect Fire Other Com batant Copyright Anthony H. Note: Does not include land mine strikes * Direct Fire includes SAFIRE events Cordesman, all rights reserved 16 Rise in Afghan Violence: 2006 vs. 2007 Average Annual Monthly Incidents 600 548 500 425 400 300 200 30% Rise in 100 2007 0 2006 2007 Adapted from DOE/EIA, IEO 2007, Table A2.Reference Case. In Quadrillions of Btus. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved 18 Trend in Afghan IEDs Incidents by Year 1600 1,370 1400 1200 1,069 1000 782 800 600 400 325 200 22 83 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 (8- 1-07) Adapted from Washington Post, 9-30-07, p.