Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal 19
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ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JOURNAL 19 2 The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the contributors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society. First Published in the UK in 1999 Copyright 1999: Royal Air Force Historical Society. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without the permission from the Publisher in writing. ISSN 1361-4231 Printed by Fotodirect Ltd Enterprise Estate, Crowhurst Road Brighton, East Sussex BN1 8AF Tel 01273 563111 3 CONTENTS Page ADDRESS BY CAS Air Chf Mshl Sir Richard Johns 5 LOGISTICS SEMINAR 22 SIR JOHN SLESSOR Sir Michael Howard 132 THE PREVENTION OF WAR THE AIR LEAGUE GOLD MEDAL 146 MRAF SIR JOHN SLESSOR 148 CORRESPONDENCE 152 Note: Due to pressure on space the names of Officers and Committee, the addresses of certain officials, and the usual final page giving notes about the Society have been omitted. The details shown in Journal 18 are still valid. For the same reason Book Reviews have been held over. 4 ADDRESS TO THE ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY By Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Johns GCB CBE LVO ADC FRAeS RAF Chief of the Air Staff Tuesday 23 June 1998 Chairman, members of the Royal Air Force Historical Society. I was greatly honoured by Air Marshal Baldwin’s kind invitation to speak to you tonight. When I chose the subject for tonight’s talk, I did so in the knowledge that it would be as a generalist amateur historian who would be speaking to experts in the field of Royal Air Force history whose knowledge is only too apparent from the Society’s consistently excellent publications, which I must say I read with considerable delight. I thought, therefore, that, rather than either challenge your expertise or immodestly draw on my experience of the Service, it would perhaps be of greater interest if I considered the future of warfare using history as a handrail to guide my thinking. Having considered the subject from a number of angles, I am led to conclude that the fundamental nature of warfare and its attendant characteristics still endure. Rather, it is the conduct of warfare that changes, driven by a variety of pressures: some technological, some political, and some social. Tonight I would like to make a somewhat flexible examination of these pressures and their consequences. So in asking you to be flexible and before I launch forth, perhaps a little story to illuminate the advantages of flexible thinking. It involves a university student who was studying Modern History. The first question on his exam paper was ‘Discuss the differing aims and objectives of the British and Icelandic Governments during the Cod War.’ The first paragraph of his answer read, ‘I know very little of the aims and objectives of the British Government during the Cod War and even less about those of the Icelandic Government. I shall thus address the topic from the viewpoint of the Cod.’ I think it would be prudent if – at the great risk of teaching some of you to suck eggs – I started off with two assumptions, several definitions and a couple of concepts; but for no more than a few minutes I promise you. My first assumption, both simple and safe, is that wars will continue to occur where they are little expected. My second assumption, similarly safe, is that 5 warfare itself will continue to contain elements of the unforeseen and unexpected. As for definitions it is best to first consider conflict as a spectrum embracing a wide range of situations in which military forces may be required to operate, ranging from peace on the one hand to general war on the other. So moving from peace to the middle of the spectrum we come to that rather grey and complex area embracing humanitarian aid, peace support operations and intervention operations. Beyond that, and at the far right of the spectrum I define general war as a major, unrestricted conflict in which national survival is at stake. While in the circumstances of today very few nations have the capacity to initiate such a war, there is always the risk that when major powers come into conflict the conduct of operations could escalate to general war. During the Cold War the classification of limited war was used to describe international conflict short of general war in which there would be no use of nuclear weapons – the Korean War being a memorable example. However, in part due to the complexity of today’s political landscape, contemporary conflict involving western countries is increasingly subject to the concept of limitation – such limits may be imposed by international law and conventions, such as the United Nations Charter and the Geneva Convention, which both legalise and regulate the use of military force. Within this broad legal framework other more specific limits may be imposed by the choice of objectives, by placing restrictions on the types of forces and weapons involved, and by confining operations to designated geographic areas. All these limits can be carefully articulated in rules of engagement which specify the degree and manner in which force may be applied so as to ensure that the use of military power is carefully controlled. To round off this overview, a few words on the concept of intensity. Most doctrinal publications I have read speak of intensity in terms of the frequency and degree of violence encountered in conflict. Frequency speaks for itself and relates to the tempo of operations, while degree usually concerns the destructive power of weapons involved and the level of violence. Relating frequency and degree to the spectrum of conflict we can conclude that low intensity operations relate to situations where the likelihood of violence (both frequency and degree) is assessed as low and high being where it is thought the likelihood of sustained violence is more than probable. That said, I recently heard a British Army general with wide operational 6 experience define intensity of operations as the rate of consumption of resources, be they men, material or money. Such a definition permits a measuring of intensity that relates directly to the conflict as opposed to the equipment deployed, the numbers involved or the preparations for battle. It also allows for Commanders remote from the battlefield to recognise that for the man in contact with the enemy, all battle is intense and to plan accordingly. I like Gen Smith’s definition – it is clear, pragmatic and is not open to misinterpretation. Well, that’s enough of assumptions and definitions and let me now try to give you a brief historical perspective of warfare and identify those elements of conflict that have not and most probably will not change. I think we can all comfortably agree that the root causes of conflict are timeless and involve an amalgam of material considerations and human emotions embracing fear, greed, hatred and ambition. Similarly the fundamental character of conflict seems unlikely to change; it will remain a dynamic contest of wills involving death, destruction, chaos and uncertainty such that for the participants warfare will continue to represent the ultimate physical and moral challenge. War is prevalent in history, one might also say inevitable. Since the end of the Cold War with all its emphasis on high intensity operations at the far right of the spectrum of conflict, we have moved into a new world era hallmarked by political instability, fragmented social structures, ethnic tensions and feeble economies. The problems generated by these tensions, previously concealed by the frozen international landscape of the Cold War, are now breaking through to the surface, and most have little prospect of quick resolution. Of some 40 active armed conflicts being fought around the globe in 1998 – that is a conflict where the parties involved must be in control of sufficient territory to sustain military operations – roughly ¾ are occurring within national boundaries between internal organised factions fighting Government Forces or each other. As we move into the next millennium I think we can predict with some gloomy confidence that as the world population continues to increase, conflict over scarce resources vital to human life, such as food and water, becomes more likely. If warfare is inevitable, it is also collective because it is fought by one group against another, not necessarily of different nationalities, wherein what you are is often more important than what you believe – in such terms much of what has happened in the former Republic of Yugoslavia becomes comprehensible. War is self-evidently violent and 7 will continue to capitalise on violent human impulsions which already exist. War generates its own friction – that force that resists all action and which makes the simple difficult and the difficult, seemingly impossible. War is dynamic in that it moves all the time although with variable speed and changeable direction. Hence the enduring uncertainty of war, an activity in which there are no guarantees and I shall return later to the difficulties of prediction within the profession of arms. Meanwhile war remains an immensely physical and cerebral activity with the tempo of operations no longer constrained by night and bad weather, and with the intensity of violence created by modern weapons systems placing new and greater demands on war fighters at all levels and irrespective of the colour of their uniform. Having thus identified uncertainty, chaos, violence, danger and human stress as perhaps the most enduring characteristics of warfare, let me now move on to consider pressures for change in the conduct of war.