BACKLASH TO THE BELT AND ROAD WHERE HAS CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE INSPIRED NEGATIVE REACTIONS, WHY, AND IS CHINA CORRECTING COURSE?

HULSE, COURTNEY S SUBMITTED TO PROFESSOR DAN DREZNER IN FULFILLMENT OF THE MALD CAPSTONE REQUIREMENT April 27, 2019

Abstract Chinese President Xi Jinping has embraced the idea of soft power and, noting China’s economic strengths, has decided to root China’s soft power strategy in non-coercive economic tools. At the beginning of his presidency, Xi launched the Belt and Road Initiative as a major feature of China’s soft power strategy, but the initiative was not fully conceptualized at that time. In the five plus years since its launch, there have been countless instances of backlash to the Belt and Road Initiative, manifesting chiefly as protests, though Chinese individuals affiliated with Belt and Road projects have been violently targeted as well. The backlash has been motivated by a variety of grievances, but the most common have to do with issues relating to land, labor, and sovereignty. Xi has made adjustments to the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative, but there is little evidence that adjustments have been made regarding implementation. Since the backlash has captured the attention of the governments of Belt and Road host countries, causing them to reevaluate their relationships with China, Xi may be wise to consider instituting standards and accountability measures for the implementation of Belt and Road projects. Table of Contents Chapter 1: Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics ...... 1 Comparing Chinese Soft Power to American Soft Power...... 1 President Xi’s Soft Power Strategy ...... 2 Beginnings...... 4 Reception ...... 6 Chapter 2: Backlash to the Belt and Road Initiative ...... 8 Where has Backlash Occurred? ...... 8 Cambodia ...... 10 Ethiopia ...... 13 India ...... 15 Kenya ...... 17 Laos ...... 19 Myanmar ...... 22 Pakistan...... 25 Sierra Leone ...... 27 Sri Lanka ...... 29 Tanzania ...... 31 Patterns ...... 32 Land Issues ...... 33 Labor Issues ...... 34 Issues of Sovereignty ...... 36 Chapter 3: What Does the Backlash Mean? ...... 38 A Referendum on Chinese Soft Power? ...... 38 Complaints by Chinese Nationals ...... 40 Are Host Governments Reevaluating? ...... 41 Chapter 4: Is China Course Correcting? ...... 44 Shifts in Policy and Action ...... 44 External Propaganda ...... 48 Chapter 5: Implications, Predictions, and Conclusions ...... 51 Appendix ...... 56 References ...... 74

Chapter 1: Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics “The traditional Chinese empire attracted many countries to its court over the years not because neighboring countries feared the empire’s military force, but because they were attracted by its advanced civilization and institutions. This kind of civilizational attraction is precisely what is meant by a country’s soft power,” said Xu Jilin, Chinese Historian.1

China has been using modeling and attraction as tools to project power and influence onto other states long before Joseph Nye gave soft power a name in the late twentieth century. The original Silk Road was known for exporting silk and gold, but it was also a conduit for innovation and culture.2 3 4 Since Nye and his contemporaries have dominated academic discussion about this concept, the modern discourse about soft power has had a Western tinge. American television shows and clothing brands are often cited as examples of exporting values through attractive culture. Ultimately, though, soft power is about winning hearts and minds, and the concept can be applied to any country or context.5

It has become somewhat of a cliché to add “with Chinese characteristics” to any concept when talking about it in a Chinese context, but the repetition has reason. China has such a long- standing and powerful culture that it makes an imprint on any concept when that concept is adopted or implemented in China, creating a distinctly Chinese version. Soft power is no different. This chapter will take stock of the Chinese version of soft power and how it differs from western conceptions of soft power, as well as examine how China’s approach to soft power has changed since Xi Jinping has been at the helm of this great state.

Comparing Chinese Soft Power to American Soft Power

China and the United States have at least one thing in common when it comes to soft power: both countries believe in the moral fortitude of their culture, that the values they are

1 Jilin Xu, “The New Tianxia: Rebuilding China’s Internal and External Order,” in Rethinking China’s Rise: A Liberal Critique (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Page 147. 2 Amy McKenna, “Silk Road,” in Encyclopedia Brittanica (Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Inc., January 30, 2019). 3 Alan Hunter, “Soft Power: China on the Global Stage,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 373–98. 4 Elizabeth C. Economy, “History with Chinese Characteristics,” Foreign Affairs, no. July/August 2017 (August 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2017-06-13/history-chinese-characteristics. 5 G. John Ikenberry, “Capsule Review: Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” Foreign Affairs, June 2004, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2004-05-01/soft-power-means-success-world-politics.

1 promoting are good and will make the world better off. The key differences between Chinese soft power and American soft power, or any other state’s for that matter, have to do with the specific cultural values that it aims to project to the world and the methods for projecting those values. For example, the United States values individualism, democracy, choice, and the right to protest, while China values hierarchy, modesty, respect for the elderly, non-intervention, stability, and harmony.

The variation in characteristics of soft power makes sense considering the often drastic differences in lived experience in the two countries.6 7 There’s a Chinese phrase, “zhong ti xi yong,” which means “adopting Western knowledge for its practical uses while keeping Chinese values as the core.”8 It would seem that, by engineering a soft power strategy with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese government is trying to do just that, which begs the question: how much can China change the American version of soft power without negating the elements that make it successful?

President Xi’s Soft Power Strategy

“In October 2011, Xi was preparing to take power, the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) devoted a whole plenary session to the issue of culture, with its final communiqué declaring that it was a national goal to ‘build our country into a socialist cultural superpower.’”9

After spending several years at high levels of the Chinese government, Xi seemed to develop his understanding of the image that he wanted to project to the world and the ways that he could do it. Xi has chosen to lean heavily on China’s non-coercive economic tools.10 On their official travels, Xi and Premier Li Keqiang have systematically dangled their economic weight in front of the leaders of other countries, signing “huge trade and investment deals, [extending] generous

6 Alan Hunter, “Soft Power: China on the Global Stage.” 7 There are some elements of Chinese and American soft power that are similar. Olympic gymnastics, for example, would fall in the overlapping portion of this Venn diagram. The fact that overlap exists, however, does not mean that the overlap is substantial. 8 George Gao, “Why Is China So...Uncool?” Foreign Policy, Tea Leaf Nation (blog), March 8, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/08/why-is-china-so-uncool-soft-power-beijing-censorship-generation-gap/. 9 David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 4 (August 2015): 99–107. 10 William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).

2 loans, and [doling] out hefty aid packages.”11 This choice may well be rooted in the understanding that “it was the US’s overwhelming importance in the post-war period that allowed it to impose itself on the international system and create a highly institutionalized system that reflected its own normative preferences.”12

China’s modern soft power strategy has been centered around an expansive international aid and investment campaign, of which the Belt and Road Initiative is one major element. China seems to have assessed that its economic success is attractive to other countries, and as a result, the prospect of partnering with China on investment projects will draw other countries closer into China’s sphere of influence.

The Belt and Road Initiative is an illustrative window into Chinese strategic thinking for two reasons. First, it is a large part of China’s efforts to promote its values and advance its interests. Second, since there has been backlash to some Belt and Road projects, an examination of the ways in which the Belt and Road Initiative has evolved may show whether China is course correcting and learning how to implement its soft power strategy more effectively. Official documents about the Belt and Road Initiative note that,

“in the 21st century, a new era marked by the theme[s] of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit, it is all the more important for us to carry on the Silk Road Spirit in face of the weak recovery of the global economy, and complex international and regional situations.”13

This statement, and the Belt and Road Initiative writ large, has a rich subtext that responds to American hegemony of the 20th century. “In the 21st century” signals that there will be a paradigm shift, perhaps away from an American-led global order. The themes referenced here seem to acknowledge the changes that globalization has imposed upon the world, while hinting that an interconnected world can be managed better—more peacefully, more equally, with more prosperity—than the current model. The Silk Road spirit refers to China’s heritage of trade and communication with civilizations near and far, dating back more than two millennia. By

11 David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect.” 12 Mark Beeson, “Geoeconomics with Chinese Characteristics: The BRI and China’s Evolving Grand Strategy,” Economic and Political Studies 6, no. 3 (2018): 240–56. 13 “Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative” (The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, March 30, 2015), http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm.

3 referencing this history, China demonstrates that it has the relevant experience to manage an interconnected world. The “weak recovery of the global economy” is likely a reference to the 2008 financial crisis, which has been attributed to mismanagement endemic in the American system, and “complex international and regional situations” could be a nod to Bretton Woods institutions, which were set up with significant support and direction from American leaders.

Indeed, some commentators have suggested that, after the 2008 financial crash, the Chinese government decided that the West could not be depended upon to be a responsible guarantor of the international financial system.14 Perhaps, Beijing believed that that developing global infrastructure would be a better way to protect against future crashes, and the Belt and Road Initiative is its method for putting those protections in place. Given this framing, it is understandable that the West has perceived the Belt and Road Initiative as a strategy to usurp American hegemony. However, at its heart, the Belt and Road Initiative is a strategy for promoting China’s interests, and that includes a world that upholds the values that China perceives to be good and right. The fact that the Chinese vision for the future, which Chinese soft power contributes to, runs counter to the already initiated American vision for the world is more of a symptom than an intention.

Beginnings The Belt and Road Initiative was a seedling during Hu Jintao's leadership. Hu introduced a White Paper in 2005 called "China's Peaceful Development Road" that envisioned a harmonious world that would be built "through 'mutual dialogues, exchanges and cooperation' that lead to 'mutual benefit and common development.'"15 Hu presented an official foreign policy that would be more outwardly focused, and against the backdrop of the largely unpopular U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not surprising that Chinese leadership would pulse the international community on their reception of a more externally reaching Chinese foreign policy.16 Xi apparently assessed that the international reaction was positive, as he aggressively took up this mantle when he assumed office, honing and adding to the "China's Peaceful

14 Peter Nolan, “China and the Global Economy,” in Charting China’s Future: Domestic and International Challenges, n.d. 15 William A. Callahan, China Dreams: 20 Visions of the Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Page 47. 16 Alan Hunter, “Soft Power: China on the Global Stage.”

4 Development Road" idea until it became “One Belt, One Road” and eventually the “Belt and Road Initiative.”

In 2013, during state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, Xi Jinping floated the idea of what is now the Belt and Road Initiative, identifying a need to promote economic prosperity and regional cooperation to promote world peace and development.17 As it has developed systems and structures for implementing the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese government has placed an emphasis on consultation and mutually beneficial cooperation, presumably so that the participating countries feel some agency and that they have maintained control over their own destiny. Of course, in this partnership, China is the most powerful player, and consequently, China drives the vision. Nadége Rolland, a Senior Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, notes that the Belt and Road Initiative is a comprehensive strategy to build a community based on the right values—Chinese values. She says,

“China has this ambition to reshape, transform, and change the world order so that it benefits its interests better. It feels that the one that it’s been living in for decades is biased and has sidelined, constrained China’s voice. Now is the time for China, as it’s grown more prosperous and more powerful, to have a say to shape the world order.”18

Rather than primarily trying to win friends through attractive policies and culture, the Belt and Road Initiative seems to be, in large part, an attempt to buy friends. Some beneficiaries of Belt and Road projects may indeed be wooed by Chinese values or attracted by the idea of being on the same team as such a considerable power. However, others may become stalwart supporters of China’s vision because they will be indebted to China financially. The Belt and Road Initiative may or may not lead to a network of likeminded states, but likeminded-ness will not matter because it will lead to a network of states that are connected economically, and states do not want to enter into conflict with their economic partners. The Belt and Road Initiative is China’s attempt to develop a network of states, but the links are economic, often indebtedness,

17 “Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative.” 18 Dan Aum, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Nadege Rolland,” Asia Insight, n.d., https://www.nbr.org/publication/asias-energy-security-and-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-podcast/.

5 rather than similar history, values, or ideology. States do not have to be attracted to China as long as they feel obliged to defer to China.19

Reception By 2015, only two years into the Belt and Road Initiative, China had already far surpassed the scope of the United States’ Marshall Plan, but China has rejected comparisons to the Marshall Plan, maintaining that the Belt and Road Initiative is not linked to ideology in the same way that the Marshall Plan was.20 21 22 Though there are those who believe that China is indeed pushing an ideology and trying to “take the center stage in world affairs,” there have also been a positive reactions to the Belt and Road Initiative.23 Some countries have welcomed the attention and opportunities for economic growth.24 Others have lauded the early successes. The AidData team at The College of William & Mary have noted that “Chinese development projects in general, and Chinese transportation projects in particular, reduce economic inequality within and between regions.”25

Still, the presence of negative reactions has been noticeable. China has been painted as a new colonialist power.26 Its foreign policy has been described as “debt imperialism.”27 Critics have contended that the “real beneficiaries probably will be big, local engineering and procurement companies” rather than the international communities that China claims to serve.28 Could these accusations of exploitative practices and general negative reactions be problematic

19 Christopher Walker, Shanthi Kalathil, and Jessica Ludwig, “Forget Hearts and Minds,” Foreign Policy, Argument (blog), September 14, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/14/forget-hearts-and-minds-sharp-power/. 20 David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect.” 21 Andrew Small, “The Backlash to Belt and Road,” Foreign Affairs, February 16, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-16/backlash-belt-and-road. 22 Richard Kozul-Wright, “China’s Belt and Road Isn’t like the Marshall Plan, but Beijing Can Still Learn from It,” UNCTAD (blog), January 25, 2019, https://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1984. 23 Hal Brands, “Inside Xi Jinping’s Plan to Dominate the World,” Bloomberg, December 28, 2018, sec. Opinion, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-12-28/xi-jinping-s-plan-for-china-to-dominate-the-world. 24 “Belt and Road” 100 Percent Welcome: Kyrgyz Official (New China TV, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKJve0bmHE0. 25 Richard Bluhm et al., “Connective Financing: Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of Economic Activity in Developing Countries,” AidData Working Paper (Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary, September 11, 2018), https://www.aiddata.org/publications/connective-finance-chinese-infrastructure-projects. 26 Jamil Anderlini, “China Is at Risk of Becoming a Colonialist Power,” Financial Times, September 19, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/186743b8-bb25-11e8-94b2-17176fbf93f5. 27 Yiwei Wang, “The Opportunity of the Belt & Road,” China US Focus, September 7, 2018, https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/the-opportunity-of-the-belt--road. 28 Anjani Trivedi, “Don’t Be Fooled by China’s Old Debt Playbook,” Bloomberg, January 7, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-07/china-s-infrastructure-stimulus-will-favor-state-firms-as- usual.

6 for China’s foreign policy? In short, yes. The following chapters will attempt to understand the motivations for the negative reactions that have arisen and explore the ways that the Chinese government may be trying to address early failures or at least to correct course so that similar negative reactions can be mitigated in the future.

7 Chapter 2: Backlash to the Belt and Road Initiative

“Is aid that is conditional upon certain kinds of support (e.g. votes in the UN), or whose withdrawal is threatened if the recipient country should support a political or economic rival of the aid provider, still 'soft power'? It is, according to our earlier definition, rather bordering on manipulation, albeit monetary rather than military. Could, I wonder, such manipulation sometimes backfire?" 29

China’s Belt and Road Initiative has been characterized as manipulative by some, and there has been backlash to Belt and Road projects in several countries.30 31 32 This chapter will focus on some of the countries that have experienced this backlash and examine the likely reasons for it.

Where has Backlash Occurred? After reading countless articles written about and by local opponents of Chinese investment through Belt and Road projects, I decided to explore whether there was a way to quantify the extent of the backlash. Indeed, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) maintains a wide-ranging dataset on political violence and protest events. Though the data does exist for all of the countries that have received Belt and Road investment, it is illustrative of the nature of the backlash in a multitude of Belt and Road host countries.33 34 Thirty-one countries exhibited incidents of backlash to Chinese investment, mostly through explicit protests of specific projects, but also through occasional violent targeting of and

29 Alan Hunter, “Soft Power: China on the Global Stage.” Page 397. 30 Christopher Walker and Shanthi Kalathil, “The Evolution of China’s Belt and Road: A Conversation with Nadége Rolland,” Power 3.0, n.d., https://www.power3point0.org/2019/01/08/the-evolution-of-chinas-belt-and-road-a- conversation-with-nadege-rolland/. 31 Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s New Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, no. May/June 2018 (June 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-04-17/chinas-new-revolution. 32 Christopher Balding, “Why Democracies Are Turning Against Belt and Road,” Foreign Affairs, October 24, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-24/why-democracies-are-turning-against-belt-and- road. 33 Clionadh Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.",” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 651–60. The data is updated every week and is available at https://www.acleddata.com/data/. 34 ACLED Data is unavailable for the following BRI host countries: Antigua & Barbuda, Austria, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Malta, New Zealand, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Samoa, Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.

8 individuals affiliated with the projects.35 The countries that have not recorded any backlash are concentrated in Europe, though this group also includes Gabon, Israel, Kuwait, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania.36 There were also a handful of incidents in which Chinese nationals themselves protested hostility that they felt from local populations. There are eighteen countries that have hosted Belt and Road projects for which ACLED data exists, but which have apparently experienced no incidents of backlash targeted toward China or Chinese companies or individuals.37 The absence of backlash could be attributed to a number of reasons. Perhaps there are no concerns about Belt and Road projects or the nature of Chinese investment in those countries. Perhaps the people living in those countries are occupied by more immediate concerns, like monsoons or ethnic violence.38 39 Perhaps there are strong disincentives to expressing dissatisfaction with projects that have been sanctioned by the government. It is worth noting that data collection begins at different times for different countries, and in some countries, there may have been incidents that occurred before data collection began.40 I have chosen to briefly examine ten country cases to contribute to the collective understanding of the anti-China backlash that is happening in places where China has invested through the Belt and Road Initiative.41 42 The countries are meant to be vignettes that provide context at a greater level of detail, and they have been chosen based on data availability and a presence of backlash. Most are countries in which there has been backlash since the Belt and Road Initiative was brought to their country. The bulk of the cases of backlash are in South Asia

35 ACLED data shows incidents of backlash to Chinese investment in the following BRI host countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Kenya, Laos, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Zambia. 36 See table in Appendix. 37 ACLED data exists, but shows no backlash toward China, for the following countries: Angola, Belarus, Chad, Croatia, Gabon, Greece, Guinea, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Rwanda, Serbia, Sierra Leone, United Arab Emirates, and Zimbabwe. 38 “South Asia Monsoon Rains That Killed 1,200 and Displaced a Million Match Climate Change Forecasts: Scientists,” The Japan Times, August 30, 2018. 39 “A New Dimension of Violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State,” International Crisis Group (blog), January 24, 2019, www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b154-new-dimension-violence-myanmars-rakhine-state. 40 Data collection for European countries began in January 2018. Data collection for Middle Eastern countries began in January 2016, except for Syria, which began in January 2017. Most data collection for Asian countries began in January 2010, but there are a few exceptions: India (2016), Afghanistan (2017), Indonesia (2016), Malaysia (2018), and Philippines (2016). Data collection for all African countries began in 1997. 41 If you only have time to read two of the cases, I recommend Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 42 When looking for coverage of what leaders in host countries have said about the BRI, I noticed that most coverage was published by Chinese sources.

9 and Southeast Asia, which is interesting because, as China’s neighbors, many of these countries already have complex bilateral relationships that probably informed reactions to the Belt and Road Initiative. For comparison, I have also included two cases in which there has not been backlash after the Belt and Road Initiative was introduced. These cases are Sierra Leone and Tanzania.43 I have removed those data representing violent incidents that have affected Chinese nationals, but that do not seem to be anti-China, like terrorist attacks in which Chinese nationals happened to be among the casualties.44 However, I have not removed anti-China incidents that are not directly related to Belt and Road projects, but are anti-China, like demonstrations in solidarity with oppressed Uyghur Muslims. Since soft power strategies intend to improve perceptions of China in target countries, and since the Belt and Road Initiative is a soft power strategy, I have assessed that a broad interpretation of anti-China incidents is appropriate for assessing the success of the Belt and Road Initiative. Cambodia45 China has invested $1.69 billion in Cambodia through the Belt and Road Initiative since the initiative began. After the initial project in December 2013, there was a pause until April 2016 when four additional projects were implemented. The projects include a hydropower plant, a farming project to support a China-based sugar company, a cement plant, an iron production project affiliated with the aviation industry, and textile production affiliated with the auto industry. In addition to these five investment projects, China has spent $5.53 billion on 17 construction contracts, but all of the contracts have been awarded to Chinese companies.46 ACLED data is available for Cambodia from 2010, so it is possible to look at anti-China events since before the beginning of China’s Belt and Road investment. There were seven anti- China events in Cambodia between 2010 and the beginning of Belt and Road investment in 2013. Most of the pre-Belt and Road events had to do with land disputes between Cambodian

43 I had hoped to find an Asian country where there had not been backlash to provide contrast to the other Asian country cases, but there was none. Bangladesh was the closest, with only one anti-China event, but it was a significant one: in October 2018, a truck driver was shot dead and over 100 people were injured during a protest about increasing toll rates at the Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridge. 44 Events involving terrorist actors have been left in the dataset when the government of China or Chinese companies affiliated with BRI projects appear to have been the intended target. 45 See map in Appendix. 46 Derek Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker,” American Enterprise Institute, January 2019, http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.

10 villagers and a Chinese development companies. Since 2013, there have been 32 anti-China events in Cambodia, mostly peaceful protests, but several violent incidents as well.47 Many of the incidents seem to be motivated by land disputes. In multiple instances, villagers held protests against alleged land grabs by Chinese firms. The Cambodian government has not been sympathetic, and in some cases seems to have given land to Chinese firms that was not theirs to give. When one group of approximately 100 people asked for compensation or the return of their land, which the government had given to a Chinese company for commercial development, Cambodian police responded by firing water jets at the group, knocking three people unconscious.48 In other similar instances, in which Cambodians complained that their land had been taken without compensation, they were violently attacked by police or detained. The land grabs, themselves, have been violent as well. In November 2014, representatives of Union Development Group, a Chinese firm affiliated with the Lower Sesan II Dam project, burned two villages, destroying 14 homes, and violently attacked locals with axes and knives.4950 To supplement peaceful protests, some Cambodians have taken to other tactics. In December 2014, a group of villagers stole bulldozers that belonged to two Chinese firms, and held two of their drivers hostage.51 In September 2015, rather than attempting to convince high- level negotiators to help them recover their land, protesters went local. Protestors directly blocked access to the road leading to and from a Chinese firm in an attempt to pressure resolution of their land disputes. Labor issues have been another theme for anti-China protests in Cambodia. In early 2016, three union members were fired for trying to organize workers at a textile factory. In protest of the firings, union members burned tires outside of the factory, making it difficult for other workers to go to work. They were later arrested.52 Cambodia legally allows up to 100 square kilometers of concessions to a single company. Hengfu Sugar, the Chinese company that received money to invest in Cambodian agriculture, “skirted this law by setting up five separate companies to each receive a contiguous land

47 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 48 Raleigh et al. 49 Raleigh et al. 50 Hul Reaksmey, “UDG Guards Again Accused of Violent Evictions,” The Cambodia Daily, November 3, 2014, http://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/udg-guards-again-accused-of-violent-evictions-71628/. 51 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 52 Mom Kunthear, “Union Officials Arrested after Kampong Speu Protest,” Khmer Times, February 2, 2016, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/35350/union-officials-arrested-after-kampong-speu-protest/.

11 concession slightly smaller than the limit.”53 This is a continuation of an established practice in Cambodia of granting land to foreign companies: “between 1994 and 2012, nearly…4.6 million hectares – an area larger than the Netherlands – went to Chinese interests.”54 The land, often, does not change hands smoothly. To compel local families to accept an unfair compensation deal, Union Development Group, a Chinese company, built fences around the families’ properties, which blocked access to their own land.55 In an apparent attempt to repel farmers from the area in which they wanted to operate, Roy Feng, a Chinese company, “sprayed a chemical substance on [a local villager’s] rice, which he says destroyed the crop.”56 The victims of forced evictions perpetrated by Roy Feng and Lan Feng, another Chinese company, largely affect people identifying as Kouy, an indigenous ethnic minority. In addition to forcing villagers off of their land, the victims alleged that the companies destroyed thousands of hectares of forest as well, contributing to deforestation, and that flooding caused by the dam has submerged the village, including ancestral graves, and tainted the village’s water supply.57 58 59 60 Lan Feng has also faced accusations that it has relied on illegal child labor.61 Though several of the anti-China events in Cambodia were violent, none led to fatalities. Additionally, there are no events reported after April 2016 despite continued Chinese investment in the country. Why have the protests stopped? It may be that investors are leaving. In August 2016, the operations manager of the Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia cited illegal demonstrations as a reason for investors to relocate to other countries.62

53 James Kynge, Leila Haddou, and Michael Peel, “FT Investigation: How China Bought Its Way into Cambodia,” Financial Times, September 8, 2016. 54 Kynge, Haddou, and Peel. 55 Soth Koemsoeun, “Koh Kong Families Call on Firm to Resolve Decades Old Row,” The Phnom Penh Post, September 10, 2018, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/koh-kong-families-call-firm-resolve-decades-old- row. 56 Phak Seangly, “Company ‘Destroyed Rice Field,’” The Phnom Penh Post, July 7, 2014, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/company-%E2%80%98destroyed-rice-field%E2%80%99. 57 Joshua Lipes, “‘Burst’ of Land Disputes Sees Dozens of Cambodians Charged: Rights Group,” Radio Free Asia, May 8, 2014, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/land-05082014175124.html. 58 Phak Seangly, “Clean Water Shortage at Sesan,” The Phnom Penh Post, December 5, 2017, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/clean-water-shortage-sesan. 59 Phak Seangly, “Phnong Want Damages for Sesan Flooded Graves,” The Phnom Penh Post, February 27, 2018, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/phnong-want-damages-sesan-flooded-graves. 60 In this part of Cambodia, traditional compensation for a ruined grave is apparently 10 buffaloes. 61 Khy Sovuthy, “Child Labor Probe on Preah Vihear Sugar Plantation Moves Forward,” The Cambodia Daily, April 3, 2014, https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/child-labor-probe-on-preah-vihear-sugar-plantation-moves-forward- 55643/. 62 “Garment Factories Close amid Political Uncertainty,” Khmer Times, August 23, 2016, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/27065/garment-factories-close-amid-political-uncertainty/.

12 Beyond financial investment, China has invested much thought and energy into its relationship with Cambodia. The 55th anniversary of their formal bilateral relationship, 2013 was declared the “Year of China-Cambodia Friendship,” which featured “active people-to-people exchanges.”63 64 A strong bilateral relationship with Cambodia has benefitted China geopolitically: “because ASEAN works by consensus, the objections of one member can thwart any group initiative. Cambodia used this effective veto to protect China” when ASEAN was close to issuing a statement against China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.65 Shortly after the veto, China promised hundreds of millions more in aid, as well as millions more in canceled debt and military support.66 Cambodian “Prime Minister Hun Sen’s willing embrace of Chinese investment, unlike neighbouring countries Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam, has ensured Cambodia is at the core of Belt and Road plans in southeast Asia,” but many Cambodians have been less than enthusiastic.67 Ethiopia68 China has invested $1.23 billion in Ethiopia through the Belt and Road Initiative since the initiative began. After the initial project in July 2014, three projects followed in April 2016, January 2018, and February 2018. The projects include a residential complex for up to 200,000 workers, two textile manufacturing hubs, and a gas exploration project.69 70 71 72 In addition to

63 “Cambodia Country Profile,” Belt and Road Portal, January 24, 2017, https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/gbjg/gbgk/5572.htm. 64 Another feature of the friendship year was the “Brightness Action” campaign, an initiative that provided free cataract treatment to Cambodians. 65 Kynge, Haddou, and Peel, “FT Investigation: How China Bought Its Way into Cambodia.” 66 Tanner Greer, “Cambodia Wants China as Its Neighborhood Bully,” Foreign Policy, The Argument (blog), January 5, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/05/cambodia-wants-china-as-its-neighborhood-bully/. 67 Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “‘No Cambodia Left’: How Chinese Money Is Changing Sihanoukville,” The Guardian, July 31, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jul/31/no-cambodia-left-chinese-money-changing- sihanoukville. 68 See map in the appendix. 69 Elissa Jobson, “Chinese Firm Steps up Investment in Ethiopia with ‘Shoe City,’” The Guardian, April 30, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/apr/30/chinese-investment-ethiopia-shoe-city. 70 Matthew Newsome, “Foreign Investment Continues in Ethiopia Clothing Sector,” Just-Style (blog), April 13, 2017, https://www.just-style.com/analysis/foreign-investment-continues-in-ethiopia-clothing-sector_id130376.aspx. 71 “Chinese Companies Showing Interest to Invest in Ethiopia,” Yarns and Fibers (blog), November 10, 2017, http://www.yarnsandfibers.com/news/textile-news/chinese-companies-showing-interest-invest-ethiopia#.XLUSU- tKjOQ. 72 “Company Summary for POLY-GCL Petroleum Investments Limited Ethiopia Branch,” D&B Global Business Browser, n.d., https://globalbb.onesource.com/web/Reports/ReportMain.aspx?KeyID=273695072&Process=CP&FtrID=UNIFIED SUMMARY.

13 these four investment projects, China has spent $8.84 billion on 25 construction contracts, but all of the contracts have been awarded to Chinese companies. 73 ACLED data is available for Ethiopia from 1997, so it is possible to look at anti-China events since before the beginning of China’s Belt and Road investment. There were four anti- China events between 1997 and 2014 when the Belt and Road began in Ethiopia. Three of these events were targeting a Chinese oil firm, and the other was an attack on Chinese nationals working at a dam construction site. The first recorded anti-China event since the Belt and Road began occurred in December 2016, which suggests that the second project may have been more problematic than the first. There have been five events in total. The December 2016 event as well as the next event, on April 5, 2017, were both fatal, killing four and three people, respectively. The first event, an ambush of a shipment of equipment from the Government of China, occurred in Awash and was perpetrated by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLA), which is considered a terrorist organization by the Government of Ethiopia.74 The victims included three Chinese nationals and their driver. The second event, an attack on a parking lot for vehicles belonging to a Chinese construction company, occurred in Gonder, and the perpetrators are unknown.75 The three other events were protests. In November 2017, protesters in Arertu burned a Chinese woodchip factory and interrupted a meeting with members of the Ethiopian government. Economic grievances, particularly unemployment of Ethiopians while Chinese projects hire Chinese workers, is cited as a motivation for the event.76 In November 2018, two protests were in coordination on the same day in Awash and Abala, and the protestors plainly demanded reform to Chinese foreign investment in Ethiopia. The ACLED data shows that anti-China events have become less violent over time, and they have also become more explicitly linked to dissatisfaction with Chinese investment. The protests may have had some impact. Civil unrest and protests are cited as a reason for Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn’s resignation in February 2018. However,

73 Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.” 74 “World Report 2012: Ethiopia,” Human Rights Watch, n.d., https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country- chapters/ethiopia. 75 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 76 “Chinese Owned Chip-Wood Factory Set on Fire after Protest in Arerti, North Shoa,” Ethiopia News, November 7, 2017, https://borkena.com/2017/11/08/ethiopia-chinese-owned-chipwood-factory-set-on-fire-after-protest-in- arertinorth-shoa/.

14 his successor was not expected to implement reforms, and the protests continued.77 Critics of Chinese investment, particularly the kind of investment that involves large scale loans, is dept- trap diplomacy. A senior government minister assured CNN that Ethiopia has not fallen victim to this kind of exploitative debt structure. He added, “‘One of the unique things that makes Chinese funding quite attractive is they practice non-intervention in local politics.”78 That’s concerning for some Ethiopians. One regular contributor to the opinion sections of Ethiopian newspapers notes that China is not bothered by human rights abuses or repression and that China will work with governments that actively do both. He says, “China has become, not unwittingly, a consenting accomplice of most human and civil rights abuses perpetrated by regimes such as our present one.”79 India80 China has invested $9.96 billion in India through the Belt and Road Initiative since the initiative began. India has hosted more Belt and Road projects than any other country, 31 projects since February 2014. The projects are spread across a range of sectors, including technology, energy, transportation, agriculture, entertainment, health, metals, real estate, and tourism. In addition to direct investment through these projects, China has spent $970 million on four construction contracts, all of which went to Chinese companies.81 ACLED data is only available for India from January 2016, so the data cannot offer a full picture of the possible anti-China protests and violence since Belt and Road investment began in 2014. However, in the two years for which data does exist, there were 50 anti-China events. All but one of the events were protests. In India, anti-China protests happen often, and mostly in the northern part of the country. The outlier event was a riot in October 2016, in which a right-wing Hindu nationalist political party burned Chinese products, citing Chinese support to Pakistan after the Uri attacks as their main concern. Indeed, many of the protests in India have related to political concerns, like China’s support for Pakistan as well as China’s occupation of Tibet.

77 Justina Crabtree, “Chinese Investment Hotspot and a State of Emergency: What’s Going on in Ethiopia,” CNBC, February 23, 2018, sec. Politics, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/23/china-investment-state-of-emergency-ethiopia- latest.html. 78 Jenni Marsh, “Skyscrapers, Trains and Roads: How Addis Ababa Came to Look like a Chinese City,” CNN, September 3, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/style/article/addis-ababa-china-construction-style/index.html. 79 Admassu Feleke, “Ethiopia: ‘Beware of the Chinese Bearing Gifts’’,’” Nazret, June 12, 2017, sec. Opinion, https://www.nazret.com/2017/06/12/ethiopia-beware-of-the-chinese-bearing-gifts/. 80 See map in the appendix. 81 Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.”

15 Nevertheless, many of the protests have had clear connections to Chinese investment. For example, at the first recorded protest, hundreds of farmers registered their dissatisfaction with the government’s decision to give fertile land to Wanda Group, a Chinese company. Wanda Group is owned by Wang Jianlin, the richest man in China, and is still “asking for tax and duty breaks, not only for his own companies that will build [a] 13 square kilometer (five square mile) township, but for tenants as well.”82 The real estate project that Wanda Group signed on to do is not a Belt and Road project, but it may have been inspired by the increase in investments by the Government, and it definitely contributes to China’s image in India. It may also be catering to the growing Chinese community in India to which Belt and Road projects have contributed. Another two events had to do with awarding contracts to Chinese companies, which has diminished employment opportunities for Indians. In February 2018, protestors in Panipat complained that garbage collection work had been given to a Chinese company. The protestors were primarily local government employees and childcare providers.83 Then, in May, thousands of Delhi Congress workers marched against the Government decision to give a cameras project to a Chinese Public Sector Unit Kikivision. A protest in Dehradun involved local potters and other artisans who demonstrated against the use of Chinese products because it has caused them to lose business.84 Three events had to do with water. There have been repeated protests in Kaggaladahundi against a China-based marigold flower processing unit near the city. The facility would be used to refine the flowers to make perfume. The protestors, mostly farmers, opposed the facility, which the state pollution control board had not yet cleared, because they believed “it would harm the environment and also pollute the groundwater.”85 In November 2017, a student group in Guwahati protested the alleged diversion of the Siang river by the Chinese government. The students had noticed dead fish in the river and wanted to raise awareness about this concerning

82 Andy Mukherjee, “Chinese Billionaire Wang Jianlin’s Impossible India Demands Are a Winner,” Live Mint (blog), September 28, 2016, https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/qvljZ8rauRABze0eFpJqPK/Chinese-billionaire- Wang-Jianlins-impossible-India-demands.html. 83 “Anganwari Workers, Nagar Palika Staff Protest in Panipat,” The Tribune, February 23, 2018, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/haryana/anganwari-workers-nagar-palika-staff-protest-in-panipat/548643.html. 84 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 85 “Farmers Protest against Setting up of Flower Processing Unit Turns Violent,” United News of India, July 25, 2016, http://www.uniindia.com/farmers-protest-against-setting-up-of-flower-processing-unit-turns- violent/other/news/567453.html.

16 development, which they believe is caused by Chinese construction upstream.86 Then in October 2018, another student group, this time from Pasighat, cited concerns about the same river, demanding a water treaty with China that would address the downstream impact of Chinese activities.87 While the majority of the anti-China events in India between 2016 and 2018 have to do with political concerns that pre-dated and arguably have little to do with the Belt and Road Initiative, there are clearly a handful of events that explicitly oppose Chinese investment and its effects. The events that are not directly related to Chinese investment do still matter because they illuminate the tensions in the China-India relationship, tensions that the Belt and Road Initiative is presumably aimed at easing. Of course, India is a very large and very diverse country, and there may well be—surely are—both groups that feel warmly toward China and groups that are strongly opposed. Still, the balance seems to be tipping against China. The Indian government has voiced opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative and declined to attend the 2017 Belt and Road forum. While India supports joint initiatives with China, government officials have said the government “believes these should also [bear] in mind the sensitivity to each country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty as well as sustainability and viability in other ways.”88 Kenya89 China has invested $670 million in Kenya through the Belt and Road Initiative since the initiative began. After the initial project in May 2015, two projects followed in 2016 and one more was implemented in 2017. Three are real estate projects and one is an alternative energy project. Additionally, China has spent $8.26 billion on 24 construction contracts, and all of the contracts have been awarded to Chinese companies.90 ACLED data is available for Kenya from January 1997, it is possible to look at anti- China events since before the beginning of China’s Belt and Road investment. There were seven anti-China events between 1997 and 2015 when Belt and Road investment began in Kenya. These events were primarily motivated by concerns about construction practices by the China

86 Vinod Kumar Singh, “Protest over Muddy Siang,” The Telegraph India, November 30, 2017, https://www.telegraphindia.com/states/north-east/protest-over-muddy-siang/cid/1424576. 87 Sumir Karmakar, “Arunachal Students Seek Sino-India Water Treaty,” Deccan Herald, October 24, 2018, https://www.deccanherald.com/national/arunachal-students-seek-sino-699591.html. 88 The Wire Staff, “India Breaks Ranks with SCO, Refuses to Endorse China’s Belt Road Initiative,” The Wire, June 11, 2018, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-breaks-ranks-with-sco-refuses-to-endorse-chinas-belt-road-initiative. 89 See map in appendix. 90 Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.”

17 Roads and Bridges Company, though there were also general concerns that Chinese businesses were undercutting Kenyan businesses. Since then, there have been seven anti-China events in Kenya. All but two events have been peaceful protests. Several events were clearly motivated by grievances about lack of employment prospects for young Kenyans. Others had to do with poor working conditions and pay. Pay issues, in particular, are a persistent issue and have been raised in respect to companies other than CRBC. In September 2018, local employees of a Chinese company contracted to pave a road demonstrated in front of Sino-Hydro’s office in Maralal, complaining of poor working conditions and failure to be paid for overtime work.91 The outlier cases have to do with a land dispute, specifically local government allowing a Chinese mining company to mine an area for which it is involved in a land dispute, and environmental concerns relating to construction of a Chinese coal plant.92 The coal plant, which is near a tourism hub, is expected to damage marine life and hurt livelihoods of Kenyans working in the fishing and tourism industries. The fact that the location is a designated UNESCO heritage site does not seem to have created any hurdles for the project’s implementation.93 In July 2015, more than 600 local employees of China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), which has had a presence in Kenya since 1984, blocked a highway at the Athi River Steel Plant in protest of the denial of a pay raise. 94 The workers had requested their pay be doubled from 250 shillings to 500 shillings, which equates to approximately $5USD, per day. CRBC is “one of the biggest Chinese enterprises in Kenya,” and, in addition to forcing local laborers to work for cheap, it “has been accused of firing workers without cause, importing labor, stealing water from local communities, and secretly dredging sand from Kenyan beaches for construction material.”95 In 2017, the UN Development Programme estimated unemployment in Kenya at 26.2% for youth ages 15 to 24, which is even more staggering when the fact that Kenya

91 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 92 Raleigh et al. 93 Abdi Latif Dahir, “A Chinese Coal Plant on a UNESCO-Protected Island in Kenya Is Facing Major Protests,” Quartz Africa, June 9, 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1301469/photos-kenya-environmentalists-protest-china-coal- plant-in-lamu/. 94 “Kenya Office,” China Road & Bridge Corporation, n.d., http://www.crbc.com/site/crbcEN/KenyaOffice/index.html. 95 Lily Kuo, “Kenyan Rail Workers Are Protesting against Their Chinese Employer for a Raise - to $5 a Day,” August 3, 2016, https://qz.com/africa/749177/kenyan-rail-workers-are-protesting-against-their-chinese-employer- for-a-raise-to-5-a-day/.

18 has one of the greatest proportions of youth to overall population in the world.96 97 In August 2016, facing unemployment, youths protested the fact that Chinese nationals were hired to build a railway instead of locals. The next day, local Masai youth attacked several Chinese railway workers with clubs and knives, chanting “our rights” in reference to promises that they would be hired as plant operators and drivers.98 The railway in question, Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), is constructed by CRBC.99 Apparently, the President had required the company to employ locals, but the company had not complied.100 Nine months later, university students blocked a highway, again in protest of the railway’s employment policy. Though Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta was one of just two African leaders who chose to attend the 2017 Belt and Road Forum in China, he “has called on China to rebalance an increasingly skewed trade relationship,” which give Kenya more control over joint projects.101 Furthermore, the Kenyan government seems to have chosen to address concerns relating to Belt and Road projects by blaming and arresting high-level officials. In August 2018, 18 officials were arrested on corruption charges, including the chairman of the National Land Commission and the managing director of the Kenya Railways Corporation.102 Kenyatta may need to take further action, however, as concerns that China may be able to seize Kenya’s port of Mombasa if Kenya cannot pay its debts to China began to surface at the end of 2018.103 Laos104 China has invested $6.86 billion in Laos through the Belt and Road Initiative since the initiative began. After the initial project in 2013, projects continued steadily through 2018. Most are energy projects, but there are also some projects relating to real estate, transportation, metals,

96 “Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update” (New York, NY: United Nations Development Programme, 2018). 97 Neville Otuki, “Kenya’s Youth Percentage among the Highest Globally,” Business Daily Africa, August 27, 2017, https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Kenya-youth-percentage-among-the-highest-globally/3946234- 4072946-jvv2x2/index.html. 98 Kuo, “Kenyan Rail Workers Are Protesting against Their Chinese Employer for a Raise - to $5 a Day.” 99 “Kenya Office.” 100 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 101 David Pilling and Adrienne Klasa, “Kenya President Urges Rebalance of China-Africa Trade,” Financial Times, May 14, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/947ea960-38b2-11e7-821a-6027b8a20f23. 102 Humphrey Malalo, “Kenya Arrests Two Top Officials for Suspected Corruption over New $3 Billion Railway,” Reuters, August 11, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-corruption-railway/kenya-arrests-two-top- officials-for-suspected-corruption-over-new-3-billion-railway-idUSKBN1KW07L. 103 Kristin Huang, “Will China Seize Prized Port If Kenya Can’t Pay Back Its Belt and Road Loans?” South China Morning Post, December 30, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2180026/will-china- seize-prized-port-if-kenya-cant-pay-back-its-belt. 104 See map in appendix.

19 and timber. In addition to these twelve investment projects, China has spent $11.48 billion on 21 construction contracts, and all of the contracts have been awarded to Chinese companies.105 ACLED data is available for Laos from January 2010, so it is possible to look at anti- China events since before the beginning of China’s Belt and Road investment. There are no recorded anti-China events in Laos between 2010 and 2013. There have been six anti-China events in Laos since Belt and Road investment began in the country. The first two events were peaceful protests, but all events since then have been violent, and four have led to casualties. The last recorded event occurred in June 2017, but it does not include the August 2018 murder of the head of China’s Hunan Province Chamber of Commerce in Laos, who was also a member of the Laos-China Friendship Association and headed a construction company.106 107 The first protest, in January 2014, was a response to an attempt by Chinese company Kings Romans Group to take land from farmers to build an airport. Farmers from six villages refused to leave their rice fields, standing in front of bulldozers in some cases. The land was given away as concessions by the Lao government, while “villagers uprooted by the project were poorly compensated and refused employment” in the project.108 Eventually, in late 2017, the airport project was scrapped, though the Kings Romans Group has moved forward with construction of a casino in the area.109 The second protest, in March 2015, was organized by Lao workers at a Chinese factory that produces fertilizers who were upset that they had not received the pay owed to them, and noted that their Chinese co-workers had been paid. Villagers near the factory have noted that wastewater from the factory have harmed the local environment, killing fish and making it impossible to grow rice or vegetables.110 In 2016, there were two isolated events in which Chinese nationals were targeted. In January, a car driving through a mountainous area was bombed killing two Chinese employees of a Chinese mining company and injuring another.111 Coverage of the bombing noted that, “a

105 Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.” 106 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 107 “‘Robbery’ Likely Motive Behind Murder of Ethnic Chinese Businessman in Lao Capital: Police,” Radio Free Asia, August 15, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/murder-08152018151203.html. 108 “Chinese Developers Abandon International Airport Project in Laos SEZ,” Radio Free Asia, November 8, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/airport-11082017152333.html. 109 “Chinese Developers Abandon International Airport Project in Laos SEZ.” 110 “Lao Workers Protest Over Salary Withheld by China-Backed Potash Plant,” Radio Free Asia, March 26, 2015, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/plant-03262015170402.html. 111 “Chinese Nationals Killed in Laos in ‘Suspected Bomb Attack,’” Deutsche Welle, January 25, 2016, https://www.dw.com/cda/en/chinese-nationals-killed-in-laos-in-suspected-bomb-attack/a-19001900.

20 growing number of Chinese businesspeople are working in Laos, and that has led to resentment among some Laotians.”112 Just over a month later in Lao Phoukhoun, militants killed a Chinese employee and injured three others when they attacked a Chinese logging company.113 There have been reports of violence in the area unrelated to Chinese companies, so it is not certain that this attack was motivated by opposition to the company.114 However, the precursor project, Nam Ngum 2 Hydroelectric Power Project, to the project that the company supports, Nam Ngum 3 Hydropower Project, displaced thousands of people, mostly ethnic minorities, so it is plausible that people feared a similar outcome.115 Then, in June 2017, a Chinese citizen was shot dead in Xaysomboun province.116 When Laos underwent a leadership change in 2016, replacing Prime Minister Thongsing Thammavong, who had been criticized for his “heavy borrowing from Beijing,” some observers expected the new president, BounNhang Vorachith, to try to scale back Chinese projects in the country.117 Nevertheless, at the 2017 Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, Vorachith expressed unqualified support for the Belt and Road Initiative and noted that Chinese supported infrastructure projects have helped Laos improve access to other South Asian states.118 “Despite the desire of Laotian leaders to avoid displaying the kind of unabashed deference to Beijing practiced in neighboring Cambodia, China’s financial clout has proven too tempting to resist.”119

112 Edward Wong, “Bombing in Central Laos Kills 2 From China,” New York Times, January 29, 2016, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/30/world/asia/laos-bombing-kills-chinese.html. 113 Shannon Tiezzi, “Another Chinese Citizen Killed in Laos,” ChinaPower (blog), March 4, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/another-chinese-citizen-killed-in-laos/. 114 Tiezzi. 115 “Nam Ngum 2 Dam Displaced over 6,000 Ethnic Minorities in Vientiane, Lao PDR,” Environmental Justice Atlas, n.d. 116 “China Issues Security Alert in Laos after National Shot Dead,” Reuters, June 18, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-laos-attacks/china-issues-security-alert-in-laos-after-national-shot-dead- idUSKBN19A09J. 117 Lake Hunt, “Leadership Change in Laos: A Shift Away From China?” The Diplomat, ASEAN Beat (blog), January 25, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/leadership-change-in-laos-a-shift-away-from-china/. 118 BounNhang Vorachith, “Statement by H.E. BounNhang Vorachith, President of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic at the Leaders Roundtable of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation” (May 15, 2017), http://mofa.gov.la/index.php/activities/state-leaders/1774-statement-by-h-e-bounnhang-vorachith,-president-of-the- lao-people%E2%80%99s-democratic-republic-at-the-leaders-roundtable-of-the-belt-and-road-forum. 119 Michael Hart, “China’s Influence Steadily Grows in Laos, Weathering Political Change,” World Politics Review (blog), December 20, 2017, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/23859/china-s-influence-steadily-grows- in-laos-weathering-political-change.

21 Myanmar120 China has invested $2.2 billion in Myanmar through the Belt and Road Initiative since the initiative began. There have been two projects in Myanmar: one relating to steel in October 2013, and one relating to oil in April 2016. Additionally, China has spent $1.83 billion on nine construction contracts, and all of the contracts have been awarded to Chinese companies.121 ACLED data is available for Myanmar from January 2010, so it is possible to look at anti-China events since before the beginning of China’s Belt and Road investment. Between 2010 and 2013, there were 16 anti-China events in Myanmar. These events included demonstrations against Chinese mining, particularly the Wanbao company. There have been 40 anti-China events in Myanmar since Belt and Road investment began in the country October 2013. Most have been peaceful protests, though some protests have become violent. Protests lasting multiple days are counted as separate events.122 While the bulk of the protests have been concentrated in and around the capital, others have occurred in the west, north, and center of the country. Many of the protests were staged in response to issues with the Wanbao Mining Company. In October 2013, around 300 protesters confronted approximately 300 armed security guards affiliated with Wanbao. A week later, in another township, another 300 farmers protested, this time demanding compensation for their crops, which had been destroyed by the company’s mining project. Protests against Wanbao continued into November, now with support from local Buddhist monks, “after a controlled explosion at the mine allegedly led to damage to a local Buddhist pagoda.”123 In December 2014, after Chinese employees of the Letpadaung copper mine, which is operated by Wanbao Mining, a subsidiary of Chinese state-owned conglomerate NORINCO, bulldozed and built fences around village land that had been seized for the mining operation, several villagers protested.124 The protests led to clashes with security forces, and one woman was shot and killed.125 Days later, protesters clashed with police as they arrived at the

120 See map in appendix. 121 Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.” 122 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 123 Raleigh et al. 124 Kyaw Phyo Tha, “More Villagers Injured in Letpadaung Mine Protests,” The Irrawaddy, December 23, 2014, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/villagers-injured-letpadaung-mine-protests.html. 125 Thomas Fuller and Wai Moe, “Woman Killed While Protesting Chinese Copper Mine in Myanmar,” New York Times, December 22, 2014, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/world/asia/woman-killed-while- protesting-chinese-copper-mine-in-myanmar.html?searchResultPosition=1.

22 Chinese Embassy in Yangon to register their distress, which includes concerns about environmental damage and flooding in addition to the shooting and land seizures.126 127 In January 2015, several hundred activists, monks, and farmers marched to the Chinese Embassy, asking for support in enforcing Wanbao to comply with the Letpaduang Inquiry Commission’s 2013 report, which provided recommendations aimed at improving conditions at and community relations with the mine.128 129 More than a year later, hundreds of villagers assembled, complaining that Wanbao had failed to comply with the report. After two days of peaceful protests, some protestors clashed with a unit jointly controlled by the Myanmar military and a Chinese weapons maker, that had been guarding the mine.130 Protests resumed in February 2017. The Wanbao Mining Company was not the only Chinese company that drew complaints in Myanmar. In April 2013, hundreds of people in Maday Island protested a petroleum pipeline being built by Shwe Gas Pipeline, a project affiliated with the China National Petroleum Corporation, complaining that they had not been compensated for land they had given up.131 In November 2016, 200 farmers again demanded compensation for land and crop losses caused by the Shwe Gas pipeline project. When the issue was still not resolved in April 2018, 100 farmers staged a hunger strike in front of CNPC offices.132 Land grabbing complaints were raised about another Chinese company in 2018, this time by farmers in Kachin state who claimed that a Chinese businessmen who intended to plant trees for tissue production had confiscated their lands.133 In April 2014, 500 villagers protested against the construction of an oil refinery in Launglon, citing environmental concerns. “More than 2000 people from six villages have signed” a petition against the refinery.134 The Myitsone dam project, supported by Beijing’s State

126 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 127 Fuller and Moe, “Woman Killed While Protesting Chinese Copper Mine in Myanmar.” 128 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 129 “Mountain of Trouble: Human Rights Abuses Continue at Myanmar’s Letpadaung Mine” (London: Amnesty International, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1655642017ENGLISH.PDF. 130 Aung Hla Tun, “Hundreds Protest Restart of China-Backed Copper Mine in Myanmar,” Reuters, May 6, 2016, sec. World News, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-mine-protests/hundreds-protest-restart-of-china- backed-copper-mine-in-myanmar-idUSKCN0XX15A. 131 “Six Charged Over China-Burma Pipeline Protests,” Radio Free Asia, April 19, 2013, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/charged-04192013175339.html/. 132 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 133 Raleigh et al. 134 Nick Baker, “Dawei Residents Protest against $3 Billion Oil Refinery,” Myanmar Times, May 3, 2016, https://www.mmtimes.com/business/20090-dawei-residents-protest-against-3-billion-oil-refinery.html.

23 Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) faced protests in 2016, as it would “inundate the ancestral birthplace of the ethnic Kachin people.”135 The project has since been suspended.136 Faith Doherty, a British environmental expert, told The Guardian that infrastructure investment, like the dam project, have led “timber bosses from China straight to Myanmar’s valuable forests.”137 Multiple protests were recorded against Chinese loggers, yet Burmese government officials have protected them, even going so far as to grant amnesty to loggers who had been found guilty.138139 Labor issues have arisen as well. An eight-day protest was organized outside of the Chinese-owned Yimei shoe factory in September 2014, as workers demanded better wages. Another sustained labor protest occurred at Chinese-owned Cixing Knitting Factory in December 2018, when workers organized a strike after the factory fired union leaders. The strike lasted for two weeks until the company reinstated the union leaders.140 Clearly, the anti-China sentiment in Myanmar is extensive. On the part of the government, there seemed to be a desire to assert control over development in the country, especially development driven by Chinese investment. At the end of 2018, the Government of Myanmar “formed a steering committee for implementation of tasks relating to the China- proposed Belt and Road Initiative,” which would be led by head of state Aung San Suu Kyi and includes several other high-ranking government officials.141 The Government of Myanmar has managed to renegotiate one major development project with heavy investment from China, scaling down the cost of a port by 80% to mitigate future debt concerns, but the Government of Myanmar does not have complete control of its country.142 Aung San Suu Kyi has acknowledged that the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) does not follow her orders. The Government of China has

135 Tom Fawthrop, “Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam Dilemma,” The Diplomat (blog), March 11, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/myanmars-myitsone-dam-dilemma/. 136 Fawthrop. 137 Tom Phillips, “Surge in Illegal Logging by Chinese in Myanmar Alarms Activists,” The Guardian, September 17, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/illegal-timber-myanmar-china-forests. 138 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 139 Wai Moe, “Myanmar Frees Loggers from China Amid a Broader Amnesty,” New York Times, July 30, 2015, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/31/world/asia/myanmar-frees-loggers-from-china-amid-a-broader- amnesty.html. 140 “Strike Action Reinstates Union Leaders in Myanmar,” Industriall (blog), January 10, 2019, http://www.industriall-union.org/strike-action-reinstates-union-leaders-in-myanmar. 141 Global Times, “Myanmar Forms Steering Committee for Implementation of Belt and Road Projects,” Mizzima News, December 8, 2018, http://mizzima.com/article/myanmar-forms-steering-committee-implementation-belt-and- road-projects. 142 Yuichi Nitta, “Myanmar Cuts Cost of China-Funded Port Project by 80%,” Nikkei Asian Review, September 28, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Myanmar-cuts-cost-of-China-funded-port-project-by-80.

24 protected the Myanmar Army, which has proven strategic, as Aung San Suu Kyi seems to “understand that influencing the Tatmadaw can only be possible through China,” and therefore Myanmar is compelled to partner with China.143 Meanwhile, the relationship is valuable to China because access to Myanmar can be parlayed into access to the Bay of Bengal, which would be critical for Chinese trade if the Strait of Malacca was ever threatened.144 Pakistan145 China has invested $7.63 billion in Pakistan through the Belt and Road Initiative since the initiative began. After the initial project in March 2014, there have been twelve more projects. Half of the projects are energy related, and the rest have to do with textiles shipping, telecoms, banking, and consumer services. In addition to these investments, China has spent $31.98 billion on 39 construction contracts, all of which have been awarded to Chinese companies.146 ACLED data exists for Pakistan from January 2010, so it is possible to look at anti-China events since before the beginning of China’s Belt and Road investment. Between 2010 and 2014, there were seven anti-China events in Pakistan. These events targeted a Chinese oil and gas company, Chinese engineers, and Chinese travelers. Though anti-China events did not begin immediately after Belt and Road projects began in the country, there have been 39 events since February 2015. Most of the events were peaceful protests, though two became violent. There were also four incidents in which a remote explosive was used, one suicide bomb attack, and one shooting.147 The first recorded violent incident was a May 2015 bombing of an oil tanker working with a Chinese company in Saindak, Balochistan. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) is suspected to have organized the attack. Over the next two years, there were three incidents of remote controlled bombs targeting Chinese engineers while driving.148 The Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army, which has expressed opposition to the CPEC, allegedly perpetrated one of

143 Joe Kumbun, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative - A Bargaining Chip for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,” The Irrawaddy, January 8, 2019, https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/commentary/chinas-belt-road-initiative- bargaining-chip-daw-aung-san-suu-kyi.html. 144 Kumbun. 145 See map in appendix. 146 Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.” 147 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 148 “Chinese Engineers Escape IED Blast in Steel Town,” Dawn, July 11, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1344466.

25 the attacks. None of the bombs led to fatalities, though several Chinese workers were injured. There were two fatal incidents. The first occurred in May 2017, when BLA militants gunned down three Chinese workers involved in building part of the CPEC as they were in town shopping for supplies. The second was a suicide bombing attack, for which BLA claimed responsibility. In August 2018, the bomber had targeted a bus that was taking several Chinese engineers to a mining project in the Dalbandin area.149 150 Most of the protests in Pakistan have to do with the route of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Many, including people in Gilgit and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), feel they have been left out of the project, since it will not come close to where they live. Others are dissatisfied with the way the routes have been drawn and prioritized. Pakistanis have protested outside of the Karachi Press Club as well as outside of local government offices. They have also organized sit-ins and blocked main roads and bridges as a means of capturing attention. Just as people are unhappy that the CPEC will be far from where they live, others are unhappy the CPEC will be nearby. Members of the Jeay Sindh Liberation Front expressed concerns that the Chinese projects would bring so many outsiders to Pakistan that it would turn Sindhis into a minority, and they feared the foreigners would take advantage of such a situation. Appropriate compensation for land that would be used in the CPEC has also been a concern of many. Pakistanis have organized protests on several occasions and in several parts of the country to demand fair pay for their land, which would be used in the project.151 In Karachi, there have also been protests of the government decision to award a garbage collection contract to a Chinese company.152 Recorded protests have included actions by government officials as well. In February, March, and June of 2015, members of opposition parties walked out of the Senate to protest the changes that had been proposed in regards to the route of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).153 Many complained that the eastern routes of CPEC had been prioritized at the expense

149 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 150 Wendy Wu, “Beijing Condemns Suicide Attack on Bus Carrying Chinese Engineers in Pakistan,” South China Morning Post, August 11, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2159291/bus- carrying-chinese-engineers-targeted-pakistan. 151 Zubair Ayub, “CPEC Route: Protesters Demand Payment of Compensation,” The Express Tribune, September 16, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1804363/1-cpec-route-protesters-demand-payment-compensation/. 152 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 153 Qamar Zaman, “Pak-China Economic Corridor: Senators Issue Ominous Warning over Route Change,” The Express Tribune, February 4, 2015, https://tribune.com.pk/story/832574/pak-china-economic-corridor-senators- issue-ominous-warning-over-route-change/.

26 of the western routes, noting that then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif hails from the eastern part of the country.154 155 Senators from Balochistan were particularly displeased, and they carried the protests forward in 2016. In September 2018, “Pakistani ministers and advisers [said] the country’s new government [would] review BRI investments and renegotiate a trade agreement signed more than a decade ago that it says unfairly benefits Chinese companies.”156 The statement came at the beginning of Imran Khan’s tenure as Prime Minister and a time when Pakistan was feeling particularly squeezed financially by China. Mihir Sharma notes in Bloomberg that, “CPEC’s costs to Pakistan are much higher than would make sense for the projects in question,” and Reuters observes that “the cooling enthusiasm for China’s investments mirrors the unease of incoming governments in Sri Lanka, Malaysia and the Maldives, where new administrations have come to power wary of Chinese deals struck by their predecessors.”157 158 Many in Pakistan feel that the government’s “decision to place so much of its economy in the hands of state investors from its much larger neighbor is resented by those who fear the country will become a de facto colony of China.”159 Sierra Leone China has invested $770 million in Sierra Leone through the Belt and Road Initiative since the initiative began. This investment has come through one project, an iron ore mine, and began in April 2015. China has also spent $1.17 billion on three construction contracts, all to Chinese companies.160 ACLED data exists for Sierra Leone from 1997, so it is possible to look at anti-China events since before the beginning of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Like in Rwanda, the data

154 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 155 Taj Haider, “To Form Consensus, Pay Heed to the Reports of the Senate’s CPEC Committee,” CPEC Watch (blog), September 24, 2018, http://cpec-watch.com/article/663. 156 Jamil Anderlini, Henny Sender, and Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan Rethinks Its Role in Xi’s Belt and Road Plan,” Financial Times, September 9, 2018. 157 Mihir Sharma, “Pakistan Bailout Exposes Potholes in Belt and Road,” Bloomberg, October 10, 2018, sec. Opinion, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-11/pakistan-bailout-exposes-flaws-in-china-s-belt- and-road. 158 Reuters, “Fearing Debt Trap, Pakistan Rethinks China’s Belt and Road Projects,” The Straits Times, September 30, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/fearing-debt-trap-pakistan-rethinks-chinese-belt-and-road- projects. 159 Patrick Wintour, “‘All-Weather Friendship’: But Is Pakistan Relying Too Heavily on China?,” The Guardian, August 3, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/aug/03/all-weather-friendship-but-is-pakistan-relying-too- heavily-on-china. 160 Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.”

27 shows no record of anti-China events between January 1997 and December 2018, which includes three years of Belt and Road investment in Sierra Leone.161 During the presidency of Ernest Bai Koroma, from 2007 to 2018, Sierra Leone “broadened trade relations with China to levels not seen since the 1980s,” and increased levels of Chinese investment in the country. The presidential candidate from Koroma’s party, Samura Kamara, who also served as Koroma’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance and Economic Development, called China an “‘all-weather friend” during the campaign.162 Their political party, the All Peoples Congress (APC) put support for, and allegiance to, China at the center of their platform, and they lost, albeit narrowly.163 164 165 166 While it may be a stretch to paint the election results as a referendum on the relationship with China, it does seem to reflect growing dissatisfaction with predatory Chinese loans, particularly relating to an airport project.167 Indeed, by his seventh month in office, current president Julius Maada Bio canceled the airport project, explaining that it was not needed, and pledged to put government funding toward refurbishing and increasing access to the country’s existing airport instead.168 Despite the fact that the China Railway Seventh Group, a state-owned company, was already contracted to build the airport, Chinese officials insisted that “the project had only been in an exploratory phase,” and that the bilateral relationship remains strong.169 Why has there not been visible backlash in Sierra Leone similar to other Belt and Road host countries? One reason may be the existence of a somewhat functioning election system. While there is certainly corruption, Freedom House has given the electoral process in the country

161 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 162 The Guardian, “China’s Influence in Sierra Leone Looms on Eve of Long-Awaited Election,” South China Morning Post, March 7, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/africa/article/2136153/chinas-influence-looms- sierra-leone-goes-polls. 163 The Guardian. 164 Arran Elcoate, “‘We Are Chinese’: How China Is Influencing Sierra Leone’s Presidential Election,” The Diplomat, China Power (blog), March 16, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/we-are-chinese-how-china-is- influencing-sierra-leones-presidential-election/. 165 Abdur Rahman Alfa Shaban, “RECAP 1: Sierra Leone’s 2018 General Elections - The Twists and Turns,” Africa News, April 11, 2018, https://www.africanews.com/2018/04/11/recap-1-sierra-leone-s-2018-general-elections-the- twists-and-turns//. 166 “Sierra Leone Election: Julius Maada Bio Fast-Tracks Presidential Oath in a Hotel,” BBC World News, April 5, 2018, sec. Africa, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43653098. 167 Elcoate, “‘We Are Chinese’: How China Is Influencing Sierra Leone’s Presidential Election.” 168 “Mamamah Airport: Sierra Leone Cancels China-Funded Project,” BBC World News, October 10, 2018, sec. Africa, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45809810. 169 Jenni Marsh and Ben Westcott, “Sierra Leone Cancels $300 Million Airport Deal with China,” CNN World, October 11, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/11/africa/china-africa-sierra-leone-airport-intl/index.html.

28 high ratings.170 It may also be the case that the people living in Sierra Leone have concerns that are more pressing than Chinese investment. For eighteen months in 2014 and 2015, Sierra Leone experienced an outbreak of Ebola, which took the lives of more than 3,500 people.171 Then, during the summer of 2018, a new Ebola virus was discovered in the country, reminding Sierra Leoneans of the threat of potential future outbreaks.172 Sri Lanka173 China has invested $2.94 billion in Sri Lanka through the Belt and Road Initiative since the initiative began. After the initial project in September 2014, there was a brief pause before additional projects were implemented in August 2017 and January 2018. Chinese investment in Sri Lanka has been spread across the logistics, real estate, and shipping industries. Furthermore, China has spent $6.57 billion on 15 construction contracts, and all have been awarded to Chinese companies.174 ACLED data exists for Sri Lanka from January 2010, so it is possible to look at anti- China events since before the beginning of China’s Belt and Road investment. Between 2010 and 2014, there were zero anti-China events in Sri Lanka. While Belt and Road investment began in 2014, anti-China events did not begin in Sri Lanka until April 2016, when Chinese nationals clashed with local laborers in Hambantota where a port has caused controversy. Between April 2016 and December 2018, there were 24 anti-China events. They were mostly peaceful protests, though five, including Hambantota clash, became violent.175 On the same day of the April Hambantota clash, which ended with eleven Chinese nationals in the hospital, there was also a protest, involving hundreds of activists and fishermen, against a Chinese-funded port project. The Hambantota Port, also known as the Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa Port for the Prime Minister who spearheaded the project, was considered a doomed project before it began because it was not expected to be able to compete with nearby

170 Anders Nordstrom, “Statement on the End of the Ebola Outbreak in Sierra Leone,” November 7, 2015, https://www.afro.who.int/news/statement-end-ebola-outbreak-sierra-leone. 171 Nordstrom. 172 Lisa Schnirring, “New Ebola Species Identified in Sierra Leone,” Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, July 27, 2018, sec. News & Perspective, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2018/07/new-ebola- species-identified-sierra-leone. 173 See map in appendix. 174 Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.” 175 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".”

29 ports.176 177 When Rajapaksa left office, his successor, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasignhe, paused the project to take stock of “allegations that the previous administration breached local laws and sidestepped environmental requirements for the deal.”178 There was not much he could do. By April 2016, the port was almost operating at a loss, and India and the United States, whose navies both have a major presence in the region, declined to help.179 180 Unable to pay loans owed to China, Sri Lanka signed a memorandum of understanding with the China Merchant Ports Holding company, transferring 80% of the ownership of the port to the company and opening the door to other development projects near the port.181 182 A series of protests occurred after this arrangement was announced. Most notably, more than 10,000 people living near the port demonstrated against Chinese companies, complaining that their land had been given away by the government for development projects. For several days in December, employees of the port protested the decision, citing fears that they would lose their jobs to Chinese workers. Protests about land concessions continued into 2017 with support from Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, a communist political movement that opposed Rajapaksa, escalating on two occasions when police used water cannons to disperse protesters.183 At the time of the 2016 deal, Wickremasignhe also signed deals greenlighting other infrastructure projects, including a railway and a road project that would both be controversial themselves.184 Residents of Galle alleged that a Chinese company had not paid for almost 500 properties that it had acquired for the construction of a major highway. Chinese nationals have protested in Sri Lanka, as well. Several Chinese employees of the Matara-Beliatta railway

176 “The Story of Hambantota Port: A Flunking Token of Political Corruption,” Ship Technology (blog), September 18, 2018, https://www.ship-technology.com/features/hambantota-port-china-sri-lanka/. 177 Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port,” New York Times, June 25, 2018, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html. 178 “Sri Lanka’s Chinese Funded Port City Project Temporarily Suspended,” Colombo Page, March 4, 2015, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_15A/Mar04_1425493697CH.php. 179 “The Story of Hambantota Port: A Flunking Token of Political Corruption.” 180 Saibal Dasgupta, “Sri Lanka Accepts Chinese Demands to Avoid Debt Trap,” Voice of America, April 8, 2016, sec. East Asia, https://www.voanews.com/a/sri-lanka-accets-chinese-demands-to-avoid-debt-trap/3276282.html. 181 “Framework Agreement Signed with Chinese Company to Develop Hambantota Port,” Hiru News, December 9, 2016, http://www.hirunews.lk/149301/framework-agreement-signed-chinese-company-to-develop-hambantota-port. 182 Atul Aneja, “China, Sri Lanka to Redefine Colombo Port City Project,” The Hindu, April 10, 2016, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-and-sri-lanka-decide-to-make-port-city-into-a-financial-hub-as- part-of-20-year-plan/article8455509.ece. 183 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 184 Dasgupta, “Sri Lanka Accepts Chinese Demands to Avoid Debt Trap.”

30 project demonstrated in an attempt to draw attention to violence they had experienced at the hands of locals.185 Sri Lanka has been widely touted as an example of Chinese debt-trap diplomacy, and the Hambantota port, which has since been signed over to China on a 99-year lease, is a major factor.186 187 The port project was a hook to attract Chinese investment, but it is unclear whether Sri Lanka really needed Chinese investment. China needed, and still needs, Sri Lanka, though. Sri Lanka is China’s conduit to the Indian Ocean, access to which is critical for shipping.188 Tanzania China has invested $2.7 billion in Tanzania through the Belt and Road Initiative since the initiative began. This investment has come through one project, a mining operation, which was started in May 2015. China has also spent $3.94 billion on eight construction contracts, all of which have gone to Chinese companies.189 ACLED data exists for Tanzania from 1997, so it is possible to look at anti-China events since before the beginning of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The data shows no record of anti- China events between January 1997 and December 2018, which includes three years of Belt and Road investment in Tanzania.190 “Tanzania is China’s largest aid recipient country in Africa.”191 Tanzania is rich in resources, including gold, and it has a long coastline. The country’s appeal to investors makes sense, and China’s interest in investing in Tanzania is not new. The Chinese government under Mao Zedong supported construction of a major infrastructure project, a railway, in the 1960s when Tanzania was still a young country.192 Between 2001 and 2011, approximately $4.6 billion flowed into Tanzania from China.193 More recently, Tanzanian president John Magufuli has

185 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 186 “The Story of Hambantota Port: A Flunking Token of Political Corruption.” 187 Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port.” 188 Dasgupta, “Sri Lanka Accepts Chinese Demands to Avoid Debt Trap.” 189 Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.” 190 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 191 “Tanzania Receive TZS97b Grant from China,” Tanzania Invest, October 24, 2016, https://www.tanzaniainvest.com/industry/china-grant. 192 Alicia Altorfer-Ong, “Tanzanian ‘Freedom’ and Chinese ‘Friendship’ in 1965: Laying the Tracks for the TanZam Rail Link,” in LSE Cold War Studies Programme (LSE IDEAS, London, 2003), https://web.archive.org/web/20121003005918/http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/workingPapers/altorferOn g.pdf. 193 Mzwandile Jacks, “China Emerges Tanzania’s Major Investor,” Ventures Africa, January 29, 2014, sec. Business, http://venturesafrica.com/china-emerges-as-tanzanias-major-investor/.

31 noted with pleasure that Chinese aid does not come with any conditions. “When they decide to give to you, they just give [to] you,” he has said.194 There is at least one major project is on the horizon. A state-owned Chinese company, with support from the Government of Oman, is planning construction to expand the Bagamoyo port, which currently traffics mainly in fishing, so that it may be able to serve container ships on a scale similar to Rotterdam in the Netherlands.195 The way this port project develops will likely have a significant impact on the way the Tanzania-China relationship is perceived domestically over the next decades, and there are early signs that the Tanzanian government is taking steps to maximize the benefits that the project will bring to Tanzanians. It has insisted that Tanzania retain a share in the ownership of the port so that the Tanzanian people receive “more than just taxes collected from the port.”196 Why has there been no visible backlash to the Belt and Road Initiative in Tanzania? It may have to do with the fact that the current president campaigned on reducing Tanzania’s reliance on Western financial support, and welcoming Chinese investment aligns with that promise. It may also have to do with the fact that Tanzania enjoys relative stability and a strong growth rate, so Tanzanian people have fewer grievances than people in other host countries.197 Patterns In many of the countries where there were anti-China events prior to the beginning of the Belt and Road Initiative, the nature of the events was consistent. Either they related to ongoing dynamics between China and the host country, like protests about China’s policies toward Tibet, or they reflect the fact that Chinese investment existed before the Belt and Road Initiative was conceived and that Chinese investment practices have not changed much since it began.

The lack of anti-China events does not necessarily mean a lack of opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative. It could mean that there are other avenues for expressing dissatisfaction or that people do not have the capacity to express dissatisfaction. The Sierra Leone case provides an example where people may not have capacity to express dissatisfaction, since their attention may

194 “John Magufuli: Tanzania Prefers ‘condition-Free’ Chinese Aid,” BBC World News, November 27, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46364342. 195 Jean-Christophe Servant, “Will a New Port Make Tanzania ‘Africa’s Dubai’?,” The Nation (blog), February 19, 2019, https://www.thenation.com/article/tanzania-china-bagamoyo-port/. 196 Associated Press, “Why China Is Running into Political Potholes on Its ‘New Silk Road,’” South China Morning Post, January 11, 2018, sec. Diplomacy, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy- defence/article/2127792/why-china-running-political-potholes-its-new-silk-road. 197 Servant, “Will a New Port Make Tanzania ‘Africa’s Dubai’?”

32 be devoted to mitigating the risks of future Ebola outbreaks. It is also possible that people may not have the capacity to express dissatisfaction in countries where there is severe retribution for doing so. For example, the United Arab Emirates experienced zero anti-China events in the two years for which data exists, but the country also has strict restrictions on freedom of assembly and freedom of speech.198 199 In the countries that recorded no anti-China events, there seem to be three types of stories. In some cases, the governments of those countries are careful not to enter into agreements with disadvantageous terms. In other cases, countries have robust enough civic institutions that the people in those countries are able to voice their concerns and demands through elections. There are also countries in which people are preoccupied with more urgent concerns than Chinese investment. These narratives are not mutually exclusive and can happen in conjunction with one another.

Though there are pre-existing elements to China’s relationships with Belt and Road host countries that, in some cases, contribute to anti-China sentiments, many of the anti-China events that occurred in these countries since the beginning of the Belt and Road Initiative appear to be direct backlash to Chinese investment and development projects. The backlash has primarily manifested as protests, both peaceful and violent, and violent targeting, often by explosive devices, of Chinese individuals affiliated with Belt and Road projects. The motivations for such backlash is various, but there are patterns. Three of the most prominent sources of dissatisfaction with Belt and Road projects are land issues, labor issues, and issues of sovereignty.

Land Issues The country cases have already shown that land concessions, and lack of fair and timely compensation for land, has been a persistent complaint of residents of host countries, particularly those living near Belt and Road projects. Additionally, in May 2015, Ugandan residents of Bukedea district clashed with police while protesting “the alleged grabbing of their land by China Civil Engineering and Construction Company,” which had been contracted by the

198 “Freedom in the World 2019: United Arab Emirates,” Freedom House, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/united-arab-emirates. 199 Another possible explanation for the lack of visible opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative in the United Arab Emirates is that people may have a high threshold for exploitative behavior. That is, any exploitative practices by Chinese companies may not be as bad as the exploitative practices by the United Arab Emirates government, which is known to have poor labor laws.

33 Ugandan government to lay roads in the area.200 In August 2015, more than 1,000 Zambian farmers protested the fact that land they had received from the municipal government had been reallocated to a Chinese company.201 In Mozambique, the government has used force to encourage people to abandon their land so that a Chinese mining company, Africa Great Wall, could use it. The government has offered alternative land, but the people say it is unsuitable for farming.202 In July 2018, in an attempt to get people to leave, Mozambican police killed one person and injured seven. Beyond land grabs and improper concessions, damage to consecrated places has been a cause for concern. In addition to the damage to a Burmese pagoda mentioned earlier, a Chinese road contractor allegedly destroyed several graves in Mbara, Uganda.203 Damage to the environment has been another major cause for concern. Environmental activists in Thailand protested in an attempt to draw attention to damage to reefs in the Mekong River resulting from blasting by Chinese companies.204 In March 2018, Gambian environmentalists demonstrated against a Chinese animal feed factory, citing concerns about the factory’s practice of dumping waste into the sea, noting that it has caused health issues.205 The Chinese government does not appear to have had regulations, policies, or even guidance in place for how projects should be implemented in a way that is sensitive to the local communities. It seems that any guidance that does exist would come from bilateral MoU’s, most of which are not publicly available. Labor Issues Belt and Road projects have a practice of hiring Chinese companies and workers, which has caused tensions among local workers who either may lose their jobs as a result or who had been told that foreign investment projects would create jobs, and then see the jobs going to

200 “Gunfire Rocks Bukedea Village as Residents Protest Over Land” (Uganda Radio Network, May 12, 2015), https://ugandaradionetwork.com/a/story.php?s=73629. 201 “Giving Land to the Chinese Cause Protest in Kalulushi,” Lusaka Times, August 29, 2015, https://www.lusakatimes.com/2015/08/29/giving-land-to-the-chinese-cause-protest-in-kalulushi/. 202 Adrian Frey, “Sleepless in Zambézia: Women in Olinda Refuse Resettlement Lands, Fear for the Future,” Club of Mozambique (blog), October 2, 2018, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/sleepless-in-zambezia-women-in-olinda- refuse-resettlement-lands-fear-for-the-future/. 203 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 204 Tom Fawthrop, “Blasting the Mekong,” China Dialogue (blog), October 2, 2017, https://chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/9606-Blasting-the-Mekong. 205 Nosmot Gbadamosi, “Gambia’s Environmental Campaigners Are Calling Time on Fishmeal,” The Ecologist (blog), August 14, 2018, http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/gambias-environmental-campaigners-are-calling-time- fishmeal.

34 foreign workers. The tensions are particularly acute in countries that face high levels of unemployment.206 In Uganda in early 2016, “more than 200 unemployed youth stormed the offices of the firm, Sinohydro, the Chinese company building the 600MW Karuma power dam.”207 In mid-2018, Ukrainians employed by the Chernomorsk port protested the lease of the port to a Chinese company, which they feared would lead to them losing their jobs and being replaced with Chinese laborers.

Poor working conditions and unpaid or underpaid salaries have been major sources of concern. In Ghana, employees of the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC), which is involved in the Tema Port Expansion Project, protested, complaining about intimidation, random firing, high physical risks, and unpaid social security allowances.208 In Cameroon, employees of the China First Highway Engineering Company demonstrated, demanding better pay and working conditions. In Iran, “a Chinese foreman reprimanding an Iranian welder, attacked him with a metal rod, fracturing his head so badly that the worker had to be rushed to a local hospital.”209 The foreman was fired and the plant, which was affiliated with the Masjed Soleyman Petrochemical Project, closed. In Lesotho, when local employees of Chinese-owned textile factories demanded a $150-per-month wage, they were shot at with rubber bullets.

In response to complaints about importing Chinese labor rather than hiring local labor, Chinese government officials might say that the Belt and Road Initiative is about building infrastructure, not about creating jobs. That said, the scale and financing that China is capable of supporting can make it difficult for local businesses to compete.210 Regarding mistreatment of local workers by Chinese companies, it is worth noting that blue collar workers in China have

206 Eric Olander and Cobus van Staden, “Ghana Resident: Why Does China Send Workers to Africa When so Many Here Are Unemployed?,” Huffington Post (blog), August 12, 2016, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/china-workers- africa_n_57ad51ace4b071840410bb60. 207 Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.".” 208 “Two Labour Unions Protest Poor Working Conditions in Accra and Tema,” Ghana Web, May 19, 2017, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Two-labour-unions-protest-poor-working-conditions-in- Accra-and-Tema-539269#. 209 “Chinese Guest Worker in Iran Attacks Iranian Co-Worker with Metal Pipe; Clashes Break Out,” Islamic State of Iran Crime Research Center, n.d., http://isicrc.org/human-rights/workers-labor-activists/chinese-guest-worker-in- iran-attacks-iranian-co-worker-with-metal-pipe-clashes-break-out. 210 Olander and van Staden, “Ghana Resident: Why Does China Send Workers to Africa When so Many Here Are Unemployed?”

35 many similar complaints, and it has led to labor protests in China as well.211 212 So, while it may seem that China is taking advantage of host countries when they’re operating abroad, it may actually be true that Chinese companies are simply operating in the same way abroad that they would at home. Issues of Sovereignty China’s Belt and Road Portal outlines five principles of peaceful coexistence, and the very first is “mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”213 This may seem hypocritical to observers who have noticed that, as Chinese companies, often state-owned Chinese companies, increase their financial stake in countries, they tend to have more influence over that country’s actions, both domestically and internationally. In some cases, it may be true that China is directly pressuring host governments to take certain decisions or enact certain policies. The Cambodia case is a good example of this, as Cambodia’s veto of an anti-China policy in ASEAN seems to have clearly been encouraged and rewarded by Beijing. In other cases, China may play more of a gatekeeper role. If Chinese companies own a bridge, then they get to decide how that bridge is operated, and that can have implications for access. For example, China has worked with the Government of Bangladesh to build several bridges that have increased access to Dhaka. However, since Chinese companies own the bridges, they are able to charge a toll, and in 2018, the toll for the First Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridge was raised four-fold for certain types of vehicles and twelve-fold for others, creating a burden for many.214 The handover of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka is another example of China encroaching on a state’s sovereignty. When the financing was renegotiated, the “Chinese demanded that a Chinese company take a dominant equity share in the port…Lawyers specializing in port acquisitions said Sri Lanka’s small stake meant little, given the leverage that China Merchants Port retained over board personnel and operating decisions.”215 It seems that

211 The Editors, “China’s Complicated Relationship with Workers’ Rights,” World Politics Review (blog), January 25, 2017, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/21000/china-s-complicated-relationship-with-workers- rights. 212 “China’s Labour Law Is No Use to Those Who Need It Most,” The Economist, August 17, 2017, https://www.economist.com/china/2017/08/17/chinas-labour-law-is-no-use-to-those-who-need-it-most. 213 Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative Hosted by the State Information Center, “The Belt and Road, The Silk Road Economic Belt + the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” Belt and Road Portal, n.d., https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ztindex.htm. 214 “For Whom the Bridge Tolls?,” The Daily Star, October 28, 2018, https://www.thedailystar.net/editorial/news/whom-the-bridge-tolls-1652590. 215 Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port.”

36 China intentionally created conditions that would enable Chinese companies to eventually run this strategically located port, and not have to answer to the government of the country where the port is located. There are fears that the groundwork for similar plans is happening in other host countries. Indeed, one Ethiopian blogger notes that the pattern of Chinese investment in Ethiopia will create “a kind of economic colonialism where our dependence on one country is so great that that our sovereignty and independence will be eroded substantially…China will eventually dictate not only the terms of its economic relation and cooperation, but of the presence of its people on our soil.”216

216 Feleke, “Ethiopia: ‘Beware of the Chinese Bearing Gifts’’.’”

37 Chapter 3: What Does the Backlash Mean?

China may have succeeded in standing up a network of states, but it has failed at buying friends.217 Given the understanding that the Belt and Road Initiative is a major element of China’s overall soft power strategy, does backlash to Belt and Road projects mean that China is bad at soft power? It could.218 It could also mean that changing attitudes is a slow process or that the governments of the countries that have hosted Belt and Road projects have work to do on addressing grievances among their constituents.

Since soft power is ultimately aimed at winning friends and admirers, perceptions of China can be an indicator of whether Chinese soft power, the latest iteration of which is closely tied to the Belt and Road Initiative, has been successful. It will be revealing to study whether leaders of countries that have hosted Belt and Road projects have decided to amend, limit, or end their country’s involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative. Additionally, it will be instructive to look at the actions that Chinese nationals living abroad have taken to speak in support or against the Belt and Road Initiative, either directly, or indirectly by speaking about the ways their lives have changed since Belt and Road projects have been implemented in that country.

A Referendum on Chinese Soft Power? Globally, approval ratings of China have remained fairly static. In 2012, before the Belt and Road Initiative was launched, the aggregate rating of China for the world was 27% approve. It fluctuated slightly over the following years, but never by more than three percentage points, and settling at 29% approve in 2017, the most recent year for which data is available. In the Middle East, ratings of China have improved in Iran and Iraq, while they have remained stable in Israel and Turkey. In Latin America, ratings of China have improved slightly in Chile, Ecuador, and Panama, though all still remained below 30% approve in 2017. Approval ratings improved at a higher rate in Venezuela, probably reflecting China’s support for the Maduro regime. Most Western European countries that have hosted Belt and Road projects have maintained a consistent approval rating of China. Austria, Poland, and Portugal saw modest improvements,

217 Jie Yu, “Money, Might and Mindset: China’s Self-Centred Global Ambition,” Chatham House (blog), November 12, 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/money-might-and-mindset-china-s-self-centred-global- ambition. 218 George Gao, “Why Is China So...Uncool?”

38 but the best approval ratings in all three still remained below 30%. In Eastern Europe, approval ratings of China remained fairly consistent as well. The exceptions include Kazakhstan and Slovenia, which both saw steady improvements, and Turkmenistan, which saw a spike from 36% to 61% approve from 2015 to 2016 before dropping back down to 32% approve in 2017. In Africa, most countries approve of China at a rate higher than the global average. Egypt saw a slight increase, while Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda showed notable decreases. In Asia, Pakistan has consistently had the highest approval rating of China, peaking at 82% approve in 2016, and it has increased since the Belt and Road Initiative began. Mongolia, Myanmar, and Nepal have seen modest improvements as well, though all have remained below 50% approve. Thailand is the only country in the entire that has shown a steady decline.219 220 The polling data does not include every country that has hosted Belt and Road projects, and the sample size was small, approximately 1,000 people per country.221 However, as an indicator of what people across each country generally think of China, the data seems to show that, while attitudes have not changed much, they seem to have slightly improved since China began the Belt and Road Initiative. If Gallup surveyors concentrated their interviews in locales where repeated protests to Belt and Road projects had occurred, the change in approval ratings may have been starker, but spread across the entire country, the effects of the land disputes and labor issues, among other complaints, seem to be minimal. Perhaps, host governments overlooked the negative effects of some Chinese projects because the negative effects primarily, or exclusively, were felt by demographics with less power, perhaps poor communities or ethnic minorities. It is possible that opinions of China did not change much during the period which the Belt and Road Initiative was implemented because most countries’ relationships with China remained status quo despite the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese investment projects existed in many of these countries before the Belt and Road Initiative began, and in some cases, existing projects were rolled into the Belt and Road Initiative because they were going well.222 Additionally, the geopolitical nature of the relationships has not changed in most cases. Consider

219 “Gallup Analytics,” 2019, https://analyticscampus.gallup.com/Tables. 220 See charts in appendix. 221 The BRI host countries that are missing from the Gallup data are Antigua and Barbuda, Brunei, Czech Republic, Jordan, Kuwait, Maldives, Malta, Namibia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, and Samoa. 222 Tanner Greer, “One Belt, One Road, One Big Mistake,” Foreign Policy, The Argument (blog), December 6, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/06/bri-china-belt-road-initiative-blunder/.

39 that while China has invested heavily in Cambodia, China already had a close relationship with Cambodia pre-Belt and Road. Complaints by Chinese Nationals Chinese nationals living abroad have borne the brunt of the anti-China sentiment caused by land disputes, labor issues, and other complaints levied against Chinese companies working on Belt and Road projects. In instances where Belt and Road projects have contributed to anti- China sentiment, and there have been many, those sentiments have often been projected on Chinese people who happen to be living nearby. Chinese nationals living in the countries that have hosted Belt and Road projects have noticed growing hostility, both in the form of increasing discrimination against Chinese people and in the form of tangible violence. In some cases, the hostility and violence has become so concerning that Chinese nationals have registered their discontent with protests of their own. The Chinese community in Johannesburg took to the streets to draw attention to and protest rising crimes against Chinese people in South Africa. In Zambia, after two Chinese businesses were robbed, hundreds of members of the Chinese community protested against increased xenophobia in the country, noting that Chinese workers have been particularly affected. In Pakistan, one rally that turned violent featured activists shouting anti-China slogans. China is not a democracy, and its leaders do not rely on votes to win elections, but the Chinese government does generally want its people to be safe and satisfied. From the perspective of the Chinese government, when people are so unsatisfied with the government, perhaps because they believe the government cannot ensure their physical safety when traveling or living abroad, that they are driven to protest, those protests can lead to instability. 223 224 These concerns have become more acute with the rise of the internet, since it has become much easier for people to provide evidence and draw attention to their grievances, and also much easier for people to organize. It would seem that, even if the Chinese government is not motivated to respond to the backlash coming from locals who have been negative affected by Belt and Road projects, China may be motivated to make changes if it sees that Chinese nationals are being consistently negatively affected.

223 Chris Buckley, “2019 Is a Sensitive Year for China. Xi Is Nervous.,” New York Times, February 25, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/world/asia/china-xi-warnings.html. 224 The Chinese government can be expected to be particularly paranoid in 2019 to protests, since 2019 marks 100 years since the May 4 movement and 30 years since Tiananmen Square.

40 Are Host Governments Reevaluating? As the negative effects of the Belt and Road Initiative have become more visible, leaders in several countries have walked back their support for the initiative and have become more diligent about negotiating terms that will safeguard the interests of their country and countrymen. In some cases, leaders have come to office by campaigning against the Belt and Road Initiative, pointing out that it was the incumbent who allowed China, and Chinese companies, to implement projects with such disadvantageous terms. India declined to sign onto the Qingdao Declaration, which expressed support for the Belt and Road Initiative, likely in large part due to apprehensions about the way China handled the Hambantota port situation.225 226 The government of Malaysia “suspended Belt and Road projects worth about 23 billion dollars,” and then canceled a few more, in response to lopsided Chinese contracts.227 228 The government of Nepal walked back plans to allow a Chinese company to build a 750 megawatt hydroelectric plant in the country, choosing instead to fund and build the project with internal resources.229 In Myanmar, the government has become “increasingly reliant on diplomatic support from Beijing as it faces western criticism over its treatment of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine state…but many in Myanmar are also wary of becoming too dependent on China.”230 After his election, President Julius Maada Bio of Sierra Leone “reassessed the huge loans offered by China to his predecessor” and ultimately decided to cancel a multi-million dollar airport project to avoid future debts to China.231

225 The Wire Staff, “India Breaks Ranks with SCO, Refuses to Endorse China’s Belt Road Initiative.” 226 Devirupa Mitra, “Despite Security Assurances, Chinese Consolidation of Sri Lankan Ports Remains a Worry for India,” The Wire, July 30, 2017, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/hambantota-china-sri-lanka-ports. 227 Erik Myxter-iino, “Is the Belt and Road Initiative a ‘Grand Strategy’? With Dr. Lee Jones,” The Belt and Road Podcast, n.d., https://www.buzzsprout.com/196316/1023480-is-the-belt-and-road-initiative-a-grand-strategy-with- dr-lee-jones. 228 Stefania Palma, “Malaysia Cancels China-Backed Pipeline Projects,” Financial Times, September 9, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/06a71510-b24a-11e8-99ca-68cf89602132. 229 Gopal Sharma, “Nepal Says to Scrap Hydropower Deal with Chinese Firm,” Reuters, May 29, 2018, sec. Asia, https://www.reuters.com/article/china-nepal-hydropower/nepal-says-to-scrap-hydropower-deal-with-chinese-firm- idUSL3N1T04IQ. 230 Reuters, “Myanmar Scales Back Chinese-Backed Port Project over Debt Fears,” The Guardian, August 2, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/02/myanmar-scales-back-chinese-backed-port-project-over-debt- fears. 231 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Africa Cancels a Belt and Road Initiative Project for the First Time,” The Economic Times, October 25, 2018, sec. World News, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world- news/africa-cancels-a-bri-project-for-the-first-time/articleshow/66363312.cms.

41 Philippa Brant of the Lowy Institute warns that “many Pacific governments have mistakenly assumed concessional loans would be eventually forgiven, as not all countries” that have received aid from China are able to repay their debt. The struggle has been enormous for some of the smaller countries.232 Maldives is one country that faces difficulties: “the government debt repayment to China alone in 2020 will be $750 million, about half of that year’s total revenue.” Exiled former president Mohamed Nasheed has said, “‘There is no way whatsoever we would be able to do that in 2020 and no one is going to give us the money…we would have to renegotiate.’”233 Governments can renegotiate many times, but they may never be able to pay China what is owed.

Maybe China is unconcerned about the money. Tanner Greer considers, “Whether Chinese leaders actually seek a financial return from the Belt and Road Initiative has always been questionable—the sovereign debt of 27 BRI countries is regarded as ‘junk’ by the three main rating agencies, while another 14 have no rating at all.”234 “Xi promised to write off China’s interest-free loans to poorer African countries if they haven’t been repaid by the end of” 2018, ostensibly to prove that there are truly no strings attached to Chinese investments.235 Nevertheless, concerns that China’s Belt and Road Initiative is using debt traps as an intentional strategy persist.236 237 238 239 240 241 Lee Jones, a professor at Queen Mary, University of London, is one of the few who differs, believing instead that the apparent debt traps have been driven by things going wrong and that they are not part of any intentional strategy.242

232 Philippa Brant, “The Geopolitics of Chinese Aid: Mapping Beijing’s Funding in the Pacific,” Foreign Affairs (blog), March 4, 2015. 233 Shihar Aneez, “Maldives’ Nasheed Vows to Renegotiate China Loans If Opposition Wins September Poll,” Reuters, June 4, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-china-debt/maldives-nasheed-vows-to- renegotiate-china-loans-if-opposition-wins-september-poll-idUSKCN1J01J6. 234 Greer, “One Belt, One Road, One Big Mistake.” 235 Laurie Chen, “Is Chinese Cash for Africa Actually Debt Trap Diplomacy,” Inkstone (blog), September 4, 2018, https://www.inkstonenews.com/china/why-chinese-loans-africa-are-causing-accusations-debt-trap- diplomacy/article/2162746. 236 Chen. 237 Reuters, “Myanmar Scales Back Chinese-Backed Port Project over Debt Fears.” 238 Aneez, “Maldives’ Nasheed Vows to Renegotiate China Loans If Opposition Wins September Poll.” 239 Aum, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Nadege Rolland.” 240 Trivedi, “Don’t Be Fooled by China’s Old Debt Playbook.” 241 RWR Advisory Group, “Philippines Senator Alleges That Unfair Chinese Loan Contract Terms Collateralize Infrastructure Assets,” RWR Alerts (blog), n.d., https://www.rwradvisory.com/philippines-senator-alleges-that- unfair-chinese-loan-contract-terms-collateralize-infrastructure-assets/. 242 Myxter-iino, “Is the Belt and Road Initiative a ‘Grand Strategy’? With Dr. Lee Jones.”

42 Seeing Belt and Road host governments reevaluating their involvement in the initiative may be a powerful enough impetus for the Chinese government to make changes, or at least, to set some basic standards for the companies that participate in the initiative.243 Correcting course will be subtle, as any admission of failure would cause the Chinese government to lose face, but it is possible. International summits are another avenue for course correcting, as they provide opportunities to go on the record with positive statements about how China and its partners will conduct themselves in the future.244

243 David Tweed, Iain Marlow, and Dandan Li, “Souring Deals Put China’s Belt and Road Dreams Under Pressure,” Bloomberg, January 29, 2019, sec. Politics, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-29/souring-deals- put-china-s-belt-and-road-dreams-under-pressure. 244 Iain Marlow and Dandan Li, “How Asia Fell Out of Love With China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Bloomberg, December 10, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-10/how-asia-fell-out-of-love-with-china-s- belt-and-road-initiative.

43 Chapter 4: Is China Course Correcting?

“Given the scale of this program, one is left wondering if the problems experienced are growing pains,” and if that is the case, then China would presumably get better at implementing the Belt and Road Initiative effectively over time.245 Among the Chinese elite, there is some amount of “ignorance of how China is perceived abroad.”246 Nevertheless, Beijing does seem to care about the backlash, or at least the ripple effects caused by the backlash, to Belt and Road Initiative projects. Apparently, “Chinese authorities have noted the examples of misconduct and are reassessing and tweaking their global infrastructure plans.”247 Observations about what the Chinese government is saying and doing differently in respect to the Belt and Road Initiative can offer clues about how it is attempting to correct course. Additionally, active efforts to disseminate positive messages about the Belt and Road Initiative seem to be a complement to any changes that have occurred, and they have targeted international audiences. Shifts in Policy and Action

One expert in Chinese Foreign policy noted at the end of 2018 that, “‘The first phase of the Belt and Road is effectively over…A new model has not yet emerged, but it is clear that the old one, almost entirely focused on speed and scale, is no longer sustainable.”248 It is not likely that a new model will be rolled out in an overt way, since announcing major changes would be akin to admitting that the initial iteration had failed. Gradual changes have less capacity to cause shame as they can be disguised as improvements. The Chinese government has been making gradual changes, and additions in some cases, to Belt and Road policies, often without drawing attention to them.

Xi has delicately fine-tuned the branding of the Belt and Road Initiative. In 2013 at a conference hosted by the CPC Central Committee to discuss China’s foreign policy strategy, Xi said, “We should well introduce China's domestic and foreign policies to the outside world, clearly tell China's story, spread China's voice, and integrate the Chinese dream with the

245 B&B Market, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Seeking Alpha (blog), September 14, 2018, https://seekingalpha.com/article/4206239-chinas-belt-road-initiative. 246 Jamil Anderlini, “China Is at Risk of Becoming a Colonialist Power.” 247 Marlow and Li, “How Asia Fell Out of Love With China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” 248 Marlow and Li.

44 desire of the people of the neighbouring countries for a good life, and with the prospects for regional development, letting the awareness of community of common destiny take root in the neighbouring countries.”249 The idea of a “community of common destiny” has been understood as a unifying vision for Asia, and perhaps eventually beyond, that is rooted in Chinese morals and ideas, and in which China is the leading power.250 Official statements about the vision and actions of the Belt and Road published in 2015 “promotes practical cooperation in all fields, and works to build a community of shared interests, destiny and responsibility featuring mutual political trust, economic integration and cultural inclusiveness.” The same document paints the Belt and Road Initiative as a “win-win” strategy, though sardonic observers have interpreted the phrase to mean “China wins either way,” and often no one else wins at all.251 252 253 By 2017, there had been a shift. In January 2017 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Xi spoke about “a community of shared future,” suggesting that the world is currently facing problems that can only be solved through coordinated action and cooperation between countries.254 Later that year, official guidance on energy cooperation assured potential partners that “China is ready to work with all countries to identify projects that accommodate all relevant parties’ interests.”255 While China still expresses a willingness to be at the fore of the developments that must occur to shepherd the global community into a prosperous future, it no longer presumes that that future is destined to have Chinese characteristics. China expert Nadége Rolland notes that, just as the shift from One Belt, One Road to Belt and Road Initiative was a

249 Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping: Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighboring Countries,” (Remarks, October 25, 2013), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t1093870.shtml. 250 Liza Tobin, “Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge For Washington and Its Allies,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 1 (November 2018), https://2llqix3cnhb21kcxpr2u9o1k- wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/TNSR-Vol-2-Issue-1-Tobin.pdf. 251 “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” (National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, March 28, 2015), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html. 252 John Fisher, “China’s ‘Win-Win’ Resolution Is Anything But,” Human Rights Watch, Dispatches (blog), March 5, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/05/chinas-win-win-resolution-anything. 253 James M. Dorsey, “A China Wins Twice Proposition: The Belt and Road Initiative - Analysis,” Eurasia Review (blog), March 2, 2019, https://www.eurasiareview.com/02032019-a-china-wins-twice-proposition-the-belt-and-road- initiative-analysis/. 254 “Full Text: Xi Jinping’s Keynote Speech at the World Economic Forum” (The State Council Information Office, People’s Republic of China, April 6, 2017), http://www.china.org.cn/node_7247529/content_40569136.htm. 255 “Vision and Actions on Energy Cooperation in Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” Belt and Road Portal, May 16, 2017, https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/13754.htm.

45 matter of translation, so too is the shift from community of common destiny to community of common future or shared future. She explains that the way these concepts are framed for international audiences is very intentional, and that the changes are probably in response to confusion or misunderstanding of what Chinese officials are trying to express.256 Rolland’s assessment suggests that the changes are primarily about repackaging, but it would seem that the substance of the Belt and Road Initiative may be shifting as well. Indeed, a senior Chinese official recently told Bloomberg News that the government “has commissioned internal reports that have highlighted the backlash…[stepping] up scrutiny of BRI projects and investment and are deliberating possible regulations.”257 If guiding policies existed before 2017, they have been kept private, but at least by 2017, the Chinese government had provided guidance for Chinese companies working on Belt and Road projects. The Belt and Road Portal shares official documents as well as documents relating to policies and regulations, and the earliest available document is dated April 27, 2017.258 In 2017, Fang Jianmeng, the vice director of the State Oceanic Administration offered guidance relating to maritime economic development, advising that, “special attention should be paid to protecting the marine ecology and environment, which are valuable natural resources for development of fishing and tourism industries.”259 The official Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, also published in 2017, expanded upon this direction, saying “efforts will be undertaken to jointly monitor, evaluate, preserve and restore the health of mangroves, sea-grass beds, coral reefs, island ecosystems and coastal wetlands,” and the Belt and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan teased a ”code of conduct on eco- environmental behaviors for overseas investment.”260 261 Official documents from mid-2017 advise Chinese companies “to fully consider the national conditions and actual needs of the country of investment,…[and] create good economic and social benefits.” Companies are also expected to “warn and inform the relevant countries of

256 Walker and Kalathil, “The Evolution of China’s Belt and Road: A Conversation with Nadége Rolland.” 257 Marlow and Li, “How Asia Fell Out of Love With China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” 258 Many of these documents have not yet been translated. 259 Yang Li, “Maritime Economic Development Plan Issued,” Belt and Road Portal, July 5, 2017. 260 “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative” (National Development and Reform Commission and the State Oceanic Administration, June 20, 2017). 261 “The Belt and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan,” Belt and Road Portal, May 14, 2017, https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/13392.htm.

46 major political, economic and social risks” and develop mitigation strategies.262 Additionally, Chinese companies are instructed “to abide by the laws and regulations of the country where they are located, respect local culture, religion and customs, protect the legitimate rights and interests of employees, prevent risks, adhere to good faith management, and resist commercial bribery.”263 In official guidance for overseas investment, the Chinese government has distanced itself from the actions and risks that businesses take, clearly stating that companies should make independent decisions and find their own financing.264 This may have protected the Chinese government from legal measures relating to violations made by Chinese companies, but the government may still be blamed for not doing enough to hold Chinese companies accountable. Chinese government officials seem to have realized this, as they have stepped up regulation of overseas investment.265 In August 2017, China tightened restrictions “on overseas investments, stepping up its campaign against what it described as ‘irrational’ acquisitions of assets in industries ranging from real estate to hotels and entertainment.” Perhaps Beijing was trying to restrict the types of projects that are less likely to help improve China’s image abroad.266 Still, the added oversight is more financial in nature than it is aimed at checking harmful business practices.267 268 The vision documents and guidelines offered up by the central Chinese government are extremely vague, and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is much more reactionary than proactive.269 This means that implementing actors are required to interpret them and make their own decisions about what appropriate investment entails. Much of the

262 National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Commerce, People’s Bank of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Guiding Opinions on Further Guiding and Regulating the Direction of Overseas Investment,” Belt and Road Portal, August 18, 2017, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/zcfg/23971.htm. 263 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, “Notice of the Two Departments on the Special Action to Support the Participation of SMEs in the Construction of the ‘Belt and Road,’” Belt and Road Portal, August 4, 2017, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/zcfg/22325.htm. 264 National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Commerce, People’s Bank of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Guiding Opinions on Further Guiding and Regulating the Direction of Overseas Investment.” 265 Eunice Yoon, “China Isn’t Discouraging Overseas Investment, Only Regulating It, Beijing-Backed Think Tanker Says,” CNBC, July 30, 2017, sec. Investing, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/30/china-isnt-discouraging-overseas- investment-only-regulating-it-beijing-backed-think-tanker-says.html. 266 Raghavendra Kamath, “Overseas Crackdown: China’s Realty Projects in India Are in Deep Trouble,” Business Standard, January 17, 2018, https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/chinese-real-estate-projects-in- india-in-limbo-after-beijing-s-clampdown-118011601483_1.html. 267 PYMNTS, “China to Increase Regulation of Financial Holding Companies,” PYMNTS.Com, November 5, 2018. 268 Yoon, “China Isn’t Discouraging Overseas Investment, Only Regulating It, Beijing-Backed Think Tanker Says.” 269 Myxter-iino, “Is the Belt and Road Initiative a ‘Grand Strategy’? With Dr. Lee Jones.”

47 overseas investment is initiated by provincial Chinese governments, and the central Chinese government does not necessarily have much control. In some cases, these localized Chinese actors have approached local governments in other countries, which makes oversight difficult and can lead to poorly designed agreements and plans, as these local governments have less experience working with international actors than capitals do.270 China has started to compensate for its past failures by underwriting goodwill missions. In the South Pacific, for example, in addition to supporting infrastructure projects, China is sending “doctors and agricultural experts to the region.” Additionally, “China is attending more development partner meetings and employing more local laborers on some construction sites.”271 The government has sponsored annual trips for African journalists to travel to China and attend courses there.272 These types of outreach may be responses to backlash and attempts to smooth over the negative attitudes that exploitative practices by Chinese businesses may have created. External Propaganda

The central Chinese government keeps a watchful eye on public opinion and uses information about public opinions to make adjustments to policy. Rather than conducting polls or allowing true participative democracy, the Chinese government does this by watching media to see what people are talking about and worried about.273 In addition to watching domestic audiences, the Chinese government also keeps an eye on what international audiences are saying about China and Chinese initiatives. It is likely that international attitudes about the Belt and Road Initiative informed the adjustments made to official guidance for implementers of Belt and Road projects. However, the Chinese government does not only observe attitudes; it also tries to change them.

China has a term for the signals that it sends to international audiences. These signals are collectively referred to as foreign propaganda, external propaganda, or “exo-prop” for short. While the budget for external propaganda is not publicized, experts have estimated that China

270 Walker and Kalathil, “The Evolution of China’s Belt and Road: A Conversation with Nadége Rolland.” 271 Brant, “The Geopolitics of Chinese Aid: Mapping Beijing’s Funding in the Pacific.” 272 “China Is Broadening Its Efforts to Win over African Audiences,” The Economist, October 20, 2018, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/10/20/china-is-broadening-its-efforts-to-win-over-african- audiences?frsc=dg%7Ce. 273 Walker and Kalathil, “The Evolution of China’s Belt and Road: A Conversation with Nadége Rolland.”

48 spends approximately $10 billion on these efforts every year.274 This is probably a low estimate since “each Chinese province [also] has a budget for promoting itself to the outside world.”275 The fact that China is putting funding into exo-prop suggests that China cares, at least some, about how it is perceived by the world.276

There is a conception in China that if western media is allowed to control the narrative about the Belt and Road Initiative it will “have a negative impact on China’s international image,” and therefore, China has a responsibility to reverse misunderstandings and to create a positive impression of the Belt and Road Initiative in foreign countries.277 278 279 280 It is the role of the external propaganda department in China to pay attention to what content is received best among different foreign audiences and to use that information to communicate China’s agenda, noting that people in Russia have different concerns about the Belt and Road Initiative than people in India do.281 282 “The regime has devised several foreign policy slogans,” like “great responsible power” to highlight the positive aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative.283 “ Additionally, as part of China’s strategy to shape the narrative, the government has been “buying up media outlets” in host countries “and training scores of foreign journalists to ‘tell China’s story well’.”284

Despite this awareness and deliberate planning, China has struggled to sell the Belt and Road Initiative on the international stage. Some observers have attributed this struggle to

274 David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect.” 275 Anne-Marie Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” Wilson Center (blog), October 26, 2015, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/chinas-foreign-propaganda-machine. 276 Walker and Kalathil, “The Evolution of China’s Belt and Road: A Conversation with Nadége Rolland.” 277 “Liang Haiming: The ‘One Belt, One Road’ Overseas Communication Must Have a Global Perspective,” Guangming.Com - Theory Channel (blog), February 6, 2016, http://theory.gmw.cn/2016- 02/06/content_18822571.htm. 278 Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine.” 279 While conducting research for this paper, I noticed that an overwhelming number of the sources writing positive pieces about the Belt and Road Initiative were Chinese sources. Examples include Xinhua, China Daily, and CCTV. 280 Da Hsuan Feng and Haiming Liang, “Belt and Road: An Initiative That Is Often Misunderstood by Foreign Media,” CGTN, July 31, 2018, sec. Opinion, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d414e3163544d79457a6333566d54/share_p.html. 281 “Liang Haiming: The ‘One Belt, One Road’ Overseas Communication Must Have a Global Perspective.” 282 Alan Hunter, “Soft Power: China on the Global Stage.” 283 Myungsik Ham and Elaine Tolentino, “Socialisation of China’s Soft Power: Building Friendship through Potential Leaders,” China-An International Journal 16, no. 1 (February 2018): 45–68. 284 Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin, “Inside China’s Audacious Global Propaganda Campaign,” The Guardian, December 7, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance- propaganda-xi-jinping?utm_source=pocket&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=pockethits.

49 differences in culture, noting that China is not accustomed to the open criticism that is prevalent in democratic countries.285 “China state media are still widely—and largely correctly—seen as being editorially biased and full of propaganda, and they still struggle to attract large audiences,” even after existing for nearly a decade.286 While there is an understanding that non-government actors, like experts and scholars who are based internationally, can add credibility to the Belt and Road Initiative by supplementing official exo-prop efforts, there is also an understanding that individuals who speak against the Chinese government are likely to face retribution.287 288 289

There is one challenging side effect to successful external propaganda: the fact that Chinese citizens see it. Professor Christopher Balding observes that,

“within China itself, there has been increased grumbling about the largesse lavished upon BRI countries. With Beijing touting the billions of dollars it is spending abroad, many Chinese are asking why that money is not being used to address domestic issues, such [as] healthcare, housing, and education.”290

It’s an understandable criticism, and it presents a conundrum for the Chinese government. If China’s external propaganda is unsuccessful, then the success of the Belt and Road Initiative is expected to suffer, but if external propaganda is successful, then China is likely to experience increased dissatisfaction, and potential instability, domestically.

285 Balding, “Why Democracies Are Turning Against Belt and Road.” 286 Hilton Yip, “China’s $6 Billion Propaganda Blitz Is a Snooze,” Foreign Policy, The Argument (blog), April 23, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/23/the-voice-of-china-will-be-a-squeak/. 287 “Liang Haiming: The ‘One Belt, One Road’ Overseas Communication Must Have a Global Perspective.” 288 Yip, “China’s $6 Billion Propaganda Blitz Is a Snooze.” 289 David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” The China Journal 57 (January 2007): 25–58. 290 Balding, “Why Democracies Are Turning Against Belt and Road.”

50 Chapter 5: Implications, Predictions, and Conclusions

Far too many analysts writing about the implications of the Belt and Road Initiative characterize it as a threat and a ploy to pursue global hegemony.291 292 293 294 295 296 While China is certainly a modern great power, and the Belt and Road Initiative is likely part of an attempt to increase China’s global influence, the threat is overstated. In reality, the Belt and Road is disorganized and messy; it may even be more of a liability to China than a boon. This study has exposed the growing pains to China’s increasingly outward facing foreign policy strategy. Not only has there been backlash in countries that have received Belt and Road investment, but the backlash has affected the lives of Chinese nationals living abroad, and it has caused leaders of countries to reassess the nature of their relationships, both economically and diplomatically, with China. The Belt and Road Initiative does not seem to have been fully thought through at the outset, and China is currently facing the consequences. The existence of backlash seems to be an indication that Chinese soft power is not working well. If China can learn from its early mistakes and adapt the Belt and Road Initiative, it may be able to turn the initiative into a more effective soft power tool, and there is some evidence that China is learning. China is, at the very least, aware of the backlash.297 China generally “employs three strategies for safeguarding its commercial interests abroad: relying on the host country’s government for security needs (as in Laos), hiring local security firms (as in Indonesia), or

291 Thomas P. Cavanna, “What Does China’s Belt and Road Initiative Mean for US Grand Strategy,” The Diplomat (blog), June 5, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/what-does-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-mean-for-us-grand- strategy/. 292 Daniel Kliman, “Wanted: A U.S. Strategic Response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” The National Interest (blog), September 7, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/wanted-us-strategic-response-chinas-belt-road- initiative-22205. 293 Kerry Brown, China’s World: What Does China Want? (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017). 294 William Hague, “The West Has Finally Woken up to China - We Must Now Work out How to Contain It,” The Telegraph, November 6, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/11/06/china-has-finally-rumbled-major- threat-western-world-now-need/amp/. 295 Jonathan E. Hillman and Matthew P. Goodman, “China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Court to Challenge Current US-Led Order,” Financial Times, July 24, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/b64d7f2e-8f4d-11e8-b639-7680cedcc421. 296 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), February 21, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative. 297 Christopher K. Johnson et al., “Decoding China’s Emerging ‘Great Power’ Strategy in Asia,” A Report of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies (Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2014), https://csis- prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs- public/legacy_files/files/publication/140603_Johnson_DecodingChinasEmerging_WEB.pdf.

51 employing a combination of Western and Chinese firms (as in Iraq).”298 In the past, security measures have primarily been taken to secure projects in conflict zones, but these measures have been used in several Belt and Road host countries, including those not in conflict zones. This is likely in response to the targeted violence that has occurred in many places. Xi Jinping has also acknowledged the need for reforms, understanding that the backlash is motivated by something.299 At Xi’s direction, the Chinese government has issued auditing and anti-corruption mechanisms, will be requiring increased due diligence, and is exploring third- party market cooperation to improve transparency and to get hesitating developed countries involved in the initiative.300 These are welcome steps, but a few questions remain. Is China learning the right things? Is China more concerned with reforming or looking like its reforming? What will it take for China repair the damage that was done and to improve its reputation on the global stage, at least among a critical mass of friends? One recurring criticism of the Belt and Road Initiative is that it is more of a branding mechanism than anything else. When it was announced, the Belt and Road Initiative subsumed several pre-existing projects that had been deemed successful, and many of the new projects are similar to projects that already existed.301 Why would China be motivated to create an initiative that did not involve much new activity? Perhaps it was a tool to get new countries to welcome Chinese investment. It’s easier to sign onto a thing if the thing has a name, and it’s more attractive to potential joiners if they can see how many others have already signed on. Perhaps China believed that grouping investment projects together and putting a name on it would make it easier to take credit for all of the investment it dispersed. China has received credit for the impressive scope of its international investment, but it has also learned the complement of credit: accountability. When an actor is known to be behind an initiative, they get congratulated for the initiative’s successes, but they also get held responsible for the initiative’s failures. It seems that

298 Yang Zi, “Securing China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Special Report (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, November 2018). 299 Brenda Goh and Cate Cadell, “China’s Xi Says Belt and Road Must Be Green, Sustainable,” Reuters, April 24, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad/chinas-xi-says-belt-and-road-must-be-green-sustainable- idUSKCN1S104I. 300 “China’s Belt and Road Cracks Down on Corruption in Image Revamp,” Bloomberg News, April 22, 2019, sec. Politics, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-22/china-belt-and-road- cleanup?cmpid%3D=socialflow-twitter- economics&utm_content=economics&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=socialflow- organic&utm_source=twitter. 301 Greer, “One Belt, One Road, One Big Mistake.”

52 grouping so many similar, and similarly problematic, investment projects under one name made it easier for critics to notice patterns of exploitation and abuse. One of the major challenges to reforming the Belt and Road Initiative and reducing the occurrence of failures is the fact that implementation of the initiative is carried out by a disjointed array of actors. Vision and guidance may come from the highest levels of the Chinese government, but the implementers are often companies run by lower level government officials, and they are often driven by local interests and domestic politics.302 303 Even as Xi has increased centralization in the Chinese government, the delegation of implementation has been necessary given the volume of Chinese construction companies that would be idle without Belt and Road projects.304 305 306 Even if the central government is interested in regulating implementation, the number of implementers would make oversight extremely difficult. If China learns from the backlash that has occurred and enacts the appropriate reforms and regulations, then the Belt and Road Initiative may yet become a robust soft power tool. It has already shown some capacity to draw participant countries to China’s worldview: upon signing Belt and Road Initiative agreements, several countries have recognized Taiwan as Chinese Taipei.307 Consider how much more Chinese soft power could accomplish if it got out of its own way. If China fails to learn the lessons from the backlash, it is likely that China will see a decline in the number and extent of its bilateral relationships. Beyond that, there are also two major risks. In the first instance, there is a possibility that there will be a government to government clash. Such a clash could be initiated by a host government that is fed up with exploitative practices, or it could be initiated by third party country, likely one that has significant power in its own right and is taking action on behalf of its neighborhood, the world,

302 Myxter-iino, “Is the Belt and Road Initiative a ‘Grand Strategy’? With Dr. Lee Jones.” 303 Lee Jones and Jinghan Zeng, “Understanding China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: Beyond ‘grand Strategy’ to a State Transformation Analysis,” Third World Quarterly, February 20, 2019. 304 Sangkuk Lee, “An Institutional Analysis of Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Power,” Journal of Contemporary China 26, no. 105 (January 11, 2017): 325–36. 305 Chris Devonshire-Ellis, “EU Ambassadors, China Policy Advisors’ Myopia Misses the Point of Belt and Road,” Silk Road Briefing (blog), April 25, 2018, https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2018/04/25/eu-ambassadors- china-policy-advisors-myopia-misses-point-belt-road/. 306 China Power Team, “How Will the Belt and Road Initiative Advance China’s Interests?,” ChinaPower (blog), September 11, 2017, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/. 307 Chris Horton, “How Beijing Enlists Global Companies to Pressure Taiwan,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 25, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/How-Beijing-enlists-global-companies-to-pressure-Taiwan.

53 or its own interests (or a combination of these three).308 Some of the more alarmist analyses of the implications of China’s more outward facing foreign policy have suggested that such a clash would occur between China and the United States, but I think a clash with India would be more likely. India has had a claustrophobic reaction to increased Chinese presence in South and Southeast Asia, the areas where Chinese investment has been the most prevalent, feeling like China, one of its competitors, is closing in on its territory. In response, in addition to refusing to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative, India has chosen to step up its own investments in the places where China has increased its presence.309 For example, “China is Tanzania’s second import partner by volume of import after India.”310 The second risk is the possibility that corruption and problematic loans may lead to a bubble and that the bubble may burst. Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde, has stressed the need for “sound fiscal policies” and “careful management of financing terms.”311 There are some fears that inappropriate debt practices could create a bubble that would have adverse economic implications for the entire world. Similar to the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States, China has been accused of giving loans to recipients who will not be able to pay them, and if the bubble bursts, it could lead to “an unorderly unraveling of Chinese credit markets.”312 Ironically, it was the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the ensuing global financial crisis that China cited as evidence that the United States could not be depended upon to be the guarantor to global investment and development, which was used as rationale for increased Chinese investment, including through the Belt and Road Initiative.313 314 It would be interesting to watch the Belt and Road Initiative as it develops and do a longer term study after more than five years have passed. Additionally, any one of the bilateral relationships between China and a country that hosts Belt and Road projects offers an

308 Andrew Small, “The Backlash to Belt and Road.” 309 The Wire Staff, “India Breaks Ranks with SCO, Refuses to Endorse China’s Belt Road Initiative.” 310 “China,” Tanzania Invest, n.d., https://www.tanzaniainvest.com/china. 311 Christine Lagarde, “Belt and Road Initiative: Strategies to Deliver in the Next Phase” (April 12, 2018), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/04/11/sp041218-belt-and-road-initiative-strategies-to-deliver-in-the- next-phase. 312 John Hurley, “The Potential Belt and Road Debt Bubble: Are We Asking the Right Questions?,” Center for Global Development (blog), October 26, 2017, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/potential-belt-and-road-debt-bubble-are- we-asking-right-questions. 313 Ian Bremmer, “How the Financial Crisis Undermined America’s Place Atop the Global Order,” TIME, September 20, 2018, http://time.com/5401647/america-global-order/. 314 Nolan, “China and the Global Economy.”

54 opportunity for further study. It would be interesting to look more closely at the types of investments that China is making, including and beyond the Belt and Road Initiative, such as the sectors that have been prioritized and the individuals in positions of power at the companies that have been given the green light to invest in several countries. What relationships do these individuals have with the Chinese government? There seems to be plenty of material relating to ports and maritime trade to do an in depth study, and in addition to the controversial port projects in South Asia, China has “acquired stakes in 13 ports in Europe” over the past decade.315 In addition to implications for trade, there may be implications for military strategy, as some of the ports, Sri Lanka for example, have begun to be used as naval outposts. Chinese controlled ports are understood to be a part of the Maritime Silk Road, and the use of ports as military outposts has been referred to as the “string of pearls theory” by some.316 317 As Chinese expands its naval capabilities, this may become more of a concern for the United States and Japan. Indeed, American military officers have raised concerns about China’s first overseas naval base, which established near the Doraleh Container Terminal in Djibouti.318

315 Joanna Kakissis, “Chinese Firms Now Hold Stakes in Over a Dozen European Ports,” China Unbound (NPR, October 9, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/09/642587456/chinese-firms-now-hold-stakes-in-over-a-dozen- european-ports. 316 B&B Market, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” 317 Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s New Revolution.” 318 Viola Zhou, “Why Is the US Worried about an African Port?,” Inkstone (blog), March 9, 2018, https://www.inkstonenews.com/politics/why-us-worried-about-african-port-hint-its-about-china/article/2136510.

55 Appendix

BRI Host Countries for which no ACLED Data Exists

Country Year BRI Began There

Antigua and Barbuda 2014 Austria 2017 Brunei 2014 Chile 2016 Czech Republic 2015 Ecuador 2014 Hungary 2017 Kazakhstan 2014 Kyrgyzstan 2014 Maldives 2017 Malta 2014 Mongolia 2015 New Zealand 2014 Panama 2016 Papua New Guinea 2015 Poland 2014 Portugal 2014 Samoa 2017 Singapore 2014 Slovenia 2017 South Korea 2013 Turkmenistan 2014 Uzbekistan 2017 Venezuela 2016

56

Anti-China Fatalities, pre- Anti-China Fatalities, post- Country Data Begins BRI Began events pre-BRI BRI events events post-BRI BRI events Angola 1997 2014 1 6 0 0 Bangladesh 2010 2015 1 0 1 1 Belarus 2018 2015 0 0 0 0 Bosnia 2018 2018 0 0 0 0 Cambodia 2010 2013 7 1 32 0 Chad 1997 2016 1 0 0 0 Congo, Rep 1997 2013 0 0 2 2 Congo, DR 1997 2013 2 0 3 1 Croatia 2018 2018 0 0 0 0 Egypt 1997 2015 2 0 1 0 Ethiopia 1997 2014 4 134 6 8 Gabon 1997 2018 0 0 0 0 Ghana 1997 2014 1 0 3 1 Greece 2018 2016 0 0 0 0 Guinea 1997 2014 1 2 0 0 India 2016 2014 N/A N/A 50 0 Indonesia 2016 2014 N/A N/A 7 0 Iran 2016 2014 N/A N/A 3 0 Iraq 2016 2013 N/A N/A 1 12 Israel 2016 2014 N/A N/A 0 0 Jordan 2016 2015 N/A N/A 0 0 Kenya 1997 2015 7 0 12 38 Kuwait 2016 2018 0 0 0 0 Laos 2010 2013 0 0 7 5 Malaysia 2018 2013 N/A N/A 5 0 Mozambique 1997 2013 1 0 4 1 Myanmar 2010 2013 16 10 40 4

Source: The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). The values in this table only reflect values included in the ACLED dataset. There may 57 have been other incidents that occurred and that have not been captured in this dataset.

Anti-China Fatalities, pre- Anti-China Fatalities, post- Country Data Begins BRI Began events pre-BRI BRI events events post-BRI BRI events Namibia 1997 2014 2 0 2 0 Nepal 2010 2015 9 0 9 0 Nigeria 1997 2018 7 11 14 2 Oman 2016 2016 N/A N/A 1 0 Pakistan 2010 2014 7 12 39 4 Russia 2018 2013 N/A N/A 1 0 Rwanda 1997 2015 0 0 0 0 Serbia 2018 2014 N/A N/A 0 0 Sierra Leone 1997 2015 0 0 0 0 South Africa 1997 2013 9 0 5 0 Sri Lanka 2010 2014 0 0 24 0 Tanzania 1997 2015 0 0 0 0 Thailand 2010 2014 1 0 4 0 Turkey 2016 2014 N/A N/A 15 0 UAE 2016 2016 N/A N/A 0 0 Uganda 1997 2014 1 0 5 0 Ukraine 2018 2016 N/A N/A 2 0 Vietnam 2010 2014 24 0 31 21 Zambia 1997 2015 11 5 4 4 Zimbabwe 1997 2014 1 0 1 0

Note: The periods before and after the Belt and Road Initiative was brought to the country are not necessarily equivalent. The post-BRI events are counted until December 31, 2018.

Source: The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). The values in this table only reflect values included in the ACLED dataset. There may 58 have been other incidents that occurred and that have not been captured in this dataset.

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

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