Raoul Wallenberg: A Historical Account of One Man’s Altruism
Tyen Redmond BA Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation Monash University 5th June 2009
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Monash University
1 Summary:
In July 1944 Raoul Wallenberg arrived in Budapest on a mission to assist the Jewish population of Hungary. Departing from Sweden, he arrived at the Hungarian capital with the support of the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm and the United States War Refugee Board. Through the final stages of the war, until the liberation of Budapest by the Soviet forces in January 1945, Wallenberg implemented measures to protect this remaining pocket of European Jewry.
Wallenberg’s past prior to his involvement in the rescue activities in Hungary will be reviewed, to determine why this young man left the safety of neutral Sweden to assist Hungarian Jews with whom he had no direct relationship and with nothing to personally gain from putting himself at risk in a war zone. Considering the theories surrounding rescuers during the Holocaust, the unusual and altruistic nature of Wallenberg’s actions will highlight his unique position amongst other rescuers.
Utilising testimonies of Australian-based survivors from the University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Video History Archive, Wallenberg’s rescue efforts will be discussed in the context of individual survivors’ personal experiences. These unique perspectives from individuals who were saved or had direct contact with Wallenberg will expand upon the existing body of knowledge surrounding his rescue efforts.
Raoul Wallenberg: A Historical Account of One Man’s Altruism
Contents:
Introduction - 1 Chapter 1: The Holocaust in Hungary - 3 Chapter 2: Raoul Wallenberg and the - 13 mission to rescue Hungarian Jews Chapter 3: The Shutzpass - 35 Chapter 4: An International Ghetto - 51 Chapter 5: Deportation and Death Marches - 60 Chapter 6: Liberation, Disappearance and - 67 Legacy Conclusion - 75 Bibliography - 77
Statement of Originality:
I declare that this thesis contains no material which has previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material which has previously been published or written by another person, except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis.
Acknowledgements:
Thank-you to Mark Baker and Deborah Staines for their guidance and time, to the University of Southern California and Monash University for providing the invaluable Shoah Foundation Institute Video Archive, to my darling fiancée Tegan who has provided constant support, and to Raoul for his inspirational efforts to assist those in need.
Introduction:
In the community of Holocaust survivors the name Raoul Wallenberg is synonymous with heroism and courage. Wallenberg, a Swedish citizen with no direct link to Hungarian Jews, left the relative safety of neutral Sweden to undertake a phenomenal rescue mission. Wallenberg was born from one of the most influential and wealthy families in the world, but this privileged upbringing did not deter his social consciousness or his willingness to assist those in need or facing persecution. With the support of the King of Sweden, the Swedish foreign office, and the United State’s War Refugee Board, Wallenberg travelled to Budapest in July 1944. He undertook the task of saving and protecting as many of the remaining members of the Jewish population as possible. This mission was a success due to the extraordinary efforts of Wallenberg and his supporting staff, and the lives of tens of thousands of Jews were saved from the clutches of the Nazi’s machinery of destruction.
The story of Raoul Wallenberg’s interventions in Hungary during the final months of Nazi occupation is familiar in the Jewish communities of survivors, because of his courage, heroism, righteousness and, ultimately, sacrifice, and the countless lives he saved because of his efforts. Wallenberg risked his life to save people in immense danger with no gain to be made for himself besides the reward of helping others in need. Wallenberg acted selflessly as he stood up to the German and Hungarian Nazi’s that were attempting to destroy one of the remaining pockets of European Jewry. Wallenberg’s story shows how one individual can take action that can positively change the lives of so many. His individual actions, often at the risk to his own safety, saved an incomprehensible number of lives in one of the darkest hours of human history. Wallenberg provided the Jewish community of Hungary a glimmer of hope, a reminder that there were people out who cared about their existence and were looking to help, and that there was a possible chance of survival.
There have been numerous books, articles and documentaries on Wallenberg’s rescue mission that have detailed his life prior to the rescue mission in Budapest, his achievements, as well as his subsequent disappearance allegedly at the hands
1 of the Soviet Union at the end of the war. The University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive provides historians a unique opportunity to gain an understanding of individual experiences during the Holocaust. Using this archive of video testimonies, the individual stories of survivors that had been directly saved or influenced by Wallenberg will expand on this existing body of knowledge and provide a unique and personal impression of Wallenberg’s efforts. Drawing on the testimonies of Jewish survivors in the Australian community from the USC Shoah Archive, Wallenberg’s rescue work will be outlined in unique detail and from various individual perspectives. In addition, reviewing Wallenberg’s past prior to this involvement with the Swedish Legation in Hungary, the reasons as to why he took such a personal risk to help those in need will be questioned. Considering the theories surrounding acts of altruism by rescuers in the Holocaust, it will become clear how Wallenberg’s acts were of an unusual nature and an altruistic form.
2 Chapter 1: The Holocaust in Hungary
It is necessary to understand the implementation of anti-Semitic legislation and the context of the Holocaust in Hungary to appreciate what Wallenberg achieved. Wallenberg arrived in Budapest during the volatile final months of the war in Hungary. For the Hungarian leaders, the Jewish question was encompassed as a part of the greater war, and was a contentious area between the Hungarians and their German allies. It is critical to understand how Hungary’s relationship with Germany, internal leadership changes, involvement in the war and anti-Jewish policy in order to grasp the context of the work completed by Raoul Wallenberg. Each nation allied or conquered by the Nazi regime imposed different measures along unique timelines against Jews. As a result, the Holocaust in Hungary unfolded along a different trajectory to Germany, Poland, Italy and so on, even though the intentions were similar. Understanding these unique circumstances helps demonstrate the specifics of Jewish suffering in this nation and the work that Wallenberg and his helpers successfully implemented.
The Hungarian government was the first parliamentary body to enact anti- Semitic legislation after the end of the First World War. Introduced on 22 September 1920, the Numerus Clausus Act is described as “the first significant piece of anti-Jewish legislation introduced in postwar Europe.”1 Introduced by the newly formed government of Count Pal Teleki, the law restricted the admission of Jews to institutions of higher learning.2 This threshold was set at six percent, equivalent to the Jewish proportion of the Hungarian populace.3 In the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War, the Jewish population in Hungary were experiencing a golden age.4 The Hapsburgs’ emancipated Hungarian Jews in 1867 in order to have them assist in the generation of national
1 T.D. Kramer, From Emancipation to Catastrophe: The Rise and Holocaust of Hungarian Jewry, Lanham, 2000, p. 53. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Istvan Deak, ‘Could the Hungarian Jews Have Survived?’, in Michael R. Marrus (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews, Westport, 1989, Vol. 4 (2), pp. 643-650, p. 643.
3 growth and development.5 Alongside the assistance the Jewish population could provide to the re-organisation of Hungary, the government passed a Bill that removed almost all anti-Jewish legislation and placed Jews in “a position of civil and political equality with individual Christians.”6 As historian Istvan Deak explains, “in exchange for embracing the political ideas of the ruling nobility, the Jews were allowed to flourish.”7 Consequently, the Jewish population of Hungary became assimilated into Hungarian culture, on a comparative level of their German counterparts in German culture.8
After the First World War, anti-Semitic feeling grew alongside a resurgent of right-wing political movements. The post-war counterrevolutionary regime led by Admiral Miklos Horthy took power in November 1919, and in the process of consolidating power, massacred several hundred Jews and introduced the aforementioned anti-Jewish legislation.9 The restrictions placed on Jewish admissions to institutes of higher learning were considered, according to Deak, as “a harsh measure, since Jewish students were a majority in some faculties.”10 Yet, after the appointment of Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen by Regent Horthy in April 1921, the Jewish population of Hungary returned to the position they held before the war.11 Bethlen critiqued the Numerus Clausus Act openly in Parliament in November 1925, promising Jews a return of the emancipation they had previously experienced between 1867 and 1920.12
The great depression struck Hungary in 1930-31, having a devastating effect of the national economy.13 Like many European nations, the economic turmoil presented an opportunity for right-wing political groups to acquire popularity and power. Bethlen was replaced in August 1931 by a conservative cabinet led by
5 Kramer, p. 7. 6 Ibid. 7 Deak, p. 643. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., p. 645. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Kramer, p. 58. 13 Ibid.
4 Count Gyula Karolyi.14 Karolyi failed to restore order in the face of social discontent and chaotic economic circumstances. The Right continued to grow in virulence and Horthy appointed the notorious right wing radical Gyula Gombos as Prime Minister in late September 1932.15 Gombos has been described as a “politician whose racism was tempered only by his enlightened self-interest.”16 Two weeks into his term as Prime Minister, Gombos stated his opinion on Jews in parliament. He expressly stated that Jews that recognised they have a common fate with the nation are considered “brothers as much as [his] Hungarian brethren”17 To the segments of the Jewish population who do not want to or cannot fit into Hungarian social life, “the Jews themselves will be the first to condemn…”18 This unexpected partial acceptance of Jews in Hungarian society by Gombos was driven by pressure placed on the new leader of the Hungarian parliament by Regent Horthy, and after reflecting on the problems facing the nation and understanding the importance of Jews to the economy.19 Though Gombos appeared to deal with the Jewish population lighter than expected, measures to further persecute Jews did slowly creep into being. His cabinet supported unofficial measures by radical Right students to target their Jewish counterparts, and refused to accept Jews as part of a government campaign to find jobs for unemployed graduates.20
Gombos instigated a shift in Hungarian policy towards Germany, beginning in June 1933 when he became the first foreign premier to visit the newly initiated German Chancellor, Adolf Hitler.21 In September 1935, Gombos and Foreign Minister Kalman Kanya signed a secret memorandum with Goring that stated that Hungary would be politically modelled on the Third Reich.22 Historian T.D. Kramer argues that Gombos recognised that, “Hungary’s greatest chance of a
14 Ibid., p. 59. 15 Ibid. 16 Deak, p. 645. 17 Kramer, p. 60. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., pp. 59-60. 20 Ibid., p.60. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., G. Baross, Hungary and Hitler, at http://www.hungarian- history.hu/lib/baross/baross01.htm, accessed 21 January 2009
5 favourable territorial revision lay in supporting Hitler’s attempted destruction of the postwar border arrangements, … able to commence redirecting his country’s foreign policy into an alignment with the Third Reich.”23 The commonality in foreign policy assisted in increasing trade between the two nations, which was proposed in the February 1934 economic compact signed by the two states.24 Hungary’s economic recovery relied more and more on Germany in the 1930’s, giving further emphasis on following the political guidelines presented by the Third Reich including anti-Jewish measures.25 This process was stunted when Gombos dies in October 1936 and was replaced by Regent Horthy by the ideologically flexible Kalman Daranyi.26
Daranyi attempted to neutralise the radical right by restructuring the parliament. Though, this measure backfired and triggered significant opposition to the new government. As author Gabor Baross explains, “in the internal political life, numerous opposition groups emerged, shouting National Socialist slogans, and the Hungarian Schwabs (ethnic Germans) with the support of the newspapers of the German Reich, started in our country as well as abroad, actions against and attacks on the new Government.”27 Daranyi was not welcome in Berlin by Nazi leaders and accordingly the relationship between the two nations cooled significantly. In May 1938 Daranyi was absolved from his position by the Regent, replaced by conservative politician Bela Imredy, with the support in his cabinet from Kalman Kanya (Foreign Minister) and Count Pal Teleki (former Head of Parliament).28
Imredy held the position of Prime Minister until February 1939, when Horthy dismissed him for two reasons. Firstly, controversy was developing on the accusations that Imredy had a Jewish great-grandfather. This rumour was in fact true, with the ancestor in question, Josef Heller, born in 1807, had in fact been
23 Kramer, p. 61. 24 Ibid. 25 Deak, p. 646. 26 Kramer, p. 61. 27 Baross, http://www.hungarian-history.hu/lib/baross/baross01.htm. 28 Ibid.
6 converted to Christianity at age seven.29 Secondly, the Regent was becoming disillusioned by Imredy’s inability to curb the influence of the radical right, and the parliaments gradual shift towards accepting Nazi attitudes.30 Horthy reinstated former Prime Minister Count Pal Teleki based on his reputation of being “a staunch Bethlenite, traditional conservative, moderate reformer, devout Catholic, dedicated chauvanist, declared Anglophile, and a steadfast proponent of “scientific, civilised” anti-Semitism.”31 Teleki held onto power through the outbreaks of hostilities on both Eastern and Western fronts in Europe, until he committed suicide in 1941.
Anti-Jewish measures were legally institutionalised in the pre-Second World War period with so-called ‘Jewish Law’s’ introduced. Under the guidance of Prime Minister Daranyi in March 1938, an announcement was made to highlight the government’s intention to address the Jewish issue in a legal manner.32 The First Jewish Law placed the Jewish question into the forefront of national policy, by violating the fundamental principles of Act VII 1867 which emancipated the Jews of Hungary.33 The law, passed in 1938 (but never implemented as it was succeeded by the Second Jewish Law), placed restrictions on the number of Jews in professions. A threshold was set at 20% and the definition of a ‘Jew’ was determined on religious rather than racial grounds, unlike the Nuremberg Laws in Germany.34 The Second Jewish Law, presented to parliament in February 1939 by Prime Minister Imredy and passed by his successor Teleki in May of the same year, differed from the previous law on the definition of who is considered Jewish.35 The definition of Jewishness was transformed along the lines of the Nazi model, defining Jews as a race rather than a religious group.36 The second law took the initial restrictions on Jews and added further components to hamper
29 Kramer, p. 74. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., p. 66. 33 Yehuda Don, ‘The Economic Effects of Antisemitic Discrimination: Hungarian Anti-Jewish Legislation, 1938-1944’, in Michael R. Marrus (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews, Westport, 1989, Vol. 4 (2), pp. 504-523, p. 507. 34 Ibid., Kramer, p. 67. 35 Don, p. 507. 36 Ibid.
7 their livelihood. Jews were prevented from acquiring Hungarian citizenship, ineligible to be elected to the Upper House of parliament (unless an official representative of the religion), unable to vote on political decisions unless they could show their family had been residing in Hungary from 1867 onwards, and ineligible to be a candidate to any elected or appointed government post.37 As a result of these discriminatory measures, thousands of Hungarian Jews applied to emigrate, with 50,000 applications by November 1939. Unfortunately, the lack of nations willing to accept Jewish refugees meant that the majority of these applicants were unable to flee the persecution.38
Leading up to the alliance between Budapest and Berlin, and the latter outbreak of war, the Hungarian political ultra-Right was led by one party. Founded in 1931, the Nemzeti Szoialista Magyar Munkaspart (Hungaraian National Socialist Worker’s Party) believed finding a solution to country’s “Jewish Question” would solve the nations troubles.39 The party, often referred to as the ‘Arrow Cross’ (from its iconic logo composed of twin intersecting arrows, after the swastika was outlawed) or Nyilas, grew in power as other Fascist groups merged to form a union of political parties on the extreme right.40 Former Army Major Ferenc Szalasi led the movement from October 1937, who Kramer describes as “the Hungarian extreme Right’s foremost protagonist and only genuinely popular leader.”41 The Arrow Cross had only 20,000 members in 1937, but these numbers exploded over the next three years with the parties membership tally reaching 116,000 by the end of 1940.42 The fascist party had a successful campaign leading to the May 1939 elections and subsequently gained 25 percent of the total votes. In Budapest alone, the number of votes for the ultra-Right increased dramatically from the previous elections, rising from 2 percent to 31 percent.43 Szalasi argued for the mass emigration of Jews from Hungary, and would later have the opportunity to implement policy to transport Jews from
37 Ibid. 38 Kramer, p. 71. 39 Ibid., pp. 62-63. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid., p. 63. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., p. 65.
8 Hungary across the borders to death camps in Poland and Austria. Relentless external pressure from Nazi Germany to expel Hungarian Jews led to the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944 and the forced resignation of Regent Horthy in October that year.44
An agreement was formally fused between Budapest and Berlin on 20 November 1940 that aligned Hungary to the Axis powers.45 While Teleki was willing to sign the Tripartite Pact, the Hungarian Prime Minister and Regent Horthy were unwilling to relinquish too much of their nations independence and capacity to determine their own affairs. On economic, military and political grounds, Hungary shared similar ambitions with Germany, as shown by Hungary’s willingness to assist Germany invade the Soviet Union, but the Hungarian leaders did not want to be forced into following the Nazi’s policy.46 This is clearly shown by Teleki’s suicide on 3 April 1941, where the leader killed himself in protest of the Reich’s demands to invade Yugoslavia. Hungary had recently signed a ‘Treaty of Peace and Eternal Friendship’ with Yugoslavia in December 1940, to protect the Hungarian minority that lived in the pro-Western neighbour.47 By March 1941, it had become exceedingly clear that Germany intended to invade Yugoslavia and that Hungary would be drawn into war because of the alliance.48 Teleki’s death allowed right-wing politician Laszlo Bardossy to become Prime Minister of Hungary, who was renown for his anti- Communist and Judeophobic opinion.49 Bardossy committed Hungarian forces to the invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, and during his 11-month term as Hungarian Prime Minister, he ordered the invasion of Russia, declared war on Britain and America, enacted further discriminatory legislation against Jews and linked Hungarian policy closer to its German equivalent.50
44 Baross, http://www.hungarian-history.hu/lib/baross/baross09.htm. 45 Kramer, p. 77. 46 Deak, p. 646. 47 Anikó Szalai, ‘Effect of the World Wars on International Treaties of Hungary’, Miskolc Journal of International Law, Vol. 5, 2008, pp. 98-108, p. 103. 48 Ibid. 49 Kramer, p. 79. 50 Ibid., Livia Rothkirchen, ‘Hungary – an Asylum for the Refugees of Europe’, in Michael R. Marrus (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews, Westport, 1989, Vol. 4 (2), pp. 524-539, p. 531.
9
Bardossy was forced to resign on 7 March 1942 as Regent Horthy became increasingly concerned of his leaning to the ultra-Right and his decision-making without consulting him.51 Horthy selected Miklos Kallay as the replacement Prime Minister, who was close friends with Horthy and shared similar political views.52 Kallay’s policy were a stark contrast to Bardossy’s, with the new Prime Minister trying to regain Hungary’s political independence from the Reich and hold greater autonomy in determining the nations approach to the war and Hungary’s Jewish population.53 Germany pressed for Bardossy to become Foreign Minister, but the former leader was denied a position in the cabinet and Kallay placed himself in charge of the Foreign Ministry.54 During his first year as leader, while Germany was at their peak of their military power, Kallay tended to follow a pro-German line.55 As historian Randolph L. Braham explains, this position shifted during Kallay’s second year when the Hungarian Army was crushed at Voronezh (12 January 1943) and when the Germans were defeated at Stalingrad (2 February 1943).56 These losses led to a re-evaluation of Hungary’s foreign policy and Kallay begnag to “reorient his policies towards a possible extraction of Hungary from the Axis Alliance.”57 Kallay began initiating contact with the Western allies in 1943 in hope of emulating Italy withdrawal from the Axis. He postured for a possible surrender with the Western powers specifically, avoiding contact with the Soviets due to Horthy and his fear of Communism and reluctance to accept their domination.58 The Hungarian leaders desire to surrender to America and Britain were hampered for two fundamental reasons. Firstly, the Western powers were still a distance away from the Hungary, therefore any attempt to surrender in 1943 would have failed miserably.59
51 Kramer, p. 82. 52 Randolph L. Braham, ‘The Jewish Question in German-Hungarian Relations during the Kállay Era’, in Michael R. Marrus (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews, Westport, 1989, Vol. 4 (2), pp. 590-615, p. 590. 53 Ibid. 54 Kramer, p. 82. 55 Braham, p. 591. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid., p. 592. 58 Ibid., pp. 592-593. 59 Ibid., p. 592.
10 Secondly, the Soviets had already declared their interest in Eastern Europe after the war would be won, and having the Russian forces closing in on Hungary meant the Western allies had little interest in occupying Hungary.60 As a result, Hungary became vulnerable to the approaching Soviet forces and both external and internal fascist opposition to Kallay and Horthy.
When it became clear that surrendering to the Western powers was no longer an option, Horthy arranged for a diplomatic to be sent to Moscow.61 The Russian forces at this stage had crossed Hungarian borders and defeat was only a matter of time. The party of diplomats that spoke with Soviet foreign minister Molotov stated that one of the reasons for the surrender was to protect the remaining Jews in Budapest.62 An agreement was made to surrender to the Soviets, and when Regent Horthy announced the surrender to the public on 15 October 1944, the Germans reacted swiftly and overthrew the government.63
As Germany became aware of the Hungarian government approaches to the Allies, they implemented measures to regain control of the nation, to prevent the loss of another Axis regime. This eventuated in the overthrow of Regent Horthy as head of Hungary and the establishment of a puppet regime guided by the influence of the German Nazi party and consolidated by the Arrow Cross. This coup occurred in October 1944 and it opened the floodgates for an assault on the Jews of Budapest, the only remaining pocket of Jews in Hungary. Prior to March 1944 the Nazis continued to respect Hungarian sovereignty, which had resulted “with the result that for Jews the country became an island of safety in an “ocean of destruction”.”64 Due to this lingering protection, Hungary continued to have a Jewish “problem” that needed to be solved in the late stages on the war. This “problem” revolved around the need to evacuate the “eight hundred thousand
60 Zvi Erez, ‘The Jews of Budapest and the Plans of Admiral Horthy August- October 1944’, in Michael R. Marrus (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews, Westport, 1989, Vol. 4 (2), pp. 616-642, p. 617. 61 Ibid., p. 624. 62 Ibid., pp. 628-629. 63 Ibid., p. 641. 64 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, New York, 1944, p. 195.
11 Jews, plus an estimated hundred or hundred and fifty thousand converted Jews” that had been protected by Horthy.65 As Hannah Arendt explains, “because of the greatness and the urgency of the task [Adolf] Eichmann arrived in Budapest in March, 1944, with his whole staff, who he could easily assemble, since the job had been finished everywhere else.”66 Eichmann unleashed a campaign of destruction at lightning speed, with the assistance of Hungarian authorities, which liquidated the Jewish population of the rural provinces of Hungary by early July 1944.67 Upon arriving in Budapest, Wallenberg assessed these losses as between 333,000 to 680,000 lives.68 Upon the pressure of protests of neutral nations and the Vatican, Horthy ceased the deportations temporarily in July, despite the presence of Eichmann and his taskforce.69
This was the situation Wallenberg faced in Budapest upon arrival. Deportations had been suspended, for the time being, and there had already been significant losses of life. Eichmann’s presence and that of his Nazi cohorts, who were determined to liquidate this remaining pocket of European Jewry, meant that it was only a matter of time that the machinery of destruction was once again set in motion. As a result, the work of Wallenberg and other embassy staff from a host of nations, that saved the lives of so many, was required in the face of tremendous danger. Their work restricted the anti-Semites from their efforts of destroying all remaining Hungarian Jews (and other Jewish refuges that had managed to make it to Budapest) before the impending defeat in the Second World War.
65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid., p. 200. 68 Raoul Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, trans. Kjersti Board in association with The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, New York, 1995, pp. 242-243. 69 Arendt, p. 200.
12 Chapter 2: Raoul Wallenberg and the mission to rescue Hungarian Jews
Understandably, after becoming aware of his heroic efforts, many people wished to know more about Raoul Wallenberg – who was he and why he accepted this difficult task? Wallenberg’s family life and upbringing shaped him into a unique individual. He grew up in a family of privilege in Sweden and spent much of his adolescents travelling, learning languages and gaining knowledge about different cultures. In reviewing Wallenberg’s life, as it was prior to his undertaking of the rescue mission to save the Jewish population of Budapest, his motivations and aspirations will become clearer.
Interest in Wallenberg’s pre war life emerged after the war, when news of his deeds spread and survivors attempted to find out more about the man whose individual actions had saved them from deportation. Numerous authors, historians and memorial associations have researched his background. A particularly valuable source in this regard is the archive of correspondence with Wallenberg that was discovered and donated by his cousins Birgitte Wallenberg and Gustaf Söderlund, and edited and published as a volume by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.70 This collection of primary documents provides an intimate and profound insight into Wallenberg’s life and is an invaluable source that makes the reader experience a unique bond with the lost hero. These letters and dispatches, alongside other secondary sources, highlight who was Raoul Wallenberg and why he accepted the task of travelling to Budapest in attempt to save as many Jews as possible.
Raoul Wallenberg was born on August 4th 1912, a Sunday with the amniotic sack surrounding him.71 According to Swedish folklore, those born on a Sunday and ‘in caul’ will become immensely successful. The traditional myth may not always hold true, but in this case it did predict a life of great achievement. His father, Raoul Oscar Wallenberg, never met his son, passing away from cancer in
70 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. vii. 71 Jenö Lévai, Raoul Wallenberg: His Remarkable Life, Heroic Battles and The Secret of his Mysterious Disapearance, trans. Frank Vajda, Melbourne, 1988, p. 15, Harvey Rosenfeld, Raoul Wallenberg: Angel of Rescue – Heroism and Torment in the Gulag, Buffalo, 1982, p. 17.
13 1912, at the age of 23, three months prior to his son’s birth.72 Wallenberg Senior was a respected naval officer, and was described as showing “exceptional courage and sangfroid” and showing “a rare energy”, characteristics that would later be used to describe the son he never had the chance to meet.73 He had married Maj Wising, daughter of the renowned neurologist Per Johann Wising, in September 1911. Maj Wising would raise her son as a single-mother with the assistance of young Raoul’s paternal grandparents. For Maj Wising, 1912 was an extremely difficult year as she lost her husband and father, while coping with a newborn child. During this period Maj admitted to her mother that, “I don’t know if I will be competent to raise this child.”74 But with the help of her mother and father in law, Gustav Wallenberg, she managed to raise and educate a unique individual who would save the lives of thousands.
The Wallenberg family was a household name in Sweden prior to Raoul’s exploits. Comparable to the Rothschild or Bleichröder families, the Wallenberg’s were a powerful and rich family, yet well respected by the Swedish people.75 As Harvey Rosenfeld notes, “for generations the Wallenberg name had been synonymous with Swedish statesmen, diplomats, military leaders, bankers, shipping and industrial magnates and bishops.”76 The Wallenberg family’s rise to prominence in Swedish and European high society begins with the brothers Jacob and Marcus. Jacob wrote Sweden’s first realist classic in the mid eighteenth century, titled Min Son På Galjen (My Son the Sailor), based on his adventures in East Asia during the 1760s, while Marcus was a respected lector at the famous cathedral in the large regional town of Linköping.77 Marcus’ two sons, Marcus Junior and Andre Oscar, developed the family’s’ wealth. The former became bishop of Linköping and owner of the Göta Canal.78 Andre Oscar Wallenberg is credited with taking “a step that helped move Sweden decisively
72 Kati Marton, Wallenberg, New York, 1982, p. 17. 73 Ibid., p. 16. 74 Ibid., p. 17. 75 Lévai, p. 17, Rosenfeld, pp. 16-17. 76 Rosenfeld, p. 16. 77 Elenore Lester, Wallenberg: The Man in the Iron Web, New Jersey, 1982, p. 27. 78 Ibid.
14 into the rank of the world’s most advanced industrial democracies.”79 After a visit to New York as part of his commission as an officer in the Swedish Navy, Andre became fascinated in the modern banking systems developed after the 1837 banking crisis.80 In 1856 he founded the Stockholms Enskilda Bank, the predecessor of the Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, which coincided with a growing demand for Swedish industrial products and timber resources.81 Andre later also became an elected member of the Swedish lower house of parliament, the Riksdag, until his death in 1866.82 Andre left a legacy of financing new enterprises and establishing strong relationships with foreign banks, and his sons and grandsons would continue this legacy.83 Andre’s son Marcus Wallenberg conducted special economic negotiations with the Allies in World War I, while his sons Marcus (Junior) and Jacob filled similar roles in World War II with the Allies and Germans respectively.84
Raoul’s grandfather Gustav Wallenberg, cousin to the aforementioned Andre’s sons, shied away from the banking industry. Instead, Gustav’s interests lay in promoting Swedish industry and trade, and studying other cultures, which would lead him to a career in diplomacy. Gustav became a member of the Liberal Party of the Riksdag, and during this time emphasised the importance of establishing trade routes to Asia.85 He became Sweden’s first envoy to Tokyo in 1906 and was also accredited Peking the following year. He was later appointed Swedish minister in Constantinople in 1920, where he remained until his death in 1937.86 From his position in Turkey, he saw this nation evolve as it dealt with the leadership vacuum that came with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Gustav strongly supported the new secular and modern Turkey that developed under the guidance of Kemal Ataturk, and promoted trade relations between Sweden and Turkey.87 Gustav’s interest in cultures and international relations would later be
79 Ibid. 80 Rosenfeld, p. 16, Lester, p. 27. 81 Lester, p. 27. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid., p. 28. 84 Rosenfeld, p. 16. 85 Lester, p. 28. 86 Ibid. pp. 28-29. 87 Ibid., p. 29.
15 transferred to Raoul due to his frequent involvement in his upbringing and education, and in the absence of a Raoul Senior, he became the key paternal figure in his grandsons upbringing.
The prominence of the Wallenberg family and name can make it easy to overlook the heritage on Raoul’s maternal side. His willingness to assist the Jews of Budapest can perhaps be linked to this ancestry. It is presently unknown whether Raoul was aware that his maternal great-great-grandfather, Michael Benedicks, was one of the first Jews to settle in Sweden.88 Benedicks would later convert to the Lutheran Church and would work for Swedish Kings Gustav III and King Karl Johann XIV. His maternal grandfather, who would pass away in the year of his birth, Dr Per Wising, was Sweden’s first neurosurgeon. Thus, Wallenberg’s ancestry on both sides of his family was full of influential figures in science, politics, banking, trade, diplomacy, industry and the arts, a practice that has continued as the Wallenberg family have remained one of the most powerful families in the world. As a result, Wallenberg’s name and family ties with the Swedish Royal family and key political figures would assist him upon arriving in Budapest in attempt to rescue the remaining Jewish population, as the reputation that proceeded it was in itself influential.
Even though he was commonly based abroad while working for the Swedish Foreign Ministry, he and Raoul were in frequent contact through the post. Correspondence between Raoul and his grandfather was regular until Gustav’s passing in 1937. Raoul would often detail his experiences and ambitions in his writings, and ask for fatherly guidance on issues that would arise. Gustav’s strong guidance on issues such as schooling, politics, employment, foreign affairs and relationships helped shaped Wallenberg into becoming the person who saved the lives of so many Jews in Budapest. Gustav helped shape Raoul’s education, travels and upbringing as a child and adolescent, alongside Raoul’s mother and her second husband Fredrick von Dardel (who held a close relationship with his step-son).
88 Ibid.
16 Gustav wanted Raoul to experience and understand the wider world, and not become trapped like many other Stockholm elites who were too caught up in their own wealth and status to understand how things work outside the borders of Sweden. As a result, he arranged for Raoul to have numerous sojourns abroad during the summer break, in order to improve language skills and learn about other cultures. Gustav was willing to fund these trips abroad to ensure Raoul grasped a broader understanding of the world and how businesses and industries worked in other nations.89 Gustav intended that Raoul would obtain a unique viewpoint on how companies operated abroad, and like past generations of Wallenberg’s, he would use this information to either expand the families economic empire or help reform or progress industries. Before he had even turned 14, Gustav arranged Raoul a visit to his residence in Constantinople on the Orient Express. Raoul thought he travelled this journey unescorted, but his grandfather paid for the railway personnel to keep a watch on him.90 By age 17, Raoul had already spent summers in England and Germany refining his language skills.91 In the summer of 1929, it was arranged for Raoul to live with a family in France. Gustav had offered the opportunity to visit England again or America to further refine his English skills, but Raoul specifically requested an opportunity to work on his French. He convinced his grandfather in a letter, stating convincingly “I don’t think another summer in England necessary, useful though it would be, and think that I will be able to get by with what I have already learned. The fact that we will have to pass a written examination in French when we graduate also argues for going to France.”92 Consequently, Raoul spent the summer staying with a French family on the shores of Lake Geneva. He shared his board with three other guests, a young Czech woman and two Serbian boys.93 Raoul found himself having to deal with one of the Serbian’s political rants, stating in a letter to his grandfather, that “It … annoys me, though, to have to listen to his half-baked revolutionary rantings.”94 Importantly, this experience provided Raoul more than just an opportunity to improve his French, but a
89 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 12. 90 Rosenfeld, p. 18. 91 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 10, Rosenfeld, p. 18. 92 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 17. 93 Ibid., p. 18. 94 Ibid.
17 chance to learn how to tolerate others from different backgrounds and who hold different views. This ability to tolerate and understand difference would become a very valuable skill in his future. Consequently, this experience would help him recognise and develop and objective understanding of political extremes, which would contribute to his opposition of Nazism and their treatment of Jews later in his life.
After an accelerated completion of High School, Raoul had to determine where and when he would continue his academic studies at a higher level. Under the guidance of Gustav and his mother, he was weighing up whether to study at the highly respected Stockholm School of Economics or at an American university. Gustav was pushing for Raoul to pursue studies in Architecture in the United States of America. His reasoning was not that the schooling system was better there, as it was not, but for Raoul to escape the Swedish traditional upbringing so he could think independently. As Gustav wrote to Raoul, “in Sweden, young men are still bought up to adhere to military principles so far as their schooling and social position go, and then throughout their lives they are taught to march to a regular beat and always keep in step.”95 He continued by claiming, “the curriculum offered by an American school is in no way superior or even equal to that offered in Sweden. No, what I am trying to provide you is an insight into the American frame of mind, the kind of upbringing aimed at teaching men to be self-reliant, even to feel that they are better than others, which may just be the basis of America’s position of leadership today. This is something very different from “keeping in step” here at home.”96 Both Gustav and his father Andre Oscar both regarded their experience in America to have provided them a direction in life that helped them with their future successes, and therefore Gustav wanted his grandson to have a similar upbringing.97 His grandfather wished that he would develop this independent model of thinking if he studied abroad in the United States, and at the same time he would escape the trappings of the Stockholm elite and would further mature into an important contributor in Sweden. This
95 Ibid., p. 29. 96 Ibid., p. 31. 97 Ibid., p. 30.
18 independence would provide him with a unique perspective that would assist him in implementing his mission in Budapest.
Raoul was understandably concerned about travelling to the United States to begin his university studies at the age of 17.98 Therefore, he compromised with his grandfather by accepting his generous offer to provide him with an American tertiary education, which he would undertake after completing his compulsory 250 days in military service and working as a volunteer for his families famous Stockholm Enskilda Bank.99 Gustav was willing to accept Raoul completing his military service, but hoped he would get away from Stockholm.100 He hoped that Raoul would escape the influence of other young members of the Stockholm upper class – such as his cousins – so he would not be lured into a lazy lifestyle.101 This concern was amplified when one of Gustav’s nephews had become a jazz dancer and cabaret performer in Paris, which he attributed to “associating with and being surrounded by people who are accustomed to taking life too easy.”102 Following this advice, Raoul served with the Guards while stationed in Örebro. He was the youngest member of the battalion and, as historian Harvey Rosenfeld explains, “with the same dedication he brought to all his endeavours, Raoul set out to perfect himself in the military.”103 Raoul finished his military training highly commended and with a fantastic rapport with the other older members of his battalion and a reputation of being an excellent soldier.104 It can be presumed that Wallenberg’s experience in the Swedish military would have highlighted the importance of rank in this environment. When undertaking various activities in Budapest for the rescue campaign, on numerous occasions he threatened to take matters to a higher rank or would claim that a higher officer had, or would have, allowed his actions to continue. This understanding of the military hierarchy and bureaucracy would have been valuable in the final stages of the war in Budapest, when the German military
98 Ibid., p. 27. 99 Lévai, p. 17. 100 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 37. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 103 Rosenfeld, p. 18. 104 Lévai, p. 18.
19 and the Arrow Cross militia were controlling the remaining areas of Hungary under occupation.
After completing military service and spending a short period of time in France, Raoul began his university studies. As suggested by his grandfather, Raoul decided to study at the Ann Arbour campus of the University of Michigan.105 Upon arriving at Ann Arbour, a campus recommended to Gustav by a family friend for its solid academic reputation and distance from any large urban centres and the prevailing temptations to teenagers at the time found in larger cities, Raoul began studying a Bachelor of Science in Architecture.106 His initial impressions of the United States were greatly different than his grandfathers. Raoul wrote apologetically in a letter to Gustav that “I’ve been a little upset that I haven’t experienced the powerful impression of America of which you spoke and which you attributed both your own and your father’s later development.”107 Raoul was concerned that his personal development may have been proceeding at a slower pace than his grandfather and wanted to apologise in advance for this.108 This concern shown highlights Wallenberg’s constant desire to improve as a person and strive for perfection. His personal disappointment in failing to have the same impression of the United States as his grandfather made him work harder to become involved in the college society and gain a better understanding of the culture. His capacity for hard-work and relentless commitment to the task at hand would assist him in carrying the required effort and workload when in Budapest. Working the exceptionally long and demanding hours to initially establish the operations of the rescue mission and later to help enforce the protection he provided, can be seen throughout his childhood and adolescence.
During his four years of study in the US, Raoul experienced intense adventures and relationships. These experienced showed his development into an independent, free-spirited individual who had a strong sense of adventure and inquisitiveness. Wallenberg became willing to take risks and increasingly expose
105 Ibid. 106 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 40. 107 Ibid., p. 38. 108 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
20 himself to chance encounters with people and experiences that he would have to negotiate. He travelled frequently during the summer breaks, exploring New York, Arizona, California and Mexico. When travelling within the United States, Raoul thoroughly enjoyed the opportunity to hitchhike, regardless of the risk involved. On an eventful day in June 1933 on the way home from the World Expo in Chicago, where Raoul was working voluntarily for the Swedish exhibitions, Wallenberg was involved in a car accident and an armed hold-up. Raoul managed to get a lift back to Ann Arbour by hitchhiking. The driver was speeding along the roads outside Chicago. But the driver failed to see a train crossing the road ahead and in attempting to brake to avoid a collision with the train, they crashed into a stationary car and were deflected through a fence. While neither driver nor passenger sustained any injuries, Raoul found himself stranded in rural Illinois without a lift and with nightfall pending.109 Finally, another car stopped and offered a lift. But once in the car he realised something was wrong, as the four other passengers were without luggage and “looked a bit suspicious”.110 Alarm bells were ringing when one of them asked him “How much would it be worth to you if we took you all the way to Ann Arbour?”111 Remaining calm and in control Raoul responded, “Nothing … because in that case I would have taken the bus.”112 With the questions about money, the absence of luggage and the suspicious behaviour of the other passengers in the car, Raoul became very wary of their intentions. He immediately began to discuss his poverty in the conversation in attempt to counteract their intentions.113 All of a sudden the car pulled into a secluded country lane and continued to drive into the darkness. In recalling the event Raoul wrote, “fearing the worst, I tried to keep a cool head so as not to make things worse.”114 The car eventually came to a stop and he was ordered out of the car. As Raoul recalls, one of the yelled ‘let’s have a look at you’ and “suddenly I saw an enormous revolver appear, reflected in the car’s headlights.”115 They demanded his money
109 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 110 Ibid., p. 91. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 Lévai, p. 23.
21 and Raoul obliged by giving the money from his pockets and in his suitcase. They found the key to his safety deposit box but using his intellect and his ability to bluff he convinced them that it only held “sentimental value to me, no value to you.”116 Concerned that he may be left in the middle of nowhere after handing over all his money, Raoul negotiated a compromise. In retelling this story in a letter to mother, he explained, “I decided it was their turn to show some goodwill, so I asked them to drive me back to the highway, since it was late and my suitcases were heavy. They let me sit next to the driver and then put the luggage on top to keep me from jumping. By this time, they were the ones who were frightened, maybe because I was so calm. I really didn’t feel scared; I found the whole thing sort of interesting.”117 Raoul admitted that this experience will not prevent him from hitchhiking in future, but he would take less money and would be more devious and cunning.118 This encounter highlighted the personality traits that would make him so influential and successful later in his life saving the Jewish population of Budapest. His ability to remain calm and in control in a dangerous and threatening situation, his skills of negotiation and bluffing and his willingness to learn from his mistakes while remaining unafraid of trying again.
After his four years of study at the University of Michigan and the completion of his Architecture degree, Raoul returned back to Sweden for a short visit. Beyond seeing family and friends for the first time in many years, Raoul was very pro- active and enthusiastic in undertaking architecture work. His eagerness to become involved in something he felt passionate about is clearly shown during this short visit home. He submitted a design for an open-air baths at Riddarholmen in Stockholm during this stay, which won second prize in the competition. There remains on-going debate to this day to implement the design and construct the pool facility.119 Raoul met with his grandfather to discuss the next stage of his education. Gustav pushed him to undertake some practical business experience abroad so he could understand how certain industries
116 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 91. 117 Ibid., p. 92. 118 Lévai, p. 23, Letters, p. 92. 119 Lévai, p. 24.
22 operated. While Raoul initially intended to travel to South America, an opportunity to work with a Swedish company became available in South Africa.120 He arrived in Cape Town in July 1938 after travelling by ship for three weeks. During this journey, rather than relax and enjoy the entertainment aboard the liner, he worked on another architectural competition, this time designing a fire station for the Northern Swedish town of Umeå. While he didn’t believe he had a chance of winning and found it difficult to complete the detail work due to the ships movement, he still thoroughly enjoyed the work.121 Again, this shows his dedication and commitment to areas of interest. Gustav’s commitment to developing Raoul’s work ethic and desire to succeed show through clearly here. There is no indication that Raoul would fall back on his family’s empire to get him through life, as he wanted to work hard and be another successful contributor to the Wallenberg legacy.
Raoul then spent six months working in South Africa but his social contact was mainly with other Swedes working over there. He didn’t believe this situation was allowing him to gain a better understanding of the different culture and the work experience was of little interest. Therefore, Gustav arranged for Raoul to work in a bank in British-mandated Palestine. He sailed to Haifa and arrived in March 1936. As it happened, Gustav had arranged for a Jewish acquaintance to assist Raoul in his new job. This time in Haifa presented his first meeting with Jews fleeing the oppression of Nazi Germany. Their stories strongly effected Raoul and he developed a strong opposition to Nazism. As he wrote to his grandfather regarding the Jewish refugees he had met, “poor people, they evidently have to adjust to being a minority wherever they go.”122 Historian Harvey Rosenfeld explains, “as a compassionate, sensitive young man, the accounts of Jewish suffering in Germany had a profound impact on him. These appalling stories grieved him greatly. Brute force and tyranny were alien to Raoul. He was not one to bend before force. He could only be convinced by truth.”123 Wallenberg’s time in Haifa taught him greatly about the banking
120 Rosenfeld, p. 23. 121 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 135. 122 Ibid., p. 171. 123 Rosenfeld, p. 23.
23 industry, but more significantly about the threat of Nazism and the developing tensions in Palestine. Unfortunately, Raoul failed to find this work experience stimulating, because it was not in an industry he desired to work and he subsequently lacked passion, and was becoming more and more motivated to return back to Sweden.
Raoul arrived back in Sweden in September 1936 and immediately underwent a short training camp as part of his military service.124 Then, Gustav Oscar Wallenberg died in March 1937 during a trip back to Sweden.125 Raoul’s loss deeply affected him as he lost another connection with his father, a key influence on his life and a provider of advice that had shaped his upbringing. Raoul reluctantly began working for the Wallenberg family bank, while continuing to pursue his architectural designs (though unfortunately his Architecture degree from the University of Michigan was refused to be recognised by the Swedish authorities)126. His stepsister, Nina Lageren, recalls that he detested working at the bank.127 Raoul sought to work overseas again to flee the boredom he couldn’t escape by being unable to work in his preferred industry.128
During this period, the Nazi policy towards Jews had not escaped Wallenberg’s attention. A personal acquaintance, Dr Phillipi, who was a Jew with a Swedish wife, was arrested and detained in Berlin by the Gestapo. When Raoul discovered this news he prepared immediately to travel to Berlin to seek his release. During his preparations the Swedish Embassy intervened and managed to secure the doctors release and travel to Stockholm.129
The opportunity to assist:
Through his cousin Jacob, Wallenberg was introduced to Swedish shipping magnate Sven Salen and Hungarian businessman Dr Kalaman Lauer who
124 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 189. 125 Ibid., p. 198. 126 Ibid., p. 208. 127 Rosenfeld, p. 24. 128 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 205. 129 Rosenfeld, pp 23-24, Lévai, p. 29.
24 operated an import/export business called Mellaneuopeiska Handels AB (Central European Trading Company).130 Lauer, who was a Jew of Hungarian decent, managed the businesses operations while Salen was the chief financier of the company. Even though Raoul had little knowledge of how international trade businesses operated, Lauer offered him a job based on his presentation, calmness and modesty.131 Due to the increasing restrictions on Jews throughout Europe, and particularly Hungary where the company’s products were primarily exported, Raoul went in place of Lauer acting as a foreign trade representative and later becoming his junior partner.132 This provided Raoul the opportunity to travel to Budapest on two occasions, the first in February 1942 and the second in autumn 1943.133 This role provided him the opportunity to use his strong interpersonal skills, his ambition to travel and the skills he developed working in the banking sector, while providing increased contact with members of the Jewish community in Eastern Europe and a capacity to monitor the ever increasing restrictions on their freedom. Rosenfeld explains the significant of these trips to Budapest: “Raoul listened with concern as [his Hungarian Jewish acquaintances] related the discriminatory practices being thrust upon Hungarian Jewry. Wallenberg realized that Lauer had many relatives in Hungary and shared his distress at this report. These business trips had familiarized Raoul with the social and economic conditions of Hungary and given him a grasp of its language and culture. Since the Central European Trading Company dealt in foodstuffs, Wallenberg became active in obtaining supplies for the Red Cross in several Central European countries.”134 Details about this initial involvement of the Red Cross have not been easy to access beyond a mention by a few historians. Though, historian Jenö Lévai noted that this contact “stimulated his interest in humanitarian work during his negotiations with the Red Cross representatives.”135 Regardless, this transition from empathy to action for the plight of European Jews was a progressive step towards his latter role in the rescue activities in Budapest. The contacts he established and experiences he
130 Rosenfeld, pp. 24-25. 131 Lévai, p. 29. 132 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 208. 133 Lévai, p. 25. 134 Rosenfeld, p. 25. 135 Lévai, p. 30.
25 gained during these business trips would be invaluable when he would later return to Hungary on behalf of the Swedish government and the United States War Refugee Board.
On 19 March 1944 Germany seized control of Hungary and conditions for Hungarian Jews quickly deteriorated. This turn of events triggered a plea for assistance by Dr Norbert Masur, a prominent Jewish communal leader in Stockholm with ties to Hungary and a representative of the World Jewish Congress.136 Masur wrote on 16 April 1944 to the Chief Rabbi in Stockholm, Dr Marcus Ehrenpries, proposing they seek the assistance of a distinguished non- Jew to help organise rescue activities in Hungary.137 Ehrenpries endorsed the project and took measure in attempt to implement the plan.
Simultaneously, the United States Department of State, after the lobbying of American Jews, approached Sweden to use its neutral position to intervene on behalf of the Jews of Hungary.138 Additionally, the Chief Rabbi of Switzerland also approached Ehrenpries seeking to have Sweden to intervene.139 Ehrenpries approached the Swedish Foreign Office proposing that the King of Sweden intervene. The Swedish King, Gustav V, warmly received the request from the Chief Rabbi after having received a similar request from the Pope.140 The King wrote a personal letter to Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian head of state, that was hand delivered by Swedish Ambassador to Hungary Carl Ivan Danielsson.141 This letter compelled the Regent to ban further deportation of Hungarian Jews to the death camps in Poland and Germany.142
136 Hugo Valentin, ‘Rescue and Relief Activities in Behalf of Jewish Victims of Nazism in Scandinavia’, in Michael R. Marrus (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews, Westport, 1989, Vol. 5 (2), pp. 533-560, p. 549, Lévai, p. 30. 137 Valentin, p. 549. 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid. 140 Lévai, p. 34. 141 Ibid. 142 Kramer, p. 133.
26 The US State Department pushed for further intervention by neutral Sweden, and sent Iver Olson of the War Refugee Board to Stockholm to help establish some form of rescue mission. At the request of President Roosevelt, through American Ambassador to Sweden Herschel Johnson and Iver Olson, the Sweden Foreign Office was asked to nominate a Swedish citizen that was capable and willing to perform rescue work in Budapest.143 Consulting through Rabbi Ehrenpries, Lauer suggested Raoul Wallenberg to fulfil this role. But the Chief Rabbi of Stockholm thought Raoul might be “too young, too brash, too ready to talk about bribes and payoffs, whatever it took to save lives.”144 This type of action was not what the conservative Rabbi was seeking. Despite this initial setback for Wallenberg, upon hearing news of Lauer’s wife’s family in Budapest he wanted to head off regardless. Lauer insisted that he should not go without a diplomatic passport that would provide him additional protection.145 The Foreign Ministry refused to provide Wallenberg this status, and at the same time he was called up for military service that would have prevented him from going regardless.146 Lauer still believed that Raoul was the right individual for this mission and arranged to meet directly with Iver Olson. Olson asked if Lauer could recommend anybody to go to Hungary to organise a rescue mission, and he immediately named Wallenberg as his choice.147 Lauer arranged for Raoul to meet Olson on June 9th at 7pm. They met and talked about the mission until 5am, talking about important elements of the planning. The following day Lauer informed his partner Sven Salen of what occurred at the meeting, who then arranged for Wallenberg to meet with American ambassador Johnson.148 Historian Jenö Levai reveals, “ Johnson was absolutely enthusiastic about him and expressed this view in front of Sven Salen several times.”149
With the approval of his selection by Johnson and Olson, Raoul began discussing the scope of his mission with the Swedish Foreign Ministry. He made it very
143 Valentin, p. 551 144 Marton, p. 39. 145 Lévai, p. 37. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid., p. 38. 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid.
27 clear that he would only undertake the mission if he was granted the freedom to perform beyond the normal restrictions of diplomats. He outlined the following nine conditions that were accepted by the Foreign Ministry:
1. He would be free to use any methods he chose, including bribery. 2. He should be free to return to Stockholm for consultations with the foreign office without having to get permission. 3. If his funds ran out, a money-raising campaign would be conducted in Sweden. 4. He should be given the title of first secretary of the legation at a salary of two thousand Swedish krona a month. 5. He should be free to have contacts with anyone he chose, including the enemy of the official government. 6. He should have the power to deal directly with any members of the Hungarian government he chose without going through the ambassador. 7. He should have the privilege of sending dispatches to Stockholm via the diplomatic courier 8. He should have the right to request an interview with Regent Horthy to ask for his help. 9. He should be permitted to give asylum in Swedish legation building to individuals under Swedish protection.150
The Foreign Ministry accepted these conditions and subsequently the King of Sweden sanctioned Wallenberg’s appointment as Secretary to the Swedish Legation in Budapest on the basis of this agreement with the Foreign Ministry.151 Raoul was provided with the latest reports out of Hungary and spent the next two days reading through them. His initial intentions were to stay until the end of July before leaving to undertake the mission, but after reading these reports he confided in Lauer by saying, “I can no longer stay in Sweden until the end of July. Every day costs human lives, I shall prepare myself for departure immediately.”152 He left his employment with Central European Trading Company and prepared to depart as soon as possible.
150 Lester, pp. 62-63. 151 Lévai, p. 42. 152 Ibid.
28 Before his departure, Olson reiterated the dangers of his mission and told Raoul that if the Germans or the puppet Hungarian government became aware of his rescue efforts there was nothing they could do to protect him. Witnesses recall that he replied immediately without hesitations that, “If I can help, if I can save a single person, I will go.”153 Raoul met with Ehrenpreis before his departure and during a tearful departure the Rabbi told him of the Talmudic dictum, “Those who are on a mission for good deeds are protected from harm.”154 Wallenberg knew that there was high expectations of what he could achieve in Budapest, but assured the Chief Rabbi that, “of one thing you can be sure: the Wallenberg family name will always prove to be respectable. With that tradition guiding me, there is no limit to what can be accomplished.”155
Wallenberg left Sweden forever – although he could not know it then - on July 6th 1944, flying from Stockholm to Berlin. He feared that the Gestapo had already breached the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s signal code, so he devised his own and left a copy with the foreign office before he departed.156 He only took a minimal amount of luggage for his journey: two backpacks, a sleeping bag, a raincoat, a hat and a revolver.157 Most importantly he carried two important lists of names. The first containing names of important contacts in Hungary, consisting of underground agents, anti-Nazis, pro-Ally officials of the Hungarian government and anti-Nazi Scandinavians currently living in Budapest.158 The second list was composed of information about relatives and friends in Hungary that Swedes hoped that he would be able to gain information regarding their safety.159 In Berlin he stayed with his stepsister Nina Lagergren (who’s husband was a member of the Swedish Embassy in Berlin).160 They spent the night talking in the houses bomb shelter as Allied bombers conducted another sortie on the German capital.161 He was scheduled to take the train to Budapest on July 9th,
153 Rosenfeld, p. 28. 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid. 156 Marton, p. 43. 157 Lévai, p. 45, Rosenfeld, p. 28. 158 Rosenfeld, p. 28. 159 Ibid. 160 Lester, p. 66. 161 Ibid.
29 but Raoul was dissatisfied with this delay. The next day he managed to board a train heading to Budapest but he was unable to get a seat. The train was full of German troops, but Wallenberg continued towards his mission, sitting on his bags in the corridor as the train slowly progressed south towards his destiny.
Theories behind rescuer behaviour and altruism during the Holocaust:
Researchers from various fields have looked at what made individuals act to rescue Jews during the Holocaust. From the various characteristics, traits and backgrounds outlined in these works, Wallenberg’s life prior to his involvement in the Hungarian rescue mission can be reviewed to see what features were similar and different to existing research. Looking for certain attributes in his personality and past, an attempt will be made to determine what caused Wallenberg to leave neutral Sweden to occupied Hungary to save the lives of innocent Jews whom he had no direct connection.
Mordecai Paldiel, director of the Righteous Among the Nations at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, defines a Righteous Gentile as “non-Jews who … risked their lives to save Jews from persecution and death, asking nothing return, no monetary compensation nor other tangible benefits, save the friendship of those under their benevolent care.”162 The question that scholars of rescuers during the Holocaust look to address is why individual acted in such an altruistic way, knowing the extreme consequences to their actions if they were to be caught. David P. Gushee has composed many of the argued contributing factors to an individual following the path to becoming a righteous gentile in a single article, drawing on the work of other researchers to compose a review on the characteristics and motivations of rescuers.163 By comparing existing research, he determines which attributes and past experiences have been consistently attributed to rescuers during the Holocaust. Similarly, in drawing her own theoretical formulation of rescue and rescuers Nechama Tec looks at the works of other researchers in this field.
162 Mordecai Paldiel, ‘The Altruism of Righteous Gentiles’, Holocaust & Genocide Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1988, pp. 187-196, p. 189. 163 David P. Gushee, ‘Many Paths to Righteousness: An Assessment of Research on Why Righteous Gentiles Helped Jews’, Holocaust & Genocide Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1993, pp. 372-401, pp. 372-401.
30 Drawing on her investigation into the motives of rescuers, Tec establishes a set of shared characteristics and conditions. These include: 1) Individuality, or the inability of the rescuer to blend with the surrounding environment, which can include a sense of adventure. 2) High levels of independence, self-reliance and self-motivation to pursue individual goals regardless of how these goals are viewed by others. 3) An enduring, strong commitment to assist those in need that existed before the war. 4) The perception of their rescue efforts as a mere duty, rather than extraordinary or heroic. 5) An unplanned beginning to rescue efforts. 6) An ability to determine who is in need based on their dependence and helplessness, rather than other attributes such as race or religion.164 Looking at these six traits outlined by Tec, as well as the role of personal ties with Jews and childhood experiences of loss, it will become clear how Wallenberg is an unusual rescuer within the category of righteous gentiles.
Tec has argued that individuals “who were on the periphery of their communities were more likely to save Jews than those who were well integrated into their social surrounding”.165 Wallenberg, however, was not on the periphery of the Hungarian community, but was completely removed as he was a Swede that resided in Sweden. Tec implies that rescuers were generally not fully part of their community, though they did not often perceive themselves as an outsider.166 It could be argued that Wallenberg was socially marginalised in his home nation, as a reluctant member of the Swedish elite who was educated abroad and grew up without a father. It is unclear from Tec’s work how this particular characteristic would apply in Wallenberg’s circumstances. Whether this is intended to apply to the community in which he lived or the community in which he acted to rescue the persecuted Jews. While it is inconclusive in this regard, this point does highlight a particularly abnormal characteristic of Wallenberg’s involvement of rescuing Hungarian Jews, which is his willingness to travel from neutral Sweden to assist members of a different nation. What is clear from his experiences prior to heading to Budapest is Wallenberg’s sense of adventure. From his various
164 Nechama Tec, When Light Pierced The Darkness: Christian Rescue of Jews in Nazi-Occupied Poland, New York, 1986, p. 154. 165 Ibid., p. 157. 166 Ibid.
31 travels abroad at a young age to his hitchhiking experience across the United States, Wallenberg was willing to takes chances and learn from his mistakes.
Under the guidance of his grandfather Gustav, Wallenberg was shaped into an independent and self-reliant individual. By escaping the restrictions of Swedish life by studying abroad in Michigan, Wallenberg developed the ability to set his own goals and think independently. This is shown in his determination to pursue his passion of architecture and find ways of escaping work in the financial sector. As Tec argues, “a high level of independence offers the opportunity to act in accordance with personal values and moral precepts, even if these are in opposition to societal expectations.”167 It appears from his experiences as a child and young adult that Wallenberg would meet this second characteristic.
Tec contended that individuals whom became rescuers showed a pre-existing commitment to stand up for the needy.168 This does not appear to be the case for Wallenberg. Though he is eager to assist Dr Phillipi when the Gestapo in Germany arrests him, as previously discussed, and, he is involved in supplying food resources to the Red Cross in Eastern Europe, there is no sustained effort made to assist those in need during his experiences prior to the rescue mission.
As referred to in the introduction, Wallenberg disappeared from Budapest upon liberation of the city by Soviet forces. Because of this disappearance it has been impossible to know what he thought of his actions and the manner he perceived of his accomplishments in Budapest. Consequently, it is difficult to determine whether or not Wallenberg meets Tec’s fourth criteria. From the accounts of Per Anger, a friend of Wallenberg’s and a colleague at the Swedish Legation in Budapest, Wallenberg said that he would “never be able to go back to Stockholm without knowing inside myself I’d done all a man could possibly do to save many Jews as possible.”169 From this quote it can be inferred that Wallenberg considered his actions as a duty rather than a heroic act, but without accounts
167 Ibid., p. 160. 168 Ibid., p. 164. 169 Per Anger, With Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest: Memories of the War Years in Hungary, trans. David Mel Paul & Margareta Paul, New York, 1981, p. 89.
32 after the events have occurred, like those that Tec could access in her research, it is unclear what the complete picture is.
It is argued by Tec that “aid often began in a spontaneous, unpremeditated way.”170 As previously discussed, this is not the circumstance for Wallenberg. His mission was premeditated and organised, and he merely accepted the opportunity to implement the resources made available to him in the most beneficial way for this remaining pocket of European Jewry. Wallenberg headed to Budapest well aware of his task and the potential risks he was exposing himself too. Consequently, this difference makes the circumstances in which he rescued Jews conflicting with the research promoted by Tec.
Wallenberg’s passion to assist the remaining Hungarian Jews was founded on the perception that these were people whose lives were under threat. Prior to his departure, he did not speak of the victims as Jews, but rather as human beings who were being unfairly targeted.171 Tec believes that rescuers are compelled to act because of “the persecution, the unjust treatment, and hence the people’s need for help and protection.”172 From the news he heard from Lauer and the experiences from his travels in Eastern Europe, Wallenberg was aware of the extent of persecution and injustice, and from the available information, appeared to be motivated to act on this basis. Wallenberg wanted to help human beings who were being that were being tormented, and he saw these individuals at risk not as Jews, but as people in need.
Gushee notes in his article that rescuer researchers are unanimous in noting personal ties between righteous gentiles and Jews.173 As it has already been mentioned, Wallenberg had close personal relationships with Lauer and Dr Phillipi. But when Wallenberg departed to Hungary, these individuals were not personally under threat, so can it be considered that these relationships shaped his transition to become a rescuer. Wallenberg showed concern for Lauer’s
170 Tec, p. 175. 171 Lévai, p. 42, Rosenfeld, p. 28. 172 Tec, p. 176. 173 Gushee, p. 384.
33 family who remained in Hungary and was willing to act in some capacity to bring them to safety, even without the protection of a diplomatic passport. Tec found in her analysis of Polish rescuers that more than half had pre-war ties to Jews that were considered as close.174 While Wallenberg’s Jewish friends weren’t directly at risk in July 1944, it is known that people close to these friends were believed to be under threat at this time. Therefore, it can be inferred by Wallenberg’s reaction to this knowledge inspired him to take action, and this would subsequently match other research in this area. This motivation is reinforced by Wallenberg’s reaction to the discovery of Lauer’s relative’s fate. In a letter to his mother dated July 16 1944, he asks his mother to invite Lauer and his wife for dinner. Wallenberg asked his mother to inform them that their family members had been sent to their deaths, so that they could be told in person and be comforted.175
Experience of loss as a child was another characteristic discussed by Gushee.176 This was an experience Wallenberg had to endure on several occasions throughout his youth. As mentioned earlier, Wallenberg’s father and maternal grandfather died in the year of his birth, and his grandfather Gustav, who became a father figure in his life, died in 1937. Having these experiences of death at an early age meets this condition discussed by Gushee, which has been argued that this grief develops “an enriched capacity for empathy and a commitment to ease the pain of others.”177 Based on this argument, Wallenberg’s childhood grief may have helped him become the altruistic hero later in his life.
These general characteristics for righteous gentiles proposed by rescuer researchers fail to apply uniformly to Wallenberg, though several of these attributes can be distinguished in his upbringing and experience prior heading to Budapest. This can be an indication of extraordinary nature of his efforts that are atypical in comparison to other rescuers during the Holocaust. The very notion that Wallenberg left the safety of neutral Sweden to head into war-torn Budapest,
174 Tec, p. 130. 175 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 273. 176 Gushee, p. 376. 177 Ibid.
34 which was occupied by Nazi forces and had Soviet armies approaching from the east, to assist people in need to whom he did not know and had nothing to gain from assisting them, shows the purity of his intentions and is a remarkable display of altruism and heroics.
35 Chapter 3: The Shutzpass
Wallenberg arrived in Budapest on the 9th of July 1944 and immediately reported to the Swedish Legation for an updated report on the Soviet forces approaching Hungary and the recent treatment of Jews.178 Upon presenting his instructions from the King of Sweden to Ambassador Danielsson, he was appointed Secretary to the Swedish Embassy to Hungary and he assumed his task of establishing a variety of rescue attempt for the remaining Jews in the country.179 Per Anger, cousin of Sven Salen and a Swedish diplomat employed at the legation, informed Wallenberg of the present situation for this remaining pocket of European Jewry in Budapest. Anger recalls Wallenberg’s arrival, stating that he looked rather odd for a diplomat.180 Seeing him carrying a hand gun, Wallenberg jokingly comforted him by saying, “the revolver is just to give me courage … I hope I’ll never have to use it.”181 While Wallenberg may not have been a typical diplomat in appearance, he had the persuasion and negotiating skills to be affective in this domain. Eight days after his arrival Wallenberg submitted his first report on the present situation of the Jewish population to the Swedish Foreign Office.182
Using sources contained in the lists of names he bought with him from Sweden, this initial report created an account that has been praised for its remarkable accuracy and, to this day, “scholars have not been able to surpass the report in its precision.”183 Sent from Budapest on 18 July 1944, the report focussed on several key topics. Details of the poor conditions of the Jews being held in deportation collection centres were provided by informants, who outlined insufficient food and water resources being provided to those awaiting selection and transportation, the extremely poor health conditions of those imprisoned, the invasive body searches by the SS, and the inadequate housing provided while they wait for their names to be called and to be loaded onto the trains.184
178 Anger, p. 50. 179 Lévai, p. 46. 180 Anger, p. 50. 181 Ibid. 182 Lévai, p. 50. 183 Rosenfeld, p. 31. 184 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, pp. 235-6.
36 Wallenberg identified the reactions of the Hungarian public in relation to the treatment of the Jewish population. He outlines in the report a sense of shame and guilt being displayed by the greater Hungarian population.185 He perceived an increasing sympathy towards their persecution, including measures of positive intervention such as provided small amounts of food or hiding places, in reaction to the turning tide of the war. He felt that the Hungarian people were wary that their governments treatment of the Jewish population was affection their perception externally, which may be costly in the event of losing the war.186 The report briefly covers the brutality of the deportations, the minute amounts of food and water provided to each wagon and how many die over the five-day long journey, and confirms the belief that only able-bodied men and young women are kept alive to work upon arrival at Auschwitz-Birkenau and Waldsee, with all other killed shortly after arriving.187 The report assesses the likelihood of Jews escaping under the present conditions. Wallenberg states that “the Jews of Budapest are completely apathetic and do virtually nothing to save themselves.”188 He outlines the available options for escape at that time, such as conversion to Catholicism or acquiring Aryan papers, but indicates that these methods have had little success. Furthermore, he assesses the viability of bribes and other forms of corruption, it which he has evidence that shows Jews have been able to buy permission to be deported in extreme circumstances, but he no evidence of people being able to escape the concentration or death camps with this method.189
This report was followed up on 29 July 1944 with an update specifying further horrific details. In regards to the treatment of the deported Jews, Wallenberg outlines the violent attacks that come with the selection process, often leaving the victims with open wounds and bruises. From a reliable eyewitness account, he indicates that “the passengers were allowed to keep food and drink” that they brought with them, but the railcar remained seal upon departure for the entire four and a half day journey, and no further food was offered. The only water
185 Ibid., p. 236. 186 Ibid., pp 236-7. 187 Ibid., p.236. 188 Ibid., p. 238. 189 Ibid., pp. 237-238.
37 provided was that given through the intervention of generous people along the way. The cramped conditions caused immense heat and discomfort, causing one individual to die along the way of this particular individuals account, and two others to go mad.190 Wallenberg believed that the general mood of the population was changing during this period, with general opposition to the Jewish question growing. Despite of this development, no form of action had occurred.191 This report also evaluated the power held by the Head of State, Regent Horthy, on Jewish policy. Wallenberg felt that Horthy still held a lot of persuasive power regarding the decision making in this area, which is shown in his decision to cease all deportations and to send two trains back carrying Jewish intellectuals.192 He felt that Horthy remained in a position of final authority on the matter and could be persuaded by foreign opposition to intervene on behalf of the Jewish people.193 After a letter from the Swedish King, Admiral Horthy ceased all deportation on July 7 and claimed to do everything in his power to ensure humanitarian and legal principles were respected.194 But this was not secure enough to protect the most vulnerable, especially as pressure from Nazi commanders and Hungarian anti-Semites continued to grow. At the end of this report Wallenberg included an estimated figures of deported Jews so far, which was approximately 333,000 up until July 1, and believed to be as high as 680,000 as of July 12.195 Once Wallenberg had a grasp of the situation and current state of affairs, he began developing a plan to assist as many affected Jews as possible. This became the origins of the Shutzpass, the protective passport.
Prior to Wallenberg’s arrival in Budapest, the Swedish Minister to Hungary and head of the legation in Budapest, Ivan Danielsson, had been authorising passports to be provided on very strict grounds.196 Thousands of Jews applied for the document, but they could only be provided to people that had family links to Sweden or established business connections that were of importance to Swedish
190 Ibid., p. 241. 191 Ibid., p. 240. 192 Ibid., pp. 240-241. 193 Ibid. 194 Rosenfeld, p. 33. 195 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, pp. 242-243. 196 Marton, p. 77.
38 trade.197 In order to ensure the documents currency and to protect the legations credibility and that of Ambassador Danielsson in Stockholm, only 700 of these protective passes had been issued by July 1944.198 Those lucky enough to hold one of these protective passes were exempt from wearing the yellow star, which identified Jews to the public, and were provided the rights of Swedish citizens.199 The passes were provided with the intention of eventually repatriating the holders to Sweden, once travel documentation from both Hungary and Germany was provided.200
Susan Avidan and her family were lucky to receive protection by the Swedish legation before Wallenberg’s expansion of the shutzpass concept. She had a half- sister and other family members that had fled from Hungary to Sweden. When these family members heard that Wallenberg was travelling to Budapest on his mission, they provided the names of family members to be included in one of the lists Wallenberg bought with him. Her relatives wrote to her parents, informing them that Wallenberg was coming on a rescue mission and that he may be in a position to help them. Susan recalls that her mother met with Wallenberg, who organised for them to have a letter from the Swedish Red Cross allowing them to be protected and to stay in the capital. She remembers the authorities accepting these documents and that they had been effective in providing some protection.201 The recognition of documents, such as those held by Susan Avidan and her family, became a vital step in the extension of the provision of protective documents by Wallenberg and the Swedish legation. Knowing that such a document was to be respected by the Hungarian and German authorities meant that greater protection could be provided to the pass holders, and that the development of the idea could be justified to Ambassador Danielsson and the Swedish Foreign Office.
197 Ibid. 198 Ibid. 199 Ibid. 200 Marton, p. 77, Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 245. 201 Susan Avidan, Testimony #5216, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive.
39 Wallenberg saw an opportunity to expand this shutzpass concept to provide protection for more Jews. Aware of the psychology of bureaucracy, Wallenberg began creating a new design for the protective passport, that in itself would be persuasive for Nazi and government officials to accept. Using his artistic training, he drafted a concept that contained the Swedish three-crown emblem and the colours of yellow and blue.202 The new document would contain a photograph of the holder and would contain Wallenberg’s signature and that of Ambassador Danielsson.203 According to author Danny Smith, staff at the legation questioned whether Danielsson would accept the proposal. Wallenberg responded that he would be able to convince the Ambassador and that the focus should be on whether the document would have a psychological impact on the SS guards.204 As the SS guards and members of the various Hungarian paramilitary forces were involved in the enforcement of policy regarding Jews, as well as the selection process as deportation centres around the city, they needed to believe the authenticity of the document and be persuaded by its official nature to such a degree that they would recognise the rights provided to the holder. 1500 of these passes were printed initially with the bearer, in effect, provisionally a Swede.205 The intention was that the holder of the pass would later emigrate to Sweden and therefore was under the protection of the Swedish government until that could occur.206 As the holders of these passes were considered to be foreign nationals, they were no longer required to wear the discriminatory mark of the yellow star.207 This provided the holder with further freedom to move about the city and escape the attention of the law enforcement officers and Arrow Cross.
Fundamental to the successful implementation of the protective passport concept was convincing the Nazi, Arrow Cross and other officials to recognise the significance of the document. The official impression of the document was vital to achieving this aim. Wallenberg recognised “that many of the Nazi soldiers and
202 Lester, p. 87. 203 Ibid. 204 Danny Smith, Wallenberg: Lost Hero, Basingstoke, 1986, p. 66. 205 Smith, p. 66, Lester p. 87. 206 Lester, p. 87. 207 Lévai, p. 78.
40 their back-ups were poorly educated young men who would be impressed with an official-looking document.”208 This point was amplified by propaganda spread around Budapest proclaiming the required acknowledgment of the shutzpass. Wallenberg arranged the printing and publication of large posters and billboards declaring the authenticity of the protective passport and how the document provided the holder the rights of a Swedish citizen.209 This advertising targeted the Nazis to familiarise them with the authenticity of the document.210
As the Jewish population of Budapest became aware of the chance to gain a Swedish protective passport, the demand on the Swedish legation staff increasingly mounted. According to official reports, Wallenberg was permitted to set up a specific office in the B section of the Swedish embassy. He spent some of the funding provided from the War Refugee Board on office supplies and borrowed other necessities from contacts.211 The legation annex, based in Minerva Street, was swamped with Jews queuing for the same thing: a shutzpass.212 This operation centre, known as ‘Section C’, was established overnight to become the initial headquarters for the rescue operation. Funded by the War Refugee Board and donations from wealthy Jewish families and organisations, the building was organised and furnished, and Wallenberg handpicked the staff to help run the operations.213 Within days, 40 workers operated within three buildings and several automobiles were purchased to support the mission.214 The staff members, Wallenberg explained in a report to the Swedish Foreign Office in Stockholm, had to be sourced primarily from the Jewish population. There was a shortage of “Christian labour”, which meant that even the Gestapo “has had to employ Jews.”215 The Swiss legation in Budapest had a pre-existing agreement with the Hungarian authorities allowing them to hire Jewish staff and exempting these staff-members from wearing the yellow
208 Smith, p. 67. 209 Ibid. 210 Ibid. 211 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 244. 212 Frederick E. Werbell, & Thurston Clarke, Lost Hero: The Mystery of Raoul Wallenberg, New York, 1982, p. 34. 213 Smith, p. 67. 214 Ibid. 215 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 244.
41 star, and this arrangement was applicable to the Swedish embassy as well.216 As a result, the majority of the 40 staff who were Jewish were granted some protection for purely working for the Swedish legation.
Drawn from the USC Shoah Archive testimonies, survivors’ stories of accessing a shutzpass and the protection it provided illustrate the effectiveness of this program. Magda Hearst and Marianne Granat both managed to meet with Wallenberg and show links with Sweden in order to gain a protective passport. Magda Hearst had a contact with a non-Jew who had business connections in Sweden. She approached this contact to request them to arrange for their Swedish connections to send a telegram stating that a relationship existed between them. Such a telegram was sent containing her name and those of the family members, which she presented to Wallenberg in order to gain the protection of the legation. At first, she recalled, Wallenberg did not believe that she was Jewish as she did not reveal this fact upon meeting Wallenberg. Once this issue was clarified he arranged protective passes for all her family members.217
Marianne Granat had been in correspondence with a Swedish girl her age during school. This was presumably some kind of pen pal. Marianne went with a Christian friend to see Wallenberg to ask whether this contact was adequate to show an existing relationship with Sweden, and therefore she would be eligible for a shutzpass. She met with Wallenberg at the Swedish embassy and asked whether she could receive protection for her family and whether they could stay at the embassy or in a Swedish protected house. Wallenberg looked up her contact in a Swedish phonebook to verify the connection. Marianne recalls that Wallenberg offered her family protection, but said that only she could stay in the legations’ protected house, as there was a limited amount of room available. In her testimony she said that Wallenberg was not particular kind to her on this occasion, more focussed on determining whether she had a legitimate link to his
216 Ibid. 217 Madga Hearst, Testimony #7428, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive.
42 home nation. At this time he could only offer protection to people with a direct connection with Sweden.218
The beginning of August 1944 saw Wallenberg meet with several key Hungarian officials to establish an understanding between the Hungarian administration and the Swedish legation. On August 1, Wallenberg met with Admiral Horthy and explained to him the function of the shutzpass and urged the Hungarian leader to transform his temporary suspension of deportation into a permanent agreement.219 Impressed by Wallenberg’s argument, the Regent asked him to submit an anonymous report regarding the protective passes and other means to act leniently towards Hungary’s “Jewish Problem”, which he would pass on to the cabinet to be considered.220 Wallenberg explained, in a document dated August 6 1944, that he submitted a report to Horthy that “ended with the demand that individuals with collective passports should be exempted from wearing the Star of David, and that the clergy be given greater freedom to speak their mind.”221 Historians Frederick E. Werbell and Thurston Clarke state that this report additionally recommended that Christian clergymen could intervene on behalf of Jewish converts and that Eichmann’s SS units be expelled from the country.222 Author Danny Smith claims that Wallenberg told a colleague back at the legation that Horthy was an imposing figure, “but during my audience, [he] felt morally taller than him.”223
On August 3, Wallenberg met with Lieutenant-Colonel Ferenczy, the Hungarian Minister of Interior and Head of the Gendarmes.224 Ferenczy had assisted Eichmann in arranging the deportation of Jews in provincial Hungary and was a powerful and influential figure who willing to assist the Nazis in their campaign against Hugarian Jews.225 Wallenberg reported back to the Swedish Foreign
218 Marianne Granat, Testimony #8787, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive. 219 Werbell & Clarke, p. 36. 220 Ibid. 221 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 248. 222 Werbell & Clarke, p. 36. 223 Smith, p. 69. 224 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 248. 225 Werbell & Clarke, p. 36.
43 Office on this meeting, revealing that Ferenczy “would welcome an even greater number of Jews leaving for Sweden and confirmed that they might be allowed to stay in special houses under Swedish protection before their departure.”226 This is evidence of remarkable progress that had been made by Wallenberg with the Hungarian authorities in less than a month since arriving in Budapest. The support for protective housing provided by the Swedish legation for shutzpass holders would later develop into the establishment of the so-called “international ghetto” in Budapest. This report from Wallenberg additionally outlined measures to rent a Jewish property to provide housing for some protected Jews and the plans to make this street a collection centre.227 Furthermore, he revealed that from the Ferenczy meeting, “the general decision to deport the Jewish population of Budapest was unresolved, but they were now in the process of securing reassurances from Germany that no harm would befall them.”228
The Hungarian officials that Wallenberg confronted would, on most occasions, submit to his demands due to the various persuasive techniques he used. By the time Wallenberg had established his influence in Budapest, the Allies had been victorious in several key battles and it was becoming clear that Hitler was losing the war.229 Wallenberg exploited this uncertainty when confronting key Hungarian figures, such as Horthy and Ferenczy. As Werbell and Clarke explain, he “exploited their fears that they would be tried as war criminals. He threatened them with trials and pretended that he had the authority to guarantee exemptions. He acted as if the war was over and he was the victor’s first Hungarian representative.”230 Increasing rumours circulating in Budapest enhanced Wallenberg’s hints towards retribution after the war, as he explained in a report to the Foreign Ministry, that people were starting to believe “that the postwar courts have already begun to operate, and they have especially focused on those responsible for the persecution of the Jews.”231 This argument resonated with many as Hungarian officials had already approached the Allies secretly to
226 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 248. 227 Ibid., p. 249. 228 Ibid., pp. 248-249. 229 Werbell & Clarke, p. 37. 230 Ibid. 231 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 246.
44 establish a peace along the lines of the agreement with Italy.232 During these secret negotiations between the Allies and Hungary, Horthy spoke of his willingness to protect Jews in order to show his defiance of the Nazis intentions.233 Wallenberg elaborates on this point in a report, stating that, “the Jewish policy is feared to be seriously injurious to the country when peace is concluded, especially in comparison to Romania.”234
Wallenberg used his relationship with Horthy against his subordinates effectively as another means of persuasion. If an official would not accept Wallenberg’s authority or would be reluctant to provide an answer, he would threaten to go over there head and straight to the Regent, who would be upset that such a trivial matter had to be handled by him.235 Furthermore, he would inform the official that the Swedish government would have to be informed of this development and that they would not look very favourably on it.236 Additionally, Wallenberg used the embassy’s capacity to send formal protest notes to the Government condemning their actions. Often supported by similar notes from the other remaining neutral embassies in Hungary, they would continue to send protest notes until the issue was recognised and addressed.
Prior to departing Sweden, Wallenberg had indicated a willingness to use bribes to save lives.237 This tactic, while ostensibly unconventional for a diplomat, was an important option for Wallenberg. He understood that certain individuals could not persuaded by fear or even be mislead and deceived into assisting his rescue mission. Therefore bribes were necessary in attempt to convince those only influenced by greed. This particular persuasive tactic was very effective in the latter stages of the war after Regent Horthy was overthrown and the Arrow Cross took control and allowed the Nazis to run loose. During this period of chaos,
232 Erez, p. 616. 233 Ibid., p. 618. 234 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 246. (Romania surrendered to the advancing Soviet forces on 23 August 1944. King Michael met with Soviet leaders and changed his allegiance to the Soviet cause. Romanian forces turned against the Germans and assisted Soviet efforts) 235 Smith, p. 70 236 Ibid. 237 Lester, pp. 62-63, Marton, p. 39.
45 with the Soviet forces bearing down on the capital, the remnants of the Hungarian leadership was in disarray. For Wallenberg to continue his rescue mission in this chaotic environment, he often held no other choice than attempt to bribe remaining officials to save the lives of the remaining Jews of Budapest.
The protective passports provided by Wallenberg and the Swedish legation assisted not only those who managed to gain access to the document, but to those who did not become protégés of Sweden. When news of the shutzpass spread in Budapest, it provided hope for the Jewish population. When its effectiveness became apparent and the document was recognised by the Hungarian officials, the protective passport concept provided an awakening from the indifference, submission and hopelessness that had flooded the Jewish community. No longer did Jews in Budapest believe it was merely a matter of time until they would vanish like those already lost, they were provided with a reason to believe that they could escape, that they could hold on and that they could survive. On numerous occasions Wallenberg wrote in reports to Stockholm of concerns about the Jews of Budapest’s apathy towards their own fate. In an official report to Stockholm dated July 29 1944, Wallenberg wrote that, “We have to rid the Jews of the feeling that they have been forgotten”.238 He continues by stating that, “The greatest value of a successful repatriation effort, or the establishment of a Red Cross camp or financial aid, is that it would inspire hope in the breasts of a hundred thousand Jews and awaken their now paralysed instincts of self- preservation.”239 Wallenberg recognised the importance of the moral of the Jewish community and their willingness to improves their chances to save themselves. While the shutzpass itself provided increased safety for the holder in relation to those without, Wallenberg knew that the hope that would come with this objective of the rescue mission would be equally valuable.
When Ervin Forrester was captured and taken to the Gestapo headquarters in the hills on the outskirts of Budapest, he thought his time had come. He was categorised as a deserter of a forced labour battalion that had the role of assisting the Hungarian Army. He was taken into the holding cell with another prisoner
238 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p 246. 239 Ibid.
46 and was told that all of those captured including him would be shot. This individual who he shared his cell had a Swedish shutzpass and was subsequently released by the authorities. Forrester recognised how valuable the protective passport had been in this situation and decided to try his own luck in attempt to be freed from certain death. Seizing an opportunity to escape, thanks to realising that the shutzpass was providing some protection, Forrester claimed that he was also a citizen under the protection of the Swedish government. He claimed that during his arrest his protective passport was taken away from him. The authorities at the facility, obviously aware of the recognition the passes had been granted, followed up the matter by calling the Swedish legation. They were transferred directly to speak with Wallenberg who asked for specific details about the prisoner. Unbeknown to the Gestapo authorities, which believed Wallenberg was searching his records to confirm whether or not he in fact held a protective passport, Wallenberg was taking down details to manufacture the document in order to save Ervin Forrester’s life. Forrester recalls that after the phone conversation, Wallenberg arrived within the hour with a passport for him and the guards subsequently released him upon presentation of the shutzpass. This daring chance taken by Forrester in attempt to preserve his life shows how individuals were willing to take chances knowing that there was a slim opportunity to survive. The protective passports provided this glimmer of hope. Forrester says that it was Wallenberg that saved him from certain death, as without the protective pass he would have died alongside all the other prisoners whom were executed.240
Arnold Fiala did not believe that the protective passports would be effective. He thought that the Germans would ignore the document and continue to kill indiscriminately. Fiala was lucky as he had permission to move about Budapest because he worked in a labour group that cleaned up rubble after bombing raids. This freedom meant that he was in a position to save himself, so he never tried to gain a shutzpass. While he did not think that Wallenberg’s plan would work, he was happy that it was successful and took measures to assist the protected Jews. Fiala would hire a horse and cart on weekends to assist Jews moving into
240 Ervin Forrester, Testimony #1278, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive.
47 Swedish safe houses. He put himself at great risk providing this assistance, as he did not have the protection of the Swedish government. Yet he provided his services regardless of this risk, just like Wallenberg who continued to help the Jews of Budapest even though the Nazis and Arrow Cross were trying to kill him.241
Stories of those saved from the clutches of the Nazis and Arrow Cross provide the best indication of how the protective passes transformed the lives of so many. On 21 December 1944, Anna Boskovitz was on her way to visit some family members when she was confronted by a police officer and ordered to show her documents. This officer deduced quickly that she was Jewish and took her to the nearby Arrow Cross headquarters where she was locked in the basement with several other captured Jews. Anna was fearing for her life as their was a frequent rumour around that the Arrow Cross were taking Jewish prisoners out onto the banks of the Danube, the river that divides the city into Buda and Pest, tying the prisoners into groups and executing one member, before throwing them into the near freezing waters.242 Arnold Fiala recalls in his testimony that these rumours about executions on the banks of the Danube were true, and Wallenberg acted to intervene. The victims were tied together before one was shot and killed, then both would be thrown into the river, with the remaining living victim being weighed down in the water by the murdered other. Fiala says that Wallenberg helped saved some of these people, pulling them out of the water himself.243 Due to the risk involved in travelling through the city, Anna had promised to call her parents on arrival. When they failed to receive a call they became very concerned as they knew she would be passing near the Arrow Cross headquarters. Her parents managed to contact Wallenberg at the Swedish legation and he immediately rang the officer in charge of the Arrow Cross headquarters. Somehow Wallenberg bluffed the Arrow Cross officer and Anna was taken up from the basement to be interrogated. The officer asked her a few questions before releasing her back onto the street. Anna quickly returned back home to the
241 Arnold Fiala, Testimony #1126, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive. 242 Anna Boskovitz, Testimony #13347, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive. 243 Arnold Fiala, Testimony #1126.
48 safety of her parents, who revealed that Wallenberg had been involved in gaining her release. She recalls being told that Wallenberg said to her parents in German after hearing of her release, “Madam, I had hardly any hope we would succeed.”244 Anna was saved from the clutches of the Arrow Cross without holding a protective passport. It was Wallenberg’s negotiations and bluffing, and the legitimacy and respect granted to the shutzpass that provided hope to the Jews of Budapest, whether they were under the protection of the neutral embassy or not.
Beyond providing hope to those who had so long been without, the protective passports provided by the Swedish legation additionally saved lives of those people lucky to be holders of the document. Elizabeth Goldsmith and Veronica Besnyoe both experienced similar horrors and were saved by Wallenberg because they held a shutzpass.
Elizabeth Goldsmith was caught by the Arrow Cross in Saint Marks Square removing her yellow star. She was transported to a holding facility where she was grouped with other captured Jews. They were sorted in groups in preparation to be shifted to the deportation yards. Then Wallenberg arrived. When he entered the building he asked loudly whether any of the Jewish prisoners held the passes. Wallenberg explained to the soldiers that they could not transport any Jews holding the passes to the deportation yard, eventually persuading them to recognise the legitimacy of the document. Elizabeth had luckily been issued a pass and she was released. She recalls running home and discussing her ordeal with her parents. They were so shocked by this development that they immediately accepted an offer to move into a Swedish protected house.245
Veronica Besnyoe shared a similar experience. She was removed from her home with her family and taken to the common assembly area for Jews to be deported, the brick factory. She was told that the group was to be forcibly marched to the Austrian border, where they would then be transported to the camps. Veronica
244 Anna Boskovitz, Testimony #13347. 245 Elizabeth Goldsmith, Testimony #2371, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive.
49 and her family spent four days at the factory awaiting their forced movement. On the fourth day, Wallenberg arrived to save the lives of people holding the protective passes. The Arrow Cross and Gestapo agents allowed the holders of the shutzpasses to be released. Veronica claimed that Wallenberg alone saved several hundred Jews on that day.246
246 Veronica Besnyoe, Testimony #2687, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive.
50 Chapter 4: An International Ghetto
Wallenberg’s meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Laszlo Ferency established the origins of the so-called international ghetto.247 Sweden and the other remaining neutral legations purchased and rented properties on the Pest side of the city that could house Jews holding protected passports. Negotiations for this protected area began under the Horthy government and were finalised by the Szalasi regime.248 The occupant of these building, in which Wallenberg had gained protection, were granted permission to stay in this specific, independent ghetto while they waited to be deported to Sweden.249
The order from Ferenczy to relocate the protected Jews to the international ghetto came on November 7 1944. Wallenberg and his supporters were only provided three days to transfer fifteen thousand people into their new housing.250 The neutral legations protested at this time limit, as it was inadequate and unrealistic, with many of the buildings still housing non-Jewish families that were reluctant to leave.251 Then, as the Jews moved into their new protected residences, roving groups of Arrow Cross members robbed and beat them, with some having their remaining possessions taken and other being dragged into cellars and physically assaulted.252
As Per Anger recalls, “the buildings comprising the ghetto were furnished with Jewish stars and were under the protection of the legations.”253 The previously established Swedish houses, used by the Jewish workers that were assisting Wallenberg’s rescue mission, were integrated into this international ghetto and became part of the thirty buildings under the protection of the Swedish embassy.254 As Rosenfeld explains, as the number of protective passes issued increased, so did the number of people smuggled into these buildings at night
247 Lester, p. 93. 248 Anger, p. 67. 249 Rosenfeld, p. 41. 250 Ibid, p. 55. 251 Ibid. 252 Werbell & Clarke, p. 119. 253 Anger, p. 67. 254 Ibid.
51 thanks to the protection of darkness. In order to accommodate these extra numbers, mattresses were spread on the floors and often 20 people were allocated into each room.255 Not only did they manage to sneak Jews into the protected housing without the knowledge of the authorities, Wallenberg also secured food sources to ensure that the people under his protection could be fed on a daily basis.256
Wallenberg established a complex organisation to manage the international ghetto. This organisation not only managed the protected housing, but also ten properties used as offices for the workers assisting Wallenberg, as well as two hospitals which specialised in epidemic diseases.257 The organisation was divided into four divisions that had specific roles. The social services divisions focussed primarily on the needs of children, the elderly and the unwell. It helped manage the children’s home that featured supervised activities led by teachers. The Red Cross played a fundamental role in assisting this division and caring for the health and nutritional needs for those exceptionally vulnerable to the extreme conditions they have been forced to endure.258 The provision division was tasked with the role of purchasing food supplies for the international ghetto. They were provided 2 million Hungarian Pengös to feed the ghetto and organise a soup kitchen that fed thousands of people at every meal.259 The housing division maintained up to date lists of the inhabitants and details of what type of protection they had, e.g. whether they had received a shutzpass from the Swedish legation or a different protective document from the Swiss or other neutral embassies, or if they had no protective documents at all. Furthermore, this division managed the housing and supervised the day-to-day issues that arose.260 The management section was tasked with special responsibilities. Their role focussed on the financing of the international ghetto, as well as dealing with information, housing maintenance and legal questions.261
255 Rosenfeld, p. 55 256 Ibid., p. 41. 257 Rosenfeld, p. 55. 258 Ibid., p. 56. 259 Ibid. 260 Ibid. 261 Ibid.
52
Wallenberg reported to the King of Sweden on 8 December 1944 that the international ghetto was holding 33,000 occupants at that time, many more that the approved number of 17,000 granted by the Hungarian authorities.262 As conditions deteriorated over time for the remaining Jews of Budapest, those living in the protected houses were in a better position that there counterparts. As the Nazi war efforts continued to fail to stop the approaching Soviet forces, the remaining radical German and Arrow Cross elements began to take more extreme measures against the remnants of the Jewish community. As the Horthy regime was overthrown and Szalasi and the Arrow Cross were placed into power with the backing of Eichmann and the Gestapo, Jews faced an increased threat as the Nazi’s attempted to make a last grasp effort of eliminating this remaining pocket of European Jewry.
Luckily, those in the international ghetto were provided greater protection compared to those exposed to the full-scale evil of Eichmann’s men. The belief that these people in this ghetto were still protected for being citizens of Sweden and other neutral nations continued to persuade authorities. Consequently, this continued to provide protection not only for many shutzpass holders, but also those living in buildings distinguished with the flags and markings of neutral nations. This protection combined with better medical facilities and housing condition increased the chances of these Jews surviving until the approaching Soviet armies could liberate the city.
On Christmas Eve 1944, Lilly Wolf shared a unique experience with Wallenberg. Lilly had several family members who had been moved into the Swedish protected houses and was looking for an opportunity for herself and her brother to join them. On the day before Christmas, Wallenberg arrived at the central ghetto to speak with the Jewish leadership. He had somehow gained permission to move 23 Jews from this ghetto and into his international ghetto. As Wallenberg could not speak Hungarian, Lilly Wolf translated his German so the Jewish leaders could understand. When the 23 Jews had been selected, they were
262 Ibid.
53 organised into two marching columns. Lilly spoke to Wallenberg and stated that she wanted to leave with him, and she also wanted her brother to come too. As her brother was not present at the time, Wallenberg said that he would not be able to save both of them as there was not enough time. Lilly decided to go with Wallenberg without her brother. By this stage it was dark, so Wallenberg ordered Lilly to hide between the two marching columns as they left the ghetto and headed to the protected houses. Policemen escorted them for this entire trip, but nobody noticed Lilly crouched between the two marching columns. Because Lilly did not have protective passport, she had to remain inside the protective houses for the remainder of the war to keep safe.263
Another testimony of survival is from Veronica Besnyoe, who was saved by Wallenberg at the Brick-factory in Budapest. Taken from impending transportation to a death camp, Veronica was luckily saved and transferred to the Red Cross Children’s Home, which was a part of the international ghetto. She managed to survive thanks to the relative safety of this Red Cross protected facility until the Soviets liberated the city. Veronica later found out that Wallenberg had been actively involved in establishing the international ghetto and assisted the Red Cross help Jewish children who were exceptionally vulnerable to the violent attacks of the Nazi’s and Arrow Cross.264
Unfortunately, not all those that were moved into the international ghetto were safe from being deported to death camps. Eva Ferenci was lucky enough to be moved into the international ghetto, but even though she was provided this greater protection, she was still deported. Eva was taken during a raid on one of the protected houses and forcible deported by train to Ravensbruck in Germany.265 Eva’s story is an unusual example, as the vast majority of those who were deported, from either the general ghetto or the international ghetto, did not manage to survive their deportation experience.
263 Lilly Wolf, Testimony #1363, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive. 264 Veronica Besnyoe, Testimony #2687. 265 Eva Ferenci, Testimony #2447, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive.
54 Magda Grozinger recalls the exempted Swedish houses to contain mainly families, excluding husbands who were often away working in forced labour battalions. She remembers that after the Arrow Cross overthrew the Horthy regime, the shutzpasses were no longer recognised or accepted. The Arrow Cross, with their capacities to target the remaining Jewish population unleashed with Szalasi in power, began to attempt to liquidate the international ghetto. Those that were taken from the protected houses were tracked by Wallenberg in attempt to save them. Magda remembers that Wallenberg saved a large number of children from the international ghetto in the final stages of the war in Hungary. During this period, she says, there was anarchy and the Arrow Cross was launching rampant attacks on the protected houses. She recollects that Wallenberg moved many of these children to the Red Cross Children’s homes where they were kept safe until the war ended.266
The Soviets began their siege of Budapest on December 8 1944.267 The inevitable, looming defeat meant that Eichmann and his Nazi and Arrow Cross subordinates were willing to take increasingly extreme actions to eliminate the remaining Jews of Hungary. As the Arrow Cross death squads launched attacks, Wallenberg counterattacked through the channels available to him as a diplomat, and when he had no other options, as an “underground guerrilla”.268 He constantly filed protest notes with the various German and Hungarian authorities that were left in control of the city as it was being bombarded by Russian artillery. An insider in the Arrow Cross had warned Wallenberg that his life was in immediate danger, but he continued to take the necessary actions to protect Jews under his protection.269 Wallenberg had been informed that the 35,000 Jews living in the international ghetto were going to be forced to move into the general ghetto. This order came from Erno Vajna, the head of the Arrow Cross at this time, who has been described as “a rabid anti-Semite who stayed on to oversee the extermination of the city’s Jews.”270 Wallenberg’s immediate concern was
266 Magda Grozinger, Testimony #3859, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive. 267 Marton, p. 129. 268 Werbell & Clarke, p. 131. 269 Marton, p. 138. 270 Ibid, p. 139.
55 the safety of the protected Jews as they were being moved, as he had little doubt that the Arrow Cross would attack them and steal any valuables or food they had, and that the move of these Jews into the central ghetto would make them increasingly vulnerable to a last-minute pogrom.271 These fears were amplified when an informant told Wallenberg that Vajna intended to exterminate his Jews with machine guns once they entered the general ghetto.272 On January 5 1945, 5000 Jews were transferred from the protected houses into the general ghetto, in spite of the protests. The following day, the remaining 37,000 residents of the international ghetto were ordered to stand in front of their houses to await transfer. At the last minute, thanks to Wallenberg’s negotiating skills, the march across the city was postponed 48 hours. On January 7, Wallenberg struck a deal with Vajna. He exchanged food reserves that he had saved to feed the international ghetto, for the safety of the Jews under the protection of the neutral embassies. Wallenberg was willing to sacrifice these food stores, besides three days worth of supplies, as he anticipated that the Soviet army would liberate the Pest side of the river in the coming days.273 In the end, this food offered by Wallenberg was never collected by the Hungarian Army, and was later distributed to Jews during the final stages of the liberation of the city by the Soviets.274
The pending Russian liberation of the city forced some Hungarian officials to change sides to protect their own interests or to protest the increasingly violent and extreme measures used by the Arrow Cross. Wallenberg only had one means to confront the Arrow Cross death squads that were randomly raiding the international ghetto to publicly execute Jews, and that means was information. With these newly formed contacts inside the remaining Nazi authorities and the Arrow Cross, Wallenberg could confront the aggressors and convince them to stop their actions at great personal risk.275 He would attempt to persuade the perpetrators to stop by using his official position as a deterrent to continue attacking people under his protection. Furthermore, Wallenberg would use
271 Werbell & Clarke, p. 131. 272 Ibid. 273 Ibid., p.. 131-132. 274 Lévai, p. 190. 275 Werbell & Clarke, p. 133-134.
56 bribes, such as cash payments and fake documents to help them flee the nearby Soviet forces, or threats of war crimes trials to convince police officers and other officials to help protect the Jews under his guardianship.276 During this time Wallenberg’s life was constantly at risk, as both the remaining Germans and the Arrow Cross were attempting to kill him. Wallenberg would never sleep at the same location on consecutive nights to prevent assassins from trailing him, and he continued to carry a revolver with him at all times.277 Just carrying a weapon was a huge risk, but a necessary one for Wallenberg, as the Arrow Cross were executing on the spot any civilian caught carrying a firearm.278 Despite all these personal risks and increasingly extreme and malicious violent acts by the Arrow Cross, who were causing anarchy throughout the city, Wallenberg continued to assist the Jews of Budapest.
Lenke Moskovic was saved by Wallenberg from a forced march and was transported to a Swedish protected house in the international ghetto. This so- called protected house proved to be a factory, and Lenke recalls that the protection provided by the Swedish government prevented the SS and Arrow Cross from harassing the residents. While she recalls this protection in hindsight, there was constant fear until liberation. Rumours circulated around the city that Adolf Eichmann had approached Wallenberg just prior to his departure from Budapest to a safer location. During this conversation Eichmann apparently told him that the Germans were going to blow up the ghettos when withdrawing from the city.279 Historians have since discovered that the Nazis intended to kill those Jews still surviving in the general ghetto.280 Wallenberg’s intelligence sources inside the Arrow Cross informed his that Eichmann had ordered five hundred Waffen SS soldiers and an unspecified number of Arrow Cross members to massacre Jews living in the general ghetto, while two hundred policeman would
276 Ibid., p. 133. 277 Smith, p. 111. 278 Werbell & Clarke, p. 135. 279 Lenke Moskovic, Testimony #29243, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive. 280 Smith, p. 114, John Biernan, Righteous Gentile: The Story of Raoul Wallenberg, Missing Hero of the Holocaust, New York, 1981, p. 115.
57 surround the area to ensure that nobody would escape.281 Physically exhausted and emotionally drained, Wallenberg managed to compose one last victory. Unable to enter the streets during daylight due to the risk to his own personal safety, Wallenberg sent a diplomatic message to SS General August Schmidthuber, the officer in charge of this final action.282 Schmidthuber was described at this stage as “concerned more with his immediate future than his loyalty to the Reich.”283 Wallenberg’s message apparently told Schmidthuber that if this pogrom proceeded and Jews died, he would personally testify at the War Crimes Tribunal to insure that he is hung for murder.284 Historian John Biernan describes the decisive moments:
With the Russian advance guard now no more than a couple of hundred yards from the ghetto and inching forward constantly, the massacre had to be carried out quickly, if at all. There would be no time to find Wallenberg and silence him first. In a fury of indecision, Schmidthuber paced up and down his command headquarters. Finally, his nerve broke. He picked up his telephone and ordered that on no account was the ghetto action to take place. Wallenberg had won his last victory.285
Wallenberg’s colleague at the Swedish legation Per Anger recalls how shaken Schmidthuber was by Wallenberg’s warning.286 Anger had pleaded insistently with Wallenberg to stay on the Buda side of the Danube River as it was safer, but Wallenberg would not listen.287 This occurred on the last time Anger saw Wallenberg, in which he responded “I’d never be able to go back to Stockholm without knowing inside myself I’d done all a man could do to save as many Jews as possible.”288 Wallenberg chose to stay on the Pest side of the river and was the only foreign diplomat to do so. When the Russians entered the general ghetto they found 69,000 Jews alive there, and later another 25,000 alive in the international ghetto. A further 25,000 Jews emerged from hiding provided by
281 Biernan, p. 115. 282 Smith, p. 115. 283 Ibid. 284 Ibid. 285 Biernan, p. 116. 286 Anger, p. 93. 287 Ibid, p. 86. 288 Ibid, p. 89.
58 monasteries, churches and Gentiles.289 While the international ghetto was under Wallenberg’s direct protection, in the final stages of the war he also worked to save the Jews of the general ghetto. Anger describes how “he could sometimes arrange for food deliveries to the starving, and he managed on several occasions to forestall the Arrow Crossmen’s rampages in the ghetto.”290 Therefore, according to Anger, Wallenberg should be considered the rescuer of not only the 25,000 Jews in the international ghetto, but the additional 70,000 stranded in the central ghetto.291
289 Biernan, p. 116. 290 Anger, p. 92. 291 Ibid., pp 92-93.
59 Chapter 5: Deportations and Death Marches
When Eichmann returned to Budapest in October 1944, after the removal of the Horthy regime and the implementation of a fascist puppet government, he had to adapt to the changing circumstances of the war. Eichmann and his powers of destruction still threatened this remaining pocket of European Jewry in Hungary, but the process of achieving extermination took a new transformation. The pending Russian front and the initial devastation of the train networks throughout Nazi occupied territories required him to act quickly to kill as many remaining Jews as possible. Those trains still capable of being used were allocated to the last stand of the German army, so Eichmann developed a unique means to the already established deadly end. It was decided that remaining Jews would be forcibly marched in groups to the border of the Reich, where they would be transported to concentration and death camps.292 These so-called ‘death marches’ were a new struggle for Wallenberg to confront. The proximity of the Soviet forces made it apparent that the war was over, it was just a matter of when. This final effort against Hungarian Jews drew on all of Wallenberg’s resources in order to discover the marches and then take adequate measures to save as many lives as possible.
Per Anger remembers first hand in his biography the nature of this method. He recalls:
When the railroad was taken over for military transport and the Nazis wanted to liquidate as many Jews as possible in the time remaining, they switched to a method that broke all previous records for cruelty and mercilessness. Thousands of people were seized where they walked, where they stood. Women in high-heeled shoes and men without overcoats were driven on foot the 125-mile-long way to Hegyeshálom, at the Hungarian-Austrian border. That is how they solved the difficult transportation problem!293
292 Smith, p. 91. 293 Anger, pp. 67-68.
60 This program began on November 8 in conditions that even caused hardened Nazis to protest.294 Historian Elenore Lester reveals that even Nazi General Hans Jüttner was disgusted by the sight of the marchers and the body of those who died along the way, lying in ditches on the side of road, that he was heard saying that he was ‘truly terrified’ and demanded to know who was in charge of this operation.295 His protests were stifled upon being informed that Eichmann was responsible. In his report to the Foreign Office dated December 12 1944, Wallenberg provides further details of the conditions, stating that the Jews:
Have been forced to march on foot to Germany. It is a distance of 240 kilometres. The weather has been cold and rainy ever since these death marches began. They have had to sleep under rain shelters and in the open. Most have only been given something to eat and drink three or four times. Many have died. I learned in Mosonmagyarovar that 7 persons had died that day, and 7 persons the day before. The Portuguese secretary to the legation observed 42 dead persons along the route, and Deputy Prime Minister Szálasi admitted to me that he had seen 2 dead. Those who were too tired to walk were shot. On the border, they were received with kicks and blows by the Eichmann Special SS Command and were taken away to hard labour on the border fortifications.296
The assistance provided by Wallenberg and his helpers in the darkest of hours shaped his reputation amongst despairing Jews as legendary.297 Wallenberg, Per Anger and others travelled tirelessly back and forth on the road connecting Budapest and Hegyeshálom, “taking vanloads of food, medicine, and warm clothing with them, Wallenberg clutching his “book of life” listing the names of Jews to whom passports had been issued, and carrying fresh passports to be filled in and issued on the spot.”298 Per Anger’s description of what standard journey along this road entailed is incomprehensible. He recounts:
On one of the first days of December 1944, Wallenberg and I set out by car along the route the Jews were being marched. We passed those masses of unfortunates, more dead than alive. Ashy-faced, they staggered forward under prodding and blows from the
294 Bierman, p. 80. 295 Lester, p. 109. 296 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, p. 265. 297 Bierman, p. 80. 298 Ibid., p. 82.
61 soldiers’ rifle butts. The road was edged with bodies. We had the car full of food, which we succeeded in passing out despite such help being prohibited, but it did not go very far. At Hegyeshálom we saw how those who arrived were turned over to an SS unit under Eichmann, who counted them like cattle. “Four hundred eighty-nine – check!” (“Vierhundert-neunundachtzig – stimmt gut!”). The Hungarian officer received a receipt that said everything was in proper order.299
Wallenberg extended himself to his full capacity to assist these people. He would issue protective passports on the spot, provide food, water and medical supplies, and even attempt to bribe officers in exchange for Jews.
Upon Eichmann’s return in October, he announced that the new Szalasi government would not recognise protective passports issued by Wallenberg and other remaining neutral embassies.300 Wallenberg reacted immediately to this news, using one of his most important contacts to have this decision reversed. Wallenberg approached Baroness Elizabeth Kemeny, wife of the Arrow Cross Minister for Foreign Affairs, a strikingly beautiful women he had met at a social event in Budapest.301 She was only recently married to the Baron, and was unaware of his status as one of Hungary’s most notorious fascists prior to their engagement.302 The Baroness, born Elizabeth Fuchs, had been acting as the “Aryan figurehead” for a Jewish Publishing Company, and some historians have argued, was of Jewish decent.303 Wallenberg established a friendship with this young woman and was able to use her sympathies towards Jews and her husband’s position to his advantage. A secret meeting between the two was arranged, where Wallenberg emphasised the importance of her making her husband rescind the recent decision to no longer recognise the protective passports.304 Baroness Kemeny, who was pregnant with her first child, was apparently told by Wallenberg that, “the father of this child will die on the
299 Anger, p. 68. 300 Smith, p. 91. 301 Ibid., p. 92. 302 Ibid. 303 Lévai, p. 105, Rosenfeld, p. 54, Smith, p. 92, Anger, p. 92. 304 Lester, p. 106.
62 gallows if he does not put a stop to this criminal persecution of Jews.”305 These words shocked her, fearful that her child would grow up without a father.306 Wallenberg had emphasised that this was a matter of life and death, and positive actions by her husband may help save his life.307 Days immediately after this conversation, Foreign Minister Kemeny personally delivered the message on the radio to the public, announcing regulations that would once again acknowledge the passports provided by Wallenberg and other neutral embassies.308 This outcome was one of Wallenberg’s many achievements, and perhaps one of the most amazing. Scholars have described it as an “extraordinary diplomatic accomplishment … without precedent”309, and “almost miraculous in view of the fact that both Eichmann and the new government became more determined to finish off the Budapest Jews each day the Red Armies drew closer.”310
The stories from Holocaust survivors in the Shoah Visual History Archives provide an individual insight into the devastation faced on these forced marches, and additionally how Wallenberg managed to intervene and save their lives. Though due to the horrific nature of these forced marches and the harsh conditions, there is only a small number of survivors who can recall these experiences. The despair caused by incomprehensible conditions and years of torment is transformed by the hope that they may live another day presented by this young Swedish man who was directly challenging the policies of persecution and discrimination that had shaped their lives throughout the war. The range of success Wallenberg achieved in these circumstances varied, besides his constant efforts. Paul Kritzler met Wallenberg in late 1944 after hearing how he had been successful in stopping some deportations by using the shutzpasses. Paul offered his assistance to the cause, but Wallenberg had to turn down the offer as he already had many people working for him and resources were stretched as far as
305 Lévai, p. 105. 306 Smith, p. 92. 307 Smith, p. 92, Lester, pp. 106-7 (After the war, Kemeny was hanged as a war criminal with all Szalasi cohorts). 308 Rosenfeld, p. 54. 309 Ibid. 310 Lester, p. 107.
63 they could go.311 Wallenberg was attempting to achieve the impossible by stopping the relentless Nazi and Arrow Cross forces from deporting the remaining Jews, when they had nothing left to lose. The war was lost and the Nazi leadership was becoming resigned to this fate as the Soviet armies to the East, and the Allies to the West crept closer to Berlin on a daily basis. The only war that they could perhaps win at this stage was the on-going battle with European Jewry. In the face of this Wallenberg and his helpers managed to interrupt this last campaign of destruction in Hungary, and successfully protect the lives of numerous members of the remaining Jewish populations.
Etel Goldman recalls seeing Wallenberg, wearing his typical long-brown leather coat, talking with two German officials at a deportation yard in Budapest. He was negotiating with these officials that these Jews be sent to Bergen-Belsen instead of Auschwitz. He offered trucks and bicycles in exchange for this compromise. The officials accepted the offer, and Etel with the rest of the group were forcibly marched towards Bergen-Belsen. When they reached the Austrian- Hungarian border, they were ordered to dig tank trenches. She recalls that over 300 people were killed on this first night. Of the 750 people forcibly marched in this group, Etel says that only three returned to Budapest alive after the war.312 In this case, it is clear Wallenberg was unable to directly save any of these people lives. While he may have failed in this regard, he did attempt to assist them by sending them away from near guaranteed destruction at Auschwitz.
Magda Giesser recalls arriving with her mother at a small village during a forced march. She can remember the railway wagons sitting on the tracks, waiting to transport them to their final destination. While waiting to be sent further along the path to destruction, Magda remembers seeing a man wearing a trench coat asking for peoples names. Her mother was hesitant to provide him with their details, as she thought he was a German, but when he approached them specifically she provided the required information because she knew she had to.
311 Paul Kritzler, Testimony #23780, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive. 312 Etel Goldman, Testimony #10267, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive.
64 The man wrote down all the details onto a list, which contained the names of many others waiting at this particular village. Nobody was sure who this man was or why he wanted people’s details. He disappeared for hours, while Magda and her mother waited for the next stage of their torment. Her mother was confident that the train wagons waiting in the village were going to ship them to the camps. They both thought they were going to die in the near future, but they were relieved they didn’t have to walk any longer in the horrendous conditions. After several hours, the man reappeared and stood on a box at the front of the crowd of people. He called out “the following people please go to the left to the wagons”. Magda and her mothers name were called out and they boarded the trains. The doors were sealed shut and the trains departed, but they did not know where they were heading or in which direction. When the train stopped and they were released, they discovered they were back in Budapest. Magda never saw this man again after this first meeting, but discovered after the war that this hero was Wallenberg, after seeing a photo of him in a Hungarian newspaper. Wallenberg was the man asking for people’s names, and he was the person that saved her life.313
The Arrow Cross had forcibly marched a group of Jews from the Brick factory in Budapest to the Austrian border. In this particular group was Lenke Moskovic. When they arrived at the border, the Arrow Cross did not have any orders to take the group any further. Wallenberg arrived in his black car, with the Swedish flag displayed, and with trucks from the International Red Cross. Wallenberg informed the Arrow Cross authorities that this group was composed of citizens under the protection of the Swedish government, and consequently convinced them to allow him to transport them back to Budapest. Lenke says that Wallenberg used random pieces of paper to substitute for shutzpasses, for those who didn’t have any. The group was taken back to Budapest to the Swedish protected houses in the international ghetto.314
313 Magda Giesser, Testimony #9997, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive. 314 Lenke Moskovic, Testimony #29243.
65 While many Jews were marched by foot to their death, either dying along the way in the treacherous conditions or at the hands of the Arrow Cross, or when they were finally transported to death camps to be annihilated, Wallenberg’s presence provided some hope. His ability to intervene in attempt to save their lives or provide food, water or warm clothing, has directly increased the number of survivors of these forced marches. Fortunately, today we are able to understand the appalling and horrifying conditions these people struggled through from the survivors, many of whom can thank Wallenberg and the neutral embassies for their survival.
66 Chapter 6: Liberation, Disappearance and Legacy
For a man who took so many risks to save the lives of others, sadly Wallenberg’s life was stolen at the very end of this process. In an ironic twist of fate, Wallenberg’s last action taken to protect the Hungarian Jewish population cost him his freedom and eventually his life. As the Soviets liberated the Pest side of the capital, Wallenberg identified himself to the leading commanders of the Russian army as a Swedish diplomat who was representing the affairs of many nations in Hungary, including those of Soviet Russia. Wallenberg wanted to speak with the Soviet General in charge of this campaign, and it was arranged for him to be transported to meet with him. Wallenberg sent his last letter to his mother on December 8 1944, the day the Soviet Army begun its siege of Budapest.315 The opening sentence of this letter is, in hindsight, a sad reminder of the suffering of his family from his disappearance: “Dearest Mother, I really don’t know when I’ll be able to make it up to you for my silence.”316 Wallenberg’s final days in Budapest transform this individual history from an account of heroism and rescue, to a mystery regarding his disappearance and the suffering of his close family at his loss.
Historians have been able to establish what occurred on Wallenberg’s last days in Budapest, where he made initial contact with Russian military commanders, proceeding his disappearance. On January 12 1945, Wallenberg returned to the Swedish Office in Üllöi-út Street for the last time. He sat in the air-raid shelter and, for the last time, completed the required shutzpass applications placed in front of him.317 Apparently he quipped in his customary good humour, “This is a moment for history. I have signed protective passes on the remains of Leningrad.”318 He then met with Pál Szalasi, the Arrow Cross delegate and Hungarian Police Chief, who had been an informant for Wallenberg and sympathetic to his cause since the previous Christmas. He explained to Szalasi how he was intending to stay with a friend in a secure location for his own
315 Wallenberg, Letters and Dispatches 1924-1944, pp. 276-278. 316 Ibid., p. 276. 317 Lévai, p. 208. 318 Rosenfeld, p. 99.
67 safety, and outlined his plans to take Szalasi back to Sweden to meet the King after the liberation.319 He also indicated his intentions to see Malinovski, the Russian commander for the Budapest siege, whom he also spoke to Miklós Krausz, head of the Palestine office, in regards to later that day.320 His main reasoning to travel so urgently to speak with Malinovski was too secure the protection of the Jews remaining in both the central and international ghettos, especially while remnants of Nazi and Arrow Cross forces roamed the city wreaking havoc.321
The following day, Wallenberg had his first contact with the Russian liberators. Upon presenting his diplomatic credentials, Wallenberg and his chauffeur Vilmos Langfelder were left with a guard while a meeting was organised with the local Russian commander.322 After this meeting took place, both men returned to their residence where they were met by the Russians to begin packing for their trip to Debrecen where Malinovski was presently based.
January 17 was Wallenberg’s last day in Budapest. On this day, he returned to the international ghetto unexpectedly to say farewell to his protégés.323 By this stage the ghetto had been liberated by the Soviet forces.324 He arrived with Langfelder, Dr László Petö (a long-time friend and a leader of the Jewish community), and a Russian officer, who waited out the front of the building. A witness recalls Wallenberg’s delight at the sight of the majority of his protégés in the international ghetto having survived the horrifying last days of the war.325 Wallenberg revealed that he was heading to Debrecen to meet with Marshall Malinovski and to try and make contact with the remnants of the Hungarian Government that had fled the capital.326 Langfelder drove a car provided by the Russians to transport Wallenberg to Debrecen, which was escorted by Russian
319 Ibid., pp. 99-100. 320 Lévai, p. 209. 321 Rosenfeld, p. 100. 322 Ibid. 323 Lévai, p. 212-214. 324 Ibid., p.211. 325 Ibid., p. 213. 326 Ibid.
68 soldiers on motorcycles.327 In the car, Wallenberg told Dr László Petö, who did not travel the extent of the journey, the now infamous words: “I don’t know whether I’m going as a prisoner or as a guest.”328 This was the last time that Wallenberg was ever seen in freedom again.
In 1991, a joint Swedish-Russian working group was commissioned to further investigate what happened to Wallenberg. A nine-year investigation took place with the outcomes published in 2000.329 This report provides the most in-depth information regarding the disappearance of Wallenberg, and his whereabouts after his departure from Budapest. This report quashes the convictions put forth by such historians as Jenö Levai, which states that he was killed by Arrow Cross supporters or during the battle for Budapest.330 The report from the joint working group goes through the available evidence in-depth, and while it is unable to reach a final conclusion, it provides a detailed account of what happened after January 17.331
On the same day as Wallenberg left Budapest for Debrecen, an arrest order was given by Deputy Defence Minister Bulganin. The warrant ordered that Wallenberg be sent to Moscow and the relevant counter-espionage authority (Smersh) had been notified, though no reason for the arrest was provided.332 The report concludes that even though Bulganin made the arrest order, it appears that the order was handed down directly from Stalin.333 A message was sent to Bulganin on January 25 that stated that Wallenberg was on his way to Moscow and his prison registration card from Lubianka Prison shows that he arrived on
327 Ibid, p. 215 328 Rosenfeld, p. 101. 329 Swedish Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Regeringskansliet), Raoul Wallenberg - Report of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, 21 March 2005, at http://www.regeringen.se/download/37b7322e.pdf?major=1&minor=41137&cn= attachmentPublDuplicator_0_attachment, accessed 14 September 2008, p. 9. 330 Lévai, p. 217. 331 Swedish Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Regeringskansliet), Raoul Wallenberg - Report of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, p. 9. 332 Ibid., pp. 47-48. 333 Ibid., p. 55.
69 February 6.334 From this period onwards, Wallenberg was interrogated and imprisoned in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet foreign ministry continued to deny any involvement in Wallenberg’s disappearance. While they initially stated that Wallenberg was in the care of USSR in February 1945, this statement was revoked on March 8 that year, with Soviet controlled radio stating that Hungarian fascist or agents of the Gestapo had murdered him.335 On August 18 1947, Soviet deputy foreign minister Andrei Vyshinsky passed a message to his Swedish counterpart in Moscow. It read: “Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union and he is not known to us."336 While pressure continued to build for further investigations into Wallenberg’s disappearance, Moscow continued to deny any role until 1957. In April 1956, after a visit from Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander to Moscow, a further investigation was launched which turned up both positive and negative information. Wallenberg’s family had hoped that Erlander would have been able to gain his release during this exchange, and even provided a letter to be passed on to their missing relative.337 On February 2 1957, Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko revealed that documents relating to Wallenberg had been found in the Lubyanka Prison archives. These documents revealed that Wallenberg had been a prisoner of the Soviet Union, but that he had died of a heart attack in his cell on 17 July 1947.338 Wallenberg’s immediate family recognised this report for it’s acknowledgment that Wallenberg had been in Soviet custody, but they failed to believe that he had died.339 By this stage there had been numerous
334 Ibid., p. 48. 335 Smith, p. 189. 336 Joshua Prager, The Wallenberg Curse: The Search for the Missing Holocaust Hero Began in 1945. The Unending Quest Tore His Family Apart, 28 February 2009, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123207264405288683.html, accessed 3 March 2009. 337 Maj Von Dardel & Frederick Von Dardel, Kära älskade Raoul (Dear beloved Raoul), trans. Amalia Johnsson, 24 March 1956, at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/raoul-sonletter-02282009.pdf and http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123569241568888101.html?mod=loomia&loomi a_si=t0:a16:g2:r1:c0.119584:b22363776, accessed 8 March 2009. 338 Smith, pp. 190-191. 339 Prager, The Wallenberg Curse: The Search for the Missing Holocaust Hero Began in 1945. The Unending Quest Tore His Family Apart.
70 sightings of Wallenberg after his supposed date of death in 1947 by other prisoners of war who had been released or exchanged with other Russian prisoners from their home nations. Reports from other prisoners upon release continued into the early 1980’s, where it was believed that Wallenberg had been identified in a wheelchair in a KGB controlled psychiatric clinic.340 These on- going sightings, referred to in numerous books as well as the 2000 joint-report, continued to suggest that Wallenberg was alive in the Russian prison systems after his supposed death and continued to suffer for a long time after 1947.
A testimony from the USC Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive provides further insight into Wallenberg’s transfer from Budapest to various prisons in the Soviet Union. If this testimony had been available some decades earlier, it would have reinforced the belief that Wallenberg was in fact in the hands of the Russians and had not been killed be lingering fascist groups as they originally claimed. The Russian army captured Jerzy Trau after liberation. He was captured alongside German and Hungarian soldiers, and even though he proved that he was not fighting with them, they refused to release him because he was Jewish. At the time of his capture, Jerzy was attempting to flee to Palestine via Romania. He was stopped and arrested initially, but managed to escape. Shortly after the Soviets managed to capture him again. He was imprisoned in a makeshift prisoner of war camp south of Budapest, in a town called Gödöllõ. The prison was in fact a high school building that had temporarily been transformed. On his first night in the Gödöllõ camp in late January 1945, Jerzy slept next to a man who was Swedish and held a diplomatic passport. After that one night, he never saw this man again. Jerzy did not know the mans name at the time, but after the war in Sydney he learnt about Wallenberg’s story and saw an image of him and instantly recognised that he was the person he slept next to on that night. He claims that he is entirely certain that the Swedish diplomat he slept next to on that first night was Wallenberg. Jerzy followed Wallenberg’s story and was aware that there was witness sightings of him up until the 1980’s. While he never
340 Swedish Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Regeringskansliet), Raoul Wallenberg - Report of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, p. 161.
71 saw Wallenberg again, Jerzy said there were thousands of people in the makeshift camp and it was hard to keep track of all the people.341
There are several theories as to why the Soviets arrested Wallenberg. Per Anger, Wallenberg’s friend and colleague at the Swedish Legation, who was also involved in the investigation of his disappearance after the war in Sweden, believes there were several key reasons. Firstly, they were immediately doubtful of his intentions for being in Budapest. As Wallenberg had been sent to Budapest upon the personal request of President Roosevelt and the War Refugee Board in Washington, it is easy to establish a concept that Wallenberg was an American spy. This is further enhanced by the fact that Wallenberg’s rescue mission had been funded by the Americans and due to the Soviet Union’s feeling towards Jews. There is sufficient evidence to support that the Russians were generally anti-Semitic, which would have influenced their belief of Wallenberg’s claims that he was in Hungary to save the remaining Jewish population. This made Wallenberg’s legitimate reasons incomprehensible to the Soviet authorities, as they could not understand why a Swede would leave their neutral home to come to Budapest in attempt to rescue Jews.342 The joint-report published in 2000 also attempted to address the question of why Wallenberg was arrested. They came to a similar conclusion that the Soviets believed that Wallenberg had been spying for the Americans during this period.343 Additionally, the report identifies that the Russian’s thought that the Swedish embassy had been assisting their enemies by providing them refuge and sanctuary.344 Furthermore, it has been argued that Moscow had an interest in the Wallenberg family and their status as the wealthiest and one of the most powerful in Scandinavia. The Russian intelligence agencies and foreign ministry investigated the family’s involvement in the war and their subsequent loyalties. Their position as upstanding capitalists would have hurt their place in the eyes of Moscow.345 Finally, the report looked at
341 Jerzy Trau, Testimony #48278, University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute Visual History Archive. 342 Anger, pp. 160-161. 343 Swedish Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Regeringskansliet), Raoul Wallenberg - Report of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, pp. 57-58. 344 Ibid., p. 59. 345 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
72 whether the Soviets were looking to either recruit Wallenberg for their spy agencies or exchange him for Russian prisoners that had been captured abroad.346 The Russian had hinted at an exchange on several occasions in the years following Wallenberg’s disappearance, and the Swedish government has subsequently apologised for their inaction in this regard.347 As the report concludes, without complete access to the relevant documents and archives, a conclusive understanding of why he was arrested is not possible, and to this day it still remains unclear.348
Wallenberg’s disappearance into the Soviet prison system is another remarkable chapter of this complex tale. Those who survived the Holocaust due to the assistance of Wallenberg, and those who have subsequently learnt of his amazing exploits recognise the need to acknowledge his contribution to humanity. As a result, there are numerous tributes all around the world in many different forms. Ranging from statues, scholarships, films, postal stamps, academic institutions, streets, musicals, schools, paintings, public areas, forests and so on, Wallenberg’s legacy has been encapsulated and remembered by many people across the globe. Notable tributes have been two nominations for the Nobel Peace Prize, named as one of the Righteous Among the Nations at Yad Vashem in 1963, the granting of honorary citizenship by the United States of America in 1981 (second person in history after Winston Churchill), and subsequent citizenship from Canada and Israel in 1985 and 1986 accordingly, the establishment of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at Lund University in 1984, and naming the street upon which stands the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, as Raoul Wallenberg Place. Wallenberg has been memorialised by Australian-based survivors in a variety of ways. Due to the significant number of Australian survivors, shown by the number of testimonies that reference Wallenberg in the
346 Ibid., pp. 67-70. 347 Prager, The Wallenberg Curse: The Search for the Missing Holocaust Hero Began in 1945. The Unending Quest Tore His Family Apart, Swedish Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Regeringskansliet), Raoul Wallenberg - Report of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, Chapter X, pp. 84-128. 348 Swedish Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Regeringskansliet), Raoul Wallenberg - Report of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, p. 57.
73 USC Shoah Archive, parks, statues, monuments, gardens, academic prizes, medical centres and plaques have recognised his efforts to save those in need, primarily in Melbourne and Sydney. Numerous organisations were established in attempt to discover the truth of Wallenberg’s disappearance and to place public pressure on national governments to champion this effort. Wallenberg’s family wrote directly to Stalin and even enlisted the help of popular figures such as Albert Einstein and actress Ingrid Bergman.349 This ordeal had a significant effect on Wallenberg’s mother Maj and his stepfather, brother and sister. It was only recently revealed that Maj and Fredrick von Dardel committed suicide in February 1979 only days apart, as the struggle to find their missing son had become too much to handle.350 Nina Lagergren and Guy von Dardel, Wallenberg’s stepsiblings, have continued the search for answers to this day regardless of the detriment to their health or their relationship.351 Wallenberg’s loss has had a devastating effect on his immediate family, and regardless of the constant struggle, there remains few answers to many questions. The fear now is that his work in Hungary and his suffering in Russia will be forgotten when Nina and Guy pass away.352
349 Prager, The Wallenberg Curse: The Search for the Missing Holocaust Hero Began in 1945. The Unending Quest Tore His Family Apart, Albert Einstein, Letter to Generalissimo Stalin, 17 November 1947, at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/raoul-einstein-02282009.pdf, accessed 8 March 2009. 350 Ibid. 351 Ibid. 352 Joshua Prager, Holocaust Hero's Fate Remains in Dispute: Sixty-four years after his disappearance, here's where the unsolved Raoul Wallenberg mystery stands, 28 February 2009, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123578821698699011.html, accessed 5 March 2009.
74 Conclusion
The courage and heroism displayed by Wallenberg can be described as autonomous altruism. As Tec defines, “autonomous altruism refers to selfless help, which is neither reinforced nor otherwise rewarded by society. Indeed, autonomous altruism may be opposed by society and may at times involve grave risks not only of physical injury but of social ostracism.”353 Wallenberg’s actions are fitting of this definition, as he acted against the social norms that were willing to ignore the treatment of the remaining Jews of Budapest, and at the same time expose himself to great personal danger. His deeds were of such a degree of selflessness, that even the Russians upon meeting Wallenberg as the city was liberated, were not willing to comprehend that this was the reason why he was in Hungary. As Tec explains, “those who without regard for external rewards risked their lives to protect Jews clearly fit [this] definition”.354 The evidence of Wallenberg’s work to save thousands of Jews in the dying stages of the war in Hungary encompasses the very spirit of this definition.
What Wallenberg achieved under the extreme circumstances in Hungary should be considered as a pinnacle of human compassion, empathy and the willingness to stand up for the justice of persecuted minorities. The testimonies of Australian based survivors enhance our understanding of his extraordinary efforts to save as many Hungarian Jews as possible. Wallenberg was a phenomenal individual whose intelligence and poise was fundamental in convincing the relevant authorities in Budapest to accept his position and recognise the shutzpasses and the international ghetto. His disappearance immediately after the liberation of the city by Russian forces is another chapter of his history, a terrible end to the life of an amazing individual. While it may never be known why the Soviets arrested him and never let him return to his family and to the people he saved, it is essential that Wallenberg’s legacy lives on through the history of what he achieved in Hungary. In the darkest days of the 20th Century, Wallenberg’s actions represent what an individual might achieve in the face of powerful opposition to assist those in perilous danger. Wallenberg has already been hailed
353 Tec, p. 152. 354 Ibid.
75 as a hero and the legacy contained in his history is considered to be an example of courage and altruism. His individual feats to save Jewish lives are a testament to his character and an example of his passion for assisting those in need, and the testimonies from Australian-based survivors in the Shoah are some of the many accounts of his successful deeds and heroism.
76 Bibliography:
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77
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81