166 Sorabji, R., Sharples, RW (Eds.) 2007. Greek and Roman

166 De novis libris iudicia / F. Alesse / Mnemosyne 64 (2011) 166-170

Sorabji, R., Sharples, R.W. (eds.) 2007. Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC— 200 AD, I-II (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement, 94). Lon- don, University of London Institute of Classical Studies. xii, 292 + x, 430 p. Pr. £90.00 (pb).

Th e volume presents the proceedings of the conference held at the Institute of Classical Studies of London University in 2004 on philosophers of the period between the fi rst century BC and the second century AD. As Richard Sorabji makes clear in the Preface, this conference completed and concluded a more wide- ranging project he and Robert W. Sharples had promoted in 1997 on Plato’s and Aristotle’s commentators in the period 200-600 AD, the results of which can now be found in Th e Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 AD. A Sourcebook, vol. 1: Psychology; vol. 2: Physics; vol. 3: Logic and Metaphysics (London 2004). Unlike the 2004 work, this work is a collection of historical-critical studies, many of which, however, provide evidence concerning either a specifi c philosophical topic or an individual personality. It is worth underlining the peculiarity of the historical period in question, 100 BC-200 AD: it involves the permanence and transformation not only of the grand systems of Plato and Aristotle but also the main Hellenistic philosophies (Epicureanism, Stoicism, Peripatos and Academy), as well as minor traditions (the Socratic literature, Cynicism, and (Neo-)Pythagoreanism). Th e intertwinement of the great systems of the fourth century with the philosophies of the third and second centuries, together with the contribution of such Roman writers as Cicero, Varro, Lucretius, Lucilius, Seneca, led to the philosophical culture of the early Imperial age. Hastily defi ned as ‘eclectic’ for a long time, then more carefully analysed in its various components, the philosophy of the fi rst two centuries is now seen as characterised by precise strategies of cultural ‘appropriation’, including techniques of philosophical commentary, religious exegesis, translation from Greek lexicon into Latin, various genres of ‘compilatory’ literature (collections of bioi, anecdotes, philosophical opinions, that is, doxai). In recent years we have learnt much about the permeation of Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism (to limit the examples to the main schools) into the fi elds of, e.g., Biblical exegesis, represented by Philo of Alexandria, or mathematics, astronomy, geography, as shown by Posidonius, Cleomedes, Strabo, among others. Finally, the period in question is very diffi cult to examine in detail, not only because it is a ‘transitional’ period from a phase of large systems to a late phase dominated by Neo-Platonism, but also for the large number of personalities that we know of only from indirect tradition. Th e contributors bear in mind as much as possible of such a complexity, examining personalities that might seem ‘minor’, but that actually played a decisive role in the continuity of the schools and the evolution of the doctrines.

Th e work consists of thirty-fi ve chapters written by twenty-one specialists—for a total of 720 pages, including additional bibliographical material and indexes. Th e chapters are arranged in four thematic sections (Stoics and Cynics; Epicu- reans; Platonists, Academics, and Pythagoreans; Peripatetics), each of which opens with a list of the most important representatives of the schools with their respec- tive chronologies. Diskin Clay off ers an appendix on ‘known and suspected’ Epi- cureans (p. 639-43) that supplements the short list opening the Epicurean section. Th e sections deal not only with the ‘schools’, that is, the institutions already exist- ing in the previous centuries, but also with ‘traditions’: a historiographic category with which recent scholarship may refer both to phases of change within the same institution (the most celebrated being, in the Hellenistic age, the sceptical phase in the Academy), and elements from outside that blend with the heritage of the characteristic ideas of a school (as, for example, the Pythagorean elements that entwined with Platonism and, less extensively, with Aristotelianism). Th e articles often seek to defi ne the thought and work of individual personalities. Th is last feature also emerges from those contributions that seem to be dealing with a philosophical problem, particularly in the section on the Peripatetics: actually, it is noticeable that the Authors concentrate mainly on individual personalities (Andronicus of Rhodes, Boethus of Sidon, Aspasius, Aristocles of Messene). Th is aspect confi rms that the philosophy of this period needs examining not so much for ‘problems’ and ‘systems’, which were mainly inherited from previous ages, as through the study of the individual masters and the lively debates that took place between schools and philosophers. At least three out of the four sections have a ‘bipolar’ character, off ering studies in the Latin or Roman area: Seneca and Mar- cus Aurelius for the Stoics, Lucretius—but, in a way, Philodemus too—for the Epicureans, and Cicero and Apuleius for the varied Platonic-Academic tradition. Unfortunately, it is impossible to give a detailed account of all the contributions: I must limit myself to drawing attention to some of them, but not before mentioning that all the authors are known authorities on the subject dealt with, and to off ering a general profi le of the problems and results that emerge from each section. Th e articles on the Stoics bring out two features above all. On the one hand, the refl ections on metaphysics and physics are more markedly scientifi c or specialised, as emerges from Stephen White’s study “Posidonius and Stoic Physics” (35-76): Posidonius’ undoubted contribution to the history of the school might seem due more to his vast range of physical and astronomical interests than to any decisive metaphysical innovation. Nonetheless, physical and cosmological inquiries on void, limits, time, as well as methodological issues concerning science of nature, are grounded on metaphysical principles, that is, God, matter, substance. On the other hand, as regards practical philosophy and the study of human nature, one