Deconstructing Afghanistan How Does America’S Past Inform Afghanistan’S Future?
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Ethnicity and the Political Reconstruction of Afghanistan
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Schetter, Conrad Working Paper Ethnicity and the political reconstruction of Afghanistan ZEF Working Paper Series, No. 3 Provided in Cooperation with: Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung / Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn Suggested Citation: Schetter, Conrad (2005) : Ethnicity and the political reconstruction of Afghanistan, ZEF Working Paper Series, No. 3, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF), Bonn, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0202-2008091124 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88366 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen -
Invisible Humans, Visible Terrorists: U.S. Neo-Orientalism Post 9/11 and Representations of the Muslim World" (2015)
Purdue University Purdue e-Pubs Open Access Dissertations Theses and Dissertations January 2015 Invisible Humans, Visible Terrorists: U.S. Neo- Orientalism Post 9/11 and Representations of the Muslim World Khalid Mosleh Alrasheed Purdue University Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations Recommended Citation Alrasheed, Khalid Mosleh, "Invisible Humans, Visible Terrorists: U.S. Neo-Orientalism Post 9/11 and Representations of the Muslim World" (2015). Open Access Dissertations. 1082. https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations/1082 This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact [email protected] for additional information. Graduate School Form 30 Updated 1/15/2015 PURDUE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL Thesis/Dissertation Acceptance This is to certify that the thesis/dissertation prepared By Khalid Mosleh Alrasheed Entitled INVISIBLE HUMANS, VISIBLE TERRORISTS: U.S. NEO-OREINTALISM POST 9/11 AND REPRESENTATIONS OF THE MUSLIM WORLD For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Is approved by the final examining committee: Prof. Aparajita Sagar Chair Prof. Shaun Hughes Prof. Alfred Lopez Prof. Ahmed Idrissi Alami To the best of my knowledge and as understood by the student in the Thesis/Dissertation Agreement, Publication Delay, and Certification Disclaimer (Graduate School Form 32), this thesis/dissertation adheres to the provisions of Purdue University’s “Policy of Integrity in Research” and the use of copyright material. Approved by Major Professor(s): Aparajita Sagar Approved by: Krista Ratcliffe 11/16/2015 Head of the Departmental Graduate Program Date i INVISIBLE HUMANS, VISIBLE TERRORISTS: U.S. NEO-ORIENTALISM POST 9/11 AND REPRESENTATIONS OF THE MUSLIM WORLD A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Purdue University by Khalid M. -
Nay Pyi Taw's Maha Thingyan Lively with Thingyan Activities
Tapo ça, ascetic practices; this is the way to auspiciousness Established 1914 Volume XVIII, Number 359 12th Waxing of Tagu 1372 ME Friday, 15 April, 2011 Four political Four economic Four social True patriotism objectives objectives objectives * Stability of the State, * Building of modern industrialized * Uplift of the morale and * It is very important for every- community peace and nation through the agricultural de- morality of the entire nation one of the nation regardless of tranquillity, prevalence of velopment, and all-round develop- * Uplift of national prestige law and order ment of other sectors of the economy and integrity and preserva- the place he lives to have strong * Strengthening of national * Proper evolution of the market- tion and safeguarding of solidarity oriented economic system * Development of the economy invit- cultural heritage and Union Spirit. * Building and strengthen- ing participation in terms of techni- national character * Only Union Spirit is the true ing of discipline-flourish- cal know-how and investment from * Flourishing of Union Spirit, ing democracy system sources inside the country and abroad the true patriotism patriotism all the nationalities * Building of a new modern * The initiative to shape the national * Uplift of health, fitness and will have to safeguard. developed nation in ac- economy must be kept in the hands education standards of the cord with the Constitution of the State and the national peoples entire nation Nay Pyi Taw’s Maha Thingyan Water throwing pandals in Nay Pyi Taw lively with Thingyan activities Hotel Zone being packed with revellers on Maha Thingyan Akya Day.—MNA NAY PYI TAW, 14 April— Today is Maha daytime and with dances and songs presented by Myat Taw Win Hotel, Hotel Shwe Pyi Taw, Thingyan Akya Day for 1372 Myanmar Era. -
The Politics of Disarmament and Rearmament in Afghanistan
[PEACEW RKS [ THE POLITICS OF DISARMAMENT AND REARMAMENT IN AFGHANISTAN Deedee Derksen ABOUT THE REPORT This report examines why internationally funded programs to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militias since 2001 have not made Afghanistan more secure and why its society has instead become more militarized. Supported by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) as part of its broader program of study on the intersection of political, economic, and conflict dynamics in Afghanistan, the report is based on some 250 interviews with Afghan and Western officials, tribal leaders, villagers, Afghan National Security Force and militia commanders, and insurgent commanders and fighters, conducted primarily between 2011 and 2014. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Deedee Derksen has conducted research into Afghan militias since 2006. A former correspondent for the Dutch newspaper de Volkskrant, she has since 2011 pursued a PhD on the politics of disarmament and rearmament of militias at the War Studies Department of King’s College London. She is grateful to Patricia Gossman, Anatol Lieven, Mike Martin, Joanna Nathan, Scott Smith, and several anonymous reviewers for their comments and to everyone who agreed to be interviewed or helped in other ways. Cover photo: Former Taliban fighters line up to handover their rifles to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan during a reintegration ceremony at the pro- vincial governor’s compound. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. j. g. Joe Painter/RELEASED). Defense video and imagery dis- tribution system. The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. -
War Crimes Prosecution Watch, Vol. 13, Issue 24
PILPG Logo Case School of Law Logo War Crimes Prosecution Watch Editor-in-Chief Taylor Frank FREDERICK K. COX Volume 13 - Issue 24 INTERNATIONAL LAW CENTER January 7, 2019 Technical Editor-in-Chief Ashley Mulryan Founder/Advisor Michael P. Scharf Managing Editors Sarah Lucey Lynsey Rosales War Crimes Prosecution Watch is a bi-weekly e-newsletter that compiles official documents and articles from major news sources detailing and analyzing salient issues pertaining to the investigation and prosecution of war crimes throughout the world. To subscribe, please email [email protected] and type "subscribe" in the subject line. Opinions expressed in the articles herein represent the views of their authors and are not necessarily those of the War Crimes Prosecution Watch staff, the Case Western Reserve University School of Law or Public International Law & Policy Group. Contents AFRICA CENTRAL AFRICA Central African Republic PSG footballer linked to war crimes and global fraudster (EU Anti-Corruption) French court orders sending Central African Republic war crimes suspect to ICC (Reuters) Sudan & South Sudan Janjaweed, ghost squads and a divided nation: How Sudan's Bashir stays in power (CNN) UN calls on Sudan to probe killing of protesters (Sudan Tribune) Sudanese opposition groups issue declaration for regime change (Sudan Tribune) Democratic Republic of the Congo Risk of 'grave crimes' in DRC ahead of vote (News24) EU condemns expulsion of envoy Bart Ouvry (BBC) DRC electoral fraud fears rise as internet shutdown continues (The Guardian) -
The Horror, the Horror T He Massacre in Kandahar Won't Mark the End of All Elaborate Plans for Afghanistan
– AA-AA !" # $ $ $ !" $ % $ % $#" www.afgazad.com [email protected] European Languages &'( )" Al Jazeera The horror, the horror T he massacre in Kandahar won't mark the end of all elaborate plans for Afghanistan. Pepe Escobar 3/15/2012 Hong Kong - It started way before a lone killer, a US Army sergeant, married with two children, walked into villages in Panjwayi, southwest of Kandahar city, and "allegedly" went on a shooting spree, leaving at least 16 civilians dead. This was Afghanistan's Haditha moment - as in Iraq; or My Lai - as in Vietnam. It had been building up via the serial drone-with-Hellfire bombings of tribal wedding parties; the serial secret US Special Forces' "night raids"; the serial "kill team" murders in 2010; the ritual urination onto dead Afghans by "our men in uniform"; and last but not least, the Quran burnings in Bagram. Mission … accomplished? According to the latest Post-ABC News poll - conducted even before the Kandahar massacre - 55 per cent of Americans want the end of the Afghan war. US President Barack Obama once again stressed that 10 years into a war that has cost at least $400bn, the "combat role" of NATO troops will end in 2014. According to Obama, Washington only wants to make sure "that al-Qaeda is not operating there, and that there is sufficient stability that it does not end up being a free-for-all". www.afgazad.com 1 [email protected] Al-Qaeda "is not operating there" for a long time; there are only a bunch of instructors "not there" but in the Waziristans, in the Pakistani tribal areas. -
Strategic Insight
Strategic Insight The Loya Jirga, Ethnic Rivalries and Future Afghan Stability by Thomas H. Johnson Strategic Insights are authored monthly by analysts with the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC). The CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. August 6, 2002 On June 24 the Afghan transitional government and administration of Hamid Karzai was installed during formal ceremonies in Kabul. Karzai had easily won the June 13 election at a national political assembly, or loya jirga. The loya jirga consisted of 1500 representatives, elected or appointed from 32 provinces, and debated the political future of Afghanistan over a seven-day period. The Karzai government is supposed to rule Afghanistan through 2003. During the ceremony, Karzai and his new cabinet took an oath in both major Afghan languages (Pashtu and Dari), vowing to "follow the basic teachings of Islam" and the laws of the land, to renounce corruption, and to "safeguard the honor and integrity of Afghanistan."[1] How successful they are in achieving these vows will be critical to the near term future of Afghanistan, its reconstruction, and possibly the stability of the entire region of Central Asia. This transitional government was the result of an Emergency Loya Jirga and part of the Bonn Agreement (of November-December 2001). While not explicitly stating so in the Bonn Agreement, Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative of the U.N. -
Ethnicity, Space, and Politics in Afghanistan
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Urban Studies Senior Seminar Papers Urban Studies Program 11-2009 Ethnicity, Space, and Politics in Afghanistan Benjamin Dubow University of Pennsylvania Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/senior_seminar Dubow, Benjamin, "Ethnicity, Space, and Politics in Afghanistan" (2009). Urban Studies Senior Seminar Papers. 13. https://repository.upenn.edu/senior_seminar/13 Suggested Citation: Benjamin Dubow. "Ethnicity, Space, and Politics in Afghanistan." University of Pennsylvania, Urban Studies Program. 2009. This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/senior_seminar/13 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Ethnicity, Space, and Politics in Afghanistan Abstract The 2004 election was a disaster. For all the unity that could have come from 2001, the election results shattered any hope that the country had overcome its fractures. The winner needed to find a way to unite a country that could not be more divided. In Afghanistan’s Panjshir Province, runner-up Yunis Qanooni received 95.0% of the vote. In Paktia Province, incumbent Hamid Karzai received 95.9%. Those were only two of the seven provinces where more than 90% or more of the vote went to a single candidate. Two minor candidates who received less than a tenth of the total won 83% and 78% of the vote in their home provinces. For comparison, the most lopsided state in the 2004 United States was Wyoming, with 69% of the vote going to Bush. This means Wyoming voters were 1.8 times as likely to vote for Bush as were Massachusetts voters. Paktia voters were 120 times as likely to vote for Karzai as were Panjshir voters. -
Choosing Sides and Guiding Policy United States’ and Pakistan’S Wars in Afghanistan
UNIVERSITY OF FLORDA Choosing Sides and Guiding Policy United States’ and Pakistan’s Wars in Afghanistan Azhar Merchant 4/24/2019 Table of Contents I. Introduction… 2 II. Political Settlement of the Mujahedeen War… 7 III. The Emergence of the Taliban and the Lack of U.S. Policy… 27 IV. The George W. Bush Administration… 50 V. Conclusion… 68 1 I. Introduction Forty years of war in Afghanistan has encouraged the most extensive periods of diplomatic and military cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. The communist overthrow of a relatively peaceful Afghan government and the subsequent Soviet invasion in 1979 prompted the United States and Pakistan to cooperate in funding and training Afghan mujahedeen in their struggle against the USSR. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan entered a period of civil war throughout the 1990s that nurtured Islamic extremism, foreign intervention, and the rise of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, ultimately culminating in the devastating attacks against Americans on September 11th. Seventeen years later, the United States continues its war in Afghanistan while its relationship with Pakistan has deteriorated to an all-time low. The mutual fear of Soviet expansionism was the unifying cause for Americans and Pakistanis to work together in the 1980s, yet as the wars in Afghanistan evolved, so did the countries’ respective aims and objectives.1 After the Soviets were successfully pushed out of the region by the mujahedeen, the United States felt it no longer had any reason to stay. The initial policy aim of destabilizing the USSR through prolonged covert conflict in Afghanistan was achieved. -
US Afghanistan Policy
U.S. Afghanistan Policy: It’s Working S. Frederick Starr Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies The Johns Hopkins University U.S. Afghanistan PolicyPolicy:: It’s Working S. Frederick Starr © Central AsiaAsia---CaucasusCaucasus Institute Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies The Johns Hopkins University Tel.: 1 202 663 7723 “U.S. Afghanistan Policy: It’s Working” is a Policy Paper produced by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. It is authored by S. Frederick Starr, Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. © Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, October 2004 ISBN: 91-85031-01-1 Printed in the United States of America Distributed in North America by: The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036, U.S.A. Tel. +1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785 E-mail: [email protected] Distributed in Europe by: The Silk Road Studies Program Uppsala University Box 514, SE-75120 Uppsala Sweden Tel. +46-18-471-2217; Fax. +46-18-106397 E-mail: [email protected] Contents I. A Litany Of Misplaced CriticismCriticism.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1 II. Core Problems ............................................................................................... -
“STRIKE HISTORY” 06 October – 12 October 2013
2nd BCT, 101st ABN DIV (AASLT) “STRIKE HISTORY” 06 October – 12 October 2013 06 October 1968 1-502 (-) (with the exception of "D", at Phu Vang; continued normal operations with negative contact. We did provide 4 EM to NP on a check point to look for VC and draft dodgers. The EM worked with elements from Pistol Pete, from vic. YD7529 to vic. YD8332. They detained 183 people who were classified as follows. IC 131 VCS 9 ARVN deserters 1 Military age males 41 VC 1 09 October 1969 Operation PHU VANG kicks off. The 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division sent elements from the 1/501st Airborne and the 2/17th Cavalry to work with the 2/54th ARVN Regiment while conducting this search and destroy - cordon and search operation of the Phu Vang District, eight miles southeast of Hue. Casualties: US not reported; enemy 96 KIA, 174 POW. 06 - 25 October 2010 Operation Eagle Claw: In early October, CTF Top Guns developed a plan to complete the clearance of Western Arghandab and remove the remnants of Taliban in the Area of Operations. The Task Force created Operation Eagle Claw to deny the enemy sanctuary in the Arghandab River Valley and prevent the area from being used by the Taliban to launch future attacks on Kandahar City. CTF Top Guns conducted Operation Eagle Claw from 6 to 25 October 2010 in combined action with 1/1/205, United States Special Operations Forces, Afghan National Army Commando forces, and Afghan Border Police. The plan called for the isolation of villages in the gardens South of Jelawur to permit clearance of insurgent sanctuaries by over 400 Afghan Border Police (ABP), combat advised by US Special Forces Detachments. -
Les Entreprises De Sécurité, L'exemple De Watan Risk Management
AFGHANISTAN 31 mars 2020 Les entreprises de sécurité, l’exemple de Watan Risk Management Avertissement Ce document a été élaboré par la Division de l’Information, de la Documentation et des Recherches de l’Ofpra en vue de fournir des informations utiles à l’examen des demandes de protection internationale. Il ne prétend pas faire le traitement exhaustif de la problématique, ni apporter de preuves concluantes quant au fondement d’une demande de protection internationale particulière. Il ne doit pas être considéré comme une position officielle de l’Ofpra ou des autorités françaises. Ce document, rédigé conformément aux lignes directrices communes à l’Union européenne pour le traitement de l’information sur le pays d’origine (avril 2008) [cf. https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/lignes_directrices_europeennes.pdf ], se veut impartial et se fonde principalement sur des renseignements puisés dans des sources qui sont à la disposition du public. Toutes les sources utilisées sont référencées. Elles ont été sélectionnées avec un souci constant de recouper les informations. Le fait qu’un événement, une personne ou une organisation déterminée ne soit pas mentionné(e) dans la présente production ne préjuge pas de son inexistence. La reproduction ou diffusion du document n’est pas autorisée, à l’exception d’un usage personnel, sauf accord de l’Ofpra en vertu de l’article L. 335-3 du code de la propriété intellectuelle. Afghanistan : Les entreprises de sécurité privée, l’exemple de Watan Risk Management Table des matières 1. A l’origine de Watan Risk Management : l’ascension des frères Popal ......................