Religion and Migration in : Governability and Diaspora*

by Ana I. Planet Contreras (Workshop of International Mediterranean Studies (TEIM), Universidad Autónoma de Madrid ) and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi Martinez (Study Group on Arab and Muslim Societies (GRESAM), Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha )

Abstract This article analyses recent Moroccan policies towards its emigrants using Spain asthe observation site and the religious arena as the specific focus. Given that the framework for analysing migration and transnationalism has become progressively more complex, the study of Moroccan policies regarding migrants must include –among the many factors that combine to preserve ties with the country of origin– a more detailed and dynamic analysis of religion. This includes examining changes in policies designed to manage religious questions in the current Moroccan context and the material and symbolic efforts made to sustain Moroccan/Muslim citizens in the diaspora. All of these entanglements of citizenship and religion are affected by debates and policies in the specific local and national contexts where migrants settle and is enriched by the commitments made by individual migrants and their descendants on a daily basis and by unstoppable processes of de facto incorporation as citizens in host countries. The most recent constitutional reform in Morocco, carried out at the behest of the king in 2011 in the context of the Arab Spring, maintained as the country’s official religion along with the principle of freedom of religion. This reform upheld the symbolic role of the Moroccan monarchy in religious terms and the reference to its Sherifian origins. Several efforts have been made to promote an Islam that is suitable for all citizens, with inherent tensions between more and less moderate views. Morocco has also been receptive to the arguments and needs of living abroad regarding religion. Keywords: Morocco, Sociology of religion, religious politics, 2011 constitutional reform, diaspora politics, Moroccans in Spain

Introduction During the last third of the 20th and beginning their population has left and settled more or less of the 21st century, many countries have been permanently in other countries that offer more affected by migration processes in which a part of favourable working and living conditions. A wide variety of approaches have been applied to the 1 This article was written under the auspices of the study of international migrations and the impact research project “Reform, Change and Conflict in the on the countries of origin and destination. The Euro-Mediterranean: Implications for Spanish Foreign Policy towards the Arab and Muslim World” financed as neo-realist perspective looks at migrations, poli- an R&D&I project by the Ministry of Finance and Com- cies in the country of origin and return policies petitiveness (CSO2011-29438-C05-01) and the project with a win-win view of the situation. The new “Cambio religioso en España. Secularización, diversi- dad religiosa e Islam” financed by the Junta de Comu- skills learned and put into circulation by individ- nidades de Castilla La-Mancha (PPII11-0184-6065). ual migrants who succeed in their migration proj-

New Diversities Vol. 17, No. 1, 2015 ISSN ISSN-Print 2199-8108 ▪ ISSN-Internet 2199-8116 New Diversities 17 (1), 2015 Ana I. Planet Contreras and Miguel H. de Larramendi Martinez

ects are returned to the society of origin in the projects coming from different branches of the form of material and immaterial goods –remit- administration, including public foundations and tances, education and experience– and they also specific councils created to handle these ques- produce citizens with a greater ability to act at tions. local and transnational level. On the other hand, Over the course of the last two decades, the the neo-structuralist perspective, which is also Moroccan state has created a transnational based on economic considerations but is less field of action that fosters a sense of belonging optimistic, looks at the policies and working among those living abroad. Transnational spaces conditions in the countries of origin and host have been developed not only where migration countries and sees that the individuals in these flows and where entries and exits are managed, diasporas are victims of inequality in both coun- but also where the identities, sense of belong- tries. They work in positions that are poorly paid, ing, and unique forms of citizen development are valued little by host society and the return to -- that are part of progressively more intricate the country of origin is not easy in terms of job international relation -- are negotiated. These options (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003). “diaspora policies” consist of an array of mea- An analysis of the country’s policies with sures, including ministerial and consular reforms, respect to its migrants clearly shows that investment policies to attract remittances, the Morocco has proposed to manage emigration extension of political rights (dual citizenship, the abroad, both by increasing the political and right to vote from abroad), and the extension of administrative resources initially developed to state protection or services and symbolic policies, deal with the RME (ressortissants marocains à all of which are meant to reinforce a sense of l’étranger or Moroccan nationals abroad) and belonging (Levitt and De La Dehesa 2003). Reli- with its recent proliferation of new immigration gious aspects are present as well, with ancillary policies.1 Generally speaking, what began as a set material elements of worship, the inclusion of of policies to provide consular services aimed at religious content in classes on the language and maintaining the channels needed to send remit- culture of origin for children of Moroccans and tances now consists of various programmes and the creation of a symbolic language of belonging to a community defined by religion. 1 We are aware that by using the term Morocco, it However, it is important not to lose sight of may seem that we are operating in terms of what Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick have categorized at least two pieces of evidence: 1) despite the as “methodological nationalism” in which the nation- mechanisms described to create a transnational state is naturalized and understood as a container dimension and to integrate the migrant popula- encompassing a culture, a polity, an economy and a homogeneous social group. Regarding the origin of tion in the host countries, Moroccan immigrants emigrants, this methodological nationalism, which is in Europe continue to live in situations of sub- implicit in the use of the word “Morocco”, is able to ordination and subalternity, in spaces of “non- project the idea of a world in which the fact of coming citizenship” embodied by the impossibility of from the same place is tantamount to sharing a single identity and culture and where relationships between participating in the process of electing therul- people who share a single national origin are commu- ing elite in Morocco. Their participation in the nitarian and produce minority or ethnic communities. politics of their country of origin continues to be This is in no way the intention of this article. If we use the national category, it is because our proposal is not limited and they are seen more as the objects of to analyse the transnational strategies developed by policy than its subjects; and 2) emigrants tend to emigrants through the creation of social fields that go to places where the appearance of foreign- connect their place/nation of origin and their place/ ers, and specifically Muslim foreigners, is not nation of settlement and involve multiple relation- ships that go beyond borders (familial, economic, so- accepted in a calm and harmonious context, but cial, organizational, religious, political) but the efforts rather in complicated social contexts, exacerbat- developed by their country of origin in this particular ing the social tensions and debates inherent in field.

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arguments of resistance. These tensions range states that contribute to the creation of religious from the discourse of protecting secularism to transnationality, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and discourses on the threat to homogeneity or the Pakistan, or from groups found in the Moroccan invasion of the eternal antagonist (Bravo López religious/political sphere like al-Adl wal-Ihsane 2005). (Darif 2010). Behind the term “ressortissants marocains à l’étranger” lies more than a simple administra- Religion and its Governance in Morocco tive category. With this name and the accompa- Tracking down religion in the context of Morocco nying policies, a renewed diasporized national today and understanding the mechanisms by identity is being constructed with which the state which religion makes itself manifest in that is trying to design new forms of belonging and country and abroad it is not an easy venture. commitment to the nation for its citizens who An attempt to understand the characteristics of have settled abroad. This partially-new identity Islam in Morocco has motivated studies in the is not only formed around the concept of belong- social sciences since before the country’s inde- ing based on nationality, but also draws on other pendence. As C. Geertz noted in his book Islam constantly evolving and plural forms in which Observed: Religious Development in Morocco religious identity seems to play a key role. On and Indonesia, the key is to recognize “the mate- the one hand, these forms facilitate the positive rial reasons why Moroccan Islam became activ- symbolic incorporation of emigrants and encour- ist, rigorous, dogmatic and more than a little age their civic participation in host countries and anthropolatrous” (1968: 20). Like A. Bel and Wes- countries of origin. At the same time, they rein- termack before him, Geertz tried to understand force a sense of ethnic belonging, of belonging and explain Islam in Morocco as a cultural whole to the nation, based on more than the use of a homogenized over time by the contact between language or knowledge and socialisation in a cul- rural tribes and city dwellers. Westermarck ture. They seek to make an exercise of citizenship wrote that in their religious practice, Moroccans visible in the countries of origin and destination “endeavour to benefit by the baraka and to escape that does not deny or hide its origin, but values the bas” (1968: chap. III). The extent to which those elements that differentiate Moroccan emi- these statements characterize the relationship grants. By participating in associations and going between Moroccans and religion in their prac- to the mosque as part of their daily life, Moroc- tices today was analysed recently with a survey can emigrants should be able to maintain their of 1,156 people, the basis of the book L’islam au commitment to their nation as Muslim Moroc- quotidien by M. El Ayadi, H. Rachik, and M. Tozy cans belonging to the school of Islam and, (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy 2007). This work looks as believers, be committed to the human rights at a significant number of aspects and makes it and the laws of the host country. This is the con- possible to form a picture of Islam in Morocco tent that is transmitted through Morocco’s most today. recent religious policy abroad (Régragui 2013). In terms of religious practice, 15% of Moroc- Moreover, the pluralist political games in cans say they never pray and only 16% go to Morocco that concern religious legitimacy take the mosque to do so (only 2% of women). The on a different colour in the diaspora. In lands level increases with age (using morning prayer where Islam is new, the elements championed as an example, 9.8% of 18-24 year olds prac- by the Moroccan state to manage religion in the tice it, compared to 57.6% of people over 60) diaspora –educating imams, establishing a pres- (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy 2007: 51-55). Despite ence in communities, sending women as spiri- the proliferation of practices like pilgrimages and tual guides– merge with other proposals for local religious festivals, pilgrimage seems to attract management and strategies coming from other increasingly fewer Moroccans (El Ayadi, Rachik

113 New Diversities 17 (1), 2015 Ana I. Planet Contreras and Miguel H. de Larramendi Martinez

and Tozy 2007: 61-62). Young people are more Politically and sociologically speaking, active practitioners than before, although this Morocco is a country that is often seen as the is seen in conjunction with religious and politi- product of several tensions: between tradition cal fervour at a time of tension with the West. and modernity, between the growing urban The common use of specific religious vocabulary influence and the rural base, between openness among young people reveals a generational and and control (López García 2000). Since the mid- ideological break and a greater understanding of 1990s, the processes of openness taking place in their religion, indicated by 56.7% of the survey the country have involved reform proposals that respondents (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy 2007: 75). affect the economy, political life and the social Religious knowledge is trending upwards, not landscape (Desrues and Hernando de Larramendi only among the well educated, with their scrip- 2011). These reforms, which include changes in turalist explanations of religion, but in general. the territorial organization of the state and the Simple practice no longer appears to be suffi- balance of powers, have preserved the centrality cient; rather, there is a growing interest in know- of the monarchy in the system revealing, in turn, ing religious history and doctrine better (El Ayadi, a decided commitment to extending democra- Rachik and Tozy 2007: 97). tization to various public spheres in a complex The study offers empirical data about the context of international pressure and regional secularization of Moroccan society. Moroccans instability. increasingly support separating religion and Formally defined as a constitutional - monar politics: 41.5% believe that politicians should not chy accompanied by an administrative appara- be involved in religion and that religious schol- tus inherited from earlier times known as the ars –ulemas– should not be involved in politics Makhzen (Boukhars 2011), the Moroccan sys- (35.4%), although 25.2% believe the opposite tem faces the great challenge of ensuring its (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy 2007: 82). Additionally, permanence and its prerogatives while dealing an important number of the survey respondents with a public with a growing capacity to mobi- say they have no opinion about the matter. For lize. Mohammed VI, who has been on the throne the authors, after the 2003 Casablanca attacks since the death of his father Hassan II in June and subsequent events, part of the population 1999, began his government with a proposal became disinterested in questions related to to reform from within, trying to strengthen the Islam and politics. They suggest that a lack of parliamentary institution and executive- pow information about the subject may explain this. ers using the Spanish parliamentary monarchy The direct question about the place of the mon- as a model. During the early years of the reign arch in this “triangle” between politics and reli- of Mohammed VI, a number of complex issues gion was not asked in the survey. were addressed. In 2001, an advisory commit- None of this contradicts the fact that 93% of tee was created to reform the Moudawana, or Moroccans continue to define themselves as reli- family code, and between 2004 and 2005, the gious according to Win/Gallup 2014. The results Equity and Reconciliation Commission, which of the study also show that religious practice answers to the Advisory Council on Human plays a declining role in daily life: ‘leur utilisation Rights, reviewed crimes committed during the de la religion est de plus en plus circonscrite dans harshest years of Hassan II’s reign. Additionally, un espace et un temps bien délimités’ (El Ayadi, a number of new organizations were created: Rachik and Tozy 2007: 227), which, along with the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture, head- opinions about the separation of religion and quartered in Rabat, the Royal Advisory Council politics, constitutes the basis for any seculariza- for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) (2006), the Coun- tion process. cil for the Moroccan Community Abroad (CCME)

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(2007) and the Advisory Council on Regionaliza- The monarch continues to play a central role tion (CCR) (2010). in the Moroccan political system in the 21st cen- The challenge of religious reform for the mon- tury (Boukhars 2011). Although no longer con- archy –which witnessed the polarization of pub- sidered ‘sacred’, as he was described in Article lic opinion during the debate on reforming the 23 of the previous 1996 constitution, he is still Moudawana between supporters of the reform defined as the Commander of the Faithful, the and those who considered any reform an attack highest religious authority, and presides over the on Islam and religious values– is a complex one. Supreme Ulema Council, which has the power to Considering the religious characterization of issue fatwas and religious rulings. Despite losing Moroccans, the question has entailed taking into his sacred status, however, the king still has other account both the desire for more secularization sources of what could be called traditional legiti- expressed by some citizens and the maintenance macy as the khalifa or foremost religious author- of tradition requested by others. This needs to ity in the country, such as sultan, the holder of be done without relinquishing control of reli- earthly power, and sharif, a descendant of the gious affairs in an international context where Prophet Mohammed with barakah, divine grace security and control are needed to prevent the (Tozy 2009, Daadaoui 2011). infiltration of destabilizing interests or doctrines, The traditional elements in the revised 2011 as seen in the 6 June 2003 attacks in Casablanca. constitution include the nature of the Moroc- Furthermore, as one of the elements used to can monarchy, which was partially reformed guarantee its permanence, the religious legiti- and defined in Article 1 as ‘constitutional, dem- macy that underpins the regime must be under- ocratic, parliamentary and social’, adding the scored, the role of the monarch as the guarantor term “parliamentary” to the 1996 constitution. of traditional religion and religious arbiter dis- The relationship between the monarch and the creetly maintained, and therefore the appear- executive power was also modified, with some of ance and spread of religiously inspired parties the royal prerogatives ceded to a prime minister, and movements controlled. now the head of government chosen from the Eleven years after his accession to the throne, the regional context created by the Arab Spring ent assembly, but a consultative commission directly and the street demonstrations of the 20 February appointed by the sovereign. It was made up of 18 Movement –a politically heterogeneous move- individuals from various sectors and with different sensibilities (union representatives, political parties, ment that initially brought together both militant civil society, human rights organizations, activists and leftist youth and the local Islamist movement technocrats). During the short debate process, the al-Adl wal-Ihsane– accelerated the processes of commission received memoranda from most of the political parties. The PJD acted as a “veto player” re- debating and approving a new constitution that, garding article 25, asking the commission not toin- without establishing a definitive separation of clude the freedom of conscience. On 1 July 2011, the powers, advanced the course of democratiza- new constitution, which substantially modified the tion and offered a potentially transformative 1996 constitution, was approved by referendum with 98.4% of the vote. With the constitutional reform and legal framework. In March 2011, Mohammed the announcement of a more even distribution of VI announced the constitutional reforms in a powers, the sovereign suppressed the momentum of speech he gave a few weeks after the onset of protests that had managed to take down presidents Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak in Tunisia protests calling for the democratization of the and Egypt, respectively, in a matter of weeks. The pre- political system and measures to combat corrup- amble to the new constitution defines Morocco as a tion.2 sovereign Muslim state whose unity is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Amazigh (now a co- official language along with Arabic) and Saharan-Has- 2 The body in charge of drafting the constitutional sanic components, enriched by its African, Andalusian, reform proposal was not the parliament or a constitu- Hebraic and Mediterranean currents.

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largest party elected to parliament, and a new habism (Tozy 2009). A discourse of this nature breakdown of the tasks entrusted to the execu- is able to ease any suspicions resulting from a tive. Additionally, the powers of parliament were progressive image of Islam reflected in the cities reinforced and its functions expanded to allow or in individual actions among members of the it to grant general amnesties and ratify interna- more traditionalist camps both inside and- out tional treaties (once the exclusive prerogative of side the country, who are willing to accept the the king), reopening the debate on citizen par- Makhzen/the monarch’s proposal due to the ticipation in institutions and the role of political symbolic capital accumulated by the monarch parties in it. The Moroccan monarchy has played over the centuries as Amir al Mu’minin, Com- and continues to play a decisive role beyond the mander of the Faithful. Given the many actors borders of the country, not only at the diplo- and settings, an increasingly clear and- moder matic level but also as the highest representative ate discourse has been established that is main- of the country, and is a key player in the policies tained by everyone: religious authorities, politi- created for emigrants living abroad. As such, the cians, academics…and consular authorities. The fact that the monarchy has maintained its tradi- role of the Minister for Religious Affairs, Ahmed tional character in a context of reforms is partic- Tawfiq, who was appointed in November 2002, is ularly important. The role of the monarch used important in this respect. In order to be efficient, to be considered an institution in the construc- a complex action strategy must be mobilized for tion of individual allegiances –baia– both explicit all the different actors involved. Indeed, it would and implicit, among citizens. The subject-citizen be simplistic and orientalist to view Morocco’s used to be connected rhetorically to the mon- current positioning in terms of religion as a step arch via his powers in the area of religion, pro- back in the modernization of the country. Rather, ducing a bond between the king and the citizen- new or renewed forms of organizing religious believers, whether or not they live in Morocco. power are appearing during a time of tension With Mohammed VI, and since the reforms pro- when religion is losing its social power, produc- posed beginning in 2004, this field has become ing a return to Islam (Belal 2011). When tradi- increasingly better organized administratively tions weaken and the mechanism of faith begins (Bruce 2013). This does not mean, however, that to be used, the reaction is a return to Islam, as the monarch has renounced his guiding role in C. Geertz has observed (Geertz 1968). As Belal this area. The “asymmetric cohabitation” of the has noted, the loss of the structuring power Monarch and the PJD after 2011 elections shows of religion makes way for new emotional com- that control of religious sphere continues to be a munities, like al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Belal 2011), or “domaine réservé de la monarchie” (López García increases the appeal and credibility of brother- 2011). hoods like Boutchichiyya (Regragui 2013). Thus, the state has faced a dual task regard- In his speech on 30 April 2004, the king laid ing firstly, ideology and discourse building and the foundation for the proposed reform (El-Katiri secondly, specific actions. In terms of the dis- 2012). Far from delegating the task to others, course, the clear option has been to increas- he evoked his role as Amir al Mu’minin (‘Nous ingly appeal to Moroccan particularism. In this astreignant au pacte sacré de l’allégeance et respect, as Mohamed Tozy has shown, Moroc- aux devoirs qui en découlent d’assurer la pro- cans have recourse to religious independence tection de la religion et de ses adeptes’ 3) to with respect to other influences through their king. By confirming their commitment to the 3 Published in its entirety on http://www.habous. Maliki rite of Islam, they are able to distance gov.ma/fr/Islam-au-maroc/29-Activit%C3%A9s- themselves from other more austere options d-Amir-Al-mouminine/574-Discours-royal-relatif- like the Hanbali school, which is closer to Wah- %C3%A0-la-restructuration-du-champ-religieux-au- Maroc.html

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call for renewed commitment from all involved, the Moroccan regime also provides a tool with announcing his intention to bolster religious edu- which to assess the importance of emigration cation and overhaul the structure of the Ministry and emigrants for the regime. of Religious Affairs, and calling for more involve- As in other countries, the first organizations to ment from the ulemas with social issues. From a concern themselves with Moroccan emigrants doctrinal point of view, ‘exige que l’on s’attache were based in consulates and focused on han- au référentiel historique unique qui est le nôtre, dling issues related to work and maintaining a à savoir le rite Malékite sunnite sur lequel s’est political profile of immigrant participation that construite l’unanimité de cette nation et dont can be qualified as low. In light of the limited la protection est un devoir et une mission dont power of these “mutual societies” to act, other Nous sommes le dépositaire’. There is no doubt policies were quickly put into effect that involved that he used religion to provide continuity and broadening perspectives; it was suggested that in unity to the nation: ‘Nous considérons que notre addition to receiving social assistance, emigrants attachement à notre unité doctrinale, au plan needed to contribute something in exchange. In religieux, s’apparente à notre engagement con- 1990, the Hassan II Foundation for Non-Resident stitutionnel pour défendre l’intégrité territoriale Moroccans was created by royal initiative with et l’unité nationale de la patrie’. the declared objective of helping Moroccans To maintain this discourse on faith and citizen- living abroad to maintain their religious and cul- ship, the state has not looked to new spaces or tural identity through educational and cultural created new institutions for religious governance, assistance for new generations.5 but rather has worked with existing institutions. The Hassan II Foundation focused its efforts In this respect, the country’s imams and ulemas on developing programmes related to teaching have been invited by the Ministry of Habous Moroccan language and culture to the children and Islamic Affairs to apply the instructions of of nationals who had settled in foreign countries the Amir al Mu’minin, to exchange experiences, and on studying migrations (Mijares 2011). The reflect and learn how to bear witness to this tol- Hassan II Foundation was partially reformed in erant, open and moderate Moroccan Islam from 1997 and continued to operate. In the reform, an orthodox perspective.4 the Foundation was restructured to incorporate At the same time, some religious traditions a migration observatory that organized its work that have seemingly weakened have been recov- around several axes: cooperation, education, ered (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy 2007: 61-62), culture, sports and youth, and social and legal highlighting their traditional Moroccan character. assistance. Programmes were also designed Examples include the brotherhoods of Sufism, to facilitate investment and business creation, which have been visibilized and reclaimed in which quickly raised two issues common in high-level cultural reunions like the Festival of countries that create these types of institutions Sacred Music in Fez and the Sidi Chiker World (Gamlen 2006): the need to explain to the popu- Meetings of Adherents of Sufism (Régragui 2013). lation why money was being spent on policies for people who did not live in the country or pay Emigration Management Policies in Morocco: taxes for its maintenance; and the overlap –and Towards a Policy of Diaspora? at times open competition– between govern- Since the middle of the last century, Morocco has ment departments with jurisdiction in the matter shown a clear commitment to creating institu- and also with other institutions created by the tions that manage structural emigration. More- over, a study of the ways power is exercised by 5 Law 19/89 creating the Hassan II Foundation for Non-Resident Moroccans, published in the Official 4 Published on http://habous.gov.ma/fr/guide-de-l- Bulletin of the Kingdom of Morocco No. 4055, 18 July imam.html 1990.

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state. The objective of public and private insti- an in-depth review of legislation and procedures tutions has been to attract emigrants to spend in order to advance, little by little, towards new money or invest in the country, as seen in the forms of exercising citizenship and towards other campaigns designed by banks, real estate com- possibilities. panies and insurance companies that greet emi- The impossibility of reducing the lives of grants when they return for their annual vaca- Moroccans living abroad to a single associative tion (Belguendouz 2006). model, the pervasive clientelism and the sus- In managing Moroccan emigration during picions that this was an instrument of political these years, there has been a constant risk of control being operated from Rabat significantly overlapping institutional structures. There is a determined how the policies developed during complex relationship between these institutions the 1990s were received (Coslovi and Gomes- and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the coun- Faria 2009, Brand 2006). The renewed efforts try’s principle actor abroad through its network made by Morocco and other states must be of embassies and consulates. The explanation seen in relation to the dynamics of integration for this overlap or competition is that while affecting Moroccans living abroad. This has been the question of non-resident Moroccans is an especially true in France, where the Association internal matter that by its very nature extends Law of 1981 lifted restrictions and allowed- for beyond borders, it is not a diplomatic action per eigners to form associations, opening the way to se. Although it is true that diaspora policies may new debates and the creation of organizational be aimed at emigrants living abroad, it is impor- strategies by the migrants themselves and their tant to remember that they also apply when descendants: les Beurs (Planet 2009). the migrants return to their country of origin; The Moroccan government was aware of the this can be seen in the form of specific services underlying problems regarding emigration and like protection against rackets or advantageous knew that it would not be sufficient to simply investment conditions (Levitt and De La Dehesa keep the consulates and civil registries operating 2003). In short, there are some Moroccans who or respond to the discontent expressed by non- live outside the country but have domestic inter- resident Moroccans about how they were being ests and who are the object of government atten- treated by their country of origin (complaints tion because of the economic importance of the about the lack of assistance during Operation remittances they send. Transit,6 denunciations of fraudulent real estate At this time, if states are to be successful in cre- promotions aimed at these workers, financial ating and maintaining power relations with their abuse at the border, etc.). One turning point non-resident citizens, this cannot be solely based occurred in 1999, when the socialist Prime Min- on the provision of social and cultural services. ister A. Youssoufi proposed that the matter be The difficulty in controlling a diaspora spread out handled directly from his cabinet along with the over five continents has an inarguable material recently opened dossier on human rights, thus basis and entails a complex question: how can being able to deny the charge that non-resident a state foster citizenship among emigrants that, Moroccans had been consigned to oblivion by following the classic model, includes political, the new “alternating government” (Belguendouz civil and social rights? Advancing in the provision 2006). of any of these rights in isolation is an extremely For four years, the question of Moroccan emi- delicate question, both because of the material grants remained in the hands of the presidential resources needed and the legal difficulties inher- ent in taking action in another country. Protect- 6 In 2000, the Mohammed V Foundation for Solidar- ing the exercise of civil and political rights is an ity was founded. Since then, it has been responsible exceptionally complex question since it involves for organizing what is called Operation Transit, a task previously handled by the Hassan II Foundation.

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cabinet, during which time it was assisted by the active in associations, unions and politics Hassan II Foundation. In 2002, with Mohammed in their host countries, this document says VI now on the throne, a proposal was made to very little about how to participate fully as hand the matter over to a lower-level ministry citizens in their country of origin where and member of the government, a delegate in they never lose their nationality, accord- the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. ing to the current civil code in the country.8 The intention was to breathe fresh air into the As with other government actions, the del- question of managing Moroccan emigration and egate minister’s proposal does not appear to establish the basis for new policies. In March to have been autonomous from the central 2003, a strategy note was sent out by the dele- sphere of power, i.e. the monarchy, given gate minister that proposed an ambitious univer- that it echoed a royal speech delivered to sal plan for emigration that included objectives mark Throne Day in July 2002, during which in the host countries and in Morocco, as well Mohammed VI addressed participation by as presenting a detailed action plan (with more non-resident nationals in national institu- explicit details in the case of the host country).7 tions. However, these remarks did not entail The initiative’s marked transnational trend is any real progress regarding the question of indicative of the current stage of migration in representation, as “participate” does not Morocco: the prospect of return exists, but is not necessarily mean “to be represented” in the the central axis. The most innovative ideas, which current established strategy. continue to be implemented today, encourage Although those who wish to participate in Moroccans living abroad to participate in the politics by voting from abroad continue to pres- politics, unions and associations in their coun- ent their demands, it has become clear that a try of residence and to organize pressure groups new kind of logic is at play in Morocco regard- to influence national and international strategic ing migrants, although the issue has never been options, along with a commitment on the part removed from government control. In his com- of Morocco to guarantee full citizenship rights. parative studies on the question, A. Gamlen has These concepts were added to the objectives explored how it is possible for two types of mech- discussed above concerning the children of anisms to operate simultaneously in diaspora emigrants and the defence of strategic national policies, one supporting “diaspora building” and causes. Working with lobbies and speaking up in the other “diaspora integration”. Diaspora build- host countries was now one of the obligations ing aims at cultivating diaspora identity or recog- for non-resident Moroccans who, as in other 8 diasporas, form an integral part of “symbolic During these years, there was no defined way to guarantee that Moroccan emigrants would be in- nation-building policies.” No longer solely- per volved and participate in their country of origin. Be- ceived as remittance senders, emigrants today tween 1984 and 1992, the difficulties in including disseminate the values of their countries of ori- emigrant votes in the organization of political repre- sentation in Moroccan institutions became apparent. gin (Gamlen 2006). At that time, five of the 204 deputies in the parliament The issue of political participation for were elected in constituencies abroad that included Moroccans living abroad was addressed in a vast area: one of the constituencies alone included this plan in a vaguely worded phrase: ‘to Spain, Italy, Portugal, England, the United States and Canada, all of South America and Africa, with the ex- guarantee the community’s right to full citi- ception of the Arab countries. This shed doubt upon zenship via better political participation’. the legitimacy of the elected officials with regard to While Moroccans were encouraged to be the effectiveness of their participation and- jeopar dized the influence of the parliamentary proposals they made as they struggled to be heard, even within their own political groups. As a result, the parties, vot- 7 These documents and action plans are available ers and political class in general gradually lost interest at the ministry website: www.marocainsdumonde. in this process (Lacroix 2005). gov.ma

119 New Diversities 17 (1), 2015 Ana I. Planet Contreras and Miguel H. de Larramendi Martinez

nition, while diaspora integration concerns re- involvement in the circumstances of Moroccans integration in the country of origin. If emigrants living permanently abroad: the Supreme Ulema can be re-integrated into homeland policies via Council, the Council of Ulema of Europe, the Con- their rights, such as the right to retain citizenship sultative Council for Human Rights, the Diwan Al both abroad and at home, the policies towards Madhalim12 and the Royal Institute for Amazigh them can facilitate political participation: being Culture, as well as the Hassan II Foundation and able to vote in elections in their country of origin the Mohammed V Foundation for Solidarity. at consulates, for example, or other measures As is the case with the other councils created that have an impact on civic participation such since Mohammad VI ascended to the throne as the creation of “consulting expatriate councils and those created during the reign of Hassan II, or advisory bodies” (Gamlen 2006). At issue here this institution has ambitious and wide-ranging is not only a new form of institutional develop- objectives and, while it has no executive capac- ment, but also a new way of understanding citi- ity, it is not limited by parliamentary political zenship as explained from within (although this dynamics. It is a non-executive deliberative body idea may not be shared by all migrants, some of with its own budget and which shares specific whom take a different approach to their actions). objectives with other existing institutions. When As in other spheres of politics, a new institu- it was created, the council was criticized for the tion was created in Morocco to tackle the ques- lack of transparency in the choice of its deci- tion of non-resident Moroccans, the Council of sion-making members; additionally, its ability to the Moroccan Community Abroad (hereafter operate without a clear action programme was CCME), whose objectives, bodies and operational questioned (Fernández Molina 2011). Today, the procedures are defined in its charter (Fernández response of the council’s leaders to this criticism Molina 2011).9 The CCME is a consultative institu- revolves around the fact that the consultative tion with administrative and financial autonomy nature of the council is not fully understood nor, whose mission is to guarantee the control and as a consequence, is its inability to take execu- evaluation of the Kingdom of Morocco’s public tive decisions. The CCME leaders also argue that policies related to emigrant nationals and to col- its resources are too limited for the complexity laborate in their improvement. As a forum for of the task at hand and that the proliferation of reflection and debate with no executive powers, institutions dealing with topics related to immi- its objectives include ‘contributing to the devel- gration –which do not always work in harmony– opment of relationships between Morocco and further complicates their task.13 the governments and the societies in the coun- tries where Moroccan emigrants reside’. With a Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of National Education, Ministry of complex structure, the CCME is made up of two Higher Education, Scientific Research and Profession- categories of members:10 the decision makers al Training, Ministry of Youth and Sports, Employment (a president, secretary-general and fifty members and Professional Training, Ministry of Social Develop- ment, Family and Solidarity and, of course, the Del- selected from Moroccans living abroad who have egate Minister to the Prime Minister responsible for distinguished themselves by their mediation the non-resident Moroccan community. skills and their professional and social success) 12 The Diwan Al Madhalim or “Office of Grievances” and seventeen observer members, including ten was created in 1992 by Royal Dahir 1.01.298 as an ombudsman to ‘examine the claims and complaints 11 ministries and six institutions that have some of citizens who believe themselves to be victims of any decision or act originating from public administra- 9 The committee was created by Royal Dahir 1.07.208 tions, local groups, public institutions and any body of 21 December 2007. with the official powers of a public authority that are 10 See the transitional provisions in Article 24 of this incompatible with the principles of the rule of law and Royal Dahir. justice’. 11 These are the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the 13 Interview with Abdallah Boussouf, October 2014. Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Available on: www.ccme.org.ma/es/entrevistas/37301

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The CCME’s ability to act has not been limited that the presence of the CCME as a consultative by its lack of executive capacity. On the contrary, body could take this issue out of the hands of the the council is able to weigh in on legislative bills parliament (which has legislative powers) and and regulations regarding emigration and non- the ministries that enact the necessary electoral resident Moroccans and participate in drafting law reforms (Coslovi and Gómez Faría 2009). The guidelines for the public policies designed to proposal, then, was not to eliminate the coun- maintain close ties between Moroccan emigrants cil, but to reformulate its advisory capacity and and their Moroccan identity with respect to lan- reposition it within Moroccan institutions like guage, religious education and cultural activities. the Social and Economic Council or the Hassan II Working alongside the ministry responsible for Foundation and its directive committee. non-resident Moroccans, the council can also propose measures to guarantee their rights and The Transnational Capacity of the Moroccan protect their interests, encourage collaboration State in the Area of Religion with institutions and a variety of sectors in their The introduction discussed how the religious country of origin and support a number of activi- reforms implemented in Morocco also have an ties in Morocco and the host countries.14 impact when they are exported to other coun- With the creation of the council, the Moroccan tries. This circumstance has opened up a broad state initiated a new policy towards its emigrants, field of analysis that requires more research. To and in doing so it has come into conflict with paraphrase C. Geertz (Geertz 1968) , observing the actions and programmes promoted by other the Islam of Moroccans in the diaspora requires actors in the diaspora. Intellectuals and migrants recognizing that the religious expression of immi- with experience in the NGO sector and grievance grant populations has a great deal to do with the groups who were not invited to join the council existing legal framework, including regulations organized themselves a few months after the regarding religious freedom and the promotion CCME was constituted as a sort of opposition of this freedom through dialogue with the state movement. In particular, they view the council as and the administration. Equally important are an indirect way to curb or eliminate aspirations the types of religious infrastructure migrants for political participation in Morocco among non- find when they arrive, the degree of recognition/ resident Moroccans. non-recognition of their religious expression and However, this type of policy has not satisfied any existing stereotypes, all of which can lead everyone and from time to time, voices are heard to processes in which religion is reformulated in insisting on the need for direct participation as longer-term migration trajectories. This involves emigrant voters and elected representatives. the possibility of new ways of approaching reli- At the end of 2009, the Moroccan parliament gion or belief, and concerns religiosity, the way received some members of Daba 2012, a move- in which believers experience their relationship ment whose primary demand was the removal with their religion. of obstacles making it difficult for emigrants to Here, again, freedom of religion is at stake, but participate in elections as voters and candidates mistrust and suspicion play a particularly impor- in the 2012 elections.15 Some experts argued tant role. Clearly, at issue in the European con- text is the coexistence of secularism, which dom- 14 The council has a regularly updated website featur- inates public space, alongside the religion prac- ing the activities it has participated in since it was -cre ticed by emigrants. The effort made by Morocco ated. See www.ccme.org.ma 15 This theme appears frequently in the demands since 2003 to prevent any form of extremism, made by various associations, which stress the impor- which has been qualified as incompatible with tance of being included on the electoral rolls (as set the Islam advocated by the Moroccan state, is out in Law 23.06) in the creation of a Moroccan iden- tity for young people born outside the country. consistent with the requirements of European

121 New Diversities 17 (1), 2015 Ana I. Planet Contreras and Miguel H. de Larramendi Martinez

authorities. This task of regulating the presence the lack of religious infrastructure, mosques and of Islam in public life is resolved using constant specific cemeteries. This survey shows differ- reminders that official Moroccan Islam is a secu- ent processes of reconstruction and religiosity, lar Islam that does not interfere with politics, but but despite its undoubted interest, it does not is present in political life in the form of the val- help to specifically understand how the respon- ues and beliefs of the citizenry. Therefore, at this dents evaluate the policies of their country of time, Islamic content in the discourse or practice origin. of Moroccan leaders cannot be interpreted as Any evaluation of the impact of the poli- an indication of non-integration; neither does its cies developed in the last decade in Morocco absence indicate better or more fully integrated regarding Spain and related to the creation of a citizens (Planet 2009). religious transnational field must be framed in The Moroccan state’s possibilities for influenc- the context of Spanish-Moroccan relations. The ing this religious sphere are both ideological and relations between the two countries are struc- material. And both discourse and action come tured around a network of interests and a frame- into play. work agreement, the Spanish-Moroccan Treaty To find out about the situation of Moroc- of Friendship, which was signed in 1991 when can immigrants and their religious practices in migrant movements were starting to grow. There Spain, some specific surveys have looked at the is very little in the agreement about migration question of the religious practice of immigrant and, of course, it does not contain any reference .16 In these surveys, Moroccans con- to religious cooperation. Moreover, the way in stitute the largest group (Moroccans 57%, Sen- which minority church-state relations are man- egalese 13%, Pakistanis 11% and Algerians 5%). aged by the Spanish state –unlike with the Cath- Most settled in Spain relatively recently (50% olic Church– does not anticipate relations with have lived in the country for between two and third countries with regard to religion. In Spain, ten years), are workers (76%) and believe they religious freedom and the freedom to worship have adapted to Spanish customs and the life- is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Min- style (95% in the case of the survey recipients istry of Justice. In the case of Islam, religious who have lived in Spain for more than ten years). associations are registered with the Ministry of When asked what they value about Spain, they Justice to be able to benefit from the Coopera- cite the freedom, the level of state assistance, tion Agreement between the Spanish State and the standard of living and respect for beliefs the Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE) signed in (78%). In terms of personal religiosity, the sur- 1992. Dialogue with the state is done through vey speaks of people who consider themselves the CIE, an umbrella organization, whose opera- religious (7.6 on a scale 1-10), with 41% defin- tion is hampered by the fact that it is made up ing themselves as seriously practising Muslims. of two federations with strategies and interests Just 13% of the immigrants polled said they had that are not always parallel: the Union of Islamic faced obstacles in the practice of their religion, Communities of Spain (UCIDE) and the Spanish most often mentioning the lack of a mosque as Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI). being the biggest hurdle (8%). This assertion is Since 1992, management and dialogue policies surprising given that a constant complaint made have been instituted at a fairly unsteady rhythm, by spokesmen for various associations involves unfailingly attempting to empower Spanish Islam to the fullest with respect to foreign references. 16 Metroscopia, a social research and survey institute While there is little more to say about this topic in Madrid, has been conducting annual polls on Mus- lims in Spain since September 2006 under the head- in terms of relations between states, this does ing ‘Barometer of opinion of the Muslim community not mean that the associations do not maintain of immigrant origin in Spain’. The most recent results relationships with their members’ countries of were published in March 2010.

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origin, although no in-depth studies have been Moroccan religious policy for its emigrants made in this field to date (Planet 2014). who have settled in Spain is currently focused However, while there is no room for dialogue on three investment areas, both materially and at state level, some regional administrative bod- symbolically. The highest level includes activities ies –specifically the Government of Catalonia– developed by the European Council of Moroc- have been implementing specific policies to man- can Ulema (Conseil marocain des oulemas pour age religious affairs since 2002. In the Catalonian l’Europe),18 whose operation parallels that of case, migration and the management of Islam as the Ulema Council of Morocco. This institution’s an important element of migrations from Paki- goals are broad and indicative of the concerns stan and North Africa are influenced by complex that led to its creation, expressing the need to considerations related to the Catalonian political promote dialogue with society and to ensure that situation. In short, Catalonian nationalism has young people are educated, ties are maintained developed a policy of collaboration with reli- and that room is made for a Moroccan religious gious communities in its pursuit of ulterior politi- outlook in Europe. All of the Council’s activities cal support, which gives the question of dialogue can be read about in the Moroccan press.19 The and influence a degree of dynamism not found in Council also collaborates on the instruction of other regions of Spain.17 With the emergence of imams and overseas missions of imams to dem- groups like the decidedly Islamophobic Platform onstrate religious values, organises pilgrimages for Cataluña party, the Catalonian electoral situa- to holy sites, and holds working groups on the tion reveals the visibility of these policies and the Moroccan community abroad and the partici- suspicions that can arise about extremist posi- pation of female spiritual guides (murshidat) in tions among a specific portion of the electorate communities at home and abroad, which is an (Guía 2014). Similarly, the Government of Cata- exercise in modernizing the role of women in lonia’s foreign relations with Morocco in the last transmitting religious knowledge and applying it two decades have been highly politicized and to daily life (Dirèche 2010). The Council has car- become part of a regional strategy. The 2014- ried out some activities in Spain as a joint ven- 2017 Moroccan Plan presented in September ture with other institutions. In Madrid in October 2014 included specific actions for the Catalonian 2010, for example, the Council co-organized a population of Moroccan origin, such as educating training seminar with one of the largest federa- Moroccan religious leaders and providing pasto- tions (FEERI), whose leadership at that time was ral care in jails, both of which are the responsibil- mainly Moroccan, in the Islamic League’s Great ity of the Directorate-General for Religious Affairs Mosque in the capital. In Barcelona two months in Catalonia, and providing assistance from later, a similar conference was held, this time with the Department of Governance about opening the collaboration of IEMED (European Institute spaces for worship and introducing Islamic reli- of the Mediterranean). However, this was not gious education by the education authorities. the first conference of imams held in Barcelona; With the exception of the last case, these poli- in October 2004, the Islamic Council of Catalo- cies have been implemented in the last decade. nia organized a meeting on imams and mosques attended by Moroccan consular authorities, 17 The situation in Melilla and Ceuta, Spanish autono- Moroccan scholars from other European coun- mous cities on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco, is different. The percentage of Muslims in these cities is very high and relations with Morocco, which wants 18 to reclaim the cities, merit a more complex analysis. Created by Royal Dahir 1.08.17 published on 20 Oc- With regard to religion, the cities contain mosques tober 2008 in the Official Gazette of the Kingdom of that are owned by Morocco and the religious influ- Morocco. To operate in Europe, the association has a ence, fostered by proximity, is unmistakable. Briones, headquarters in Belgium. 19 Tarrés and Salguero published a study on this topic in The news that appears can be consulted on 2013. http://www.maghress.com/

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tries, members of the Council of Catalonia and ‘managing religious affairs is the responsibility of Mohammed Chaib. the Spanish state’.23 With regard to direct support for associations Finally, the growing participation of Moroccans and mosques, according to Moroccan official in interlocution processes, which was quite neg- sources, very few religious associations have ligible in the 1990s, has become significant with made use of the funds that the Moroccan Minis- regard to both state and regional bodies in recent try of Religious Affairs proposed for that purpose. years (Planet 2014). Gone are the days when par- For example, a 2013 activity report published by ticipation only occurred at the community level. the Ministry listed only four associations head- Spurred by the development of dialogue with the quartered in Spain that requested and received Muslim community, which intensified after the financing (the Union of Islamic Cultural Centres terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004, there of Catalonia, the As-Salam Mosque, the Al-Noor has been a notable increase in the presence of Islamic Association and the Maresme Islamic Moroccans, whether they have Spanish nation- Association).20 Similarly, initiatives to build ality or not, in the leadership ranks of religious mosques in countries like France have not been organizations at national level. At state level, echoed in Spain to date.21 Moroccan association leaders have become vis- The Hassan II Foundation has, in turn, used its ible in leadership positions in the Spanish Fed- religious leadership programme for Moroccan eration of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI), but communities abroad to send imams overseas it is far from being a Moroccan official initiative. for Ramadan. In 2014, 20 Moroccans were sent This has been apparent since the January 2006 to Spain, 10 preachers, 7 university professors assembly, but became extremely clear with the and 3 imams (although no further information is election of Mounir Benjelloun as FEERI president available about exactly where they went).22 The in the January 2010 assembly (an election that incorporation of these envoys, which included was challenged but upheld in January 2012). It murshidats, into mosques was seen as a positive should not be thought that the incorporation development by the heads of the associations of these figures is due to efforts promoted by who had requested their presence. When asked Morocco, since the journey made by these asso- about the programme, one imam in the Commu- ciations and their leaders to reach these levels of nity of Madrid responded that it was ‘evidence representation has been a long one. In this par- of the country of origin’s interest in educating ticular case, it is a group of associations joined imams’ at the same time that it indicated that together in the Organización Nacional para el Diálogo y la Participación (ONDA), which has a strong showing in the regions of Murcia, Anda- lusia and Madrid. Although this organisation 20 The activity reports are available in Arabic on maintains close ties with al-Adl wa al-Ihssane, the official Ministry of Religious Affairs webpage: it has called for these ties with the Moroccan http://www.habous.gov.ma/component/content/ organisation to be formally broken (Arigita 2010). article/19-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8 %A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%B2%D This group has become increasingly involved in 8%A7%D8%AA/216-2012-05-17-09-50-02.html Spanish religious matters, challenging attempts 21 Press accounts indicate the extent of Morocco’s made by the Moroccan authorities to control this interest in promoting the construction of a great mosque in Badalona, with the idea of fostering the in- sphere (Planet and Larramendi 2013). fluence of Moroccan Islam from there. This particular In Catalonia, as noted above, the Islamic Coun- project would be done in collaboration with the Union cil of Catalonia was created in 2002 in an attempt of Cultural Centres of Catalonia. See http://www.abc. es/espana/20150424/abci-mezquita-auge-salafista- to create a federation of associations with roots barcelona-201504241253.html. 22 See http://www.fh2mre.ma/promotion-culturel- 23 Interview done in March 2015 by F. Tahiri as part of le/animation-religieuse/mission-en-cours.html the reference research project.

124 Religion and Migration in Morocco: Governability and Diaspora New Diversities 17 (1), 2015

in Catalonia and with which the Government of clearly modern in its communication and the Catalonia has maintained particularly close rela- policies created and promoted by existing insti- tions since the beginning. Efforts have been made tutions. In the creation of a transnational space, to create interlocution spaces for a Catalonian a citizenry in the diaspora, the needs expressed Islam to integrate Muslim immigrants, alongside by a mature community of Moroccans abroad other citizen participation initiatives like the Ibn are being met by new institutions –the Council Battuta Association. The speed with which this for the Moroccan Community Abroad– and are process has occurred suggests that the Catalo- quite apparent as well in the religious reforms. nian authorities see dialogue as something that Is this a coordinated action or a convergence befits the political moment in the region (Guía of interests? It is perhaps best described as a 2014: 101-129), but it cannot be understood shared progression that reminds Moroccans that without the political drive and perspective of one Islam, which belongs to everyone, is also a source of the most active intermediaries and politicians of legitimacy that gives meaning to the Moroc- working with Moroccan emigration in Catalonia, can community whether at home or abroad. The the Moroccan Catalonian Mohammed Chaib. community may be identified with a religion that continues to be dominated by a central stake- Conclusion holder, but each and every citizen is a participant Migration generates a multiplicity of “life (Belal 2011). The action, however, is not sponta- courses”. It cannot be argued that the processes neous, but rather coordinated by a state working of adapting, integrating or assimilating migrants at home and abroad to reinforce an image and into a new context result in the loss of their recover deep traditional Islamic values for pub- native cultural matrix and that preserving this lic action and public discourse. With this effort, matrix is, therefore, a duty of the state of origin. the state seeks to exclude those who intend to Morocco’s diaspora policies should not be ana- invoke an Islam beyond the religion proposed by lysed simplistically or from a do-gooder perspec- the authorities. tive with the idea that the end goal is to main- tain the culture of origin. Instead, they are some of the resources that the state has drawn on to strengthen and consolidate the political regime References and political system in a broader sense, actions Arigita, E. 2010. “Al-‘Adl wa-l-Ihsan en España: that operate on the periphery of the state at the ¿Un proyecto nacional para un movimiento is- service of emigrant citizens. They can only be lámico transnacional?” Revista de Dialectología y Tradiciones Populares, LXV, 1: 113-136. understood from the perspective of the means, Belal, Y. 2011. Le cheikh et le calife: Sociologie re- strategies and policies seen as conducive to the ligieuse de l’islam politique au Maroc. Lyon: ENS preservation of the Moroccan nation at a time of Éditions. transition in the kingdom and relegitimization of Belguendouz, A. 2006. “Le traitement institu- the new monarch. tionnel de la relation entre les marocains résidant In the area of religion, the reforms introduced à l’étranger et le Maroc, Rapports de recherche by Mohammed VI after he came to the throne 2006/6, Robert Schuman Centre”. Reached at and the constitutional reform a decade later con- http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent= tinue to indicate the close ties between Islam 484&callText=281 Politics in Morocco: Executive and national identity. One innovative aspect is Boukhars, A. 2011. Monarchy and Enlightened Authoritarianism. how what was traditionally used by the monar- New York: Routledge. chy as a sign of legitimacy has been incorporated Brand, L. 2006. Citizens Abroad: Emigration and into the institutional framework, the administra- the State in the Middle East and North Africa. tive apparatus with close ties to the palace, but Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Note on the Authors

Ana I. Planet Contreras is a Professor of The Sociology of Islam at the Department of Arab and Islamic Studies, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and Director of the Workshop of Mediterranean International Studies (TEIM). A specialist in Islam in migratory contexts, she is the author of numerous works, including “Islam in Spain” in Cesari, J. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on European Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press published in 2014.

Miguel Hernando de Larramendi Martinez is a Professor of Arab and Islamic Studies, Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha and Director of the Study Group on Arab and Muslim Societies (GRESAM). A specialist in Morocco and relations between Spain and North Africa, he has authored a variety of works, including Mohamed VI. Política y cambio social en Marruecos, Cordoba: Almuzara, published in 2011 with Thierry Desrues.

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