OIG-13-24 January 2013
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Department of Homeland Security Adequacy of USSS’ Internal Investigation of Alleged Misconduct in Cartagena, Colombia OIG-13-24 January 2013 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov January 24, 2013 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Mark Sullivan Director United States Secret Service FROM: Charles K. Edwards Deputy Inspector General SUBJECT: Adequacy of USSS’ Internal Investigation of Alleged Misconduct in Cartagena, Colombia Attached for your action is our final report, Adequacy of USSS’ Internal Investigation of Alleged Misconduct in Cartagena, Colombia. We incorporated the formal comments from the United States Secret Service in the final report. The report contains no recommendations. Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we are providing copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post the report on our website for public dissemination. Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Carlton I. Mann, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, at (202) 254-4100, or William J. McCarron, Chief Inspector, at (202) 254-4206. Attachment OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Table of Contents Executive Summary............................................................................................................. 1 Background ......................................................................................................................... 2 Results of Review............................................................................................................. ... 3 USSS Management in Cartagena Responded Appropriately to Allegations That Employees Solicited Prostitutes .................................................. 4 USSS Inspection Division Conducted an Administrative Investigation ..................... 6 USSS Revised Policies and Changed Supervision Staffing on Protective Visits....... 13 Appendixes Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ............................................. 16 Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report................................. 17 Appendix C: Timeline of Events ........................................................................... 18 Appendix D: Major Contributors to This Report ................................................. 19 Appendix E: Report Distribution .......................................................................... 20 Abbreviations CNP Colombian National Police DHS Department of Homeland Security DOD Department of Defense FSD Forensic Services Division GS General Schedule ISP Inspection Division (USSS) NCCA National Center for Credibility Assessment OIG Office of Inspector General RAIC Resident Agent in Charge RES Office of Professional Responsibility SAIC Special Agent in Charge USSS United States Secret Service www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-13-24 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Executive Summary In April 2012, United States Secret Service (USSS) employees were in Cartagena, Colombia, preparing for a Presidential visit to the Summit of the Americas. During these preparations, several USSS employees were suspected of soliciting prostitutes. In response, USSS took the following steps: (1) managers in Cartagena responded to the alleged solicitation; (2) USSS’ internal affairs office investigated the alleged solicitation; and (3) USSS revised policies and supervision staffing for protective visits. We assessed USSS’ response to the alleged solicitation of prostitutes by its employees. We determined that USSS responded expeditiously and thoroughly to the allegations. Managers in Cartagena began a management inquiry to determine whether USSS employees solicited prostitutes and to ensure that the protective mission was not compromised. The USSS Director relieved 11 employees who allegedly solicited prostitutes from their protective assignments in Cartagena. USSS replaced 5 of the 11 employees and reorganized staff to maintain the integrity of the protective mission. USSS placed the 11 employees suspected of soliciting prostitutes on administrative leave and suspended their security clearances. USSS’ internal affairs organization, the Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspection Division, conducted an investigation. Investigative activities included interviewing 232 subjects and witnesses, sending four inspectors to Colombia, reviewing thousands of email messages, and administering 14 polygraph examinations. On August 29, 2012, USSS issued a report on its investigative activities through May 24, 2012. The report presented a thorough account of employee conduct, and concluded that Presidential security, sensitive information, and equipment were not compromised in Cartagena. On December 27, 2012, the agency issued a second report on the results of its interviews and investigative work conducted after May 24, 2012. We received the second report while we were preparing our final report, and determined that it did not alter our findings or conclusions. USSS subsequently established and issued a directive that reiterated agency expectations and policies, and introduced additional guidance regarding briefings, supervision, and off-duty activities on foreign trips. The USSS Director also created a Professional Reinforcement Working Group to assess USSS’ organizational behavior, performance, and accountability. We make no recommendations in this report. www.oig.dhs.gov 1 OIG-13-24 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Background USSS has two primary missions: (1) to safeguard the Nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems and (2) to protect national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, designated sites, and high-profile events. USSS employs approximately 3,200 special agents, 1,300 uniformed officers, and more than 2,000 technical, professional, and administrative support personnel. In April 2012, USSS staff were preparing for a Presidential visit to Cartagena, Colombia, for the Summit of the Americas. The Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of the Miami Field Office is responsible for USSS activities in Colombia. Other managers such as the SAIC of the Protective Intelligence Division and the Assistant SAIC of the Presidential Protective Division were also present (figure 1). In addition, the Resident Agent in Charge (RAIC) of the Bogota, Colombia office was in Cartagena in support of preparations for the Presidential visit. Figure 1. USSS Chain of Command During the Presidential Visit to Cartagena, Colombia, in April 2012 Source: USSS. On April 12, 2012, the Colombian National Police (CNP) received a complaint from a prostitute alleging that a patron at the Hotel Caribe, who was a USSS employee, did not pay for sexual services she provided. After CNP and USSS personnel were unsuccessful at contacting the employee, a discussion concerning payment ensued among CNP officers, the prostitute, and USSS personnel outside the room of the alleged solicitor. www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-13-24 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security The prostitute’s complaint was resolved when two other USSS employees paid the complainant. The head of security for Hotel Caribe notified U.S. Embassy personnel about the incident. The State Department’s Deputy Regional Security Officer notified USSS managers of the incident and that other USSS employees might have solicited prostitutes. Although prostitution is not specifically addressed in USSS’ standards of conduct, USSS officials asserted that solicitation of prostitutes violated standards, which state that “employees shall not engage in criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral or notoriously disgraceful conduct or other conduct prejudicial to the [United States] Government.” Further, the agency’s standards of conduct state that the absence of a specific, published policy covering an act that brings discredit to an employee or USSS does not mean the act is condoned, is permissible, or would not call for and result in corrective or disciplinary action. USSS employees are expected to adhere to these standards both on and off duty. In addition, adjudicative guidelines for revoking access to classified information state, in part, that sexual behavior is a factor when the behavior may subject the individual to coercion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion. All USSS employees must maintain eligibility to access classified information at the Top Secret level to remain employed. Results of Review USSS managers must use their discretion to address employee conduct concerns while meeting security needs on protective assignments. Managers in Cartagena responded appropriately by notifying headquarters promptly about the incident, gathering facts, and taking steps to ensure that the protective mission was not compromised. The USSS Director relieved employees who allegedly solicited prostitutes from their protective assignments in Cartagena. Subsequent to the employees’ removal from the protective assignment in Cartagena, USSS’ internal affairs organization, the Office of Professional Responsibility (RES), Inspection Division (ISP), investigated the alleged solicitation. The investigation was consistent with USSS procedures, was conducted quickly, and provided a credible account of employee conduct. USSS also established and issued a directive that reiterated agency expectations and policies,