JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE DECISION SUMMARIES

July-August 2018

In the Matter of Roberts, Order (Arizona Supreme Court August 28, 2018) (https://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/reports/2017/17-084.pdf) Based on a stipulated resolution, the Arizona Supreme Court publicly censured a judge for knowingly permitting his bailiff to work for 2 court service providers. The Court’s order does not describe the misconduct; the resolution, including stipulated facts, are attached to the order. Wise Choice Alternatives provides “Life Skills,” a court-ordered sentencing alternative program that a defendant is required to complete in 60 days. Completion requires use of a workbook that, if sent by mail, a defendant receives in 5-10 days. If a defendant did not wish to wait for the workbook by mail, the defendant could obtain a copy from a Wise Choice Alternatives representative. In May 2015, the judge asked Jeffery Hickman, a part-time court bailiff supervised by the judge, if he would be interested in serving as Wise Choice Alternatives’ local representative to distribute workbooks to defendants ordered by the court to complete the program. When asked, the judge told Wise Choice Alternatives that Hickman might be willing to serve as its local representative. Wise Choice Alternatives hired Hickman directly and paid him $10 for each of the 48 workbooks he provided to defendants from June 2015 through March 22, 2017. The judge was aware that Wise Choice Alternatives compensated Hickman for distributing the workbooks. If a hearing were held, the judge would testify that he believed that the public benefited from having workbooks available for immediate distribution but acknowledged that he erred in failing to consider the code of conduct for court employees, which precluded such employment. SCRAM of Arizona provided alcohol monitoring services for the court. In May 2015, the judge asked Hickman if he would be interested in installing SCRAM bracelets. When asked, the judge told SCRAM representatives that Hickman might be willing to serve as its local representative. SCRAM hired Hickman to install alcohol monitoring bracelets. From June 2015 to March 22, 2017, Hickman installed 17 SCRAM bracelets. SCRAM compensated Hickman not less than $1,037, $50 to install a bracelet, $5 to remove a bracelet, and $.50 a mile for travel. The judge was aware that Hickman was being paid by SCRAM to install alcohol monitoring bracelets during the time he was a part-time bailiff for the court. If this matter were to go to a hearing, the judge would testify that he believed the public benefited from the services but would acknowledge that he erred in failing to consider the code of conduct for judicial employees, which precluded such employment. In March 2017, the chief court administrator, deputy court administrator, and presiding judge advised the judge to address the issue of Hickman’s employment by Wise Choice Alternatives and SCRAM. As soon as an opportunity presented itself, the judge notified the bailiff that he must end his employment relationships with Wise Choice Alternatives and SCRAM.

Letter of Censure of McGowan (Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission July 13, 2018) (http://jddc.publishpath.com/Websites/jddc/images/pdf/Press%20Release/McGowanCensure. pdf) Based on the judge’s agreement, the Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission publicly censured a judge for being impatient, discourteous, and undignified toward a public defender in a hearing, toward a deputy prosecuting attorney in 2 hearings in drug court, to a drug court litigant during a hearing, to probation officers, and to members of her court staff. The Commission stated that it would monitor the judge’s compliance with the agreement for the rest of her judicial career and ordered her to attend a course at the National Judicial College, the National Center for State Courts, or any similar educational institution involving proper judicial demeanor, to coordinate with the administrative judge regarding management of her court, to allow Commission staff or their assigned agent entry into her courtroom at any time, and to provide the Commission with audio recordings of any proceeding as requested. In a hearing in a criminal case, the judge instructed the defendant to step away from the deputy public defender and proceed to the probation officers while the public defender was attempting to argue on the defendant’s behalf and excused the public defender from her court as he was attempting to make the same legal argument. In a drug court case, the judge interrupted the deputy prosecuting attorney, eventually excused or removed her from the courtroom in the middle of a hearing, and proceeded with the hearing without a deputy prosecutor. The judge conducted a hearing in a second drug court case without another deputy prosecuting attorney available. On a different date, in a third drug court case, the judge raised her voice and used a discourteous tone while talking to a litigant as his case was being heard. The Commission also found that the judge behaved impatiently, discourteously, and in an undignified manner to probation officers assigned to her court and to members of her court staff. The Commission stated:

The average citizen cannot be expected to brush off impatient or undignified temperament by a judge. The power imbalance is such that a litigant has no way to respond without risking a harsh or even vindictive counter response from a judge. Undignified judicial temperament may render litigants reluctant to fully present their case. Thus, fear of being unfairly chastised or mocked may affect the fundamental right to a fair hearing.

In November 2008, the Commission had reprimanded the judge for injudicious temperament toward litigants and lawyers. In 2016, the Commission informally adjusted the judge for a delayed ruling and publicly reprimanded her for delay in 7 cases.

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In the Matter Concerning Gianquinto, Decision and order (California Commission on Judicial Performance August 22, 2018) (https://cjp.ca.gov/wp- content/uploads/sites/40/2018/08/Gianquinto_DO_Censure_8-22-18.pdf) Based on a stipulation, the California Commission on Judicial Performance publicly censured a former commissioner and barred him from receiving an assignment, appointment, or reference of work from any California state court for (1) Facebook posts and reposts that reflected, among other things, anti-immigration sentiment, anti-Muslim sentiment, anti-Native American sentiment, anti-gay marriage and transgender sentiment, anti-liberal and anti- Democrat sentiment, anti-California sentiment, opposition to then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, accusations against President Barack Obama, support for Donald Trump, a lack of respect for the federal justice system, and contempt for the poor and (2) representing to his presiding judge and the Commission that he had taken the posts down when that was not true, although he believed the posts were no longer publicly viewable. The Commission noted that, because the commissioner had retired, a censure and bar was the strongest discipline he could receive. In 2016 and 2017, the commissioner maintained a public Facebook page that identified him as “Jj Gianquinto,” stated that he “works at Kern County,” and contained photos of him recognizable by the public, but did not identify him as a commissioner. On May 8, 2017, Presiding Judge Charles Brehmer notified the commissioner in writing that there was “significant concern” about the “content” of a number of his posts and the “impression” a member of the public might have on reviewing them. Copies of the posts were included with the letter. The posts were:

• “When [Obama] said he was going to ‘fundamentally transform’ this nation, he was gaining success. He was going to transform it from a primarily Judeo-Christian nation into Islam. Got it now? Thank God for Trump.” • “What a pity it is to watch the RINOs [Republican in name only] run from the immigration order like roaches when the light comes on. They are more interested in saving their positions, than in protecting the rest of us.” • “For the Indian Rez that will not permit the wall built on 75 miles of border on their land — how about building the wall around that rez, fencing them into Mexico? That should please them.” • “What would cause anyone to be depressed or disappointed over the Clinton thing? If you paid any attention, you had to know from the outset that nothing was going to happen to her. So, I have lost respect for the federal justice system, but I am not surprised.” • “I am asking myself ‘Why am I reading all the crap about the FBI and Hillary? It only causes me grief when I know nothing will EVER happen?’ /so, [sic] I guess I will sign off for a little while during the complete destruction of a magnificent republic. We are no longer a nation of laws.” • “As I drove to the gym this morning, my route goes past several low income housing units recently built, and some apartment buildings that are also low income. I did not see a single light on at 6:00. That is when people going to work arise.”

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Judge Brehmer’s letter also included copies of additional photos or videos and statements that the commissioner posted on his public Facebook page during the same period. For example:

• The commissioner stated, “Democrats are consistent, and they proved that at President Trump’s address in Congress!” with reposted photos with the text, “Democrats haven’t changed in 250 years. They just left their hoods in their office.” • The commissioner posted, “LIBERALS ARE AMERICA’S CANCER. Any doubt in your mind?” • With a video of protesters chanting “no border, no nation, f*** deportation,” the commissioner posted, “SHOULD TRUMP ARREST THESE PROTESTORS? LIKE + SHARE = YES!” • The commissioner stated, “Leftist values on full display. #WomensMarch” with reposted photos. • The commissioner stated, “It’s time to stop messing around with people who cause chaos. Do you agree?” with a reposted photo with the text, “Anyone caught rioting on Inauguration Day should lose their welfare benefits. SHARE if you agree!” • The commissioner reposted a photo with the text, “Obama Says Requiring Employees To Speak English IS DISCRIMINATION. SHARE If you think Obama is an ANTI-AMERICAN MORON!” • The commissioner stated, “Before the grand jury had a chance to interview witnesses and review the evidence of what happened in Ferguson, Barack . . . Obama Created Open Hunting Season on Police Officers.” • The commissioner added, “The Blacksphere,” to a reposted list: “Let criminals out. Let illegals In. Let boys in girl’s locker rooms. Let women kill their offspring. Prosecute innocent officers. Persecute Christians. Accept barbarity in the form of Islam. Over tax the hard working. Coddle the lazy. This Is what Democrats have created In America.” • The commissioner reposted a picture of the White House with the accompanying text, “Why is it time for a FEMALE President? Shouldn’t it be time for a QUALIFIED President? • The commissioner reposted a photo that had the accompanying text: “ILLEGALS should not get welfare benefits! Like and share if you agree.” • The commissioner stated, “This is the dream and goal of most followers of terror religion ISLAM . . . Some show it openly and many hide their real face . . . ,” with a reposted photo with accompanying text that stated: “Entire world will be converted to a single nation with Islam as the only religion. Mecca as the capital and Quran as an official constitution. It has already begun. Zakir Naik” • The commissioner stated, “Absolutely agree!” with a reposted picture and text that stated, “ILLEGAL ALIENS SHOULD NOT BE OFFERED TAX CREDITS. SHARE IF YOU AGREE.” • The commissioner stated, “Are you part of the 89%?” with reposted text that stated, “SHARE if you are part of the 89% of Americans AGAINST increasing immigration.”

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• The commissioner stated, “Millions of illegal aliens are in the United States. We don’t know who they are, where they’re from or what their intentions are,” with the reposted text: “ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IS A THREAT TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. LIKE IF YOU AGREE.” • The commissioner stated, “DAMN STRAIGHT. #NoAmnesty [comment is cut off],” with a photo accompanied by the text: “WE SHOULDN’T REWARD ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS WITH DRIVER’S LICENSES. [Like] IF YOU AGREE!” • The commissioner commented, “Motor voter laws did this!,” with reposted text: “CALIFORNIA IS REGISTERING THREE MILLION NON-CITIZENS TO VOTE WHEN THEY GET THEIR DRIVERS LICENSES? AMERICANS SHOULD SUE CALIFORNIA FOR RESULTS FROM ANY NATIONAL ELECTION. SHARE IF YOU AGREE.” • The commissioner reposted a photo with accompanying text that stated: “TRUMP WANTS TO DEFUND CALIFORNIA BECAUSE THEY REFUSE TO REPORT ILLEGALS TO FEDERAL OFFICIALS. SHARE IF YOU AGREE WITH HIM.” • The commissioner reposted a photo with accompanying text that stated: “THEY SUCK THE WESTERN WELFARE SYSTEMS DRY, OUTBREED TO BECOME A MAJORITY, LOBBY FOR THEIR OWN LAWS AND TAKEOVER.” • The commissioner reposted a video entitled, “Bachmann Calls Muslim Migration A ‘Planned Invasion’ to Destroy Western Christendom,” and added the comment, “I am glad SOMEONE is noticing and evaluating it correctly!” • The commissioner reposted a photo with the accompanying text: “Islamists want bacon banned because it offends them. I say ban Islamists because it offends my bacon. Like and share if you agree.” • The commissioner stated, “Attention, leftists: all people have natural rights, but only American citizens have constitutional rights,” next to a reposted photo with the text, “Do illegal aliens have constitutional rights?” • The commissioner reposted a photo with accompanying text that stated: “IF YOU ENTER THE U.S. ILLEGALLY, YOU ARE AN ILLEGAL ALIEN. THAT’S NOT A RACIST STATEMENT. THAT’S A FACTUALLY ACCURATE STATEMENT. LIKE IF YOU AGREE.” • The commissioner reposted a photo with the accompanying text: “THEY CAME TO TAKE PART IN THE AMERICAN DREAM. EUROPEAN CHRISTIANS BUILT THIS NATION. THEY DIDN’T COME TO BITCH, COLLECT WELFARE, WAGE JIHAD, AND REPLACE THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION WITH SHARIA LAW.” • The commissioner reposted the text: “IT TAKES A SPECIAL KIND OF LUNATIC TO THINK THAT IMPORTING WELFARE RECIPIENTS WHO WANT TO KILL US IS A GOOD IDEA.” • The commissioner reposted a picture with the text: “MEN DON’T belong in the ladies room. Period. SHARE = agree.” • The commissioner stated, “Amen ... Absolutely I do! Anyone who may disagree is free to take it up with God,” next to a picture with the text: “One man, one woman . . . Say ‘I Do’ to supporting traditional marriage! ‘[Like]’ and ‘Share’ if you agree!” • The commission reposted a picture with the text: “Food stamps shouldn’t be accepted at restaurants! ‘Like’ & ‘Share’ if you agree!”

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• The commissioner posted an original statement that: “Ok Kiddies, listen up. This BS needs to be shared. YOU ALL need to see how your elected officials think. You all need to see what you have been voting for. Are you OK with this s**t? If you are in my friends list, you better not be. Prop 57 is going on the ballot as ‘Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act.’ Very similar to prop 47, which was School Safety Act (which reduced certain crimes to misdemeanors, including controlled substances offenses) The attached is a description of the ‘nonviolent’ offenses that current state inmates can be released early for. I love it. ‘Rape by using a drug’ ‘battery with serious bodily injury’ ‘domestic violence’ ‘Assault with a deadly weapon, on a peace officer’ nonviolent! You tell me if you can get behind supporting this proposition and releasing ‘nonviolent’ offenders early!!! You need to share (copy/paste/screenshot, you won’t be able to share my post) this information and stop it in its tracks.”

On May 15, the commissioner met with Presiding Judge Brehmer. On June 20, in a written response to the presiding judge, the commissioner stated: “After concerns about the posts were brought to my attention, I immediately deleted the posts and have refrained from sharing additional posts of this nature. I have also designated my Facebook account as ‘private’ which means only my friends can view any future posts.” On June 28, the presiding judge issued a private written reprimand to the commissioner. On June 27, the commissioner self-reported to the Commission that copies of his Facebook posts had been dropped off at the courthouse and delivered to the presiding judge. The commissioner’s letter, which included copies of the referenced posts, stated: “Preliminarily, after Judge Brehmer brought this matter to my attention, I deleted the posts and have refrained from sharing additional posts of a political nature. I also designated my Facebook account as private.” Despite his written representations to Judge Brehmer and to the Commission, the commissioner had not made his public Facebook page private or deleted all of the posts covered by Judge Brehmer s letter. The commissioner’s Facebook page remained public and 6 of the posts were still on the page until at least August 2. The commissioner had intended to make his Facebook page private and delete the offending posts, but “his unfamiliarity with the technology resulted in the changes not taking effect as intended. When alerted to the fact that the posts were still visible to the public, the commissioner immediately sought further assistance, deleted the offending posts, and increased the privacy settings on his Facebook profile.” The commissioner’s public Facebook page contained similar posts that were not part of the presiding judge’s investigation, including:

• The commissioner shared a post with a photo of Hillary Clinton, with accompanying text stating, “The problem isn’t that Hillary is an unethical, corrupt, lying criminal dirtbag — Everyone knows that. The problem is that her supporters don’t care. Are you people brain dead? Join us Facebook/Stop Hillary in 2016.” • The commissioner shared a post from Allen West stating, “The sad fact is NO previous Republican presidential candidate has had the guts to call ya’ll out. We finally got one,

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and the left can’t stand it. Share this one folks.” This text is followed by a photo of Hillary Clinton, captioned, “Yes, BIGOT. Trump is right.” • The commissioner posted: “When it comes to Democrats running for office, I have relatives who are not only willing and able, but WILL close their eyes to facts such as who has been disbarred, who was fired from the Nixon matter for lying and unethical conduct, and the rest of the unethical, dishonest conduct during the past thirty years. I do NOT know how they can do that.” • The commissioner shared a post stating, “When they asked him whether he thought Donald J. Trump was good for America [Vc] What he said was the most HARDCORE response I’ve EVER heard! If this doesn’t have you voting Trump, nothing will. Let’s get 3,000 shares for a guy that knows that we don’t need a politician, we need a LEADER! This Hispanic Billionaire UNLEASHED on Trump Haters, Says, ‘Who Else Would You Have In A F**king Foxhole?’” • The commissioner shared a post with a photo of Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan, overwritten with text stating, “AS SOON AS HILLARY WINS THE ELECTION, WE’LL HAVE THE NUMBERS TO TAKE YOUR GUNS AWAY AND GIVE ILLEGALS CITIZENSHIP AND VOTING RIGHTS.” • The commissioner publicly shared a post stating, “IF EVERY GUN OWNER VOTED AGAINST HER, HILLARY WOULD NOT WIN.” • The commissioner publicly shared a post stating “JUST REMEMBER THAT THE PARTY OF SLAVERY, SEGREGATION, THE KKK, AND GOVERNMENT DEPENDENCY IS THE DEMOCRAT PARTY.” • The commissioner publicly shared a post with a photo of Hillary Clinton winking, overwritten with text stating, “We were dead broke after leaving the White House and today we are worth over 110 million.” Under this is a photo of Harry Truman, with the caption, ‘“You can’t get rich in politics unless you’re a crook.’ Harry S. Truman.” • The commissioner publicly shared a post showing a cartoon rendition of Hillary Clinton with text stating, “If Hillary Wins WE ALL LOSE! Yes = Share.” • The commissioner publicly posted an image showing photos of Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, and Dianne Feinstein, accompanied by text stating, “DEMOCRATS A bunch of rich people convincing poor people to vote for rich people by telling the poor people that other rich people are the reason they are poor.” • The commissioner publicly shared a post showing pictures of Hillary Clinton and James Comey, overwritten with text stating, “IF YOU FEEL BETRAYED BY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND THE FBI PLEASE LIKE AND SHARE.” This was originally posted by “Donald Trump for President.” • The commissioner publicly shared a post with a photo of Hillary Clinton alongside text stating, “SHARE IF YOU ARE OUTRAGED HILLARY WON’T BE CHARGED BY THE FBI.” • The commissioner publicly shared a post showing a photo of Hillary Clinton overwritten with text stating, “SILLY AMERICANS LAWS ARE FOR POOR PEOPLE.”

The Commission decision includes screenshots of many of the posts.

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The Commission found that the commissioner’s “conduct on Facebook was egregious, and is the type of conduct that inherently undermines public confidence in the judiciary and that brings the judicial office into disrepute.”

Inquiry Concerning Mills, Decision and order (California Commission on Judicial Performance August 28, 2018) (https://cjp.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2018/08/Mills_DO_Censure_8-28-18.pdf) Agreeing with the findings of the 3 special masters following a hearing, the California Commission on Judicial Performance publicly censured a former judge and barred him from seeking or holding judicial office for (1) modifying a contempt sentence to deny good time credits to a divorce litigant based on an ex parte communication with the sheriff’s department and subsequently granting good time credits for reasons unrelated to the merits and (2) offering advice to a prosecutor on an issue related to the trial outside the presence of defense counsel while the jury was deliberating. The judge had retired during the pendency of the proceedings; the Commission noted that censure and bar is the most severe discipline it can impose on a retired judge. (1) On August 12, 2016, the judge held Joseph Sweeney in contempt for violating a protective order entered in his divorce proceedings. There was a discussion about whether Sweeney was entitled to good time credits on a civil contempt sentence. The judge did not resolve the issue, but continued the matter for sentencing to August 16, because he thought Sweeney was entitled to a 72-hour stay before sentencing. At the sentencing hearing on August 16, the judge sentenced Sweeney to 25 days in jail, and remanded him to the custody of the sheriff’s department. During that hearing, Michaelene Insalaco, the attorney for Sweeney’s wife, argued that Sweeney was not entitled to good time credits, and asked the judge to make an explicit finding in this regard. Sweeney’s attorney, James Morrison, responded that denial of good time credits would be illegal. Following a discussion of unrelated legal issues, the judge stated he concurred with the order drafted by Insalaco; the order prepared by Insalaco did not address good time credits. The written order the judge signed outlining the sentence was silent regarding good time credits. The judge did not rule on the issue of whether Sweeney was entitled to good time credits. Later the same day, the sheriff’s department returned the sentencing order to the judge’s court, questioning whether the sentence included good time credits. After consulting with the judge, the judge’s clerk handwrote on the order, “No good time credits to be given,” and the judge initialed the notation. The clerk sent the form back to the jail, but did not serve it on the parties. On August 25, Sweeney’s mother contacted Morrison about the release date. Morrison investigated and learned about revised order when he received a copy from the jail. In a letter to the judge, copied to Insalaco, Morrison requested that the judge correct the order and notify the sheriff. In a letter in response, Insalaco urged the judge to leave the “no good time credits” order intact. The judge consulted with his supervising judge, Judge John Kennedy. In his written response to the Commission’s preliminary investigation, the judge stated that he and Judge Kennedy concurred that Sweeney was not entitled to good time credits on a civil

8 contempt, but decided to give them to him to avoid a “constitutional crisis” because Sweeney had a history of filing appeals, motions, and complaints against the Commission and others. On August 25, the judge issued another order, this time granting Sweeney good time credits. The judge contended that his August 16 notation on the sentencing order did not violate the prohibition on ex parte communications because he was simply correcting the written order to reflect what he had decided in the presence of the parties earlier that day. Rejecting that argument, the Commission found that the judge’s notation denying good time credits was a modification, rather than a clarification of his previous order. The Commission noted that, in his response to the preliminary investigation and in his answer to the notice, the judge had stated that, when he received the inquiry from the sheriff’s department, he reviewed the penal code; the Commission concluded, if the judge had merely clarifying an order as he now claimed, he would not have had to research the law. The Commission also noted that, “[b]y the time the judge filed his prehearing briefs to the special masters, his explanation for amending the August 16 order had changed. There, he claimed that he was clarifying “‘the order by specifically writing what the [sentencing] order already provided -- no good time credits applied,’” and that his memory of having researched the law was “erroneous.” The Commission adopted the masters’ finding that the judge did not make an order concerning good time credits when he imposed sentence but rather denied good time credits without notice to the parties later that day, in response to the sheriff’s department question. The Commission concluded that the judge’s modification of the order, which he transmitted to the sheriff’s department, was a communication from the judge outside the presence of the parties and concerning a pending proceeding. It noted that, although there is an exception to the prohibition on ex parte communications for consulting with court personnel, the sheriff’s department is not court personnel. The Commission emphasized that it was not the judge’s “interpretation of the law or his legal ruling that is at issue, it is the fact that he issued an ex parte modification of an order involving a deprivation of liberty without providing the parties an opportunity to be heard.” The judge argued that he granted good time credits in the August 25 because of the complexity of the law, and therefore, his conduct was, at most, improper action. The Commission noted that the judge had informed the Commission in his response to the preliminary investigation, that he had concluded that Sweeney was not entitled to good time credits and that he issued the August 25 order, not based on a legal analysis, but on Sweeney’s litigation history and to avoid a constitutional challenge. The Commission agreed with the masters that the problem with the judge’s August 25 ruling was not that it was legally erroneous, but that the judge decided “an issue for reasons unconnected to the merits . . . .” (2) The judge presided over a driving under the influence jury trial in People v. Jeffers in which an expert witness for the defense challenged the accuracy of the breath machine. As the jury was deliberating, Deputy District Attorney William Moser was gathering his papers to leave the courtroom. The judge asked Moser, outside the presence of the defendant and defense counsel, “[D]o you want to know what I would have done?” and talked to him about an argument that might have “defeated the defense theory,” or words to that effect. The jury in Jeffers deadlocked, resulting in a mistrial.

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The next day, Moser reported the conversation to his supervisor, who reported the conversation to Jeffers’s defense attorney and to the supervising judge of criminal courts. Subsequently, the presiding judge learned of the conversation, met with Judge Mills, and told him that the matter was “potentially serious,” and that he (the presiding judge) might have to report it the Commission. As the presiding judge was seeking an ethics opinion on his obligation to report the matter, Judge Mills self-reported to the Commission. On the record in the Jeffers case, the judge disclosed that he had described to Moser, “in relation to the expert witness that was presented by” the defense in Jeffers, that when he last tried a DUI case 29 years ago, there was an expert witness who tracked the accuracy of a breath machine by looking at the cases in which both breath and blood samples had been taken to determine if the results matched. The judge then recused himself from any further involvement in the case. The judge’s position at the discipline hearing was that he was simply sharing a “war story” with Moser. Rejecting that defense, the masters found that the judge offered Moser advice about how he should have handled a specific part of the case, while the case was still pending. The Commission adopted the masters’ finding that the judge’s conversation with Moser was related to issues raised during the Jeffers trial and that he offered Moser advice about how to handle a specific part of the case and found that a reasonable person would interpret the judge’s “comments as suggesting that the prosecution use an expert to track the accuracy of the Draeger machine (used in the Jeffers case) in the same manner.” The Commission stated that “[o]ffering advice to an attorney in a case before the judge outside the presence of opposing counsel and while the matter is pending constitutes an improper ex parte communication.” Noting the judge’s contention that he was simply sharing a “war story” that had no relation to the Jeffers case, the Commission stated that “[t]here is no ‘war story’ exception to the prohibition against ex parte communications.” The judge has been previously disciplined 5 times over his 23-year judicial career. “Particularly troubling,” the Commission stated, “is the similarity between some of his prior misconduct and the misconduct in this matter.” In 2013, the judge was publicly admonished for engaging in out-of-court communications about his son’s infraction with a court clerk and the pro tempore judge handling the case. In 2011, the judge received an advisory letter for allowing his son to accompany a police officer in executing a search warrant the judge had signed without going through the application process for going on a ride-along. In 2008, the judge received an advisory letter for improperly conditioning a defendant’s release in a misdemeanor probation revocation proceeding on posting bail for the improper purpose of collecting restitution. In 2008, the judge was publicly admonished for a series of ex parte communications in a criminal case; assuming the role of the prosecutor in another criminal matter; and engaging in a pattern of discourteous, demeaning, and belittling comments in criminal cases. In 2001, the judge was privately admonished for remarks suggesting a lack of impartiality and for attempting to obtain a guilty plea from a defendant despite statements from the defendant indicating he wanted counsel. The Commission stated that another important factor was the judge’s lack of candor in the proceedings. The Commission noted that, although the judge did not testify at the hearing, he submitted numerous written communications and a personally verified answer to the charges, stating “written communications of counsel are deemed to be the written

10 communications of the judge.” The Commission found, “There were multiple inconsistencies and misrepresentations in these submissions and statements. . . . Judge Mills’s shifting defenses not only portray a lack of candor, they also reflect a failure to accept responsibility and acknowledge the impropriety of his conduct.” The Commission also stated that the judge’s “failure to appreciate or acknowledge the impropriety of his conduct, his willingness to give disingenuous explanations and shift blame to a judicial colleague, and his lengthy history of discipline suggest a high probability that he would reoffend if he were to serve in a judicial capacity in the future.” The Commission also noted that the judge’s conduct had a negative impact on others and undermined public respect for the judiciary. It explained:

Although Sweeney ultimately received the good time credits to which he was entitled, the judge’s changing and conflicting orders required his lawyer to expeditiously file papers to prevent the unlawful denial of conduct credit and most likely caused stress to Sweeney. In Jeffers, Judge Mills’s initiation of an ex parte communication put DDA Moser in the uncomfortable position of having to report the communication to his superiors who in turn had to report the conduct to Judge Mills’s superiors. Additionally, when a judge who has been disciplined five times by the commission engages in subsequent misconduct, public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and the administration of justice is undermined.

The masters had found no mitigating factors. The judge urged the Commission to consider his dedication and service to the community over 3 decades but presented no evidence of that service. The Commission concluded that, “[g]iven the seriousness of the misconduct, the judge’s extensive history of discipline, his failure to appreciate the impropriety of his conduct, and his lack of candor as evidenced by his shifting explanations for his conduct, we conclude that there is a strong likelihood that Judge Mills will engage in subsequent misconduct if he were to serve in a judicial capacity in the future.”

In re Steigman (Illinois Courts Commission August 13, 2018) (https://tinyurl.com/y9u3gkxt) Following a hearing on a complaint filed by the Judicial Inquiry Board, the Illinois Courts Commission publicly reprimanded an appellate judge for soliciting paid speaking engagements using his judicial position. In August 2016, the Board received a letter from an attorney that a client who was a physician on the medical staff of a local hospital had received a letter from the judge on his judicial stationery advertising his availability to deliver a presentation on medical malpractice law for an “honorarium” of $800 plus travel expenses. The physician asked the attorney whether this solicitation was appropriate and ethical; the attorney asked the Board the same question. The judge testified that he had been writing and speaking on legal topics for decades to share his love of the law and educate the public. He began soliciting paid speaking opportunities after an organizer of continuing legal education seminars for prosecutors offered

11 to pay him $1,250 for a 2-day presentation. The judge’s income from such presentations was $32,000 to $34,000 over 2 years. He used judicial letterhead for most of his solicitations to law enforcement groups. The judge initially sent solicitations to medical societies and hospitals by his work e-mail but switched to judicial letterhead because the response to the e-mail solicitation was “tepid.” If he did not receive a response with either method, he sometimes followed up by telephone. He had his secretary assist him with the letters and e-mail solicitations by dictating them for her to transcribe as he would any other correspondence. He paid all the postage for the letters himself. The judge testified that he simply viewed the letterhead as confirming his identity as a judge of the appellate court but agreed that he also wanted to distinguish his solicitation letters from “junk mail” and increase the response rate. The judge stated that, although he initially had not seen any problem in using judicial letterhead (and still did not believe it violated the code), in retrospect, he could see that reasonable people could deem it “unseemly” and he regretted it. The judge’s presiding judge testified that the judge, as required by rule, had asked for approval for his presentations to law enforcement and medical audiences and he had given it but that he had not known that the judge was soliciting paid speaking opportunities or was using judicial letterhead to do so. The Commission found that the Board had not proven its claim that the judge’s presentations and solicitations reflected adversely on his partiality, noting the Board had presented no evidence of the actual content of his presentations. Although occasional comments in evaluations indicated that attendees at law enforcement presentations viewed him as pro-police, the Commission accepted the judge’s explanation that this meant that he understood the stresses that police officers were under and the demands of their job, not that the judge would favor them in court. The Commission acknowledged that the judge’s practice of soliciting only law enforcement and medical malpractice defense groups could suggest some partiality, but concluded there were other reasonable explanations, noting it was a prosecution CLE organizer who first suggested paying the judge and the judge’s paid speaking “business” was relatively young. Noting that the code prohibits judges from soliciting donations for charitable organizations, the Commission stated that, “[t]he same principles apply with even greater force when the ‘cause’ for which the judge is soliciting is a business or commercial activity that serves the judge’s own financial benefit.” The Commission found that the judge’s use of stationery and other judicial resources to advance his “burgeoning speaking business was an exploitation of his judicial office . . . .” It explained:

Respondent pursued the opportunity to give paid presentations on the law with energy, using judicial letterhead stationery to increase the likelihood of a positive response to his solicitations and making follow-up calls to recipients who had not responded. Respondent’s zeal in this pursuit arose primarily from his genuine belief that he was providing a public benefit by explaining legal concepts to non-lawyers. Nevertheless, while his motives may have been pure, the fact that the “public service” he was providing also enriched him financially created the danger that recipients of his

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solicitation might feel coerced to hire him, or might think that hiring him to give a presentation would cause him to favor their interests in cases that came before him.

The Commission also found that the judge had engaged in financial and business dealings with persons likely to come before his court. It acknowledged that the fact that the judge is an appellate court judge means that “persons rarely ‘come before’ the court in the sense of being physically present in the courtroom,” but concluded it was “clear that the rule is intended to encompass a broader reference to persons who have an interest in litigation that ‘comes before’ the court.” Finally, the Commission concluded that the judge had had an active role in managing a business, contrary to the provision in the Illinois code stating that “a judge should not assume an active role in the management or serve as an officer, director, or employee of any business.” It agreed that merely being paid to speak or teach may not equate to actively managing a business but emphasized that the judge went beyond that permitted conduct by directly soliciting paid speaking engagements and following up to urge reluctant recipients to hire him. It concluded that, “[i]n so doing, he went beyond simply earning a fee for permitted activity, and instead actively sought to increase his extrajudicial sources of revenues.” Finally, the Commission found that the judge’s promotion of his business lent the prestige of office to advance his private interests, could cause a reasonable personal to question the independence and integrity of the judiciary, and created an appearance of impropriety. It recognized the judge’s widespread reputation for impartiality and honesty and did not find that he intentionally sought to act against these principles. However, it explained:

This order is not intended to criticize or inhibit the practice by judges of educating the public regarding the law. . . . These activities unquestionably provide a valuable public benefit, and this is true even when judges receiving compensation . . . . Our order today is directed only to the solicitation of paid business opportunities from persons likely to come before the court on which a judge sits, the exploitation of judicial office in the course of such solicitation.

In mitigation, the Commission noted the judge’s “many contributions to greater understanding of the law, the majority of which he provided without compensation. Respondent’s pursuit of paid speaking opportunities no doubt provided a valuable education on the law to many. However, it also provided him with private financial gain. Given the fact that his presentations served, at least in part, his own financial interests, his use of judicial resources in his solicitations was improper, in addition to trading on the respect due his judicial office.” The Commission stated that it was not finding that the judge’s misconduct was willful but noted it was “frankly puzzled” that he had never sought guidance from available sources such as “prior decisions of this Commission (some of which relate to the conduct of business by judges) and the excellent advisory opinions produced by the Illinois Judges Association’s committee on judicial ethics,” several of which were on relevant topics. In mitigation, the Commission noted that the judge had never attempted to conceal his conduct, did not make any misrepresentations, fully cooperated with the Board, and did not realize his solicitations

13 were unseemly and that there was no evidence of bias or an effect on performance of his judicial duties. 1 member concurred in part but dissented from the finding the judge had had an active role in business but agreed with the reprimand. A second member concurred in part but dissented from the finding that the judge had had an active role in managing a business and argued the complaint should have been resolved with a private admonition.

In the Matter of Johanningsmeier, 103 N.E.3d 633 (Indiana 2018) Based on a statement of circumstances and conditional agreement for discipline, the Indiana Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge for failing to recuse from a case in which his friend had received a ticket and securing favorable treatment for his friend. The judge is close friends with B.K., who received a speeding ticket in April 2015. In early June 2015, the judge and B.K. vacationed together. On June 18, B.K. failed to appear in court on the ticket; a default judgment was entered, and his license was suspended for failure to appear. On June 30, B.K. filed a petition for a trial de novo in the judge’s court. The judge granted the motion the same day and reinstated B.K.’s license, without disclosing the conflict or giving the prosecutor an opportunity to respond, contrary to the trial de novo rule. In March 2016, the Commission issued a private caution letter advising the judge that his close friendship with B.K. would cause a reasonable person to question his impartiality. Despite the caution, the judge did not recuse and did not set the matter for hearing. The case remained in limbo until early 2017. Shortly before Christmas 2016 and while the case was still pending, the judge posted on Facebook a photo of himself, his sister, and B.K. at a party in the judge’s home. B.K. “liked” the photo. The photo was visible to the public and showed that the judge and B.K. were close friends. On March 6, 2017, the prosecutor moved for a bench trial in B.K.’s case. Instead of recusing, the judge set the motion for hearing. At the hearing, he stated on the record that the case involved “a friend of mine” and “I was hoping we could just get the State to dismiss it.” The prosecutor immediately orally moved to dismiss the case, and the judge granted the motion.

In the Matter of the Reese, Opinion (Maryland Court of Appeals July 31, 2018) (https://www.courts.state.md.us/data/opinions/coa/2018/2a17jd.pdf) The Maryland Court of Appeals dismissed with prejudice the finding of the Commission on Judicial Disabilities that a judge did not exhibit thoroughness or diligence when she denied a peace order request. The Commission had recommended that the judge be ordered to attend at least 5 days of specialized training on the dynamics of domestic violence victims, protective orders, pro se litigants, and social media. Patricia Stein filed an ex parte petition for a peace order on behalf of her 17-year-old granddaughter, Tricia Hiltz, alleging a former boyfriend, Benton Lecuyer, had attacked Hiltz.

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The relationship between Hiltz and Lecuyer ended 2 weeks before Lecuyer tracked her by phone to a friend’s home where he assaulted her and her friend, resulting in visible bruising around Hiltz’s eyes. The following is the entire exchange between the judge and Hiltz at the hearing:

Judge: What do you want to tell me, ma’am? Hiltz: Well, everything she said is true. Stein: Well, what do you got to -- I mean -- Judge: Has this ever happened before? Hiltz: No. Judge: Okay. Did you have any conversation with him that day? Hiltz: No. I blocked him from my phone. His phone number is blocked. Judge: Okay. All right. It looks to me like she’s taking care (sic) of it. Okay? Stein: Mm-hmm. Judge: I have to be able to find two things. One, is that one of the nine statutory forms of abuse have occurred. And, number two, he’s likely to commit the purported act against her in the future. And I don’t have any indication from his past behavior that anything like this is likely to occur again in the future. So I’m not going to enter the order today. If anything else were to occur, you can go to the commissioner’s office if the court is not open. Or you can come back to the courthouse to file for relief. Okay? Stein: Okay.

In the discipline proceeding, the judge “testified that she believed the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited her from asking any further questions, for fear that she would appear biased and advocating for one party over another in an ex parte proceeding.” An appeal of the denial of the peace order was filed, and the circuit court determined that Hiltz was not eligible for a peace order. Stein and the Women’s Law Center filed complaints against the judge. The Women’s Law Center also filed complaints about the judge’s handling of 2 other protective and peace orders proceedings. Following a hearing, the Commission found that, in the Stein hearing, the judge had not exhibited “the thoroughness or diligence necessary to render any decision she was to make as part her judicial responsibilities.” According to the Commission, the judge’s interaction with Hiltz, who was unrepresented and had visible bruising around her eyes, lasted 19 seconds, and the entire hearing lasted 3 minutes. Stating that “[m]issing from the Commission’s reasoning is any statement of what specific behavior or conduct lacked competence, diligence, or promptness,” the Court rejected the argument of the Commission and the Women’s Law Center that the judge committed sanctionable conduct because she did not “undertake a more thorough approach in developing the factual scenario in the peace order matter . . . . “ The Court acknowledged that the hearing was brief and that “[r]easonable minds could differ on whether the petition for a peace order should have been granted.” However, it stated that a “disagreement over whether to grant the requested remedy . . . has no bearing” on whether the judge committed sanctionable conduct”

15 and that “brevity in judicial proceedings, without any refusal to consider evidence or argument, hardly seems grounds for misconduct.” It explained:

A judge must be able to exercise the appropriate discretion that reflects an appreciation of the facts presented, an understanding of the law that applies, and a reasonable conclusion based upon an analysis of the law’s application to those facts. Judge Reese carefully considered the testimony of seventeen year old Ms. Hiltz, and her grandmother, Ms. Stein, both of which provided the factual predicate for the petition for a peace order against Mr. Lecuyer, the ex-boyfriend of Ms. Hiltz. After considering the testimony and evidence presented, and ascertaining through questioning that similar conduct had not occurred previously, Judge Reese found insufficient evidence that the abuse was likely to occur in the future, and denied the petition.

However, if Judge Reese erred in her ultimate decision, appreciation of the factual circumstances and the applicable law, such error does not constitute sanctionable conduct.

The Court emphasized that no applicable Maryland rule required “a specific measurement of time in order for a judge to determine whether they possess enough information to render a decision, nor does any other rule or statute require a certain number of inquiries prior to rendering a decision. Conduct should not lie within a rigid and finite formula that requires a limited number of questions to be posed, or required as part of the reasonable exercise of judicial discretion.”

Commission on Judicial Performance v. Curry, 249 So. 3d 369 (Mississippi 2018) Accepting an agreed stipulation of facts and proposed recommendation, the Mississippi Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge for signing warrants based on affidavits sworn by her relatives; dismissing petitions for an order of protection from domestic abuse without holding the statutorily mandated hearings; presiding over the initial appearance of a relative, setting the bond at $50,000, and subsequently reducing the bond to $5,000; waiving an expungement fee and directing the clerks to void the receipts and refund the money; and requesting that the county board of supervisors transfer the complainant from her position as justice court clerk because of the complaint. The judge signed warrants based on affidavits sworn by her relatives. She would not set bond even though the charges were misdemeanors but would recuse herself from the case, citing her relationship to the affiants. In violation of the Mississippi Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, the judge dismissed petitions for orders of protection from domestic abuse without having the statutorily mandated hearing. The judge presided over the initial appearance of a relative on a possession of a controlled substance charge, setting the bond at $50,000. Later, the relative filed what purported to be a motion for bond reduction but was blank, did not state any reason for the

16 bond to be reduced, and only contained the relative’s signature. Nevertheless, the judge granted the motion and reduced bond to $5,000. The judge waived an expungement fee and directed the clerks to void the receipts in the matter and to refund the money. The judge, after being informed of the Commission’s investigation and the identity of the complainant, sent a letter to the county board of supervisors requesting that they transfer the complainant from her position as justice court clerk, citing the filing of the complaint as a reason for removal.

In the Matter of Smith, Stipulation and order of consent to discipline (Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline July 26, 2018) (https://tinyurl.com/ybua7f3v) Based on a stipulation and the judge’s consent, the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline publicly censured a judge and ordered him to pay a $1,500 fine to a law-related charity for (1) rudeness and sarcasm in 1 criminal case, including threatening to apply duct tape to the defendant’s mouth and (2) muttering under his breath to a defendant convicted of child abuse, “I hope this follows you to prison” in a second case. The judge also agreed that he would complete a National Judicial College course entitled “Ethics and Judging: Reaching Higher Ground” or a similar class and that his failure to comply with the order would result in his permanent removal. (1) In a calendar call in a criminal case, the defendant requested the appointment of a new attorney because his attorney had allegedly failed to file a motion contending that the state had failed to comply with its obligation to disclose all exculpatory evidence. The judge denied the motion. The Commission found that, throughout the hearing, the judge failed to treat the defendant and his lawyer in a patient, dignified, and courteous manner and his conduct was marked by rudeness and sarcasm. He repeatedly threatened to order the trial to begin in only 12 days and to deny the defendant’s unopposed motion to continue even though defense counsel attempted to explain that he was not prepared for trial. The judge also threatened to apply duct tape to the defendant’s mouth if the defendant continued to make any statements to the court. The Commission found that the threat was excessive under the circumstances. (2) In a second criminal case, the judge sentenced a defendant who had been convicted of child abuse for kicking a 5-year-old boy in the face to 28 to 72 months in prison, the maximum sentence allowed under the plea agreement. After issuing the sentence, the judge muttered under his breath, but still loud enough to be heard, “I hope this follows you to prison.” The Commission found that the statement created the appearance that the judge “wished harm upon the Defendant in prison.” Although the comment is clearly heard on the recording and is in the official court transcript, in his interview with the Commission investigator, the judge denied that he made the comment, stating, “no, no, I did not say ‘I hope it follows you.’ I said, ‘This will follow you.’ We were reading from a doctor’s report.”

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In the Matter of Moore, Order (New Hampshire Supreme Court July 5 2018) (http://www.nhattyreg.org/assets/1531143768.pdf) The New Hampshire Supreme Court disbarred a former judge based on his conviction on charges of fraud pursuant to a guilty plea.

In the Matter of Skinner, Determination (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct June 26, 2018) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/S/Skinner.John.M.2018.06.26.DET.pdf) Accepting an agreed statement of facts and recommendation, the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly censured a non-lawyer judge for (1) delaying and mishandling a small claims action and (2) failing to mechanically record any court proceedings for more than 8 years. (1) On April 14, 2015, Erek Treen-Goff filed a notice of small claim against Heidi Schimmelpfennig, seeking $3,000 plus $15 court costs for damage caused to his vehicle that he claimed was sustained when he swerved into a utility pole to avoid hitting Schimmelpfennig's dog, which had run into the road. On April 14, the town court clerk processed the petition and set a hearing date for 6:00 PM on May 19, 2015. On May 12, Schimmelpfennig filed an "affidavit of facts" demanding a jury trial and paid a jury fee of $10 and a $50 deposit. The affidavit was not notarized. In a letter sent on May 19, the judge asked Schimmelpfennig for a notarized written demand for a jury trial and an affidavit of facts, among other items. On June 1, Schimmelpfennig re-filed a jury trial demand and "affidavit of facts" that were not notarized. From May 12, 2015, to August 20, 2016, the judge adjourned the hearing date at least 3 times, notwithstanding that neither Treen-Goff nor Schimmelpfennig ever requested an adjournment. The judge finally held a hearing in the case on September 27, 2016. During the hearing, the parties testified about the accident, and the plaintiff or his grandfather provided a police report and documentary evidence concerning repairs to Treen-Goff’s vehicle. At the conclusion of the proceeding, the judge adjourned the matter to provide the plaintiff with time to obtain records from the New York State Electric and Gas Corporation about when the accident occurred and when the utility pole was replaced. On October 11, the parties again appeared before the judge. During the appearance, Treen-Goff provided the judge with weather reports from the date of the accident, handwritten statements from neighbors who had allegedly witnessed the defendant's dogs in the road, and a document from the utility company regarding repairs to the utility pole. The judge issued a judgment in favor of Treen-Goff, awarding him $1,000 plus $15 court costs. On October 18, the judge sent Schimmelpfennig a copy of the judgment. In a cover letter, the judge wrote that Schimmelpfennig's motion for a jury trial was denied, and he returned her $50 deposit and $10 filing fee. On October 31, Schimmelpfennig sent a notice of appeal to Treen-Goff and the town court by certified mail, signature required. The caption stated that the judgment was being appealed to the "Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Judicial Department," although the Columbia Town Court is located in the Third Judicial Department and the proper forum for appeal is county court.

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On November 9, Schimmelpfennig sent the Columbia Town Court a money order for $101.50 and a $5 cash filing fee. On November 29, the judge returned Schimmelpfennig's money order. He failed to direct his court clerk to prepare minutes of the proceeding and to file a return with the county court, and he did not otherwise take any action on Schimmelpfennig's appeal. The judge failed to mechanically record any appearances in Treen-Goff v. Schimmelpfennig. Prior to presiding over Treen-Goff v. Schimmelpfennig, the judge had never received a small claims jury trial demand and did not know how to process the petition. The judge also stated that he was waiting for the results of the Commission's investigation before acting on the appeal and that he had never previously handled an appeal, but he assured the Commission that in the future he will consult with the Judicial Resource Center concerning his judicial obligations with regard to appeal procedures or any other matters that may confound him. The Commission found that the judge was “responsible for significant delay in a small claims action that was filed in his court.”

By not holding a hearing until 17 months after the notice of claim was filed, he deprived the parties of the opportunity to have the claim resolved in a timely manner. . . . A small claim is not insignificant to the parties involved, and for litigants whose cases may represent their only personal involvement with the courts, an unduly delayed resolution of their dispute would likely convey the impression that the judicial system is inefficient and insensitive to their concerns.

The Commission also stated that the judge’s “apparent uncertainty about how to process the defendant's demand for a jury trial obviously does not excuse the excessive delay.”

While respondent, who had never previously handled a small claims jury trial request, appears to have recognized that the defendant's unsworn submission did not meet the statutory requisite . . . and asked her to submit a notarized filing, it is unclear why he then inexplicably delayed and repeatedly adjourned the matter for over a year, instead of seeking guidance from the City, Town and Village Courts Resource Center.

The Commission also stated that the judge’s “claim that he was awaiting the results of the Commission's investigation before acting on the appeal is patently unacceptable since he was required to comply with the statutory directives, and his unfamiliarity with appeal procedures does not excuse his failure to seek appropriate guidance.” (2) From January 1, 2009, when he assumed judicial office, through May 23, 2017, the judge failed to mechanically record any appearances in the Columbia Town Court as required by the Rules of the Chief Judge and Administrative Order that became effective on June 16, 2008. The judge did not begin recording proceedings until after he was asked by the Commission during its investigation to provide audio recordings of appearances in Treen-Goff v. Schimmelpfennig. The judge asserted that he did not know how to operate the laptop recorder, and, until the Commission's inquiry, he did not ask for help to learn how. The judge also asserted that,

19 notwithstanding the clear mandate of the Rules of the Chief Judge and the Administrative Order that all proceedings be mechanically recorded, he believed his handwritten notes of proceedings were sufficient, even though he had not researched the matter and could point to no authority supporting his interpretation. After the Commission attempted to obtain audio recordings of proceedings in Treen-Goff v. Schimmelpfennig, the judge received training from a local computer technician, which he acknowledges he could have done years before. Since May 2017, the judge has complied with the mechanical recording requirement and pledges to continue to comply. The Commission found:

Respondent's claim that he "believed that his handwritten notes of proceedings were sufficient" suggests that he had at least some awareness of the recording requirement, and while he has explained that he "did not know how to operate the laptop recorder," which the court system had provided, his failure for more than eight years to seek assistance in learning to do so is plainly inexcusable. Not until after the Commission contacted him to ask for an audio recording of a particular proceeding did he seek training from a local computer technician and begin to comply with this important mandate.

The absence of a recording in any proceeding is significant since it not only makes it more difficult to determine what transpired at the proceeding but also indicates lack of compliance with an administrative order, which is inconsistent with a judge's ethical responsibilities . . . .

Noting the other cases that have come to its attention “generally involved judges who may have forgotten to turn on the recorder in isolated instances, did not ensure that the court staff had activated it or simply did not realize the equipment was not working,” the Commission emphasized that the judge's “decision to simply ignore this important requirement by failing to record any proceedings whatsoever was unprecedented and grossly improper.”

In the Matter of Peeler (South Carolina Supreme Court August 22, 2018) (https://www.sccourts.org/opinions/HTMLFiles/SC/27830.pdf) Accepting an agreement for discipline by consent in which the judge admitted misconduct and consented to a confidential admonition or a public reprimand, the South Carolina Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a former judge for calling court personnel "heifers" and "DW" (double wide) and using the probate court account for personal financial dealings. The judge had resigned and agreed never to seek or accept judicial office in South Carolina without the express written permission of the Court, after providing written notice to Office of Disciplinary Counsel. The Court noted that, because the judge had resigned, reprimand was the strongest punishment it could impose on him. The judge admitted calling court personnel "heifers" and "DW" (double wide). He maintains he was joking. The Court noted that the agreement also referred to "pranks and jokes" the judge instigated and participated in during working hours that he admits were

20 unprofessional and discourteous but stated that the agreement provides no details, making it unclear “if this is simply a further reference to the inappropriate comments.” The judge received 2 checks from his insurance company to cover the cost of repairs to his roof. Because his ex-wife's name remained on the deed, the insurance checks were made out to both the judge and his ex-wife. At the judge’s request, his stepson secured his ex-wife's signature on the checks. When the bank would not accept the checks for deposit, the judge deposited them in the probate court account and wrote a check from that account to the stepson in the amount of the insurance proceeds. The stepson did not use the funds to pay the roofing company but for his own benefit. The judge learned of his stepson's actions when he was served with a summons and complaint by the roofing company. The judge has filed suit against his stepson to recover the money. The Court noted that the judge received a letter of caution in March 2004, a confidential admonition in June 2005; and a letter of caution in June 2015.

In re Roach, Judgment and public admonition (Texas Special Court of Review July 24, 2018) (http://www.scjc.texas.gov/media/46686/roach18-0006judgmentandopinion.pdf) Following a trial de novo, a Special Court of Review Appointed by the Texas Supreme Court publicly admonished a judge for being involved in and referencing his judicial title and position to promote a project with his wife called “divorce in peace” that included a book, website, and on-line referral service. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct had issued a public warning. The judge’s wife is an attorney who devotes about 80% of her practice to conducting mediations in family law cases. Together they conceived and launched a project called “Divorce in Peace” with 3 interconnected components. They co-authored a book entitled Divorce in Peace: Alternatives to War from a Judge and Lawyer. The judge testified that he wrote the book to promote the use of alternative dispute resolution in divorce cases, not to make money. He also testified that he researched the permissible limits of his actions as a sitting district judge in writing, publishing, and marketing a law-related book, but he did not contact the Commission, the State Bar of Texas, or persons with expertise in judicial ethics as part of this research. The book’s front cover lists “John and Laura Roach” as authors. The back cover features a photo of the authors together next to the statement: “John and Laura have spent their careers, as lawyers and a judge, trying to help couples avoid the pitfalls of high conflict divorces.” An “About the Authors” section at the book’s beginning describes John Roach as “a Texas district court judge with a true passion for the law” and states that, “[a]s a judge, he has had a front row seat to over 10,000 family law cases.” The book’s text does not refer to “Judge John Roach” or “Judge Roach.” Among other things, the book describes how “The Family Court System” operates, advises couples contemplating or seeking a divorce to consider using alternative dispute resolution as “a more productive way to end your marriage” and “a path to a peaceful divorce” that reduces the expense and emotional toll of divorce litigation, and describes how various alternative dispute resolution procedures operate in contrast to procedures used as part of a divorce trial. Throughout the book are sections entitled “Judge’s Perspective” and “Mediator’s

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Perspective” offering additional comment on particular topics. The book’s introduction states: “[W]e think it is crucial for couples who want to Divorce in Peace to find like-minded professionals — attorneys, financial planners, mental health professionals and others — who are committed to the same principles of peaceful resolution. These professionals are listed at our website, www.divorceinpeace.com.” The website was operated by “DivorceinPeace LLC,” a for-profit entity created by the judge and his wife. Laura Roach is the LLC’s registered agent, only member, and designated “managing member.” The judge is not a member and disclaims any ownership of the LLC. He testified that his wife spent approximately $50,000 in community assets to create and launch the LLC. The LLC operated the www.divorceinpeace.com web-site and “a referral service for all manner of professionals that serve persons seeking a divorce” who can be listed for free as a participating “Divorce in Peace Professional,” including a photo, resume, practice-area description, and e-mail address. Fee-based subscription options were also offered, ranging from $59.99 a month to $199 a month. Professionals who chose the fee-based options were allowed to post additional information on the web-site such as client reviews, blog posts, articles, and videos. The website also offered the book for purchase. The book contains 11 references inviting readers to visit www.divorceinpeace.com for help in finding attorneys “who are familiar with the low-stress methods of dissolving a marriage” along with mediators, financial planners, marriage counselors, and real estate agents. The judge testified that one goal of the book was to encourage people contemplating divorce to visit the website. The LLC was created in September 2015. The book was published in print and electronic formats in May 2016. The website “appears” to have been online from spring 2016 until it was disabled in early 2018. The LLC still exists as a legal entity but has not been active since May 2017. The book still was available for purchase on www.amazon.com and www.barnesandnoble.com as of the date of trial. About 200 copies have been sold. At least 2 attorneys, and perhaps as many as 8 or more, subscribed as “Divorce in Peace Professionals” appearing on the website. The judge testified that he did not know whether any of the subscribing attorneys had appeared in his court. He also testified that the subscribing attorneys used his wife as a mediator; the judge himself did not contact potential subscribers. The Commission alleged that the website generated approximately $22,000 in revenue from subscribers to the client referral service, but no testimony was elicited to support this figure during the trial de novo, and the judge testified that he “[d]idn’t make any money” from referrals of people who visited the website. The judge participated in various marketing activities in connection with the project, focusing on the book rather than the client referral service and website. The judge testified that he did not participate publicly in marketing the client referral service or website but participated behind the scenes by working with marketers and website developers to create the look and functions of the website and to launch a separate “landing pad” website used solely for the book. He also promoted the book by appearing on television and radio, in newspapers, and at least 1 conference. 18,000 brochures were mailed at approximately the same time the book was published in May 2016. The website address appears in multiple locations on the brochure; the brochure stated: “Clients are Looking to Divorce in Peace . . . Can They Find You?” and “Let them find you

22 on the Divorce in Peace Attorney Network.” The brochure describes the benefits available at various subscription levels for attorneys participating in the network. It also shows the front cover of the book next to a photo of the judge and his wife. The return mailing address lists the sender as “Divorce in Peace” with a street address in Frisco, Texas. The brochure mailing was contracted out to a third party vendor. The judge was generally aware of the mailing and its target audience, which included about 12,000 attorneys who identified themselves as family law practitioners with the State Bar of Texas. A series of promotional videos were made in connection with the project. In 1 video, entitled “About Us,” the judge and his wife were featured with a picture of a gavel; the judge discusses his expertise as an elected state district court judge who has presided over 10,000 family law cases. Another, entitled “Ask Us,” features the judge and invites viewers to submit questions on the website; the judge states: “If you’d like to do some research on your own, we suggest that you start by buying our book, Divorce in Peace.” A third, entitled “Attorney Packages,” features Laura Roach describing the various marketing packages available to subscribing attorneys and professionals. Another, entitled “Learn More About Us,” features the judge inviting viewers to buy the book and describes the information available through Divorce in Peace blogs and articles written by attorneys and other professionals. Another, entitled “Divorce in Peace Professional Network,” features Laura Roach discussing why subscribing professionals “should . . . choose to partner with us,” which refers to the judge and his wife. Another, entitled “Find Out More,” features Laura Roach and refers to a time “[w]hen John and I were writing our book and building this website.” Another, entitled “Welcome Attorneys,” features Laura Roach, states: “[W]e are looking for attorneys that want to become a part of a network . . . ,” referring to Judge Roach and Laura Roach, and invites prospective subscribers to “partner with us today.” In another video, entitled “Welcome Clients,” the judge refers to potential clients finding “an attorney or other divorce professional from our network.” The judge testified that he was not comfortable with the videos after viewing them and did not use them because he was concerned that portions may have violated the canons. He further testified that it is not appropriate for a sitting district court judge to “partner” with attorneys or other professionals and that he decided not to use these videos for this reason. Despite this decision, the videos were publicly available on the website for approximately 30 days. The record is not clear on whether any members of the public actually accessed the videos during that time. They were also still accessible on YouTube as of the trial in May 2018, because they were placed there by a production company in India that helped to create them. According to the judge, his repeated efforts to remove these videos from YouTube have been unsuccessful because he lacks the user name and password necessary to take them down and cannot obtain this information from the videos’ creator. He testified that he and his wife have continued to pursue avenues to have these videos removed from YouTube. The court rejected the judge’s argument that “the Divorce in Peace book is a stand- alone undertaking separated from the www.divorceinpeace.com website by a ‘brick wall,’” finding all 3 components of the Divorce in Peace project were linked. The court concluded that the judge’s “participation in aspects of this interconnected project” violated the prohibition on lending the prestige of office to advance private interests and exploiting his judicial position in business activities. The court acknowledged that the judge is never referred to as “Judge John

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Roach” or “Judge Roach” in the book or in the referral service brochure, there is no evidence that the judge was photographed in his robe as part of his activities in connection with the book and website; there is no evidence that anyone who purchased a book, received the brochure, subscribed, visited the website, or saw the videos appeared in his court; and there was no evidence that he was involved in frequent transactions with persons likely to come before his court. However, it found that his “judicial role is readily apparent based on the first eight words of the book’s ‘About the Authors’ section” and “[l]ittle effort is required for readers to discern that the ‘Judge’ referenced on the front and back covers is John Roach, and that the ‘Judge’s Perspective’ highlighted throughout the book comes from him.” It also noted that the judge is explicitly identified as a judge in at least 1 video that also shows a picture of a gavel. The court rejected the judge’s contentions that “limited references to the website somehow render the book a mere marketing pamphlet for the website, ignoring the 350 pages of content” and that “there was no financial gain from readers of the book visiting the website because the book was aimed at those contemplating divorce rather than professionals, and non-professionals were never charged anything for visiting the website, nor were there any subscriptions for non-professionals.” The court stated that this “argument misses the mark because the Divorce in Peace project was structured to create a financial gain arising from attorneys who paid for subscriptions in hopes of being hired by readers who acted on the book’s multiple invitations to visit the website and find Divorce in Peace-affiliated attorneys.” The court noted that many decisions in which judges were found to have impermissibly lent the prestige of office involved “judicial intervention in a discrete court matter or a particular event such as an arrest” and that the “guidance regarding ongoing business dealings involving a judge or a judge’s family member is more limited and highly context-sensitive.” The court stated, “It is useful to envision a spectrum involving various types of conduct.” “On one end of the spectrum,” the court explained, “are plainly impermissible situations involving a judge who directly uses his or her authority over litigants to coerce actions that will benefit the judge financially,” citing a case in which a family law master attempted to get a couple who previously appeared before him in court to reduce the father’s child support obligations due to an illness that diminished his earning capacity to become a sales representative for Amway. At the other end of the spectrum, the court stated, “judges are permitted to write and publish books on legal and non-legal topics; identify themselves as judges in biographical descriptions; and sell books they have written so long as they do not exploit the judicial title in doing so. The court concluded that, “[t]his case falls in the middle of the spectrum” because there is no allegation or evidence that the judge “directed coercive conduct towards litigants or attorneys appearing in his court to compel actions from which he stood to benefit financially. And yet, these circumstances involve more than individual sales of a law-related book written by a judge.” The court concluded that the canons “encompass more than the directly coercive conduct” but also “reach circumstances like those present here that are not directly coercive but nonetheless involve use of the judicial office to promote the financial interests of a judge or a judge’s family member.” The court found that the judge’s activities exceeded those limits.

The Divorce in Peace book was tied explicitly to a subscription-based client referral service for attorneys and the website through which that service operated. The book

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encouraged its readers — who are envisioned to be prospective clients in need of attorneys and other professionals involved in divorce litigation — to visit the website and use the referral service. Some 12,000 Texas family law attorneys received a brochure touting the referral service, website, and book. The brochure urged these attorneys to “let [clients] . . . find you on the Divorce in Peace Attorney Network.” A promotional video accessible online identified John Roach as a judge and included a gavel; other videos invited attorneys to subscribe and “partner with” Judge Roach and Laura Roach in the Divorce in Peace project. Attorneys did so by participating in the client referral service as “Divorce in Peace Professionals.” Through DIP LLC, Laura Roach stood to benefit directly from subscription sales to attorneys generated by these joint marketing efforts. Judge Roach stood to benefit as well.

The Commission had also charged that the judge cast public discredit upon the judiciary by 2 statements in the book. The first statement was: “Going to court is like going to Vegas,” in a section that compared the risks of a divorce trial to betting “your life savings on a spin of the roulette wheel” and “playing high-stakes poker using your kids as the chips.” The second statement asserted that “most family law appeals do not change a court’s decision” and appeared in a section that discussed the pros and cons of choosing private arbitration over a public trial. The Commission acknowledged that “a judge is allowed to write a book, and a judge is allowed to encourage alternative dispute resolution” but contended that “it is not appropriate for a judge to be setting up a business model that benefits from scaring people away from going to court.” The court rejected the Commission’s argument. It explained:

These two statements are not inflammatory or inappropriate when viewed in isolation. The first aptly describes the risks inherent in litigation using a common gambling analogy. The second describes in plain terms the difficulty of obtaining appellate relief following an unfavorable trial court result. Allowing innocuous statements like these to become fodder for disciplinary proceedings threatens to chill permissible judicial commentary on the law and the legal system . . . .

These statements become even less subject to controversy when viewed in light of surrounding text and the book as a whole. This book fully aligns with Texas public policy when it advocates using alternative dispute resolution procedures for family law cases.

In re Bond, Opinion (Texas Special Court of Review August 10, 2018) (http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/media/46691/scr-18-0005-opinion-of-special-court-of-review- bond.pdf) Following a trial de novo, a Special Court of Review Appointed by the Texas Supreme Court publicly admonished a former judge for issuing a writ of attachment that resulted in a witness’s involuntary confinement without the legal prerequisites for a writ of attachment being met or due process for the witness.

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On December 8, 2015, the judge began presiding over the trial of Keith Hendricks, who was charged with sexually assaulting a homeless woman, referred to as “Jane Doe.” On direct examination, Doe’s testimony was incoherent. The judge excused the jury and had a discussion with counsel while Doe remained on the witness stand “making unintelligible noises.” According to the trial transcript, the judge believed Doe’s responses were nonsensical and that she appeared to be responding to “internal stimuli.” The judge recessed for lunch, advising Doe to return to resume her testimony at 12:45 p.m., which Doe acknowledged by nodding. At 1:00 p.m., outside the jury’s presence, Assistant District Attorney Nick Socias informed the judge that Doe had been taken into custody pursuant to a mental health warrant from another court. Socias stated he had observed Doe to be a danger to herself, heard her say she was not going to return, and observed her asking random people for a ride so she could leave the courthouse. Socias asked the judge for a witness bond to ensure Doe’s presence so she would be released “back into our custody and not released out into the street.” Defense counsel objected. The judge recessed the case until January 11, 2016. The judge then signed a form titled “Writ of Attachment or Bench Warrant” that named Jane Doe as a “Witness taken on mental health warrant now located in [NeuroPschiatric Center].” It stated:

The above named individual is a witness or defendant in the above styled and numbered case. The case is set on the court’s docket for January 11, 2016 at 8:00 a.m. in the Harris County District or County court listed above. Witness bond is fixed at $10,000. So that he may appear before this Court, we ORDER you to deliver the above named individual to the custody of the Harris County Sheriff or any of his deputies.

On December 18, Doe was released from custody on the mental health warrant and taken into custody by the Harris County Sheriff’s Office. Because of the bench warrant issued by the judge, the sheriff’s office held her in the general population at the jail and not in the mental health division. While in custody at the jail, Doe was assaulted by another inmate and allegedly had an altercation with a guard, for which she was charged with assault of a public servant, a felony. Her assault case was assigned to the judge. On January 11, 2016, Hendricks’s trial reconvened, and Doe resumed her testimony. Later that day, the judge signed an order recusing herself from Doe’s assault case, noting, “This defendant testified as a complaining witness in a jury trial before me. I have a great deal of sympathy for this individual. It would be improper for me to oversee her case. I would feel terrible about punishing her.” The district attorney’s office subsequently dismissed the assault charge against Doe. On January 14, the judge released Doe from her material witness bond, and Doe was released from the jail. Pursuant to the code of criminal procedure, the state is entitled to a writ of attachment for a witness who (1) resides “in the county of the prosecution,” (2) has “been duly served with a subpoena to appear and testify in any criminal action,” and (3) “fails to so appear.” Doe was not a resident of Harris County where the Hendricks case was being prosecuted. The state had not served Doe with a subpoena; it is undisputed that Doe voluntarily went to Harris County to

26 testify. Doe did not fail to appear but, in fact, had appeared and then suffered a mental health crisis that led to her involuntary hospitalization. Although the judge stated that she had not intended to confine Doe to jail, she agreed that her writ played a part in Doe’s confinement by failing to include language such as “instanter” or “forthwith” that would have required that Doe be brought before her immediately when released from the mental health confinement so she could hold a hearing, inform Doe of her rights and the consequences of failing to appear, and give Doe a personal recognizance bond. The court acknowledged that the judge “appears to be remorseful” about Doe’s treatment while in the sheriff’s custody. However, the judge contended that “she followed the applicable law and that she should not be sanctioned because at most she merely made a mistake in signing a poorly worded form for a Writ of Attachment or Bench Warrant for a material witness.” During her appearance before the Commission, the judge admitted “the order isn’t written the way it should have been, and that is 100 percent on me,” that in hindsight she would have “re-checked that the prosecutor had properly issued his subpoena, and I would not have issued a writ on the day that we broke for the postponement,” and that she did not read the writ form as carefully as she should have, for which she felt “ridiculously, horribly sorry.” However, the court concluded, “while mere mistakes of law generally are not sanctionable, on the record before us, we conclude that Judge Bond made an egregious legal error” when she signed a writ of attachment against an individual then detained under a mental health warrant.” It explained:

It is incumbent on a trial judge to determine the scope of her lawful authority before exercising it. . . . While a trial judge may reasonably rely on court personnel and officers of the court to provide her information affecting the due course of proceedings in her court, it is the independent obligation of the trial judge to act knowledgeably and within the confines of the law. . . . We find that Judge Bond failed to inform herself of the law and failed to comply with the law when she granted the State’s request to issue an order, in the form of a writ, to detain Ms. Doe upon her medical release and until trial without consideration of whether the witness was subject to a subpoena, and without consideration of minimum due process and constitutional guarantees. Judge Bond knowingly issued the subject writ without first determining her lawful authority to do so in compliance with the law.

The judge argued that she had no duty to appoint counsel or hold a hearing for Doe because, at the time, Doe was not a defendant and had no right to notice of the writ of attachment or the date of trial, a hearing, or the appointment of counsel. The court found the judge’s “position regarding Ms. Doe’s lack of any due process rights troubling.” The court noted that, at the time, the judge had been on the bench for 4 years, she had spent more than 20 years as a prosecutor and a defense attorney, and she was board-certified in criminal law. When asked why she did not follow through on the bench warrant and determine Doe’s location, the judge replied, “I have many, many, many cases before me each day,” adding that she had between 700 and 1,000 defendants in her court, and can “only deal with what’s in front of me.” The court acknowledged that criminal district court judges have a heavy work load and agreed that prosecutors and attorneys, as officers of the court, have the responsibility to bring

27 certain matters to a judge’s attention. However, it stated, a “judge has a responsibility to do more than sign the orders or forms placed before them by a prosecutor or attorney, and . . . must be particularly cognizant of the law and potential impact upon witnesses whose liberty interests are implicated by the issuance of a Writ of Attachment.” The court noted that judge’s “issuance of the Writ of Attachment led to public outrage.” The court stated that, although a private admonition may be appropriate in some cases, “given the facts of this matter as presented to us, a public admonition is appropriate.”

Public Warning of Buck and Order of Additional Education (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct August 9, 2018) (http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/media/46699/buck17-1006-jpand17- 1123-jppubwarnwoae.pdf) The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly warned a judge for (1) modifying a protective order based on ex parte communications and (2) ordering a couple incarcerated for contempt without due process. The Commission also ordered that the judge obtain 2 hours of instruction with a mentor on peace bonds. (1) On April 8, 2017, Jorge Ventura was arrested after a domestic dispute with his husband and charged with misdemeanor assault family violence. The judge magistrated Ventura and entered an emergency protective order prohibiting him from, among other things, entering the marital residence. On April 18, the judge modified the protective order to permit Ventura to return to the marital residence. On April 19, the judge modified the protective order to its original restrictions. In his responses to the Commission, the judge stated that he had modified the protective order because Ventura’s husband appeared in his office on April 18 and “stated that he was going to vacate the [marital] residence.” The judge also stated that Ventura’s husband returned to his office on April 19 to inform him that “he was not going to vacate the residence” so the judge modified the order to its original terms. (2) On April 5, 2017, the judge entered a peace bond against Donna Garcia and her roommate, Darryl McClure, on the application of their neighbors, Robert and Linda Schneeman. On May 4, the judge ordered Garcia and McClure to appear on May 8 to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. The order to show cause stated that the judge had found constructive contempt based on Garcia “FAILING TO OBEY A COURT ORDER (VIOLATIN [SIC] OF PEACE BOND), DISTURBING NEIGHBORS AND MAKING THREATS TOWARD NEIGHBORS.” A few hours after issuing the order to show cause, the judge instructed law enforcement to pick up Garcia and McClure for a hearing later than afternoon. During the hearing, the judge did not inquire whether Garcia or McClure were indigent or provide them with court-appointed counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge found Garcia and McClure in contempt, sentenced them to 72 hours in the county jail, and fined them $100.

In re Ponomarchuk, Stipulation, agreement, and order of admonishment (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct July 20, 2018) (https://www.cjc.state.wa.us/materials/activity/public_actions/2018/8838FinalStip.pdf)

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Based on an agreement, the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a court commissioner for requiring a defendant to “tattoo” his next court date on his arm in black ink. The commissioner also agreed to participate in ethics training focusing on appropriate demeanor. The court commissioner presided over a hearing to address conditions for an individual who had been apprehended on a civil warrant for failing to appear at a child support enforcement hearing. The defendant explained that he had missed his previous court hearing because he had been dealing with medical issues and appointments and lost track of the court date. The commissioner, noting the defendant had missed other court dates, allowed his release but on the condition that he “tattoo right now the next court date.” The commissioner directed the defendant to approach the bench and handed him an ink pen. Although defendant’s counsel objected to the court requiring “someone to tattoo themselves,” the defendant complied with the commissioner’s directive and wrote his next court date across his forearm with the ink pen. The Commission noted that the commissioner’s actions “predictably” were the subject of comment at the courthouse and were brought to the attention of the court. The court’s personnel and executive committees suspended the commissioner for 15 work days without pay, informing the commissioner that requiring the defendant to write on his body and referring to “tattooing” were “inherently demeaning and carried connotations for some of tattooing victims of the Holocaust.” The executive committee had imposed remedial measures on the commissioner in response to demeanor issues 3 times since 2013. During the Commission’s investigation, the commissioner said that he had not intended to be discourteous toward the defendant but meant to “impress upon him the seriousness of the proceedings while allowing his release.” He added that he was “’mortified’ to learn that his use of the term ‘tattoo’ could be interpreted as analogous ‘to the historical horror of the Holocaust and the tattooing of prisoners for identification.’” The commissioner expressed remorse and recognized that, regardless of his intent, his actions caused discredit to him and the court. The Commission found:

Requiring a defendant to write or “tattoo” his next court date on his arms in black ink was demeaning and humiliating. Judicial officers often encounter frustrating individuals who lead chaotic lives. Accordingly, judges and commissioners are entrusted with great power to enforce their orders. Respondent’s actions here, however, were contrary to a judicial officer’s ethical obligation to treat people before the court with dignity, courtesy and patience.

The Commission noted that persons in the courtroom were personally impacted by the commissioner’s actions and that the defendant had been accused of an infraction because county jail inmates are prohibited from writing on themselves. The Commission stated that, if its action had been the only response to this and prior incidents, it might have imposed a greater sanction, noting its public admonishment had a substantial additional impact and that the court’s measures had not been public. The Commission also found that the commissioner had “credibly stated that he has truly

29 internalized the importance of maintaining appropriate judicial demeanor and assured the Commission that he will conduct himself with appropriate judicial temperament going forward, even if he experiences impatience or frustration on the bench.”

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