a more recent critique, see Jay Rosen, What Are ]011rnalistsFor? ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 286, 296. CHAPTER X 44. Posner and Vermeule, "The Credible Executive," 911. 45. Rahul Sagar, "Against Moral Absolutism: Surveillance and Disclosure After Snowden," Ethics a11dfotemational Affairs 29, no. 2 (2015): 145-59. The Case for Kinship

ClassicalRealism and PoliticalRealism

ALISON McQUEEN

he past decade ha witnessed the revival of political reali m within conremporary policical theory . These political realists have T a tandard story they cell chem ·elves about themselves . Ic is a story about a theoretical approach that, although targeted at the particular pathol­ ogies of contemporary liberal political philosophy, has its roots in the work of Thucydides, Augustine of Hippo, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, Publius, Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber, and Carl Schmitt. 1 There are at least two interesting facts about this story. First, none of the thinkers listed self-identifies as a "realist." Second, the list excludes a sizable group of mostly self-identified realists in the field of international relations (hereafter, "international realists")-for instance, midcentury clas­ sical realists such as E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau (hereafter, "classical realists") and more contemporary structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer (hereafter, "structural realists"). 2 This chapter is concerned primarily with this second fact. 3 In particular, it asks whether this exclusion is well grounded. Are there foundational theoretical differ­ ences between political realism in contemporary political theory (here­ after, "political realism") and international realism that might reasonably ground a firm distinction between the two? Many political realists seem to think that there are. The exclusion of all international realists from political realism's standard list of forerunners

[242] RAHUL SAGAR [ 243] suggests an implicit argument to this effect. Some political realists make realists offer important lessons for thinking about the possibilities and chal­ the case quite explicitly. 4 The most frequent ground for such a distinction lenges of the political realist research agenda. This chapter seeks to highlight is international realism's purported tendency to underplay the role of three lessons that strike me as both particularly valuable and underex­ moral considerations in the explanation and evaluation of political out­ plored. The first concerns the nature and breadth of the realist target. The comes .5 International realists are often cast as amoral strategists who are second addresses realist assumptions about human nature. The third deals "normative without being moral, eager to advise political actors on the with realism's purported conservative bias. basis of what will help them succeed without regard to the moral costs of success."6 However, a small body of recent work rejects the distinction between political and international realism, claiming that both approaches The Realist Family share a set of canonical forerunners (e.g., Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Weber) and targets (e.g., various forms of"idealism"). Given these points of com­ This section asks whether there are fundamental distinctions between polit­ monality, the argument goes, political realists should pursue a deeper engage­ ical realism and international realism by considering whether interna­ ment with at least some strands of international realism. 7 tional realists can affirm what political realists take to be a series of defining I am sympathetic to this line of argument, and this chapter seeks to build commitments. A close examination of the recent literature on political real­ upon it. However, I think that arguments for a foundational distinction ism suggests that it is a distinctive family of approaches to the study, prac­ between political and international realism are worth taking seriously. I tice, and normative evaluation of politics that tend to (a) affirm the also think that the case for a deep foundational connection between polit­ "autonomy" (or, more minimally, the "distinctiveness") of politics; (b) hold ical and international realism has so far been made in rather gestural terms. an agonistic account of politics; (c) reject as "utopian" or "moralist" those Shared canonical forerunners and a common tendency to rail against . I approaches, practices, and evaluations that seem to deny these facts; and "idealism" are not in themselves evidence of the kind of deep conceptual ' (d) prioritize the requirements of political order and stability over the and analytical kinship that could make closer engagement between polit­ l demands of justice (or, more minimally, reject any kind of absolute prior­ ical and international realism fruitful. The case for kinship demands a ity of justice over other political values).10 stronger and more sustained articulation. If political realists and interna­ I take this conceptualization of political realism to be relatively uncon­ tional realists are engaged in fundamentally different projects, it is less clear troversial. The question for our purposes is whether international realists that the former has anything to learn from the latter's successes and fail­ can affirm these commitments . It seems clear that most structural realists­ ures. Political realists might then carry on much as they have been, setting those writing in the aftermath of Kenneth Waltz's book Theory of Interna­ international realism aside as a distant and substantially distinct member of tionalPolitics (1979)-could affirm neither the particular conceptual framings the realist family. 8 nor the normative dimensions of these claims. This is simply because struc­ This chapter considers the most plausible arguments for a firm distinc­ tural realism is predominantly an analytic paradigm whose aim is to explain tion between political and international realism. I argue that although there and predict international outcomes.11 Consider two examples of com­ may be foundational theoretical differences between political realism and mitments that structural realists would likely fail to accept. First, although

structural realism, there are no similarly strong axes of distinction between I• structural realists might seem to affirm something like the "autonomy" of political realism and classical realism. The exclusion of thinkers such as Carr (international) politics, their reasons for doing so are purely analytical. As and Morgenthau from the political realist "canon" cannot be justified on Kenneth Waltz explains, "In reality, everything is related to everything else, the grounds of important foundational differences and is more likely the and one domain cannot be separated from others. Theory isolates one realm result of a caricatured picture of classical realism. What is more, as Wil­ from all others in order to deal with it intellectually." 12 The structural real­ liam Scheuerman has suggested, this exclusion comes at a cost.9 Classical ist is not committed to the notion that politics is, in reality, an autonomous

[ 244] ALISON McQUEEN THE CASE FOR KINSHIP [ 245] realm but only to the assertion that it may be analytically useful to treat it amoral realm, that it is a realm with its own normativity distinct from that as such. On these grounds, she would reject the political realist's concep­ of other spheres, or that it is a realm in which conventional and/or univer­ tual framing of the "autonomy" of the political. sal moral rules must be overridden and "good" political actors must dirty Second, the structural realist would not affirm any kind of non11ativepri­ their hands. ority of political order and stability over the demands of justice. She might However, a third reason why politics might not be reducible to ethics is instead insist on the empirical and descriptive claim that states act primar­ that the two are deeply m11t11allyenmeshed. On this view, politics deserves ily on the basis of their interest in political order and stability (or security "attention in its own right, not because we think that it is something sepa­ and survival) rather than on the basis of justice and right. On an extreme rate and autonomous, but precisely because we think it is an important version of this view, state arguments that invoke the demands of justice dimension of all realms of human activity and experience: we cannot just 13 are just "cheap talk" that conceal "real" power interests. Thus, the struc­ work out ethical truths and then apply them to 'politics' because ethics is tural realist would reject the normative dimension of the political realist's already a part of politics (and politics a part of ethics)." 18 If politics and claim about the priority of order. I take these examples to be illustrative of ethics are enmeshed in this way, then it is simply a mistake to think that deeper differences and sufficient for concluding that the political realist and certain moral values are insulated from the forces of politics or have "ante­ the structural realist are engaged in fundamentally different projects. From cedent authority over the political." 19 Only the first of these three argu­ the perspective of the political realist, the structural realist is at best a rather ments for nonreducibility commits the realist to a strong claim about the distant relative. "autonomy of the political." The remaining two are committed to the However, the case seems far less clear once we turn to the classical more moderate claim that politics is a distinctive realm that is connected realists. Let us take in turn each of the four commitments listed earlier. in various ways to other kinds of human activity and forms of evaluation. First, political realists affirm the "autonomy" of politics. To my mind, Classical realists affirm the overarching commitment to the nonreduc­ this framing of the commitment is somewhat misleading because what ibility of politics to ethics. For Carr, the tendency to "regard politics as a political realists tend to mean when they make claims about the "auton­ function of ethics" is part of a broader tendency within "idealist" or "uto­ omy of the political" is that politics is not reducibleto other fields or domains. pian" thought first to devise moral principles a priori and then to apply The variant of this claim advanced by many contemporary political realists them to the political world. 20 It is this kind of thinking, he suggests, that concerns the nonreducibility of politics to ethics. It is this kind of argu­ lies behind the bankrupt doctrine of the harmony of interests and the spec­ ment about nonreducibility, rather than a broader claim about the auton­ tacular failure of the League of Nations. However, his objection to reduc­ omy of the political, that seems to underpin both Raymond Geuss's critique tionist thinking is not exclusively practical. The problem is not just that of "ethics-first" approaches to political philosophy, which try to derive reductionism may lead to costly and dangerous political outcomes but also 14 political principles from ethical ones, and Bernard Williams's insistence that it fails to understand the relationship between politics and ethics. For 15 that "political philosophy is not just applied moral philosophy." Carr, as for those who take the third route outlined earlier, politics cannot There may be several reasons why politics might be nonreducible in this be reduced to ethics because ethics is always and already deeply political. way. One is that politics is an entirely separateand containedsphere of human Wearing his Marxism on his sleeve, Carr claims that realism's great achieve­ activity. It is not clear that political realists want to explicitly endorse this ment was to reveal that moral arguments can never truly be formulated a 16 claim. Another is that politics is a distinctiverealm of human activity with priori and are always both the product and the reflection of power and "its own character, purposes and means," albeit one that "sits in a series of interests. 21 17 complex relations with other human activities." Both the more radical Morgenthau similarly sees the reduction of political questions to moral claim about separateness and the more moderate claim about distinctive­ ones as a utopian tendency. 22 At first blush, he appears to ground this ness might be taken to ground a range of familiar arguments about the commitment to nonreducibility in a claim about the radical separateness relationship between politics and ethics-for instance, that politics is an of politics as a sphere of human activity. He argues that the realist sees

[246] ALISON McQUEEN THE CASE FOR KINSHIP [ 247] "politics as an independent sphere of action and understanding apart from authoritarianism)-each with its own core values, institutional arrange­ other spheres, such as economics, ethics, aesthetics, or religion." 23 How­ ments, practices, and procedures-that may allow us to live together in ever, it would be a mistake to interpret this argument as a commitment the face of deep disagreement. Although these frameworks may channel about the nature of politics as rnch. Like Waltz, Morgenthau thinks that and manage disagreement, they will not eliminate it. In fact, realists treating politics as an autonomous sphere is a necessary theoretical abstrac­ expect that the terms of political association will themselves be the subject tion. Without this abstraction, "a theory of politics, international or of ongoing disagreement. We will disagree not only about the normative domestic, would be altogether impossible." 24 desirability of particular political frameworks but also about the interpre­ When Morgenthau tries to capture the actual relationship between pol­ tation and relative priority of the values that any given framework is seen itics and ethics, he most often affirms a claim about the distinctiveness of to instantiate. 33 It is in part for this reason that political realists view all politics. For him, politics is a realm with its own imperatives and stands forms of political order as provisional and fragile. in a complex and often fraught relationship with the demands of moral­ Classical realists affirm a similarly agonistic conception of politics. For ity. In the realm of politics, "universal moral principles cannot be applied Carr, the primary explanation for political disagreement and conflict lies to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but they in the competing interests of hierarchically situated groups. Dominant must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of times and place." 25 groups will tend to defend and justify the status quo, whereas less-power­ The political realm is governed by a contextual, consequentialist, and ful groups will tend, so far as they are able, to resist and criticize it. In the prudential ethics, which means that political actors will regularly face tragic face of this disagreement, dominant groups will deploy their formidable choices between the moral imperatives of politics and the demands of the ideological resources to make the case that the existing order benefits every­ universal moral law. 26 The prevalence of these tragic choices is part of what body. 34 For Morgenthau, in contrast, the roots of political disagreement makes the political realm distinctive. That they are experienced both as can be found in human nature. Evincing his debts to Nietzsche and Sig­ "tragic" and as "choices" is evidence that the political realm is not entirely mund Freud, Morgenthau argues that man has a lust for power and a will separate from the moral realm. to dominate. This "aspiration for power over man" is, for Morgenthau, Second, political realists have an agonistic conception of politics. They both an important cause for conflict and "the essence of politics." 35 take disagreement and conflict to be perennial (or, more strongly, constitu­ Whatever the cause of conflict and disagreement, classical realists tend tive) features of the political condition. Williams gives one of the stronger to be cautiously optimistic that domestic political and social institutions articulations of this claim when he suggests that the "the idea of the political and practices can effectively channel and manage it, thereby preventing is to an important degree focused in the idea of political disagreement." 27 outright war. Like political realists, classical realists think that a number of Political realists attribute this disagreement to a variety of causes that tend to possible political frameworks can plausibly achieve this goal. However, fall roughly into one or more of the following categories-human nature because the sphere of international politics lacks any comparable kinds of and the limits of human rationality, 28 competing identities and interests, 29 institutions and practices, they think that disagreement and conflict are lia­ and value pluralism. 30 Whatever their causes, these disagreements are not ble to become far more explosive in this sphere. Despite the international primarily intellectual and will not tend to be resolved through "the unforced focus of their arguments, they clearly hold the kind of agonistic account of force of the better argument." 31 The fact that we disagree over moral, reli­ politics that would be familiar to political realists. gious, economic, aesthetic, and other matters makes it difficult (or impossi­ Third, political realists tend to reject as "utopian" or "moralist" those ble) to live together in the absence of a political authority capable of making approaches that seem to deny the autonomy of politics and the persistence and enforcing commonly binding decisions. of disagreement and conflict. The first of these labels is at least somewhat Politics is necessary "because we have to live and act alongside those misleading . To be sure, political realism is frequently interpreted as a rejec­ with whom we disagree." 32 There are various possible political frame­ tion of the "utopianism" of contemporary liberal political philosophy. 30 On works (e.g. representative democracy, direct democracy, competitive this interpretation, political realists are concerned primarily with questions

('.?48] ALISON McQUEEN THE CASE FOR KINSHIP [ 249 J of fact sensitivity and feasibility. They take aim at theories and approaches utopianism and realism is often seen as the "first great debate" in the field that fail to attend to psychological, sociological, and institutional con­ of international relations. 42 straints on political action and therefore offer inadequate (or even danger­ Yet although it is certainly true that both Carr and Morgenthau take ous) guidance for political reform. "Top-down," "ethics-first" theories aim at utopianism for its fact insensitivity and failure to attend to feasibil­ are, suggest political realists, particularly prone to these purported pathol­ ity constraints, these complaints do not capture their fundamental worry. ogies. Political realism, on this view, is primarily a methodological critique For Carr, the underlying problem with utopianism is its appeal to absolute aimed at prompting greater fact sensitivity-a corrective to the abstraction and prepolitical ethical standards as the basis for political evaluation and and idealism of contemporary liberal political philosophy. reform. 43 Realism, in contrast, insists that there are no prepolitical ethical This antiutopian interpretation of political realism captures something standards because ethical judgments are deeply inflected by power rela­ important. Political realists do take aim at top-down approaches to politi­ tions.44 For Morgenthau, utopianism is motivated by a disdain for power, cal thinking and often raise questions about feasibility. However, the inter­ disagreement, and conflict, which, for the utopian, are contingent features pretation fails to capture the foundational conceptual motivation for these of social life, atavistic remnants of a past age that must be repudiated and positions. Political realists are not concerned with feasibility and fact sen­ replaced by a "rational and moral political order derived from universally sitivity per se. 37 Rather, they are concerned with the conception of poli­ valid abstract principles." 45 I think there is a plausible case to be made that tics that lies at the heart of much liberal political philosophy. As Matt Sleat even for classical realists political moralism is a more fundamental target puts it, for the realist, "liberal theory fails to be sufficiently political: either than utopianism. it does not adequately recognize the extent to which politics is an autono­ Finally, the fourth commitment is that political realists tend to priori­ mous human activity or it overlooks the extent to which politics is char­ tize the requirements of order and stability over the demands of justice. acterized by political disagreement and conflict rather than harmony and For political realists, order and stability are fragile acco111plish111ents.Because consensus." 38 disagreement and conflict are ineradicable, order and stability are always These purported pathologies are better captured by what political real­ vulnerable. They should never be understood as "once-and-for-all achieve­ ists call "moralism," or an approach to political thinking that insists on the ments."-16 It is precisely because of this fragility that stable systems of priority of the moral over the political and understands the purpose of poli­ authoritative political order should be viewed as profound accomplish­ tics as the elimination of conflict and disagreement. 39 By conceiving of ments. This is part of the reason why Williams objects to John Rawls's the political realist's target as utopianism, we run the risk of mistaking a characterization of a pragmatic social consensus as "a mere 111od11svivendi." 47 conceptual criticism for a methodological one. To the extent that realists For Williams, there is nothing "mere" about a modus vivendi: "experi­ are concerned with fact sensitivity and feasibility constraints, these con­ ence (including at the present time) suggests that those who enjoy such a cerns are derivative of a conceptual disagreement with political moralism. I thing are already lucky." 48 return to this point in the following section. However, political realists do not merely want to insist that order and For now, it is worth noting that this third commitment, framed in this stability are more fragile and valuable achievements than contemporary way, may seem like a difficult one for classical realists to affirm. Thinkers political liberals seem to assume. Many political realists want to defend such as Carr and Morgenthau bear much of the responsibility for framing the stronger claim that order and stability enjoy a certain priority over the realism as a reaction to or even the opposite of "utopianism" (or "ideal­ demands of justice. Williams identifies the problem of securing "order, ism"). For Carr, pure realism and absolute utopianism stand in a dialectical protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation" as "the 'first' relationship, each offering a corrective for the excesses of the other. 40 political question." The question of order and stability enjoys priority Morgenthau takes a similar line when he argues that the struggle between "because solving it is the condition of solving, indeed of posing, any utopianism and realism is the central story of modern political thought. 41 others. It is not (unhappily) first in the sense that once solved, it never It is largely due to Carr and Morgenthau that the encounter between has to be solved again. This is particularly important because, a solution

[250] ALISON McQUEEN THE CASE FOR KINSHIP [ 251] to the first question being required all the time, it is affected by historical reasoning about justice is unreliable. This is true at both the individual circumstances."-19 level and the international level. Classical realists think that arguments from Williams's framing of this point manages to be both ambiguous and justice at the individual level are often mere rationalizations for uncon­ forceful. There are at least two points here on which political realists might scious drives , irrational impulses, and material interests. 55 They expect disagree among themselves. The first concerns the kind of priority claim this tendency to be even more pronounced at the international level, that is being made here. Is it the case that order and stability enjoy a logical where these drives, impulses, and material interests are less effectively priorityover the demands of justice, such that it is not possible to work out contained by laws and institutions. 56 the conditions for a just regime without first working out the conditions Second, classical realists worry that state representatives who think that for a stable one?50 This case seems implausible. 51 Or do order and stability they are motivated primarily by justice are comparatively more likely to merely enjoy a politicalpriority over the demands of justice, such that, as a pursue absolute ends and less likely to be susceptible to moderation and practical matter, we must generally secure order and stability before pur­ compromise . Instead of seeing states with competing ends as opponents suing other political values? The latter view seems more plausible because, to be reckoned with through bargaining and war, the justice-motivated in a political context at least, "justice purchased at the expense of order is state sees them as immoral pariahs and legitimate targets of unlimited likely to prove self-defeating." 52 violence. 57 The second point on which political realists might disagree concerns Finally, even when justice does not serve as moral cover for baser inter­ the strength of Williams's claim. Political realists want to insist on a crr­ ests or propel a state toward dangerously absolute ends, classical realists tain asymmetry in the relationship between justice, on the one hand, and think there may nonetheless be good prudential reasons to avoid assigning order and stability, on the other. Whereas a just but unstable order will absolute political priority to justice (or indeed to any political value). This tend to be self-defeating , a radically unjust order , history suggests, will not is because the political realm is tragic. The complexities of social coordi­ reliably face the same fate. 53 Nevertheless, it seems possible to acknowl­ nation mean that we are often unable to control and anticipate the effects edge this asymmetry without committing oneself to any absolutepriority of of our actions. Once performed, a political action collides with other order and stability over justice . The political realist might instead com­ actions, leading to consequences that we could never have foreseen and mit herself to the more minimal view that "justice enjoys nothing like an have only a limited capacity to control. These collisions "deflect the action absolute priority over other valued features of political life." 5-1Indeed, this from its intended goal and create evil results of our intentions." 58 view would be consistent with a realist suspicion of "ethics-first" and a This is especially true at the international level, which lacks the laws priori thinking. On this more minimal version of the fourth commitment, and institutions that might channel political actions in more predictable political realists would abstain from any antecedent judgment about the ways. Instead of assigning absolute priority to any one political value or relative priority of political values. Tensions among justice, order, stability, moral end, the prudential actor must evaluate and compare policies accord­ and any number of other political values must, on this view, be subject to ing to his or her best estimation of their political consequences. 59 Impor­ more local forms of political judgment. On this more minimal framing, the tantly, classical realists insist that none of these arguments should lead us to political realist rejects any absolute political priority of justice over other abandon the transformational project of international justice. Rather, they values. are "persuaded that this transformation can be achieved only through the Can classical realists accept either the maximal or minimal versions of workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have shaped the past this claim about the relative political priority of justice and order? The prin­ as they will the future." 60 cipal view that runs through classical realist thought is that it is i111pmdent To sum up, I have argued that political and classical realists affirm a com­ for states to affirm the absolute political priority of justice over other values . mon set of defining commitments, even if they sometimes do so through This is because doing so will dangerously distort foreign policies . Classi­ different routes. Insofar as the affirmation of a common set of conceptual cal realists offer several reasons for this view. First, as a general matter, our commitments is sufficient for inclusion within a theoretical family or

[ 252) ALISON N1cQUEEN THE CASE FOR KINSHIP [ 253) tradition , there are no clear grounds for ignoring the conceptual and ana­ critiques contend that, insofar as one of the goals of liberal political phi­ lytical kinship between political and classical realism. I also take the con­ losophy is to offer guidance to political actors and reformers, an insuffi­ ceptual arguments described in this section to be sufficient to demonstrate cient regard for the facts or attentiveness to feasibility constraints will prove that classical realism is hardly amoral in its commitments and approach. counterproductive . Nonideal critiques are methodological interventions Why, then, have most contemporary political realists tended to ignore and internal correctives ofliberal ideal theory. 64 In contrast, realism's crit­ the possibility of such a kinship with classical realism? I think that this rejec­ icisms are conceptual ones that resist a particular vision of politics that is tion is based not on profound conceptual or analytical differences but common to much ofliberal political philosophy. rather on a caricature of classical realism as a form of amoral realpolitik. c,i The disadvantage of conceiving of the target in this way is that it too There may be rhetorical reasons to insist on such a caricature. Many of the easily leads to a potentially misleading view of realism's relationship to lib­ most powerful critiques of realism have tended to reduce the entire family eralism . The realist 's target is political moralism, of which some forms of approaches to the uncareful skepticism and amoralism of a crude real­ of liberalism are a species . Because liberal approaches have dominated politik _c,2 By insisting on the caricature, contemporary political realists can contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy and because liberal contain these criticisms by conceding their force against a particular strain democracies have been the dominant postwar political form in the West, of realism while insisting on the distinctiveness of their own approach . But most political realists have focused their critical attention there. This focus however rhetorically useful such a caricature may be, it nevertheless has obscured two facts-that there are forms ofliberalism that are not mor­ obscures deep conceptual and analytical connections. alistic and that there are forms of political moralism that are not liberal. The first helps us to account for the fact that many political realists either self-identify or are plausibly categorized as liberals. 65 There is nothing con­ Three Lessons tradictory about this . There are forms of liberalism that acknowledge the distinctiveness of politics and are not wedded to the strongly harmonious In this section, I suggest that at least three important lessons can be learned vision of politics that is characteristic of political moralism. These forms of from political realism's closer engagement with classical realism. liberalism might plausibly include contestatory Madisonian liberalism, Judith Shklar's liberalism of fear, modus vivendi and value-pluralist liber­ alisms, as well as several more recent articulations ofliberal realism. 66 Realisms CriticalTargets There are also many core liberal values that do not depend on (and are perhaps even antagonistic toward) a strongly harmonious conception of First, such engagement might allow political realists to be clearer about the politics. These values might, as Andrew Sabl has suggested, plausibly include nature of their critical targets. This is a question about which there is some "liberty, equality, individualism, freedom of speech and dissent, at least a confusion. We have already considered one sort of confusion. Although minimal form of justice, dispersion of the effective ability to choose, and realists often claim that their target is utopianism, I argue that their target security against arbitrary power-and, in all modern contexts, representa­ is more accurately construed as political moralism. One advantage of clear­ tive democracy." 67 Indeed, for much of the history ofliberalism, defenses ing up this confusion about realism's target is that it helps us to distinguish of these values have happily coexisted with more contestatory and agonis­ more clearly between political realism and nonideal critiques of ideal the­ tic visions of politics . However, just as there are forms of liberalism that ory, which are also concerned with questions of fact sensitivity and feasi­ are not moralistic, so too are there species of political moralism that are bility. 63 Nonideal critiques are primarily methodological, operate within not liberal. And contemporary political realists have said far too little on liberal political philosophy, and take aim at theories that make assumptions this matter. about human behavior and institutional capacities that are unlikely to hold For classical realists, however, liberalism is only one species of the larger true in a world like ours (e.g., Rawls's assumption offull compliance) . These genus of political moralism. 68 They provide a fuller account of both the

[254) ALI SON M cQ UEEN THE CASE FOR KINSHIP [ 255] features and the dangers of this larger genus. Like political realists, classi­ ethics-first, top-down approach of the political moralist, the political real­ cal realists think that the problematic features of political moralism flow ist begins "from an account of our existing motivations and our political from its failure to acknowledge the distinctiveness of politics and its reli­ and social institutions." 72 What the political realist aims to capture is not ance on a strongly harmonious vision of politics. For these reasons, political the behavioral and institutional requirements of a fully just state or even a moralists will tend to see conflict and the exercise of coercive power as "realistic utopia" but rather "the way the social, economic, political, etc., objectionable disturbances and exceptions to harmonious normalcy, to have institutions actually operate in some society at some given time and what confidence in the human capacity to impose our will on the political world, reallydoes move lmman beingsto act in given circwnstances."73 Yet most political and to share a belief in the possibility and durability of moral progress in realist work has hovered between the abstract and the polemical without politics.m much attempt to offer these kinds of empirically attentive accounts of Although liberalism may provide the paradigmatic instance of these ten­ human motivation or institutional operation.7 4 dencies, they have been shared by other post-Enlightenment political pro­ For the sake of argument, let us focus on the question of human moti­ grams, such as Marxism and Nazism. 70 These commitments become vation.75 Political realists rely on both explicit and implicit assumptions in dangerous when they are challenged by the realities of the political world­ responding to this question. Untethered to empirical evidence, the explicit when conflict and coercive power can no longer be dismissed as excep­ assumptions have the air of timeworn ritual utterances. Echoing "realist" tional, when politics escapes human mastery, and when moral progress forerunners such as Thucydides, Augustine, and Machiavelli (all of whom, it proves elusive or reversible. At this point, suggest classical realists, there is bears noting, wrote during times of war or deep political crisis), contempo­ a temptation for the moralist political actor to double down and to con­ rary political realists ask us to take it as an "undeniable fact that most human template more radical and violent means for achieving a harmonious and agents most of the time are weak, easily distracted, deeply conflicted, and moral political order. 71 confused." 76 These agents' beliefs are often indeterminate, incoherent, and Contemporary political realists need not affirm the particular details of the product of various forms of illusion. 77 Such "facts" are made to bear a this account pf political moralism and its dangers. However, they might heavy burden in the realist's attempt to explain why the moralist's political do well to follow the lead of classical realists in offering a fuller account of and institutional principles translate so poorly into effective political pro­ nonliberal instances of political moralism and in specifying the features they posals. Yet, despite decades of major advances in the empirical study of indi­ share with liberal ones. Which forms of republicanism, Marxism, or con­ vidual and social psychology, such statements remain purely stipulative. What servatism are appropriately subject to the realist rejection of political mor­ is more, many political realists seem to assume that human weakness, dis­ alism? What sorts of practical dangers do all of these forms of political traction, and irrationality are virtually co11stallttraits . They do not offer any moralism share? What is missed by focusing the critique of the genus of account of how and under what circumstances we might expect such traits political moralism so squarely on its liberal species? to be more or less pronounced. It may seem rather strange to suggest that classical realists have any­ thing to teach political realists on this question. After all, classical real­ Realism's Account cifHuman Motivation ists are often taken to have a hackneyed account of human nature that was influenced more by a pessimistic theology of original sin and a dated Second, political realists might look to classical realists for a more empiri­ philosophical anthropology than it was by empirical psychological find­ cally attentive account of human motivation. Regardless of whether one ings. However, classical realists such as Morgenthau and Carr were far understands political realism as a methodological or a conceptual critique, more attentive to the psychological findings of their day than is generally it is clear that one of the advantages it claims over its targets is that of a supposed. This attention is most visible in these thinkers' intellectual debts more bottom-up approach to political thinking. In contrast to the abstract to Freud. For instance, Morgenthau argues that man is motivated by two

[ 256] ALISON Mc QUEEN THE CASE FOR KINSHIP [ 257] instincts: self-preservation, which is satisfied when the requirements of sur­ point to the ways in which moral reasoning might be motivated by uncon­ vival have been met, and self-assertion, a will to dominate that "would be scious drives, irrational impulses, and material interests. satisfied only if the last man became an object of domination, there being Morgenthau largely echoes these arguments. Although the individual nobody above or beside him, that is, ifhe became like God." 78 For Morgen­ "is dominated by interests and driven by emotional impulses, as well as thau, these instincts produce the intense disagreements and conflicts that motivated by reason, he likes to see himself primarily in the light of this define the political condition. As Robert Schuett's textual and archival latter, eminently human quality. Hence he gives his irrational qualities the work has shown, this account of human motivation reflects Morgenthau's earmarks of reason. What we call 'ideology' is the result of this process of close engagement with Freud's instinct theory. 79 rationalization." 83 This motivational account provides the psychological Both Morgenthau and Carr evince additional debts to Freud's accounts underpinning for an account of international state behavior. State actors of repression and identification in their common argument about the roots will tend to rationalize their states' drives and material goals by appealing of aggressive state behavior. Within the state, the individual's instinct toward to arguments about justice and right. 84 For both Carr and Morgenthau, self-assertion is diverted and weakened by rules, institutions, and social the task of the realist is to unmask the drives and interests lurking behind norms. However, the individual compensates for the domestic repression of these ideological smokescreens. 85 these instincts by vicarious identification with his state's self-assertion. 80 Of Whatever one makes of the international application of these arguments, course, these arguments now appear hopelessly dated. However, I suggest it is clear that there is powerful empirical evidence that individuals have a that this datedness reflects the nascent state of the field of psychology in the tendency to invoke moral reasons in order to defend and justify their needs mid-twentieth century rather than the classical realists' failure to engage and inclinations. 86 Among these reasons is an inclination to consciously and seriously with empirical questions of human motivation. unconsciously justify and rationalize the political, economic, and social sta­ One aspect of human motivation about which classical realists may have tus quo. 87 There is disturbing evidence that under certain circumstances been generally correct concerns our tendency toward moral rationaliza­ individuals will rationalize the existing order even when it violates their tion. They argue that what appear to be moral arguments may often be individual or group self-interest. 88 Given the centrality of claims about post hoc and largely unconscious justifications for our inclinations, intu­ rationalization to their account of human motivation and critique of itions, and interests. Contemporary political realists such as Raymond Geuss political moralism, contemporary political realists might engage with these share this motivational assumption, treating the tendency toward rational­ findings more closely. At the very least, such an engagement might prevent ization as a virtual constant and therefore as a ground for suspicion of moral political realists from treating rationalization as a motivational constant and argument. Arguments about justice and right are, he suspects, often moral prompt them instead to offer some account of the conditions under which cover for the interests of the powerful and the preservation of the existing we should expect the tendency toward rationalization to be especially pro­ order. 81 nounced. This is merely one example of how deeper engagement with the However, where Geuss makes motivational suggestions,Carr and Mor­ empirical study of human motivation may both support and strengthen the genthau offer more complete and empirically attentive accounts. For Carr, contemporary political realist agenda. Freud's great contribution to the understanding of human motivation was to drive "the last nail into the coffin of the ancient illusion that the motives from which men allege or believe themselves to have acted are in fact ade­ Realism '.s-Account efHuman Moti11ation quate to explain their action." 82 Although Carr is unwilling to give up altogether on the explanatory power of human reason, he insists that it is Third, and on a closely re~ated note, classical realists might give political a less-potent motivational force than post-Enlightenment optimists tend realists insights into the routes by which realism acquires a conservative to suppose. He combines this Freudian insight with a Nietzschean moral bias. In both its international and political variants, realism is often criti­ psychology and a Marxist diagnosis of ideological illusion, all of which cized for being a rationalization of the status quo and an apology for

[258] ALISON McQUEEN THE CASE FOR KINSHIP [259] existing power relations. The suggestion seems to be that there is some­ and critique of the status quo need not sit uncomfortably with realist thing about the conceptual framework or methodological approach of commitments. 92 realism that makes it particularly vulnerable to becoming a mere rational­ Nevertheless, as Lorna Finlayson has forcefully argued, although realist ization or apology for the existing order. Yet, on its face, this suggestion is commitments do not logically entail an affirmation of the status quo, many puzzling. Although realist commitments may be consistent with certain political realists tend to make argumentative moves that push them toward strands of conservatism, these commitments do not themselves demand a kind of conservatism . They focus on institutional or behavioral phe­ that one assign any special normative value to the status quo. For most nomena that are allegedly fixed and constant rather than variable. They realists, the fact that a set of institutions, traditions, customs, or prejudices then move from seeing these phenomena as fixed to treating them almost happen to have stood the test of time does not invest them with particular always as constraints on political possibility and virtually never as enabling normative significance. factors. Finally, they criticize their predominantly liberal targets for over­ And many realists, as public intellectuals and political actors, have looking these phenomena and constraints and for being too ambitious in defended a range of progressive positions aimed at challenging or upset­ their demands on institutions and citizens. To the extent that realists make ting existing power relationships. What is more, realists are acutely attuned these argumentative moves, their position will shift "towards a greater to the ways in which political and moral arguments can serve as rational­ acceptance of the st11t11squo, towards more modesty in the change that izations of the status quo and apologies for power. They diagnose these [they] are prepared to propose or demand." 93 On Finlayson's account, real- • tendencies-often with a certain unrelenting zeal-in the arguments made ists end up affirming the status quo because they make a series of conser- by their "idealist," "utopian," or "high liberal" targets. 89 So if realism does vative argumentative moves that they mistakenly think are entailed by amount to a rationalization or apology of the kind that its critics allege, it realism's fundamental commitments. If they can be persuaded that doing is not because realists set out to defend or justify existing power relation­ so is indeed a mistake, there is no reason why they cannot move in more ships. If realists end up as rationalizers and apologists, they get there through radical directions. a more circuitous route. Classical realists, however, suggest a subtler route toward an affirmation Political realism's critics and interlocutors have proposed several such of the existing order-and one that may be more difficult to avoid. As we routes. Insofar as political realists are committed to fact sensitivity and have seen, a frequent realist charge against political moralism is that, despite attentive to feasibility constraints, extreme forms of realism may be left with its seemingly radical aims , it amounts to a rationalization of or apology for no other option but to affirm the status quo. David Estlund reminds us of the existing order. Realists often see their role as that of revealing or Jean-Jacques Rousseau's complaint in the preface to Emile: "'Propose what unmasking such rationalizations and apologies. Carr is especially attuned can be done,' they never stop repeating to me. It is as ifI were told, 'Pro­ to the way in which this very attention to the possibility of status quo jus­ pose doing what is done.' " 90 Theories that are maximally sensitive to facts tification can prevent the realist from identifying and defending genuine and attentive to feasibility constraints must endorse or demand precisely moral principles at all. The realist, "in denying any a priori quality to polit­ the kinds of institutions and patterns of citizen behavior that we have ical theories, and in proving them to be rooted in practice, falls easily into already. Of course, as Estlund acknowledges, "virtually no one will insist a determinism which argues that theory, being nothing more than a ratio­ on this extreme kind of realism in normative theory.'' 91 Even if there were nalization of conditioned and predetermined purpose, is a pure excrescence some who did insist on this extreme realism, it might not be accurate to and impotent to alter the course of events." At its extreme, political real­ equate their fact sensitivity and attentiveness to feasibility constraints with ism leaves us with no "right of moral judgment" or grounds for principled "realism." As we have already seen, realists are concerned not with fact and purposive political action.9-+ sensitivity and feasibility per se but rather with the conception of politics In other words, in attempting to avoid the dangers of rationalization and that is held by their critical targets. It is at least logically possible to be a status quo justification, the realist embraces a form of unmasking criticism realist who is not concerned with fact sensitivity and feasibility. Radicalism that threatens to reproduce the problem by another means . If all normative

[260] ALISON Mc QUEEN THE CASE FOR KINSHIP [ 261) political arguments are potentially corrupted by interest, then no particu­ Notes lar argument can be easily defended. In these circumstances, the realist is left without firm grounds for pursuing political action of any sort. All r. William Galston, "Realism in Political Theory," E11ropea11]011mal of Political proposals are suspect, and therefore the existing order is likely to continue Tlieory 9, no. 4 (20ro): 385-411; Matt Sleat, Liberal Realism: A Realist Theory of by default as no more obviously unjustified than any other alternative. 95 Liberal Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013); Enzo Rossi Carr worries that the only option left for a thoroughgoing realist is the and Matt Sleat, "Realism in Normative Political Theory," Philosophy Compass "passive contemplation" of political reality. 96 9, no. ro (2014): 689-91. Now, one might reasonably suggest that Carr has fallen victim to the 2. At this point, the sensitive reader is no doubt reeling at the sheer number of "realisms" that I have managed to invoke in a single paragraph. Some con­ genetic fallacy. Even if the realist can show that any given moral claim is a ceptual and definitional clarification is in order. I take "international realism" rationalization or apology for the existing order, this does not itself show to include both classical realism and structural realism as well what has come that the claim is false. It is, at best, merely grounds for suspicion-an invi­ to be called "neoclassical realism" (see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism tation to seek independent corroboration for the claim. However, I take and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics51, no. 1 [1998): 144-72). How­ Carr's worry to be that the realist's embrace of a certain kind of unmask­ ever, I take the central contrast for my purposes here to be between classical ing criticism, as both a psychologicaland an epistemologicalmatter, leaves her and structural realism. Both of these forms of international realism share "com­ suspicious of even the well-justified moral beliefs and therefore at perpet­ mon orienting principles regarding the significance of the role of anarchy, ual risk of political paralysis. Offering the realist a remedial philosophy lec­ fear, the balance of power, and the national interest, as well as the central role ture on the genetic fallacy may not reliably ease this suspicion. Given the of politics in explaining the behavior of actors in international relations" Qon­ place of unmasking criticism in certain strands of contemporary political athan Kirshner, "The Economic Sins of Modern IR Theory and the Classical realism, this strikes me as a worry worth taking seriously. Realist Alternative," T-VorldPolitics 67, no. 1 [2015]: 156). There are at least three differences worth flagging here . First, structural realists (e.g., Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer) locate the causes of international order and disorder In sum, there is a close conceptual and analytical kinship between polit­ in the structure of the international system (e.g., anarchy, the distribution of ical realism and classical realism. Political and classical realists share core power, changes in the distribution of power). Classical realists attend not only conceptual foundations, although they may do so through different routes: to structural explanations but also to explanations that rest on human nature a commitment to the autonomy or distinctiveness of politics, an agonis­ and domestic politics. Second, classical realists tend to be comparatively less tic account of politics, a critique of political moralism, and a rejection of any sanguine than their structural realist counterparts about the possibilities of reli­ absolute priority of justice over other political values. Insofar as shared core ably predicting state behavior. This is because, in contrast to their structural commitments are sufficient for conceptual and analytical kinship, there are counterparts, classical realists tend both to emphasize uncertainty and con­ no good grounds on which to ignore the familial ties between political and tingency in international politics and to reject strongly rationalist assumptions classicalrealism. What is more, a failure to acknowledge this kinship is con­ (see Kirshner, "Economic Sins"). Third, classical realists do not tend to affirm ceptually and analytically costly. Classical realists have thought carefully on a clear is/ought distinction and therefore, in contrast to their structural coun­ questions about realism's targets, its account of human motivation, and its terparts, are more comfortable making overtly normative claims and extend­ potential for status quo bias. These questions are at the heart of contempo­ ing their analysis beyond a strict focus on the explanation of outcomes (see rary conversations both among political realists and between them and their William E. Scheuerman, "The Realist Revival in Political Theory, or: Why New Is Not Always Improved," fotematio11alPolitics 50, no. 5 [2013): 789-814, critics. Classical realists such as Carr and Morgenthau should be given places and Scheuerman's chapter in this volume). at the family table. 3. For a piece that deals with the problems raised by the first fact, see Alison McQueen, "Political Realism and the Realist 'Tradition,'" Critical Relliell' of fotcmatio11alSocial a11dPolitical Philosophy 20, no. 3 (2017): 291-305.

[ 262] ALISON Mc QUEEN THE CASE FOR KINSHIP [ 263] 4. Raymond Geuss, History a11dIl/11sio11 in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­ lines. Despite their differences, the approaches that emerge from these devel­ versity Press, 2001) and Politics a11dthe Imagi11atfo11(Princeton: Princeton opmental trajectories bear a certain "family resemblance" to one another. See University Press, 2010). Duncan Bell, introduction to Political Thought and fotematio11alRelations: Vari­ 5. For example, Geuss, History a11dIl/11sio11, 55, and Politicsa11d the Imagi11atio11,39; ations 011a Realist Tlzeme, ed. Duncan Bell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Bonnie Honig and Marc Stears, "The New Realism: From Modus Vivendi 2008), 3. I owe part of this conception of a "distinctive family" to Joshua to Justice," in PoliticalPhilosoplzy Vers11sHistory? Co11text11alisma11d Real Politics Cohen. i11Co11te111porary Political Thouglzt, ed. Jonathan Floyd and Marc Stears (Cam­ II. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of fotert1atio11alPolitics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2orr), 182. 1979); Charles Beitz, Political Theory and fotematio11al Relations, 2nd ed. 6. Andrew Sabl, "Strategy: Liberal Realism in Politics," working paper (2014), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 7, http://www.academia.edu/6188408/Strategy_Liberal_Realism_in_Politics. 12. Waltz, Tlzeory of fotemational Politics, 8. Sabl himself resists such a reading. 13. John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," foter- 7. Scheuerman, "Realist Revival"; Sleat, Liberal Realislll, 12-14; Rossi and Sleat, 1zatio11alSecurity 19, no. 3 (1994): 5-49. "Realism in Normative Political Theory," 696-97- 14. Geuss, Philosophy a,1dReal Politics, 8-9. 8. I am grateful to Charles Beitz, who helpfully pushed me on these questions. 15. Bernard Williams, "From Freedom to Liberty: The Construction of a Politi­ 9. Scheuerman argues that the failure of political realism to engage seriously with cal Value," in fo tlze Begi1111i11gWas tlze Deed, 77. classical realism is a mistake for two reasons. First, it means that political 16. For example, Geuss, Philosophy a11dReal Politics, 23. realists do not learn from the classical realists' failures. They therefore 17. Matt Sleat, "Realism, Liberalism, and Non-ideal Theory, or, Are there Two "unwittingly reproduce [the] conceptual ambiguities" of the classical real­ Ways to Do Realistic Political Theory?" Political Studies 64, no. 1 (2016): 32. ists, particularly on the question of the relationship between morality and 18. Lorna Finlayson, "With Radicals Like These, Who Needs Conservatives? politics and the autonomy of the political. Second, the political realist failure Doom, Gloom, and Realism in Political Theory," E11ropea11]011mal of Political to engage with classical realism means that political realists do not learn from Theory 16, no. 3 (2017): 267. the classical realists' successes (i.e., their ability to move beyond polemical 19. Rossi and Sleat, "Realism in Normative Political Theory," 689. critique and toward "a powerful descriptive account of real-life international 20. E. H. Carr, The Iiventy Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, politics") ("Realist Revival," 799; see also Scheuerman's chapter in this vol­ 1964), 14. ume). I am largely in agreement with Scheuerman's diagnoses, but I think he 21. Ibid., 63-88. See also Raymond Geuss, "Realism and the Relativity of Judg­ has far from exhausted the case for a more productive engagement between ment," foternatio11alRelatio11s 29, no. I (2015): 3-22. political realism and classical realism. 22. Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Ma11,,s. Po11,erPolitics (Chicago: University of IO. Raymond Geuss, Plzilosoplzyand Rea! Politics(Princeton: Princeton University Chicago Press, 1946), 168-203; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: Press, 2008); Kamna Mantena, "Another Realism: The Politics of Gandhian The Stmggle for Power a11dPeace, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1954), 3. Nonviolence," America11Political Scie11ce Review 106, no. 2 (2012): 455-57; Rossi 23. Morgenthau, PoliticsAmong Nations, 5. and Sleat, "Realism in Normative Political Theory"; Sleat, LiberalismRealism; 24. Ibid. Bernard Williams, "Realism and Moralism in Political Theory," in In tlze 25. Ibid., 9. Begi1111i11gvVas tl1eDeed: Realism and i\;foralismi11 Political Argu111e11t, ed. Geof­ 26. Ibid.; Morgenthau, Scie11tijicMa11 tJs, Power Politics;Richard Ned Lebow, The frey Hawthorn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 1-17. I should TragicVision of Politics:EtMcs, I11tercsts,a11d Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­ note than in conceiving of political realism as a disti11ctivefamily of approaches, versity Press, 2003), 216-56. I mean to emphasize both terms in this phrase equally. Political realism is dis­ 27. Williams, "From Freedom to Liberty," 77. See also Galston, "Realism in Polit­ tinctive in the sense that there are other approaches and positions that reject ical Theory." these commitments (e.g., those found in Plato's Republic or John Rawls's 28. Carl Schmitt, T!te Co11ccptof the Political,trans. George Schwab (Chicago: Uni­ Theory of]11stice).It is afami/y of approaches in the sense that its various com­ versity of Chicago Press, 1996); Geuss, Philosophy a11dReal Politics; Mark mitments can, as we shall see, be developed and expressed along different Philp, Political Co11d11ct(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

[264] ALISON McQUEEN THE CASE FOR KINSHIP [ 265] 29. Chantal Mouffe, 011 tlte Political (London: Routledge, 2005); Bonnie Honig, theorizing without first working out an ideal of justice ("Ideal and Nonideal PoliticalTheory a11dtltc Displacementof Politics(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Theory, " P/1ilosop/rya11d P11blic ~!fairs 38, no . 1 [2010]: 34; see also Burke A. 1993). Hendrix, "Where Should We Expect Social Change in Non-ideal Theory?" 30. John Gray, Tu10 Faces of Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); David Political Theory 41, no. 1 [2013]: 133-35). In the case of the relative priority of McCabe, Mod11sVive11di Liberalism: Theory a11dPractice (Cambridge: Cambridge order and stability, on the one hand, and justice, on the other, this kind of University Press, 2010). claim about logicalpriority would be consistent with thinking that, as a political 31. Jurgen Habermas, Bet11JecnFacts and Ne>rms:Ccmtrib11tio11s to a Discourse Theory and practicalmatter, the conditions of a just society have to be compatible with of Lai1•a11d Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 306. those of a stable one. I refer to this assertion as a claim about politicalpriority p. Sleat, LiberalRealism, 44. and address it separately later in the chapter. 33. Matt Sleat, "Legitimacy in Realist Thought: Between Moralism and Realpo- 51. It seems more plausible to think that it is possible to establish the conditions litik," PoliticalTheory 42, no. 3 (2014): 323. for a just regime without any concern for the requirements of order and stability. 34. Carr, 1i11c11tyYears' Crisis, 41-62. We might then identify a range of possible institutions, practices, and procedures 35. Morgenthau, Scie11t!fic1vfa11 vs. Poll'erPolitics, 45. that meet the requirements of justice. Finally, we might use the requirements 36. Galston, "Realism in Political Theory"; Laura Valentini, "Ideal vs. Non-ideal of order and stability as a constraint when choosing institutions, practices, and Theory: A Conceptual Map," Philosophy Compass 7, no. 9 (2012): 654-64. procedures from that range that seem best suited for the circumstances we find 37. Rossi and Sleat, "Realism in Normative Political Theory"; Sleat, "Realism, ourselves in "now and around here" (Williams, "Realism and Moralism in Liberalism, and Non-ideal Theory"; Enzo Rossi, "Facts, Principles, and (Real) Political Theory," 2).

Politics," Ethical Theory a11dMoral Practice19, no. 2 (2016): 505-20. 52. Galston, "Realism in Political Theory," 388. 38. Sleat, "Realism, Liberalism and Non-ideal Theory," 8. 53. One has to think only about the persistence oflndia's caste system or any num­ 39. Ibid .; Williams , "Realism and Moralism in Political Theory." ber of brutal imperial orders to dispel any optimism on this score . The only 40. Carr, 1i1•e11ty)'cars' Crisis, 93. way in which the situation might look different is if one, like Rawls (Political 41. Morgenthau, PoliticsA111011g Natio11s, 3. Liberalism), were to adopt a moralized conception of stability. This move is 42. See, for instance, Steve Smith, "The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Geneal­ understandably something that political realists want to resist. ogy oflnternational Relations Theory," in fotematio11alRclatio11s Theory Today, 54. Galston, "Realism in Political Theory," 388. ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 1-37; Chris 55. E. H. Carr, The Nc111Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 69, 105-6, and vV/iat Brown, U11dcrstandi11gllltematio11al Relations (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, Is History? (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 1986), 134; Morgenthau, Scie11t!fic 1997). kla11 vs. Poll'erPolitics, 155. 43. Carr, 1il'c11tyYears' Crisis, 22-24 . 56. Carr, 1i11rntyYears' Crisis; Morgenthau, PoliticsAmo11g Natio11s, 81. 44. Ibid., 67-71. 57. Carr, 1i11c11tyYears' Crisis, 51-53; Hans J. Morgenthau , "The Twilight oflnter­ 45. Morgenthau , PoliticsAmo11g Natio11s, 3; Morgenthau, Scientific Ma11vs. Poll'er national Morality," Ethics 58, no. 2 (1948): 87-99 . Politics, 41-74. 58. Morgenthau, Scirnt/fic l'vla11vs. Power Politics, 189. 46. Philp, Pt,liticalCo11d11ct, 62. 59. Morgenthau, PoliticsAlllo11g Natio11s, 7; Beitz, Political Theory 1111dfotematio11al 47. John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), Rclatio11s,190. 147. 60. Morgenthau, PoliticsA111011g Natio11s, 9; Carr, Til'enty Years' Crisis, 224-39. 48. Williams, "Realism and Moralism in Political Theory," 2 n. 2. See also Geuss, 61. Geuss, Politicsa11d tire I111agi1111tio11,x; Geuss, History a11dIll11sio11, 55. Philosophyand Real Politics, 21-22. 62. For example, see Beitz, Political Theory a11dIntematio,ial Rclatio11s,13-66, and 49. Williams, "Realism and Moralism in Political Theory," 3. Marshall Cohen, "Moral Skepticism and International Relations," P/rilos<'phy 50. I have in mind here something like the kind of logical priority claim that is mid Public 4/Jairs 13, no . 4 (r984): 299-346. sometimes made about the relationship between ideal and nonideal theory. 63. For example, see Colin Farrelly , "Justice in Ideal Theory : A Refutation," Polit­ A. John Simmons argues, for instance, that ideal theory necessarily enjoys log­ ical Studies 55 (2007): 844-64; Zofia Stemplowska, "What's Ideal About Ideal ical priority over nonideal theory such that we cannot engage in nonideal Theory?" Social Theory a11dPractice 34, no. 3 (2008): 319-40; and Laura Valentini,

[ 266] ALISON McQUEEN THE CASE FOR KINSHIP [ 267] "On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory," Journal of Political Plzilosophy17, 87-John T. Jost and Joanneke van der Toorn, "System Justification Theory," in no. 3 (2009): 332-55. Handbook of Tlzeories of Social Psychology, vol. 2, ed. Paul A. M. Van Lange , Arie 64. Sleat, "Liberalism, Realism, and Non-ideal Theory," 3-4. W. Kruglanski , and E . Tory Higgins (Los Angeles : Sage, 2012), 313-43. 65. Finlayson, "With Radicals Like These"; Galston, "Realism in Political 88. John T. Jost, "An Experimental Replication of the Depressed-Entitlement Theory." Effect Among Women," Psychologyof Wo111e11Q11art erly 21, no . 3 (1997): 387- 66. Sabl, "Strategy"; Sleat, Liberal Realism. 93; John T. Jost and Mahzarin R. Banaji, "The Role of Stereotyping in I I. 67. Sabl, "Strategy," System-Justification and the Production of False Consciousness," British]011r­ 68. As I suggested earlier, classical realists often use the terms 11topianism,idealism, t1alof Social Psyc/1ofogy33, no . I (1994): 1-27. and 111oralis111somewhat interchangeably. For the reasons I suggested, I tend to 89. For example , see Geuss, Philosoplzyand Real Politics. find this interchangeable use misleading. 90. Jean-Jacques Rousse au, Emile, or 011 Ed11catio11, trans . Allan Bloom (New York : 69. Carr, 1i11e11tyYears' Crisis, 22-62 ; Morgenthau , PoliticsAmong Natio11s,3; Hans Basic Books , 1979), 34, quoted in David Estlund , DemocraticA11tlrority: A Phil­ J. Morgenthau, In Defe11seof the National Interest (New York: Knopf , 1951), osophicalFram ework (Princeton : Princeton University Press , 2008) , 263. 92-101. 91. Estlund, Democratic A11thority,263. 70. Carr, 1ive11tyYears' Crisis, 90-91; Morgenthau, Scicnt!ficMa11 vs. Power Politics, 92. Rossi, "Facts , Principles, and (Real) Politics ." 41-74. 93. Finlayson, "With Radicals Like These," 270. 71. See, for example, Morgenthau, Sde11t!ficMan vs. Power Politics,52-67, and Carr, 94. Carr, 1i1'e11tyYears' Crisis, 13, 89. 1i11e11tyYears' Crisis, 89-93. 95. These arguments are explored in greater depth and detail in McQueen, "Polit­ 72. Geuss, Philosoplzyand Real Pt1litics,59. ical Realism and Mo ral Corruption." 73. Ibid ., 9, my emphasis. 96. Carr, 1i11e11tyYears' Crisis, 92. 74. Galston , "Realism in Political Theory" ; Scheuerman, "Realist R evival." 75. On the relationship between realism and human motivation, see William Galston's chapter in this volume . 76. Geuss, Plzilosoplzyand Real Politics, 2 . 77- Ibid ., 3-4, IO-II. 78. Morgenthau, Scie11t!ficMan vs. Po111erPolitics, 193. 79. Robert Schuett, PoliticalRealism, Fre11d,and H11mat1Nat11re in InternationalRela­ tions: The Res11rrectio11of Realist i\1Ia11(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 25-34. 80. Carr , 1i11wty Years' Crisis, 159; Morgenthau, PoliticsAmong Nations, 95. 81. Geuss, Philosophyand Real Politics, 91-1 II, 85-92. 82. Carr , What Is History? 134. 83. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 155. 84. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis; Morgenthau, PoliticsAmong Nations, 80-89. 85. Alison McQueen, "Political Realism and Moral Corruption," August 2016, DOI: IO.II77II4748851I6664825. 86. Jonathan Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intu­ itionist Approach to Moral Judgment," Psychology Review 108, no . 4 (2001): 814-34 ; Jonathan Haidt and Matthew A. Hersch, "Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of Conservatives and Liberals ," ]011mal of Applied Social Psychology 31, no. 1 (2001) : 191-221.

[268] ALISON .McQUEEN THE CASE FOR KINSHIP [ 269]