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UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE a Comparative UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE A Comparative Analysis of Electoral Management Bodies in Central America A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Antonio Ugues Jr. June 2013 Dissertation Committee: Dr. David S. Pion-Berlin, Chairperson Dr. Shaun Bowler Dr. William T. Barndt Copyright by Antonio Ugues Jr. 2013 The Dissertation of Antonio Ugues Jr. is approved: ______________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ Committee Chairperson University of California, Riverside Acknowledgements This dissertation was completed with the support of a Dissertation Research Grant as well as a Dissertation Year Fellowship from the University of California at Riverside. I am grateful to the many people whose knowledge, guidance, and expertise contributed to its completion. I thank the members of my committee for their advice and suggestions on this dissertation. Very special thanks go to my advisors and mentors, David Pion-Berlin, Shaun Bowler, William Barndt, Martin Johnson, Kevin Esterling, and Benjamin Bishin whose guidance and encouragement made my graduate career at UCR, and this dissertation, possible. I would like to thank my family for their unending love, support, and encouragement. I thank my wife, Elsa, and our children, Cecilia, Elizabeth, and Abraham, for their love and inspiration. I also thank my parents, Antonio and Marina, for instilling in me the passion for learning and a desire to excel in everything and my brothers, Andrew, Adam, and Alexander. I also want to acknowledge my grandparents and extended family for their support and for always keeping me grounded. I extend special thanks to my brothers and sisters at St. Anthony’s parish in Riverside for their love and support outside of the university setting. Finally, I extend my thanks to my dear friends in the political science department at UCR – D. Xavier Medina Vidal, Masahiro Omae, Thomas J. Hayes, Yun “Ramon” Wang, Diego Esparza, Andrea Silva, and Steven Cauchon. iv Dedication I dedicate this dissertation to my family, Elsa, Cecilia, Elizabeth, and Abraham, and My parents, Antonio and Marina. v ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION A Comparative Analysis of Electoral Management Bodies in Central America by Antonio Ugues Jr. Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science University of California, Riverside, June 2013 Dr. David S. Pion-Berlin, Chairperson This dissertation enhances our understanding of elections and electoral processes in developing democracies by examining the institutions responsible for the management of elections – electoral management bodies (EMBs). This study provides a comparative analysis of electoral management bodies in the Central American states that democratized during the third wave of democratization, including El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In so doing, this dissertation 1) explains the introduction of formally independent EMBs in each of these cases, 2) explains the development of autonomy and impartiality exhibited by each EMB, and 3) explains citizens’ trust in their respective EMB. This study contributes the scholarly literature on elections and election management in developing democracies. This study also makes a significant contribution to the policy community by indentifying concrete areas in which to strengthen democracy. vi Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction………….....................................................................................................1 Chapter 2: The Introduction of Formally Independent Electoral Management Bodies in Central America……………………………………………………….…..20 Chapter 3: Explaining the Autonomy and Impartiality of Electoral Management Bodies in Central America…………………………………………………………...73 Chapter 4: Explaining Citizens’ Trust in Electoral Management Bodies in Central America………………………………………………………………….120 Chapter 5: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………....149 References……………………………………………………………………………......161 Appendix 3.1……...……………………………………………………………………...183 Appendix 3.2……...……………………………………………………………………...185 Appendix 4.1…...………………………………………………………………………...187 Appendix 4.2…...………………………………………………………………………...188 Appendix 4.3…...………………………………………………………………………...189 vii List of Tables Table 2.1 Comparison of Competing Explanations........……………………………..66 Table 3.1 Violations of EMB autonomy in Central America………………………...83 Table 3.2 Violations of EMB impartiality in Central America………………………85 Table 4.1 Average EMB Trust Across Central America……………………………126 Table 4.2 Explaining Trust in Electoral Management Bodies in Central America…138 Table 4.3 Marginal Effects for Model 3……………………………………………140 viii List of Figures Figure 2.1 Depiction of the Political Transitions Hypothesis…………...…………….32 Figure 2.2 Depiction of the Electoral Fraud Hypothesis……………………………...35 Figure 2.3 Depiction of the Strategic Motivations Hypothesis………………………..37 ix Chapter 1: Introduction Free and fair elections are desired by all democratic states. Achieving this though has remained elusive for many developing democracies. Why? Academicians have noted that the conduct of democratic elections is an extraordinarily complex process that requires coordination and planning at multiple levels and phases (Wall et al. 2006; Massicotte et al. 2004; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002). In particular, scholars have commented that developing democracies often lack the bureaucratic capacity or “administrative competence” to conduct democratic elections (Pastor 1999). In response, many democratic states have sought to overcome these obstacles through the establishment of institutions capable of handling the complexity of elections – these institutions are known as electoral management bodies or EMBs (Wall et al. 2006; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; López-Pintor 2000). The design and introduction of these institutions often reflects the cultural and political traditions of each state as well as its particular experience with democracy (López-Pintor 2000, 20). As a result, electoral management bodies often take on different forms and classifications.1 Notwithstanding 1 For example, the United Nations Development Programme identifies five main types of electoral management bodies. These types include the government-run model, a model run by the government in a decentralized system, a model run by the government but under some supervisorial or judicial authority, an independent body, and a model that is independent with multiple bodies. For the most part, three variations of these five are used in practice around the world (Lopez-Pintor 2000, 25). Pastor (1999) identifies four main types of electoral administrations, including a body completely run by the government, one run by the government with oversight from a judicial body, an independent electoral commission, and a multiparty electoral commission (79). Mozaffar and Schedler (2002) identify the “power-sharing” model, where the main political players agree to establish rules of restraint on the electoral game (results in a multiparty commission), a “delegation” model, where electoral authority is delegated to individuals who are independent and neutral (results in a nonpartisan commission), and the “abdication” model, where the main political players abdicate electoral authority to citizen authorities or independent officials, who in turn appoint neutral, nonpartisan electoral officials (results in nonpartisan commission). Massicotte, Blais, and Yoshinaka (2004) also identify three main types including an electoral 1 these differences, the purpose of electoral management bodies is clear – to facilitate and secure the credibility and legitimacy of democratic elections (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002, 6). More specifically, EMBs are responsible for the management of those elements deemed “essential” for democratic elections (Wall et al. 2006, 5).2 While the responsibilities and powers of electoral management bodies vary by country, it is clear that these institutions play a vital role in a country’s democratic development. Contemporary research suggests that for developing democracies, the ideal EMB is one that is professional, autonomous, and impartial in its operations (Wall et al. 2006; Hartlyn et al. 2008; Lehoucq and Molina 2002). Indeed, a recent survey of EMBs across the world indicates that most developing democracies have established legally independent electoral management bodies (Wall et al. 2006, 304-325; López-Pintor 2000).3 This seems logical. In the face of multiparty competition, the main political actors or interests would prefer legally independent EMBs to those dependent on the government since the former would manage elections in a transparent and impartial manner (at least in theory) while the latter increases the likelihood of management that may favor the individuals within the government (Lehoucq 2002; Massicotte et al. 2004, 5). Thus, we would expect developing commission, the appointment of a single official, or the appointment of a government minister, all of which have autonomy over electoral matters in their respective country (83). More recently in a study on electoral management design, the International IDEA identifies the independent model, which is independent and autonomous from the government, the mixed model, which combines elements of the government and independent-model , and the government model, which is operated by the government usually by a ministry
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