DOCSLIB.ORG

Honduras: 2013 Election

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Honduras: 2013 Election Key Findings on Election violence Prevention: Honduras: 2013 Election Targeted peacebuilding efforts are frequently used to prevent election violence (PEV). Practitioners can draw on a variety of programming options or interventions, including peace messaging campaigns, preventive diplomacy, dedicated youth programs, or monitoring missions. The choice among preventive measures is often made intuitively or impulsively, rath- er than based on empirical evidence or risk assessments. In order to further professionalize the field, and help establish evidence-based practice, USIP recently concluded an ambitious study to assess whether prevention efforts demonstrate a measurable impact on election violence levels. The risk of election violence surrounding the 2013 elections in Honduras was high. However, the country did not descend into mass violence. The pattern of uninvestigated homicides in Hondu- ras complicates efforts to measure election-related violence, and gauge the effectiveness of prevention tools in Honduras. Despite these hurdles, it appears security sector engagement and preventive diplomacy contributed to the prevention of mass violence and the management of risk during the 2013 elections. On November 24, 2013, nearly two thirds of Hondurans cast Election violence, and other forms of political violence, is not com- their vote for the president, legislative representatives, and monly recognized as a challenge that is distinct from the rampant mayors. The National Party candidate, Juan Orlando Hernán- criminal violence in Honduras. The 2013 election cycle saw no dez, emerged as a clear winner before the official announce- overall increase in murders, and few violent incidents could be ment on December 11th, which provoked the two largest rival directly linked to the elections, except for poll workers being locked parties, LIBRE and the Anti-Corruption Party (PAC), to take in their rooms and the blockade of a mayor’s office. However, dozens to the streets. The largest protest occurred on December 2, of candidates and political workers were assassinated under poorly when over 1,000 LIBRE supporters demanded a recount. investigated circumstances, killings that were plausibly political in International and domestic observers expected protests to nature. Despite these difficulties in determining the link between escalate into widespread violence; this fear ultimately did violence and the electoral process, several initiatives helped prevent not materialize. the anticipated mass violence during the 2013 Honduras elections. Government-sponsored peace messages were delivered through Contextual vulnerabilities religious networks, but failed to influence much of the electorate Contextual vulnerabilities are potential social, political, or eco- due to unsophisticated targeting and limited geographic reach. The nomic drivers of election violence that shape the environment in government also initiated civic education campaigns to encourage which prevention efforts operate. The primary vulnerabilities for voter turnout, though many citizens reported that the parties’ overt Honduras in 2013 are its unconsolidated democratic system, un- political messaging overshadowed these efforts. Youth program- certainty regarding the election outcome, and widespread insecuri- ming is a common practice in Honduras. While this work did not ty. The two party system that endured for nearly half a century fell necessarily engage on election violence, youth are primary per- after the coup in 2009, creating space for new political parties to petrators of violence in Honduras; anti-crime activities targeting compete. The country was destabilized, and Honduras’ democracy youth may plausibly reduce the levels of election violence as well. remained weak four years later. The 2013 elections in Honduras yield little conclusive data on the Prevention tools effectiveness of prevention tools. The country’s specific efforts • The visible engagement of security forces deterred violence on to mitigate or prevent election violence generally failed to affect election day, even though the police is unable to consistently normally high levels of violence. Preventive diplomacy was wide- enforce the law and curb violence in Honduras. spread due to the strong international desire for peaceful elections following the 2009 coup. Youth programming did not target • Youth programming focused on criminal violence may indi- election violence, but demonstrated impact in reducing youth rectly mitigate election-related violence. participation in criminal activity. Security forces, deployed in in- creased numbers on election day, may have mitigated widespread During the 2013 elections the Government of Honduras engaged violence around election day but failed to curb targeted assassina- in several prevention activities. Security forces demonstrated their tions throughout the election cycle. Other prevention measures ability to prevent overt violence in the immediate lead-up to the were absent, or failed to make any significant impact. Honduras’ elections and on election day, but failed to address or investigate 2013 elections continued the nation’s history of relatively peaceful the targeted political assassinations that characterized the entire elections tainted by constant criminal violence. 2013 electoral cycle. The Honduran security sector, particularly the police, generally suffers from low capacity, corruption, and poor ABOUT THE CENTER governance. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) succeeded admirably in the technical administration of the election through Through evaluative research and field experiments, USIP’s effective party registration, and the creation of a political party and Center for Applied Research on Conflict (ARC) will contin- journalists’ ethics pacts. However, the TSE structure did not adjust ue to facilitate the transition from intuitive programming to the new multi-party system, eliciting legitimate accusations of towards sustained election support grounded on empirical bias from the unrepresented parties. The TSE also failed to manage research and rigorously evaluated for impact. campaign financing in order to curb political contributions from illicit actors, and maintained a poor system of certifying poll work- Project Team: ers through political party nomination, a system widely regarded • Jonas Claes, as an invitation to fraud. At least one incident of polling station vi- Project Lead: [email protected] olence, in Copan, could have been averted if the TSE had properly • Elizabeth Murray, Honduras Case Lead: [email protected] ensured the impartiality of poll workers..
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Honduras: Background and U.S
    Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations Peter J. Meyer Specialist in Latin American Affairs Updated July 22, 2019 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov RL34027 Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations Summary Honduras, a Central American nation of 9.1 million people, has had close ties with the United States for many years. The country served as a base for U.S. operations designed to counter Soviet influence in Central America during the 1980s, and it continues to host a U.S. military presence and cooperate on antidrug efforts today. Trade and investment linkages are also long- standing and have grown stronger since the implementation of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2006. In recent years, instability in Honduras—including a 2009 coup and significant outflows of migrants and asylum-seekers since 2014—has led U.S. policymakers to focus greater attention on conditions in the country and their implications for the United States. Domestic Situation President Juan Orlando Hernández of the conservative National Party was inaugurated to a second four-year term in January 2018. He lacks legitimacy among many Hondurans, however, due to allegations that his 2017 reelection was unconstitutional and marred by fraud. Hernández’s public standing has been further undermined by a series of corruption scandals that have implicated members of his family, administration, and party, and generated speculation about whether the president has participated in criminal activities. Honduras has made uneven progress in addressing the country’s considerable challenges since Hernández first took office in 2014. Public prosecutors have begun to combat corruption with the support of the Organization of American States-backed Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras, but the mission’s mandate is scheduled to expire in January 2020 and Honduran political leaders have expressed little interest in extending it.
    [Show full text]
  • NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES ELECTORAL RECIPROCITY in PROGRAMMATIC REDISTRIBUTION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE Sebastian Galiani Nadya Ha
    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES ELECTORAL RECIPROCITY IN PROGRAMMATIC REDISTRIBUTION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE Sebastian Galiani Nadya Hajj Pablo Ibarraran Nandita Krishnaswamy Patrick J. McEwan Working Paper 22588 http://www.nber.org/papers/w22588 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 September 2016 Samantha Finn and Caroline Gallagher provided excellent research assistance in the collection of voting data. Fiorella Benedetti, Dan Fetter, Phil Levine, Kyung Park, and Akila Weerapana provided helpful advice and comments, without assuming responsibility for errors or interpretations. The views expressed herein do not represent the views of the IDB, its Board of Directors, the countries they represent, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2016 by Sebastian Galiani, Nadya Hajj, Pablo Ibarraran, Nandita Krishnaswamy, and Patrick J. McEwan. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Electoral reciprocity in programmatic redistribution: Experimental Evidence Sebastian Galiani, Nadya Hajj, Pablo Ibarraran, Nandita Krishnaswamy, and Patrick J. McEwan NBER Working Paper No. 22588 September 2016 JEL No. H3,I38 ABSTRACT We analyzed two conditional cash transfers experiments that preceded Honduran presidential elections in 2001 and 2013. In the first, smaller transfers had no effects on voter turnout or incumbent vote share. In the second, larger transfers increased turnout and incumbent share in similar magnitudes, consistent with the mobilization of the incumbent party base rather than vote switching.
    [Show full text]
  • EU EOM Honduras Final Report General Elections 2017
    HONDURAS FINAL REPORT General Elections 2017 EUROPEAN UNION ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION www.moeue-honduras.eu This report has been produced by the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to Honduras 2017 and contains the conclusions of its observation of the general elections. The contents of this report do not necessarily reflect the official position of the European Union. European Union Election Observation Mission, Honduras 2017 Final Report on the General Elections TABLE OF CONTENTS I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................................3 II. THE EU EOM AND THE 2017 GENERAL ELECTIONS ..........................................................................................................8 III. POLITICAL CONTEXT........................................................................................................................................................9 IV. ELECTION SYSTEM ..........................................................................................................................................................9 V. ELECTION CAMPAIGN ...................................................................................................................................................10 VI. LEGAL FRAMEWORK .....................................................................................................................................................13 VII. CIVIL REGISTRY AND VOTER REGISTER
    [Show full text]
  • Elections in Honduras: 2017 General Elections Frequently Asked Questions
    Elections in Honduras 2017 General Elections Frequently Asked Questions Americas International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2011 Crystal Drive | Tenth Floor | Arlington, VA 22202 | www.IFES.org November 20, 2017 Frequently Asked Questions When is Election Day and for whom are citizens voting? ............................................................................. 1 Who are the presidential candidates? .......................................................................................................... 1 Who can vote? .............................................................................................................................................. 2 How many registered voters are there? ....................................................................................................... 2 What is the structure of the government? ................................................................................................... 3 What is the election management body? What are its powers? ................................................................. 3 How many polling places will be set up on Election Day? ............................................................................ 3 What provisions are in place to promote gender equity in Honduras? ....................................................... 3 Is out-of-country voting allowed? ................................................................................................................. 4 How will voters with disabilities cast their ballots?
    [Show full text]
  • Honduras1 Honduras Is a Central American Country Known for Its
    Background- Honduras1 Honduras is a Central American country known for its successful banana industry, which has been the subject of repeated conflicts between workers and often U.S.-based landowners. In the 1970s and 1980s, Honduras avoided the descent into civil war experienced by many of its neighbors, but its right wing government provided a base for training combatants in the nearby civil wars and disappeared left wing activists within Honduras. Since the 1990s, there have also been regular murders of environmentalist and indigenous activists protesting the commercial exploitation of indigenous land. Additionally, Honduras has persistently struggled with one of the most severe crime problems in Latin America, including murders of police, prosecutors, and ordinary people by criminals and the abuse and murder of suspected criminals by police. Honduras’ efforts to combat these problems have been hampered by political disruptions, including accusations of corruption against high level politicians and the successful 2009 ouster of a leftist president suspected of planning a Hugo Chávez-style power grab. Before its emergence as a modern nation, Honduras was occupied by the Spanish, British, and a variety of indigenous peoples. At the time the Spanish arrived in the 1500s, Honduras was on the southeastern edge of the Mayan empire and home to other smaller tribes. The discovery of first gold and then silver caused Spanish prospectors to flock to the region but hindered the development of agriculture. Honduras’ Caribbean cost was the subject of continual attacks by pirates and the British, who allied with the Miskito to temporarily wrest control of the coast away from the Spanish.
    [Show full text]
  • Corruption in Honduras in Comparative Perspective and Over Time
    Hondurans march against corruption, demanding a UN-backed anti-impunity commission. Rbreve. Flickr, June 27, 2015. WHEN CORRUPTION FUNDS THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY OF HONDURAS DANIEL M. SABET 1 1 Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Some data for this paper was collected by Social Impact as part of an evaluation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) Threshold Program in Honduras with funding from MCC. The views reflected here are those of the author alone and not Social Impact’s nor MCC’s. I appreciate the support of colleagues at Social Impact, including Irma Romero, Lisette Anzoategui, and Liz Ramos, and at MCC, including John Wingle and Rabia Chaudhry. I also appreciate the cooperation of staff at the Honduran procurement regulator ONCAE and the secretariats of health, education, and public works. Many thanks to Cindy Arnson, Lester Ramírez Irías, Irma Romero, Eric Olson, Jeff Ernst, and Benjamin Gedan for valuable comments, and to Oscar Cruz for design assistance. I am grateful to the Woodrow Wilson Center for the time and financial support to write this article and the assistance of Dylan Walsh and Natasha Oviedo. CONTENTS Executive Summary . 3 Acronyms . 5 Introduction . 7 A Latin American problem: Corruption as a means to fund political campaigns . 9 Corruption in Honduras in comparative perspective and over time . 11 Corruption in Honduras: Four salient arenas . 13 Embezzlement of social development funds . 14 Procurement corruption . 15 Organized crime corruption . 18 Patronage and human resources related abuses . 20 Summary: A lot of money, top officials, a history of impunity, and a source of party funds .
    [Show full text]
  • Rapid Evolution of the MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras from Gang to Tier-One Threat to Central America and U.S
    Authors: Mr. Doug Farah is the President of national security consulting firm, IBI Consultants, and a Senior Visiting Fellow at the Center for Complex Operations at National Defense University. He is an award-winning journalist, the author of two critically acclaimed books, and a frequent speaker at Perry Center conferences and courses. Kathryn Babineau is a Research Coordinator at IBI Consultants and the Center for Strategic Research (INSS) at National Defense University. She holds a Master of Philosophy in Latin American Studies from the University of Oxford (UK) and a Master of Public Policy from the University of Virginia. She has conducted fieldwork in Peru and elsewhere on illicit commodity supply chains and other issues. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and are not an official policy nor position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense nor the U.S. Government. Co-Editors: Pat Paterson and Dr. David Spencer Layout Design: Viviana Edwards The Rapid Evolution of the MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras from Gang to Tier-One Threat to Central America and U.S. Security Interests Douglas Farah and Kathryn Babineau William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies Perry Center Occasional Paper March 2018 2 Perry Center Occasional Paper, March 2018 Table of Contents Introduction and General Framework 5 The Next Steps 8 Key Strategies and Trends 10 From Accommodation to Direct Action 12 Initial Steps: From Local Control to National Political Players 12 The Honduran Earthquake
    [Show full text]
  • Democracy Program Election Assistance Project
    DEMOCRACY PROGRAM ELECTION ASSISTANCE PROJECT PHASE I MAY 1986 SUBMITTED BY EDDIE MAHE, JR. & ASSOCIATES INC. Foreword Eddie Mahe, Jr. and Associates, Inc. was awarded a grant on September 25, 1985 from the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), No. OTR-0086-G-55-5199-00, to develop a program of election assistance. The principals of Eddie Mahe, Jr. and Associates, Inc., Ladonna Y. Lee and Eddie Mahe, Jr., together with principal subcontractor, Stephen J. McCarthy of Oxford Management Services, directed and undertook the activities necessary to complete the grant requirements and develop a plan to achieve the long range goal established by the Director of A.I.D.: To strengthen democracy around the world through improving the election process. The assistance from within A.I.D., State, NSC and other government agencies added to the principals' understanding of Third World elections and is greatly appreciated. Steve Dunkel, Melissa Williams, Christine Stumpf, Fairy Cogswell, Debbie Mahe and Jane McCarthy provided invaluable assistance in completing the project and producing this report. This document is the final report and fulfills all requirements as defined by the terms and conditions of this grant. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page SECTION I INTRODUCTION. 1 SECTION II RESEARCH. 14 Refined Objectives. .20 Foundation. .22 Assumptions. 29 Election Process...... 48 Globalists and Specialists. 105 Commodities... ................ .I10 Latin America Experience............. 114 SECTION III PLAN . .118 SECTION IV SUMMARY. 148 ADDENDUM Country Reports. A Guatemala Honduras Costa Rica Philippines Globalists and Specialists List. .B Commodities. .C Ballot Paper Ballot Boxes/Baqs Ink Locks Computer Hardware and Software Vendor List Bibliography..
    [Show full text]
  • 15 2001 Honduras R01654
    Date Printed: 11/03/2008 JTS Box Number: 1FES 5 Tab Number: 15 Document Title: International Election Observation, Honduras, November 21-27 2001: Document Date: 2001 Document Country: Honduras 1FES 1D: R01654 II * I I I I MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK I I I I I I , El AMATlllO ,.. eLAS'M" ANO$ EL S.t... LV ADO R. SAN i. I ','C,,' ,,'_ ,'" .elORENZO eEL ESPINO t·! I C ARAGUA. I ~~~lt~~~!iif1{~~·i::"'~ I I INTERNATIONAL ELECTION I OBSERV ATION I HONDURAS I November 21-27, 2001 I I HONDURAS PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS I November 25, 2001 OBSERVATION ELECTION GUIDE I I I I I INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS I I I I I MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK I IFES INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION DELEGATION I HONDURAS 2001 GENERAL ELECTIONS NOVEMBER 25, 2001 I I TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction A. Welcome letter, Richard Soudriette, President, IFES I B. IFES experience in Honduras C. Staff of the Americas Division, IFES D. Contacts I E. Map of Honduras F. Observer List I G. Scope of Observation II. Background on Honduras A. CNN Election Watch I B. CIA Fact book: Honduras C. List of current cabinet members D. Building Democracy in Honduras - USAID I E. Honduras This Week III. Appendix I A. Manual for Election Observation B. Election Qbservation Form I C. Voter Education Manual: Elecciones 2001-lnstructivo electoral I I I I I I Ie I I I I I I ..I I I I I I I ~ I , I w(Q)n®§ J I I I I I I ..I I I I I I I J.
    [Show full text]
  • Honduras: Background and U.S
    Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations Peter J. Meyer Specialist in Latin American Affairs Updated June 4, 2019 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov RL34027 Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations Summary Honduras, a Central American nation of 9.1 million people, has had close ties with the United States for many years. The country served as a base for U.S. operations designed to counter Soviet influence in Central America during the 1980s, and it continues to host a U.S. military presence and cooperate on antidrug efforts today. Trade and investment linkages are also long- standing and have grown stronger since the implementation of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2006. In recent years, instability in Honduras—including a 2009 coup and significant outflows of migrants and asylum-seekers since 2014—has led U.S. policymakers to focus greater attention on conditions in the country and their implications for the United States. Domestic Situation President Juan Orlando Hernández of the conservative National Party was inaugurated to a second four-year term in January 2018. He lacks legitimacy among many Hondurans, however, due to allegations that his 2017 reelection was unconstitutional and marred by fraud. Hernández’s public standing has been further undermined by a series of corruption scandals that have implicated members of his family, administration, and party, and generated speculation about whether the president has participated in criminal activities. Honduras has made uneven progress in addressing the country’s considerable challenges since Hernández first took office in 2014. Public prosecutors have begun to combat corruption with the support of the Organization of American States-backed Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras, but the mission’s mandate is scheduled to expire in January 2020 and Honduran political leaders have expressed little interest in extending it.
    [Show full text]
  • Legitimacy Buying
    CPSXXX10.1177/0010414015574882Comparative Political StudiesGonzález-Ocantos et al. 574882research-article2015 Article Comparative Political Studies 2015, Vol. 48(9) 1127 –1158 Legitimacy Buying: The © The Author(s) 2015 Reprints and permissions: Dynamics of Clientelism sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0010414015574882 in the Face of Legitimacy cps.sagepub.com Challenges Ezequiel González-Ocantos1, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge2, and David W. Nickerson3 Abstract Although elections have become the norm not only in democratic regimes but also in autocratic ones, the legitimacy of the electoral process in different countries is often contested. Facing strong international pressures to prove democratic credentials, eventual winners have a strong incentive to ensure high levels of voter turnout. Conversely, leaders of parties likely to lose the election have an incentive to reduce turnout—for example, through boycotts—to delegitimize the election. In such situations, turnout is a major dimension of competition. To overcome the potential delegitimizing effects of low turnout, incumbents will often turn toward clientelistic mobilization, as high turnout can be a powerful rejoinder to those who denounce elections as a sham and can put observers’ concerns about the legitimacy of the electoral process to rest. We develop a theory to explain how such campaigns will target particularistic benefits. We argue that what we term “legitimacy buying” will be primarily aimed at “staunching the bleeding” of supporters who are usually consistent voters but have doubts about the legitimacy of the election. This theoretical prediction departs from theories 1University of Oxford, UK 2Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexico City, Mexico 3University of Notre Dame, IN, USA Corresponding Author: Ezequiel González-Ocantos, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, 1 Manor Road, OX1 3UQ, UK.
    [Show full text]
  • Report of the National Lawyers Guild Delegation to the November 2013 Election in Honduras
    Report of the National Lawyers Guild Delegation to the November 2013 Election in Honduras April 1, 2014 National Lawyers Guild 132 Nassau Street, Room 922 New York, NY 10038 Tel: 212-679-5100 Fax: 212-679-2811 www.nlg.com i Introduction A 17-member delegation from the National Lawyers Guild went to Honduras in November 2013 to observe that country's presidential, congressional, and municipal elections and meet with human rights defenders, political activists and government officials. We are issuing this report to document our findings: that both on election day and beforehand, there were serious problems that significantly undermine conclusions of the US State Department and certain others that the election was "free and fair" and “transparent.” The events leading up to this election – and the NLG's involvement with Honduras – began with the June 2009 coup d'état. At that time, human rights activists and other Hondurans asked the NLG to investigate problems with the rule of law, lack of respect for international law, the abrogation of human rights, attacks on the judiciary, and the circumstances that had given rise to the coup. In response, the NLG, the American Association of Jurists (AAJ), the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), and the International Association Against Torture sent a joint delegation to Honduras whose preliminary report in English is here. The final report, in Spanish, is here. Since then Honduran lawyers, judges, human rights organizations, environmental rights organizations, and others whom we met there have asked for our support when they have come under attack. We have written letters, lobbied our senators and representatives, and educated our own members about the situation in Honduras.
    [Show full text]