Key Findings on Election violence Prevention: : 2013 Election

Targeted peacebuilding efforts are frequently used to prevent election violence (PEV). Practitioners can draw on a variety of programming options or interventions, including peace messaging campaigns, preventive diplomacy, dedicated youth programs, or monitoring missions. The choice among preventive measures is often made intuitively or impulsively, rath- er than based on empirical evidence or risk assessments. In order to further professionalize the field, and help establish evidence-based practice, USIP recently concluded an ambitious study to assess whether prevention efforts demonstrate a measurable impact on election violence levels. The risk of election violence surrounding the 2013 elections in Honduras was high. However, the country did not descend into mass violence. The pattern of uninvestigated homicides in Hondu- ras complicates efforts to measure election-related violence, and gauge the effectiveness of prevention tools in Honduras. Despite these hurdles, it appears security sector engagement and preventive diplomacy contributed to the prevention of mass violence and the management of risk during the 2013 elections.

On November 24, 2013, nearly two thirds of Hondurans cast Election violence, and other forms of political violence, is not com- their vote for the president, legislative representatives, and monly recognized as a challenge that is distinct from the rampant mayors. The National Party candidate, Juan Orlando Hernán- criminal violence in Honduras. The 2013 election cycle saw no dez, emerged as a clear winner before the official announce- overall increase in murders, and few violent incidents could be ment on December 11th, which provoked the two largest rival directly linked to the elections, except for poll workers being locked parties, LIBRE and the Anti-Corruption Party (PAC), to take in their rooms and the blockade of a mayor’s office. However, dozens to the streets. The largest protest occurred on December 2, of candidates and political workers were assassinated under poorly when over 1,000 LIBRE supporters demanded a recount. investigated circumstances, killings that were plausibly political in International and domestic observers expected protests to nature. Despite these difficulties in determining the link between escalate into widespread violence; this fear ultimately did violence and the electoral process, several initiatives helped prevent not materialize. the anticipated mass violence during the 2013 Honduras elections. Government-sponsored peace messages were delivered through Contextual vulnerabilities religious networks, but failed to influence much of the electorate Contextual vulnerabilities are potential social, political, or eco- due to unsophisticated targeting and limited geographic reach. The nomic drivers of election violence that shape the environment in government also initiated civic education campaigns to encourage which prevention efforts operate. The primary vulnerabilities for voter turnout, though many citizens reported that the parties’ overt Honduras in 2013 are its unconsolidated democratic system, un- political messaging overshadowed these efforts. Youth program- certainty regarding the election outcome, and widespread insecuri- ming is a common practice in Honduras. While this work did not ty. The two party system that endured for nearly half a century fell necessarily engage on election violence, youth are primary per- after the coup in 2009, creating space for new political parties to petrators of violence in Honduras; anti-crime activities targeting compete. The country was destabilized, and Honduras’ democracy youth may plausibly reduce the levels of election violence as well. remained weak four years later. The 2013 elections in Honduras yield little conclusive data on the Prevention tools effectiveness of prevention tools. The country’s specific efforts • The visible engagement of security forces deterred violence on to mitigate or prevent election violence generally failed to affect election day, even though the police is unable to consistently normally high levels of violence. Preventive diplomacy was wide- enforce the law and curb violence in Honduras. spread due to the strong international desire for peaceful elections following the 2009 coup. Youth programming did not target • Youth programming focused on criminal violence may indi- election violence, but demonstrated impact in reducing youth rectly mitigate election-related violence. participation in criminal activity. Security forces, deployed in in- creased numbers on election day, may have mitigated widespread During the 2013 elections the Government of Honduras engaged violence around election day but failed to curb targeted assassina- in several prevention activities. Security forces demonstrated their tions throughout the election cycle. Other prevention measures ability to prevent overt violence in the immediate lead-up to the were absent, or failed to make any significant impact. Honduras’ elections and on election day, but failed to address or investigate 2013 elections continued the nation’s history of relatively peaceful the targeted political assassinations that characterized the entire elections tainted by constant criminal violence. 2013 electoral cycle. The Honduran security sector, particularly the police, generally suffers from low capacity, corruption, and poor ABOUT THE CENTER governance. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) succeeded admirably in the technical administration of the election through Through evaluative research and field experiments, USIP’s effective party registration, and the creation of a political party and Center for Applied Research on Conflict (ARC) will contin- journalists’ ethics pacts. However, the TSE structure did not adjust ue to facilitate the transition from intuitive programming to the new multi-party system, eliciting legitimate accusations of towards sustained election support grounded on empirical bias from the unrepresented parties. The TSE also failed to manage research and rigorously evaluated for impact. campaign financing in order to curb political contributions from illicit actors, and maintained a poor system of certifying poll work- Project Team: ers through political party nomination, a system widely regarded • Jonas Claes, as an invitation to fraud. At least one incident of polling station vi- Project Lead: [email protected] olence, in Copan, could have been averted if the TSE had properly • Elizabeth Murray, Honduras Case Lead: [email protected] ensured the impartiality of poll workers.