ISSUE 127
MARCH 2008
Sun Tzu’s ‘TheArt of War’: Its Relevance to Contemporary Maritime Strategy ADM Raymond Spruance, USN & his Leadership Skills during the Pacific War Whales & Active Sonar – Challenges & Opportunities Images from Euripides
Journal of the Welcome to the future of naval maintenance
Photos courtesy KBR's capabilities include ILS planning at of Defence the conceptual stage of a project
Applying commercial best practice to sustain complex maritime platforms and systems
Jointly providing integrated materiel services to the RAN’s amphibious and afloat support ships
Contact Email: [email protected] Phone: 1800 194 866
K0709 09/07
Welcome to the future of naval maintenance
Photos courtesy KBR's capabilities include ILS planning at of Defence the conceptual stage of a project
Applying commercial best practice to sustain complex maritime platforms and systems
Jointly providing integrated materiel services to the RAN’s amphibious and afloat support ships
Contact Email: [email protected] Phone: 1800 194 866
K0709 09/07 3 President’s Message Contents y first purpose is to extend an Headmark, our office costs, staging the annual Minvitation to attend the Australian Vernon Parker Oration and so on. Sun Tzu’s ‘The Art of War’: 4 Naval Institute’s Annual General Meeting in We also have agreed that the ‘reserve’ of Its Relevance to Contemporary the Military Theatre of the Australian Defence equity of the Institute should, as a principle, Maritime Strategy Force Academy at 1730 on Thursday 13 equate to two years’ expenditure and that, as Front page March. we increase our activities, we should do so in photograph: Only partly as an inducement for you such a way that our new calls on resources Admiral Raymond Spruance, 10 The crew of Collins to join us, the meeting will be followed, by do not prevent the accompanying increase USN and his Leadership Skills Class Submarine, kind permission of the Commandant and in equity. The Council is of the view that during the Pacific War HMAS Collins the President of the Mess Committee, by an this principle should prevent a return to our conduct abandon ANI Reception at the ADFA Officers’ Mess parlous financial situation of 2000-2001. I ship drills alongside at 1830. Apart from allowing members to should add that, at our current – but only our President’s Message Continued… 13 Fleet Base West. socialise, we also intend this as a recruiting current – activity level, we are very close to measure – please feel free to bring a potential achieving a two year reserve. ANI member as a guest. PLEASE PUT THIS The second requirement is therefore that The Ship’s Command Team 15 IN YOUR DIARY NOW!! the membership fees need to be increased to & Network Centric Warfare If you are able to join us for the AGM and/ achieve the appropriate balance. I attach a table or the start of year Reception, I would be very of proposed fees. Several points may be made. grateful if you could let my office know, via The first is that this is the first increase in fees Royal Australian Navy Pilot Training 23 Lieutenant Commander Aaron Nye or Cynthia in seven years and will move the individual & Aerial Hydrographic Surveying Kelly, on (02) 6275 6191, email Cynthia.Kelly@ membership fee from $45 to $60. The second, in the 1920s customs.gov.au and this is associated with our next area for The AGM will have some important improvement, is that we are providing for decisions to make and I think it vital that you a junior membership fee, not only for full Whales and Active Sonar 28 have the opportunity to consider their rationale time students, but for persons of the rank – Challenges & Opportunities before we bring any proposal to the floor. of Lieutenant or below, of $40 (less than the The ANI Council have had the opportunity current individual fee). We are also providing to consider our progress in relation to the for a reduced fee to members who are fully Images from Euripides 32 Strategic Plan which we adopted in 2005. I can retired from the work force. I should add that report that we believe that we have achieved we are providing for multi-year membership RADM Bill Dovers Obituary 36 some success, but that we think we need to do for both categories and will have no concerns much better in three key areas, closely related. if a member should change status during The first, while we have considerably that period. On the other hand, we will be Australia’s Secret War 38 improved our equity very largely due to a happy to consider a return of fees if a member – Ship Repairs generous program of sponsorship, is that the retires while holding a standard multi-year long term well being of the ANI demands a membership. better balance between the financial support These fee increases will not themselves be Visions from the Vault 43 provided by our membership and that enough to support our equity requirements. provided by our sponsorship program. The For its own sake, also, our third area of Council have adopted as a principle that the development needs to be an increase in Book Reviews 44 membership fees should be able to cover the individual membership. It stands currently basic annual commitments of the Institute at just over 300. The Council has set a target which we do not regard as discretionary and of 200 additional members over the next five Style Notes for Headmark 47 which we regard as central to its continued years – requiring a net increase of 40 members existence. This would include, for example, a year. ANI Events Program 48 the production and distribution costs of President’s Message continued on page 13> Issue Number 127
ANI Online Guide 49 Printed by Everbest JACOBS AUSTRALIA Printing Company ATI KBR AUSTAL LOPAC Australian Naval Institute Info 50 ISSN 1833-6531 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE CREDIT UNION P & O BOOZ ALLEN & HAMILTON FRIEND RAYTHEON AUSTRALIA Design & DTP: ANI Membership Application Form 51 Diane Bricknell EDS SAAB [email protected]
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 Sun Tzu’s ‘The Art of War’: Its Relevance to Contemporary Maritime Strategy BC y oMMANDER M A Razzak
Sun Tzu (535 BC), a General under the experience relevant to contemporary objectives with the means to achieve Emperor He Lu of Wu State in China, maritime strategy, let alone naval such objectives in peace and in war.”5 wrote The Art of War in 490 BC. This strategy? A sceptical view tends to According to the Dictionary of Military legendary work first became known to simmer as little reference of Sun Tzu and Associated Terms (US Department the Western part of the world through is found in the studies of maritime of Defense 1987) strategy is “the art its translation into French in 1782 AD. strategy. In fact, Clausewitz is much and science of developing and using Since then, The Art of War has been in referred in analysing the views of political, economic, psychological, and print in different languages around the maritime strategists. For example, military forces as necessary during world and studied beyond militaries to while evaluating Mahan’s maritime peace and war, to afford the maximum the political, diplomatic, business and strategic thoughts, Geoffrey Till wrote, support to policies, in order to increase intellectual circles. Sun Tzu’s views are “Essentially, Mahan built strategically the probabilities and favourable debated, researched and applied in war. on existing ideas about maritime consequences of victory and to lessen “There is a legend that this little book activities, which were, as we have seen, the chances of defeat.”6 Liddell Hart was Napoleon’s key to success and his largely tactical in their approach, and defines strategy “as the art of allocating secret weapon …. Certainly Napoleon made some attempt to situate naval and employing military means in used all of Sun Tzu to his own thinking in broader context of the such a way that the ends of policy are advantage to conquer most of Europe. strategic thinking represented by the achieved.”7 According to Encyclopaedia It was only when he failed to follow likes of Clausewtiz and Jomini.”4 Any Britannica, “Strategy, in warfare, the Sun Tzu’s rules that he was defeated.”1 way, examinations of strategic visions science or art of employing all the James Clavell was moved so much by and historical events in light of Sun military, economic, political and other the inner thoughts of the book that Tzu’s philosophy keeping in mind the resources of a nation to achieve the he stated, “I truly believe that if our thoughts of maritime strategists can objects of war.”8 military and political leaders in recent help to find an answer to the question. Warfare, Sun Tzu described as ‘art’. times had studied this work of genius, With this short introduction this Clausewitz described, “… the art Vietnam could not have happened as essay aims to examine the relevance of war is the art of using the given it happened; we would not have lost of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War to means in combat; there is no better the war in Korea (we lost because we contemporary maritime strategy. The term for it than the conduct of war.”9 did not achieve victory); …. and, in all effort begins with attempts to develop “The art is applied drawing on probability, World Wars I and II would a relational concept between strategy science, which is to say drawing on have been avoided – certainly they and philosophy. Then it ascertains knowledge.”10 Knowledge increases would not have been waged as they relational dynamism between the through education. The Art of War were waged; …”2 components of maritime strategy imparts philosophical education This superb book in 13 chapters is - both military and non military. for the orchestration of means to “… so encompassing that it almost Finally, the essay makes a comparative achieve military objective for a seems to predict the emergence of examination between The Art of War political end. Philosophy is “… the air and space power when it says, and components of maritime strategy critical examination of the grounds metaphorically, “the expert on the with special reference to naval strategic for fundamental beliefs and analysis attack strikes from out of the highest elements. of the basic concepts employed reaches of the heavens.”3 It is also in the expression of such beliefs. acknowledged that this archetypal Strategy and Philosophy: Philosophical inquiry is a central work of Sun Tzu is one of the most element in the intellectual history of A Relational Concept 11 influential works in kinds and degrees many historical civilizations.” in military theories and studies. “Strategy generally denotes the The Art of War gives insight into Despite these facts, there remains design and implementation of a plan the basic tenets of conducting wars. a natural question; is this two and a for the coordinated employment of Strategy grows on those basics and half thousand years old philosophy resources with the aim of attaining modified with the changes in the based on Sun Tzu’s soldiering assigned objectives. Strategy links the ambient factors of peace and war. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 5
On the other hand, such factors can the naval planners and commanders by Stratagem does not say how to make influence little the philosophical to evolve favourable strategy with an attack. It is rather an insight into sayings based on ‘critical examination flexible option as Sun Tzu said, “Having targeting enemy objects and taking full of the grounds for fundamental beliefs paid heed to my assessment of the advantage of it depends on command and analysis of the basic concepts.’ For relative advantages and disadvantages, which, according to Sun Tzu, is a example, Sun Tzu’s five factors (the way, the general must create a favourable “matter of wisdom, integrity, humanity, heaven, earth, command and rules and strategic situation which will help courage, and discipline.” regulations) on ‘Making Assessments’ bring the victory to fruition. By this I subtly suggests “to compare two sides mean being flexible and making the in terms of above factors and appraise most of the advantages to gain the the situation accordingly.” Then it is for initiative in war.”12 Similarly, Attacking
Review Political Decision
Strategic Input Filtration Sources of Naval Strategy Output Decision Strategic Capability
Naval Mission Government’s Elements Factors To win, keep, contest War Value Economic or ignore use of sea Performance
Military GDP Non-military Issues Material Battle Sea Control/Sea Power Function Defence Budget Poverty Alleviation Ship Fleet in Being Denial Trade Protection Health Service Base Active Influencing Continental War Distant Operation Naval Share of Defence Education Logistics Passive Protection of Trade Budget Housing Repair Source Protection of Off Shore Policing Environment Blockade Assets Fishery Protection Human Open Distant Suppression Drug Political Tactics Close Trafficking Public Sentiment Judgemental Error Anti Smuggling toward Defence Doctrinal Error Expenditure Peacetime Pollution Control Crew Endurance Contribution to Crime Prevention Crew Efficiency National Ecomony Support Political Diplomatic/Naval Resolve Presence Mission Negotiation Manipulation Prestige Essential Considerations Resource, Balance of Power in Employment, Excellence in Warfare, Strategic Advantage, Speed in War, Machine and Warfare, Economy of Effort and Resource, Mobility of Means, Simple and Flexible Strategy, Initiative in War.
Relational Dynamism between Components of Marine Strategy
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 6 Sun Tzu’s ‘The Art of War’: Its Relevance to Contemporary Maritime Strategy
Components of Maritime simultaneously in peace and war, as the course of Strategy: Relational it has been. Relational dynamism the war. “Out Dynamism between the two divisions of maritime of the total 451 strategy and their components are surface warships “Maritime strategy concerns the use shown in the flow diagram at the end of and submarines of the sea for support of national or this article. in commission alliance policies in peace and war. Such during the war, strategy encompasses the maritime 332 had been sunk aspects of war as well as security in The Art of War and by the time Japan 13 time of peace.” According to Julian Components of Maritime surrendered and Corbett, “By maritime strategy we only 37, or 8.2 mean the principles which govern a Strategy: Comparative percent remained ADM Chuichi 20 war in which the sea is a substantial Examination operational.” Nagumo, factor. Naval strategy is but that part of Japanese Navy it which determines the movements of Resource Factor in Maritime Balance of Power and the fleet when maritime strategy has Strategy. Employment of Military Means. determined what part the fleet must Resource is the single most important Achieving maritime objectives through play in relation to the action of the land component of maritime strategy the employment of military resource forces; …”14 The definitions disclose and extremely contributory to its demands the determination of balance three basic constituents of maritime development and application. Resource of power. “Factors in the art of warfare strategy – objective, obtaining the of the state has a limit to spare for are: First, calculations; second, means to achieve objective and its forces. Economy of resource is quantities; third, logistics; fourth, principles governing the application of critically important for sustainable the balance of power; and fifth, the means. Maritime strategy in today’s force transformation and for providing possibility of victory. Calculations are context is, therefore, rephrased as sustenance to operations. Admiral based on terrain, estimates of available organizing, protecting, managing and Vern Clark hopes the US Navy to quantities of goods are based on these securing the movements of national invest savings from Sea Enterprise in calculations, logistical strength is based logistics over the oceans in response transforming the navy into the 21st on estimates of available quantities of to conflicting demands of peace Century. goods, the balance of power is based on and war where political, economic, War costs a nation hugely. “He logistical strength, and the possibility technological, social, psychological and who wishes to fight must first count of victory is based on the balance of (national) logistical and military factors the cost.”15 “In joining battle, seek the power.”21 are the components of warfare. quick victory.... There has never been The Battle of Atlantic during WW Above definitions and explanations a state that has benefited from an II was primarily a battle to draw, keep unveil two fundamental divisions extended war.”16 “.... if the campaign and contest the balance of power in maritime strategy, which are is protracted, the resources of the through the destruction/protection non-military and military aspects State will not be equal to the strain.”17 of logistics. For Axis German it was a of the strategy. Non-military feature These philosophies indicate interactive battle to destroy 600,000 to 750,000 includes population, politics, ocean relation among national resource, tons of British shipping per month for trade, technology, economy, maritime logistical strength and the balance of a year to force UK to sue for peace.22 area, oceanography and maritime power. History also reveals that, “… The Falklands War showed how the infrastructure. These are also the victory went to the power best able to consideration for balance of power sources of military dimension of produce and organize materials and impacted the preparation for war. The maritime strategy i.e. naval strategy. manpower for war.”18 During WWII, terrain for the naval dimension of the Naval strategy focuses on securing the the US Navy had 67, 952 ships of all Falklands War which can be referred interest in the use of the sea. Military types on 30 June 1945 compared to to as “the fall of the land, the proximate and non-military components of 1099 on 30 June 1940.19 On the other distances, difficulty of passage, the maritime strategy succeed through hand, Japan was unable to make degree of openness, and the viability mutual support. They are active good the losses she suffered during of the land for deploying troops”23 was Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 7
quite unfavourable to the UK leading to bombers on deck and returning aircraft The strategic advantage that Japan huge preparations to draw the balance from Midway in the air. Further, gained through its surprising action of power in favour. Then,keeping the evasion tactics enforced on Nagumo’s against the USA on 7 December 1941 balance in favour went further into the forces by US torpedo bombers was short lived, yet, expanded Japanese superior application of combat power. prevented him from launching aircraft influence over the South Pacific It is both superior concentration and on deck and also prevented him from rapidly. Then, the combination of application of combat power that made recovering returning aircraft running surprising actions and straightforward the difference in the Pacific during out of fuel.28 Japan’s losses in the battle operations by the US forces across WW-II, the Falklands War and the of Midway due to Nagumo’s ignorance the Pacific resulted in the capitulation naval aspects of Arab-Israel Wars. It is of defence were the beginning of an of Japanese Forces. The Indian a vital consideration for the successful end. Navy’s (IN) innovative attack on employment of the US Navy’s Sea Karachi Harbour in December 1971 Power 21. Hence, Sun Tzu’s saying has Excellence in Warfare. and straightforward operations in relevance that number alone confers no Wining a war is certainly a matter of the Bay of Bengal established IN advantage.24 excellence. Sun Tzu said, “... to win dominance at sea. “Surprise and a hundred victories in a hundred straightforward operations give rise Offence and Defence: The battles is not the highest excellence; to each other endlessly just as a ring Resultant Value in Naval the highest excellence is to subdue is without a beginning or and end.”32 Warfare. the enemy’s army without fighting In today’s technological environment Sun Tzu’s saying that the possibility at all.”29 The expression is explicitly straightforward operations may be of victory lies in attack is valid in relevant to maritime strategy affairs. difficult proposition but surprising naval warfare. In the history of naval “Since 1945 there has been one real action will remain an important warfare none emerged victorious naval war, half a dozen rather one- element in maritime warfare. To without offensive actions. Sun Tzu also sided naval contributions to operations achieve strategic advantage through emphasized on defence to avoid defeat on land, and more than 200 political surprise, a naval commander should to achieve victory. “Being invincible applications of limited naval force.”30 consider innovation, speed and target lies with defense, the vulnerability of History of maritime strategy reveals prioritization. the enemy comes with the attack.”25 that ‘political application of limited Offensive and defensive actions have naval force’ achieved maritime Speed in Naval Warfare. complementary roles. “... Attack is objectives more than the recourse “War is such that the supreme the secret of defence; defence is the to naval engagements, which can be consideration is speed”, said Sun Tzu.33 planning of an attack.”26 “In battle, credited with the “highest excellence”. In narrower outlook it is the timing of there are not more than two methods Latest in the series of ‘excellence’ was an attack. In wider sense it is the total of attack - the direct and indirect; yet the US securing Pakistan’s support speed of means of war. Admiral Clark these two in combination give rise to for its war on terror. Prior to the US attached great importance to the need an endless series of manoeuvres.”27 invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11, for speed for different components of Nagumo’s ignorance of defence during US threat to employ naval power to Sea Power 21. Thinking of speed for the attack on Midway in 1942 severely send Pakistan back to the Stone Age, strategic advantage should be viewed affected Japanese Forces in the Pacific. peacefully secured Pakistan’s support. in whole system perspective. A ship’s After the first air attack on Midway, speed available for action should be he concentrated more on offensive Gaining Strategic Advantage. viewed as the total speed of whole actions. Nagumo rearmed his torpedo Maritime history has many accounts system aboard. A fleet’s speed for bombers for ground attack, which were of gaining strategic advantage through action should also be looked at kept in defence against US surface intelligent combination of ways and similar perspective. During the forces. When Spruance’s carriers means. “For gaining strategic advantage Gulf War of 1991, the US success were sighted, Nagumu was unable to (shih) in battle, there are no more in transporting 8.3 trillion kilogram launch immediate strike. On the other than “surprise” and “straightforward” war material in five months 8500 Fleet Admiral hand, Spruance’s torpedo bombers operations, yet in combination, they miles away from the mainland and Chester Nimitz with caught Nagumo’s carriers with ground produce inexhaustible possibilities.”31 subsequent quick victory is credited binoculars Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 8 Sun Tzu’s ‘The Art of War’: Its Relevance to Contemporary Maritime Strategy to total speed. In the context of Speed in manoeuvre adds agility.”39 without disaster.43 “… what current maritime asymmetric threat “Physical mobility directly affects enables the wise sovereign environment, speed is also critically the deployment of force. This is and good general to strike and important to tackle the fundamental especially critical when the distances conquer, and achieve things problems for maritime forces operating from the basing and staging area are beyond the reach of ordinary in the littoral ‘where the battle space long and the forces must be deployed men, is foreknowledge.”44 is compressed into a much smaller at short notice.”40 The concept of In narrower concept spatial area, reaction time is less and mobility extends beyond the physical foreknowledge is tactical in manoeuvring space is limited’.34 movement of forces. “The availability nature. In wider sense it of highly mobile and effective means includes enemy’s military Economy of Effort and of fire power enhances the movement strategic information, national Resource. capabilities of one’s forces… Mobility character and culture, economy and For the purpose of economy of also means communication. Without political resolve/vulnerability. Prior to resource and effort target prioritization reliable communication throughout Pearl Harbor disaster, Rear Admiral is important. “… the best military the chain of command, firepower and Kimmel asked his Fleet Intelligence policy is to attack strategies; the next speed of movement mean little.”41 Officer about the location of Japanese to attack alliances; the next to attack carriers. The officer replied that he did soldiers; and the worst to assault Simplicity and Flexibility in not know.45 And the consequence of walled cities.”35 An understanding Maritime Strategy. not knowing the enemy is known to of the philosophy helps prioritizing Simplicity and flexibility are essential the world. Contrarily foreknowledge of target and weighing relative benefit of attributes of maritime strategy and also the Japanese forces enabled Nimitz to targeting. During the attack on Pearl found in the principles governing wars. maintain the initiative and take the lead Harbor on 7 Dec 1941, “... Nagumo, Plans to achieve maritime objectives in the Pacific during the WW-II. fearing a counter attack, made a critical must be simple and flexible. Knowledge mistake by refusing to launch a third of the following five essentials for Concluding Remarks wave on the harbour’s repair facilities victory42 together with factors on and fuel installations, which would ‘Making Assessments’ can produce This essay examined significant have destroyed Pearl as a base.”36 In simple and flexible maritime strategy. incidents from the contemporary the battle of Coral Sea (4-8 May 1942), a. He will win who knows when to maritime history and futuristic Admiral Nimitz targeted the Japanese fight and when not to fight. visions to find relevance of Sun Tzu’s main invasion force destined for Port b. He will win who knows how The Art of War to maritime strategy. Moresby that could isolate Australia. to handle both superior and inferior Examinations revealed that despite He left the invasion of Tulagi and forces. being the work of Sun Tzu’s soldiering Louisiade unopposed. Although the c. He will win whose army is experience, the relevance of The Art battle ended in confusion and loss animated by the same spirit throughout of War extends beyond land warfare on either side, Allied forces could foil all its ranks. into maritime warfare. It can guide Japanese landing on Port Moresby.37 d. He will win who, prepared invaluably to formulate, materialize himself, waits to take the enemy and apply maritime strategy. Last Mobility: Value in Naval unprepared. but not the least; the fundamental Warfare. e. He will win who has military concept for the US Navy’s operational Mobility is an essential component of capacity and is not interfered with by effectiveness –Sea Strike, Sea Shield maritime strategy. Napoleon’s battles the sovereign. and Sea Basing are found to be the depended upon mobility. It is one expanded transformation of Sun of the things that Sun Tzu stresses.38 Initiative in Naval Warfare. Tzu’s thoughts on attack, defence and Naval forces without mobility and Initiative is the key to achieve essentials for operational mobility manoeuvrability are ineffective and objectives. Initiative originates from attributed to evolutionary changes in inefficient at sea. “Mobility assures knowing the enemy and knowing the international political set ups and manoeuvrability in tactics and one’s self. Such knowledge enables a technological advancement in a time flexibility to adjust to the changes. commander to fight a hundred battles span of 2500 years. � Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 9
Stoughton, London, 1981. 15 The Art of Warby Sun Tzu, p. 19. The Book of War (Sun Tzu The Art of 16 The Book of War (Sun TzuThe Art of Warfare & Karl Von Clausewitz On War), Warfare & Karl Von Clausewitz On War), The Modern Library, New York, 2000. p. 75. Sunzi: The Art of WarSun Bin: The Art of 17 The Art of War by Sun Tzu, p. 19. War, Edited and translated into modern 18 Richard Harding, Sea Power and Naval Chinese by Wu Rusong and Wu Xianlin, Warfare, 1650-1830; UCL Press, UK, 1999, translated into English by Lin Wusum, p. 3. Foreign Languages Press, China, 2001. 19 The Oxford Companion to the Second Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and World War, Oxford University Press, New Translated by Michael Howard and Peter York, 1995, p. 1199. Paret, Everyman’s Library, UK, 1993. 20 The Oxford Companion to the Second Geoffrey Till,Seapower A Guide for the World War, p. 626. Twenty-First Century, Frank Cass Publisher, 21 The Book of War (Sun TzuThe Art of UK, 2004. Warfare & Karl Von Clausewitz On War), Richard Harding, Sea Power and naval p. 84. warfare, 1650-1830, UCL Press, UK, 1999. 22 The Oxford Companion to the Second Commander Mohammad Abdur The Oxford Companion to the Second World World War, p. 63. War, Oxford University Press, New York, 23 The Book of War (Sun TzuThe Art of Razzak, BN, was commissioned into 1995. Warfare & Karl Von Clausewitz On War), the Bangladesh Navy on 1 June 1984. International Military and Defense p. 73. Encyclopedia, Vol-3 (pp.1131-1135) Vol-4 24 The Book of War (Sun TzuThe Art of He graduated from Defence Services (pp. 1657-1662) and Vol-5 (pp.2573-2577), Warfare & Karl Von Clausewitz On War), Brassey’s (inc) USA, 1993. p.105. Command and Staff College (DSCSC), The New Encyclopedia Britannica,15 th 25 The Book of War (Sun TzuThe Art of Bangladesh and attended Naval Edition, Volume-9 (p. 388), Volume-11 Warfare & Karl Von Clausewitz On War), (p-305), USA, 1997. p. 83. War Course in Turkey in 1999-2000 26 The Art of War by Sun Tzu, p. 27. Magazines/Journals 27 The Art of War by Sun Tzu, p. 32. and 2001-2002 respectively. He has Cdr M A Razzak, Bangladesh Navy, ‘Winds 28 The Oxford Companion to the Second had a number of papers published in of Change Reshaping Principles of War’, The World War, p. 871. Naval Review, UK, Vol. 94, No. 2, May 2006, 29 The Book of War (Sun TzuThe Art of Bangladesh Armed Forces Journal, pp. 124-131. Warfare & Karl Von Clausewitz On War), Richard Scott, ‘Scourge of the Sea’, Jane’s p. 79. Journal of Bangladesh Institute of Defence Weekly, Vol. 41, Issue No. 43, 24 30 International Military and Defense International and Strategic Studies, October 2004, pp. 19-23. Encyclopedia, Vol - 3, p. 1135. The Art of Warby Sun Tzu, Edited and 31 The Book of War (Sun TzuThe Art of Mirpur Papers (Journal of DSCSC), foreword by James Clavell , Hodder & Warfare & Karl Von Clausewitz On War), Stoughton, London, 1981, p. 11. p. 85. The Naval Review, UK and in the USA’s 2 The Art of War by Sun Tzu, p. 7. 32 The Book of War (Sun TzuThe Art of Proceedings. He was the “Second 3 The Book of War (Sun TzuThe Art of Warfare & Karl Von Clausewitz On War), Warfare & Karl Von Clausewitz On War), p. 85 Honourable Mention” winner in the The Modern Library, New York, 2000, p. 33 The Book of War (Sun TzuThe Art of xxiii. Warfare & Karl Von Clausewitz On War), International Navies Essay Contest 4 Geoffrey Till,Sea Power A Guide for p. 113. 2000 organised by the US Naval the Twenty-First Century, Frank Cass 34 Richard Scott, ‘Scourge of the Sea’, Jane’s Publishers, UK, 2004, p.40. Defence Weekly, Vol. 41, Issue No. 43, 24 Institute. Presently he heads the 5 International Military and Defense October 2004, p. 22. Encyclopedia, Vol - 5, Brassey’s (inc) USA, 35 The Book of War (Sun TzuThe Art of School of Logistics and Management, 1993, p. 2573. Warfare & Karl Von Clausewitz On War), Bangladesh Navy. 6 International Military and Defense p.79. Encyclopedia, Vol - 5, p. 2574. 36 The Oxford Companion to the Second 7 International Military and Defense World War, p. 872. Encyclopedia, Vol - 5, p. 2575. 37 The Oxford Companion to the Second 8 The New Encyclopedia Britannica,15th World War, pp. 271-272 (Endnotes) Edition, Volume-11, USA, 1997, p. 305. 38 The Art of Warby Sun Tzu, p. 11. 11 Lieutenant Hewitt underwent RAAF 9 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and 39 Cdr M A Razzak Bangladesh Navy, pilot training in the same scheme as Translated by Michael Howard and Peter ‘Winds of Change Reshaping Principles of Kennedy. He later transferred to the RAAF, Paret, Everyman’s Library, UK, 1993, p. 145. War’, The Naval Review, pp. 128-129. rising to the rank of air vice marshal. Sir 10 Cdr M A Razzak BN, ‘Winds of Change 40 Milan Vego, Operational Warfare, USA, Richard Williams, These are Facts; The Reshaping Principles of War’, The Naval 2000, p.66. Autobiography of Air Marshal Sir Richard Review, UK, Vol. 94, No. 2, May 2006, p. 124. 41 Milan Vego, Operational Warfare, p.66. Williams KB CB DSO (the Australian War 11 The New Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th 42 The Art of War by Sun Tzu, p. 26. Memorial and the Australian Government Edition, Volume-9, 1997, p. 388. 43 The Art of War by Sun Tzu, p.8. Publishing Service), Canberra, 1977, p. 144. 12 Sunzi: The Art of War Sunbin: The Art 44 The Art of War by Sun Tzu, p.90. of War, Edited and translated into modern 45 The Oxford Companion to the Second Chinese by Wu Rusong and Wu Xianlin, World War, p. 870. translated into English by Lin Wusum, BIBLIOGRAPHY Foreign Languages Press, China, 2001. p. 7. 13 International Military and Defense Books Encyclopedia, Vol - 4, p. 1657. The Art of War by Sun Tzu, Edited and 14 International Military and Defense foreword by James Clavell, Hodder & Encyclopedia, Vol - 4, p. 1658. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 10 RANAdmiral Raymond History Spruance, USN and his Leadership Skills during the Pacific War SbL u - iEUTENANT Toby Frewin
‘Always calm, always at peace with of the Philippine Sea. Each encounter himself, Spruance had that ability saw crucial victory for the US Navy, which marks the great captain to but it is questioned whether Spruance’s make correct estimates and the right decisions failed to take full advantage of the situation and turn these battles into decisions in a fluid battle situation.’ decisive, overwhelming triumphs. – Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison1 At Midway, Spruance made a series of important decisions. However, Admiral Raymond Spruance was an some have been contested as being extremely successful naval commander too conservative. The first of these was and was responsible for much of the the timing of the launch of the first success of the US’s drive to victory attack wave from his carriers. Spruance across the Pacific in World War II. made the courageous determination to Spruance began the war as commander launch at the first available opportunity. his overarching mission – to minimise of a division of heavy cruisers, based He hoped to find the Japanese carriers exposure of his fleet to attack while at Pearl Harbor. His cruiser division unprepared and thus maximise inflicting maximum damage upon the formed part of a carrier task force surprise and reap the advantage of enemy,8 what he knew of enemy forces commanded by Admiral Bill ‘Bull” striking first. This plan was not without in the area and the knowledge that Halsey. But Spruance was destined risk but depended upon Spruance the advantage of carrier superiority for greater things. He was thrust into being correct in his assessment of likely would not be realised in a night command of the carrier task group Japanese movements and disposition.3 action. Further, there remained the when Halsey fell ill, on the eve of the The ploy worked and three carriers possibility that there was an additional, Battle of Midway. From there, Spruance were effectively destroyed.4 There is untouched carrier in the Japanese served as chief of staff to the Pacific some contention, however, whether to force. The Japanese force was still Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Chester attack so early was, in fact, Spruance’s superior numerically and in firepower Nimitz. He spent the last two years of plan. It is alleged that he intended and, without air cover, could only be the war commanding the US Fifth Fleet delaying the first wave until the range effectively employed at night.9 Such a – ‘the greatest and most powerful fleet to the enemy carriers was reduced.5 night battle was indeed the intention in the history of the world.’2 Following This version of events sometimes of the Japanese forces and Spruance’s the war, Admiral Spruance served alleges that it was Spruance’s inherited action effectively thwarted any as Pacific Commander-in-Chief and chief of staff, Captain Miles Browning, opportunity for the Japanese to glean President of the US Naval War College. who urged him to launch immediately.6 any measure of success at Midway. After resigning from the US Navy, he As such, there remains a line of thought Similar controversy surrounded spent three years as US Ambassador to which credits Captain Browning with Spruance after the Battle of the the Philippines. much of the success at Midway. Philippine Sea. However, history A second contentious decision has not been kind enough to furnish Significant Achievements and was that made not to pursue Japanese a definitive verdict on whether his Failures forces on the first evening of the decisions were the best circumstances Admiral Spruance’s conduct during battle. Rather than pursue the crippled allowed. The naval battle occurred as a the Pacific War was littered with Japanese force, Spruance turned his sideline to US landings on the Mariana significant achievements. Yet perhaps ships away in the evening to avoid Islands of Saipan, Guam and Tinian, in his greatest achievements could also further engagements during the June, 1944. There, Spruance’s primary be considered his greatest failures. hours of darkness. He was criticised mission revolved around protecting the This dichotomy arises from differing in some circles for not pressing home Marines and their transports landing perceptions regarding crucial decisions a perceived advantage after the day’s on the islands until they were well he made in command of operations action.7 But Spruance’s decision was established.10 at the Battle of Midway and the Battle based upon several factors including When the Japanese fleet was Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 11
known to be in the area, Spruance such as ‘The Thinking Man’s Admiral’16 delegated all detail to his subordinates. agonised over whether to seek out and ‘The Quiet Warrior’17 give a telling He believed in making very detailed and attack the enemy, or to remain indication of the type of man and the plans but acknowledged that any on station and provide protection to type of leader he was. plan could not foresee all possible the amphibious landing.11 In the final As a leader, Spruance was not the circumstances. Therefore, Spruance analysis, Spruance was convinced type to inspire passion and affection empowered his officers to act on their that the Japanese focus would be to in his charges. Indeed, Spruance own initiative with very brief orders, or attack the transports. Based upon this struggled at times to communicate no orders at all.26 assumption and his interpretation that with others. He was inspirational Spruance also believed that a small protecting this force was his primary almost exclusively due to the enormous staff would experience less internal duty, Spruance determined to remain ability he exhibited.18 He maintained a friction. This theory was tested as two near Saipan and let the enemy come to façade of cool detachment19 which saw of his most senior commanders, Vice him. In short, then, he was prepared to him sometimes known among junior Admiral Kelly Turner and Marine ‘risk his carriers before he would risk officers as ‘Old Frozen Face.’20 However, Major General Holland Smith were his transports.’12 his status as a leader was evident in the both blunt, tactless, strong-willed The Americans still recorded a respect and the loyalty afforded him. and stubborn’ and their relationship decisive victory as the Japanese carrier This was what he showed his men and throughout the war was always borne aircraft attack was decimated in they reciprocated. His command was explosive. 27 It was Spruance’s calm what became known as the ‘Marianas always marked by ‘dignity, tolerance, diplomacy which allowed the two to Turkey Shoot.’ There was little justice, professional competence, and work together.28 damage to American assets but the quiet confidence.’21 Japanese fleet remained out of range It is instructive to compare Spruance as a Subordinate of American aircraft and thus retired Spruance with the style of his During the Pacific War, Spruance was from the battle largely unscathed.13 As contemporary, Bull Halsey. Halsey not subordinate to many. To those such, it has been questioned whether was a colourful, bold and gregarious he was, it is evident he was held in Spruance was too conservative and character, almost a polar opposite the highest regard. When Halsey should have taken offensive action to to Spruance. Halsey was aggressive was forced to surrender command pursue the weakened Japanese Navy. to the point of impetuousness and prior to Midway, he did not hesitate This could have been accomplished audacity.22 Halsey’s impulsiveness to recommend Spruance. Spruance within the parameters of protecting meant that his staff was constantly on was perhaps an unlikely choice given the landing but Spruance chose to edge, wondering what would happen that he was the commander of a focus his energies on the core of his next. In contrast, Spruance always cruiser division and hence arguably mission. Certainly, to pursue the enemy had detailed, up to the minute plans unqualified to command a carrier task would have involved greater risk but so which guided everyone’s actions.23 It group. But Halsey harboured no doubts much greater rewards could have been was said that Spruance’s operations about Spruance’s ability, judgement and reaped. Based on this circumstance, seemed to always go to plan – ‘like qualification for higher command.29 calls were made for Spruance to be well-planned drills’.24 Throughout his Nimitz had never served with relieved from his position.14 However, career, Spruance maintained a quiet Spruance before Midway but he knew Spruance retained the support bridge, dealing with crises, large and of Spruance’s reputation and character. of Nimitz and the Chief of Naval small, efficiently, with minimal fuss and Indeed, Spruance was already destined Operations, Fleet Admiral King who without raised voices.25 to be Nimitz’s next chief of staff when reportedly told Spruance that he ‘did Spruance ensured he surrounded Halsey made his recommendation. a damn good job in the Marianas. No himself with the best people he Nimitz did not hesitate, partly based matter what other people tell you, your could, and trusted them to perform upon his faith in Halsey’s judgment, decision was correct.’15 their duties largely without his and partly due to his own knowledge input or interference. He believed in of Spruance.30 The Chief of Naval Spruance as a Leader maintaining only a small staff so that Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King did Spruance’s leadership style is perhaps he could know each one well, including not need convincing either – Spruance personified largely in the titles used in their strengths and weaknesses. Once was the only flag officer King admitted literature written about him. Headings satisfied in their abilities, Spruance was smarter than he was, suggesting Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 12 Admiral Raymond Spruance, USN RAN& his Leadership History Skills during the Pacific War Spruance’s brain seemed to be Spruance.36 ‘composed of millions of computers.’31 Regardless of recognition, The faith Nimitz and King showed Spruance’s place in history is in Spruance was well rewarded by unarguable. Admiral Spruance’s forces Spruance’s performance, but it was not were some of the largest the world untested. However, neither man would has seen and they fought some of entertain the slightest negative thought the greatest naval and amphibious on Spruance while some called for him battles recorded. Yet he perhaps did to be relieved following the Battle of not fit the prototypical perception the Philippine Sea.32 of the great military leader. He was quiet, intellectual, serious and aloof. Place in History His leadership was not marked by There is a dichotomy in assessing infectious war cries or inspirational Sub-Lieutenant Toby Frewin, RAN Admiral Spruance’s place in history. He exhortations but rather a cerebral, was instrumental in the prosecution rigorously methodical, logical and Toby Frewin was born in Adelaide and of the US’s strategy in the Pacific and unemotional approach to warfare. attended the Flinders University of successfully commanded some of the He never sought public acclaim or South Australia, graduating in 2006 largest actions in history. Yet Spruance glory – he was content to allow his with a Bachelor of International Studies remains one of the least known US achievements, ability, intellect and and a Bachelor of Laws. He joined the commanders of the war. This is perhaps integrity to speak for him. Admiral due largely to his modest, unassuming Raymond Spruance stands as one of RAN in 2006 as an undergraduate, nature, purely professional conduct and the greatest military leaders in history completing New Entry Officer Course 33 disdain for publicity. He was satisfied and his legacy is a testament to the and commencing Junior Warfare 34 to know he had done his job well. qualities he exhibited. Officer Application Course in 2007. During the war, the US Navy These qualities inspired Nimitz to was empowered to promote four of succinctly describe him thus: ‘I have the its officers to the five-star rank of highest regard for Admiral Spruance Fleet Admiral. The first three were … He is a fine man, a sterling character Bibliography easily determined but the last one and a great leader … Nothing you Andidora, Ronald, Iron Admirals: naval was reduced to a choice between could say about him would be praise Leadership in the Twentieth Century (2000). 37 Buell, Thomas,The Quiet Warrior: A Halsey and Spruance. Both were enough.’ � Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance rotating through the same role. If (1987). anything, Spruance’s record during Forrestel, E.P., Raymond A Spruance, USN: A Study in Command (1966) the war was superior. Yet Halsey Greene, P., Admiral Spruance and The Battle received the promotion. There was of Philippine Sea: A Brilliant Victory or a Bungled Opportunity? (Core Course Essay, some justification in that Halsey National War College, National Defense was the senior officer and began University, 1994) 9-10, at National Technical Information Service
(Endnotes) We believe that this is practicable, to capitalise on the great work done by 1 Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two Ocean provided that we can create additional interest Geoff Lawes in bringing it into being, we War (1963) 581. 2 Thomas Buell,The Quiet Warrior: A in and enthusiasm for the ANI amongst think that Headmark needs to attract more Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance younger members of the RAN. The Council contemporary articles and, just as important, (1987) xxix. is considering a number of initiatives (some we need to sustain a healthy program of 3 E.P. Forrestel, Raymond A Spruance, USN: A Study in Command (1966) 43-5. inspired by our members of Council currently seminars and activities. 4 John Wukovits, ‘Admiral Raymond A. studying at ADFA) which we think may help I ask that you think about these issues and Spruance’ in Stephen Howarth (ed), Men of ‘do the trick’ and I hope that they can be aired consider the way ahead. We intend to place the War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II, (1992), 158, 164. at the AGM. draft 2008-2013 Strategic Plan on the Website, 5 Forrestel, above n 3, 45. Our view as Council is that we need to together with the existing 2005-2010 Plan to 6 John Lundstrom, ‘Introduction’ to do even more to make the ANI attractive and give you a better idea of where we need to go, Thomas Buell,The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Raymond A. Spruance (1987) something in which involvement is valued. as well as where we have been. xi. Certainly, the range of activities over the last 7 Wukovits, above n 4, 165. year, from our involvement in the King-Hall 8 Forrestel, above n 3, 39. Proposed Table of Fees and Naval History Conference, our sponsorship 9 John Lundstrom, ‘Raymond A. Spruance: Charges The Thinking Man’s Admiral’ in Jack of Dr Eric Grove and the associated lecture 1 year 2 years 3 years Sweetman (ed), The Great Admirals: program by him and Dr Gary Weir, our Individual Australia/ $40 $77.50 $112.50 Command at Sea, 1587-1945 (1997) 458, - Concession New Zealand 476. social activities in Canberra and Sydney, Asia Pacific $55 $107.50 $157.50 10 Wukovits, above n 4, 171. the Vernon Parker Oration by Mike Carlton Rest of World $62 $121.50 $178.50 11 Buell, above n 2, 291. 12 Buell, above n 2, 295. and the Annual Dinner, as well as the recent 13 P. Greene, Admiral Spruance and The Naval Warfare Seminar at HMAS WATSON Individual Australia/ $60 $115 $167.50 Member New Zealand Battle of Philippine Sea: A Brilliant Victory indicate that we have got some runs on the or a Bungled Opportunity? (Core Course Asia Pacific $75 $145 $212.50 Essay, National War College, National board. Judging for the 2008-2009 Maritime Rest of World $82 $159 $233.50 Defense Univeristy, 1994) 9-10, at National Advancement Australia Award (currently set Technical Information Service
Jacobs Australia (JA) was established in Canberra in August 1997 and has since grown to have operations in all major centres across Australia. The growth is a direct result of our employees developing innovative ideas and delivering outstanding service to clients. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Issue 127 15 The Ship’s Command Team & Network Centric Warfare BC y oMMANDER STEPHEN DRYDEN, RAN
The ADF’s adoption of network- centric warfare (NCW) is driving the RAN’s command and control future. Future technologies, particularly advances in information technology, will enable a more distributed command structure for the ADF, but it is critical to remember that command is, and will always remain, a human function.
The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations
In October 2005, naval personnel around the world remembered A Marine and an the Battle of Trafalgar; a naval battle of Nelson as a Commander; indeed, Commanding Officers. The medium Aussie soldier that was fought in 1805. That we two hundred years later, it the victory by which orders were communicated keep watch for remember this event two hundred for which he is most venerated. varied between signal flags and non-friendly forces as part of exercise years later, stands as testimony to the However, as great as Trafalgar was for voice. Underpinning this system Talisman Saber 2007 great strategic victory that was won Nelson, it was also a defining moment was a clear understanding of the that day for the British nation. for his Commanding Officers and their Commander’s intent; this having Trafalgar was a brilliant victory. respective Command Teams. Nelson been communicated in person by Eighteen French and Spanish ships aboard Victory did not win Trafalgar Nelson to his Commanding Officers of the line were captured without alone; it was the combined effect of a the evening prior aboard Victory. The the loss of one English ship.1 Britain number of discrete Command Teams final key to success was Nelson’s trust gained undisputed control of the seas acting to achieve a common goal – the of his Commanding Officers to then around her and the threat of invasion defeat of the combined Fleets of France take the fight to the enemy, with the by France, a constant presence since and Spain – that carried the day. minimum of intervention by him. This the start of the Napoleonic War in There are those who like to believe use of mission command empowered 1803, was finally removed. Tactically that Network Centric Warfare (NCW) his decision-makers to ‘fight and win’ a masterstroke of planning and is new; certainly the technology in even though he (Nelson) lay mortally execution, the sea battle also marked a use tends towards the ‘latest and wounded in the bowels of Victory for strategic watershed that turned the tide greatest’. However, at Trafalgar we see the majority of the battle. of the war against France in England’s an excellent example of the benefits to Much of what happened that day favour. It was an empowering victory be gained by promoting the ‘sensor- at Trafalgar is relevant to the way we for Britain, and set the scene for the shooter-decision-maker’ relationship. conduct NCW today. final victory against France achieved by In other words, at Trafalgar, we have an Wellington at Waterloo in 1815. It was example of NCW at its best, given the Scope also the last major naval battle in the technology available at the time. This paper will initially discuss the age of sail. To briefly elaborate. The primary current status of NCW within the Trafalgar exemplifies the excellence sensor was one’s eyes; the shooter – Australian Fleet. Next, the paper will the warships of the British Fleet, and review the information needs of a 1 Hibbert, C. 1994, Nelson – A Personal the decision-makers, the respective ship’s command team operating at the History, Penguin Group, England, p377 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 16 The Ship’s Command Team & Network Centric Warfare tactical/lower operational level. There networked Fleet by 2014. Defence CIS capabilities of two frigates of the will be an emphasis on an environment Projects such as SEA1442 and Joint same class, or even that of two major dominated by information networks Project 2008 remain instrumental fleet units. In these instances, both and stove-piped systems. A review in the achievement of these goals, doctrinally and practically speaking, of the composition, role and delivering critical communications and the roles and missions of the fleet units responsibilities of a ship’s command information systems (CIS) capability to being compared are similar. Yet, as the team will follow, emphasising the Fleet units. situation currently stands, an upgraded role of the Commanding Officer. However, with this progress towards Frigate such as HMAS Sydney is sailing Further discussion will cover the a networked maritime force in mind, with a disproportionately greater human dimension to decision-making, the RAN Fleet has arrived at a cusp. aggregate CIS capability than that emphasising the importance of The critical question is now how far of her sister Adelaide Class frigates. effective information management. The the Fleet will embrace advanced IP Likewise, HMAS Arunta will shortly paper will conclude with a discussion networks for command & control, and be enjoying a significantly enhanced on the challenges and opportunities just how much of the ‘traditional’ ways aggregate CIS capability to that of her provided to a ship’s command team of communication, such as military sister ANZAC Class frigates. through the implementation of NCW messaging and tactical voice circuits, in the maritime environment. will be retained. So why is this so and where is this taking the Fleet? On the one hand, the Fleet is about THE FLEET to significantly expand its existing IP- Even though some may wish for a In the maritime environment, it based networks, with the introduction complex answer, the simple truth is is fortunate that interaction and of leading edge capability such as that interoperability is the key driver. cooperation between naval, land Sub Net Relay (SNR) and wideband Even though the RAN is a medium and air forces, both domestic and satellite communication capabilities in navy in today’s terms, interoperability foreign, has been occurring for many selected major fleet units towards the has proven to be a key force multiplier years. The maritime culture is one of end of this year. Whilst this will initially for the Fleet. This explains why, when cooperation, and hence the concept of be done in response to operational an Australian warship is earmarked interoperability has always been valued imperatives, the ‘push’ for a wider for coalition operations, the system highly. fielding of this capability will result. goes to great lengths (and expense) to In achieving interoperability, navies On the other hand, there is this ensure that the ship is able to play on have established information-sharing continual debate over what legacy the same field as the other participants. networks as a matter of course. Whilst CIS systems and procedures the RAN The influence of allied and regional the mediums used have varied in should and must retain. Driven by naval CIS capability in spurring on the response to technological change, a powerful combination of factors growth and development of our own the requirement to share information such as interoperability, cost and organic communications capability within the ‘sensor-shooter-decision- conservatism, it is envisaged that cannot be overstated. Our embracing maker’ relationship has remained fleet units in 2011 will operate in of NCW as a key warfighting enabler constant. Hence, it can be argued that a CIS environment that reflects supports this statement. even in the earliest days of the Royal a combination of broadband IP- As technology continues to advance, Australian Navy, the elements of NCW networks and the more traditional particularly in the field of information were present. communications networks such as communications technology (ICT), It can be stated with confidence tactical voice and military messaging. the capacity of communications that the RAN is steadily maturing Complicating this is the knowledge systems to convey, process and display towards a Fleet that is network enabled; that there is a significant difference information is also forging ahead. This able to operate effectively in a broad between the left hand edge of CIS empowers the NCW system; enabling range of information enclaves, driven capability in the Australian fleet, and an expansion of the tactical picture by a diverse range of missions and the right hand edge of capability. from horizons initially limited by one’s coalitions. The Australian Network Whilst it would be unfair to compare, vision to nowadays, horizons that are Centric Warfare Roadmap, published side-by-side, the CIS capabilities of only limited by the storage capacity of in 2007, aims for a networked task a Patrol Boat to that of an upgraded one’s track management database. group capability by 2011 and a fully Frigate, it is reasonable to compare the The RAN Fleet currently stands Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 17
at the base of a rapidly building wave greatest public commentary, it is a view is no Fleet CIS capability baseline; so called NCW. It is the tsunami of naval that is never far from the minds of us there is nothing to measure existing communications. The RAN Fleet’s all. CIS capability against. Does a unit ability to ride this wave, which for The second view takes the approach have what it needs to ‘fight and win’, reasons of interoperability and strategic that a warship is a critical node within or is its organic CIS capability coming relevance it needs to do, will be largely an information-sharing network. The up short of ‘expected’ requirements? determined by two considerations. ship can be imagined as a telephone Likewise, there is no complete First, is the ability of key Defence pole that has a myriad of interwoven ownership or control of Fleet CIS ICT projects to deliver relevant CIS cables extending from it; each cable capability by the Fleet; so access to capability quickly and effectively. receiving and transmitting a specific essential enabling activity such as the Whilst easy to state, this is particularly information exchange requirement. provision of communications bearers challenging when the dynamics of This view is the harder one to sell, eg SATCOM Satellites is determined the ICT environment result in a least of all understand. It is hard to by organisations external to the Fleet. technology refresh every eighteen easily explain this view to the layman, Crucially, there is no defined boundary months, and a major capability leap particularly if one appreciates that between the tactical information and/or an organisational change each cable has its own specific security, environment that the Fleet uses to ‘fight every three to five years. The second bandwidth and shore infrastructure and win’ (the Maritime Tactical Wide consideration is simpler. It is the ability requirements, and each these factors Area Network) and the larger, and to say ‘No’. Just because a particular has to be working in order for the more corporate-orientated Defence capability is new, or someone else is ‘cable’ as a whole to work. When one Information Environment (DIE). using it, doesn’t mean that we should further considers that the information Hence, issues such as security policy adopt it. The proliferation of stovepiped capacity of each cable changes every and practice, capability development, CIS capability within the Fleet attests eighteen or so months, the final result operational support and software to past practice in this regard. is indeed complex! configuration management are areas The core of the future RAN Fleet So what are the information where two worlds collide! is a networked-enabled, not network- exchange requirements of a warship? It would be remiss, having raised dominated force. As we embrace What information do the decision- the topic, to not attempt a reasoned NCW and introduce significant CIS makers aboard a Fleet unit need, in answer to the information exchange capability into the Fleet, our focus must order to ‘fight and win’? requirement question. This paper remain firmly on the ‘fight and win’ The problem with discussing posits that broadly speaking, there requirement. Inherent in this, is our information exchange requirements is are four information exchange continuing ability to interoperate with that no where has the decision-maker requirements for a ship’s command Joint, Allied and Coalition members, at sea, operating as part of the ship’s team. These are: and to be seen as an equal player command team, actually defined a. Information exchange capable of taking the lead as required. in both qualitative and quantitative between Corporate/Enterprise Systems terms, their information exchange eg personnel and logistic management INFORMATION NEEDS IN THE requirements. I suggest there is much information systems. MARITIME ENVIRONMENT intuitive understanding of the subject, b. Information exchange in With the NCW construct in mind, it is and certainly academic and scientific direct support of Operational Decision- posited there are two ways in which a assessments have been conducted, but making eg operational planning warship can be viewed. where, for example, is the prioritisation activities, command administration, First, is that of a sleek, grey of a ship’s Common Operating Picture links to higher command eg OPCON, ship charging through the waves, (COP) when compared to the ship’s Operational HQ battle ensign hoisted, displaying RESTRICTED email system defined? c. Information exchange in an impressive array of sensors and Indeed, is this prioritisation between direct support of Tactical Decision- weapons that enable it to ‘fight and win’. information exchange requirements making eg force tactical manoeuvre, This view is arguably the most popular static or dynamic? Common Operating Picture (COP), one, and emphasises the ‘sensor- The RAN hasn’t tackled this subject tactical C2, Indicators & Warning shooter’ capabilities of a warship. As with any degree of conviction or (I&W) intelligence arguably the area that attracts the certainty; and with good reason. There d. Information exchange that Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 18 The Ship’s Command Team & Network Centric Warfare supports Quality of Life (QoL) eg Satellite TV at sea, email, internet web browsing Having broadly defined a ship’s information exchange requirements, it is interesting to observe the following developments within the Fleet: The greatest use of bandwidth stems from the Corporate / Enterprise information systems and unclassified email and Satellite TV ‘human dimension’. QoL services. Similarly, the greatest at Sea are pertinent. Indeed failure Irrespective of its location, state driver for increased bandwidth is to provide reliable QoL services can of readiness, or mission, a Fleet unit coming from the provision of QoL impact negatively on retention and also is simultaneously a defence business services. receive Ministerial attention. unit, a warfighter, and an operational Failure to provide frequent and There is a saying that ‘theory is vessel. Each of these activities demands reliable connectivity for Corporate / often at odds to reality’. It is interesting the constant attention of the ship’s Enterprise information systems directly to observe that much of the impetus command team. The focus of decision- impacts on the Command’s ability to for increased CIS capability within making must constantly shift from one meet Navy and Defence governance the Fleet is coming from the NCW fundamental activity to the next. In the and accountability requirements. focus. The provision of capability such words of one Commanding Officer, These requirements are levied on the as MASTIS – the Fleet’s Wideband ‘twenty four hours is a long time at sea.’ Ship’s Commanding Officer and are Satellite capability (approx 3MBps), The complexity of the decision- mandatory. has origins in improving the fleet’s making environment aboard a fleet Information exchange in support ability to operate within a networked unit is further compounded by of operational and tactical decision- environment. Ironically, however, the cultural approaches to Command. making largely uses Commercial- most immediate benefits delivered Some Commanding Officers insist on off-the-Shelf (COTS) solutions to the ships so fitted, has been reviewing all signals prior to despatch protected by MILSPEC information substantially increasing the bandwidth from a ship; others, delegate release security systems and procedures. This assigned to the information exchange authority to key decision makers introduces significant sustainment and requirements of the Corporate / within the command team. Some, are obsolescence issues, given the ICT Enterprise information systems and comfortable with key activities being refresh dynamic and the tendency for to the QoL services. However, RAN planned and executed via emails; commercial ICT providers to focus on units have satisfactorily performed others, insist on military messaging provisioning current ‘vogue’ capability CTG duties in the Persian Gulf with to fulfil this function. Whatever the vice sustaining superseded technology. an aggregate bandwidth of 128kbps. preference, one truism stands, the There exists redundancy with Perhaps this could lead one to ponder quantity of information being sent to respect to operational and tactical exactly just how much bandwidth a and from a ship continues to increase; information exchange. However, ship actually needs to conduct NCW? the majority of it being transparent to this redundancy is provided by the Is it really as much as we believe? the Command. retention of ‘legacy’ communication The ship’s command team systems such as HF RATT and visual THE SHIP’S COMMAND TEAM comprises, broadly speaking, the signalling. It is a complex, but predictable picture Commanding Officer, the Heads of Once a QoL service has been that has been painted in this paper. Department, and the Operations introduced, it is extremely difficult to There is a third dimension to NCW Officer. Invested in this team is the either (i) remove the capability from that arguably introduces a further responsibility for the planning and the ship or (ii) fail to provide it on a complex, but less predictable factor execution of all activities involving continuous basis. Examples such as into the NCW equation. This is the the ship. Business activities and the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 19
day-to-day running of the ship is HMAS Tobruk’s navigation officer Lieutenant typically the responsibility of the Commander Anthony Allen gives orders to Heads of Department, answering to the bridge from HMAS Tobruk’s bridge wing the Commanding Officer. The conduct of operational and tactical activities is vested in the Principal Warfare Officers (when borne), the Navigating Officer and the ship’s Operations Officer; again answering to the Commanding Officer. So how does NWC impact on this team? There are two separate effects. First, is the previously mentioned expansion of information exchange supporting the Corporate/Enterprise information systems. This is a predictable consequence noting that these systems are generally the greatest users of the available bandwidth. The impact on the ship’s hand, Head of Department command team is most immediately hovering close by, is all too felt by the Commanding Officer and common. One is reminded the respective Heads of Department; of those ancient marble as the quantity of business related statues of Atlas, head and information being sent to and from torso bowed, bearing the the ship is increased. Gone forever are weight of the world upon his the days when the Command team shoulders. only had to focus on administrative correspondence alongside in port. THE HUMAN DIMENSION TO The contemporary environment DECISION-MAKING requires constant attention to these issues, irrespective of the operational Colonel John Boyd once ship, and the requirement for this to Embarked forces conduct baton workload placed on the command stated, ‘Machines don’t fight wars. be processed by the ship’s command training during their team. People do, and they use their minds.’ A team, is significant. Relating this to transit to Exercise The second effect is the enhanced famous fighter pilot, and an individual Boyd’s OODA loop, it can be deduced Talisman Sabre on situation awareness being delivered renown for his great intellect, Colonel that without any further intervention HMAS Manoora to the ship’s operations staff. Greater Boyd devoted considerable energy or information filtering, the decision- amounts of tactical data are now being to understanding the mechanism of making capability of the individual can passed into the ship’s operations room, human decision-making. The most reach maximum capacity. both pictorially and in text form. famous outcome of this was his OODA As much as theory can be espoused, Additionally tactical voice circuits loop; a concept that Boyd only drew a and acknowledged, it is essential that, remain essential, so the contemporary little over a year before he died. as an organisation, changes in the way PWO now has to listen, watch an The OODA loop describes human in which we communicate must occur. increasingly complex and far ranging decision-making in the context of Recently, the RAN participated in tactical picture, and type – often at the four key activities: Observation, Exercise Talisman Sabre, a combined same time. Orientation, Decision and Action. The exercise with the USN Seventh Fleet. The combined effect can be seen in OODA loop is depicted as follows: To quote a senior communications the Commanding Officer. The image of This paper has already hinted to officer aboard an Australian frigate, a Commanding Officer wearing anti- a key impact of NCW on a ship’s ‘the quantity of information was flash sitting in the Operations Room, command team. The increase in horrendous.’ headset on, clipboard and pen in information flowing to and from a It is ironic that, in an era where Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 20 The Ship’s Command Team & Network Centric Warfare
Able Seaman Air required reaction times to events are Technical Aircraft reducing, the quantity of information Travis Scrace, one is required to process is increasing. Able Seaman The words of that communications Air Technical Avionics Don officer should resound in our collective Mason, ABATV minds as we embrace NCW in the Fleet. David Broadhurst and ABATV Grant CHALLENGES Rogers The implementation of NCW in the maritime environment poses two key challenges to a ship’s command team. They are (1) managing existing CIS capability and (2) the processes governing the delivery and management of information. The NCW Roadmap 2007 details four key actions that will continue the ADF on the road to becoming a fully NCW force. Of the four, ranking It is crucial that these factors second is:2 are addressed before new capability Establish the Network that will link is delivered to ships. The Defence engagement systems with sensor and Capability Development Manual command and control systems and 2006 offers a robust framework for provide the underlying information ensuring this occurs. In considering infrastructure upon which the all the Fundamental Inputs to networked force will be developed. Capability (FIC)3 in the project As this action indicates, a key phase, capability will be delivered activity is the delivery of new networks to the Fleet that is well-developed to the ADF that will enable the conduct and cognisant of the impost placed of NCW. in ship’s companies at the time of The Fleet’s experience with the delivery. management of the delivery of CIS Likewise, the aim must be to capability is not strong. Factors such as deliver a common hardware and the delayed delivery of communications software solution across the Fleet. capability into fleet units, capability Whilst some variation may be that is incomplete due to poor project required by platform type, pushing scoping, a proliferation of discrete for a common equipment baseline CIS capability along FEG lines (aka minimises the raise, train and stovepipes), and a lack of operator sustain requirements. The effect of training has soured the experience at this can not be overstated. the ship level. Similarly, the increased The second challenge, the demands being placed upon Ship’s delivery and management of average person can read up to 250 An Australian Black Hawk Loadmaster Command and Communications information, is harder to solve. words a minute, speak at 120 words a prepares to lower a Teams has not been adequately catered Contemporary literature suggests minute, and type at 35 – 50 words a soldier’s equipment for, as ship’s scheme of complements that the human mind has the ability to minute. In a similar vein, the literature continue to reflect a manning construct comprehend up to 600 words a minute. suggests that the human mind can take established, in some cases, in the early The literature further states that the in an A4 sized picture in a quarter of a 1980’s. second; however the degree to which 3 There are eight FICs: Organisation; Personnel; Collective Training; Major the information is comprehended is not 2 Commonwealth of Australia, NCW Systems; Supplies; Facilities; Support; clear. Roadmap 2007, p v Command and Management Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 21
The above indicates that the most in Fleet CIS capability is managed efficient method of communicating correctly, NCW will also deliver greater information to a decision maker is by interoperability for our maritime forces. pictures, followed by reading text. The The ability to participate in combined slowest method of communication is and allied exercises or operations as by typing. a respected and equal player will be In examining how NCW is highly welcomed, both by the RAN as conveying information to the well as by our allies. decision-maker, it would appear that a combination of pictures and text is CONCLUSION the most efficient. Perhaps one should This paper examined the impact of question the prevalence of ‘Chat’ as a NCW on the ship’s command team. means of conducting tactical command It posited that the implementation and control, noting the limitations of of NCW in the tactical maritime typing when compared to that of using environment presents substantial Commander Stephen Dryden, RAN one’s voice. challenges and opportunities for Whatever the solution adopted, it the ship’s command team. It further Commander Dryden is a Surface is essential to minimise the amount of posited that to fully capitalise upon Warfare and Communications information required to be processed the enhanced operational capability specialist. He has held appointments by the decision maker. Placing this into delivered by NCW, it is important to as the CTG SCO/OPSO HMAS Brisbane, the context of a ship, the imperative understand the human dimension as a member of the Directing Staff must remain on the delivery of the right to command decision-making. As a information, at the right time, and to critical node in the ‘sensor-shooter- at the PWO Faculty HMAS Watson, the right person. The intelligent limiting decision-maker’ system, the ship’s and as the Deputy Director Maritime of information being delivered to the command team must be able to Communications and Information decision maker must then also optimise operate effectively and efficiently in an Systems (N63). More recently, he was towards methods that promote rapid environment dominated by information the Commissioning Executive Officer of comprehension, such as text and and multiple communications networks pictures for information pull and voice The successful implementation of the ANZAC Class frigate HMAS Ballarat. for information push. NCW into the Australian Fleet will rely Graduating from the Australian on two key factors: the effective delivery Command & Staff Course in 2006, he OPPORTUNITIES and management of the enhanced CIS commenced his current appointment as The implementation of NCW in the capability that NCW provides; and by the Commander Fleet Communications Fleet offers great opportunities for ensuring that the human dimension to the ship’s command team. Enhanced decision making is fully considered in (N6) at Fleet Headquarters in January situational awareness and improved the NCW construct. 2007. decision-making will deliver more The final word, given this paper’s effective operational effects in the introduction, will be left with Admiral maritime battlespace. Lord Nelson, who said: ‘My disposition Bibliography Commonwealth of Australia, Australian The delivery of greater CIS capability cannot bear tame and slow measures.’ Maritime Doctrine, RAN Doctrine 1, into the Fleet, spurred on by the NCW 4 One can be quietly confident, as the Department of Defence, Canberra, 2000. Commonwealth of Australia, The Navy requirement, is also delivering positive Australian Fleet embraces NCW and Contribution to Australian Maritime results to the Fleet. Greater bandwidth improvements in decision making and Operations, RAN Doctrine 2, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2005. is now facilitating more effective operational effectiveness result, Nelson Hibbert, C. 1994, Nelson – A Personal business activities, improving the would be well pleased. � History, Penguin Group, England Jones, S & Gosling J., 2005, Nelson’s Quality of Life at sea, and is providing Way – Leadership Lessons from the Great greater options for the conduct of Commander, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, London operational and exercise planning and 4 Jones, S & Gosling J., 2005, Nelson’s execution. Way – Leadership Lessons from the Great Provided that the widening gap Commander, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, London, p56 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Issue 127 23 Royal Australian Navy Pilot Training & Aerial Hydrographic Surveying in the 1920s DTmC r i oYLE
Chart showing off- viation in the Royal Australian shore survey area Navy (RAN) began with the by 101 Flight. The orderingA of six Fairey IIID floatplanes reconnaissance area in 1920 as ‘Australian Naval Aircraft’ lay between latitudes 20 and 21 degrees to operate in the survey role. With the south. An advance formation of the Royal Australian Air base for two officers Force (RAAF) in 1921 the aircraft were and seven airmen transferred to the RAAF and based was established on at Point Cook, Victoria. Although St Bees Island, 100 miles from Bowen. intended for operations from naval St Bees Island is ships only one aircraft – attached contained within the to HMAS Geranium – was actually lowest of the three deployed in this role.1 squares.16 To staff the naval air arm, a small number of naval officers underwent pilot training with the RAAF at Point 2 February 1925 and he soloed on 23 urban landmarks over which he Cook. The aviation career of one of March with a total flying time of 15 flew. Two training flights comprised these officers, Lieutenant Vincent hours 10 minutes.3 His first excursion triangular courses Point Cook – Edward Kennedy RAN, is illustrative from the confines of the Point Cook Winchelsea – Geelong – Essendon – of the short-lived naval pilot program aerodrome occurred on 30 March Point Cook, which were completed by of the 1920s, which culminated in the when he flew as a passenger to Port the end of September. pioneering use of aircraft for RAN Melbourne and return. A further Other flying serials included hydrographic surveying off the North flight to St Kilda and return on 9 June general aircraft handling comprising Queensland coast. was also as a passenger in a formation circuits and landings, forced landings, Lieutenant Kennedy entered the flight. His first flight solo beyond the aerobatics and formation flying. RAN College at Jervis Bay in 1915 and, Point Cook aerodrome area was to Kennedy then began to train in as was normal practice at the time, Melbourne and return flying a DH9 military applications such as Lewis undertook his senior midshipman on 4 September. This and subsequent gun practice, photography, visual training in a Royal Navy ship, the flights required very little navigational signalling and bombing. He underwent battle cruiser HMS Tiger. In 1924 he expertise because of the prominent a photography test over the Point underwent a naval observer’s course at Point Cook and was appointed to the survey ship HMAS Geranium as observer in the Fairey IIID seaplane attached to the ship, which was operating on the Great Barrier Reef conducting hydrographic surveys for the preparation of maritime charts. The following year he volunteered for the ‘Australian Fleet Air Arm’, together with Lieutenants G.G. Carter and D. Ross, and undertook flying training and subsequent service with the RAAF Excerpt from Chart 2759a Australia until 1928 when he elected to remain Northern Portion, in the RAN as an observer, rather than London, published transfer to the RAAF as a pilot.2 at the Admiralty 28th Kennedy’s flight training began on December 1934. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 24 Royal Australian Navy Pilot Training & Aerial Hydrographic Surveying in the 1920s
Cook airfield on 1925 was 119 hours, so the exercise naval exercises. The crew arrived at 12 November and would not have taxed his general flying the college slipway on 22 August after a visual signalling skills despite his limited exposure to a total flying time of six hours. In exercise with the ‘cross-country’ flying. His total hours addition to the several exercises flown light cruiser HMAS were accumulated through experience in support of RAN ships, such as Sydney steaming in on five aircraft types: the Avro 504, observing the fall of main armament Port Phillip Bay the the DH9, the DH9A, the Fairey IIID shot and carrying out dummy attacks next day. Supermarine Seagull floatplane and the SE5A fighter. The on the ships, the crew undertook a III amphibian ‘Cloud flying’, a rudimentary Avro 504 was a twin-seat basic trainer two hour 45 minute reconnaissance showing the and inherently dangerous ‘blind amphibious features on which pilots received elementary from Jervis Bay to Port Hacking and flying’ technique, was undertaken as of flotation hull and flying instruction and first soloed. The return.7 Port Hacking is located to part of the flying training syllabus.4 retractable wheels DH9 provided training in military skills the south of Botany Bay in the present Approximately 90 minutes was by which the aircraft such as gunnery and photography as Sydney metropolitan area. This return practiced in several flights within the could be taxied well as familiarisation with a heavier, flight demonstrated the ability of a from the Bowen confines of the aerodrome. beachfront into the more advanced aircraft. Experience floatplane crew to reconnoitre an area Kennedy’s ‘air pilotage’ test was the sea.10 on the Fairey IIID was required for of coastline to a radius of 90 nautical first navigation-based examination, future seaplane flying on hydrographic miles (nm) and return to base. In this and was conducted over three flights operations; and the SE5A was a fighter context of maritime reconnaissance the on 24 November in a aircraft used for aerobatics training. aircraft could have alighted on Sydney DH9A. The first test The requirement to convert onto each Harbour, refuelled, and continued for comprised a flight of of these aircraft types required extra a further 90 nm, thereby covering the two hours duration dual flying, solo tests and subsequent approaches to Australia’s premier naval at a height of 2000 flying practice.6 and mercantile port. feet on a course ‘as Kennedy increasingly flew the required for test’. This Fairey IIID floatplane in navigation Aerial Hydrographic flight was logged with exercises in the Port Phillip Bay and Surveying Kennedy in command Mornington Peninsula areas. Flights Following the 1925 government and accompanied by also comprised naval cooperation and decision to construct a seaplane a Flying Officer Simpson. No detail of military practice such as the 1 June carrier for the RAN, a complementary the route was provided. The second 1926 ‘bombing Submarine J2’. Toward requirement arose for suitable aircraft flight, 55 minutes at 2400 feet, with the latter part of World War I, trained to operate from the ship. The type Kennedy flying solo, was carried out observers carried out the military skills selected was the Supermarine Seagull over the route Point Cook – Lake of reconnaissance, gunnery, bombing III single-engined, wooden-hulled, Durdiwham – Sunbury – Essendon. and signalling in multi-crewed biplane amphibian. Kennedy landed at Essendon at 1520 aircraft; however, with the postwar The aircraft arrived from the United but immediately took off for the return disbandment of the observer category Kingdom in mid-1926 and joined to Point Cook at 2000 feet with a 20 in the Royal Air Force and RAAF, pilots No. 101 (Fleet Cooperation) Flight minute flight time.5 The outward were required to be proficient in these commanded by Flight Lieutenant A. L. flight was a north-westerly track skills. When the RAAF developed a Hempel. The first three aircraft were to Sunbury thence south-easterly maritime reconnaissance capability assembled and transported to Bowen to Essendon airfield. These flights in the 1930s, these duties gradually in north Queensland for hydrographic were not geographically challenging reverted to the re-invigorated observer surveying duties, which had begun because a road and railway intersected category. with the Fairey IIID seaplane in 1924. at Sunbury and Essendon airfield was On 20 August 1926 a crew of three, The survey flights began in September similarly well-marked. The return comprising Kennedy, a Lieutenant 1926 and continued until the end of flight had the advantage of the city of Carter and RAAF Corporal Haynes, 1928. Operations started and ended on Melbourne and the western edge of departed Point Cook in a Fairey IIID the beach at Bowen with the Seagulls Port Phillip Bay marking the route. for the RAN College at Jervis Bay, taxying into the water on their wheels Kennedy’s total aeronautical Australian Capital Territory – via before retracting them manually for experience at the end of November Paynesville and Eden – to support take-off and lowering them at the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 25
conclusion of the flight when returning On 18 March 1927 Hempel, days later. to the beach.8 Kennedy and an aircraftman left The Seagulls then returned to north Two methods were employed on the Bowen to fly south to take part in a Queensland to continue surveying. aerial surveys. One involved sketching series of RAAF ceremonial flights Kennedy in A9-4 arrived at Gladstone the reefs and islands from the air, which on the occasion of the opening of on 18 July and carried out a series was a rapid means of initial surveying. the provisional Parliament House in of surveys until 8 August using the This was followed by a small boat team, Canberra on 9 May by the Duke of photographic technique along the reefs which refined the sketches and took York. A second Seagull was probably adjacent to Bunker Gap, Lady Elliot depth soundings. The other method in company.12 The route was coastal Island and the islands in the region of involved aerial photography in which, via Styx, Bundaberg, Brisbane, Port the Capricorn and Curtis Channels. to fix the position of reefs in relation to Macquarie to Pittwater, north of Kennedy flew back to Bowen and each other, markers were dropped onto Sydney, thence inland to the RAAF carried out photo reconnaissance the reefs and photographed, ensuring base at Richmond where the aircraft flights in the previously-surveyed area that the markers appeared in both arrived on 24 March after a total flying until 2 December when he returned prints. Position fixing by both methods time of 17 hours. Two days later to Melbourne while Seagull surveying was carried out by the aircraft alighting the aircraft took part in the escort operations continued until the end of on the water adjacent to the reefs and for the battle-cruiser HMS Renown 1928. Kennedy’s last flight as a pilot the observers taking sextant readings to carrying the Duke and Duchess took place on 30 May 1928 when measure angles from prominent shore of York who were arriving for the he did 50 minutes dual aerobatics geographical features.9 opening of parliament ceremonies. practice in an Avro trainer. All his Pilots used an Aircraft Plotting Following some local air practice in the subsequent flying was as an observer Wimperis Wind Diagram (APD) to sketch details from Gauge Bearing Sydney area, which included artillery operating from RAN cruisers, the which bearings and distances could Plate for measuring cooperation, Hempel and Kennedy seaplane carrier HMAS Albatross be calculated. The APD featured a drift angle by tail flew the Seagull to Point Cook and Royal Navy aircraft carriers. He centrally printed compass rose and bearings.22 departing 17 April and arriving four was seconded to the RN (July 1928 to graduations for latitude along the January 1929 and May left hand edge. The observer drew 1930 to May 1932) meridians of longitude and entered the flying from the aircraft latitude band for the area of operations. carriers HM Ships The features under survey were then Hermes and Glorious sketched using the centre of the respectively. compass rose as a reference point. Kennedy and Lieutenant J. E. Hewitt North RAN began hydrographic operations Queensland on 27 September with a three hour Hydrographic 30 minute flight in Seagull A9-3 from flights in 1928 Bowen to the Barrier Reef and return.11 With the conclusion of The flight took oblique photographs the air support to the and carried out general reconnaissance. hydrographic effort Flying then proceeded on a daily basis in North Queensland, with flights of approximately three Lieutenant Hewitt, hours 30 minutes covering distances officer-in-charge up to 100 nautical miles from Bowen of 101 (Fleet surveying the many reefs in the vicinity Cooperation) of Hook, Cumberland and Holbourne Flight, reported Islands flanking the Whitsunday on the operations. Passage, and proceeding as far as In addition to the Flinders Passage. Sketching was the activity detailed in primary surveying method carried out connection with on these flights. Kennedy’s attachment, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 26 Royal Australian Navy Pilot Training & Aerial Hydrographic Surveying in the 1920s
or oblique used was blamed. Added to this photographs was constant bad weather and initial and plotting unfamiliarity with the immediate from area. Dead-reckoning navigation ‘navigationally became progressively less accurate controlled over 50 miles from the starting point aerial traverses’. of the flight as errors inherent in wind- Vertical finding, instrument errors and flying photography accuracies compounded, particularly was discounted if there were several course changes because of the required for each flight.17 To reduce scattering of the number of course changes, a series the reefs, the of ‘control points’ was established extremities to serve as starting points for each of which traverse flight.18 could not be Instruments used for the traverse the Flight carried out a number of Excerpt from Chart framed in single photographs, while no flights were two Type 253 compasses Outer Barrier Reef surveys that were 2759a Australia suitable oblique cameras were available. (for pilot and observer), an ‘aneroid’ pioneering in the use of aircraft and Northern Portion, Therefore the previously untried (altimeter), an air speed indicator (ASI), London, published innovative techniques for hydrographic at the Admiralty navigationally-controlled traverse a Wimperis wind gauge bearing plate, 13 19 surveying. 28th December 1934. method was adopted which gave a a marine sextant and a chronometer. The area of the Reef to be surveyed Bowen is situated relatively accurate representation of These instruments were inadequate comprised approximately 5000 square at 20 degrees south the reef shapes and positions. The for the exacting standard of navigation miles, to a distance of 45 miles off- latitude, 148 degrees procedure was to fly pre-determined required for the traverse surveying east longitude. shore. The object of the survey was compass courses as accurately as flights. The 253 compasses were non- to locate passages through the reef possible while the observer took aperiodic and would have been subject for naval defence and to mark the bearings on prominent points of the to turning errors.20 Because of the lack inner and outer reef edges for the reefs. The observer also plotted the of specialised equipment, the ‘aneroids’ compilation of a reconnaissance map courses and the bearings on charts, and the ASI could not be calibrated showing the grouping and relative sketched the reefs and photographed for the local environment. Laboratory positions of the various reefs.14 them.15 testing for the ASI was not available in The methods considered for the In practice the traverse method Australia at that time and calibration survey were mapping from vertical provided mixed results for which the in the field could only be carried out quality of the by flights upwind and downwind over instruments a known distance.21 Precise altitudes could not be flown because of the inaccurate calibration and also because the instrument dials were marked Aircraft Plotting in units of 200 feet. While this was Diagram (APD) pencil sketch adequate for normal service flying, showing the coast when precision height-holding was not between Port necessary, the need for accuracy in the Fairy, Victoria, aerial survey application challenged the and Millicent, technology available at the time. South Australia. Hewitt estimated the errors in APD printed by the Hydrographic reef positions to average three miles, Dept. of the which could have been reduced by Admiralty 25th one-third with accurate instruments. March 1933, He regarded the overall aerial survey Kennedy papers. method as carried out by 101 Flight Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 27
scheme as Kennedy. He later transferred from the international standard atmosphere, as insufficiently accurate to definitively fix reef positions for to the RAAF, rising to the rank of air vice which in 1928 was a sea level temperature of marine navigation, so more traditional surface surveying marshal. Williams, p. 144. 10 degrees centigrade and a pressure setting 12 Kennedy operated A9-2 on 4 March and of 1013.2 millibars. With the application procedures were required to follow-up the aerial surveys to left Bowen in A9-1 on 18 March. It is likely of these corrections the true air speed was refine results.23 � the two aircraft flew in company to provide obtained, which, in the operation under mutual support. Kennedy and Flying discussion, was set into the Wimperis Officer Ross flew A9-2 on 26 March for the instrument from which was extracted the Lieutenant Commander Coyle royal escort. wind component and the ground speed. 13 NAA File Series A9376, Control Symbol 22 H.E.Wimperis, Air Navigation, D. Van has been an active naval 97, Report on Air Survey of the Great Nostrand Company, New York, 1920, p. Barrier Reef 1928 by No. 101 Flight RAAF. 54. A glass panel occupied the centre of the reserve intelligence officer Hewitt’s unsigned report was included as bearing plate and was marked by concentric for 20 years. In his civilian part of the overall report to the Naval Board circles corresponding to wind speeds by by the commanding officer of the survey intervals of 10 mph. Beneath the glass a employment he is an adviser to ship HMAS MORESBY. red-coloured wind point (A) was mounted 14 Ibid. Hewitt’s portion of the report on a wind arrow (B) which was slid so that Government on international comprised Appendix B of the MORESBY the red spot could be set to any wind speed submission with reference to the circles. B was set into arms control issues. In August 15 Ibid, Appendix B, Section 3 Outline of the wind ring (R) which was turned by a 2006 he submitted his PhD Method. knob, N, so that it could be pointed in any 16 Ibid. Appendix B, Section 2, Work direction relative to the bearing plate. A thesis on the history of air Carried Out, Figure 1. drift bar (D) was marked with speed and 17 Ibid. Appendix B, Section 4 Actual time scales and a bevelled edge for drawing navigation in the RAAF. Procedure. drift lines on the bearing plate glass. It also 18 Refer Figure 5. The ‘major control had drift wires on either side which carried points’ were Tern Island, at the southern two sets of timing beads, one red and one (Endnotes) extremity of the area, Parker Reef, at the black. D was pivoted at one end to a nut 1 Lieutenant R. M. Jones, ‘Launching Air Arm’, in Navy Quarterly, western edge, and Square Reef, which which was adjusted by handle S until the Volume 2, Number 2, (Autumn/Winter 1973, Department of the was the north-westerly extremity (not index pointed to the true air speed on scale Navy and the Australian Government Publishing Service), p. 7 marked on chart), which was established X. The nut carried a quadrant drift scale (Q) 2 F. B. Eldridge, A History of the Royal Australian Naval College, by astronomical fixes by the 1927 survey over which the tail of D moved, the pointer (Melbourne, Georgian House for the Author, 1949), pp. 363 ─ 364. flights. Six ‘minor control points’ were indicated the drift angle. The height bar H 3 All references to Kennedy’s flying career are taken from his log then required – three on the outer reef was hinged at the base with slider C. C had books. These comprise A.18 Royal Australian Air Force Flying edge and three approximately half way two ring backsights for observing the drift Log Book with entries from 2 February 1925 to 30 May 1930 and between the inner and outer edges. These against the ‘V’ foresight or along the drift Naval Observer’s Log Book from 17 July 1930 to 26 November 1936. minor points were established by drawing wires of any object over which the aircraft These log books are from the papers of the late Commander V. E. a three-mile square area on the chart and had passed. Kennedy RAN (Rtd.) via Rear Admiral Phillip Kennedy AO RAN a flight conducted from a major control Method of Use: When established on a (Rtd.). point to the area and the position located steady course the bearing plate was turned 4 ‘Cloud flying’ was employed in early aircraft when pilots lost by DR and by an astro position line taken by until the lubber mark (reference line) visual contact with the ground. Blind flying panels, which provided a marine sextant (if possible). Two further pointed to the course being steered. D was safer instrument flying, were introduced in the 1930s and comprised flights were then made from the other major then turned until it was parallel to the earth gyro-stabilised instruments such as the artificial horizon, vertical control points to pass over this position so drift which was noted by observing a ground speed indicator, directional gyro and turn coordinator. Cloud flying its position was fixed by three intersecting object over which the aircraft had passed, or consisted of the pilot listening to the ‘singing’ of the aircraft flying flights. a smoke float if over water. A line was then wires, which roughly indicated the attitude of the aircraft and its 19 Control Symbol 97, Appendix B, Section drawn on the glass along the bevelled edge speed. These skills came naturally to pilots as their experience grew 6, Instruments. D. A new course was then turned onto, not and, theoretically, they could tell whether the aircraft was climbing, 20 ‘Aperiodic’ compasses, developed in less than 45 degrees from the line of the first diving or flying straight and level. In zero visibility, pilots presumed 1918, eliminated the dangerous ‘northern course and the procedure was repeated. that by listening to the sound of the wires they could maintain turning error’ which occurred when an The intersection of the two lines gave the the aircraft’s correct attitude in cloud. This could be fatal, or at aircraft banked, causing the compass card wind speed and direction (wind velocity) least startling, when the pilot broke through cloud and regained to assume the same banked angle. This and drift. orientation. resulted in the compass needle appearing The alternative method which only required 5 ‘Lake Durdiwham’ was not located in research for this study but to turn in the direction of the turn and one course, was to time the passage of a was probably located near Sunbury. Current maps show a series of thus not continuing to point to magnetic ground feature or smoke float from one waterworks reservoirs north west of Sunbury. north. The aperiodic compass rapidly timing bead to the other on D while viewing 6 The Avro 504 was equipped with an obsolete ‘rotary’ engine, returned the needle to north-pointing, when the object through the backsight C set to the which turned with the propeller. The engine revolutions could only deflected, by ‘damping’ the compass system, correct altitude. This gave a timing run of be controlled by switching off the engine when descending. This which consisted of fine wires suspended half a mile. Timing could be by the red or took the form of ‘blipping’ the switch to control the descent by in compass bowl liquid. For the surveying black beads. If timing on the red beads the rapidly switching off and on to maintain flying speed and control. operations, the compasses were swung with backsight was set to the red scale and vice As no other RAAF aircraft used the rotary engine at this time it was the aircraft fully loaded in flying position versa if timing from the black beads. From necessary to convert onto a later type to continue training. with the engine running at cruising speed. the stop-watch reading in seconds, a mark 7 Aircraft observation of fall of shot was one of the first uses of Deviation on the cardinal points (north, was made on the glass opposite the red aircraft in military operations, both in land and maritime operations. south, east and west) and the quadrantal figure on the drift bar. This gave the wind While shell splashes could be reasonably estimated by gunnery staff points (north-east, south-east, south-west velocity. The reading on the black scale of in warships’ gunnery directors high on the masts in larger warships, and north-west) did not exceed two degrees. D against the mark gave the ground speed aerial observations communicated by W/T provided an accurate Control Symbol 97, Appendix B, Section 6, while the red scale gave the number of cross-check. Instruments. minutes to cover 30 miles. 8 Lieutenant R. M. Jones, pp. 7 ─ 8. 21 Control Symbol 97, Appendix B, Section 23 Control Symbol 97, Appendix B, Section 9 Ibid, p. 8. 7, Errors. ASI readings had to be corrected 7, Errors (f) Summary. 10 Ibid, p. 10. for instrument errors and for the divergence 11 Lieutenant Hewitt underwent RAAF pilot training in the same of local temperature and pressure conditions Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 28 Whales and Active Sonar – Challenges & Opportunities BCy ommander Steve Cole, PhD, RANR
The extent to which marine mammals uniformly stable, or recovering, and • masking of important biological are affected by human-created are not under threat from human sounds (sounds of prey or underwater sound, particularly active activity. Depletion of some species communication with other sonar, has been a topic of growing through whaling and other human members of the pod) public concern in recent years. This causes such as pollution and by- • changing behaviour (dive article explores the complex issues catch has strengthened community Australian waters patterns, movement, abandonment surrounding the effects of underwater resolve to ensure their protection. are populated or of activities such as hunting prey) sound on marine mammals and the In parallel, development of a whale visited by around • stress (fright, flight) importance the Royal Australian watching industry with prospects for forty species • physical injury to hearing Navy (RAN) places on environmental employment and wealth generation mechanisms of whales and management, to ensure long term in regional areas has highlighted the • tissue damage leading to injury access to vital offshore training areas. economic value of marine mammal dolphins or death. Australia is fundamentally a conservation. maritime nation, potentially vulnerable All marine mammals have adapted The scale of impact is a function of the to any efforts to block key trade and to use sound as a primary tool for source sound output level (loudness), supply routes from above or below communication, identification and transmission reflection and absorption the sea. Maintaining a credible RAN hunting prey. anti-submarine capability remains As a result, any important in a region that has seen human activity significant growth in submarine forces. that produces In addition, the increasing focus on underwater littoral operations, linked partly to sound has the need for maritime amphibious the potential capabilities, means ships will need to to impact on operate in areas where conventional or disrupt sonar technology is challenged by poor these vital seawater transmission characteristics communication and complex sea floor structure. processes. Modern conventional submarines are Underwater quieter through better design, and are sound from therefore more challenging to identify RAN vessels by passive means. With no viable can be emitted alternative technology, the RAN will by explosives, continue to rely on a combination of ship and passive and active sonar for detection boat engines, of submarines. This requires regular underwater and realistic sea-going training communication of personnel and maintenance of systems and equipment to meet this complex and active sonars. multi-faceted challenge. The impact Australian waters are populated of sound or visited by around forty species of disturbance whales and dolphins, ranging in size on marine from dolphins to the Blue Whale (up mammals can to 30 metres in length). Unlike other be manifested parts of the world, Australian marine in a number of mammal population levels are almost ways, including: Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 29
characteristics of the water column slope waters, and are and sea floor, and distance from the the deepest diving of all source to the animal. Equally important air breathing species, is the auditory capability of the animal recorded at depths (can the species hear the transmission exceeding 2,000 metres, frequency?) and the animal’s propensity and able to breath-hold to react to the sound (is it easily for periods in excess of startled?). Scientists and regulators are a staggering 80 minutes. particularly interested in managing Scientific understanding ‘biologically significant’ sounds, of the physiology of specifically those that affect important beaked whales is poor, activities such as feeding, breeding and unsurprising when they migration. are commonly exposed Recent articles have highlighted the to pressures of over challenges faced by navies worldwide in 200 atmospheres and dealing with these issues. For the RAN, significant oxygen deficits the conduct of vital training activities during a single dive. in realistic conditions at sea is essential The actual cause of to maintaining necessary operational these strandings remains skills. Offshore training areas are unclear, but a number concentrated close to the major fleet of theories have been bases on the east and west coasts, to suggested to explain a ensure ready access and minimise potential mechanism for transit times between harbour and injury. The most plausible sea. These areas are also frequented of these imply a change by increasing whale populations. For in diving behaviour example, the West Australian Exercise leading to symptoms Area, west of Fremantle, is inhabited by of decompression various species, including Blue whales sickness or induction which feed in the Rottnest Trench use of active sonar in the northern of stress through a fright and flight in summer and autumn. Humpback hemisphere, and once during a seismic response to the sound. The difficulties whales migrate through the area survey of the Gulf of California. in understanding and managing these twice each year between their winter Of these events, strandings in the risks are compounded by recent breeding areas in the tropical north Canary Islands and a highly publicised evidence that beaked whales hear quite and summer feeding grounds in the In recent years stranding in the Bahamas have poorly at the frequencies used by naval waters of Antarctica. Beaked whales the RAN sought galvanised public and interest group anti-submarine sonars. are also seen in deep offshore waters to develop attention to ensure that active sonar is A stranding of melon headed over summer. Increasing numbers of environmental used in a manner that avoids similar whales during the 2004 Rim of the marine mammals can therefore be incidents in future. Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise off Hawaii management expected to be encountered in the area Beaked whales are amongst the influenced the US Navy to seek a regardless of time of year, reinforcing strategies most poorly understood of all whale permit to conduct sonar exercises the need for RAN exercise planners that would be species. They are relatively small, during RIMPAC 06. This was granted and individual ships, submarines and recognised as elusive, generally do not congregate by the US National Marine and aircraft to remain alert to possible amongst the best in large numbers, and their principal Fisheries Service, though a subsequent whale interactions. habitats often lie well offshore. Beaked court challenge by a US interest group in the world Beaked whales are acknowledged whales have been observed in most resulted in a restraining order against as potentially threatened by southern waters of Australia from New the US Navy, citing ‘overwhelming underwater sound. A number of South Wales to southwest Western evidence’ that active sonar can injure multiple strandings of beaked whales Australia. They are unique in that they marine mammals. Subsequent have occurred coincident with naval hunt for squid in deep continental negotiation saw the exercise proceed, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 30 Whales and Active Sonar – Challenges & Opportunities
but with significant mitigation to ensure that activities routinely areas, dive profiles, as well as auditory measures in place. conducted at sea are managed in a responses and behavioural reactions to Despite lack of scientific consensus, way that meets legislative obligations noise, and the longer term biological circumstantial evidence surrounding and community expectations, using consequences of noise impact, are all some whale strandings is enough a widely endorsed framework. The crucial to understanding the potential to suggest the need to manage the MAEMP has been designed with three impact of human activities on marine potential adverse impact of some levels of management: mammals. Some valuable research types of active sonar. Indeed, the • Planning Handbooks for some continues on a number of whale Australian Environment Protection key training areas where a range species, including Blue whales off the and Biodiversity Conservation Act of activities may be conducted West coast, but beaked whale research 1999 prescribes such a precautionary simultaneously, to assist exercise in Australia is minimal. approach in cases where complete planners in considering cumulative The key point is that the RAN data is not available. The EPBC impacts and location specific issues. would be a direct beneficiary of such Act also focuses on critical habitat • Planning Guides provide guidance research. This justifies allocation of for each species, most importantly on specific activities during the dedicated research funding targeted at feeding, breeding and resting areas. activity planning phase. Where key species which are considered most These obligations formed the basis necessary, both the Planning at risk from the effects of underwater for the RAN developing appropriate Handbooks and Guides recommend noise. Better knowledge would provide mitigation standards to avoid adverse separation of an activity from a greater confidence that appropriate impacts on marine mammals. critical habitat. management strategies and mitigation Managing the potential for impact • Procedure Cards provide specific measures are devised to avoid causing is challenging in an environment guidance on individual activities, unnecessary harm. There is also need where the animals are mostly unseen, recognising the importance of for continued education within the elusive, and have poorly understood managing activities in real time. RAN about managing potential whale physiology and behaviour. Some of the The MAEMP is widely acknowledged interactions during training activities principal mechanisms available include as amongst the most comprehensive at sea. separation of activities from known and effective in use today, and has The consultative and innovative whale congregations in space and time enhanced the RAN’s reputation for approach used by the RAN in (a planning function), detection and proactive and innovative management managing potential marine mammal avoidance methods using observers, of marine environmental issues. The interactions puts the Navy in a leading and management of transmissions to MAEMP has also been well accepted position, by demonstrating that reduce received sound intensities to by RAN personnel, who are keen meeting necessary environmental accepted levels where interactions are to ensure that their responsibilities compliance standards is possible considered likely. for environmental compliance and without undue impact on training. In recent years the RAN sought to sustainable management are met. Further research will help to minimise develop environmental management However, uncertainties about any regulatory constraints placed strategies that would be recognised marine mammals remain and there is a on activities at sea, and ensure that as amongst the best in the world, risk that overly precautionary measures maximum value is obtained by employing all of these mitigation and prescriptive management could conducting necessary training under techniques. Of particular note was impact unnecessarily on the RAN’s realistic conditions. By maintaining its the decision to adopt a consultative training role at sea. In an effort to edge as leader in this field, the RAN approach, ensuring that key better understand the more vulnerable can continue to demonstrate that both government agencies, interest groups species, further scientific research into the environment and the Service can and the public had an opportunity behaviour, population distribution and be winners. � to participate in the development of abundance is fundamental to ensuring appropriate management strategies. effective mitigation measures and This article originally appeared The Maritime Activities management practices are in place in as a Semaphore periodic publication Environmental Management Plan key exercise areas. from the Sea Power Centre - (MAEMP) was progressively developed Information on individual species Australia. and finally implemented in 2005, including feeding, breeding and resting Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 31
21 Third Avenue, Technology Park SA 5095 • t 08 8343 3800 • f 8343 3778 • www.saabsystems.com.au
Saab Systems’ state of the art technology is making informed decisions enabling you to constantly evolve to meet changing needs and challenges.
HMAS Collins (foreground) rendezuous with HMAS Waller (left) and HMAS Rankin. Collins Class Submarines, HMAS Rankin, HMAS Waller and HMAS Collins transitting in formation through Gage Roads, Cockburn Sound.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 32 Images from Euripides D Sr aVID tEVENS
One of the more remarkable Australian other ranks and stalls for 20 horses. operations at the beginning of the Nevertheless, with the whereabouts of First World War took place not on several German warships uncertain, the battlefield but within our national authorities were unwilling to risk the shipyards. When, on 3 August 1914, troopships until they could assemble Prime Minister Joseph Cook informed a sufficiently powerful naval escort. Great Britain that Australia was Euripides did not embark her first anxious to send an expeditionary troops at Sydney until 19 October, with force, 20,000 strong, to any destination lighters used to ferry the troops from desired, little thought had actually Circular Quay. Few onboard knew been given to the question of how where they were going, but the scale of to transport the men and all their the undertaking was obvious to all. equipment. On 5 August the Australian Euripides made a quick passage Naval Board was forced to ask the of the Bight, and after waiting for the military authorities whether the Board remainder of what was now known was needed to prepare a scheme for as Convoy 1 to assemble, sailed from taking up ships, and if so from what Albany on 1 November. There were ports, and to carry what numbers, what 38 transports in all, with Euripides arms and what horses? leading the 3rd Division comprising A record send off from the population of Melbourne. Motor launches A first task was to prepare a list of the fastest vessels. The four escorting packed with well-wishers would also accompany the departing all ships in port or approaching the cruisers provided great comfort, and transports. Australian coast, which would allow for eight days later, one of them, their inspection and measurement by HMAS Sydney, destroyed the a Naval Transport Officer. Conversion German light cruiser SMS plans were prepared as soon as a Emden off the Cocos Islands. vessel had been assessed as suitable, Banjo Patterson, accompanying so that once her current cargo had the first troop contingent as a been discharged fitting out could war correspondent, ‘could hardly begin immediately. Modification work believe that Australia’s first naval entailed the gutting of all passenger engagement could have been accommodation, and included the such a sensational win’. addition of galleys, latrines, hospitals, For all the excitement of troop deck fittings and horse stalls. Convoy 1, the later voyages were To save time and expense the main usually quite routine, and to features were standardised, but still keep the troops fit and occupied required major changes to each ship’s required significant organisation. electrical and water systems. Speed of The Commanding Officer of the Pillow fighting competition. conversion grew with experience, and Fifth Light Horse Regiment described by June 1915 it was found possible to the ‘intensive training’ carried out merit were appointed to non-commissioned rank. Regular equip fully a transport for 1,500 troops during Convoy 2’s 42-day passage: courses of lectures were given to and by officers. Musketry, in just 60 hours. A certain part of the regiment was including practices at landscape targets were given special The largest of the 28 steamships detailed to look after the horses, and attention.1 initially requisitioned was Euripides, an the remainder underwent systematic The Transport Branch of the Navy Department Aberdeen White Star vessel of 15,000 instruction. Special attention was given eventually arranged for the requisition of 74 transports tons. Given the official number ‘A.14’, to the training of non-commissioned and, over the course of the War, 44 convoys would carry she was one of three transports to be officers. During the voyage the various some 337,000 men and 27,000 horses from Australia to fitted out in Brisbane. When completed examinations …were held, and shortly on 18 September 1914 Euripides before the termination of the voyage 1 Brigadier-General L.C. Wilson and Captain H. had berths for 136 officers, 2204 those men who had shown greatest Wetherell, History of the Fifth Light Horse Regiment, Motor Press, Sydney, 1926, p. 14, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 33 Euripides the battlefields of the Middle East Troop transport voyages from Australia made by Euripides 1914-1918 and Europe.2 None of those carried Embarkation Convoy Sailing Officers NCOs Men Nurses Total was ever lost to enemy action while Port Date on passage. In all it was a remarkable Sydney 1 19/10/14 73 115 2081 2269 demonstration of the mobility of Melbourne 6 8/5/15 66 86 2052 2204 resources conferred by Allied sea Sydney 13 2/11/15 26 63 2057 2146 power. The accompanying photos were Melbourne 20 4/4/16 31 69 2018 10 2128 taken by a crewmember of Euripides Sydney 24 9/9/16 26 53 1433 7 1519 and provide an insight into life Melbourne 24 11/9/16 14 20 584 618 Fremantle 24 17/9/16 1 1 onboard. � Melbourne 30 18/3/17 3 1 1 5 Sydney 35 31/10/17 42 77 1944 7 2070 Sydney 39 1/5/18 14 13 480 507 2 G. Tregarthen, Sea Transport of Totals 295 497 12651 24 13467 the AIF, Naval Transport Board, undated.
The Roman Catholic service.
Teatime.
David Stevens is the Director of Strategic and Historical Studies within the Sea Power Centre - Australia. He A lecture. has written many articles on naval historical and strategic subjects and is the author or editor of a number of books, most recently Sea Power Ashore and in the Air. Pictorial Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 34 Images from Euripides Euripides
The censors at work on the transport’s mail.
The view from the mainmast of Euripides when underway
Mouth Organ Band. The Orderly Room.
No. 4 Sea Transport Section AAMC. Washing Day.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 35
Disembarkation at Suez. Pay Day for the 11th Reinforcements of the 3rd Battalion.
A game of draughts.
For those personnel unused to the big ocean swells, the voyage could be unpleasant. Seasick soldiers sleeping on the upper-deck.
Innoculations.
Submarine drill. The greatest threat to the transports came from German U-boats and once in dangerous waters life vests were worn at all times.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 36 Loyal leader earned respect BM Fy iKE oGARTY
REAR ADMIRAL Marjorie Ray Thorpe – known as Ray – a year on the Voyager, Dovers was Bill Dovers was a was thrown from her horse and landed chosen to command the Royal Royal Australian at his feet. Despite his long absences at Malayan Navy, in the newly formed Navy officer who sea, they married during the war. Malayan Federation, for 2½ years. His commanded many At the outbreak of World War uncompromising integrity and political ships and much II, Dovers was serving on HMAS neutrality served him well in the new respect during his Canberra. He joined HMAS Nestor country and he deftly managed smooth 43-year career. in 1941. In December the Nestor relations with his hosts and their His service ranged destroyed the German submarine former imperial power. from wartime service U-127 with depth charges, the first In 1962 Dovers returned to sea in the Atlantic, the sinking of an enemy submarine by an to command HMAS Sydney, a time Mediterranean, the Australian warship. marked by tragedy. In 1963 five young Indian and the Pacific The following year, Dovers joined officers from the ship drowned during a to Korea, the Malayan Emergency and HMAS Quickmatch as its first training exercise. A court martial found the Malaysian Confrontation. lieutenant and served in the Burma Dovers guilty of neglect of duty and He was the first senior RAN officer campaign, co-operating with the British he was reprimanded. However, a naval to command the Royal Malayan Navy Far East fleet. In 1944 he returned board review found the verdict faulty and his final appointment was as the to Flinders Naval Depot and headed and quashed it. flag officer commanding the East the Officers’ Training School until In 1964 Dovers was selected for Australia area. He possessed qualities early 1945. He then got his first sea the year-long imperial defence course that benefit a nation: service, loyalty, command, as an acting lieutenant- in London, which all but assured his leadership, example, responsibility commander, on HMAS Swan. promotion to rear admiral. In 1965 and duty. He was a fine seaman who He was awarded the Distinguished he became the deputy chief of naval earned respect through his deeds, had Service Cross “for outstanding courage, personnel and in 1967 was made rear a genuine concern for the welfare of his skill and initiative while serving on admiral and was also director of joint sailors, and survived a court martial. HMAS Swan in operations in the Far services plans. In 1969 he was awarded William John Dovers, who has died East which covered the bombardment his CBE, and from 1971 to 1973 was at 89, was born at Eastwood, the oldest of Tarakan, Wewak, Labuan and flag officer commanding the Australian of seven children of George Dovers – a Balikpapan and the attack on Lingayen fleet. surveyor who went to the Antarctic Gulf, Aitape and Wewak”. He was later Disappointed not to head the Royal with Douglas Mawson’s 1911-14 awarded the CBE. Australian Navy, he accepted that expedition – and his wife, Ursula. After the war Dovers commanded there were always more deserving Dovers went to school in Wollongong, seven Australian warships from 1945 men than positions available. His final then to North Sydney Boys High and in to 1965 – Swan, Barcoo, Gladstone, appointment was as the flag officer 1932, at 14, joined the Royal Australian Arunta, Voyager, Sydney and Supply. commanding the East Australia area Naval College as a cadet. He had a brief He also served in non-command billets, from 1973, which he held until his time there as cadet-captain but was on HMAS Bataan and Australia, retirement in 1975. He then spent eight demoted when he was caught smoking. and ashore was posted to the Royal years as the chief project officer of He had a good academic record Australian Naval College at Flinders, the planned Australian Defence Force and excelled at sports, later becoming the Navy Office in Melbourne, the Academy. Let us Remember captain of the Navy rugby team and the Royal Naval In retirement he supported the Victorian interstate side. College at local arts and followed rugby. His golf Dovers swayed like real sailors Greenwich handicap improved to five and he should and smoked throughout his and the Royal played 18 holes twice a week. He and career. He also liked a Scotch. Australian Ray were also active with the Salvation He graduated as a midshipman Naval College Army’s Red Shield charity. in 1935 and did sea training with the at HMAS William Dovers is survived by his Royal Navy in the Mediterranean. Creswell. children, Sandra and William, and their Back in Australia, just before the war, After families. Ray died in 2005. � Journal of the Australian Naval Institute AustAl
Proven, Capable, Affordable
mAritime seCurity solutions
Shipyards: Australia and USA Email: [email protected] Fax: +61 8 9410 2564 Tel: +61 8 9410 1111
www.AUSTAl.com
3917-AUSTAL Headmark Ad.indd 1 10/5/07 9:09:23 AM 38 Australia’s Secret War –Australia’s Ship Repairs Secret War byH al G.P. Colebatch
Ship Repairs this. Mr Douglas-Brown commented: July, 1944. These vessels were about 80 We knew they wanted to get feet long and generally armed with a “Fit for treasons, stratagems and spoils.” aboard and get at the sailors’ 20-mm gun, a 0.5inch heavy machine- - Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice lockers and steal cigarettes. gun, two medium machine-guns and We couldn’t prove it was the depth-charges. They served in a variety In November, 1943, the auxiliary dockyard workers, but cigarettes of theatres: cruiser HMS Kanimbla, originally a had been stolen while we were peace-time passenger-liner, was taken alongside, and the sailors, who I am serving on the “Australia When Kanimbla in hand at Sydney’s Garden Island were issued with them, had no Remembers” committee and went to sea to dockyard for conversion into HMAS reason to steal from each other. am very keen to promote proof-fire the Kanimbla, a landing ship. This involved Of course, they were also a remembrance of the war-effort 1 gun, spending altering the armament and installing black-market currency. carried out by the great majority 25 landing-craft to be lowered from of decent, hard-working loyal about two hours special davits. In the ship’s new role Another of Kanimbla’s crew, Mr F. E. civilians at home ... But I will outside Sydney the gun-armament was to be primarily Thornton, wrote to theWest Australian not assist in any project which Harbour, the anti-aircraft, the largest gun being a on 20 May, 1995, giving further details involves “wharfies” or “dockyard riggers came 4-inch high-angle gun mounted aft. of strikes while Kanimbla was being mateys.” too. For this they Lieutenant Archie Douglas- refitted: They were a disgrace to the Brown RANR(S) was a peace-time In 1943 Kanimbla berthed Australian nation during the got about £100 Merchant Service sea-officer. He had at Sydney to be refitted from war and we will remember them danger money, joined Kanimbla as senior watch- an armed merchant cruiser to a so. (at a time when keeping officer and later became First landing ship. These individuals used to soldiers were Lieutenant. According to Mr Douglas- Every available space below come aboard, cadge and steal getting five Brown, the dockyard riggers went on deck had previously been our cigarettes, ration coupons, strike and refused to hoist the gun stacked with 44-gallon drums, and, above all, our valuable shillings a day). onto the ship from the dock. This was empty and sealed, in order to instruments etc. required Mr Douglas- eventually done by officers inKanimbla help keep the ship afloat should to maintain and service our Brown believed with previous mercantile experience serious damage occur while at equipment while serving in this was the rigging slings, and, when the gun was sea. They were to be removed operational areas. reason for the aboard, fixing it to the deck-mounting and replaced by bunks for They used to sit in the mess- themselves. The dockyard riggers also troops. The waterfront workers decks, especially on Saturdays, strikes. refused to splice the lifting-falls for the went on strike leaving this work do no work and listen to the landing barges (the cables by which the to be done by the ship’s crew. races on our service sets, and, barges were raised and lowered). Later we moved to Cockatoo if refused, find an excuse to When Kanimbla went to sea to Island to be rigged out with declare us “black.” For this proof-fire the gun, spending about 25 landing barges. Before arduous duty they were paid two hours outside Sydney Harbour, this work was completed the double time, which was more the riggers came too. For this they got workers again went on strike ... than we received in a fortnight. about £100 danger money, (at a time Kanimbla eventually went to We had to detail a man to follow when soldiers were getting five shillings sea - and war - leaving the ship’s them around watching every a day). Mr Douglas-Brown believed crew to finish the jobs.2 movement to safeguard our this was the reason for the strikes. gear. The ship was fumigated with Mr Keven Johnson recalled that Their delaying and loafing cyanide at about the same time, and another Australian warship, Patrol tactics were renowned and if we an armed guard was posted to keep Vessel HMAML (motor launch) tried to speed up the process people off till the cyanide fumes had Q1358, in which he served, was by doing any work ourselves cleared. There was another strike over blacklisted by Sydney dock-workers in whilst in dockyard hands, the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 39
ship would also be declared process. The Skipper, witnessing by a gutter bolt and a small “black.” This is how these this little charade, said to me: wooden block between two of parasites backed Australia’s “Get a crowbar!” This I did its flanges - so he stopped and fighting forces. As for being and he then proceeded to waited for a carpenter. left without shipments of food prize the platform out of the The block was there but and ammunition, that’s another deck. The dockyard matey he couldn’t fit it. He was very saga. was aghast and picked up his much in my working way so I Ask any sailor if these stories tools and departed. A foreman sent him on a fictitious journey are correct. later advised that owing to up forward on the pretext that The ship involved in the our heinous crime we were he might get a cup of tea and above was HMA Harbour blacklisted. in two minutes I had the job Launch Q1358, a patrol boat Blacklisting Number Two completed. A Naval nurse, I I have no doubt carrying a crew of two officers, occurred when, after finishing at figured, could handle a metal that many two petty officers and seven the Garden Island dockyard we bolt and a bit of wood. He ex-servicemen ratings, and the approximate returned to HMAS Rushcutter returned and complained would have tales date was July, 1944. (the motor launch base) to bitterly that I might have similar to mine of We were “blacklisted” on two be slipped and painted. The brought the whole dockyard out other occasions during our refit dockyard mateys wanted extra on strike.4 union disruption, at about the same period. We money for fares as they had a delay and even sailed overseas as soon as we little further to travel to work. Ean McDonald joined the Royal of servicemen completed our “running up” and When they met resistance Australian Naval Reserve in 1938 as fighting union sea-trials. to this they manufactured a an Ordinary Signalman and was called men for the very Blacklisting Number One motive for walking off the job up at the beginning of the War. He occurred when our skipper by claiming that a “docker” had was commissioned during the war right to fight for commenced prizing up a painted the wrong part of the and retired from the Navy in 1946. their country. gun-platform which was not hull. This is where I found out He remained an active member of the required and was considered what a “docker” was. Apparently Naval Reserve after the war with the dangerous - the gunners a “docker” paints below the rank of Lieutenant-Commander, well preferred to move around on water-line and a “painter” paints remembered by many who passed the plain deck. Our skipper above the waterline. Apparently through the Fremantle Port Division as became exasperated why the offending “docker,” whether “the Gunnery Bloke.” a dock-yard matey arrived by accident or design, painted Ean qualified as a Master Mariner to inspect and remove the above the water-line, hence in 1988, and lectured on maritime platform. He sat down and lit supplying a good reason for subjects as well as writing a text-book a cigarette and proceeded to walking off the job.3 on celestial navigation. He was also for gaze at the project for about a time a Perth City Councillor. The 10 minutes. Then he rose Well-known West Australian writer following, published here with Mr reluctantly to his feet, took a and journalist C. R. Chambers served McDonald’s permission, is from his saw from his bag and cut a small during the war at sea as a Navy memoir Flip-Side War. It is a detailed section out of the platform. sick-berth attendant. Mr Chambers account of what appear to have He then resumed the sitting recalled: been typical methods of obstructing position with a cigarette as In 1945 the Tribal-class and disrupting the functioning of the exertion of the last task destroyer Arunta was in dock Australian Naval ships. appeared to have exhausted in Sydney, being refitted for the I have no doubt that him. planned recapture of Singapore. many ex-servicemen would have tales similar to mine of Another ten minutes of In the sick-bay a dock-side union disruption, delay and gazing spell-bound at the metal worker was refitting a even of servicemen fighting platform brought about enough two-gallon electric urn to the union men for the very right recovery to enable him to metal wall. The inch steel band to fight for their country. resume his feet and repeat the around the urn had to be joined In Brisbane in 1944 we Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 40 Australia’s Secret War –Ship RepairsSecret War had just completed a refit raced off with them to the ship’s their intentions. The bossman of HMAS Shepparton [a stores. Wharfie shouted abuse at us, Bathurst-class corvette/ By 10 a.m. we had put away threatening a full waterfront mine-sweeper] after many about one hundred pieces and strike by first thing Monday. months of pathfinding for had more than a thousand to go, “Go ahead, friend,” beamed our troops battling their way so it became clearly apparent I, “We’ll be back to our war by doggedly but successfully that the job was, at that rate, then.” along New Guinea’s jungle going to take till well after The stores were all aboard coasts. midnight. by three that afternoon. The We were anxious to get back That was fine for wharfies on wharfies all went to the pub, and to our job of helping them do Saturday double time, extending our dance was a ball ... It did not occur theirs. to triple time after lunch, but no to them that As a last fling before leaving good for sailors looking forward Mr McDonald described in detail the apart from the I, as Executive Officer of the to their last social event for deliberate go-slow and harassment once or twice the ship, had organised a Saturday months. tactics employed by dockyard night dance for our ship’s About 10.15, I sought out the workers when working on refitting Japs managed to company. We had the Hall and Major Domo wharfie man as he warships. The following extract from land a few shells Band and 100 young service sat heavily, smoking, on a barrel. his manuscript has been somewhat in harbourside girls happily lined up for a fun “I’d like you to get your abridged. suburbs, the night before we sailed again chaps moving faster, please. We war reached for the front early on Monday have other jobs to do and other After each year or so of morning. commitments for later today.” intense activity in forward areas Sydney only in the Our ship had been emptied “Oh yeah? No deal, mate. we came down to Australia newsreels. of all but essential food stores Can’t strain my boys. Goin’ as again for a refit. and now had to be re-stocked fast as they’re s’posed to.” We were scheduled to go for the months. Truckloads of “So,” said I, “Let me tell you alongside the various specialist replenishing stores arrived on that if this stuff is not aboard by dockyards for about five weeks. the wharf as we lay alongside mid-day, I’ll turn my chaps onto The whole period would be on Saturday morning. But there the wharf to get it.” one of turmoil as the ship was a catch. “Can’t do that, mate. We’ll underwent major overhaul, We had been instructed that strike.” repair and renovation ... Part of we could not touch the stuff on “Your problem, Mister,” I our remaining ship’s company the wharf. It had to be delivered replied, and told my fellows of would be set to outloading to our ship’s gangway be a great the situation. stores, emptying compartments tram of wharfies, who by 8 a.m. At that he heaved himself needing access for repairs. were standing about glaring at up on a truck to harangue his Supposedly dangerous us. Our boys could only take team on Rights for Workers and ammunition would go first delivery at the gangways. Capitalist Attitudes of Naval onto barges sent down from Sailors lined the side as Officers, and the whole loading Goat Island. The fact that we the wharfies began, but they operation stopped dead. lived comfortably with it all our were a delicate lot. We soon At noon I took the plunge days did not go down with the realised that they could only and freed my boys who “Dockies,” who first would not handle one light biscuit tin or swarmed ashore to the trucks, come near the ship until it was one small crate of beans at a and the crates and boxes began clear of everything remotely time. They queued at the trucks to move aboard at a highly- explosive and declared fully and, ever so slowly, gently and satisfactory rate. “safe” by their shop stewards. deliberately, began to collect the A few wharfies tried to It did not occur to them that small bundles, stroll ten metres muscle in but we had a few apart from the once or twice and deposit the stores at our of our own good fist-men the Japs managed to land a few side, whereupon our blokes who made no bones about shells in harbourside suburbs, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 41
the war reached Sydney only in run a wire through here, Charlie electrician would mutter to the newsreels. Mate. Needs a five eight ‘ole. his mate that they would need When all was cleared for Tell you what! We’ll have a another hole to get through them to go aboard, the droves cuppa and you can run orf and the other side. By that time in of dockies swarmed in bringing get a fitter.” the afternoon it would be too their cut lunches so they could They would plump down on late to expect any reasonably- strew the second-hand pie- your cabin lino, pull open their motivated dockyard matey to crusts, paper bags and worn-out crib baskets, open some comics waste time finding another busy apple-cores all about our once- and pour themselves a mugful fitter, so away they would go tidy ship. of tea. They’d quaff a sandwich to sign off in time to catch the They loved draping miles of or two and scatter the crusts knock-off bell. electric cables about our decks, and wrappers all about. At 9 am the next day, after On good days for always laid to cause most people After half an hour the mate a further conference, it would them, a job would to trip over them. That at least would go off to find a fitter, be decided to get another fitter run on after three created an air of busyness. They who, with his mate, would join to drill the final hole and by and their pay left their welding generators the others in lounging about about lunchtime the job would would begin to running noisily to prove that the cabin reading everything in be done, completed, finished. they were around or had been sight including your own mail. now you could not expect any rate time and a recently. The fitter would send his respectable dockie to move off half. Their dirty paws mate off to the store with a to another job after lunch, so systematically mauled note and on his return with a the afternoon, or most of it, everything with reach. Their drill and a stores docket to be would be spent sitting down greasy boots smeared our living signed by someone, the fitter munching the remainder of decks. Their filthy overalls would screechingly drill a small sandwiches and a banana or smudged our chairs and sofas. hole in the steel bulkhead. By two. Very satisfactory rubble, Our cabins became pig-sties. then it would be their tummy- banana skins. Devouring of a They even joked about that. rumbling time and they would magazine or two, deep debate Officers were known as “Pigs” all disappear for an hour or two. on the state of the war ... would anyway. After lunch there would take up a reasonable amount The whole period was one of be a conference among the of time. Then by about 3 there strain for us. Dockyard workers electricians about sizes and would be just enough time for ... never cleaned up their off- lengths of wire, and off would these fellows to stroll up to sign cuts or grease-spots or rubbish go the mate to get it. They off for the day. from their meals. They cared would then poke the wire On good days for them, a job not that we had to go half a mile through the small hole and would run on after three and ashore to have a decent wash, drape the wire across the cabin, their pay would begin to rate and had to eat cold food while effectively barring access to it, time and a half. they kept our galley too filthy so you would go away and find It would take two full days to use. a barrel on the deck to use as a of real time to run a light wire I could be at my cabin desk temporary work-desk. across two and a bit metres about 9 am. trying to do some It would then be afternoon of any cabin. Over all of that paper-work, when a typical tea-time and the munching time the cabin was practically sequence would begin. of more sandwiches, taking of uninhabitable and filthy ... A dockie electrician and his more tea and spreading of more each day we had ourselves and little mate would barge straight remains would add to the mess our sailors feverishly trying to in with not so much as a knock, already lying on your deck. keep the ship clean after the muttering about a wire needed By about 3 p.m.. the wire expert messers on our decks across my cabin. He’d glare at would be screwed in place along ... They were getting about 15 the bulkhead on one side and a duct on the deck-head of the times the pay of the sailor who mutter to his off-sider: “Can’t cabin and, lo and behold! The went off to fight for them ... We Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 42 Australia’s Secret War –Ship RepairsSecret War Notes: finally decided, with requisite for it all for the next generation. Admiral’s Office agreement, that “Danger” did not stop the (1) Interview, Perth, 17 May, 1994. (2) Letter, West Australian, 20 September, we preferred to sail [and] leave dockies coming on trips like 1995. some minor repairs for our own that. They came in droves to (3) Letter, 15 May, 1995. (4) Letter, 9 September, 1994. shipboard staff to tackle. “finish off” some minor repair (5) Ean McDonald, Flip-Side War, Clean-up commenced, stores that took them half an hour. The Unpublished Manuscript, made available by Mr McDonald, Perth, September, 1994. began to come aboard. Finally rest of the day they picnicked since published by Hesperian Press, Perth. the Boatswain’s Mate went on our deck spreading more (6) Letter, 2 May, 1996. round piping: “Ammunition of their refuse but letting Ship will take place on papers blow away into the sea. Thursday. All parties will muster “Danger” did not stop them on the wharf at 0800 Thursday smoking and chucking butts morning. All leave after about our decks ... 5 20.00 on Friday is cancelled. Leading Hands to muster in Mr Philip Archer served in the RANR the galley flat at 16.00 today for as a Telegraphist (No. H1376). He instructions.” recalled an incident when he offered By this action we generated to give a workman assistance during another problem. Dockies the refitting of a ship in early 1942 - the would promptly be called to a period of major invasion threat. stop-work meeting to confer on the question of whether they I was aboard HMAS Hal G.P. Colebatch has an MA in History/ could possibly work on a ship Doomba [an 800-ton auxiliary Politics and a PhD in Political Science with live ammunition on board. minesweeper] as she refitted and is the author of several books as Of course not! Unless they were at Mort’s Dock, Balmain, well as many articles in The Australian, paid more. early in 1942, and making my Quadrant, The American Spectator From the moment the way ashore along the waists ammunition barges even I saw a workman holding an etc. His book Blair’s Britain was chosen looked like touching the ship object up with one foot while as a Book of the Year in the London the dockies would gather on he attempted to weld it to the Spectator. His latest book is Steadfast the wharf to negotiate their bulkhead. So I offered to hold it Knight: a life of Sir Hal Colebatch rates of pay for their “Danger up for him. (Fremantle Arts Centre Press, WA). This Money.” For days before that He looked most uneasy but they had been slowing down put the work down and looked is an extract from his unpublished book jobs like drilling little holes so around, then ran back quickly Australia’s Secret War. they would be sure to have some and welded it while I supported reason to come aboard after the it. He explained that had he ammunitioning began when been seen employing non-union
their rates went up by doubling. assistance the ship could quite Another trick was to delay easily have been “blacked.”6 � our trials so they would take place off Sydney on a Saturday or Sunday with consequent repeated doublings of their pay rates, to a level approaching that of the Prime Minister. The war debt grew as the government puzzled about overruns to its budget, and the very dockies’ children were committed to pay Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 43 Visions from the Vault VisionsVisions from from the the Vault Vault
Operation Crossroads, t 33 seconds after 0900 on 1 Naval Attache in Washington. Seen navies. The atomic tests, Spurgeon August 1946, UN July 1946 the United States in this picture second from the right concluded, had raised many problems, representatives explodedA its fourth atomic bomb, an in the middle row, Spurgeon was one but had not made navies obsolete: air-burst, over a selection of 90 target of 21 UN representatives invited to ‘They will not lose their function until ships anchored in Bikini Atoll. This the tests by the US State Department the sea is no longer a highway in war. first post-war explosion, Test Able, and embarked in USS Panamint, an It is certain that this traffic on the sea was followed by Test Baker on 25 July amphibious flagship.Panamint was must continue for a long time, we must which generated even greater interest stationed some 21 miles away from the protect that traffic, and therefore we because the bomb was detonated target array during the first test and must if necessary fight on the sea. No underwater. The main purpose of the at about half that distance during the practical substitute for the warship has tests was to ascertain the effect of the second. Once levels of radioactivity yet appeared for the defence of trade. atomic bomb against naval vessels in were declared safe, Spurgeon was able If there is to be atomic warfare, naval order to gain information on possible to make a first hand inspection of warfare will not be exempt from it. As changes in ship design, spacing of the damage caused among the target the weapons change in the new atomic tactical formations at sea, and berthing vessels. His report back to Australia age, ships and tactics of naval warfare of ships in port. The sole Australian makes interesting reading, for it was must also surely change.’ government observer was Commander a time when many analysts were S.H.K. Spurgeon, RAN, the Australian questioning the future relevance of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 44 Book Reviews
Marder’s volumes on the British and drive to war, suffering a physical and Imperial Japanese Navies. nervous collapse in 1940. Yamamoto, Combined Fleet Commander, was This is a study in strategic ideas, famously forced to fight the protracted in naval policy and politics, and their war he did not want and knew he could combined impact upon war planning, not win. Nomura, the pro-American international relations, and ultimately admiral and friend of Franklin the history of a large part of the world. Roosevelt, called out of retirement to In short, Asada’s central theme is serve as ambassador to Washington, how a generation of Japanese naval was white-anted by the Japanese Naval officers –encouraged by several key bureaucracy in his efforts to prevent gurus amongst their number - became war – a war which he warned would obsessed with Mahan’s ideas of decisive involve Japan in fighting both the From Mahan to Pearl fleet action, with belief in an inevitable United States and the British Empire. Harbor: The Imperial conflict with the United States, and Asada concludes that the Imperial with the imagined feasibility of a short, Japanese Navy suffered a progressive Japanese Navy and the sharp and victorious Pacific war. He breakdown of leadership, rendering it United States begins by placing Mahan in the context unrecognizable from the traditionally of Japanese-American relations early Anglophile and outward-looking force by Sadao Asada, in the century (Mahan’s advice to the which had won at Tsushima. How US Naval Institute Press, 2006, President of the Naval War College on deeply Western and international xii, 385 pages, tables, notes, War Plan Orange in 1911, emphasizing influences had truly penetrated into bibliography, index, the use of Guam as a forward base, Japanese naval culture is still, however, ISBN 1-55750-042-8, was eerily prescient and is still relevant perhaps a matter for debate. This a century later). Asada then deals implies a further question, not quite Price for non-USNI members with the seminal intellectual and addressed explicitly in this book, as to professional contacts between the two how far the IJN fell under the influence US$36.95. navies (there was in fact an idea, which of Mahan and how far it adapted him never materialized, for Mahan to teach to its own political and cultural needs. Anyone who believes that military at the Japanese Naval Staff College). He The major historical lesson of this history is neither fascinating nor takes the reader through the inter-war book is what happens when dogma important, or who professes to be naval conferences, the events of the replaces strategic thinking. Dogma was uninterested in war (when indeed war 1930s, the opportunity for southward inherent in Mahan’s ideas (which were may well be interested in them) should Japanese advance created by the actually a brief for just one kind of sea be offered this book to read. Sadao European war, the American embargo, power), but it was also in the eye of Asada is a distinguished Japanese and the coming of the Pacific war. the beholder, as Asada shows. The US practitioner of diplomatic-naval history, Navy predicted the course of the War trained at Yale, and a longstanding There is also an intriguing chapter far better than the IJN, and was less authority on inter-war Japanese- on ‘Men, Organization, and Strategic enslaved in practice by the Mahanian American relations, recently retired Visions’ in the Japanese Navy between battlefleet view. The way it fought in from Doshisha University in Kyoto. In 1931 and 1941, charting the roles the Pacific displayed all the classical this book, with meticulous scholarship, of key groups and individuals, their flexibility of naval power in warfare, and utilizing new Japanese as well as strategic ideas, and their roles in and in this sense was reminiscent of the American archival sources, he traces service and national politics. Here campaigns of the Royal Navy between the tragic story of the Imperial Japanese groupthink, factionalism, inter- 1793 and 1815. Navy’s drift to war with the United service rivalry, and mediocre middle Mahan’s influence is often blandly States over a period of forty years. An management triumphed over senior cited in discussions of early twentieth absorbing and cautionary tale, it will be individuals and breadth of vision. century navalism. This book is an appreciated by specialist naval and lay Navy Minister Yoshida almost actual case study of the role of strategic readers alike. It forms a bookend with single-handedly opposed the Navy’s ideas in helping to shape military Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 45
reality. Part of its intellectual merit broader strategic needs of China and is the exploration of interrelated how a navy can meet these ends. themes: human, ideological, political China’s Future Nuclear Submarine and economic. Naval and diplomatic Force is a compilation of essays by history are intimately related for a host a variety of academics and former of reasons. This book, with its respect USN officers discussing the growth for context, represents the best type of in this element of China’s naval force both. structure. The editors have chosen This is also a topical book in the to divide the articles into five broad light of current great power rivalries categories: in East Asia and the Pacific. China is not, unlike Japan, an archipelagic 1. the wider context of China’s nation. Neither does it possess the nuclear submarine development, Samurai warrior tradition. Its ultimate China’s Future Nuclear 2. its dimensions and capabilities, strategic aims may still be evolving. Submarine Force 3. discussion of current and future Comparisons between Imperial Japan operations, and the PRC cannot be simple or E dited by Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle 4. assessment of Cold War lessons crude. But China remains a potentially J. Goldstein, William S. Murray, learnt, and revisionist power challenging 5. implications for the US. and Andrew R. Wilson American influence in the Pacific, is seeking blue water naval capability US Naval Institute Press, 2007 The perspective this book provides under the influence of Mahanian 412 pages, notes, index, is a valuable contribution to this ideas, and has an ongoing concern to bibliography field. Even though China is aiming to secure national energy resources. There maintain a large, predominantly diesel may well be lessons here for current ISBN-13: 978-1-59114-326-0 submarine fleet of Russian Kilo Class students of the Asia-Pacific. Price: US$40.50 (SSK) submarines, an understanding There are few, if any, better of China’s nuclear submarines’ role examples in military history of in the PLAN provides some clarity transgressing the Clausewitizian In his recent address to the 17th in analysing China’s immediate and principle of knowing how to end a war National People’s Congress, President future strategic ends. This is because you start than the story of Japanese Hu Jintao made statements of these submarines are very expensive naval policy prior to 1941. Put another rapprochement towards Taiwan and resource intensive platforms, way, in dealing with the delicate issues highlighting a desire for peaceful and their cost is therefore correlative of international politics and possible integration of the island into the with China’s strategic vision. The war, be careful what you want. The mainland’s political structures. China’s submarines’ primarily sea denial fact that we are hauntingly aware of economic and multidimensional capability indicates that China is the outcome of this story makes it security interests have evolved to the seeking sea power with a defensive none the less readable. It seems to point that any conflict over Taiwan is posture, while still maintaining an enhance its dramatic impact. This is no longer worth the societal cost. The aggressive stance. Both of China’s also a handsomely produced volume. mainland’s extensive maritime trade developing type 093 Shang Class (SSN) Recommended. and rapid coastal development have and 094 Jin Class (SSBN) submarine seen a complete reneging on Mao’s models are deemed to possess R eviewed by Dr John Reeve, Osborne once ‘Third Front’ and reclamation significant attack capabilities which are Fellow in Naval History, UNSW@ of Taiwan strategies. Accordingly, a mainly geared toward surface units, ADFA. readjustment of our understanding with the long range SSBN also able to of China’s future plans now requires project a threat of nuclear strike against commentators to move away from the coast of an enemy state. Thus, these viewing the People’s Liberation Army boats have a strong deterrent focus in Navy (PLAN) within the Taiwan Straits the maritime environment. In addition security paradigm and to analyse the to the issue of Taiwan, this capability Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 46 Book Reviews
allows China to contest broader over Taiwan or proxy conflicts, such maritime strategy seeking to grasp the relationship between maritime areas such as the Spratlys. as occurred in Korea and Vietnam, are the world super power and its nascent rival. Even though Several of the articles describe how therefore no longer in either party’s China does not publish official data on such topics, there is these assets will be able penetrate the national interest. In this sense, while it a growing amount of strategic literature emerging from the first island chain of Japan, Taiwan and may be useful to look for lessons learnt mainland, which is allowing foreign commentators to test the Philippines to challenge the US in from the expansion of Soviet nuclear their opinions on China’s role in the world. the deep Pacific as well as in the Indian submarine fleets and to compare In the opening paper, McVaden highlights the fact that Ocean. Part of the meta-narrative of them with China’s expansion, as China has recently held combined exercises with the UK, this text is that these boats are almost discussed in the article by Lowenthal, France, Russia, Australia, India and Pakistan. In addition to giving China, notwithstanding their the political and military implications McVaden’s contribution, McDevitt’s and Erikson’s & Wilson’s limitations in exercising sea control, a are starkly different. This makes the articles provide an acknowledgement of China’s diverse blue-water capability without a Carrier military relationship between the two relationships with countries other than the US. But there is Fleet. powers primarily one of espionage and no analysis of these partnerships in any of these articles. It The authors discuss how the utility manoeuvre, a relationship in which is this reviewer’s assertion that this range of relationships of submarines can be assessed from nuclear submarines play a vital role. demonstrates that China’s strategic position in the world several perspectives. Firstly there One obstacle that this text should not be analysed purely from a US perspective and is the historical approach whereby encounters is that whenever one that, if anything, this is the major shortcoming of this text. the usefulness of submarines was is dealing with matters of strategic While it is a USNI publication, a broader examination of demonstrated in previous Taiwan affairs, the open source dilemma China’s place in the world from other perspectives could Strait crises, when US fleets were inevitably exists. Firstly, many of the provide a more contextualised understanding of Chinese kept at bay by PLAN submarines factors, technologies and strategies of naval strategy. China’s relationship with countries in the patrolling the area. Then there is the states are shrouded in secrecy. This Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait are not mentioned, nor is security umbrella approach, in which is compounded by the fact that the there discussion of possible pipelines through the Middle it is argued that recent harassment silent service is amongst the most East or the Caspian Sea to supply China’s energy needs and of Chinese shipping by the US in the secretive institutions a state can how these may affect the use of nuclear submarines. Further, Persian Gulf has spurred China’s desire possess. Several of the commentators the relationship with Myanmar and the Maldives, in terms of to develop capabilities that can protect in this compilation address this Chinese strategic bases for some of these submarines, is not long range maritime shipping interests. matter in highlighting the point that even mentioned. Thirdly there is the doctrinal approach. no external analyst truly understands These omissions may be due to the fact that all of the In this context, it is submitted that China’s current strategy. Intelligence- authors have some affiliation with the US Naval War China is focused on developing new wise, Mahnken points out that in College and so it would seem that this is primarily a text and unique approaches to warfare. the year preceding the writing of his for students of that school with a strong focus on China’s Moving away from the dominant US article, the US intelligence agencies Asia-Pacific interests. One can forgive these oversights as thinking about war, the PLAN is trying were caught unaware of twelve merely providing the paradigm for the text rather than being to establish its own understanding military developments in China. It illustrative of any major shortcoming. As it stands, China’s of sea power which draws heavily on is also saliently noted in the text that Future Nuclear Submarine Force is an authoritative set of the writings of Gorshkov as well as on no open source photos exist of any essays on this subject for an English speaking audience. those of indigenous strategists. of China’s SSN or SSBN platforms. Without doubt it is part of a growing body of seminal works An important factor to consider Notwithstanding these limitations, that are opening up the debate between the US and China when dealing with the Communist this volume provides an uncannily on naval affairs and it therefore comes recommended by this State is that, whereas during the Cold insightful and well argued set of essays reviewer. War when a country fell under the on the strategic, military, technological influence of the Soviet Union this and political value of China’s emerging R eviewed by Lieutenant Michael Paes RAN generally involved denying American nuclear submarine fleet. commerce access to that nation, One of the great aspects of this China, by contrast, does not seek any collection is that the contributors have such deprivation. China is seeking to used their expertise in Chinese to bring influence nations, not dominate them, a range of local sources into the English and it is more than happy to share discourse on the subject. This makes markets with the US. Direct conflict this text indispensable to the student of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 47 Thinking of Making a Contribution? Style Notes for Headmark
In general, please present your work So: honours - Lieutenant Commander Bill Crabbe, CSC, RAN - with the minimum of formatting. Adkin, Mark. Goose Green. London: unless you would prefer not to use them. Then please supply a Paragraphs: Leo Cooper, 1992. paragraph on yourself, to a maximum of 50 words, including Don’t indent, and leave left justified. Adler, Bill (Ed.) Letters from Vietnam. any qualifications you would like listed, and any interesting Separate paragraphs by one line. Single New York: EP Dutton and Co., 1967. biographical aspects. If possible please supply a colour or spacing only. Use one space only after Articles use quotation marks around greyscale head and shoulders e-photo of yourself for use stops and colons. their title, which is not in italics. alongside the article title. Conventions: If citing web sites please use the Illustrations: Use numbers for 10 and above, convention: Do not embed graphs or figures in your text without words below. Ship names use italics in Australian Associated Press. “Army sending a separate file as well. If supplying photographs use title case; prefixes such asHMAS in admits mistakes in SAS investigation”. a minimum of 300 dpi. We are keen on colour images but capitals and italics. Book and Journal 17 February, 2004.
Specialist Shipping Services
P&O Maritime Services
is recognised as a
premier regional
provider of specialist
shipping and related
logistic services to
defence, marine
science and
research,
mining and
government GPO Box 88, Melbourne Vic 3001 Australia sectors Telephone +61 3 9254 1600 Facsimile +61 3 9254 1658 www.pomaritime.com [email protected]
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 48 Australian Naval Institute Events Program
Event Date Location Comments/Contact
JANI AGM 1730 13 March ADFA For more details of ANI events followed by 2008 Military Theatre visit the website: Reception in the www.navalinstitute.com.au Officers Mess 1830
HMAS Maryborough is the newest Armidale Class Patrol boat to enter service in the Royal Australian Navy, recently commissioning in Colour Ad 25/5/06 10:14 AM Page 1 Brisbane
You Don’t Have to be a High Flyer to earn high interest Online $tar $aver Direct ● Easy maintenance online savings account ● Savings available at call ● 24 hour access by phone and Internet ● Interest calculated daily and paid monthly ● Fee-free internet and phone transactions Apply online at www.adcu.com.au or contact our Member Contact Centre today on 1300 13 23 28
Terms and conditions, fees and charges apply and are available on application. Australian Defence Credit Union Ltd ABN 48 087 649 741 AFSL 237 988
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 49 ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.
Our new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the Changing your details previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion When your account is created, only your member ID and password are forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change you take full advantage of the new features. your details, login and click the “Change Your Details” menu item (figure 5). Then select the “change” link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the “save” button (figure 7). Figure 1 The personal information that you provide will be visible to other Obtaining an account members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off- browser (figure 1), click the “Members Login” menu item (figure 2), line records. then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member ID and password.
Figure 7 Figure 8
Participating in the forum In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login Figure 2 Figure 3 and click the “Forum” menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that Logging in to your account you would like to view by clicking its “View Topics” button (figure Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its “View this the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website topic” link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, (figure 1) and click the “Members Login” item (figure 2). Enter your you may add your own by clicking the “Add New Topic” button (figure member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by the “Login” button. The case of the member ID and password are clicking “Add New Post”. Fill in the heading and body of your reply and important: i.e. “CaSe” and “case” are considered entirely different words click the “Submit” button to add your reply to the topic. If you change by the authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as your mind while writing your reply, you may click the “Cancel” button a single “*” to prevent others from seeing your password as you type. and your reply will not be added to the topic. If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.
Figure 4 Figure 9 Logging out of your account In order to protect your identity and to prevent malicious use of your account by others, you must log out of the site when you are finished browsing. This is especially important on public computers. In order to log out, click the “Logout” link in the grey status bar (figure 4). Figure 10
Further questions If you have specific questions regarding website features or even a feature request, post a topic in the “Website Questions” forum and a Figure 5 Figure 6 site administrator will reply. Otherwise, happy browsing!
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 50 Australian Naval Institute
The Australian Naval Institute was formed as a self- members (and others) on these topics submitted to the Sea Power Centre- supporting and non-profit making organisation; are keenly sought. Australia for possible publication incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The Views and opinions expressed in as a Working Paper (seapower. main objectives of the Institute are: Headmark are those of the authors [email protected]) • to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge and not necessarily those of the related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and Institute, the Royal Australian Navy, the Editorial Board • to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning Australian Defence Organisation, or the The Board is largely drawn from subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession. institutions the authors may represent. the ANI Council but key roles are Membership subscription rates are located on the next page. The ANI does not warrant, undertaken by the following members: Further information can be obtained from the: guarantee or make any representations Chairman: CDRE Steve Gilmore Business Manager, Australian Naval Institute, as to the content of the information Editor: Dr Tom Lewis PO Box 29, Red Hill ACT 2603, ph +61 2 62950056, contained within Headmark, and will Strategy: CDRE Steve Gilmore fax +61 2 62953367, email: [email protected] or via the not be liable in any way for any claims History Section: Dr David Stevens website at http://www.navalinstitute.com.au resulting from use or reliance on it. Shiphandling Corner: Sponsors Articles and information in CMDR Mal Wise OAM The Australian Naval Institute is grateful for the Headmark are the copyright of the Book Reviews: Dr John Reeve continued support of: Booz Allen Hamilton, Austal, Australian Naval Institute, unless Raytheon Australia, LOPAC, SAAB Systems Australia, otherwise stated. All material in Bequests KBR, Australian Defence Credit Union, Thales Underwater Headmark is protected by Australian As a self-funding organisation the Systems, P&O Maritime Services, ATI and Jacobs Sverdrup. copyright law and by applicable law in Institute relies on membership Patron other jurisdictions. subscriptions and sponsorship to Chief of Navy: VADM Russ Shalders, AO CSC A CDROM of the Journal of the maintain its activities. Financial Australian Naval Institute covering donations and/or bequests are Council Members the period 1975-2003 is available for welcome and will assist the ANI in President: RADM James Goldrick, AM CSC RAN $99; see the next page for ordering undertaking its activities. Vice President: CDRE Ray Griggs, CSC RAN information. Secretary: LEUT Sam Fairall-Lee RAN Pen Names. Contributors can publish Sea Power Centre-Australia Treasurer: Mr Richard Jones under a pen name. The Editor must be Research Collection Chair of Editorial Board: advised either in person or in writing The Sea Power Centre-Australia CDRE Steve Gilmore AM CSC RAN of the identity of the individual that research collection incorporates the Sponsorship Member: wishes to use the pen name. The Editor ANI library, to which members have CAPT Martin Brooker CSC RAN will confirm in writing to the member access. The research collection is Councilor: CDRE Peter Jones DSC AM RAN seeking to use a pen name that the normally available for use 0900-1630 Councilor: CMDR Paul Hornsby RAN name has been registered and can be each weekday, but it is not possible Councilor: CMDR Ian Campbell RAN used. More details are available on the to borrow the books. Members are Councilor: LEUT M. Paes RAN Institute’s website. requested to ring the SPC to confirm Councilor: CMDR Wendy Malcolm RAN Article submission. Articles and access, particularly if visiting from Councilor: MIDN Thomas Ford RAN correspondence should be submitted outside Canberra. Councilor: MIDN Nikola Johnson RAN electronically in Microsoft Word, with The ANI/Sea Power Centre- Website Manager: limited formatting. (See the style guide Australia will gladly accept book Mr Ernst Power (non membership position) in this issue for further details.) donations on naval and maritime Public Officer: Articles should ideally range in size matters (where they will either be CAPT Peter Murray RAN (non membership position) from 3000-7000 words, but smaller added to the collection or traded for Journal of the Australian Naval Institute articles will be considered, as will difficult to obtain books). The point of Headmark is published quarterly. The Editorial Board the occasional larger piece of work. contact for access to the collection, or seeks letters and articles on naval or maritime issues. Submissions should be sent to the to make arrangements for book/journal Articles concerning operations or administration/policy Editor in the first instance. donations, is the SPC-A Information are of particular interest but papers on any relevant topic Email: [email protected] and mark Manager on (02) 61276512, will be considered. As much of the RAN’s operational and attention Editorial Board. email: administrative history is poorly recorded, the recollections of Articles of greater length can [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 127 51
The Australian Naval Institute ABN: 45 988 480 239 http://www.navalinstitute.com.au PO Box 29 Red Hill ACT 2603, AUSTRALIA PHONE: +61 2 6295 0056 FAX: +61 2 6295 3367 EMAIL: [email protected]
MEMBERSHIP/SUBSCRIPTION RATES Individual 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years Undergraduate student rate* $30 Australian/New Zealand* $45 $85 $125 Asia† $60 $115 $170 Rest of World† $67 $129 $191 Institutional Australian/New Zealand* $60 $110 $160 Asia† $75 $140 $205 Rest of World† $82 $154 $226
* Please note that no GST is payable in relation to ANI membership † Includes air mail postage
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute on CDROM The Australian Naval Institute is pleased to announce that a complete set of theJournal (1975-2003) is now available on a 2 disc CD ROM for $99. Sets can be ordered using the membership application form below. Membership of the Australian Naval Institute I apply for membership of the ANI in the category of Student / Individual / Institutional (select/circle one).
Name:
Address:
Post Code:
Email:
Website Username Preferences: 1. 2. 3. (Please use only characters (a-z) or numbers (0-9). Usernames are case sensitive. You will receive you password by email. Payment Details Please select one.
1. A cheque made out to the Australian Naval Institute is enclosed. Please forward to: The Business Manager, Australian Naval Institute, PO Box 29, Red Hill ACT 2603 AUSTRALIA
2. Please debit my Mastercard Visa for $AUD for a year subscription
AND/OR $AUD for sets of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute on CD ROM.
Card No.
Name of cardholder (PLEASE PRINT):
Signature: Expiry Date:
3. Payment of $AUD has been made by direct deposit to: Account Name: Australian Naval Institute Bank: Commonwealth Bank of Australia Branch: 33-35 Northbourne Avenue, Canberra City ACT 2601, Australia BSB: 062-919 ACC No.: 0091 4309
I agree to abide by the Constitution and by-laws of the Australian Naval Institute.
Signature: Date:
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Collins Class Submarines, HMAS Rankin, HMAS Waller and HMAS Collins transitting in formation through Gage Roads, Cockburn Sound