“THE MOST VITAL QUESTION”: RACE AND IDENTITY IN OCCUPATION POLICY CONSTRUCTION AND PRACTICE, OKINAWA, 1945-1946 Courtney A. Short A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Department of History. Chapel Hill 2015 Approved by: Joseph Glatthaar Richard Kohn Wayne Lee W. Miles Fletcher Gerhard Weinberg © 2015 Courtney A. Short ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Courtney A. Short: “The Most Vital Question”: Race and Identity in Occupation Policy Construction and Practice, Okinawa, 1945-1946. (Under the direction of Joseph Glatthaar) This study explores the planning considerations of the United States military in formulating and implementing policy for the occupation of Okinawa from April 1945 to July 1946. American soldiers, Marines, and sailors on Okinawa encountered not only a Japanese enemy but a large local population. The Okinawans were ethnically different from the Japanese yet Okinawa shared politics with Japan as a legal prefecture. When devising occupation policies, the United States military analyzed practical military considerations such as resources, weapons capability, and terrain as well as attempted to ascertain a conclusive definition of Okinawa’s relation to Japan through conscious, open, rational analysis of racial and ethnic identity. Unable to definitively determine the depth of Okinawan loyalty to Japan, American planners opted for caution and advised military forces to expect the people to act like enemy. While the Marines held steadfast to the image of the enemy civilian, soldiers’ ideas about the race, ethnicity, and identity of the Okinawans evolved through interactions with the civilians throughout the battle. Seen as obedient, docile, and cooperative, the Army expressed feelings of kinship towards the civilians and reshaped its military government policies towards leniency. The Navy, upon taking control of the military government program following the war, likewise adapted its view of the ethnicity of the Okinawans and recognized them as competent and civilized: a group that formed a distinct, separate, unique ethnic community that was neither American nor Japanese in its likeness. For all services, assignments of identity influenced the parameters of occupation policy iii - whether by retaining tight restrictions like the Marines or by allowing the Okinawans ownership in the design of their community like the Navy. Okinawans themselves also actively chose and promoted a self-identity that gained them the advantage of good treatment by the American victors. Considerations of race, ethnicity, and identity by the Americans deeply influenced the conduct of the occupation beyond practical concerns of resources and battlefield conditions. The mercurial nature of the identity of the Okinawans displays both the malleability of race and ethnicity and its centrality in occupation planning. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS As with all dissertations, the academic journey towards completion is a long one that is not walked alone. First and foremost, it is the people that live with you and love you that contribute and sacrifice the most in support of your success. My husband, David, stands as my greatest supporter, my steadfast partner, and teammate in life. Through years of constant military moves and demanding jobs, he always ensured I had time for my academic pursuits, challenged me intellectually, and committed our whole family towards the accomplishment of this project. He has stood by me every step of the way and genuinely believed in me. He is the foundation upon which I have built my whole life. My little girl, Olivia, has also been crucial to the development of this work. Since she was three years old, she has sat right next to me and colored, drawn pictures, or banged away on a children’s computer as she worked on her own “dissertation.” As she grew older, she even let me know which sentences did not “sound good.” She has been literally right next to me every moment I worked and her pristine behavior and keen insights allowed me to think and create. To my family, I owe everything. Dr. Richard Kohn and Dr. Joseph Glatthaar taught me the art of historical thinking and reasoning as well as how to write intellectually. I am honored to have had the privilege to work with such renowned scholars whose brilliance is immeasurable. I will forever be in their debt for teaching me and challenging me. Dr. Kohn introduced me to the historical profession and guided me from the initial conception of this project through successful completion of my Masters. He molded me from simply an Army officer into a scholar as well. I would also like to particularly express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Glatthaar who, through his continuous v mentorship, inspired me to finish this work. Through the years, he motivated me and pushed me to the most rigorous academic standards. Knowing he was always awaiting the next chapter kept me in the archives and at the keyboard. I would also like to thank all the members of my committee - Dr. Gerhard Weinberg, Dr. W. Miles Fletcher, and Dr. Wayne Lee – for their time and extremely valuable insights and critique. The University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill provided an invigorating educational experience that expanded my worldview and developed me as a person. I am indebted to the fine institutions and exemplary professionals that house and care for the archival materials that provide the foundation for this work. The National Archives and Record Administration, The Gray Research Center at the United States Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections, The United States Marine Corps Historical Division, and The United States Army Heritage and Education Center continue to beautifully preserve our heritage. Of note, I would like to particularly thank the outstanding Veterans History Project at the Library of Congress for providing such excellent resources in such an accessible format, Dr. Gregory L. Mattson at the Kadena Air Base Archives for allowing me into back rooms and old file cabinets, the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, and the University of Missouri. On a personal note, I am grateful for Robert Hostetler’s time and valuable insights and the kindness of Colonel (retired) Gary Montgomery, USMC, who allowed me to look at materials he had collected from limited access Marine Corps personnel files. Lastly, I am blessed to work at an outstanding academic institution, the United States Air Force Academy. The Department of History is populated with an impressive group of scholars and officers and the environment is supportive and conducive to personal and professional vi growth. I consider myself lucky to work at a place that supports my scholastic endeavors and gives me academic freedom in the classroom. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………...1 CHAPTER 1: IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY: ARMY WARTIME OCCUPATION POLICY………………………………………………………………………..11 CHAPTER 2: MARINE COWBOYS: STRICT DIRECTIVES IN WARTIME MARINE MILITARY GOVERNMENT…………………………………………..63 CHAPTER 3: THE NAVY PERIOD: NAVIGATING THE TRANSITION TO PEACE……………………………………………………………………..126 CHAPTER 4: HAVING A SAY: OKINAWAN MANIPULATION OF IDENTITY………………………………………………………………………………….172 CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………................222 BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………................230 viii INTRODUCTION The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 catapulted America into a world war with battlefields across an ocean. Despite poor diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan over the previous twenty years, the raid on the Hawaiian base shocked Americans and dislodged any hopes they had of remaining isolated from the international war that brewed in Europe. Japan stood as a formidable foe that had both tactical skill and intelligent military leaders. In quick secession, Japan followed the Pearl Harbor strike with attacks on Allied possessions in Singapore, the Philippines, Borneo, and Java. By 1942, the Japanese fought at sea and on land as they aimed for Port Moresby, New Guinea, and the American fleet at Midway.1 American military strategy focused on the ultimate objective of invading the Japanese home islands. Japan, however, established a defensive perimeter around its mainland by occupying numerous islands throughout the Pacific. Confronted by Japanese aggression at the edge of this boundary, the United States military embarked on a multiservice island campaign in 1943 that featured two simultaneous approaches – one along the South Pacific led by the Army under General Douglas MacArthur and one in the Central Pacific led by the Navy under Admiral Chester Nimitz. American forces progressed north towards Japan by selectively assaulting islands that had the greatest strategic value and bypassing those that lacked Japanese troops or could offer the advantage of cutting off Japanese forces from supplies. Captured islands served 1Christopher J. Anderson The Marines in World War II: from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay (London: Stackpole Books, 2006; Michael J. Lyons, World War II: A Short History (Cambridge: Pearson Publishing, 2009), 142-150; Max Hastings, Inferno: The World at War, 1939-1945 (New York: Vintage Books, 2012), 198-263. 1 as refit outposts and staging bases for further operations. The campaign demonstrated immense American industrial and military power. Supported by the strength of its production and mobilization, the United States fought in the air, on land, and at