DOCSLIB.ORG

The Problem with Metzinger

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Problem with Metzinger Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 7, no. 1, 2011, pp. 7-36. THE PROBLEM WITH METZINGER Graham Harman American University in Cairo ABSTRACT: This article provides a critical treatment of the ontology underlying Thomas Metz- inger’s Being No One. Metzinger asserts that interdisciplinary empirical work must replace ‘arm- chair’ a priori intuitions into the nature of reality; nonetheless, his own position is riddled with unquestioned a priori assumptions. His central claim that ‘no one has or has ever had a self’ is meant to have an ominous and futuristic ring, but merely repeats a familiar philosophical ap- proach to individuals, which are undermined by reducing them downward to their material underpinnings, and ‘overmined’ by reducing them upward to their functional effects. Ultimately, Metzinger blends a rigid form of traditional materialism with an ontology of processes and events that is too reminiscent of late 1990’s continental philosophy. In both directions, the novelty and fertility of Metzinger’s position can be called into question. KEYWORDS: Thomas Metzinger; Selfhood; Scientism; Naturalism 1. INTRODUCTION Respect for his opponents is not among the chief virtues of Thomas Metzinger. With minimal prodding from his interviewers at the journal Collapse,1 Metzinger bluntly dis- misses a host of near and distant foes. His first target is the ‘philosophical conserva- tism’ of ‘the folk and the philosophers’, who are apparently leagued in union against the truth.2 He takes a simultaneous shot at both analytic philosophy and its enemies, since the now ‘conservative’ analytic school (for it disdains empirical work) was once ‘a beau- tiful rebellion against academic pretentiousness and narcissistic obscurantism’.3 Even neuroscientists are not exempt from Metzinger’s global critique, since he finds that some are guilty of the ‘corniness’ of seeking ‘media attention’.4 In his view such corniness is not limited to modern media hounds, but extends back into primeval humanity and its pre-human forefathers: as when he speaks of the ‘unargued conservatism and corniness 1. Thomas Metzinger, ‘Enlightenment 2.0: Interview with Thomas Metzinger’, in Collapse Vol. V, 2009. Note: All page references in parentheses refer to Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. All other works by Metzinger and other authors are footnoted normally on a case-by-case basis.) 2. ‘Enlightenment 2.0’, 189. 3. ‘Enlightenment 2.0’, 190. 4. ‘Enlightenment 2.0’, 190. www.cosmosandhistory.org 7 8 COSMOS AND HISTORY [that were] successful strategies in primate societies and the world of our ancestors’.5 If ‘primate corniness’ sounds like an implausible philosophical target, we can turn instead to Metzinger’s grim verdict on more recent society: ‘The overall situation on our planet reminds me of one big ocean of irrationality, suffering, and confusion…’6 Those who oppose Metzinger’s version of naturalism are described as people who ‘desperately seek emotional security’.7 He dreams aloud of a new phenomenology that, unlike the cur- rent one, would not be ‘driven solely by anti-reductionist resentment’.8 He even closes his doors to readers who endorse his theory of self-as-process, since they ‘perhaps only do so because it has a trendy, “narrative” ring to it’.9 Even the Collapse interviewers who cheer him on receive a sharp slap on the wrist: ‘let us not commit a psychologistic fal- lacy or indulge in paranoia…’10 And finally, Metzinger’s own students are critiqued no less than the doctrines they attack on his behalf, as when Metzinger disdains ‘what my excellent British PhD student (who is a bit chaotic, but from whom I learn a lot) has recently termed ‘Continental Jazz’.11 The problem here is not one of bad manners, as if Metzinger needed a social repri- mand for insensitivity to the feelings of his colleagues. For there are times when a touch of polemic is useful for expanding the fortunes of a philosophical position that one feels has been unjustly treated. In Metzinger’s eyes, such classic figures as Descartes, Kant, and Husserl defend views of subjectivity that are simply falsified by recent empirical dis- coveries in neuroscience, and he seems both frustrated and contemptuous that these discoveries have left little trace on philosophy. He accusingly (and somewhat bizarrely) contends that even Descartes and Kant ‘could have known [what modern neuropsy- chiatry shows] had they listened more closely to the schizophrenics of their own time’, (446) and insinuates that there is no remaining excuse for the philosophers of 2011. Fair enough. If you agree with Metzinger that up-to-date empirical work should replace a priori intuitions into the nature of the human subject, then you too will feel surrounded by widespread reactionary resentment on topics pertaining to the mind. Nor will I say that Metzinger is a hypocrite for calling his opponents resenters and ideologues despite his own intense emotional investment in one particular theory: an eliminativist form of scientific naturalism for which he displays markedly aggressive animal passion. After all, the psychologizing of one’s opponents is not always beyond the pale, but sometimes has valuable rhetorical power and even a grain of truth. Instead, my complaint is that Metzinger’s hasty assumption of the worst possible mo- tives on the part of his opponents betrays the same failure of imagination of which he is so quick to accuse some of the greatest philosophers of the past. It is not just a matter of throwing the baby out with the bathwater: some half-dozen babies are extinguished in 5. ‘Enlightenment 2.0’, 191. 6. ‘Enlightenment 2.0’, 206. 7. ‘Enlightenment 2.0’, 206. 8. ‘Enlightenment 2.0’, 196. 9. ‘Enlightenment 2.0’, 196. 10. ‘Enlightenment 2.0’, 211. 11. ‘Enlightenment 2.0’, 196. Emphasis added. Graham HARMAN 9 the dungeon of Metzinger’s mammoth work, Being No One. As he puts it on the book’s first page: ‘No one ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. The phenomenal self is not a thing, but a pro- cess…’ (1) And though we have already seen that Metzinger sneers even at those who sup- port his own self-as-process model,12 the notion of ‘process’ does significant work for his theory, and thus cannot claim immunity from philosophical criticism. This is especially true given that his book simply adopts realism as a ‘background assumption’, (21) even though realism ought to be one of the foundational problems for any serious philosophy. In what follows, I will not imitate Metzinger by adopting my object-oriented ontology (OOO) as a ‘background assumption’. Instead, I will show that it deals with reality in a more adequate manner than Metzinger’s own theory. Whatever Metzinger’s arsenal of empirical data, his theory culminates in an ontology of processes and events that shares much in common with the mainstream ‘Continental Jazz’ he openly despises. Appeals to the majesty of Science are not enough to dissociate Metzinger from these ‘corny’ jazz musicians, whose weaknesses he shares even while he fails to assimilate their strengths. The fact that Being No One runs to 634 pages suggests greater conceptual diversity than the book actually contains. This is not meant as a critique: books of philosophy are often much simpler in argument than they are in expression. But it does entail that Metzinger is easier to summarize in a brief article like this one than his defenders will wish to admit. The inevitable limitations of this article stem not from the fact that Metz- inger’s book is far too rich to summarize briefly, but because I like any reviewer bring my own interests to the table. Metzinger sees himself as part of an ongoing dialogue be- tween neuroscience, cognitive science, and the philosophy of mind. But this is not my own intellectual world, and in what follows I will not attempt to situate him amidst his various partners and rivals in those disciplines. My interest in Metzinger is limited to his influence on recent continental philosophy, which I frankly regard as a bad influence. If continental philosophy has been remarkably dismissive of natural science since the days of Husserl and Heidegger, the scientistic wing of recent continental thought takes the opposite tack: ‘Science was once nothing; henceforth, let it be everything’. As a corollary, those who deny that science is everything are found guilty of claiming that it is nothing. The role of philosophy is to provide supplemental commentary on the natural sciences: in other words, philosophy must once more accept the role of a handmaid, centuries after it finally shook off this role. Attempts to escape one’s place as a handmaid can lead only to ‘armchair’ philosophizing. For my purposes, Metzinger’s argument can be summarized roughly as follows. The time for pure philosophy has passed; we need an interdisciplinary approach to con- sciousness, in which the hard empirical sciences will have a stronger place than before. There is no such thing as a ‘self’, nor has there ever been. What we think of as a self is simply the content of a ‘transparent self-model’ (TSM), and to think of this model as a genuine self is mere confusion. We do not have direct access to the real, since the workings of the brain entail ‘autoepistemic closure’, an inability to know what we do 12. ‘Enlightenment 2.0’, 196. 10 COSMOS AND HISTORY not know. Hence Plato’s beautiful myth of the cave was right to think that we only see shadows on a cave wall, but wrong to think that there is a true enchained self that can be liberated from the cave, since even Plato’s prisoner does not exist.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Empfindungsfähigkeit Und Moralischer Status Eine Kritik Der Pathozentrischen Ethik
    Empfindungsfähigkeit und moralischer Status Eine Kritik der pathozentrischen Ethik Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophie im Fachbereich A Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften der Bergischen Universität Wuppertal vorgelegt von Erasmus Scheuer aus Düsseldorf Wuppertal, im Januar 2018 Die Dissertation kann wie folgt zitiert werden: urn:nbn:de:hbz:468-20180503-133904-3 [http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=urn%3Anbn%3Ade%3Ahbz% 3A468-20180503-133904-3] alles bleibt wie es ist Geheimnis in einem Geheimnis Muster in einem Muster (Norbert Scheuer – Nichts) Meinen Eltern, Elvira und Norbert Scheuer Vorwort Der Pathozentrismus betrachtet die Leidens- oder Empfindungsfähigkeit aller, auch nichtmenschlicher Spezies als zentrales moralisches Kriterium. Diese Arbeit hat die pathozentrische Position zum Gegenstand und bewegt sich bewusst zwischen Kritik und Verteidigung eines solchen Ansatzes. Einerseits liegen die Schwächen des Pa- thozentrismus m.E. mehr oder weniger offen zu Tage, da die Kluft zwischen Empfin- dungen des Menschen und den Empfindungen anderer Spezies nur schwer inner- halb eines naturwissenschaftlich-physikalistischen Weltbildes überbrückbar erscheint. Andererseits vertrete ich als Verfasser dieser Arbeit die Ansicht, dass eine Erweiterung der Moralobjekte über die Menschen hinaus erfolgen muss, dass das Leiden anderer Kreaturen Teil einer jeden ethischen Betrachtung sein sollte. Der Pa- thozentrismus vertritt mit seinem Kriterium der Leidens- bzw. Empfindungsfähigkeit eine ethische Position, die vom Ansatz her eine Erweiterung der Moralobjekte an- strebt. Aus diesem Grund liegt meine Sympathie beim Pathozentristen. Infolgedes- sen versucht diese Arbeit, einerseits die Kritik am Pathozentrismus aufzuzeigen, an- dererseits dem Pathozentristen auch Argumente an die Hand zu geben, die es ihm erlauben, seine Position zu verteidigen. Der Pathozentrist hat nach meiner Ansicht zwei schwerwiegende und grundlegende Probleme, wenn er seine Ethik innerhalb eines tendenziell physikalistischen Weltbildes zu verteidigen sucht.
    [Show full text]
  • A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective1
    The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective1 Thomas Metzinger e-mail: [email protected] http://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/metzinger Geschäftsführender Le iter, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz (Germany) Abstract. Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into the theoretical model as it grows and becomes more refined. This paper makes an attempt at sketching the outlines of such a theory, offering a representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person perspective. Three phenomenal target properties are centrally relevant: “mine- ness” (phenomenal appropriation; the sense of ownership), “selfhood” (the con- scious experience of being someone), and “perspectivalness” (a structural fea- ture: phenomenal space as a whole is organized around a center, a supramodal point of view). This contribution analyzes these properties on a representational as well as on a functional level of description. The author introduces new con- ceptual constraints for phenomenal representations, plus two theoretical entities needed in order to understand what a first-person perspective is: “the phenome- nal self-model” (PSM) and “the phenomenal model of the intentionality rela- tion” (PMIR). A phenomenal self-model is a multimodal representational struc- ture, the contents of which forms the contents of the consciously experienced self.
    [Show full text]
  • TOWARD a SCIENCE of CONSCIOUSNESS April 12-17, 2010 Tucson Convention Center Tucson, Arizona
    TOWARD A SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS April 12-17, 2010 Tucson Convention Center Tucson, Arizona • Sponsored by the CENTER FOR CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES The University of Arizona CONTENTS Center for Consciousness Studies . .2 Welcome . .3 Program Outline . .7 Pre-Conference Workshops . 14 Full Program . 17 Classified Abstracts . .38 Index to Authors . 226 Location Map . 236. P.O. Box 210068, Tucson, AZ, USA 85721-0068 Tel: 520-621-9317 • Fax: 520-626-6416 E-mail: [email protected] www.consciousness.arizona.edu • Director Stuart Hameroff, Anesthesiology, Psychology The University of Arizona, Tucson Associate Directors Bernard J. Baars, The Neurosciences Institute, Berkeley David Chalmers, Australian National University, Canberra Alfred Kaszniak, The University of Arizona, Tucson Uriah Kriegel, The University of Arizona, Tucson Program Committee TSC 2010 Stuart Hameroff, Co-Chair, The University of Arizona, Tucson David Chalmers, Co-Chair, Australian National University, Canberra Bernard J. Baars, The Neurosciences Institute, Berkeley Anthony Freeman, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Exeter Al Kaszniak, The University of Arizona, Tucson Christof Koch, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena Uriah Kriegel, The University of Arizona, Tucson Hakwan Lau, Columbia University, New York Marilyn Schlitz, Institute of Noetic Sciences, Petaluma Conference Management/Media Liaison Arlene ‘Abi’ Behar-Montefiore, Center for Consciousness Studies, Tucson 3 WELCOME Welcome to the 2010 Tucson conference “Toward a Science of Consciousness,” the ninth in
    [Show full text]
  • Minimal Phenomenal Experience the ARAS-Model Theory: Steps Toward a Minimal Model of Conscious Experience As Such
    Thomas Metzinger Minimal Phenomenal Experience The ARAS-model theory: Steps toward a minimal model of conscious experience as such This manuscript provides a short summary of an interrelated set of ideas presented in my third Carnap Lecture, given on 9 March 2018 at the Ruhr-Universität in Bochum, Germany. The current manuscript is only for purposes of discussion, it will not be submitted to any peer- reviewed journal; but all comments, relevant phenomenological case-studies, and constructive criticism are welcome. Some parts of it, together with new material, will be submitted in 2019, to a new academic open-access journal titled Philosophy and the Mind Sciences edited by Sascha Fink, Wanja Wiese, and Jennifer Windt (see for example Dresler & T. Metzinger, in preparation; Gamma & T. Metzinger, forthcoming; T. Metzinger, 2019, submitted). A simple 80-minute video of the original talk with slides is electronically available. The current manuscript is a work in progress and part of a larger research project. 1. Introduction In 2009, Olaf Blanke and Thomas Metzinger asked two questions: What are the minimally sufficient conditions for the appearance of a phenomenal self, that is, the fundamental conscious experience of being someone? What are necessary conditions for self- consciousness in any type of system (Blanke & T. Metzinger, 2009, p. 7)? One of their results was that bodily agency is a causally enabling, but not a constitutive condition, for phenomenal selfhood (Blanke & T. Metzinger, 2009, p. 13). Blanke and Metzinger then introduced the concept of “minimal phenomenal selfhood” (MPS), the central defining features of which are, (i) a globalized form of identification with the body as a whole (as opposed to mere ownership for body parts), (ii) spatiotemporal self-location and (iii) a weak, geometrical first-person perspective (1PP).
    [Show full text]
  • EGO TUNNEL 0465045679-Metzinger:Layout 1 2/3/09 9:28 AM Page Ii
    0465045679-Metzinger:Layout 1 2/3/09 9:28 AM Page i THE EGO TUNNEL 0465045679-Metzinger:Layout 1 2/3/09 9:28 AM Page ii This page intentionally left blank 0465045679-Metzinger:Layout 1 2/3/09 9:28 AM Page iii The Ego Tunnel the science of the mind and the myth of the self Thomas Metzinger A MEMBER OF THE PERSEUS BOOKS GROUP New York 0465045679-Metzinger:Layout 1 2/3/09 9:28 AM Page iv Copyright © 2009 by Thomas Metzinger Published by Basic Books, A Member of the Perseus Books Group All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information, address Basic Books, 387 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016-8810. Books published by Basic Books are available at special discounts for bulk purchases in the United States by corporations, institutions, and other organizations. For more information, please contact the Special Markets Department at the Perseus Books Group, 2300 Chestnut Street, Suite 200, Philadelphia, PA 19103, or call (800) 810-4145, ext. 5000, or e-mail [email protected]. Set in 10.75 point Warnock Pro by the Perseus Books Group Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Metzinger, Thomas, 1958- The ego tunnel : the science of the mind and the myth of the self / Thomas Metzinger. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-465-04567-9 (alk.
    [Show full text]
  • Embodiment in Evolution and Culture
    Embodiment in Evolution and Culture Embodiment in Evolution and Culture Edited by Gregor Etzelmüller and Christian Tewes Mohr Siebeck Gregor Etzelmüller, born 1971; Professor for Systematic Theology at Osnabrück Uni‑ versity and Principal Investigator of the Heidelberg Marsilius Project “Embodiment as Paradigm for an Evolutionary Cultural Anthropology”. Christian Tewes, born 1972; adjunct Professor (Privatdozent) for Philosophy at the Uni‑ versity of Jena and Principal Investigator of the Heidelberg Marsilius Project “Embodi‑ ment as Paradigm for an Evolutionary Cultural Anthropology”. e ‑ISBN PDF 978‑3‑16‑154901‑4 ISBN 978‑3‑16‑154736‑2 Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliogra‑ phie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2016 by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Germany www.mohr.de This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher’s written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations, microfilms and storage and processing in electronic systems. The book was typeset by Laupp & Göbel in Gomaringen using Garamond typeface, printed by Laupp & Göbel in Gomaringen on non‑aging paper and bound by Buchbin‑ derei Nädele in Nehren. Printed in Germany. Acknowledgements To answer the question of how evolution brings forth an embodied human being that is able to transcend itself by shaping itself culturally, the Heidelberg Mar‑ silius‑Project “Embodiment as Paradigm for an Evolutionary Cultural Anthro‑ pology” (specifically, Gregor Etzelmüller, Thomas Fuchs, Grit Schwarzkopf and Christian Tewes) organised an international symposium on “Embodiment in Evolution and Culture” which was held in December 2014 at the International Academic Forum Heidelberg (IWH).
    [Show full text]
  • Paul M. Churchland
    CURRICULUM VITAE: 01/19/2007 PAUL M. CHURCHLAND Citizenship: Dual: American/Canadian Present Position: Professor: Valtz Chair of Philosophy Member, Cognitive Science Faculty Member, Institute for Neural Computation Member, Science Studies Faculty University of California, San Diego La Jolla, CA 92093 Born: Oct. 21, 1942, Vancouver, B.C., Canada Married: to Patricia S. Churchland, B.A., M.A., B.Phil.(Oxon.), D.Litt. Children: Mark (27) and Anne (25) Office Phone: (858) 534-4883 Home Phone: (858) 755-5678 Home Fax: (858) 755-4393 AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION EDUCATIONAL HISTORY Philosophy of Mind University of British Columbia, 1960-64 Philosophy of Science (Philosophy, Physics, & Mathematics) Epistemology -- B.A. (hons.), 1964 Perception University of Pittsburgh, 1964-69 Philosophy of Neuroscience (Philosophy of Mind/of Science) Philosophy of Cognitive Science -- Ph.D., 1969 EMPLOYMENT HISTORY University of Pittsburgh at Greensburgh, Instructor, 1969 University of Toronto, Lecturer, 1967-69 University of Manitoba, Assistant Professor, 1969-74 Associate Professor, 1974-79 Professor, 1979-84 Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J. Member, 1982-83 University of California, San Diego, Professor, 1984-present Department Chair, 1986-90 Valtz Chair, 2003 -- 1 ACADEMIC HONORS, AWARDS, AND GRANTS 1964 Woodrow Wilson Fellow 1965 Andrew Mellon Fellow 1975 Canada Council Leave Fellowship 1975 Canada Council Research Grant (Scientific Realism) 1978 Rh Institute Award and Research Grant, for Outstanding Contributions to Scholarship and Research in the Humanities 1981 SSHRC Special Project Research Grant (Stereopsis) 1982 Member, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J. 1983 SSHRC Leave Fellowship 1983 SSHRC Research Grant (Evolutionary Epistemology) 1989 President: Society for Philosophy and Psychology 1990 Univ.
    [Show full text]
  • Chalmers, David J. 1996. the Conscious Mind
    THE Conscious Mind PHILOSOPHY OF MIND SERIES Series Editor: Owen Flanagan, Duke University SELF EXPRESSIONS Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life Owen Flanagan DECONSTRUCTING THE MIND Stephen P. Stich THE CONSCIOUS MIND In Search of a Fundamental Theory David J. Chalmers THE conscious Mind IN SEARCH OF A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY David J. Chalmers OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS New York Oxford Oxford University Press Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogota Bombay Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Copyright © 1996 by David J. Chalmers First published by Oxford University Press, Inc., 1996 First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1997 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Chalmers, David John The conscious mind : in search of a fundamental theory p. cm. (Philosophy of mind series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-510553-2 ISBN 0-19-511789-1 (Pbk.) 1. Philosophy of mind. 2. Consciousness. 3. Mind and body. 4. Dualism. I. Title. II. Series. BD418.3.C43 1996 128'.2—dc20 95-36036 9 10 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper. Acknowledgments first became excited by consciousness and the mind-body problem as an undergraduate studying mathematics at the University of Adelaide.
    [Show full text]