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The Debate Over Autonomous Weapons Systems, 47 Case W Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Volume 47 | Issue 1 2015 The eD bate Over Autonomous Weapons Systems Gregory P. Noone Dr. Diana C. Noone Dr. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Gregory P. Noone Dr. and Diana C. Noone Dr., The Debate Over Autonomous Weapons Systems, 47 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 25 (2015) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol47/iss1/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) The Debate Over Autonomous Weapons Systems Dr. Gregory P. Noone and Dr. Diana C. Noone1 The debate over Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) has begun in earnest with advocates for the absolute and immediate banning of AWS development, production, and use arguing AWS should be banned because these systems lack human qualities, such as the ability to relate to other humans and to apply human judgment, that are necessary to comply with the law. In addition, the weapons would not be constrained by the capacity for compassion, which can provide a key check on the killing of civilians. The opposing viewpoint in this debate articulates numerous arguments that generally include: it is far too premature and too speculative to make such a proposal/demand; the Law of Armed Conflict should not be underestimated in its ability to control AWS development and future operations; AWS has the potential to ultimately save human lives (both civilian and military) in armed conflicts; AWS is as inevitable as any other technology that could potentially make our lives better; and to pass on the opportunity to develop AWS is irresponsible from a national security perspective. The purpose of this article is to help refine the AWS debate. 1. Dr. Gregory P. Noone, Ph.D., J.D. is the Director of the National Security and Intelligence Program at Fairmont State University and an Associate Professor of Political Science and Law. He is a United States Navy Captain with nearly 25 years service as a judge advocate. Dr. Diana C. Noone, Ph.D., J.D. is the Chair of Social Sciences in the College of Liberal Arts at Fairmont State University and an Associate Professor of Criminal Justice. She has previously served at the Department of Justice in the National Institute of Justice. The authors would like to thank Dr. Adam Podlaskowski, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Fairmont State University for his invaluable input, Rachel Pruden for her research assistance, Richard Wanerman and all of the Case Western student editors. This article benefited greatly from the suggestions, comments, and editing of Russell J. Verby, Rymn J. Parsons, Amber S. Ward, William J. Morrison, Justin R. Valentino and Peggy Britton. The views expressed are those of the authors alone and should not be understood as representing those of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other governmental or non-governmental entity. This article is in honor of LT John Snyder, United States Navy, and Villanova University, Class of 1987. LT Snyder and nine of his shipmates were killed on October 30, 1990 while serving this great nation onboard the USS Iwo Jima. 25 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) The Debate Over Autonomous Weapons Systems CONTENTS I. Introduction.................................................................................. 26 II. What are Autonomous Weapons Systems? .................................. 27 III. Common Ground .......................................................................... 29 A. Law of Armed Conflict ...................................................................29 B. Human Error ................................................................................31 C. Machines Instead Of Humans ..........................................................32 IV. Technology ................................................................................. 33 V. Conclusion .................................................................................... 35 I. Introduction The debate over Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) has begun in earnest with advocates for the absolute and immediate banning of AWS development, production, and use planting their flag first. They argue that AWS should be banned because these systems lack human qualities, such as the ability to relate to other humans and to apply human judgment, that are necessary to comply with the law. In addition, the weapons would not be constrained by the capacity for compassion, which can provide a key check on the killing of civilians.2 The opposing viewpoint in this debate articulates numerous arguments that generally include: it is far too premature and too speculative to make such a proposal/demand; the Law of Armed Conflict should not be underestimated in its ability to control AWS development and future operations; AWS has the potential to ultimately save human lives (both civilian and military) in armed conflicts; AWS is as inevitable as any other technology that could potentially make our lives better; and to pass on the opportunity to develop AWS is irresponsible from a national security perspective.3 Some of the most respected and brilliant lawyers in this field are on opposite sides of this argument. The purpose of this article is to help refine the AWS debate. 2. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 2, 4 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/ sites/default/ files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf 3. Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 231, 234 (2013). 26 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) The Debate Over Autonomous Weapons Systems II. What are Autonomous Weapons Systems? The International Committee of the Red Cross defines Autonomous Weapon Systems as weapons that can “independently select and attack targets, i.e. with autonomy in the ‘critical functions’ of acquiring, tracking, selecting and attacking targets.”4 The U.S. Department of Defense defines AWS as: “a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further human input after activation.”5 AWS is not artificial intelligence.6 There will not be “human qualities such as consciousness, emotion, sociability, semantic understanding required for human moral decision making.”7 AWS also isn’t a Terminator science fiction movie scenario.8 “SkyNet” is not going to take over the world.9 Unless of course you think we are from the future and we’re here to convince you autonomous weapon systems should be developed and trust us there is no Terminator scenario. In that case, have Sarah Connor give us a call.10 “The autonomous robots being discussed for military applications are closer in operation to your washing machine than to a science fiction Terminator. The way the term ‘autonomy’ is used in robotics should not be confused with how the term is used in philosophy, politics, individual freedom or in common parlance. It is more related to the term automatic. An automatic robot carries out a pre-programmed 4. INT’L CMTE. RED CROSS [ICRC], AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL, AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS 7 (2014). 5. See Autonomy in Weapon Systems, DoDI 3000.09 (Nov. 2, 2012). 6. Matt McFarland, Elon Musk: ‘With artificial intelligence we are summoning the demon,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2014/10/24/elo n-musk-with-artificial-intelligence-we-are-summoning-the-demon/, (addressing the comparison of artificial intelligence to “summoning the demon.”). 7. See WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 9 (2009). 8. See Gabi Siboni & Yoni Eshpar, Dilemmas in the Use of Autonomous Weapons, 16 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 75, 75 (2014) (addressing cultural anxiety toward autonomous weapons systems due to movies in popular culture like The Terminator). 9. SkyNet is a fictional self-aware artificial intelligence robot that is The Terminator’s main antagonist. TERMINATOR (Hamdale Film Corporation 1984). 10. Sarah Connor is one of the film’s protagonists. Id. 27 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) The Debate Over Autonomous Weapons Systems sequence of operations or moves in a structured environment. A good example is a robot painting a car.”11 Autonomous Weapon Systems would be able to select and engage targets without human involvement in an unstructured environment. This is really the crux of the argument. Should weapons be developed that do not have a human in the “loop” (i.e. a closed “loop” system)? There are three types of weapon systems and they are generally described as: 1. Human-in-the-loop or semi-autonomous systems require a human to direct the system to select a target and attack it, such as Predator or Reaper UAVs. 2. Human-on-the loop or human-supervised autonomous systems are weapon systems that select targets and attack them,
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