TechnologyRESEARCH and Fratricide

INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGY TO REDUCE FRATRICIDE Larry Doton

The high incidence of fratricide during the requires materiel devel- opers to anticipate and compensate for the consequences of partially or completely non-integrated technology. Solutions include thorough risk as- sessments for all systems, combat identification capability equal to the range of the weapons employed, and service integration of IFF technology.

his paper will analyze the appli- lyzed and that the consequences of in- cation of technology in our mod- appropriate or incomplete application ern warfighting systems, evaluat- be averted. Columnist and retired ing the potential adverse impacts of ap- Army colonel Harry Summers recently plying mismatched, non-integrated, or addressed an argument made by Walter incomplete technology to a require- Lippmann, writing in December, 1941, ment. It will substantiate the criticality that air and sea power would prevail in of thorough requirements analysis prior World War II with ground forces play- to implementation of technology in ma- ing only a minor role. Wrote Summers: jor weapons systems. The paper will show that the high fratricide rates in the Lippman [did] not understand the Gulf War were due to incomplete and dynamics of the Army where man non-integrated applications of technol- is still dominant and the machine ogy, resulting in a ‘blind’ spot for the merely a tool. Technology must lethal warfighting systems. The paper serve the soldier, not vice versa will discuss fixes made during the Gulf (Summers, 1995). War and current initiatives to solve the problem. Finally, it will offer recom- Summers is right. Requirements mendations to minimize the incidence should drive the technology, not vice of fratricide in future conflicts. versa. We must critically evaluate the Given the lethality of our warfighting importance of the man-machine inter- systems, it is imperative that the appli- face to minimize the possibility of frat- cation of technology be carefully ana- ricide.

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The Gulf War verified the impor- equipment or facilities, which re- tance of superior knowledge on the sults in unforeseen and uninten- battlefield. This control of knowledge, tional death or injury to friendly and its denial to the enemy, proved to personnel (Department of the be an indispensable factor. As Alan Army, 1992). Campen noted in the Introduction to The First Information War, allied forces In a recently published study on frat- could see, hear, and talk all through the ricide, Army Col. Kenneth Steinweg, a war. After a few hours, the enemy could physician, argues that, “This restrictive not. Campen also discusses the ability definition precludes accidental weapon of information warfare technology to explosions and misfires, training acci- support a leaner and cheaper force dents, casualties from unexploded ord- while continuing to effectively support nance, or self wounding of any kind. the nation’s goals and objectives. Vic- This artificially reduces the true fratri- tory in any future conflict will hinge on cide percentage rate” (Steinweg, 1994). our ability to win the information war. In his 1982 paper on the same sub- A vital part of winning the information ject, Army Lt.Col. Charles Shrader war is the prevention and minimization coined the term amicicide. He derived of fratricide. this from the legitimate combination of the Latin noun amicus (friend) with the common latinate suffix for killing (- WHAT IS FRATRICIDE? cide) (Shrader, 1982). The term fratri- cide was at that time applied most of- To understand the lack of serious at- ten to casualties inflicted by artillery tention given this problem prior to the projectiles. This limited definition arti- Gulf War, it is important to grasp how ficially lowered true fratricide rates. restrictive the official definition of frat- ricide is. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, quoting from the U.S. Army HISTORY OF FRATRICIDE IN WAR Training and Doctrine Command’s Fratricide Action Plan, defines fratri- A brief history of fratricide since the cide as: 18th century illustrates the evolution of problems in positive combat identifica- The employment of friendly weap- tion. This history documents that com- ons and munitions with the intent bat identification remains a critical to kill the enemy or destroy his problem, particularly with our techno-

Lieutenant Colonel Larry Doton, USA is the Project Manager, Electronic Campus, for the Defense Systems Management College at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Doton holds a M.A. in Personnel Management from Central Michigan University and a M.S. in Management Infor- mation Systems from American University in Washington, D.C.

2 Technology and Fratricide

logical capability to engage targets at American plane incinerated nearly an previously unfathomable ranges. These entire U.S. Marine platoon. And com- ranges go beyond the capability to vi- bat identification problems continued sually distinguish friend from foe. in Vietnam. In his study of fratricide, In 1758, during the French and In- Shrader referenced many Vietnam dian War, the commander of a British friendly fire occurrences. Among them detachment and Col. George Washing- was a terrible artillery incident. It hap- ton, then a colonial officer of the Brit- pened in 1967 when a gun crew cut an ish Army, mistakenly identified each incorrect powder charge. The ‘long’ others’ forces as French. In his papers, round killed one and wounded 37 U.S. Washington reported that between 13 soldiers. Compounding the tragedy, the and 40 British soldiers died at the hands victim’s unit initiated extremely accu- of their own forces during the ensuing rate counterbattery fire, resulting in an engagement (Abbot, 1988). Uniforms additional 53 casualties. The entire in- at that time identified alliance. Due to cident occurred in the short span of 23 the ‘fog of war,’ that means of identifi- minutes (Shrader, 1982, p. 21). cation proved to be ineffective. In a recent keynote address on frat- Of the five million French casualties ricide, the Assistant Secretary of De- in , artillery caused two- fense for Command, Control, Commu- thirds, regardless of friend or foe. nications, and Intelligence reported French General Alexandre Percin be- that fratricide caused over 30 percent lieved that French artillery fire caused of all losses during the 1973 Is- one million, or 20 percent of French raeli-Egyptian War (Paige, 1994). Inci- casualties (Hawkins, 1994). During the dents of fratricide also occurred in breakout from Normandy in the Sec- Grenada and Panama. In Grenada, four ond World War, British aircraft inad- Navy A-7 aircraft strafed a U.S. Army vertently bombed the 30th Division for command post, inflicting 17 American over two days, killing, among others, casualties. Similarly, in Panama, American Lt.Gen. Leslie J. McNair. At friendly fire incidents accounted for the , the First Infan- three of 23 killed and between 16 and try Division became the target of heavy 37 of 310 wounded, as reported by De- ‘friendly’ bombing. In St. Lo, over 750 fense Department spokesman Pete Wil- casualties occurred as a result of U.S. liams during the June 19, 1990 daily bombers attacking American ground DoD press briefing (Department of De- forces. fense, 1990). Meanwhile, in the Pacific theater, an As this brief history documents, frat- allied destroyer depth-charged and sank ricide is not a new phenomenon, but a an allied ; likewise, in the recurring and deadly problem in com- Caribbean, friendly fire sank the Ameri- bat identification. Despite the evolution can submarine USS Dorado. of high technology systems for The Korean War saw similar occur- warfighting, ‘blind’ spots exist and frat- rences: A napalm bomb dropped by an ricide continues to occur.

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OPERATION DESERT STORM: Operation Desert Storm. These inci- THE FIRST HIGH TECHNOLOGY WAR dents equated to 104 woundings and 30 deaths, 10 percent of total casualties in Ground combat identification again the operation (Wright, 1993). Rick emerged as the core issue related to Atkinson of The Washington Post re- fratricide during the Gulf War. In an ported that despite the hundreds of article published in the Journal of Elec- fixed and rotary-winged aircraft from tronic Defense, Vito DeMonte suc- more than a dozen allied nations, none cinctly described the friendly fire sta- of the Gulf War fratricide cases involved tistics of Operation Desert Storm. air-to-air fratricide (Atkinson, 1994).

Never before have we fought such a short war, in such a confusing en- UNDERSTATEMENT OF vironment, with such a great per- FRATRICIDE RATES centage of deaths due to friendly fire (Demonte, 1992). The high incidence of fratricide in the Gulf War brought new and heightened Friendly fire killed 35 Americans and attention to this historically troubling wounded 72 during the Gulf War. In a problem. The Office of Technology As- special column in The Washington Post, sessment agreed (with Steinweg) that Robert MacKay reported that of the 35 past rates of fratricide were systemati- Americans who died, 24 died as a re- cally and substantially underestimated sult of ground-to-ground fire, and 11 (Office of Technology Assessment, succumbed to fire from U.S. aircraft 1995, p. 1). Shrader’s 1992 study, (MacKay, though “primarily historical, narrative, 1993). The Of- and highly selective,” concluded that ...fratricide rates during fice of Technol- “casualties attributable to friendly fire conflicts of the 20th ogy Assessment in modern war constitute a statistically century equaled at least five to eight times the (OTA) deter- insignificant portion of total casualties generally accepted two mined that the (perhaps less than two percent)” percent figure. official friendly (Shrader, 1982, p. vii). Because of the fire casualty dearth of published documents on this rate for Desert Storm was 24 percent subject, Shrader’s assessment had be- (Office of Technology Assessment, come the de facto standard. In subse- 1993). This figure did not include the quent published articles, Shrader ac- British soldiers killed by aircraft bomb- knowledged that actual fratricide rates ing, nor did it include engineer and are considerably higher than two per- medical personnel, who were casualties cent (Shrader, 1992). In a 1993 inter- of unexploded ordnance. As docu- view, Shrader further acknowledged mented in his paper on unexploded ord- that higher rates are prevalent. He nance, Lt.Col. Gary Wright stated that stated that “It just seemed to be the 94 separate incidents involving number that I kept coming up with, unexploded ordnance occurred during based on the materials that I had to

4 Technology and Fratricide

work with, which were pretty limited” Hour War did liberate Kuwait and se- (MacKay, 1993, p. A-4). verely defeated Saddam Hussein’s In a 1994 paper on the subject, forces. Steinweg substantiated his thesis that In an article published shortly after fratricide rates during conflicts of the the Gulf War, John D. Morrocco, a 20th century equaled at least five to writer for Aviation Week & Space Tech- eight times the generally accepted two nology, lauded the performance of the percent figure (Steinweg, 1994, p. 1). high technology systems used during Steinweg’s study examined historical the conflict. He also postulated that the evidence of the 20th century, experi- Department of Defense would continue ences at the National Training Centers, to press for high-leverage advanced and the application of technology. Be- technology systems. cause the casualty reporting system failed (and continues to fail) to accu- Operation Desert Storm [has] vali- rately document fratricide, Steinweg dated the U.S. ’s empha- also used medical documents in sub- sis on quality versus quantity in stantiating his thesis. Steinweg con- weapon systems and provided a cluded that “Fratricide rates have been tremendous boost to the credibil- and are conservatively 10-15 percent of ity of high-technology programs our casualties, not two percent” now in development (Morrocco, (Steinweg, 1994, p. 29). 1991). In 1992 another Army physician, Col. David M. Sa’adah, presented a paper Yet, the fratricide rate for the Gulf to the 31st U.S. Army Operations Re- War rivaled that of all conflicts in this search Symposium at Fort Lee, Vir- century. ginia. Sa’adah compared data from five In previous conflicts, artillery in- casualty surveys (three in the Pacific flicted the highest percentage of fratri- during World War II and two from the cide deaths. The Office of Technology Vietnam War) with Desert Storm data. Assessment re- He concluded that all weapons available ported that the “Reducing fratricide is on the battlefield are potential contribu- sole artillery ‘right near the top, if tors to friendly fire incidents. Further, fratricide inci- not right at the top’ of he asserted that movement from defen- dent in Desert the list of critical areas sive to offensive operations resulted in Storm occurred that the Army is cur- increased fratricide rates, sometimes by on February 26, rently exploring.” a factor of two (Sa’adah, 1992). 1991, when one Operation Desert Storm was the first soldier died from injuries inflicted by major conflict in which America’s fight- the premature burst of an artillery ing forces used the high technology round (Office of Technology Assess- weapons systems designed and built ment, 1993, p. 27). That single incident during the Reagan Administration. It accounted for less than two percent of proved to be a major test of the billions the fratricide casualties in the conflict. of dollars invested. The One Hundred Steinweg and Sa’adah’s research sub-

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stantiates previous fratricide figures as Steinweg and Sa’adah’s finding. routinely in the 15-20 percent range, As a result of the Desert Storm fig- vice the previously quoted Shrader rate ures, fratricide became a topic of in- of two percent. creased attention. The Department of Desert Storm data revealed a new Defense and the services formed Frat- paradigm. At the 1994 Combat Identi- ricide Task Forces. In an August, 1993 fication System Conference, Col. article in the Journal of Electronic De- Sa’adah reported that the M1A1 fense, Col. David O. Bird, Team Chief Abrams inflicted 71 percent of of the Army Materiel Command’s Frat- fratricide casualties during the war ricide Task Force, spoke of the high pri- (Sa’adah, 1994). Journal of Electronic ority in coming to the quickest possible Defense writer Zachary Lum further total solution for fratricide reduction. substantiated Sa’adah’s findings. “Reducing fratricide is ‘right near the top, if not right at the top’ of the list of The Abrams M1A1 was the worst critical areas that the Army is currently offender in the Gulf, responsible exploring” (Lum, 1993, p.48). Retired for 85 percent of the fratricide ca- Navy Commander George Cornelius sualties. (The U.S. lost 10 in reported in a Signal magazine article the war, seven to fratricide; of 28 that the Gulf War experience, because Bradley Fighting Vehicles de- of , rendered air-to-air stroyed, 22-23 were victims of frat- and ground-to-air identification prob- ricide.) (Lum, 1993). lems nearly irrelevant. However, the problem of air-to-ground and ground- Sa’adah’s research documented the to-ground encounters revealed seri- redundant lethality of what he termed ous shortcomings in combat identifi- weapons ‘platforms.’ cation capabilities (Cornelius, 1994). The Department of Defense and the The fratricide agent is not the spe- Clinton Administration have indicated cific weapon, but the platform that they recognize that the probability where the firing decision resides... of fratricide cannot be eliminated. Their The main gun is accurate and le- reasonable goal is the reduction of frat- thal to the target vehicle, but it was ricide. Secretary of Defense William the follow-on with the lesser arma- Perry charged the services to rapidly ment that created the majority of develop and field, as a high priority, an casualties (Sa’adah, 1994, p. 8). integrated, enhanced identification ca- pability to reduce the risk of fratricide The variation in calculated fratricide to armor, aircraft, and ships. He further rates highlights the difficulty in defini- declared that the Army should reduce tion (Shrader and Steinweg), as well as the possibility of fratricide through en- the non-standard application of calcu- hancement of situational awareness lation methodologies. Nevertheless, fig- technology (Paige, 1994, p.2). Situ- ures clearly substantiate the significance ational awareness is officially defined of the problem and fall in line with by the U.S. Army Combined Arms

6 Technology and Fratricide

Command as: Advances in technology, ironically enough, can exacerbate, rather than im- The real-time accurate knowledge prove some situations. They are but one of one’s own location (and orien- piece of the pie. Emmett Paige, Jr., As- tation), as well as the locations of sistant Secretary of Defense for Com- friendly, enemy, neutrals, and non- mand, Control, Communications, and combatants. This includes aware- Intelligence, recently substantiated this ness of the METT-T conditions point in a keynote address to the 1994 that impact the operation (Depart- DoD Joint Service Combat Identifica- ment of the Army, 1992). tion Systems Conference.

Similarly, Maj.Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Unless we have reliable means of then a deputy chief of staff at the U.S. positively identifying foes at long Army Training and Doctrine Com- range, the technological advantage mand, was quoted as saying “So we’ve we have achieved in our weapon got to focus on the minimization... rec- systems, at great expense, will be ognize that we will never be able to pre- partly negated (Paige, 1994, p. 3). vent all instances of fratricide” (Gellman and Lancaster, 1991). Beyond Visual Range (BVR) tech- The Office of Technology Assess- nology permits detection of potential ment also recognized that reduction of targets at previously unattainable fratricide is a correct and reasonable ap- ranges. As the term implies, the eye proach. cannot detect, let alone iden- ...the fratricide experi- Reducing fratricide is desirable tify a target as enced during the Gulf and feasible, but eliminating it is either friend or War was a legacy of not. Although programs to reduce foe. BVR tech- previous weapons fratricide are certainly needed, set- nology can de- acquisition policies. ting a goal of eliminating it is un- tect targets sig- realistic and probably counterpro- nificantly smaller than a pixel on our ductive (Office of Technology As- sensors, thereby precluding positive sessment, 1993, p. 2). identification. Unfortunately, the Desert Storm record of fratricide Believing that the application of tech- proved a downside to these technologi- nology alone will solve the problem is cal advancements. DeMonte highlights fallacious and foolhardy. As Cornelius the major reason. “Engagement ranges stated in an article published by the U.S. became so extended that differentiation Naval Institute Proceedings, “Elec- between friend or enemy leapt beyond trons, however marvelous, can never the capability of the ‘sensor-aided eye- relieve humans of the awful responsi- ball’” (DeMonte, 1992, p. 35). bility of the final, lethal decision to fire” (Cornelius, 1993).

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NON-INTEGRATED APPLICATION identification appeared necessary. OF TECHNOLOGY Review of applicable Cost and Op- erational Effectiveness Analyses To a large degree, the fratricide ex- (COEA) for combat vehicles in the late perienced during the Gulf War was a 1970’s (i.e., for the systems later used legacy of previous weapons acquisition in Desert Storm) revealed that combat policies. Planners and designers of high identification was not a system require- technology warfighting systems, such as ment. In the area of survivability, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the COEA data consistently concentrated Abram’s tank, the Multiple Launched on the areas of large and small caliber Rocket System (MLRS), improved con- direct fire weapons; indirect fire; mines; ventional munitions, and scatterable nuclear, biological, and chemical weap- mines failed to account for collateral or ons; and air attack (Department of the unforeseen impacts. Employment of Army, 1978). In no single COEA was BVR technology without evaluating all there a reference to combat identifica- consequences, resulted in a ‘blind’ spot tion or identification friend-or-foe in the positive identification of ground (IFF) technology (Department of the combat vehicles. Army, 1963). Built-in features such as A review of official documents re- fire suppression, blow-out panels, hard- veals recognition of the need to improve ened armor, and protective linings combat identification. However, prior served to increase survivability. These to the Desert Storm experience with measures proved effective in minimiz- fratricide, little substantive progress oc- ing the impacts of friendly fire during curred in reducing its incidence. The the Gulf War. As it turned out, the in- commander of the Combat Develop- corporation of IFF would have been a ments Com- more effective survivability factor. mand, in a No- ...“failure to consider In a February, 1974 letter following effects of unexploded vember, 1967 the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict and the submunitions increased letter to the Israeli’s difficulty in identifying friendly the potential for Army Chief of from enemy tanks, the Assistant Secre- friendly deaths.” Staff (Depart- tary of the Army for Research and De- ment of the velopment acknowledged that there was Army, 1967), observed that soldiers not a battlefield IFF system for use with must be conditioned to distinguish be- tanks (Department of the Army, 1974). tween friend and foe. He recommended He directed the Army staff and the U.S. a study to analyze modification of train- Army Training and Doctrine Command ing firing ranges to condition trainees to determine the Army’s need for a to make distinctions among targets battlefield IFF system for tanks. prior to firing. In June, 1982, J.R. Sculley, the As- The November, 1967 letter also re- sistant Secretary of the Army for Re- ported that improvements in techniques search, Development, and Acquisition, for visual recognition of friendly per- in a memorandum for the Under Sec- sonnel and procedures for battlefield retary of Defense (Research and En-

8 Technology and Fratricide

gineering), concluded that there was no with submunitions” (Wright, 1993, p. requirement for an electronic question 17). Further, Wright stated that “The and answer system for ground combat transfer or sharing of UXO information vehicles (Department of the Army, is not currently in our Joint or Service 1982). The Assistant Secretary based doctrine” (Wright, 1993). his recommendation on the results of a Unfortunately, this is not a new phe- Battlefield Identification Friend-or- nomenon. It applies, as well, to Foe (BIFF) study (Science Applica- minefield placement. In the November, tions, 1979). 1967 letter previously cited, the com- The Rand Corporation conducted a mander of the U.S. Army Combat De- study on ground-to-ground fratricide at velopments Command noted the inad- the National Training Center in 1986. equate reporting and recording of In the study entitled Applying the Na- friendly protective minefields. The tional Training Center Experience - Inci- commander reported that casualties in dence of Ground-to-Ground Fratricide, Vietnam occurred because units failed Martin Goldsmith provided several to record or retrieve minefields before conclusions. His data revealed that half moving. The report recommended re- of the recorded fratricides were pre- newed compliance with the published ventable if the shooter had proper doctrine. knowledge of the location of friendly Project office technical management units. Further, he found that one third engineers and the Studies Branch Chief of the fratricides were preventable if in the System Manager’s Office for tank gunners had knowledge of the lo- MLRS confirmed that: cation of individual friendly vehicles. Finally, Goldsmith found that 17 per- The battlefield safety of operating cent of fratricides were also preventable areas where submunitions had with the implementation of IFF devices been delivered was not considered on combat vehicles. during the design and early pro- In the case of the MLRS, a ‘blind’ duction of the system (MLRS). spot in doctrine emerged during the They [the System’s Manager’s Of- Gulf War. In his paper on the problem fice, Training and Doctrine Com- of unexploded ordnance on the battle- mand] said the Army believed the field, Lt.Col. Gary Wright calculated weapon would most likely be used that more than 1.5 million unexploded against the Soviet threat in Eu- munitions (UXO) remain on the Gulf rope, where U.S. troops would War battlefield. Wright further docu- probably be in a defensive posi- mented that vast amounts of tion. Therefore, U.S. soldiers were submunitions targeted beyond the For- not expected to occupy submuni- ward Support Coordination Line tions-contaminated areas (Gen- caused maneuver problems as ground eral Accounting Office, 1993). forces thundered into Iraq. Wright documented that “Many units found The U.S. Army Training and Doc- themselves in areas that were saturated trine Command’s System Manager for

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Cannon acknowledged that the “failure As previously documented, ground to consider effects of unexploded combat identification accounted for submunitions increased the potential nearly all the incidents of fratricide in for friendly deaths” (General Account- the Gulf War. Admittedly, however, ing Office, 1993, p. 8). combat identification is not a simple Tank developers likewise failed to task. Rudolf Buser, director of the U.S. recognize the consequences of a non- Army Communications and Electron- integrated application of technology ics Command’s (CECOM) Night Vision (i.e., IFF for ground combat vehicles). and Electro-Optics Directorate at Fort A senior Army officer who served over Belvoir, Virginia, succinctly delineated 29 years as a tank expert reported in an the complexities of combat identifica- interview that the issue of tanks’ vulner- tion. ability to fratricide was not a significant part of building a better tank. Further, Combat identification is a complex he indicated that such technologies as problem involving tradeoffs in per- transponder systems were excluded formance, covertness, cost, and from tank designs for a number of rea- other factors, and no single solu- sons (Tyler, 1991). Cornelius’ research tion exists. The Army is pursuing indicates that Army planners routinely a number of technical approaches dismissed IFF technology. Arguments to solve the problem (Morzenti, for rejection included maintenance 1991). complexity, better use of room used otherwise, and perceived dangers that The Desert Storm experience served emissions might reveal a unit’s location as a wake-up call for those designing (Cornelius, 1993, p. 89). and developing future systems. In the In the previously mentioned Gulf future, combat and materiel develop- War friendly fire incident, an AH-64 ers must fully consider positive combat Apache battalion commander, due to identification. The capability to posi- inadequate combat identification, mis- tively identify ground combat vehicles takenly engaged a Bradley Fighting must be equal to or greater than the en- Vehicle, killing two persons and injur- gagement range. Technology must be ing four. This showed clearly that de- integrated and matched to minimize the spite all of its high-tech gadgetry, the occurrence of fratricide. Apache and its human pilot cannot dis- tinguish between friendly and enemy forces in adverse weather conditions ob- OPERATION DESERT STORM scuring visual identification and verifi- QUICK FIXES cation (Johnson and Solomon, 1991). Without some sort of transponder or Following the first incidence of frat- IFF device, American and coalition ricide during the Gulf War at the battle ground combat vehicles could continue of Kafja, a number of emergency efforts to be mistaken targets in future con- were made to prevent fratricide. These flicts. efforts recognized the combat identifi-

10 Technology and Fratricide

cation gap as it applied to ground com- The Army rushed over 120,000 bat vehicles. With a full-fledged ground square feet of thermal tape to the the- war impending, the Department of ater. This tape was used to ‘mark’ ve- Defense initiated a number of quick hicles as friendly when acquired by heat fixes. One of the devices was an infra- seeking target acquisition sights. Be- red beacon, termed an Anti-Fratricide cause the coali- Identification Device (AFID). Pro- tion forces had cured in only 24 days by the Defense no monopoly The device was dubbed Advanced Research Projects Agency on infrared and the ‘Budd Light’... (DARPA), the infrared beacon used night-vision two high-powered infrared diodes to sensors, there was concern that the ther- emit optical power. Because of air su- mal panels might serve as bull’s eyes for premacy, there was little danger that Iraqi forces. In Desert Storm this did Iraqi aircraft would use emissions from not happen. the devices to target coalition vehicles. The Army also ordered over 10,000 The AFID employed a protective col- Small Lightweight Global Positioning lar to prevent infrared energy from be- Receivers to assist vehicles in determin- ing seen by ground forces. Used in con- ing their locations. Although only effec- junction with Night Vision Goggles, the tive in daylight and with good visibility, devices allowed coalition pilots to de- the coalition forces also used a field tect and identify the AFID emissions expedient side marking technique. VS- from as far away as 8-10 kilometers. Be- 17 panels marked ground vehicles on tween inception and full-scale produc- the top and inverted ‘V’s marked side tion, engineers made over 100 mechani- panels on coalition vehicles, identifying cal, electrical, and functional design them as friendly forces. Inverted ‘V’ changes in just four days. Though ini- symbols consisted of a variety of mate- tially called AFID, it became known as rials, including fluorescent placards, the DARPA light, after the agency that white luminous paint, black paint, and procured it. The DARPA light had a 50- thermal tape. Overall, these measures hour battery life. Each device shipped proved to be marginally effective. to the desert had two additional battery packs (Hughes, 1991). Another infrared emitting device, de- INITIATIVES AIMED AT RESOLUTION signed by Army night vision engineer Henry ‘Bud’ Croley, did not have a The immediate and overwhelmingly shroud to preclude ground detection. positive efforts in fielding expedient This allowed Bradley and Abrams crews remedies during the Gulf War were ad- to see them, as opposed to limiting de- mirable. However, these efforts did not tection to fixed or rotary wing aircraft. work well and failed to negate the im- The device was dubbed the ‘Budd pacts of bad weather, poor visibility, and Light,’ partially in deference to Croley night combat conditions. Cornelius and also as a reminder of the customs summarized the impact in a U.S. Naval of the host nation. Institute Proceedings article.

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Cheap, simple measures to iden- bilities. The receivers to be installed are tify friendly armor have not the Small Lightweight Global Receiver worked well. Colored panels are (SLGR) and the Precision Lightweight invisible at night and at best seen Global Receiver (PLGR) (Starr, 1993). only at close range; colored lights The Combat Identification Project were better, but easily duplicated Management Office currently focuses by the enemy (Cornelius, 1993, p. on a near-term solution to the problem. 90). Following tests at a fly-off competition at Fort Bliss, Texas in 1992, the Army Because of the minimal positive im- selected millimeter wave (MMW) tech- pacts of quick fixes, efforts to return to nology for further development. Com- the pursuit of IFF technology re- peting against infrared laser beacons, doubled. Following the war, DoD es- retro-reflector lasers, and radio fre- tablished a Joint Combat Identification quency (RF) based solutions, MMW Management Office. The office coor- technology was selected for further de- dinates the activities of the services. The velopment because it is least affected U.S. Navy is the lead service in the area by smoke or bad weather (Starr, 1993). of cooperative airborne identification. The Project Office faces many chal- The Navy’s focus is on upgrading exist- lenges, not the least of which is cost. The ing IFF systems for air-to-air and sur- estimated cost for equipping a single face-to-air contacts. Under the auspices division’s worth of vehicles is currently of the Program Executive Officer for In- estimated to be $250 million (Starr, telligence and Electronic Warfare, the 1993). The Assistant Secretary of De- U.S. Army Battlefield Combat Identi- fense for Command, Control, Commu- fication Systems Program Manager nications, and Intelligence, based on an leads the largest effort. The U.S. Army assessment by the Joint Requirements Materiel Command and the Deputy Oversight Council (JROC), recom- Chief of Staff for Research, Develop- mends near-term armor identification ment, and Acquisition provide materiel techniques on the order of $1,000 per and hardware solutions. The U.S. Army application (Paige, 1994, p. 3). Addi- Training and Doctrine Command is re- tionally, the Project Office must ensure sponsible for testing and evaluation that MMW technology is compatible (Starr, 1993). with U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force com- The Army began installation of im- bat identification plans (Starr, 1993, p. mediately available off-the-shelf navi- 961). gational applications on the M1A1 A less expensive alternative to spend- tank, the M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Ve- ing $250 million per division is to equip hicles, and the ‘Hummer’ utility vehicle. approximately 1,500 vehicles. This These applications are an interim solu- would be sufficient to support a substan- tion, pending investigation of alterna- tial contingency force. The Office of tive technologies. The devices add ad- Technology Assessment estimates an ditional position/navigation (POS/ outlay of about $100 million to outfit NAV) and situational awareness capa- such a force with MMW technology

12 Technology and Fratricide

(Roos, 1993). sion unless combat identification is spe- Many positive initiatives grew from cifically addressed (Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Desert Storm experience with frat- 1993). Additionally, Department of ricide. In April, 1993, the Army Deputy Defense Directive 5000.2 will be modi- Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans fied to require evaluation of weapon published the Operational Require- systems combat identification capabili- ments Document (ORD) for the Battle- ties at all milestone reviews. field Combat Identification System (BCIS) (Department of the Army, 1993). The document mandated the CONCLUSIONS AND need for a target identification system RECOMMENDATIONS with ground-to-ground and air-to- ground capability. This ORD supported Operation Desert Storm confirmed the April, 1992 U.S. Army Training and a gap in the application of technology Doctrine Command Operational and to positively identify ground combat Organizational (O&O) Plan for Army vehicles. The incidence of fratricide, un- Combat Identification Systems, which precedented in 20th century warfare, itself required an effective and surviv- confirmed the need for combat and able combat identification system to materiel developers to carefully analyze preclude engagement of friendly forces the application of technology into our and noncombatants. The O&O plan major weapons systems. Although we mandated the capability to positively can acquire targets at previously unfath- engage targets out to the maximum ef- omable ranges, we can not always con- fective range of the designated weap- firm positive combat identification. The ons system, with or without line of sight identification of ‘blind’ spots high- (LOS) technologies (Department of the lighted our inability to positively iden- Army, 1992). tify ground combat vehicles. The U.S. Army Training and Doc- Implementation of quick fixes dur- trine Command published TRADDOC ing the Gulf War was a start in resolv- Pamphlet 525-58, U.S. Army Operations ing the combat identification problem. Concept for Combat Identification, in Current initiatives in millimeter wave August, 1993. The pamphlet provides technology are similarly positive. In the Army with a concept for combat conjunction with these initiatives, the identification which will increase com- Department of Defense and the De- bat effectiveness, prevent fratricide, and partment of the Army should pursue protect neutrals and noncombatants. the following actions to further reduce In December, 1993, the Vice Chair- the incidence of fratricide in future con- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed flicts. that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) screen all future Op- • Continue to emphasize the impor- erational Requirements Documents tance of combat training and re- (ORD) to ensure that no new combat hearsals with particular attention systems proceed to a Milestone I deci- placed on fratricide prevention.

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• Continue the development and dis- • Continue to pursue all-service inte- tribution of training materials such gration of IFF technology, with spe- as the U.S. Army Armor School’s cific emphasis on combat ground ve- Fratricide video cassette. hicles.

• Continue to develop joint doctrine • Closely monitor and enforce consid- and train to it with more Joint Train- eration of combat identification ca- ing Exercises. pabilities at all Milestone reviews.

• Include fratricide prevention in all While the success of the Gulf War Mission Needs Statements and as- cannot be negated, the lessons learned sociated operational requirements from the high incidence of fratricide documents for our combat systems. must serve as a reminder that require- ments must drive technology, not vice • Continue emphasis on fratricide at versa. In the future, combat and mate- all Training Centers (e.g., the Na- riel developers must anticipate and tional Training Center and the Joint compensate for the consequences of Readiness Training Center). partial or non-integrated application of technology. The ultimate solution must • Require combat and materiel devel- address multiple areas to include doc- opers to conduct a thorough risk as- trine and procedures, organization, sessment for all systems, including training, the application of advanced fratricide prevention capabilities. technologies, and hardware. Fratricide prevention must be a standing require- • Enforce the requirement that com- ment for all combat and materiel de- bat identification capability be equal velopments. We owe our nation’s to engagement ranges of particular Armed Forces nothing less. weapons systems.

14 Technology and Fratricide

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