THE PROBLEM of the TRINITY: Is There a Middle Way Between Modalism and Tritheism? David Kemball-Cook
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
1.1.14 THE PROBLEM OF THE TRINITY: Is there a middle way between modalism and tritheism? David Kemball-Cook Abstract .................................................................................................................................................................1 1. The supposed ‘middle way’ between modalism and tritheism ....................................................................1 2. Attempts to define or explain the Trinity ......................................................................................................2 3. The ambiguity of ‘Person’............................................................................................................................... 3 4. The conflation of numerical identity and generic identity ...........................................................................4 4.1 The ‘is’ of numerical identity....................................................................................................................... 5 4.2 The ‘is’ of generic identity........................................................................................................................... 5 5. Example: the ‘Shield of the Trinity’ .............................................................................................................. 7 6. Confusion over ‘Being’....................................................................................................................................8 7. Example: James White’s definition of the Trinity........................................................................................ 9 8. Philosophical defences of the Trinity ........................................................................................................... 10 8.1 Relative identity......................................................................................................................................... 10 8.2 ‘Social’ trinitarianism ................................................................................................................................ 10 8.3 ‘Divine mystery’ ........................................................................................................................................ 11 9. Conclusion: no middle way ........................................................................................................................... 11 Abstract It is the thesis of this paper that there is no viable route between modalism and tritheism for a Trinity defined in the ways that theologians have attempted. There is no internally consistent way of defining or explaining a Trinity which does not result in shipwreck either on the ‘Scylla’ of modalism or in the ‘Charybdis’ of tritheism. There are three ambiguities and confusions in the attempted definitions of the Trinity which have tended to obscure these difficulties. 1. The supposed ‘middle way’ between modalism and tritheism Since the fourth century theologians and philosophers have expended much ink and paper in the cause of showing that there is a viable middle way for the doctrine of the Trinity between two perceived heresies. On the one hand is the ‘Scylla’1 of modalism, meaning one God with different personal manifestations, properties or ways of being. On the other side is the ‘Charybdis’ of tritheism, meaning three gods. 1 Scylla and Charybdis are two sea monsters taken from Greek mythology. Scylla is rationalised as a rock shoal and Charybdis as a whirlpool. They guard a narrow strait, often identified as the Strait of Messina between Sicily and the Italian mainland. The strait is too narrow for ships to pass safely. If they steer to avoid the one, they will be shipwrecked upon the other. In the Odyssey, Odysseus chooses Scylla and loses a few sailors rather than his whole ship in Charybdis. The famous problem of the Trinity is that no way can be found of defining a Trinity with three distinct Persons of equal divinity which does not also imply three different gods. If the Persons are truly distinct, with separate consciousness, wills, memories and emotions, and they share a divine nature, then they are three distinct divine beings, i.e. three gods. If an attempt is made to unite the Persons together more strongly than by possession of a common divine nature, such as by asserting each Person is numerically identical to God, then the distinctness of the Persons is lost, and the result is modalism. It is this ‘monstrous dilemma’ which Gregory of Nyssa2 (and thousands of theologians since) struggled to resolve. There are three confusions in trinitarian definitions which obscure this dilemma. 2. Attempts to define or explain the Trinity A basic definition is from the Westminster Confession: In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power and eternity: God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost Article 1 of the 39 Articles of the Church of England states: There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions; of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; the maker and preserver of all things both visible and invisible. And in unity of this Godhead there be three Persons, of one substance, power, and eternity; the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost Numerous writers have attempted definitions and clarifications. Here are some modern examples. Gregory Boyd: ‘The doctrine of the Trinity simply states that God fully exists in three personally distinct ways’.3 William Lane Craig defines the Trinity in terms of centres of consciousness: ‘there is one God who has three centers of self-consciousness: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit’.4 Craig uses the example of the three-headed dog Cerberus of Greek mythology as a model for how different centres of consciousness could co-operate together in a single body: ‘Despite the diversity of his mental states, Cerberus is clearly one dog. He is one three-headed dog, a single biological organism which exemplifies a canine nature’.5 Millard Erickson talks about the Trinity as ‘a society, a complex of persons, who, however are one being’,6 and that the ‘three persons constitute three centers of consciousness within the one being’.7 2 Gregory of Nyssa, Answer to Abablius: On Not Three Gods. < http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2905.htm> [accessed 7 October 2013] 3 Gregory Boyd, Oneness Pentecostals and the Trinity (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1992), p50. 4 William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, Defenders Podcast Series 2: Doctrine of the Trinity (Part 1) http://www.reasonablefaith.org/defenders-2-podcast/transcript/s5-1 [accessed 13 July 2013]. 5 William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, Defenders Podcast Series 2: Doctrine of the Trinity (Part 8) http://www.reasonablefaith.org/defenders-2-podcast/transcript/s5-8 [accessed 13 July 2013]. 6 Millard J. Erickson, Making Sense of the Trinity: Three Crucial Questions (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), p.58. 7 Erickson, Making Sense of the Trinity, p.67. Wayne Grudem: ‘God eternally exists as three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and each person is fully God, and there is one God’.8 Robert Morey: ‘While there is only one God numerically speaking, yet, within this one God, there exists more than one person, ego, intellect or self’.9 Cornelius Van Til: ‘God exists in himself as a triune self-consciously active being. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are each a personality and together constitute the exhaustingly personal God.’10 James White: ‘Within the one Being that is God, there exists eternally three coequal and coeternal persons, namely, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit … we are talking about one what and three who’s. The one what is the Being or essence of God; the three who’s are the Father, Son and Spirit’.11 There are differences between these definitions and explanations. For instance Gregory Boyd’s definition is more akin to modalism than most trinitarians would be comfortable with. Some trinitarians (e.g. Van Til) consider that the triune God is a ‘he’, whereas others (e.g. White) consider that God is an ‘it’. There are also disagreements over the applicability of analogies like Cerberus.12 We will use the following as a working definition: (A) God is one Being (B) There are (exactly) three Persons in this one God (C) The Persons are distinct from each other (D) Each Person is God (E) The Persons share the Being of the one God This definition is fairly representative of those given above. We now try to outline the three confusions and ambiguities in trinitarian definitions. 3. The ambiguity of ‘Person’ Trinitarian definitions almost always use the term ‘Person’. In the above example it is used four times. Much therefore depends on what is meant by ‘person’. However the word is notorious for its ambiguity, and dictionaries are no help.13 Is a ‘Person’ of the Trinity a 8 Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology (Leicester: IVP, 1994), p.226. 9 Robert Morey, The Trinity: Evidence and Issues (Las Vegas: Christian Scholar’s Press, 2005), p.87. 10 Cornelius Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 2nd edn, ed. by William Edgar (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 2003), p29. 11 James White, The Forgotten Trinity (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1998), pp.26-27. 12 For instance James White strongly criticises William Lane Craig’s use of the Cerberus analogy to explain the Trinity and his use of the film Avatar to provide a model for the incarnation. White maintains that the Trinity and the incarnation are unique revelations of God which cannot be modelled by other situations. Alpha and Omega Ministries: The