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Royal Responses to Military Defeat in the Achaemenid Empire

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Royal Responses to Military Defeat in the Achaemenid Empire Please provide footnote text CHAPTER 3 The Assassination of Tissaphernes: Royal Responses to Military Defeat in the Achaemenid Empire Jeffrey Rop In 395 BCE, Agesilaus of Sparta led a Greek army to victory over a Persian cav- alry force near Sardis, capital of the Achaemenid satrapy of Lydia. Soon after this defeat, the Achaemenid Persian King Artaxerxes II sentenced to death Tissaphernes, satrap of Lydia and Caria and commander of imperial forces in western Anatolia. Summoning him to Colossae in Phrygia, the King’s chiliarch1 Tithraustes seized the unsuspecting satrap in the bath and cut off his head. Artaxerxes then gave command to another satrap, Pharnabazus, who deci- sively ended the war in Anatolia by annihilating the Spartan navy at Cnidus in 394.2 No other general in Achaemenid history is known to have been executed as punishment for a military defeat, making Tissaphernes an exception that invites further investigation.3 While the emotionally driven execution of a long serving subordinate closely matches the Classical stereotype of Persian 1 The full range of responsibilities assigned to the chiliarch is not certain, but it is clear that the position involved command of the royal bodyguard and was one of the most powerful in the Empire. For an overview, see Briant (2002) 258–62. 2 Xen. Hell. 3.4.25; Diod. Sic. 14.80; Plut. Artax. 23.1–2, Ages. 9–10; Nep. Con. 3–4; Polyaenus, Strat. 7.16.1; Just. Epit. 6.1–2. The ancient sources are in some disagreement, but this para- graph summarizes the conventional narrative accepted by most scholars, none of whom doubt that Artaxerxes sanctioned the execution of Tissaphernes or that the satrap’s military failure near Sardis was its immediate catalyst. Thus Olmstead (1948) 384; Westlake (1981); Hammond (1986) 454; De Voto (1988) 51–52; Dandamaev (1989) 288–89; Debord (1999) 247; Briant (2002) 638; Cawkwell (2005) 148; Ruzicka (2012) 51–52. All dates are BCE. 3 Herodotus mentions that Xerxes ordered several Phoenicians beheaded during the Persian defeat at Salamis in 480 (8.90–91), but they were not Persians. The specific reason for their ex- ecution is not poor military performance, but false accusations they levied against the Ionian Greeks serving in the King’s fleet. The historicity of this event is doubtful. More likely it is an invention intended to highlight the fighting abilities of the Greeks at the expense of the Phoenicians and to portray Xerxes as a despot. It is similar to Herodotus’ report earlier that the King beheaded Phoenician and Egyptian engineers after their pontoon bridge over the Hellespont was destroyed in a storm (7.35), an event Waters (2014) 125 suggests is “apocryphal and literary.” © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004355774_004 52 Rop monarchs as temperamental, capricious, and violent, Achaemenid specialists have questioned this stereotype in recent years.4 In reality, it was the Greeks who sometimes sentenced unsuccessful generals to death.5 This chapter uses the occasion of Tissaphernes’ demise to explore how Achaemenid kings responded to the military failures of their subordinates.6 Persian rulers did not punish defeat with execution, but instead carefully assessed the conduct of their generals during and after military campaigns. Many were reappointed to positions better suited to their abilities following a formal review, which could take place at the conclusion of a campaign or even during one in response to complaints lodged against a general. In the case of Tissaphernes, political rivals subverted this royal evaluation process. The sa- trap’s death was an assassination, not an execution ordered by Artaxerxes II. The Consequences of Defeat Any attempt to analyze the treatment of defeated Persian generals faces a chal- lenge common to the study of the Achaemenid Empire: the complete lack of Persian narrative sources from which to draw. This forces reliance upon lim- ited, biased, or ill-informed coverage of the Near East by Classical Greek and Roman authors, in whose works we are fortunate to receive mere mention of major battles and wars not involving the Greek world.7 The most descriptive 4 This stereotype of Achaemenid kings is a major feature of the traditional, largely negative, “orientalizing” view of the Persians as decadent and effeminate that has come under sig- nificant criticism since the 1980s. See Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1987); Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Kuhrt (1987); Briant (1989) and (2002) 5–9, 515–18 pertaining specifically to Xerxes; Wiesehöfer (2007); Kuhrt (2007) 6–10. Some recent scholarship has argued that these cri- tiques are excessive, e.g., Llewellyn-Jones and Robson (2010) 24–29; Harrison (2011). 5 For a comprehensive summary of the trials and punishments of Greek generals, see Pritchett (1974) 4–33. Sinclair (1988) 146–76 surveys fourth-century Athenian punishments of politi- cal and military leaders; see further Foster (this volume) on Thucydides’ representation of defeated commanders. 6 Although Achaemenid royal ideology stressed the importance of the king as a warrior and commander-in-chief, Briant (2002) 227–28 notes that Achaemenid kings rarely entered com- bat themselves and even when present often delegated command responsibilities to their generals; on Roman imperial parallels, see Turner (this volume). As such, it is appropriate to consider the treatment of generals defeated even during campaigns on which the King was present. Neo-Assyrian royal responses, as discussed by Melville (this volume), provide a notable contrast. 7 Waters (2014) 8–18 offers a recent overview of the evidence available on the Achaemenid Persians..
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