Governing Foreign Aid: Explaining Donor Responsiveness to The

Governing Foreign Aid: Explaining Donor Responsiveness to the

Sustainable Development Goals

Brianna Scrimshaw Botchwey

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

University of Toronto

Governing Foreign Aid: Explaining Donor Responsiveness to the Sustainable Development Goals

Brianna Scrimshaw Botchwey

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

University of Toronto

2021

Abstract

In September 2015, the United Nations adopted the 17 Sustainable Development Goals

(SDGs). Foreign aid is crucial to achieving the SDGs in developing countries, as it can fill key funding gaps that the private sector or NGOs cannot. However, there exists a fair amount of variation in the impact of the SDGs on the aid policies and practices of major OECD donors. Drawing on case evidence, including elite interviews and qualitative document analysis, from three bilateral aid donors (Sweden, Canada and the United Kingdom), this dissertation seeks to explain this variation and identify the causal mechanisms through which global goals influence aid policy and practice.

I argue that the SDGs exert influence through a mechanism of show and tell in donor normative frameworks. Show and tell involves rhetorical performance that obligates performers to communicate their policies, practices and identities using a common script. The sensitivity of donors to this mechanism of show and tell is shaped by the perceived instrumentality of the SDGs in furthering donors’ specific reputational aspirations. When donors perceive that the SDGs will further their reputational aspirations they will show and tell a story about how their aid programs and even more fundamentally their donor identity

iii are linked to the SDGs. This process of show and tell can lead to goal responsiveness because donors then link SDG implementation to the maintenance or achievement of particular donor identities.

The variation in donors’ political commitment to the goals, then, is attributable to their differing sensitivity to the performative mechanism of show and tell which is in turn rooted in differing concerns for their reputation, and their perception of the SDGs utility in furthering their reputations. Donor governments who perceive that the SDGs are useful in achieving their desired reputation are more likely to be highly responsive to the goals.

iv Acknowledgements

My decision to embark on a PhD over six (!) years ago was spontaneous and admittedly not well thought out. Yet somehow, despite all odds, I have managed to finish this thing even in the midst of a global pandemic.1 I wish that I had a host of defeated enemies over which to lord this achievement but alas, I didn’t get out enough to have enemies. Like raising a stubborn puppy, completing a PhD also takes a village (not that this dissertation is a puppy, as that would imply that I hold some affection for it). This might seem like an odd analogy because conventional wisdom suggests that writing a PhD is a lonely process, but while the student may be doing the researching and writing on their own, they are, if they are lucky, also supported by an extensive network of peers, colleagues and mentors.

I have been incredibly lucky to have Steven Bernstein as a supervisor, who has had to put up with approximately 5 million requests for reference letters, awkward jokes during class, sarcastic footnotes, passive voice, disparaging comments about his preference for cats and listening to me complain about academic life. Thanks for putting up with me (and for your incredibly thorough and constructive supervision)! I am also grateful to my committee members— Stephen Brown, whose work on nation branding (including his reference to the iconic Meghan Trainor song) had a tangible impact on the theoretical orientation of this dissertation, and Wilson Prichard, who in addition to not being named a variation of Stev/phen, provided extremely valuable comments about the framing of the project. I am also thankful to the internal examiner, Matthew Hoffman, who somehow decided even after teaching a class on the SDGs, he wanted to read an entire dissertation on them. His comments were extremely helpful in refining the argument and addressing key measurement issues. I am very lucky that despite being a quantitative sociologist, Liam Swiss agreed to act as the external examiner. I very much enjoyed engaging intellectually with someone who is passionate about comparative aid policy.

I am incredibly grateful to all of the people I interviewed in Paris, London, Stockholm and the bourgeois paradise of Ottawa. This dissertation would not have been possible without these individuals agreeing to take time out of their busy schedules to speak with me about the SDGs. I hope that this dissertation helps to shed light on some of the challenges and opportunities we discussed in our conversations.

1 For the record, I do not recommend writing a PhD during a global pandemic.

v A number of other individuals made fieldwork a more enjoyable experience at personal level namely, the team at the OECD GovNet— from whom I learned a tremendous amount about development policy, international organization bureaucracy and orchid management. My wonderful friends— Caitlin Hoffmann, Catherine Perks, Alexandra Remond and the Cambridge MPhil gang— thank you for getting me out of the house when I was doubting my abilities. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Janet Vähämäki who saved my fieldwork in Sweden and was a gracious host at SEI. In Ottawa, I am incredibly thankful for the neighbours of Farnham Crescent (Celia Borgatti, Larry Bennett, Alexandra, Louis and Harry Wood) who imparted valuable life wisdom and organized doggy play dates, as well as my former colleagues at Global Affairs Canada who provided excellent career advice and encouragement in the early years of the PhD.

I have also been lucky to work on a number of other projects including through the Environmental Governance Lab and the Transformative Politics of the Wild project. Andrea Olive— thank you for letting me join your wildlife project so I could get a break from studying SDGs to study what I really care about— cute animals. Unfortunately, I likely won’t be getting married in an exotic location to which I could invite you, so you’re going to have to settle for this shout out. In the final year of the PhD, I also had the pleasure to work with a number of wonderful co-authors like Caitlin Cunningham, Abbie Yunita and Jecel Censoro.

This project benefitted from financial support from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the University of Toronto School of Graduate Studies, the Department of Political Science and the School of the Environment. I am also incredibly grateful for fellow dog enthusiast Carolynn Branton, as well as Louis Tentsos, who graciously shepherd lost graduate students through the unnecessarily complicated quagmire of UofT administration.

I was also lucky to have the opportunity to present early versions of the dissertation’s theory to a doctoral workshop organized by the Canadian Association for the Study of International Development (CASID) in November 2019. I am grateful for the insightful feedback from the organizers and for the opportunity to connect with other PhDs in Canada studying international development.

I would be remiss to not include the fantastic women in the PhD that made this experience somewhat tolerable. Neekoo Collett—with whom I plotted how to enact revenge on our non- existent enemies, Amy Janzwood— who skyped me to commiserate about fieldwork and

vi unfortunately convinced me to watch the Goop series on Netflix, Eugenia Yupanqui Blain- who let me sleep on her couch despite my hate for her three cats, Aden Dur-e-Aden—my future source of royalties once she goes big in political comedy, Emma Lecavalier—who let me harass her dog, Dudley, on multiple occasions and in multiple countries. I am also incredibly grateful for colleagues such as Kristen Pue, Reut Marciano, Gözde Böcü, Nidhi Panwar, Alix Jansen, Busra Hacioglu, Annika Ganness, Eve Bourgeois, Heather Millar, Nick Tosaj, Shannon Coulter-Low, Chi Kwok, Bowen Yu, Steve Loleski, Daniel Pomerants, Kirstyn Hevey and members of the BIPOC caucus, with whom I commiserated about the myriad challenges of gradschool life.

To my father Kwesi Botchwey and other siblings with doctorates and various advanced degrees— you may have beat me to the Dr. title, but I still have time to defeat your publication/awards count (not that this was a competition). I am also grateful for the encouragement of my extended family— Brent, Lorraine, Mackenzie and Quincy Scrimshaw. This PhD would not have been possible, however, without my long-suffering mother, Sandelle Scrimshaw. I am incredibly grateful not just for her unwavering emotional support and encouragement but also for instilling in me the importance of compassion and empathy, as well as for showing me everything that women are capable of. Lastly, I wish to thank my dog, Sunshine Cordelia, first of her name, destroyer of lambchops and queen of anxiety— without whom this dissertation would have been completed at least a month in advance.

vii

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ...... v Table of Contents ...... viii List of Abbreviations ...... xi List of Figures ...... xii Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Context ...... 4 1.2 Explaining Donor Responsiveness ...... 7 1.2.1 Defining Donor Responsiveness ...... 7 1.2.2 Taking Seriously the Role of Show and Tell and Reputation ...... 7 1.3 Research Design ...... 10 1.4 Research Contribution ...... 11 1.5 Outline of the Dissertation ...... 12 Global Goals and Their Effects ...... 14 2.1 Introduction ...... 14 2.2 Assessing Goal Influence Mechanisms ...... 16 2.2.1 The specific characteristics of the SDGs ...... 16 2.2.2 Potential Mechanisms 1: Motivation, Prioritization and Coordination ...... 19 2.2.3 Potential Mechanism 2: The Power of Numbers, Benchmarking, Naming and Shaming ...... 20 2.2.4 Potential Mechanism 3: Learning and Best-Practice sharing through the HLPF and VNRs ...... 24 2.3 Assessing potential determinants of goal influence ...... 29 2.3.1 Potential Determinant 1: Domestic Development Constituencies ...... 29 2.3.2 Potential Determinant 2: Norm Entrepreneurs or Goal Champions ...... 30 2.3.3 Potential Determinant 3: Aid Institutions ...... 31 2.3.4 Potential Determinant 4: Donor Ideas and Identities ...... 32 2.4 Conclusion ...... 33 Central Argument and Methodology ...... 35 3.1 Introduction ...... 35 3.2 Central Argument ...... 35 3.2.1 Show and Tell in Donor Normative Frameworks ...... 37 3.2.2 Determinant of Influence: Reputation ...... 41 3.3 Operationalizing the Framework ...... 47 3.3.1 Measuring Responsiveness ...... 47 3.3.2 Measuring SDG impact and reputation as a driver of responsiveness ...... 51 3.4 Research Design ...... 53 3.4.1 Case Studies ...... 53 3.4.2 Data Analysis ...... 56 3.4.3 Data Collection ...... 58 3.4.4 Elite Interviews and Participant Observation: Ethics, Access and Positionality ...... 61 3.5 Conclusion ...... 64 Sweden ...... 65

viii 4.1 Introduction ...... 65 4.2 Sweden’s SDG Responsiveness ...... 66 4.2.1 SDG Governance in Sweden ...... 67 4.2.2 Policy Responsiveness ...... 68 4.2.3 Practice Responsiveness ...... 77 4.3 Drivers of Sweden’s SDG Responsiveness ...... 81 4.3.1 Show and Tell and the Impact of the Voluntary National Review in Sweden ...... 81 4.3.2 Sweden’s Reputational Aspirations ...... 87 4.4 Conclusion ...... 93 Canada ...... 96 5.1 Introduction ...... 96 5.2 Canada’s SDG Responsiveness ...... 97 5.2.1 SDG Governance in Canada ...... 97 5.2.2 Policy Responsiveness ...... 99 5.2.3 Practice Responsiveness ...... 104 5.3 Drivers of Canadian SDG Responsiveness ...... 109 5.3.1 Show and tell and the impact of the VNR in Canada ...... 110 5.3.2 Canada’s Reputational Aspirations ...... 116 5.4 Conclusion ...... 119 United Kingdom ...... 122 6.1 Introduction ...... 122 6.2 UK’s SDG Responsiveness ...... 123 6.2.1 SDG Governance in the UK ...... 123 6.2.2 Policy Responsiveness ...... 124 6.2.3 Practice Responsiveness ...... 129 6.3 Drivers of UK responsiveness ...... 133 6.3.1 Show and Tell and The Impact of the Voluntary National Review in the UK ...... 134 6.3.2 The UK’s Reputational Aspirations ...... 138 6.4 Conclusion ...... 147 Conclusion ...... 149 7.1 Introduction ...... 149 7.2 Comparative Analysis ...... 149 7.2.1 The Impact of Show and Tell (Proposition 1) ...... 150 7.2.2 Reputation and the SDGs (Propositions 2-4) ...... 153 7.2.3 Explaining Donors’ Goal Commitment ...... 156 7.3 Research Limitations and Areas for Future Research ...... 157 7.3.1 Research Limitations ...... 157 7.3.2 Areas for Future Research ...... 158 7.4 Research and Policy Contributions ...... 160 7.4.1 Contributions to Governance through Goal Setting ...... 160 7.4.2 Contributions to Foreign Aid ...... 161 7.4.3 Implications for Policy ...... 162 7.5 The SDGs in the time of Covid-19 ...... 163 7.6 Conclusion ...... 164 References ...... 166 Appendices ...... 192

ix Appendix A: List of Interviews ...... 192 Appendix B: Sample Semi-Structured Interview Guide ...... 194 Appendix C: List of Participant Observation Events ...... 194 Appendix D- Code System ...... 196 Appendix E- Survey of Donor Approaches to the SDGs (2018) ...... 197

x List of Abbreviations

DAC Development Assistance Committee DFID Department for International Development ESDC Employment and Social Development Canada GAC Global Affairs Canada GSDR Global Sustainable Development Report ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office FIAP Feminist International Assistance Policy FSDS Federal Sustainable Development Strategy HLPF High-Level Political Forum IEAG-SDG Inter-Agency Expert Group SDGs IDG International Development Goals IDC International Development Parliamentary Select Committee (UK) IFI International Financial Institution IGO Intergovernmental Organization LDC Least Developed Countries LNOB Leave No-One Behind MDG Millennium Development Goals MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sweden) NGO Non-governmental organization OAG Office of the Auditor General ODA Official Development Assistance OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ODI Overseas Development Institute SDGs Sustainable Development Goals SDPs Single Departmental Plans Sida Swedish International Development Agency SDSN Sustainable Development Solutions Network TOSSD Total Official Support for Sustainable Development UN United Nations UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNSC United Nations Security Council VNR Voluntary National Review

xi List of Figures

Figure 1 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) ...... 2 Figure 2 SDG 17 Targets and Indicators ...... 24 Figure 3 Central Argument ...... 36 Figure 4 Criteria to assess responsiveness ...... 50 Figure 5 Summary of Case Studies by Key Variables ...... 55 Figure 6 Summary of Research Phases ...... 61 Figure 7 Sweden SDG Timeline ...... 66 Figure 8 Summary of Sweden's SDG Responsiveness ...... 80 Figure 9 Canada SDG Timeline ...... 97 Figure 10 Summary of Canada's Responsiveness ...... 109 Figure 11 UK SDG Timeline ...... 123 Figure 12 Example MDG Analysis in DFID Country Profiles (DFID 2012) ...... 130 Figure 13 Example SDG section in DFID Country Profiles (DFID 2018a) ...... 130 Figure 14 Summary of UK's SDG Responsiveness ...... 132 Figure 15 DFID Secretary of States (2015-2020) ...... 146

xii

Introduction In September 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, an ambitious vision for improving the lives of people across the globe. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a key product of this new consensus on global development. These goals mark the latest and arguably most ambitious attempt at global governance through goal setting— the use of non-binding global goals to steer state behaviour. Unlike other modes of global governance, governance through goal setting does not rely on regulation or strict enforcement mechanisms (Kanie and Biermann 2017). As the global community passes the fifth year of SDG implementation, questions are emerging about the ability of the SDGs to actually induce goal-attaining behaviour at the national level (see, for example, Easterly 2015; Sridhar 2016; Forestier and Kim 2020).

SDG 1 End poverty in all its forms everywhere SDG 2 End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture SDG 3 Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages SDG 4 Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all SDG 5 Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls SDG 6 Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all SDG 7 Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all SDG 8 Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all SDG 9 Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation SDG 10 Reduce inequality within and among countries SDG 11 Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable SDG 12 Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns SDG 13 Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts SDG 14 Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development SDG 15 Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests,

1 combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss SDG 16 Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels SDG 17 Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Figure 1 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

While the SDGs are universal and relevant to all countries, bilateral aid donors are an important governance target for the SDGs. Indeed, despite many years of criticism (e.g. Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009; Williamson 2010), bilateral development assistance remains crucial to achieving the SDGs in developing countries, as it can fill key funding gaps that the private sector or NGOs cannot (OECD 2017a). In recognition of this crucial role, SDG 17 includes a specific target (17.2) calling for “developed countries to implement fully their official development assistance commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of ODA/GNI to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries” (United Nations 2019b).

As this dissertation will demonstrate, there exists a fair amount of variation in the impact of the SDGs on the aid policies and practices of major OECD donors, even among progressive donors. Thus, this research project asks why do some donors demonstrate a greater political commitment to globally agreed development goals (as measured by their responsiveness in terms of policy and practice) than others? In particular, it aims to identify the causal mechanisms through which these global goals influence foreign development assistance policies and the conditions under which these mechanisms matter.

Throughout the history of bilateral development assistance there have been several international goal or target-based attempts to shape donor behaviour, with varying levels of success. Among the most well-known is the target to raise official development assistance to 0.7% of donors’ national income (OECD 2016). While this target has been in place since 1970, only a handful of donors have met it. Other precursors to the SDGs include the International Development Goals (IDGs) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) launched the IDGs in 1996. The IDGs were a set of three broad goals (Economic wellbeing, Social development and

2 Environmental sustainability and regeneration) (OECD 1996). The IDGs had a variable impact on donors, with progressive donors such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, at least at the level of policy, taking the IDGs seriously, while among others the IDGs did not have much of an impact (Hulme 2009). While the IDGs may not have had concrete policy impacts on donors, they did amplify global poverty reduction as the core of international development efforts (Hulme and Fukuda-Parr 2009).

The UN MDGs were the “world’s biggest promise— a global agreement to reduce poverty and human deprivation at historically unprecedented rates through collaborative action” (Hulme 2009, 4). The UN designed the eight MDGs to draw attention to and mobilize resources for core development priorities including poverty eradication, education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health, HIV/Aids, environment and a “global partnership” (Fukuda-Parr, Yamin, and Greenstein 2014). In terms of the impact of these goals on donors, aid levels did rise during the MDG period, albeit the cause of this increase is a matter of debate and cannot be solely attributed to the MDGs (Waage et al. 2010; Kenny and Sumner 2011). Sectoral allocation of aid also shifted, with greater attention to social sectors, particularly health and education (covered by 4 of the 8 MDGs) (Manning 2010). In a comparative analysis of the alignment of 20 donors’ policy strategies with the MDGs, Fukuda-Parr found, on the other hand, that the MDGs were used largely as a normative framework and that there was “little evidence that donors [used] the MDGs as a planning framework for resource allocation and for programming more generally” (Fukuda-Parr 2008, 13).

The SDGs differ from their predecessors in several respects (Fukuda-Parr 2016). First, they do not demarcate between developed and developing countries as they aim to be a truly “universal” agenda. Second, they are far more comprehensive - covering a range of issues from more traditional “development” issues like health, education and poverty to urbanization, energy and governance. Finally, the SDGs are supported by a novel follow up and review mechanism- the Voluntary National Reviews (VNR) and the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF).2 These unique features of the SDGs, compared to previous attempts at goal- setting, have implications for whether and how the SDGs might influence bilateral donor policies and practices.

2 The VNR is a voluntary report that assesses and presents a country’s progress and actions towards the SDGs, as well as potential challenges in achieving them. States present their VNRs at the annual HLPF in July in New York.

3 Thus, this dissertation contributes to a growing body of knowledge around the potential steering effects of the SDGs and governance through goal-setting more broadly (see Kanie and Biermann 2017; Biermann, Kanie, and Kim 2017; Fukuda-Parr and McNeill 2019; Vijge et al. 2020). It focuses specifically on the impact of the SDGs on the foreign aid policies and practices of OECD-DAC donors given the continued importance of bilateral aid flows for financing the SDGs, particularly in LDCs that are heavily dependent on aid (UNCDP 2015).

1.1 Context

The research question of this project is interesting on a number of fronts. First, this project is particularly timely as we enter the UN decade of action to deliver on the SDGs (2020-2030). It reflects on the first five years of SDG implementation, providing insights into the mechanisms that drive implementation of the SDGs in the foreign aid policies of developed countries.

Second, the SDGs explicitly and implicitly call for shifts in bilateral donors’ aid spending, policy and practices. As previously mentioned, the SDGs explicitly implicate bilateral donors through SDG target 17.2 that directly calls for greater resource mobilization, particularly for LDCs. In this way, ODA is a core means of implementation of the SDGs. Recent reporting on target 17.2, however, suggests that donors are not “living up to their pledge to ramp up development finance, tamping down efforts to achieve global Goals” (UNSTATS 2019). According to the OECD’s 2018 Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development report, bilateral ODA has remained relatively stagnant since 2015 (OECD 2018b). Similarly, the Secretary-General’s 2019 SDG progress report identified declining ODA flows as a significant challenge to the achievement of the SDGs (UN 2019). Focusing only on trends in ODA flows among DAC donors suggests that the SDGs are having little influence on donor aid practices. However, a core proposition of this dissertation is that the SDGs may have different kinds of effects on bilateral donors’ aid policies and practices beyond their levels of ODA spending, for instance on the content of their aid policies.

The SDGs are underpinned by several principles including Leave No-One Behind (LNOB), policy coherence, indivisibility, partnership and universality that could and should be integrated in aid policies. Theorizing the implementation implications of the SDGs, Rudolph (2017) proposes a concept of “SDG-sensitive development cooperation” in keeping with the

4 core SDG principles. First, she argues that the 2030 Agenda “offers the opportunity to… use [development policy] as a coherence instrument to design a whole-of-government approach” (Rudolph 2017, 4). In other words, SDG-sensitive development cooperation involves a ramping up of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) efforts. Thus, we might expect to see greater coherence between development assistance policies and trade policies, for instance. Similarly, others have also suggested that the SDGs obligate developed countries to assess the impact of their consumption and production patterns on international development (O’Connor et al. 2016). In this way, policy coherence mechanisms or policies are an important part of donors’ SDG responses.

In addition to policy coherence activities, “SDG-sensitive” bilateral foreign aid may also involve greater acknowledgement, analysis and operationalization of synergies and trade-offs between the different goals (M. Nilsson, Griggs, and Visbeck 2016; Rudolph 2017; Pradhan et al. 2017; Weitz, Carlsen, and Trimmer 2019). The principle of LNOB not only involves greater spending towards LDCs and to particular sectors, but also re-focusing on and prioritizing the most marginalized within recipient countries including through data disaggregation, or specific LNOB policies/institutions within the aid architecture (OECD 2018b; Engen, Hentinnen, and Stuart 2019). Building on this conceptual exploration of “SDG-sensitive” bilateral foreign aid, I outline more specifically the kinds of policies and activities that will be used to illustrate donor responsiveness in the subsequent section on explaining donor responsiveness.

Nevertheless, it is evident that the SDGs explicitly and implicitly call for shifts in bilateral aid policy. Yet, in practice, donors choose to interpret the goals and principles of the SDGs in different ways and to different extents. This is because the SDGs, as a novel form of governance through goal setting, are “bottom-up, non-confrontational, country driven and stakeholder oriented” meaning that states have a fair amount of leeway in how to implement the goals domestically (Kanie and Biermann 2017a, 297). As such, some variation among donors’ responses to the SDGs is to be expected. However, this dissertation is less concerned with donors’ specific implementation choices (e.g. whether they focus more on one goal or another) than their overall commitment or responsiveness to global development goals.

The varying political commitment of donors is also interesting given the relative lack of external incentives for donors to be very responsive to the SDGs. For instance, the SDGs lack formal enforcement mechanisms (aside from the voluntary VNRs) and they purposefully

5 avoid informal enforcement mechanisms like naming and shaming (a point discussed at more length in subsequent chapters). Furthermore, the low saliency of global development goals, and bilateral aid more generally, among non-development related actors and the general populations of donor nations produces little internal pressure on states to respond to the SDGs. This lack of internal pressure is compounded by the fact that major OECD donors tend to “have little humanitarian motivation for aid giving” (de Mesquita and Smith 2009, 8). Indeed, while scholars may disagree on the exact motives of donors in allocating aid — be they commercial (Berthélemy and Tichit 2004), geopolitical (Alesina and Dollar 1998; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp 2014) or security (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; de Mesquita and Smith 2009) related — the motivations behind aid allocation decisions are not only based in humanitarian concerns, but also in the instrumental and diplomatic objectives of donor states, particularly among the larger donors.

The instrumentality of aid allocation decisions does not, of course, preclude responsiveness to global development goals, particularly as paying lip-service to global development goals in policy documents involves minimal resources and can still help donors maintain positive reputations. However, there does exist variation in the overall responsiveness of donors to global development goals. More importantly, some donors are devoting significant resources to incorporating the SDGs in both their foreign aid policies and practices. This suggests that further probing is needed to understand why some bilateral donors go beyond paying lip- service to the SDGs. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, reputational concerns may be one form of incentive that drive donors to at least pay lip-service to global development goals but the conditions under which reputational concerns matter in the bilateral aid world and in the context of SDG responsiveness still merit further exploration.

It should be noted, however, that this dissertation will primarily be concerned with impact on donor behavior rather than development outcomes. Given the myriad of factors that affect development outcomes, it would be difficult to attribute causation to one particular initiative and doing so would require a very different research design. At least in the case of the SDGs, it is also much too early to evaluate their impact on development outcomes. We can, however, study donor behaviour and policy change as an SDG impact of interest given that bilateral aid, policy support and advocacy from major bilateral donors remains an influential force in the global international development system.

6 The research and analysis for this project took place only five years into the fifteen-year agenda. This timing also places an important caveat on the analysis and conclusions of this project. Most states change their priorities, policies and governments frequently in fifteen years and unexpected events like the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic also have an impact on state policy choices. As such, this project provides insight into the current (as of August 2020) donor approaches and the potential (pre-pandemic) trajectory of the case countries in terms of SDG implementation in their foreign aid policies and practices.

1.2 Explaining Donor Responsiveness

1.2.1 Defining Donor Responsiveness

In order to measure the impact of the SDGs on bilateral aid donor policy and practice, I draw on the concept of “donor responsiveness”. I define responsiveness as the extent to which actors respond to global goals in terms of their normative frameworks and actions. More specifically, I look at two measures of responsiveness: policy and practice. Policy responsiveness refers to the overall alignment of actor policy frameworks with the broad goals of the SDGs, while practice responsiveness measures the ways in which donors have integrated global development goals in the everyday implementation of development programming or in corporate processes. I use these measures to assess the overall political commitment of the case countries to the SDGs.

As previously outlined, policy responsiveness might include the creation or adaptation of policy coherence instruments or dedicated policies or strategies addressing core SDG principles such as LNOB. Integration of the SDGs in donors’ monitoring and evaluation frameworks and dedicated SDG projects are indicators of practice responsiveness, among others. I also assess donors’ VNRs and SDG related institutional structures, as these are also explicit requirements of SDG implementation. Chapter 3 provides a more comprehensive list of assessment criteria for policy and practice responsiveness.

1.2.2 Taking Seriously the Role of Show and Tell and Reputation

Scholarly work and analyses of global governance through goal setting has focused largely around the politics of their emergence, how and whether they will be met and the reasons for failure, and occasionally success, in meeting them. However, there is still a poor understanding of the political mechanisms through which global goals produce behavioural

7 outcomes in foreign policy, particularly their impacts, or lack thereof, on bilateral donor behavior (Fukuda-Parr 2013; Velazquez Gomar 2014; Hagerman and Pelai 2016; Biermann et. al. 2017). Given the growing use of governance through global goal setting in a range of global issue areas such as climate change or global health, it is important to understand how or whether this form of governance has an impact on behavior and outcomes.

As will be outlined in Chapter 2, existing explanations for the influence of global goals focus on the “power of numbers”— or, in other words, the influence of the target and indicator systems that underpin the goals (see for example, Fukuda-Parr, Yamin, and Greenstein 2014; Fukuda-Parr and Yamin 2017). The SDGs, like the MDGs, have an extensive target/indicator system (169 targets and 231 indicators) designed to benchmark, measure and assess progress towards the broader goals. By quantifying the broader goals, the targets and indicators render the SDGs more specific and legible. For instance, SDG 1 (Eradicate Poverty) includes more specific targets around eliminating extreme poverty, implementing social protection systems and building disaster resilience, with attendant quantitative indicators to measure progress towards these targets. Scholars focusing on the impact of the numeric targets and indicators on state behaviour suggest that they influence behaviour by creating incentives for goal- attaining behaviour by fostering healthy competition and/or facilitating naming and shaming (Fukuda-Parr and McNeill 2019). However, these effects are less relevant in the case of bilateral aid donors who use their own internal systems of targets/indicators and are less concerned with healthy competition (at least in the case of globally agreed development goals like the SDGs).3

Rather than focusing only on the impact of the numeric target and indicator system of the SDGs, I suggest a turn to the “power of goals” — taking into account the specific characteristics of the goals in terms of their ambition, specificity and institutionalisation. In so doing, I aim to identify the specific features of the broader goals themselves that influence behaviour. In this dissertation, I outline three specific characteristics of the SDGs that shape the relevant mechanism of influence. More specifically, the SDGs are highly ambitious, vague and lacking in formal enforcement mechanisms. They also have weak institutionalisation in the form of the HLPF and the VNR process, all of which has implications for the ability of the goals to steer behaviour at the national level.

3 A more detailed assessment of the applicability of the global goals literature is undertaken in Chapter 2.

8 Indeed, a central tenet of this dissertation is that there is a performative dimension to the SDGs, one that has the potential to steer states towards goal-attaining behaviour. The SDGs themselves are a flexible script that states use to communicate a host of policies, priorities and even national identity narratives. In this vein, the HLPF and VNR process are venues in which states perform these narratives. In the aid domain more specifically, donors can use the SDGs to communicate their aid policy priorities, as well as donor identity narratives.

Drawing on the metaphor of show and tell, I argue that rather than dismissing the potential for the SDGs to influence behaviour, scholars should take seriously this performative and rhetorical dimension of the SDGs and the follow-up and review mechanisms of the VNRs and the HLPF. The showing and telling of aid policy priorities and donor identities using the script of the SDGs has clear rhetorical and potentially constitutive effects. Show and tell obliges states to embed the SDGs in their aid policy frames and donor normative frameworks more broadly. Certain donors also link the SDGs explicitly to their donor identity narratives. The linking of the SDGs to donor identity, in particular, can lead to a greater prioritization of global goal attaining behaviour as that behaviour becomes linked with the attainment or maintenance of a particular donor identity.

However, not all donors choose to use the SDG script to communicate their policies, normative frameworks or donor identities. To explain this variation, I turn to determinants of influence that might shape states’ sensitivity to the show and tell mechanism of the SDGs. I argue that government’s concern for their reputation is a key driver of their responsiveness to the SDGs, given the inherent performativity of the goals and their follow up and review processes.

The likelihood of donor states linking their aid policy and donor identity narratives to the SDGs through the show and tell process stems from their relative concern for building or affirming a particular reputation. The choice to use the SDGs specifically as a reputational tool in turn derives from the perceived instrumentality of the SDGs by governments in building these reputations. I outline several scenarios in which governments may come to perceive the SDGs as useful in reputational terms—namely to achieve strategic foreign policy goals or for domestic electoral gain. In sum, the goals exert influence through the performative mechanism of show and tell but the sensitivity of donors to this mechanism is determined by reputational concerns.

9 The findings of this dissertation demonstrate that some donors are “showing and telling” their priorities and identities using the SDG script. As two of the cases demonstrate (Canada and Sweden) showing and telling has clear impacts on aid policy, at least at the level of framing and communication. It also finds strong evidence that donors choose to use the SDG script in their aid policies due to their specific reputational aspirations. Returning to the central question of the dissertation, I argue that the variation in donors’ political commitment to global development goals is attributable to differing sensitivity to the show and tell mechanism which in turn is determined by differing reputational aspirations. Donor governments who perceive that the SDGs are useful in achieving their desired reputation are more likely to link the SDGs to their donor identity narratives and as such be responsive to the goals. At the same time, however, this dissertation suggests that this mechanism of show and tell is not leading to fundamental changes in aid practices among donors, as even typically progressive donors like Sweden have not fundamentally altered their aid practices in line with the SDGs. As such, I argue that the SDGs have a greater impact on how donors talk about aid, rather than how they practice aid.

1.3 Research Design

This project takes a comparative most-similar case-study approach, engaging with case evidence from three OECD-DAC donors: Sweden, Canada and the United Kingdom (UK). , All three are “most-likely” to be responsive to the SDGs given their claims to progressiveness and leadership within the donor community. However, as this dissertation shows, there is variation in political commitment to the goals even among progressive donors.

Sweden frequently ranks highly in donor rankings and scholars have noted Sweden’s aid generosity, progressiveness and leadership in the donor community for many years (Center for Global Development 2018; OECD 2019b). This leadership role appears to have extended to the SDGs, as very shortly after the launch of the goals, Sweden declared its ambition to be an “SDG champion state”. Its SDG leadership ambition has also translated to its aid programme. I find that, of the three cases, Sweden is the most responsive to the SDGs in terms of its aid policy and practice. Although, as noted above, while Sweden has implemented some SDG practices such as SDG-related projects and integrating the SDGs in its statistical system of aid reporting, it has not fundamentally changed its approach to aid at the level of practice.

10 Of the three cases, Canada is the least generous donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI. However, in 2015 the new Liberal government came into power with an ambition to reset Canada’s foreign policy in order to restore Canada’s international reputation. The new government also espoused a commitment to gender equality and women’s empowerment. In keeping with this commitment Canada’s new Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) launched in 2017. Given the linking of FIAP with the SDGs (and the goals’ inclusion in other corporate procedures in Global Affairs Canada), I argue that Canada is moderately responsive the SDGs.

The UK is one of the few donors to meet the 0.7% GNI/ODA commitment and in the past has demonstrated leadership among donors (OECD 2014b; ODI 2019). Yet, up until the beginning of its VNR process in 2018, it was not very responsive to the SDGs in terms of policy and practice. Following the VNR process, the UK increased its SDG activities both domestically and in terms of foreign aid. Thus, while it did increase in terms of responsiveness, of the three cases it demonstrates the lowest political commitment to the SDGs.

This research takes a qualitative approach, drawing on evidence from qualitative document analysis of over 120 documents, as well as participant observation and 57 semi-structured interviews with government bureaucrats, politicians, civil society and academics in the three countries. Through document analysis and interviews, I was able to identify the policy and practice responsiveness of each case country. This analysis was also pivotal in identifying the impact of show and tell, as well as, each case country’s specific reputational aspirations. Chapter 3 provides a more detailed account of the research process, including the interview procedures, document selection and analysis.

1.4 Research Contribution

This dissertation stands to make theoretical, empirical and policy contributions. At a theoretical level, this project extends current research on the potential steering effects of the SDGs. More specifically, it acknowledges and takes seriously the role of show and tell as a mechanism of influence. It also expands upon the role of reputation in driving state’s sensitivity to this mechanism of influence by identifying the conditions under which states draw on global goals for reputational purposes, as well as the strategic and electoral sources

11 of states’ particular reputational aspirations. In this way, this dissertation contributes to our theoretical understanding of goal setting as a global governance mechanism.

This dissertation also builds on insights about the instrumentalization of not only aid spending, but also aid policies and narratives. Furthermore, as one of the first to compare OECD-DAC bilateral donor approaches, this study provides rich empirical material about the impact of the SDGs on foreign aid policy and practice. As such, this dissertation is highly policy relevant as it provides policymakers with potential ways to address the SDGs in aid policy and practice. The findings may also help SDG proponents identify levers through which to encourage donors to act on the SDGs.

Unpacking how governance through goal setting drives foreign aid policy is also important for assessing the relevance of global development goals for the broad range of actors working in global development policy, including the United Nations, civil society and aid practitioners. While there has been skepticism regarding the utility and effectiveness of global development goals from both academics and development practitioners, given the tremendous resources and lengthy negotiations behind the creation of both the MDGs and SDGs, it is important to study their effects (intended and unintended).

1.5 Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 draws on the literature from governance through goal setting and the determinants of aid policy to assess the applicability of existing arguments about the influence of global goals to the case of the SDGs and bilateral aid donors. It suggests that the former relies too heavily on the “power of numbers”— that is the governance impacts of the numeric targets and indicators that underpin global goals. This literature suggests that global goals steer state behaviour through dynamics of benchmarking, ranking and healthy competition—dynamics purposefully avoided in the SDGs. The chapter also draws on the aid policy literature to identify potential determinants of donors’ SDG responses.

Chapter 3 builds on the insights of Chapter 2, proposing the central argument and methodology of the dissertation, summarized earlier in this introduction. It also outlines the primarily qualitative approach of the dissertation, drawing on qualitative content analysis of aid policy documents and semi-structured interviews with policy makers and other

12 stakeholders involved in SDG implementation or the aid policy space more broadly. The chapter concludes with reflections on ethics, access and researcher positionality.

Chapters 4-6 assess the plausibility of the central argument in three case chapters. The Swedish case chapter locates Sweden’s SDG aid response in the government’s ambition to be an “SDG champion state”. Similarly, Canada’s response to the SDGs should be understood within the Liberal government’s aspirations to restore Canada’s reputation as a caring and compassionate ally dedicated to multilateralism. The UK case sheds light on the galvanizing impact of the VNR show and tell process. However, it also demonstrates how donors might rely on different reputational tools (in this case, a legal commitment to spend 0.7% GNI on aid) at the expense of SDG responsiveness.

Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation first by undertakings a comparative analysis of the case evidence presented in the chapters 4-6, outlining nuances and limitations of the central argument. It then explores the applicability of the dissertation’s arguments to other donors (e.g. emerging donors) and suggests avenues for further research. As this dissertation aims to be policy relevant, it also suggests implications for policymakers and those wishing to increase SDG responsiveness among donors.

13 Global Goals and Their Effects

2.1 Introduction

Global goals share an important lineage with organizational performance goals common to the realm of business and public administration. Governments and organizations have long used group goals as tools to motivate individuals and organizations, as well as to improve performance (Mierlo and Kleingeld 2010). The MDGs themselves were heavily influenced by this goal-based approach to performance management (Hulme 2007). Organizational psychologists offer several insights into how group goals influence individual and group behaviour (see, for example Locke and Latham 2015; Latham and Locke 2007; Klein, Cooper, and Monahan 2013; Zhang and Chiu 2012, among others). First, this literature makes clear the importance of distinguishing between different kinds of goals. Some goals may be specific, while others may be more amorphous, some goals are public, while others are private, some goals may centre around learning, while others around performance (Latham and Locke 2007). For instance, Locke and Latham (2006) argue that vague, abstract group goals are more likely to lead to lower performance than specific, difficult group goals. Second, the determinants of individual commitment to group goals are multidimensional and include factors such as group member attributes, group member perceptions, potential for or actual goal conflicts and the complexity of the task(s) required to reach the goal (Klein, Cooper, and Monahan 2013). In other words, goal attaining behaviour is likely the result of specific goal characteristics and target group member attributes.

While global goals resemble organizational performance goals in that they “identify and publicize collective ambitions or aspirations in order to achieve some set of objectives,” they are different in key ways (Seijts and Latham 2005; Kanie et. al. 2017, 5). For instance, the desired outcomes targeted by global goals are not always as easily measurable as sales or profit goals and the architects of global goals are not always the actors responsible or even able to influence their implementation (Fukuda-Parr 2014).4 In many ways, broad-based global goals more closely resemble corporate vision statements than organizational or team

4 Most global goals, including the SDGs have quantifiable targets and indicators designed to measure performance. However, some of the targets/indicators are not always fit-for-purpose, particularly for more complex goals such as reducing inequality or strengthening institutions or good governance. This is further compounded by the fact that the targets and indicators of global goals are the product of complex political negotiations, rather than purely technocratic processes. The following sections delve more deeply into the specific characteristics of global goal influence mechanisms.

14 performance goals. In the case of global goals, however, the “corporation” in question is a highly diverse and complex international system of states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), sub-state and non-state actors. Nevertheless, the notion that goal attaining behaviour is the product of interactive dynamics is important. Indeed, as this chapter will demonstrate, one of the weaknesses with current explanations about the influence of global goals is a lack of attention to target group member characteristics that shape their sensitivity to global goals.5

Importantly, goal setting as a strategy of global governance also differs from rule-based modes of global governance in several important respects, with implications for the kinds of mechanisms of influence that may be relevant. Most significantly, global goals operate on an aspirational, rather than proscriptive or prescriptive logic. While some global goals do include elements of prescriptive or proscriptive norms, others like the SDGs define what broad outcomes should be achieved rather than the specific behaviours that ought to be implemented to achieve those outcomes. This flexibility means that, unlike rule-based agendas imposed in a top-down fashion, goal-based agendas are more bottom-up and do not prohibit or limit particular types of behaviour (Kanie and Biermann 2017a). While this flexibility offers advantages for broad buy-in and participation, it does complicate monitoring, enforcement and accountability (Persson, Weitz, and Nilsson 2016). While some global goals have monitoring and review mechanisms, the consequences of non-compliance are often minimal or non-existent. Indeed, it is also not always clear when states “comply” with global goals since they do not create legal obligations on states or normative standards of behaviour (Simmons 2002; Chayes and Chayes 1993; T. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013). How, then, do global goals achieve influence without clear behavioural prescriptions, strict monitoring and robust enforcement and institutional oversight?

The goal-setting literature offers several explanations answering this question— ranging from more broad galvanizing effects to the specific effects of the numeric target and indicator systems underpinning global goals. The aim of this chapter is to assess these existing

5 Importantly, this study is largely concerned with the impact of goals on behaviour rather than outcomes, which is another important distinction between this study and some of the organizational psychology literature that identifies a direct link between goal setting and outcomes. However, the outcomes outlined by global goals are affected by so many confounding factors outside the control of most states that concretely identifying causation between global goals and these outcomes would be challenging. Some quantitative studies of the MDGs have attempted to identify causal relationships to outcomes, but with varying success (see for example, Baulch 2006; Thiele, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher 2007). Aside from these quantitative studies, much of the literature on global goals is more concerned with effects on behaviour.

15 arguments about the mechanisms of goal influence on state behaviour to the case of the SDGs and bilateral aid donors. It suggests that the hypothesized mechanisms outlined in the global- goal setting literature cannot adequately explain the impact of the SDGs on state behaviour, particularly among the very specific group of states under study— OECD-DAC donors. In part, as previously suggested, this stems from a lack of attention to target group member characteristics, or in other words, the determinants of influence that condition their responses to global goals. Given that this dissertation is specifically concerned with bilateral donors, the chapter turns to the determinants of aid literature to identify and assess the potential target group member characteristics that might also contribute to behavioural change in line with global goals. This review of both literatures makes clear the need for an analytical framework that can capture the interactive effects between the specific mechanisms and determinants of goal influence relevant to the SDGs and bilateral aid donors.6

2.2 Assessing Goal Influence Mechanisms

Before turning to the assessment of the applicability of existing theorized goal influence mechanisms to the case of the SDGs and bilateral aid, it is important to outline the specific characteristics of the SDGs. There are different kinds of global goals with different characteristics that have implications for which mechanisms of influence may be most relevant in explaining goal attaining behaviour. Since its inception, the UN has set a variety of global goals from ending colonialism to eradicating smallpox and adopting human rights standards (Jolly 2010). These global goals have varied in terms of their level of ambition, specificity and institutionalisation (including monitoring, review, follow-up and compliance mechanisms).

2.2.1 The specific characteristics of the SDGs

The SDGs are highly ambitious. Achieving peaceful and inclusive societies globally in 15 years, as outlined in SDG 16, is arguably more ambitious than the global goal to eradicate polio (Global Polio Eradication Initiative- GPEI), as an example. In part, this is because the complexity of tasks involved to achieve peaceful societies is greater than those required to eradicate polio. Crucially, high ambition need not necessarily make a goal less likely to be

6 This chapter uses the terms “mechanisms of influence” and “determinants of influence” as a means to describe the different kinds of factors that are relevant in explaining goal responsiveness. Mechanisms of goal influence are the specific means through which global goals elicit goal attaining behaviour. Determinants of goal influence are those specific conditions or factors that shape a goal target’s receptivity or sensitivity to a mechanism of influence.

16 achieved or dilute its influence (Locke and Latham 2006). As argued by Fukuda‐Parr and McNeill (2019), ambitious goals can still have a significant effect on how problems or issues are framed and be vehicles for powerful global norms. Nonetheless, the relative level of ambition of global goals has implications for the kinds of mechanisms through which they may achieve influence on states. For instance, more ambitious global goals may rely more heavily on normative mechanisms to achieve influence.

While all goals are fundamentally aspirational, they also vary in their level of specificity. Some are quite specific, such as the 2°C goal of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, while others, like the strategic goals of the Aichi biodiversity targets7, can be quite vague or ill-defined (Kanie et al. 2017). Specificity also applies to the relative “directiveness” of goals in terms of goal attaining behaviours and pathways. As Reddy and Kvangraven (2015) argue, more abstract and vague goals may lack sufficient detail about the means of implementation but provide more flexibility in terms of implementation, which could be an advantage in contexts of uncertainty about the sufficiency or saliency of potential goal attaining behaviours and policies.

The SDGs tend towards vagueness to the point where one commentator argued that they should stand for “Senseless, Dreamy, Garbled” (Easterly 2015). This characteristic, in part, stems from the consultative and consensus-based nature of the negotiation process that involved a great deal of compromise and (re)-interpretation (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018; Fukuda‐Parr and McNeill 2019). Indeed, the SDGs are quite vague or light on detail when it comes to implementation (e.g. the actions required to achieve the goals). As previously mentioned, this was a specific design choice to give states flexibility in their approach to the SDGs.

Nonetheless, some of the goals are more specific than others. Goals such ending poverty (SDG 1), ending hunger (SDG 2) and climate action (SDG 13) are clear and readily measurable. Extreme poverty, for instance, is measured by the UN as people living on less than $1.25 a day while climate action very specifically refers to climate change. Goals such as decent work (SDG 8), sustainable cities (SDG 11) and innovation and industry (SDG 9), on the other hand, are less specific and more importantly can be defined in a number of ways.

7 The Aichi Biodiversity Targets, part of the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Strategic Plan for Biodiversity, are a set of 20 time bound targets to be achieved by 2020 aiming to address global biodiversity loss (https://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/).

17 For instance, decent work could refer to anything from livable minimum wages and standards for paid leave to the right to a healthy workplace or even economic growth. In fact, “sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth” is one of the qualifiers of SDG 8, without a clear definition of what sustained, inclusive or sustainable economic growth looks like. Like SDG 8, SDG 11 on sustainable cities also includes a number of qualifiers as it aims to make cities (and human settlements more broadly) inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable again without specifying what those qualifiers actually mean in practice.

The breadth of even the more specific goals like SDG 1 and 2 also undermines their relative specificity compared to other goals. SDG 1 aims to eliminate poverty in “all its forms”— not just the easily measurable extreme poverty. Yet, the only form or dimension of poverty that is explicitly defined in the targets and indicators of SDG 1 is extreme poverty and any other forms of poverty of not defined. In part, this lack of specific definition links back to a recognition that different countries have their own definition of poverty. Scholars have similarly criticized SDG 3 (Good health and well-being) (Costanza, Fioramonti, and Kubiszewski 2016; McFarlane et al. 2019). Not only is “well-being” not defined, there is not an evident target or indicator relating to well-being (e.g. no reference to mental health, or quality of life indicators like OECD’s Better Life Index) (Eckermann 2018). These trends in broadness or ambiguity are particularly prevalent in the more societal oriented goals like gender equality (SDG 5), reduced inequalities (SDG 10), decent work (SDG 8) or peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16) — although as outlined above ambiguity is also present in the more traditional development goals like ending poverty.

For some of the goals, the target and indicators serve to specify and clarify. By looking at the targets and indicators for SDG 16, for instance, we come to understand that “promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development” more specifically entails ending violence against children, significantly reducing the illicit financial and arms flows and providing legal identity for all, among other factors (United Nations 2019a). However, as several studies have observed, the targets/indicators are also vague and do not always measure or capture the goal in question, making the specificity of these targets and indicators potentially meaningless for these particular goals (Mair et al. 2018; MacFeely 2019; MacNaughton and Frey 2015). For instance, Fukuda-Parr finds that targets and indicators underpinning and ostensibly rendering SDG 10 (Reducing Inequality) more specific, do not actually measure the reduction in inequalities, rather they focus more broadly on inclusion (a

18 somewhat related, but distinct, concept to inequality) (Fukuda-Parr 2019). Target 10.2 aims to “empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all” but its indicator “proportion of people living below 50 per cent of median income” does not actually measure the empowerment of promotion of social, economic and political inclusion (e.g. there is no measure of social or political inclusion) and thus the target and the goal remain vague or ill- defined even with the more specific targets and indicators. Overall, while some of the goals and their targets and indicators have elements of specificity, their tendency towards breadth or lack of definition or qualifiers make it possible to describe the goals as being vague in nature.

Global goals may also have different levels of institutionalisation. Kanie et. al. (2017) distinguish between several kinds of institutionalisation. There are those goals that are solely aspirational, those that begin as aspirational but later develop institutional arrangements and those that are explicitly underpinned by institutional arrangements at the outset (Ibid.). Like many categorisations these are not always discrete or concrete boundaries and different global goals, including the SDGs, have demonstrated characteristics of each. It is unlikely that the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development will develop into a more formal implementing body or acquire greater authority and resources to meet the third categorisation.8 Rather, Abbott and Bernstein (2015a) suggest that it acts as more of an orchestrator, relying on softer modes of influence or working through intermediary organizations to guide and support state behaviour. As the following section will discuss, the institutions associated with global goals can be, in and of themselves, mechanisms through which global goals drive goal attaining behaviour. Nevertheless, in sum, the SDGs are highly ambitious, vague and have weak institutionalisation (even beyond the HLPF).

2.2.2 Potential Mechanisms 1: Motivation, Prioritization and Coordination

The literature on governance through goal setting proposes several mechanisms of influence through which global goals might induce goal attaining behaviour among states and other targets of global governance. Young identifies four such mechanisms (2017, 32):

(i) establishing priorities to be used in allocating both attention and scarce resources among competing objectives, (ii) galvanizing the efforts of those assigned to work towards attaining the goals, (iii) identifying targets and providing yardsticks or

8 In February 2020, the UN launched a review of the HLPF (Beisheim and Bernstein 2020; UN 2020a) As of August 2020, this process was ongoing. However, commentary suggests that the HLPF will likely not progress towards a true implementing body and likely will remain as a forum (De Burca 2019b).

19 benchmarks to be used in tracking progress toward achieving goals and (iv) combatting the tendency for short-term desires and impulses to distract the attention or resources of those assigned to the work of goal attainment.

The prioritizing effects of global goals were certainly evident with the MDGs, where they laid out eight specific sectors for development actors to invest in. The SDGs also establish priority areas, albeit likely too many for most actors to address on their own. The motivating role of global goals was also evidenced by the MDG experience where the MDGs helped to mobilize public support for development. This mobilizing effect can involve a ramping up of resources (including bilateral, multilateral aid and/or technical assistance) for goal related activity. These funds can increase the capacity of states to achieve particular goals (e.g. basic education, women’s empowerment or decreasing maternal mortality). This increased capacity might, in turn, have an impact on their willingness to pursue a particular goal (Scott and Lucci 2015; King and Rose 2005; Bernstein and Cashore 2000). Reddy and Kvangraven (2015) also argue that goals can play a coordinating role among diverse actors by providing a common aim, while Billé et al. (2010) suggest that goals can help to clarify roles and responsibilities. However, the prioritizing, galvanizing and coordination roles of global goals are arguably more general behavioural effects and do not explain why states, or other actors implicated by the goals, may be motivated to coordinate or prioritize in line with the goals in the first place.

2.2.3 Potential Mechanism 2: The Power of Numbers, Benchmarking, Naming and Shaming

Another prominent mechanism through which global goals may have governance effects include their monitoring or follow-up and review systems. More specifically, scholars point to the quantitative nature of the target and indicator systems that underlie global goals like the MDGs and SDGs (Fukuda-Parr 2014; Merry 2011). Merry (2011) argues that numeric indicators have both knowledge and governance effects, both of which can influence state policy and behaviour, albeit in different ways. The former refers to the fact that targets and indicators translate and simplify complex, and often contested, concepts and norms into supposedly apolitical, objective, universally applicable and fixed categories.

The simplification and clarification provided through quantification have some advantages for steering policy. In addition to enabling prioritization discussed above, quantification makes lofty goals like achieving global gender equality or a peaceful and just society appear

20 to be more realizable objectives such as decreasing the proportion of women and girls who are married before the age of 15 or reducing the number of conflict related deaths (United Nations 2019a). As supposedly apolitical, scientific and unproblematic numbers, targets and indicators also render these norms more easily communicable and universally applicable, which can help to achieve consensus among diverse groups of stakeholders (Fukuda-Parr 2014). It should be noted, however, that the setting of target and indicator systems can be very contentious processes (Fukuda-Parr 2019; Razavi 2019; Unterhalter 2019; Clegg 2015).

This process of translation and simplification also has consequences on the ways in which global norms or concepts are understood and practiced. In other words, it creates “a form of ‘constructed objectivity’ that acts back upon the reality it aims to describe” (Broome and Quirk 2015, 821). For instance, the MDGs redefined the purpose of development and enshrined a global “super-norm” that identified extreme poverty as morally unacceptable (Fukuda-Parr 2014). By shaping discourse and actors’ understandings of particular issues, quantification can influence behaviour. For example, an understanding of poverty as living with an income of less than $1.25, has different policy implications than understanding poverty as multidimensional.

Aside from these ideational and framing effects, numeric targets and indicators, particularly those that are comparable, set performance standards, thereby acting as benchmarks that can foster “healthy competition” among states (Fukuda-Parr 2014, 120). In this way, quantitative targets and indicators are instruments of “self-regulation” because they provide incentives to improve behaviour, implement new policies and align priorities with those of the goals. These incentives are largely related to concerns about a state’s international reputation but higher rankings or positive progress can also aid in gaining or retaining domestic political support (Kelley and Simmons 2015). Conversely, states may also be concerned with the potential political, reputational or even material consequences of performing poorly on global indicators (ibid.). Benchmarking and rankings are not only tools of self-regulation. The target-relevant information gathered can be wielded by states, IGOs, civil society and domestic coalitions as a form of external social pressure via naming and shaming or transnational advocacy campaigns (Kelley and Simmons 2015; Jolly 2004; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Shiffman and Smith 2007; Clegg 2015).

Importantly, the character of global target, indicator and ranking systems can vary with differential implications for their likelihood of impact on state policies and behaviours. As

21 Kelley and Simmons (2015, 56) argue, the quantitative indicators most likely to influence state policy include those that are “based on systematic monitoring… comparative, are wielded by a respected actor or group/organization of actors, and are widely disseminated”. While the SDGs include an extensive, primarily quantitative target-indicator system against which states may compare themselves, there is not a formal ranking system like the United Nations Human Development Index or the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index.

Since 2016, the UN Statistics Division and Department of Economic and Social Affairs publishes annual SDG reports on global progress and investment on each goal and identifies key challenges. However, these reports do not disaggregate by individual country progress (although the 2019 report disaggregates by geographic region) (UN 2019). In addition to the annual SDG reports, an Independent Group of Scientists appointed by the Secretary-General produce the Global Sustainable Development Report (GSDR) that documents and describes “the landscape of information on specific issues that are policy-relevant in the field of sustainable development” (UN 2020b). While this report includes some information about countries’ relative progress on a range of issues (i.e. meeting basic human goals within biophysical boundaries, top 30 economic units by revenue, labour force participation rates etc.), the aim of the report is not to compare countries against each other but to use this information as a means to identify challenges and opportunities for global progress on sustainable development. Moreover, the report does not revolve around those rankings and different editions of the GSDR draw on different rankings (in addition to a host of other reports and scientific information).

The UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and Bertelsmann Stiftung also publish the “Sustainable Development Report.” The report includes an “SDG Index and Dashboards,” which comparatively ranks countries according to their progress on the SDGs (outcomes) but is not an official monitoring tool and it is not clear the extent to which states take this report into consideration, particularly since many states collect their own data on SDG implementation which is then fed into the UN system at the global level (SDSN 2019). It is also arguable that neither of these reports are as high profile as other global or even UN rankings.

Thus, while the SDG indicators are wielded by a respected organization and widely disseminated, the comparative and benchmarking function of the indicators are not as prominent as in previous global goals. Indeed, the SDG follow-up and review system was

22 envisioned as more of a learning and informational system rather than a competitive benchmarking or ranking system (Donald and Way 2016; Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018). The voluntary nature of the SDG follow up and review mechanism emerged during SDG negotiations because states explicitly wanted to avoid competitive and shaming dynamics (Bexell and Jönsson 2017; Donald and Way 2016). As Donald and Way (2016, 202) note, during the Post-2015 negotiations there was a sense of “mistrust regarding the idea of accountability for the new goals and targets and in particular to the idea of progress being judged by or against other countries,” with countries voicing their concern over the prospects for “mud-slinging” and “naming and shaming.” States also rejected proposals for more formal peer-review mechanisms through peer shadow reports (ibid.). Indeed, unlike the Universal Periodic Review associated with the human rights regime, shadow reports from civil society are not a formal part of the HLPF/VNR process. As such, when explaining the governance effects of the SDGs specifically, scholars are obliged to look beyond healthy competition, peer-pressure or naming shaming dynamics to explain whether and how the SDGs have an impact on states’ policies and practices.

In addition, it is not clear that the quantitative targets and indicators of global goals have equal influence on all states. For instance, do targets and indicators have the same kind of influence on high performers - those countries who consistently rank at the top of global rankings? It is questionable whether these high-performers are subject to the same social pressures associated with benchmarking particularly as high-performers likely do not have to change their policies or practices to maintain their position in global rankings. For instance, significant drops in global rankings by traditionally high-performing countries are rare.9

Given that this project is concerned with OECD-DAC donors which are frequently high- performers in a range of global rankings, these actors may be less sensitive to the benchmarking effects of global goals, particularly the SDGs.10 In addition, among the 169 targets and 232 indicators only one target and indicator specifically implicate bilateral donors- Target 17.2 and Indicator 17.2.1 (see Figure 2). The 0.7% GNI target is not unique to the SDGs, having been in place for decades, yet it continues to be unmet, bringing into

9 Although the case of the USA’s falling position on health-related rankings (e.g. maternal mortality and life- expectancy) shows that drops by high-performers are possible. 10 There are several donor specific rankings such as Publish What You Fund’s Aid Transparency Index (Publish What You Fund 2018), the Center for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index (Center for Global Development 2018) and the Overseas Development Institute’s Principled Aid Index(ODI 2019). However, none of these include criteria related to donors’ responses to the SDGs.

23 question whether the target and indicator system of the SDGs can wield influence on bilateral donor behaviour specifically.

Target 17.2 - Developed countries to implement fully their official development assistance commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income for official development assistance (ODA/GNI) to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries; ODA providers are encouraged to consider setting a target to provide at least 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries”

Indicator 17.2.1 - Net official development assistance, total and to least developed countries, as a proportion of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee donors’ gross national income (GNI)

Figure 2 SDG 17 Targets and Indicators

Finally, these arguments about the role of quantitative targets and indicators focus too exclusively on the “power of numbers” as influential in changing state behaviour (Fukuda- Parr 2014). These arguments based on the “power of numbers” focus exclusively on the impact of quantification and the target/indicator system, but global goals are more than just a set of targets and indicators. Rather, the governance effects of global goals might also derive from their nature as aspirational visions for a particular community and from the other institutions and processes that underpin them. To this end, I call for a more holistic focus on the “power of goals” themselves, rather than just their target and indicator system.

2.2.4 Potential Mechanism 3: Learning and Best-Practice sharing through the HLPF and VNRs

As previously mentioned, global goals have different levels of institutionalisation. These underlying institutions and processes in and of themselves may also be mechanisms of global goal influence. While not a direct implementing body, the HLPF plays an important orchestration role in global SDG implementation (Abbott and Bernstein 2015b). The HLPF, created in 2013 by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to replace the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, has an ambitious mandate to provide political leadership on sustainable development, to follow up and review progress on sustainable development commitments, enhance integration of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development and to consider new and emerging sustainable development challenges (UNGA 2013).

24 In 2015, with the adoption of Transforming our World, the HLPF also became the central body for the VNR process (United Nations 2015). The HLPF convenes annually under ECOSOC at the ministerial level and every four years under the UNGA at the head of state level. During the annual HLPF states present their VNRs and review global progress on a particular set of SDGs, issuing a ministerial declaration at its conclusion. As Abbot and Bernstein (2015b) argue, the HLPF, as a universal forum, was designed to rely on soft and indirect modes of governance given that no substantial new resources or authority were committed to the HLPF for it to act as an implementation or enforcement body. In their view, the HLPF has the potential to be an “orchestrator of orchestrators” designed to mobilize and facilitate cooperation and collaboration (Boas, Biermann, and Kanie 2016; Bernstein 2017).

The VNR process is the SDG follow-up and review mechanism aimed at accelerating SDG implementation by facilitating the sharing of experiences, strengthening policies and institutions of governments and mobilizing multi-stakeholder partnerships (United Nations 2019c). These reports are voluntary, country-led and country-driven, universal and involve multiple stakeholders (United Nations 2019b). While states are meant to report progress on SDG implementation, the VNR process differs from a true performance review, as there are no tangible consequences for poor performance and, in fact, states are encouraged to be honest about challenges and set-backs (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018). It is also in this sense that “follow-up and review” differs from “monitoring and enforcement” as there are no real “sticks” to be used against laggards and states have a fair amount of control over how their progress on the SDGs, both at home and abroad, is presented internationally. In addition, thus far, most VNR reporting has focused more on the structures and processes put in place for SDG implementation rather than progress on indicators (Kindornay 2019; 2018; Cutter 2016; United Nations 2018).

As previously mentioned, the form of the VNRs (and the HLPF) were the result of a political compromise throughout the negotiations on a monitoring and accountability framework for the SDGs (Donald and Way 2016). It is a compromise that appears to have paid off in terms of encouraging broad participation in the process. As of the 2019 HLPF, almost two-thirds of UN members have presented VNRs, with several already having presented twice and some, like Togo, having presented three times (United Nations 2019c). In terms of the governance implications of the HLPF and VNR process, these two processes can influence state behaviour through mechanisms of learning and best-practice sharing. Indeed, this is one of

25 the core aims of both processes. Learning, for example, is a key mechanism of policy diffusion, particularly if facilitated by international organizations which can enhance information flows between members or participants (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007). Relatedly, governments and IGOs, such as the OECD and various International Financial Institutions (IFIs), use best-practice sharing to promote reform and influence national policies (Bernstein and van der Ven 2017). In principle, best-practice sharing among state-peers can drive behaviour by providing non-coercive social and economic incentives (ibid). Crucially, these practices derive their legitimacy from their appearance as technical, scientific and apolitical, thereby reinforcing the role of the HLPF not as an enforcement body, but as a neutral “safe space” to follow-up on SDG implementation.

It is questionable, however, the extent to which the HLPF has, thus far, really facilitated learning and best-practice sharing. Critics of the process argue that it more closely resembles a forum for showing-off rather than a genuine learning and best practice sharing event (Hald 2019). Indeed, while its architects designed the HLPF as a forum for dialogue and discussion, states only have 15 minutes to present, with Major Groups and Other Stakeholders11 also only have 15 minutes to ask questions, therefore limiting the possibility for genuine dialogue (United Nations 2019e).12 It is also not yet evident that states look to learn from or even mimic their peer’s VNRs in terms of new policies or practices to pursue in SDG implementation. Preliminary evidence from a recent survey conducted by the UN on the VNRs suggests instead that the VNR process has been useful at a national level for prioritization, enhancing institutional capacity for implementation, creating partnerships and enabling multi-stakeholder participation from civil society, corporations, regions, cities etc. in the SDG implementation process (IISD 2019). This suggests that the process of creating a VNR can have internal effects on states. It is too early to tell, however, whether the institutions and partnerships created from the crafting of VNRs endure after presentation at the HLPF. As participants in a 2019 HLPF session reflecting on the VNRs noted, very few countries follow-up on their VNRs after presenting at the HLPF (Risse 2019). Thus, while there has been some progress in terms of knowledge-sharing and learning, the HLPF and

11 Major Groups and Other Stakeholders is the official term for a range of stakeholders who are represented at HLPFs. These range from broad groups like “Women”, “Children and Youth” and “Farmers” to NGOs, Unions and Local authorities. A full list is available here: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/majorgroups/about 12 Interview respondents across the cases indicated that there is some best-practice sharing around data collection for the SDGs, but this occurs predominantly through the Inter-Agency Expert Group (IAEG-SDG), rather than the HLPF.

26 VNR processes are arguably not facilitating as much learning as intended, particularly in terms of foreign aid.

Indeed, rather than providing a venue for meaningful dialogue and learning, some argue that the HLPF is simply a performative forum of show and tell (Nieuwenkamp 2017; CESR 2016; WEDO 2017; Beisheim 2018). The performative dimension of UN summitry is not new or unique to the HLPF (Death 2011; Alstine, Afionis, and Doran 2013; Shimazu 2014). Yet, while the HLPF and VNR processes may be inherently performative they may still have influence. As Death (2011, 7) argues, the political theatre of international summits demonstrates examples (and expectations) of responsible and legitimate conduct to watching audiences. In order to be seen as a responsible member of the international community, then, states participating in these summits need to align their behaviour, or at least rhetoric, with the expectations of this stage.

In the case of the SDGs, the broad expectation is that states take SDG implementation seriously, or at least be seen as doing so.13 More specifically, the HLPF and VNR process obligate states to show and tell a story about SDG implementation in their countries. The HLPF and VNR processes are not the only stages on which states can perform responsible conduct in the context of the SDGs. For instance, states make reference to the SDGs in their domestic policies, parliamentary debates, legal documents or in the context of foreign aid more specifically— their aid policies and communications. These are all sites of performance that are relevant for understanding the impact of the SDGs. Nonetheless, the use of the SDGs as scripts for performance on these stages has clear rhetorical effects as states frame their pre- existing policies, priorities and even identities as contributing to the SDGs.

Emerging scholarship on the impact of SDG reporting provides preliminary evidence of the performative dynamics of the SDGs and their reporting system. Bexell and Jönsson (2018), emphasize this important identity performance function of the HLPF in their study of Sweden’s 2017 VNR reporting. They argue that VNR reporting under the HLPF is a performative act through which identity formation or reinforcement can occur (Ibid.). However, as they admit, Sweden is an ideal or an extreme case given that it is a high-income country that at the outset of the SDGs had aspirations to be an SDG leader. Their study also does not connect these rhetorical effects to goal responsiveness. As such further research is

13 As mentioned previously, specific actions for SDG implementation are meant to be variable from country to country given their national circumstances so I focus here more on overall commitment to the SDGs.

27 needed to understand whether these rhetorical effects, including identity performance, can have more fundamental impacts on goal attaining behaviour in the context of bilateral donors and the SDGs. Moreover, as comparative research on the content and quality of VNRs demonstrates, the effort put into these performances varies quite significantly from state to state (Cutter 2016; Kindornay 2018; 2019). This variation once again suggests that determinants of influence also play a key role in goal responsiveness explores potentially relevant determinants of influence.

The preceding discussion surveyed existing explanations about the impact of global goals on state behaviour. It argued that explanations centered around the impact of the numeric target and indicator system was not as relevant for studying bilateral donors. Similarly, it highlighted that learning and best practice sharing are less prominent in the HLPF/VNR processes than intended, bringing in to question the ability of these mechanisms to shape state behaviour. It also raised questions about the potential impact of the performative rhetorical effects of the SDGs on state behaviour. Furthermore, it highlighted that an issue that all of these existing explanations share, is a lack of attention to the factors that determine the success of the respective mechanisms. For instance, why are some states more sensitive to healthy competition or more receptive to learning than others? Thus, not only are these proposed mechanisms ill-suited to explaining the specific impact of the SDGs on bilateral aid policy but they also cannot account for the variation among donors’ responsiveness to the SDGs.

As argued in the group psychology literature, target group member attributes and perceptions play an important role in shaping goal commitment and driving goal attainment behaviour. I previously suggested that target group member attributes are also important in explaining variation in states’ sensitivity to any mechanism of global goal influence. The target “group” in question for the SDGs is highly diverse given that, unlike their predecessors, the SDGs are universal. The SDGs are meant to be “for” everyone— multilaterals, states, cities, corporations and even individuals. This thesis, however, is concerned with a very specific sub-group of states and a specific foreign policy area: OECD-DAC donors and their foreign aid policy. Given this specific target group, the aid policy literature may offer potentially relevant determinants of influence. In the following section, I assess the applicability of factors deriving from this literature to the case of the SDGs and bilateral aid donors.

28 2.3 Assessing potential determinants of goal influence

There is a long lineage of explanations about the drivers of aid policy choices from which one can infer potential determinants of the success of the SDG’s governance mechanisms on bilateral donor states. Some, for example, point to donor’s commercial or strategic motivations for giving aid (Alesina and Dollar 1998; Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Burnside and Dollar 2000; de Mesquita and Smith 2009). However, while this might explain broad aid allocation patterns, it cannot explain aid policy design choices nor donors’ responsiveness to global development goals given that they offer no obvious commercial or strategic (economic/security) benefits. The rest of this section weighs the applicability of potential determinants for goal influence, including the role of domestic development constituencies, norm entrepreneurs, the role of aid institutions and fit with existing ideas and institutions.

2.3.1 Potential Determinant 1: Domestic Development Constituencies

Scholars often cite domestic and international civil society pressure as explanations for compliance with human rights treaties or international norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; Price 1998). Certainly, the MDG experience also points to the way in which both international and domestic civil society used global goals to hold states accountable to their international commitments (Jolly 2004). In the aid literature, more specifically, scholars point to the role of development constituencies—those civil society organizations and groups deeply interested in aid policy in shaping the character of bilateral aid policy (Lancaster 2008). Lundsgaarde (2012), for example, argues that the volume and content of bilateral aid are “a product of interactions between domestic political actors taking place in the confines of a set of domestic institutions.” The strong poverty-orientation of donors like Denmark, he argues, is the result of “the direct incorporation of NGOs into the policy formulation process, the support for aid coming from [economic interest groups], and the compact nature of [the] policy-making system where the aid administration occupies a central position” (189). Thus, the presence of an active civil society or development constituency, particularly domestically, may be a determinant of goal influence.

Civil society influence is certainly important, particularly since strengthening partnerships for development is one of the SDGs (SDG 17). However, both international and domestic civil society pressure on bilateral aid donors tends to coalesce around particular goals (e.g., malnutrition, HIV/Aids) or in response to particular events (e.g., famines, natural disasters),

29 rather than around alignment with global development goals more generally. More interestingly, Nelson (2007) found that the MDGs in particular were not a motivating driver of citizen action given their association with the major IFIs.

In the case of the SDGs specifically, civil society and other “stakeholders” are encouraged to participate in the HLPF and VNR process. However, this participation takes the form of side- events and occasionally one or two questions following VNR presentations. Unsurprisingly, there has been persistent criticism over the lack of meaningful dialogue for civil society in the HLPF/VNR process, as well as in domestic SDG implementation (De Burca 2019a; Rowlands 2018; interviews conducted March-September 2019). Thus far, it is not evident that there have been meaningful dedicated SDG campaigns targeted at bilateral donors Moreover, with few exceptions, awareness of the SDGs is low and thus there is little pressure from the general public to implement the SDGs.

2.3.2 Potential Determinant 2: Norm Entrepreneurs or Goal Champions

The global goals literature has also emphasized the role of norm entrepreneurs or goal champions in driving commitment to goals. Building off the work of Keck and Sikkink (1998), Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2011) argue that norm and message entrepreneurs drive responsiveness to global development goals in their home countries. These domestic gatekeepers play an important and complementary role to norm entrepreneurs in pushing for the adoption of international norms domestically (Busby 2007). The case of the United Kingdom certainly lends weight to the argument that domestic norm entrepreneurs matter in responsiveness to global development goals. Clare Short, the Secretary of State for International Development (1997-2003) “sold the IDGs (the precursors to the MDGs) to her cabinet colleagues… and the UK public and fed them to the [UK] media” (Hulme 2009, 8). At the same time, the “political and administrative context around Clare Short and her Department for International Development (DFID) was also very positive” (ibid., 7).

While the presence of enthusiastic norm champions for global development goals may be important in particular contexts, the conditions under which individual agency leads to goal responsiveness still merit further exploration. For instance, why did these particular actors have the power to incorporate the global development goals into national aid policy, particularly since this often involves executive level decision making? As Breunig (2013), argues norm entrepreneurs and gatekeepers are embedded with particular political institutions

30 which can mediate their influence. In this way, any explanation about the role of individuals in encouraging SDG implementation also needs to understand the institutional and ideational context in which those agents exist.

2.3.3 Potential Determinant 3: Aid Institutions

There is a growing body of research that suggests that donors’ aid institutions and in particular the relative autonomy and capacity of aid agencies, have an impact on donor aid policy choices (Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp 2014; Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, and Potter 2015; Gulrajani 2017; Honig 2018). Autonomy does not only refer to an aid agency’s position within the government (e.g., as a division with a foreign affairs ministry, as an implementing agency). Indeed, even an amalgamated aid agency may still retain some measure of autonomy (e.g., Norway). Rather, autonomy in this case refers more broadly to “freedom from external control and influence” (Gulrajani 2017, 378). This autonomy is important to consider given that it lends aid agencies the credibility and ability to influence national aid policy. Autonomous agencies are crucial to insulating aid programs from nationalistic or strategic ambitions, as it is aid agencies, and the bureaucrats within them, that “represent and champion global development priorities within a donor nation,” including the global development goals (Ibid., 375). Aid bureaucrats are more likely to have a globalized identity or outlook and be guided more by the moral imperative around aid. They may also have closer ties with international bureaucrats at the UN or OECD (Stone 2008; Slaughter 2009). Indeed, as Arel-Bundock et. al. (2015) find, when aid bureaucrats are dependent on the Executive14 aid flows tend to be more strategic in nature. However, where they are more independent, ODA flows appear to be more responsive to recipient need. Applied to the SDGs, one might expect that donors with more autonomous aid agencies would be more responsive to the SDGs. However, explanations focused around autonomy do not explain why these aid agencies may have a stronger commitment to global goals. Indeed, the comparison of Canada’s integrated GAC and the former DFID in the UK demonstrates that autonomous aid agencies may not lead to greater alignment with the SDGs. Furthermore, given that the SDGs are meant to be “universal”, responsibility for SDG implementation does not always lie with aid agencies or foreign ministries meaning that the SDGs may not have as

14 They define “dependence” as a situation where there is a high level of influence over aid bureaucrats by the Presidency or the political level. They argue that this is determined by agency design choices like proximity to the President, expertise requirements, fixed terms or personnel protections.

31 much prominence in these agencies if they are not actually responsible for coordinating SDG implementation.

Previous studies of global goals emphasized the important role of state capacity in shaping a state’s ability to respond to global goals (Shiffman 2007). These arguments are particularly persuasive in the case of developing countries which often have weak institutional capacity and limited resources to implement and achieve global development goals. Donor states, on the other hand, are not dependent on financial and technical assistance. However, given the ambition of the SDGs, including their specific implications for donors, their implementation requires significant cognitive and human resources. Different bilateral aid donors have varying capacities to implement international agendas. Thus, donor capacity may be an important factor in shaping donors’ responses to the SDGs. However, while capacity may explain why some donors are more able to implement the SDGs, it cannot, on its own, account for why they choose to implement the SDGs in the first place.

2.3.4 Potential Determinant 4: Donor Ideas and Identities

Given the normative nature of global goals, ideational factors take on a particular significance. Indeed, “fit” with pre-existing ideas and institutions may be an important determinant of global goals responsiveness (Yee 1996; Bernstein 2002; Acharya 2004; Van der Veen 2011). For instance, the ideas enshrined within global development goals may be more at odds with Japanese ideas about foreign aid and development than Norway’s or Sweden’s, as the former focuses more on the economic rather than the human side of development (Fukuda-Parr and Shiga 2016). Conversely, global development goals may fit more neatly with the ideational frameworks of the Nordic donors, who are among the most responsive to global development goals, share a stronger moral imperative around aid and envision themselves as internationalist and pioneer donors (Gates and Hoeffler 2004; Selbervik and Nygaard 2006; Browning 2007). However, the SDGs are a highly permissive framework in which most OECD-DAC donors can situate themselves. There is very little in the SDGs that explicitly goes against the norms of the bilateral development community and the content of most OECD-DAC donors’ aid programmes, even those who frame their aid in the language of national interest (e.g. Van der Veen 2011; Fukuda-Parr and Shiga 2016).15

15 The exception, of course, being those donors who continue to fund fossil fuel development from their bilateral aid budget. However, even that could, in principle partially contribute to SDG 9: Industry, Innovation and

32 Thus, in principle, the SDGs inherently “fit” with most OECD-DAC donors’ conception of aid and sustainable development.

Other pre-existing ideas about a donors’ identity may also explain why some take the SDGs more seriously than others. Particular pre-existing identity configurations that emphasize the importance of multilateralism and being a “good” donor arguably lend themselves more easily to meaningful participation in the VNR process. Certainly, the usual “progressive” states such as the Nordics often have the most comprehensive VNR reports (Kindornay 2019). However, other countries (including emerging donors such as China or the United Arab Emirates.) with very different identities and normative frameworks have also embraced the SDGs and produced comprehensive VNRs (ibid.). For instance, China’s 2016 VNR emphasized their international contributions to the SDGs and the linkages between the Belt and Road Initiative and the SDGs (United Nations 2016). Similarly, in its VNR presentation the UAE stressed that it had “reoriented its foreign aid program to align with the SDGs” and presented their 2016 ODA contributions through the lens of the SDGs (Lootah 2018). This suggests then that goal responsiveness is not always determined by fixed pre-exiting identities, rather it may be linked to how states wish to present themselves in international fora — or in other words, to their international reputational aspirations.

2.4 Conclusion

States and other international actors are increasingly using global goals as a means to steer the behaviour, policies and practices of a number of actors. The SDGs represent the latest and most ambitious attempt at governance through goal setting. As this chapter demonstrated, the SDGs are unique in several ways. First, they operate on an aspirational, rather than regulatory or prescriptive logic. Second, they are highly ambitious, vague and have weak institutionalisation. Unlike previous global goals, the SDGs were also purposefully designed to avoid competitive ranking or naming and shaming dynamics. As a result, previous explanations of goal influence centred around these mechanisms are less applicable to the case of the SDGs.

While the architects of the SDGs designed the institutions and processes that underpin the goals (the HLPF and VNR) to foster best practice sharing, in practice this function is faltering

Infrastructure. Second, even “progressive” donors frame their aid with reference to a more benevolent or altruistic conceptions of “national interest” so this is not always a useful demarcation between donors.

33 (in part, because of the constraints of the HLPF). However, given the centrality of the HLPF and VNR process to the SDGs, it is still important to explore whether there may be other ways in which these SDG institutions and processes might influence state behaviour.

The survey of potential determinants of influence suggests that reputational concerns may be particularly salient in terms of understanding donors’ SDG policies and practices. Yet, as suggested by the organizational psychology literature, the effects of goal-setting stem from an interaction between the goals themselves and the characteristics of the goal targets. As such, both the governance through goal setting and aid literatures cannot, on their own, adequately explain donor approaches to the SDGs. Rather, any explanatory framework concerning the influence of global goals on donor behaviour needs to account for the interactive effects between potential mechanisms of goal influence and determinants of influence. The subsequent chapter outlines an argument that captures the interactive effects to ultimately explain how global goals influence donor behaviour, as well as the determinants that temper that influence.

34 Central Argument and Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The analysis of existing literature on global goals and foreign aid policy demonstrated the importance of understanding the impact of both mechanisms and determinants, and their interaction, in driving goal attaining behaviour among the relevant governance targets. Building on this insight, this chapter presents, at a theoretical level, the central argument of the dissertation. More specifically, this argument clarifies the mechanism through which the SDGs influence donor policies and practices, as well as the determinants of influence that make donors more or less sensitive to that mechanism.

The first section builds on the insights of the previous chapter, reaffirming that the SDG follow up and review mechanism is performative in nature and that the SDGs themselves are a flexible script with clear rhetorical effects, as the goals can be used to communicate a variety of policies or even donor identities. As such, it argues that the linking of core aid policy and donor identity frames to the SDGs, in a process of show and tell, is the primary mechanism through which the SDGs can influence or induce goal attaining behaviour among donors beyond SDG-washing, the practice of superficially attaching SDGs onto existing policies. However, donor government concerns for creating or maintaining particular reputations explains the relative sensitivity of donors to this mechanism and also acts as an important lever in closing the rhetoric-implementation gap. The third and fourth sections describe the core methodology of the dissertation, including operationalization of core concepts, case selection and processes of data collection and analysis.

3.2 Central Argument

As outlined in the previous chapter, understanding the mechanisms through which the SDGs may exert influence on donor foreign aid policy and implementation, involves not only considering the impact of the SDG target and indicator system but also the impact of the HLPF, as well as follow up and review through the VNRs. More specifically, I argued that previous explanations focused on the role of the target and indicator system in promoting healthy competition, peer pressure or naming and shaming are not central drivers of goal responsiveness in bilateral aid donors as there is a low concern for SDG related global rankings or other governance effects associated with the target and indicator system among

35 this particular set of actors. I highlighted that despite low levels of learning/best practice sharing the performative dimensions of the HLPF and VNR processes could still elicit goal attaining behaviour— in other words, this performance could be a salient mechanism of goal influence.

Based on the survey of potential determinants of influence, I also noted that existing determinants of aid policy were ill-suited to explaining variation in donor sensitivity to SDG- specific mechanisms of influence. Rather, I suggested that reputation, a factor that involves a concern for image and identity presentation, may be better suited to explaining donor sensitivity to the SDGs mechanism of goal influence. The central argument of this dissertation builds on these insights about the role of performance and reputation. Figure 3. illustrates the various components of the central argument.

Figure 3 Central Argument

I argue that the SDGs, including through the HLPF and VNR process, exert influence through a mechanism of show and tell in donor normative frameworks. The sensitivity of donors to this mechanism of show and tell is shaped by the perceived instrumentality of the SDGs in furthering donors’ specific reputational aspirations. When donors perceive that the SDGs will further their reputational aspirations they will show and tell a story about how their aid programmes and even more fundamentally their donor identity are linked to the SDGs. This process of show and tell leads to goal responsiveness. because donors then link SDG implementation to the maintenance or achievement of particular reputations and

36 identities. Donors who do not view the SDGs as useful in furthering particular reputational aspirations will not be as sensitive to the show and tell mechanism and therefore will demonstrate lower goal responsiveness. Importantly, this argument is specific to the case of the SDGs and bilateral aid donors. The subsequent sections outline each of the argument’s components and interactions in more detail, as well as the operationalization of the framework.

3.2.1 Show and Tell in Donor Normative Frameworks

As previously mentioned, the HLPF and VNR process involve a performance of sharing and learning. As Death (2011, 1) argues, global summits, like the HLPF, can be understood as “moments of political theatre, performative enactments of legitimacy and authority and sites for the communication of particular examples of responsible conduct.” In other words, they are “stages for political identities to be performed”, functioning as “advertising and branding sites” (Craggs and Mahony 2014, 420; Death 2011, 13). Like Death (2011) who suggests that the symbolic and theatrical dimensions of summitry can have important governance effects, I argue that states are showing and telling stories about their SDG implementation and that this performative show and tell can have both rhetorical and more tangible impacts on state behaviour. Indeed, these summits and forums like the HLPF are not only sites of performance but they also exercise agency as directors of the stage given that they set the rules, parameters and scripts of these performances.

I define the show and tell of the HLPF and VNR as a process involving rhetorical performance in a designated institutional forum that obligates performers to communicate their policies, practices and identities using a common script, usually to an international audience. In this case, the SDGs, as a series of colourful logos and aspirational, supposedly apolitical global goals, are the common flexible script that can be used in multiple arenas. Indeed, SDG show and tell can be targeted not only at the specific international audience of the HLPF but also in other international fora or, as I will discuss in the next section, a domestic audience. For instance, donors at the DAC frequently use the framework of the SDGs to discuss their contributions to DAC priorities. In this way, show and tell, even beyond the HLPF, has clear rhetorical effects in terms of how issues, policies or even national identities are communicated. The question then becomes whether these more superficial rhetorical effects can have a more meaningful impact on states’ policy choices.

37 Research on the impact of discourses, narratives, frames and normative frameworks on policy outcomes demonstrates that the stories policymakers tell not only reflect, reinforce or justify preferred policy choices but also have a role in shaping policy outcomes (Chong and Druckman 2007; Hajer 1995; Eckersley 2016; Blaxekjær and Nielsen 2015; Yee 1996; Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). They accomplish this by setting the policy agenda (Crow and Jones 2018), by precluding particular counter-narratives, circumscribing policy options (Fischer 2003) or helping to forge new coalitions of actors (Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth 2011). In the aid domain more specifically, several scholars have suggested that the framing of foreign aid in normative frameworks has an impact on how it is practiced. Lancaster (2008, 6) argues that the way aid is communicated has a “visible impact on public support for aid”. Fukuda-Parr and Shiga (2016, 5) argue that normative frameworks around aid “serve to create a narrative that define and communicate the problem of development in a particular way, identify key problems, and justify a specific policy approach and set of interventions being financed.” They suggest that “aid as charitable assistance to end poverty” framings preclude particular aid instruments, policies and practices such as using aid financing for economic infrastructure or providing loans.

Van der Veen (2013) finds clear links between aid frames and specific aid policies, such as the share of tied aid, share of aid through multilaterals, the selection of aid recipients and even overall aid volume. He suggests that the relative strength or salience of different framings of aid policies imply different goals for aid, which then results in different policy choices. For instance, he finds that high levels of tied aid were correlated with strong economic self-interest frames, while high levels of aid generosity reflect the high salience of a humanitarian frame for aid. In this way, the content of aid frames and narratives can shape aid policy choices.

Aid frames and narratives need not only be limited to particular aid policies but are also used to communicate donor identities (Varga 2013). Scholars have also shown how aid policies and programs, in and of themselves, have been used by states to communicate particular national brands (Brown 2018b). The flexibility of the SDG script allows states to frame different kinds of donor identities (e.g. as feminists, as aid leaders, as innovators, etc.) and also leaves room for specialization in particular SDGs, making them ideal fodder for identity and reputational communication, which is often used by states to distinguish themselves from one another (Varga 2013). In this way, the SDGs could play a constitutive role in that using

38 the language of the SDGs means that those identities and reputational aspirations then become intertwined with the implementation of global goals, even beyond the specific theatre of the HLPF or VNR process.

It is important, however, not to overstate this potentially constitutive role of the SDGs. I am not suggesting that the SDGs are changing donor identities, rather that the SDGs are changing how those identities are communicated and it is that shift in communication that has impact. This communication of donor identity through the SDGs can lead to a greater prioritisation of global goal-attaining policies and behaviour in donor aid programs because those global-goal policies and behaviours also contribute to the maintenance or construction of a particular donor identity. Effectively, global goal-attainment takes on greater importance for donors because it becomes, at least publicly, linked with their desired donor identity. By linking the SDGs to donor identity, donors may also come to view SDG implementation as the right thing to do. In other words, they are motivated by both an instrumental and appropriateness logic (March and Olsen 2011).

This argument is similar to constructivist international relations theories focusing on a mechanism of rhetorical entrapment in order to explain compliance to international norms (Schimmelfennig 2001; Morin and Gold 2010; Petrova 2016). Under this mechanism of entrapment, which can be understood as “the inability to pursue a preferred option that violates a prior rhetorical statement” (Morin and Gold 2010, 577), reneging on their SDG commitments or engaging in anti-goal attaining behaviour becomes more difficult for donors, as it could result in damage to their desired donor identity and reputation or their broader credibility, legitimacy or status. However, I argue that this rhetorical entrapment mechanism is better suited to explaining compliance, rather than the drivers of political commitment, particularly commitment to a set of global goals specifically envisioned to be inclusive and non-contentious. The identity-linkage dynamic I discuss above has less to do with external actors holding donors accountable to their rhetoric; rather, it refers to an internal process where global goals take on greater importance because of their linkage to the maintenance or creation of a particular donor identity.

Thus, the embedding of the SDGs in aid and donor identity frames and narratives, as part of the show and tell process, is an important mechanism through which they can influence goal- attaining policies and practices. First, by leading to greater prioritisation of goal-attaining behaviour due to the identity linkage dynamics described in the previous paragraph, but also

39 through the institutionalisation of SDG-related aid narratives in regular communications, monitoring and evaluation systems, internal aid structures (e.g. working groups), partnerships with different external actors (e.g. the private sector) or more specific sector/issue policies instruments. The challenge empirically becomes to distinguish superficial SDG-washing from more meaningful SDG integration in aid frames or narratives, as most OECD countries include at least one reference to the SDGs in their aid communications. As the subsequent section on methodology will argue, it is possible to distinguish between these two behaviours by analyzing precisely how the SDGs are used in aid policies and documents.

Show and tell may also lead to the creation of new SDG related policies, instruments or institutions. This latter dynamic stems from the fact that, in order to show and tell, donors must actually have something to show and tell. Some choose to create show and tell narratives by re-framing existing priorities in SDG language, as outlined above, while others commit to or create new initiatives in order to bolster their SDG narratives. The show and tell of the SDGs can also galvanize goal attaining behaviour through other means, although these may be less relevant for the aid domain. For instance, if SDG rhetoric is also used domestically this can then have a domino effect on other domestic actors by raising awareness of the goals and mobilizing further action from domestic stakeholders such as regions (i.e., states or provinces), cities and the private sector. The VNR/HLPF process is also not a performance that requires little effort. Reporting on the 17 SDGs requires governments to work across departments and with a variety of stakeholders in a way that is novel, even in developed countries. Furthermore, in some cases this performance has also led to the creation of tangible institutions, policies and partnerships across policy domains that contribute to goal-attaining behaviour domestically (IISD 2019; United Nations 2019b). Importantly, the placement and framing of these SDG institutions can also be a form of performance. For instance, placing responsibility for SDG implementation in a department focused on domestic issues (rather than a department concerned with foreign policy issues) can signal a state is truly embracing the universal principle of the SDGs. Nonetheless, it is likely too soon to assess the impact of these SDG institutions but the longer-term trends are not promising as these institutional arrangements can change frequently and post-VNR follow-up has been weak in most countries (Risse 2019).

Concerning aid policy more specifically, it is evident that while most donors make passing references to the SDGs, not all donors use the SDGs in their aid communications and policies

40 to the same extent and in the same ways. Thus, why do some states choose to more explicitly or comprehensively link their aid programs, policies and donor identities with the SDGs? A second core question revolves around the link between aid rhetoric and shifts in aid practices (e.g. implementation). For instance, certain donors have made efforts to align certain aid practices, particularly monitoring and evaluation systems, with the SDGs. Nonetheless, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, in the three cases studied there has not been a fundamental shift in aid practice in the post-2015 period. Thus, another challenge is to understand the factors that narrow, but not close completely, the rhetorical and implementation gap. Determinants of influence play an important role in narrowing this gap and explaining variation in states’ sensitivity to the show and tell mechanism.

Before turning to the determinants that interact with and shape this show and tell process, it is important to stress that that this mechanism of goal influence is unique to the case of the SDGs. In previous experiences with goal setting, other mechanisms of influence played an important role in driving behavioural change. For instance, the global polio eradication goal undoubtedly mobilized resources and attention, the MDGs helped donors prioritize particular development sectors and civil society has used a variety of global indices and rankings to pressure particular targets to change behaviour in a variety of areas. Rather the argument is that the relative effectiveness or influence of goal influence mechanisms depends on the specific kind of global goal and governance target concerned. For instance, developing countries will be subject to different kinds of mechanisms and determinants than their developed country counterparts. Furthermore, if we parse out different sectors or policy areas, the political dynamics might look different. Naming and shaming is more prominent in the human rights policy domain than in the area of science and innovation, for example, where technology transfer and resource mobilization may matter more. In this way, my argument is specific to the case of the SDGs and bilateral aid donors, although elements of the argument (e.g. the role of reputation) may also apply to domestic responses to the SDGs in developed countries but the data collected for this project focused solely on foreign aid.

3.2.2 Determinant of Influence: Reputation

The previous chapter suggested that reputational aspirations play a vital role in determining the responsiveness of countries to the SDGs. Reputation is particularly salient given that the central argument of this dissertation is that the core mechanism through which the SDGs exert influence involves performative show and tell. Reputation has a long lineage in the

41 international relations literature as an important variable in explaining why states comply with international agreements or initiatives, particularly those without strict enforcement mechanisms (e.g. Simmons 2009; Hathaway 2007). The meaning of “reputation” however differs depending on one’s theoretical orientation and the type of behaviour one is attempting to explain. A game-theoretic understanding of reputation emphasizes its role in building credibility and in information provision. In this view, reputation can help predict state behaviour or signal resolve leading to benefits in terms of deterrence, credible threat making or in securing other strategic goals of states (Mercer 1996; Tomz 2012; Guzman 2005). This conceptualization is less applicable in the case of the SDGs since the SDGs purposefully avoid conflictual dynamics and the benefits of SDG implementation, in the case of developed countries, are not necessarily strategic or economic in nature. In other words, there are no clear material costs or benefits associated with SDG implementation.

Several scholars have noted that this strategic conceptualization of reputation does not capture the social nature of reputation, nor acknowledge the construction of a particular reputation as an end in and of itself (Erickson 2015; Simmons 2009). A social theory of reputation understands that states are “strategic actors operating in a social setting where norms and institutions affect the behaviours that are collectively valued” (Erickson 2015, 23). States pursue policies and behaviours then to maintain “a good name in the world of nations” and accrue certain social benefits such as positive self-image, increased international legitimacy, prestige or greater social influence (Wang 2006, 91; Erickson 2015). Relatedly, states may also pursue policies to avoid international social censure (ibid.). I argue that this latter dynamic is less relevant in the case of the SDGs given the explicit avoidance of naming and shaming dynamics in their follow-up and review process. In addition, the risk of reputational damage for not complying with the SDGs is low compared to non-compliance to human rights or environmental treaties.16

Rather, in the case of the SDGs it is less that states want to avoid negative social judgements but more that states want to cultivate a particular image signalling that they are a member in good standing of this particular community. The reputational function of global goals is attributable to the fact that global development goals, particularly the SDGs, are based on a truly global consensus and moral vision of development and thus, like human rights, can be

16 Remarkably relatively few states have not undertaken activities related to the SDGs or VNR/HLPF specifically and, as of August 2020, there has also been no publicly available list of or international campaign against states who have not presented VNRs.

42 used by states to “signal their intentions and status as a member of the community” (Zartner and Ramos 2011, 74). Indeed, Uvin (2002, 3) argues that donors adopted the language of the MDGs “in order to benefit from [their] moral authority and political appeal” following the crisis of legitimacy that faced neoliberal development policy in the mid-1990s (Carroll and Jarvis 2015). Framing global development policy in the language of the Millennium Declaration provided donors with a tool through which they could re-legitimize their ODA activities. The SDGs can similarly be used in this fashion.

The politics of social reputation take on particular importance in international institutions as they give states an opportunity to publicly display their policies and positions to their peers (Johnston 2001; 2008; Hurd 2008). This is especially true of the HLPF as a forum where states can win social praise by communicating their successes on the SDGs or their novel institutions, policies or partnerships for SDG implementation. States, particularly donor states, may also receive praise for their acknowledgement of their own domestic issues which challenges traditional narratives about donors and recipient states. In this way, participating in the VNR/HLPF process and communicating a state’s actions on the SDGs to an international audience, is arguably an easy way to improve or maintain a good reputation with attendant benefits in terms of legitimacy and prestige.

The previous paragraphs refer to states’ concerns with their broader overall reputations. However, states’ concern for their reputation may vary across sectors or international institutions (Erickson 2015). Given the moral character of foreign aid, or at least the veneer of a moral imperative (as outlined by Lumsdaine 1993 and Hattori 2003), this raises the importance of reputational concerns in explaining state behaviour in this particular sector.17 Donors use their aid programs strategically, not only for geopolitical or commercial purposes but also to “look good” in the eyes of peers, aid recipients and domestic taxpayers (Enghel, Noske-Turner, and Noske-Turner 2018; Brown 2018b; Browning 2007). As previously argued, this “looking good” because of their development activities can yield benefits in terms of social influence and prestige, particularly internationally. The UK’s identity as a 0.7% donor, for example, has important soft power value for the UK both in the UN and in donor fora like the DAC (Gifkins, Jarvis, and Ralph 2019; Mawdsley 2017).

17 Scholars have also used reputation to explain a range of sectors or issues that also have moral dimensions such as gender equality, human rights or the environment.

43 While most states care about their international reputations, even powerful states and those not embedded the international community, not all states care necessarily that they have a good reputation in the context of the SDGs. Thus, while reputation appears to be a potentially compelling determinant of goal influence given the nature of the goals and the international context of the HLPF, further work is needed to understand the conditions under which states use the SDGs and its associated processes as tools through which to advance particular reputational aspirations.

Given that the SDGs can be used as a form of donor identity communication, the perceived fit of the SDGs with pre-existing donor identities may be one driver of states’ choice of reputational tool. However, rather than pinpointing specific identity narratives that fit well with the SDGs (e.g. narratives of classic middle powers/internationalists), identity is important for understanding SDG implementation because of the way in which governments strategically interpret “national identity” for their own national branding and broader reputational aspirations.18 As Varga (2013, 13) argues, governments use national identity to craft “flexible and capitalizable” entities in the form of external identity communication or national brands. This instrumentalization of identity is also the case with “donor identity” which often overlaps with the narratives that underly the broader national identity. In this way, there are not particular static identities that make states more likely to want a good reputation in the context of the SDGs, but rather it is the perceived instrumentality of the SDGs in furthering a government’s particular national branding or reputational aspirations, including the reputation of their aid programmes. Recalling the flexibility of the SDG script, the goals can be used to further a variety of reputational narratives from feminism and sustainability to innovation and multilateral leadership.

The perceived instrumentality of the SDGs for reputational gain may stem from donors’ context-specific instrumental motivations. Some states, like Canada and Ireland, have specific foreign policy goals that are more clearly linked to the multilateral context of the SDGs and the HLPF. For instance, both countries touted their leadership on the SDGs as a selling point of their Security Council seat campaigns (Ireland 2018; Canada 2019b; Canada UN Mission 2018). Other states, like Sweden, seek international leadership on the SDGs and aid for broader social influence in an international context like the UN (Bexell and Jönsson

18 Governments are not the only actors who craft narratives of national identity for strategic purposes, but in the context of SDG implementation and foreign aid policy, I argue that their use of national identity is the most relevant.

44 2018). Not all states are planning on pursuing a Security Council seat in the 15-year time period of the SDGs, but this provides an important demonstration of how states leverage having a good reputation in the context of the SDGs to achieve strategic foreign policy goals, particularly in the multilateral context of the UN.

The likelihood of viewing the SDGs in instrumental terms is not only linked to strategic foreign policy aspirations but can also be linked to a government’s domestic ambitions. One of the weaknesses of reputational explanations in IR is that they often underplay the importance of domestic audiences in shaping governments’ reputational moves internationally. States are not only motivated by a desire for a positive image abroad but are also motivated by a desire to cultivate a particular image at home based on that government’s perception of the ideas and interests of their base. These domestic reputational moves may not be driven by a specific upcoming election but can also be used to distinguish a particular administration from its competitors or as a means of party branding.

A desire for a strong international reputation may, paradoxically, be a domestic policy goal particularly for governments wishing to appeal to a more internationalist or cosmopolitan electoral base (Brown 2018b). This is also the case in the aid sector, where governments seek to craft a narrative about foreign aid that is in line with their electoral base and/or desired electoral base (Ibid.). For instance, aligning foreign aid policies and practices with the SDGs, the current dominant “international development agenda”, as numerous interview respondents described them, is a way in which donors can easily justify and communicate their aid activities to an internationalist domestic audience, while also cultivating an image internationally as a responsible donor that takes international commitments seriously. Thus, I argue that should the government of the day perceive that the SDGs can contribute to strategic foreign policy aims and/or bolster donors’ aid narratives in line with their electorate,19 it makes them more likely to use the SDGs as a reputational tool.20 This also

19 Crucially, these narratives are not divided along left-right lines. Certainly, the literature is inconclusive about the differences between left and right governments vis a vis foreign aid policy. Furthermore, I have not identified particular narratives most aligned with the SDGs given that different states with different ideas about their role in the world may be responsive to the SDGs. What matters most is the perception that the SDGs align with particular domestic narratives be they more about internationalism, sustainability or wanting to be an international leader. 20 I have added the caveat “government of the day” given that reputational aspirations both domestically and internationally are often tied to particular governments. Furthermore, of the three cases studied only Sweden had a very minor change in their ruling coalition so the evidence gathered in this project can’t predict the effects of changes in government.

45 means, then, that show and tell dynamics are not only directed to the international audience of the HLPF or donor peers but also to key domestic groups.

The previous paragraphs outline the conditions motivating states to draw on the SDGs to further particular reputational aspirations. States that are more likely to be responsive are those whose governments perceive that the SDGs can be used to further or maintain a particular reputation with an aim to achieve particular strategic foreign policy goals or domestic electoral ambitions. However, one of the weaknesses of the preceding argument is it cannot adequately account for the fact that some states do appear to go beyond SDG- washing. Reputational gains can be accrued relatively easily by producing a VNR and other rhetorical nods to the SDGs in aid policy or communications documents. Yet, some donors, like Sweden, have made efforts to incorporate the SDGs in aid practices. Outside of the foreign aid realm, we see even more tangible actions at the level of data collection, funding programs and partnerships. Thus, it is important to understand why some states make efforts to go beyond rhetorical responses to the SDGs.

While states can achieve reputational gains from the SDGs by producing a VNR or through other rhetorical nods to the goals, their reputational claims in terms of the SDGs can be strengthened through evidence of actual implementation, including through aid policy and practice. States win praise at the HLPF or more specific donor fora by pointing to examples of concrete actions they have taken. In other words, SDG implementation itself provides more material for furthering particular reputational ambitions. Alternatively, while there may not be threats of large scandals related to the SDGs, states may still wish to avoid domestic reputational costs that could be incurred from behaving hypocritically or to further reputational benefits from going beyond rhetorical commitment. While it may not generate widespread scandals, states can, in principle, still be caught out behaving hypocritically on the SDGs. Although, as previously mentioned, civil society pressure has been quite weak in the case of the SDGs. Thus, it is more likely that states choose to go beyond rhetorical responsiveness to the SDGs in order to reinforce particular reputational aspirations with concrete actions, rather than to avoid potential reputation costs from hypocrisy. In this way, reputational concerns, which are shaped by governments’ image or branding aspirations and domestic politics, are the primary determinant of states’ sensitivity to the mechanism of show and tell.

46 The preceding discussion outlined the central argument of the dissertation. This argument may also be expressed in four propositions:

1) The SDGs exert influence on states through their integration in donor normative frameworks, particularly through linkage with donor identity, in a process of show and tell by donors to both international and domestic audiences. 2) Donor states are more likely to link their aid policy and donor identity narratives to the SDGs based on their relative concern for building or affirming a particular reputation. 3) Donors perceived instrumentality of the SDGs in building these reputations determines their choice to use the SDGs specifically as a reputational tool. 4) Donors’ perception of SDG fit with their international or domestic strategic aims and/or resonance with desired reputation audience shapes their perceived instrumentality of the SDGs in furthering reputational aspirations.

In sum, the variation in levels of donor responsiveness is the product of the interaction between the SDG’s show and tell mechanism and states’ reputational aspirations. Donors with low responsiveness are likely those who are not sensitive to the show and tell mechanism because of their specific reputational aspirations and the perception of whether and how the SDGs as contribute to these aspirations. Donors with higher responsiveness will have reputational aspirations that are more clearly served by the SDGs and SDG implementation more specifically. Drawing on case study evidence, the subsequent chapters will investigate the extent to which and how these propositions play out in practice.

3.3 Operationalizing the Framework

3.3.1 Measuring Responsiveness

To understand the impact of the SDGs, it is important to first understand and categorize donor responses to the SDGs. The global goals and international relations literature offer several other ways to comparatively measure the impact of global goals. Firstly, compliance — when actual behaviour conforms to a particular prescribed behaviour — would not be an appropriate lens through which to measure the impact of the SDGs given that the goals do not prescribe specific kinds of behaviour (Simmons 2002). Given the normative elements of global development goals, another means through which to assess their impact might be to consider the extent to which they have been internalized by the actors in question (Finnemore

47 and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen et al. 1999). Internalization refers to the process through which norms take on a taken for granted quality or “become accepted standards of behaviour” (Lantis 2016, 386). However, it is difficult to apply this concept to the SDGs given that many different kinds of behaviours may lead to goal achievement, making it difficult to observe whether internalization had taken place and compare this against other contexts where governments choose different kinds of goal attaining behaviour.

As an alternative to thinking of compliance and internalization, analysing goal responsiveness is a useful measure of SDG impact and allows for more rigorous comparison of SDG approaches, despite the variation in particular policy approaches to the SDGs. Goal responsiveness refers to the extent to which actors respond to global goals in terms of their normative frameworks and actions. Numerous scholars have looked at the responsiveness of a variety of stakeholders to international development initiatives, like the Global Safe Motherhood Initiative (Shiffman and Smith 2007), Education for All (Lei and Myers 2011) or even specific development goals like MDG 4 on child survival (Shiffman and Sultana 2013). However, there is a tendency among these works to only look at financial commitments and disbursements to measure responsiveness. However, for more complex initiatives like the SDGs, defining responsiveness only in terms of financial responsiveness would not capture the more performative and normative effects of the SDGs. Furthermore, it is difficult to attribute changes in specific spending patterns to comprehensive global goals such as the SDGs and MDGs given the likelihood of a myriad confounding factors such as global economic shocks or developments, other international commitments or government policy priorities.21

To measure donor responsiveness to the SDGs, I use two measures of responsiveness: 1) policy and 2) practice. Policy responsiveness refers to the overall alignment of actor policy frameworks with the broad goals of the SDGs. Ways to assess policy responsiveness empirically include analyzing: i) to what extent actor policy statements explicitly discuss how they will contribute to global development goals; ii) whether they use similar language to the goals (e.g., do actors in the education sector use the SDG language of inclusive and quality education for all when discussing support to education?); iii) to what extent actors develop

21 Several scholars attempted to trace financial impact of the MDGs, by measuring donor spending to the poorest countries (Baulch 2006; Hailu and Tsukada 2012) or in terms of sectoral spending (Thiele, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher 2007). Given the lock-in of donor aid budgets over several years, it is likely too soon to see a change in aid spending patterns in the SDG period.

48 new policies or strengthen existing polices in areas highlighted by the goals; and iv) how the SDGs are framed within documents and rhetorically by relevant actors (e.g. politicians and aid agency staff).

Practice responsiveness measures the ways in which donors have integrated global development goals in the everyday implementation of development programming. This may include the production of internal “best practices” manuals for using global development goals, the development of internal monitoring and evaluation systems using SDG indicators or the creation of SDG specific institutions both within their foreign aid architecture or in the broader government. Policy and practice responsiveness are inherently related given that the latter refers to the specific implementation of the former. However, policy responsiveness refers to a donors’ overall approach to foreign aid broadly speaking while practices concern the day-to-day practices of foreign aid.

49 High Responsiveness • Policy Responsiveness: § Dedicated SDG implementation or policy coherence for sustainable development strategy. § Development policy priorities are explicitly linked with SDGs. § SDG principles (leave no-one behind, human rights-based approach, interlinkages, partnerships) have dedicated strategies/policies or are consistently referenced in other policy documents. § SDGs are framed as central to mission and a core priority. • Practice Responsiveness: § Monitoring and evaluation frameworks and/or statistical systems designed around SDG language, targets and indicators. § SDGs appear in other corporate procedures (e.g., call for proposals, country profiles, project approval documents etc.). § Dedicated projects for SDG implementation (e.g., funding VNR processes, SDG funds etc.). § Development communications include consistent references to the SDGs. § Dedicated institutional structures for SDG implementation within aid agency and/or central government.

Moderate Responsiveness • Policy Responsiveness: § Some development policy priorities linked to the SDGs. § Other policy documents make broad reference to the SDGs. § Some reference to SDG principles in other policy documents. § SDGs are framed as important but only one of many priorities. • Practice Responsiveness: § Monitoring and evaluation systems or statistical systems make some references to particular SDGs at the goal level. § Inconsistent reference to SDGs in corporate procedures. § Some projects framed as contributing to the SDGs. § Some institutional structures or staff responsible for the SDGs within aid agency. § Some development communications include references to the SDGs.

Low Responsiveness • Policy Responsiveness: § No or few references to SDGs or SDG principles in policy or strategy documents. § References to SDGs largely repackaging of pre-existing priorities or programmes. § SDGs are framed as not a priority or as business as usual • Practice Responsiveness: § No or few references to SDGs in monitoring and evaluation or statistical systems. § None or few communications include references to the SDGs § No institutional structures or staff responsible for SDGs or institutional structures only for HLPF/VNR coordination. Figure 4 Criteria to assess responsiveness

50 Goal responsiveness is admittedly a vague metric and assessing “what counts” as responsive under each of the measures is partially interpretive in nature. To address this and develop more rigorous, comparable and specific criteria to assess responsiveness, in 2018 I undertook a survey of all OECD-DAC donor responses to the SDGs based on publicly available information in English or French (see Appendix E). This survey revealed certain commonalities in responses to the SDGs, but also variation in the kinds of and level of responses. Thus, based on this broad data, I inductively developed the criteria in Figure 4 (criteria that are weighted equally). It is possible, and in fact quite common, that states can be highly policy responsive but have low practice responsiveness. Nevertheless, to assess the overall level of responsiveness, I look at the presence of both indicators.

From the 2018 survey (Appendix E), donors with high responsiveness include countries like Ireland and Germany where the SDGs are integrated in policy documents, there are dedicated institutional structures for SDG implementation within aid agencies and/or central government and there are clear examples of SDG practices, such as linking the SDGs to budgeting practices and funding SDG-specific projects. Countries with moderate responsiveness include France and South Korea who have linked some of their development policy priorities with the SDGs and have some relevant SDG practices such as including the SDGs at the goal level in their monitoring and evaluation systems or framing some projects as contributing to the SDGs. Donors with low responsiveness include Australia and the United States of America that had no evident practice responsiveness and little or no reference to the SDGs in policy documents.22

3.3.2 Measuring SDG impact and reputation as a driver of responsiveness

The first step in the empirical analysis of this dissertation is to identify each case countries’ policy and practices responsiveness in line with the criteria of Figure 4. The next step in the analysis is to understand whether donors are showing and telling by integrating the SDGs in their donor identity frameworks. As previously mentioned, the show and tell nature of the SDGs involves rhetorical effects on aid policies and donor identities. To understand whether

22 This survey was completed in 2018 and as such some of the countries that I have classes as low, moderate or high may have increased or decreased in ranking. Furthermore, this information is based on publicly available information in English/French so some donors may be doing more than what was captured in the survey. Finally, the initial survey includes domestic actions, in part as a means to understand overall attitude of each donor towards the SDGs.

51 the mechanism of show and tell is at work, we need to identify where and when the SDGs are used in policies and practices. The policies identified as policy responsiveness are one site where we can observe the rhetorical effects of the SDGs. Similarly, we can also observe the performative effects of the SDGs in the SDG associated or adapted institutions, partnerships or other practices (e.g., communication campaigns) classified as practice responsiveness. Through analysing practice responsiveness, we can also identify the more tangible effects of the SDGs, such as potential institutionalisation.23

However, to distinguish between superficial SDG-washing and deeper integration of the SDGs in aid policy and donor identity narratives, we need to not only identify instances where the SDGs are used in policy and practice but also how and when they are used. In other words, it is important to understand to what extent governments use the SDGs to frame and/or justify particular identities, policies or practices, particularly beyond the VNR process and forum of the HLPF. As such, a core part of the analysis of this project involves analysing aid policy and donor identity frames and identifying how the SDGs are used in these frames.

Furthermore, as theatre involves not only the performance and performers, but also an audience and stage, it is essential to identify the venues where SDG language is used (e.g. international conferences, conferences around sustainable development, in parliament, through domestic stakeholder engagement etc.) and intended audience (Shimazu 2014). Paying attention to venue and audience also helps to illuminate the specific reputational aspirations of donors and the perceived instrumentality of the SDGs

Indeed, the theoretical discussion in this chapter identified reputation as an important driver of states’ sensitivity to the show and tell mechanism. Thus, the third step in the analysis identifies the reputational aspirations of the case countries and whether and how the SDGs serve these aspirations. States can be quite explicit about the image they want to project internationally. For instance, as previously mentioned, numerous countries have nation branding strategies or public diplomacy strategies (Browning 2015; Dinnie 2015). Alternatively, governments outline their international reputation ambitions in electoral materials or speeches, signalling that pursuing a particular reputation internationally can have

23 Importantly, many new or adapted aid practices among donors have only been adopted in the last year or two (2018/2019), as such it is difficult to concretely observe whether institutionalisation of SDG-linked aid frames is taking place as these practices or instruments are in their infancy. Rather, this project assesses potential institutionalisation.

52 domestic motivations as well. The analysis of donor normative frameworks in donor communication materials can also provide evidence of the image they wish to cultivate internationally.24 In other words, the stories donors tell about themselves in their communications is another source of evidence about donors’ reputational aspirations. As such, in the empirical chapters I trace the reputational aspirations of each case using these diverse materials. Drawing on interview data, document analysis and secondary literature, I then unpack the aim of these reputational aspirations — be it strategic foreign policy goals or domestic electoral ambitions. Finally, I trace whether and how donors perceive that the SDGs contribute to their reputational aims.

Each empirical chapter follows this model of first identifying policy and practice responsiveness using the criteria listed in Figure 4. and analysing where and how the SDGs are used in these policies and practices. They also discuss the institutional arrangements in each case for the SDGs as SDG institutions can also be a form of performance. The chapters then unpack show and tell dynamics in the VNR/HLPF processes and the reputational aspirations and perceptions of the relevant governments.

The subsequent section describes the research design of this project and the specific kinds of data used to assess perceived instrumentality of the SDGs and perceived fit with desired audience, as well as the methods of data analysis.

3.4 Research Design

This section describes the research design of the project- namely the process of case selection, data analysis and collection.

3.4.1 Case Studies

In the summer of 2018, in order to identify potential cases, I first surveyed publicly available information in English and French, concerning OECD DAC donor approaches to the SDGs (See Appendix E).25 During the survey, I noticed variation, both in terms of policy and practice responsiveness, even among DAC donors self-identified as or considered to be

24 There is some overlap in terms of the sources of data about policy responsiveness and reputational aspirations, as policy documents and communications can also provide evidence of reputational aspirations. 25The case selection was based on information available prior to fieldwork in 2018. Since this survey was conducted and even since I completed fieldwork in October 2019, several donors have announced new initiatives or announced other policies or approaches.

53 progressive by the OECD, donor peers and in the academic literature. Arguably, such progressive, multilateral-internationalist states are most likely to be among the most responsive to international agendas and will be the most concerned with their reputation vis a vis multilateral agendas and initiatives. From this survey, I noticed particularly striking variation in the levels of responsiveness of Canada, the UK and Sweden, contrary to expectations that like-minded donors would have similar levels of political commitment to the goals.

All three resemble each other in key ways. They are all members of the DAC and all makes claims to leadership within the DAC community. All three are also democracies, albeit my findings suggest that regime type does not have bearing on SDG responsiveness. For instance, some autocratic states such as China are active in SDG implementation further undermining arguments about the role of regime type in driving SDG implementation. Nevertheless, Sweden and the UK are two of the few DAC donors to meet the 0.7% commitment, while Sweden and Canada both describe themselves as “feminist” donors.

54 Given the similar prioritisation and similar26 narratives around aid, one would expect that this group of donors would have similar levels of responsiveness. Yet, as outlined in Figure 5, this belies the idea that progressive states care about their reputations and respond to multilateral agendas in the same way. Similarly, concern for reputation and the kinds of reputational narratives put forward express themselves differently even among similar countries. Furthermore, aid generosity, as measured by ODA as a percentage of GNI, does not mean that a donor will be more responsive to international development agendas.

Canada UK Sweden

● Goal ● Goal Responsiveness: ● Goal Responsiveness: Responsiveness: Low-Moderate28 High Moderate ● Centre-right government ● Centre-left government ● Centre-left ● ODA=0.70% GNI (2018) ● ODA= 1.07% of GNI government ● High capacity aid agency (2018) ● ODA= 0.28% GNI (Independent during the ● High capacity aid (2018)27 research period (2018- agency (Independent ● Moderate capacity 2019), integrated in 2020) but policy decisions aid agency taken by Ministry of (Integrated) Foreign Affairs)

Figure 5 Summary of Case Studies by Key Variables

This project is fundamentally concerned with explaining these specific diverging foreign policy outcomes. Furthermore, the framework at the heart of this project necessitates an understanding of motivations of key actors and the processes behind those foreign policy decisions. As such, a comparative case study approach, which is well suited to this kind of analysis, is an important tool through which to address the central questions of this study (Blatter and Haverland 2012). Furthermore, while in part the case selection was motivated by differences in their SDG responsiveness, the choice to focus on a particular sub-set of donors is in keeping with a most-similar case design (Seawright and Gerring 2008; Levy 2008). Case selection of this kind involves cases that are similar in as many ways as possible but differ in key respects namely the dependent variable and key independent variables (Bennett and

26 I do not argue here that these narratives around aid are identical, rather, as the case chapters illustrate, they share core principles about the importance of poverty reduction and the linking of aid to national interest (albeit different kinds of national interest). 27 ODA figures from donor tracker (Donor Tracker 2020) 28 The UK has two categorizations because over the research period they began to implement more SDG related policies due to their VNR process that began in late 2018 after the initial survey had been conducted.

55 Elman 2007). Selecting cases that vary in terms of outcome and on the key independent variable also helps to avoid biased inference (Geddes 1990).

3.4.2 Data Analysis

This project used both within-case analysis and cross-case comparison as this is the strongest means of drawing inference from a case study approach (Bennett and George 1997). Regarding within case analysis, I drew on both process tracing and qualitative content analysis. The former is an essential tool through which to “[identify] novel political and social phenomena and systematically describing them”(Collier 2011, 824). Given that the theoretical framework outlined previously involves interactive dynamics between variables, process tracing is an ideal approach as it forces researchers to unpack the systematic links between the theoretically informed causal mechanisms and the outcome under study (Brady and Collier 2010; Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett and Checkel 2015).

Using process tracing to understand the drivers of responsiveness was challenging given that the object of study is not a single policy output or foreign policy decision with a linear narrative or sequence of events. However, process tracing need not always be presented in a narrative form (e.g. temporal sequences or major events), rather it can be presented “as a stepwise test of each part of a causal mechanism” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 5). The case chapters follow this approach by presenting case evidence for each of the mechanisms and variables described in the previous section.

Given the central role of performance and framing in the analytical framework described earlier, my empirical investigation needed to identify the specific aid policy and donor identity frames being performed and communicated by donors in key documents, speeches and other forms of communication. In analysing this data, I took a qualitative content rather than discourse analysis approach to document analysis. The former is more useful for analyzing “specific policy related concepts and goals… such as roles [and] beliefs about other actors in international relations” (Van der Veen 2011, 53).

Qualitative content analysis involves the “subjective interpretation of the content of text [including verbal] data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1278). I took an inductive approach to coding, although it was also influenced by the theoretical framework described earlier, as I sought to identify the particular ways in which donors used the SDGs and Agenda 2030 in core texts,

56 speeches and interviews, as well as the more specific narratives about donor identity and the framing of each donors’ aid programme.

I conducted this analysis using MaxQDA. MaxQDA allows researchers to assign codes to particular passages or words within documents (including interview transcripts), develop a hierarchical coding system and analyse relationships between codes (Kuckartz and Rädiker 2019). The coding process involved two readings of each document or transcript.29 The first reading aimed to get a sense of the key messages, overall structure and potentially interesting and theoretically relevant passages. At this stage, I also inductively generated potential codes. I then coded the documents during the second reading, removing codes that were less relevant across documents (e.g. only appearing once) or not relevant to the central research question and argument of this project.

Through the inductive coding process, I identified a set of 44 codes implicating over 600 segments of text. The coding system is included in Appendix D. The coding system includes both top-level codes and sub-codes. I derived some top-level codes from the factors of interest to the dissertation (e.g. policy/practice responsiveness, donor normative framework, SDG other influence), while others mainly serve an organizational purpose (e.g. to differentiate between the three case countries) and so were not applied to segments of text. While coding the text, some passages would be coded with both a broader top-level code and a specific sub-code. For instance, a passage indicating some form of policy responsiveness would be coded with the top-level “SDG Policy Influence code” and also with a more specific code like LNOB if the passage made reference to that particular principle.

Some of the specific sub-codes were applicable across cases, while others were specific to the donor in questions, particularly those codes related to donor identity or specific reputational aspirations. These codes enabled me to identify the forms of policy and practice responsiveness from a variety of donor documents, as well as to better understand whether and how the SDGs feature in donor normative frameworks and the kinds of reputational aspirations held by the donor countries. More specifically, I looked for textual evidence of SDG policy responsiveness and practice responsiveness. As outlined above in Figure 4., the SDG policy and practice responsiveness can take several forms. As such, I looked for textual

29 Due to data privacy and security concerns, I did not actually analyze the interview transcripts in the MaxQDA software but I followed the same coding approach while analyzing the interview transcripts (note: the segment of text count does not include interview segments).

57 references to key SDG principles such as policy coherence and LNOB as well as explicit references to attempts to mainstream the SDGs in aid programmes. I also noted instances where donors framed pre-existing programmes as contributing the SDGs.

Not only did this analysis allow me to assess SDG policy and practice influence (particularly in donor normative frameworks), but it was also a key source of evidence concerning each donors’ reputational aspirations. To this end, I leveraged textual data from the top-level code “donor normative framework” and the associated country-specific sub-codes. Under this top- level code I also included a specific reputation code that I used across countries to indicate instances where donors explicitly discuss their reputation (often explicitly outlining specific reputational aspirations or noting a good reputation in a particular area). However, to understand donors’ more specific reputational aims (and also the potential perceived instrumentality of the SDGs in meeting those reputational aims), it was important to identify prominent narratives in each donors’ documents, including their thematic priorities (e.g. feminism/sustainability) and explicit policy objectives (e.g. commitment to multilateralism, donor leadership or feminist leadership), both of which can also indirectly signal particular reputational ambitions.

Some of the untethered codes (those without a top-level code) act more as research notes or elements of the text that I found interesting but perhaps less relevant to the central research question (e.g. the SDG other influence, aid agency influence and aid effectiveness codes). Importantly, I also interviewed civil society members and analyzed civil society documents to assess SDG influence, as these stakeholders and their documents can assess gaps in SDG implementation that likely would not be identified by government interviewees. This analysis yielded the “lack of policy influence” and “lack of practice influence” codes.

3.4.3 Data Collection

Process-tracing is an information-intensive method, often requiring multiple sources of data (Bennett and George 1997; Checkel 2005; Bennett and Checkel 2015; Beach and Pedersen 2013). I collected data through the following methods: elite interviews, qualitative document analysis and participant observation. Drawing on this range of data is not only essential for projects with complex relationships between variables, but it is also important for ensuring reliability of research findings.

58 Elite interviews with policymakers and bureaucrats are an invaluable source of information particular when trying to understand particular policy decisions (Harvey 2011; Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Van Audenhove and Donders 2019). Prior to fieldwork, rather than following a random sampling method to gather interview respondents, I identified critical individuals based on their membership in a particular stakeholder group or their involvement in relevant policy outputs (Onwuegbuzie and Collins 2007; Fujii 2017). While in the field, I used the snowball method to identify other potentially relevant interview subjects. Snowballing is essential when trying to gain interviews with bureaucrats (who I found were more difficult to contact than politicians). I found that bureaucrats were more willing to speak with me if another contact referred me to them or, if they could not speak with me themselves, they would put me in touch with other relevant people. In total, between March 2018 to October 2019, I conducted 18 interviews in the UK, 23 in Canada and 16 in Sweden (57 interviews total). Of these, 19 (3 in the UK, 11 in Canada and 5 in Sweden) requested full anonymity and 18 were remote, conducted over Skype or telephone. Interviewees included government bureaucrats (n=19), politicians (n=4), civil society (n=30), former public servants (n=1), the private sector (n=1) and academics (n=2). See Appendix A for full list of interviewees.

I used interview data to confirm data on goal responsiveness and gather evidence on the drivers of responsiveness in each case. I asked interview subjects a common set of questions, with some variation depending on their expertise and particular position and given limited interview time. For instance, I did not ask civil society respondents about internal government decision making process but did ask about their impressions of those processes. Core questions for all participants revolved around overarching aid narratives and donor identity. I also asked participants who were directly involved in aid policy processes (rather than civil society or non-policy participants) about how (e.g. who was consulted, was there learning from other donors etc.) and why the SDGs came to be used (or not) in key aid policy outputs or aid practices. This latter question was useful for understanding donors’ reputational aspirations and the perceived instrumentality of the SDGs in furthering those aspirations. I also included questions concerning potential alternative explanations, such as the influence of civil society or particular individuals. A sample interview guide is included in Appendix B.

59 I triangulated interview data with the qualitative document analysis described earlier. At the beginning of each fieldwork trip, I established a sampling frame of documents. I selected documents for analysis based on their relevance for aid and SDG policy and whether they were publicly available in English.30 In most cases, I looked at any major policy documents, white papers, public statements, party platforms, legislation (e.g. budget bills), parliamentary debates or reports published about aid, sustainable development or the SDGs since 2015. I also used document analysis to gather data on policy responsiveness and practice responsiveness. Data on the latter was gathered through qualitative document analysis of internal aid agency documents, manuals and monitoring and evaluation systems.

Finally, I also undertook participant observation at SDG or aid-related events in each case country. These events included government consultations, corporate sustainability events (with government participation), civil society engagement on the SDGs or conferences related to aid (see Appendix C for full list of events attended). During this participant observation, I took notes concerning speeches, interventions or questions from stakeholders of interest (e.g. aid or SDG-related policy-makers and aid civil society), attendance (e.g. who from government attended- politicians, senior government officials or lower-level bureaucrats?), membership of official delegations, the audience and any signage or visual displays. This data also helped to understand how the SDGs are used by governments when engaging with external stakeholders and provided another opportunity to observe how donor identities are performed across venues.

Figure 6 provides a summary of the research process.

30 For the very few documents only available in Swedish, I used unofficial translations (google translate) to ensure the documents were relevant and to get a general sense of the overall narrative. I checked the accuracy of the informal translation by using example documents available in both English/Swedish and assessed how the informal translation compared to the official translation. In most cases, the informal translation was highly similar. Furthermore, in all of the non-English documents I cite directly there was also commentary (either from media sources or even the OECD) against which I could compare ethe information from the informal translations. In these cases, I cite both the original Swedish document and relevant commentary. However, for direct quotes and the more in-depth analysis I relied on documents available in English. Most important documents related to aid, however, were available in English.

60 Prior to • Surveyed existing literature about global goals to identify potential causal mechanisms. Fieldwork • Identified pre-existing narratives about aid and national identity prior to the SDGs to establish a baseline from which to compare post-2015 responses. • Gathered information about SDG responsiveness publicly available in English/French or translated. • Identified key individuals or organizations to interview. • Established broad sampling frame for document analysis. Fieldwork • Contacted key individuals and used snowball method to identify further potential interviewees. • Identified and attended SDG relevant events. • Confirmed, through interviews, SDG responsiveness information. • Conducted qualitative content analysis of key policy documents, public statements, speeches and interviews. Data- • Reviewed interview material and document analysis results. Analysis • Established a timeline of key SDG decisions or other related processes (e.g. SDG audits, civil society reports etc.). Figure 6 Summary of Research Phases

3.4.4 Elite Interviews and Participant Observation: Ethics, Access and Positionality

I conducted interviews under the University of Toronto Human Research Protocol #36957. All interview participants signed consent forms with multiple options for anonymity and confidentiality. For the Canadian case, I did not conduct interviews with anyone with whom I had previously worked in order to ensure that potential interview subjects did not feel unduly obligated to participate. Given that my mother is also an employee of GAC, I did not interview her current or former colleagues.

It is important to note that I had variable access to aid agency or SDG related government officials in each country. In Canada, while I did not conduct interviews with former coworkers (nor did I ask anyone who I had directly worked with to refer me to potential interview subjects), I had the greatest access to government employees and decisionmakers across government. I attribute to this, in part, to the desire of the Canadian government to publicize its efforts around the SDGs. In Sweden, I also had good access to key informants in government, compared to the UK. In the Swedish case, I also had institutional affiliation at the Stockholm Environment Institute as a visiting researcher under Dr. Janet Vähämäki (Head of Unit, Resources and Development). As a visiting researcher, I had access to the office space of SEI, as well as to its resident experts on the SDGs. Dr. Vähämäki and other staff at SEI assisted me with contacting key government employees. As in Canada, policy

61 makers working on the SDGs were also enthusiastic to discuss their work. Thus, in both the Canadian and Swedish cases I was able to gather rich interview evidence.

The UK was the most challenging in terms of data collection, given an apparent reluctance of public servants to speak with a foreign researcher. Given the difficulty in obtaining interviews with public servants, I collected data from interviews with parliamentarians with interests in aid and members of civil society or private sector engaged with SDG implementation in the UK, as well as several freedom of information requests. The interviews with parliamentarians gave me a sense of government motivations around aid and the SDGs. I also undertook participant observation at key events where DFID staff and other public servants were present and making remarks, including a DFID consultation on the SDGs, corporate sustainability events with senior DFID staff and attending parliamentary committee meetings about the SDGs. Fortuitously, the International Development Committee (IDC) in the UK parliament was also conducting an inquiry on SDG implementation in the UK during my fieldwork and so I drew a fair amount of data about the UK’s responsiveness from the oral evidence, written evidence and committee reports from that inquiry.31

Researcher positionality plays an important part in interview research, even when interviewing elites. Researcher positionality can influence access to elites, how a researcher is perceived by elites, a researcher’s ability to establish rapport with elite interviewees and researcher reflexivity during the research process (Herod 1999; Srivastava 2006; Conti and O’Neil 2007; Berger 2013; Wettergren and Blix 2018; Mason-Bish 2019). My positionality as a former international development officer at GAC influenced the development of this project, as I initially conceived this project while working at GAC in the summer of 2016. While working as a project officer, I became puzzled by the contrast between the media attention around the SDGs and the lack of SDG-related activity at the project management level.32

31 Informal conversations with other foreign scholars/academics studying UK policy making in the post-Brexit era also note difficulty in accessing government respondents. The differences in access in Canada, Sweden and the UK may also be attributable to a different corporate culture in terms of transparency and engagement with the public and who within the aid agency is able to speak to outside researchers, particularly since different aid agencies have different rules (both formal and informal, documented and undocumented) around public engagement. Although, notably, none of the organizations included in this study needed to approve of the project before their employees participated. 32 I was in a temporary, junior position with very little influence.

62 My previous GAC experience also shaped my interview process in Canada in two ways. First, I was able to more easily identify key informants (e.g. knowing what websites and resources to use) and navigate complex organizational charts. Second, and more significantly, my experience meant that I was conversant in the bureaucratic language, norms and culture of the Canadian government. As suggested by Mikecz (2012), familiarity with elites’ behavioural norms is useful in gaining trust and creating rapport. In the Canadian case, I was certainly able to establish a rapport with my government interviewees. Furthermore, my positionality as a former public servant and as an academic from a Canadian institution may have made them more willing to speak to me in the first place.33 I cannot comment, however, on whether this meant they were more forthcoming or gave me information that they would not have otherwise divulged, given that public servants are governed by particular rules concerning engagement with the public even if the public in this case was a former public servant.

In the UK and Sweden, on the other hand, I was a foreigner both to the country and to the norms and procedures of the government system. This foreign-ness was also amplified by my identity as a young mixed-race black woman, all of which might have had an impact on my perceived legitimacy as a researcher. In Sweden, this foreign-ness was partially attenuated by the fact that I had institutional affiliation with a Swedish institute and one that was well known for its work on the SDGs. Furthermore, my foreign-ness in Sweden was actually an advantage as some of my Swedish interviewees were very interested in hearing about how other countries, including Canada were approaching the SDGs.

At the beginning of my fieldwork research in the Fall of 2018, I also completed a 6-month internship at the OECD-DAC in Paris on a specific subcommittee concerned with SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) (OECD GovNet). While this did give me an insider perspective on the operation of the DAC and donor relations within the DAC, I draw on participant observation only from public events in the case countries, rather than OECD-DAC meetings, in order to avoid potential conflict of interest or ethical issues (e.g., accidentally disclosing classified information). Unfortunately, I was not able to attend UN-SDG related events, such as the HLPFs, in person. However, I was able to watch several hours of VNR

33 While my mother also held a number of senior management positions at GAC prior to her retirement 9 years ago, she was not known to any of my interviewees and so I do not believe this had any influence on my access to current employees.

63 presentations on YouTube and also gathered data about the HLPF from the IISD Earth Negotiation Bulletin reports.

3.5 Conclusion

Any explanatory framework aiming to unpack how the SDGs influence bilateral aid donors’ policy and practice needs to take into account the unique characteristics of the SDGs and their follow-up and review mechanisms. More specifically, a central tenet of this dissertation is that scholars should take seriously the performative nature of the SDGs (and the follow-up and review process of the VNRs and HLPF) as a potential mechanism of influence. To some extent, all previous examples of global goal setting have been performative (albeit with less visually appealing logos) but this characteristic is amplified in the case of the SDGs.

The show and tell mechanism proposed in this chapter outlines how the performance, theatre and script of the SDGs can encourage goal-attaining behaviour among governance targets. After all, in order to show and tell, one must have something to show and a story to tell. As such, we can see the effects of this rhetorical mechanism in donor performances in the specific venue of the HLFP but also in their communications, policies and practices. The embedding of the SDGs in donor policies and practices can lead to a greater prioritization of goal-attaining behaviour, particularly if the SDGs become linked with donor identity.

Yet, not all donors will be sensitive to or react to this mechanism of influence in the same way. As such, there is also a need to identify the determinants of influence that shape donors’ responses to the SDGs. The role of reputation takes on a particular importance in explaining donor responsiveness given the performativity of the SDGs and the way in which aid itself is leveraged by states for reputational purposes. The key is to understand the perceived utility of the SDGs for different donors’ reputational aspirations. This chapter proposed several conditions through which donors come to view the SDGs as useful in furthering particular reputational aspirations.

The following chapters draw on case evidence to assess the plausibility of these arguments empirically. Analysing the implementation of the SDGs in practice, also enables and understanding of the effectiveness of this performative mechanism of show and tell in driving meaningful and sustainable goal-attaining behaviour among donors.

64 Sweden

“It is the government’s ambition that Sweden will be a leader in implementing the 2030 Agenda – both at home and through contributing to its global implementation” – Sweden’s Voluntary National Review (Sweden 2017c, 4)

“A large number of studies confirm that Sweden has a good international reputation. If you ask people around the world, they place us among the top countries for prosperity, innovation, openness, education, gender equality, low corruption, competitiveness, corporate social responsibility and sustainable development”– Strategy for the Promotion of Sweden Abroad (Sweden 2017b, 3)

4.1 Introduction

In many respects Sweden is an ideal case of SDG responsiveness as the country declared its ambition to be a leader in SDG implementation. Part of this SDG champion role involved pursuing international leadership on SDG issues. For instance, in September 2015, the Swedish Prime Minister formed an informal high-level political group composed of heads of states from Brazil, Colombia, Germany, Liberia, South Africa, Tanzania, Timor-Leste and Tunisia to ensure that the 2030 Agenda remain “high on the international agenda” (Sweden 2017c, 8).34 Similarly, in 2016, the UN Secretary General appointed the Swedish Crown Princess to serve as one of 17 ambassadors in the SDG Advocacy group from 2016-2018 (Sweden 2020b). Interview respondents were also quick to point out that it was a Swedish artist, Jakob Trollbäck, who designed the colourful logos of the goals (Trollbäck+Company 2020, anonymous interview October 2019b). As this chapter will demonstrate, this SDG leadership ambition also extended to Sweden’s foreign aid policy.

Sweden has a long tradition of pursuing an activist foreign policy and leadership in multilateral settings. This chapter suggests that a significant driver of Sweden’s SDG implementation is the Swedish government’s linking of the SDGs to its pre-existing international leadership ambitions. More specifically, I outline two modes of leadership that

34 This group is no longer active given certain changes in the political orientation of members (e.g. Brazil). Sweden continues to cooperate with these countries bilaterally or in other configurations (anonymous interview October 2019a)

65 Sweden pursues in an international context— one that involves leadership through activism and the other that involves leadership through what I describe as “influencing”.35 Influencer style leadership operates by encouraging emulation, meaning that the country needs policies and practices in place to emulate. Achieving these two modes of international leadership, then, involves not only rhetorical nods to the SDGs but also the implementation of the goals in Sweden, both in terms of domestic policies and development assistance.

The first section of this chapter lays out Sweden’s policy and practice responsiveness in terms of its development assistance. It finds that Sweden is highly policy responsive and moderately practice responsive. Significantly, aid policies and aid practices both show and tell a narrative about Sweden’s exceptionalism and its identity as a leader, particularly in multilateral fora. The chapter then assesses the role of the VNR process, finding similar narrative patterns. It then outlines how Sweden’s reputational ambitions contribute to its SDG responsiveness.

4.2 Sweden’s SDG Responsiveness

Figure 7 provides a timeline of key events post-2015 in Sweden.

September 2015-Swedish PM forms international high-level political group to promote the 2030 Agenda March 2016 -Sweden appoints Delegation for the 2030 Agenda 2016 – Revised aid policy framework released February 2017- Swedish VNR preparations begin, SCB tasked to prepare statistical report July 2017- Swedish VNR Presentation November 2017 – First statistical report on the SDGs in Sweden released June 2018 – SDG Action Plan released September 2018 – General Election, Social Democrats-Greens coalition retain power, but more reliant on opposition parties (Government not formed until January 2019) March 2019 – Agenda 2030 Delegation releases final report April 2019- Change in ministerial responsibility for SDG implementation October 2019- Second Agenda 2030 statistical review published by SCB February 2020- Government appoints National Coordinator for the 2030 Agenda

Figure 7 Sweden SDG Timeline

35 “Influencer” marketing is a modern style of brand promotion relying on, usually famous or influential, individuals who use the product in question and in so doing influence their followers to use the product (e.g. encouraging emulation). This is an appropriate (and timely) metaphor to describe Sweden’s SDG approach, as several interview respondents stressed the Swedish government’s ambition to lead by doing. This is a point I develop in more detail in subsequent sections of the chapter.

66 4.2.1 SDG Governance in Sweden

Following the adoption of the goals in 2015, the Swedish government placed responsibility for coordinating and promoting the domestic implementation of the SDGs with the Minister for Public Administration (housed in the Ministry of Finance), while the Minister for International Development managed Sweden’s international implementation of the SDGs. A third Minister for Strategic Development and Nordic Cooperation (based out of the Prime Minister’s Office) was responsible for overall strategic direction of SDG implementation in Sweden. In 2015, Sweden also appointed Kajsa B Olofsgård as “Ambassador for the 2030 Agenda”, which is a senior government position that serves a representational and high-level strategic function.36 Sweden often appoints thematic ambassadors to signal particular foreign policy priority areas. For instance, there is also a Swedish Ambassador for Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, and an Ambassador for Global Health (Sweden 2019f; 2020a). The appointment of an SDG ambassador, then, is another means through which to demonstrate the country’s commitment to the Agenda.

In March 2016, the government appointed a “Swedish delegation for the 2030 Agenda” comprised of experts from different segments of Swedish civil society, designed to “support and stimulate Sweden’s implementation of the 2030 Agenda.” The government tasked the delegation with “conducting a survey and assessment of the extent to which Sweden fulfils the goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda submitting proposals for an overarching action plan for Sweden's implementation; and disseminating information on examples of best practice in the area of socially, economically and environmentally sustainable development, and working to ensure these win attention” (Sweden 2016b).37 The delegation focused less on the implementation of the SDGs in Swedish development cooperation and more on the domestic implementation of the SDGs (Interview Stanton October 2019; Interview Sandahl October 2019). The delegation submitted its final report in March 2019.

In September 2018, Sweden held general elections that led to protracted coalition talks. As a result, the new government was not formed until January 2019. The new government changed a few features of Sweden’s SDG governance architecture. For example, in April

36Ambassador Olofsgård previously served as Sweden’s “Ambassador for the Post-2015 Development Agenda”. Ambassador Olofsgård left the SDG ambassador role in 2019 and was replaced by Ambassador Jenny Ohlsson in September 2019. 37 The VNR also references a Scientific Council for Sustainable Development, however I was unable to confirm whether it is still operational or details of its membership.

67 2019, the government shifted responsibility for domestic implementation of the SDGs to the Minister of Environment and Climate Change, while foreign implementation remained with the Minister for International Development. In part this shift reflected the former development minister, Isabella Lovin’s desire to “keep” the SDG file in her new role as Minister of Environment (Anonymous interviews October 2019 d-e). In February 2020, the government also appointed a “National coordinator the 2030 Agenda” with a mandate to “strengthen, promote and deepen the work of different actors” including municipalities, regions, business, civil society and academia (Sweden 2020b).

SDG governance structures at the bureaucratic level remained more constant. There are two teams responsible for coordinating and supporting national and international SDG implementation. The international coordination team, composed of 6 people, coordinates Swedish efforts to support SDG implementation through its ODA and in multilateral fora (Anonymous Interview October 2019d). The national coordination team worked closely with the Swedish delegation for the 2030 Agenda and has ramped down activities since the delegation submitted its final report in March 2019. There are also two interdepartmental working groups at the ministerial and bureaucratic level. The latter comprises departmental focal points. In most government ministries, there are two focal points, one focusing on domestic implementation and the other on international implementation. The working groups meet once a month to share information and discuss particular issues related to the Agenda.

A review of Sweden’s governance structures makes clear that Sweden’s approach to the SDGs focuses on both domestic and international implementation, with the SDGs being addressed across government departments. Indeed, despite the shift in ministerial responsibility that some feared signalled a de-prioritisation of the Agenda, the SDGs remain a government priority as evidenced by the ongoing functioning of SDG governance structures and the appointment of new leadership positions for SDG implementation.

4.2.2 Policy Responsiveness

Sweden has what the OECD has described as a “forest of strategies” and policies (OECD 2019b). As of 2019, Sweden implements 63 strategies that govern its development cooperation: 6 regional, 25 country, 13 global thematic, and 19 that relate to multilateral cooperation (Sweden 2018h). This section unpacks the extent to which the SDGs may have

68 influenced the development of these policies, as well as the ways in which they are used in the policies.

Two of the most important policy instruments for Swedish aid in the post-2015 period include the Policy for Global Development (PGU) and the new aid policy framework (released in 2016).

4.2.2.1 The SDGs in the PGU

The PGU, introduced in 2003, is a national policy document designed to increase policy coherence for development by ensuring that all Swedish government ministries and policies take into account potential impacts (both negative and positive) on global development efforts (Sweden 2006). The government reports on the PGU biennially to the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament). Sweden was the first country to have this kind of dedicated policy instrument in the context of policy coherence for development (Sweden 2014).

In 2014, the Swedish government announced a relaunch of the PGU. Sweden justified the update as necessary to take into account the then upcoming 2030 Agenda, as well as to respond to an evaluation by the Swedish Agency for Public Management calling for more clarity in the policy (Sweden 2018d). Furthermore, in 2015, the government tasked all ministries to develop “internal plans of action” detailing how their activities contribute to the policy for global development and the SDGs (Sweden 2016a; OECD 2018a). In 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also tasked all of Sweden’s missions abroad to report on how they are implementing and promoting the 2030 Agenda (Sweden 2018d, 9). Sweden views the PGU as an important tool in its implementation of the 2030 Agenda as it argues that policy incoherence has the potential to “limit Sweden’s contribution to the fulfilment of the Global Goals” given the interconnectedness of the Agenda (Sweden 2018d, 6). Indeed, the aim of the PGU itself, even prior to 2015, was to identify potential conflicts of objectives and interests between different policy areas, as well as to harness potential synergies.

Since 2015, the government has reported twice on the PGU—in 2016 and in 2018. Both reports explicitly link the PGU with the 2030 Agenda.38 They are both, for example, designed around the 17 goals, providing an overview of how particular PGU areas contribute to each

38 Previous reporting on the PGU focused on and was organized around “global challenges” such as, oppression, economic exclusion, migration flows, climate change and environmental impact, conflicts and fragile situations and communicable diseases and other health threats (Sweden 2012; 2008)

69 of the 17 goals. For instance, under SDG 1 (No poverty), the 2018 report describes Sweden’s work on social protection, including investments in developing social protection systems in African countries and activism within the EU and IFIs to support capacity development in the tax administrations of developing countries, while under SDG 2 (Zero hunger)it describes its work on global food security. For some SDGs, like those on education, water and sanitation, energy, cities, consumption/production, climate and life below water, the examples provided are broader. Under SDG 11 (Sustainable cities and communities), for example, it describes Swedish work on “sustainable urban development,” while under SDG 6 it describes work on “sustainable management and secure access to water and sanitation.”

In this way, the latest reporting on the PGU does not represent a comprehensive summary and analysis of every activity undertaken in Sweden with implications for the global achievement of each of the SDGs. Rather it provides examples of particular policy areas, under the responsibility of not only the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the MFA but also other ministries that the government views as “relevant in the PGU work linked to the Global Goals” (2018, 12). The reports provide more detail and analysis (e.g. not just examples of programming) around thematic priority areas where the government has expressed “a particular ambition.” In 2016, these priorities included: sustainable business, sustainable consumption and production, sustainable energy, capital and tax evasion and security and development. In 2018, the government slightly modified the priorities, retaining sustainable business, consumption and capital and tax evasion, while replacing the other two priorities with the feminist foreign policy and climate and oceans.

While the aim of the PGU is to identify potential conflicts and synergies, the reports only do so for a few of the SDGs rather than consistently across the 17 goals. The 2016 report, for example, outlines conflicts for SDG 7 (Energy access), 9 (Industry, innovation and infrastructure), 12 (Responsible consumption/production), 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions) and 17 (Partnerships). Similarly, the 2018 report identifies conflicts for only 5 of the SDGs: SDG 5 (Gender), 9 (Industry, innovation and infrastructure), 12 (responsible consumption/production), 14 (life under water) and 17 (partnerships). Notably, in both reports these are the SDGs most closely aligned with the government’s specific thematic priorities described above.

70 Both reports highlight Sweden’s ambition to be a leader in SDG implementation. More specifically, they emphasize two modes of leadership: leading by example and leading through activism, particularly in multilateral environments. I identified the former through segments of text coded with the “influencer leadership” code in Appendix D, such as in the 2018 report, for instance, where Sweden commits under SDG 7 that its energy policy “shall serve as a model and relevant Swedish experiences and solutions shall contribute to the global work on sustainable energy” (28, emphasis added). Sweden’s activist leadership was evident in text segments coded with the “activist leadership” code. For instance, in the same 2018 document, Sweden also commits to be “an active and constructive partner in joint international work on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda” (71) and the report is rife with references to Sweden’s activist leadership on SDG-related issues as diverse as sexual and reproductive health and. rights, sustainable management of chemicals, antibiotic resistance, sustainable consumption and climate. The Swedish leadership narrative in both documents also underscores that its own actions and ambitions in areas such as the promotion of democracy, human rights and gender equality go beyond those of the goals.

In sum, the SDGs provided one impetus for the government’s 2014 relaunch of the PGU. The SDGs also frame the Swedish government’s post-2015 reporting on the PGU, as the reports are organized around the 17 goals. In addition to this framing role, Sweden uses the SDGs in this document to communicate its leadership ambitions internationally.

4.2.2.2 The SDGs in the Aid Policy Framework

In 2016, Sweden updated its overarching aid policy — the “Policy Framework for Swedish Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance” (Sweden 2016c) . A key motivation was the need for Swedish development cooperation to “adapt to changing conditions, new challenges and needs in the world,” including new international commitments, such as the SDGs, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda for Development Finance, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Indeed, Sweden views these frameworks as an “integrated sustainable development framework with goals and means of implementation” (6). In addition to this new multilateral sustainable development framework, Sweden also identified key global challenges (changing demographics and patterns of poverty, environmental degradation, increasing fragile states, as well as a rolling back of democracy and human rights, etc.) and opportunities (e.g. technological development, gender equality, etc.) that also necessitated a relaunch of its aid policy.

Nevertheless, Sweden used these multilateral agreements, including the SDGs, to justify a relaunch of Sweden’s strategic thinking on development. Thus, in this respect, the SDGs did have some influence on the development of the new Swedish aid policy, in that they represented a new global framework that Sweden argued it needed to respond to (as discussed in the previous paragraph). However, this new global framework was not only made up of the SDGs, but also the other multilateral development and environment initiatives adopted in 2015 described above. The references to these other multilateral agreements further demonstrates a commitment to multilateralism that has long characterized Swedish development assistance and foreign policy more broadly (Ingebritsen 2002; Björkdahl 2013).

The policy also describes several “perspectives” and thematic areas that guide Swedish development cooperation. These are: the “perspective of poor people on development,” a “rights-based perspective” and three thematic perspectives (conflict, gender and environment and climate). The “perspectives” are “tools for identifying and managing conflict and… promoting synergies” across decision making, planning, implementation and evaluation (14).39 In addition to the “perspectives”, there are eight themes: 1) human rights, democracy and the principles of the rule of law, 2) gender equal health, 3) education and research, 4) global gender equality, 5) peaceful and inclusive societies, 6) environment, climate and natural resources, 7) inclusive economic development and 8) migration and development. Most, if not all, of these perspectives and themes are implicitly aligned with the SDGs, but they are not explicitly linked in the document.

When describing each of the themes, the government lays out long-term policy commitments, provides a justification for each of these commitments rooted in broader trends relevant to that particular theme and includes a small section outlining the relevant SDGs linked to the thematic area. For example, the migration and development theme is linked to SDGs 1, 8, 10, 13 and 16.Sweden also links its humanitarian assistance work to the SDGs more explicitly than other donors, arguing that the SDGs are relevant to humanitarian assistance given that they contribute to building resilience and disaster risk reduction, both of which “reduce the risk and consequences of humanitarian crises” (49). The document frequently frames the theme-specific policy commitments as being “essential” to the achievement of the

39 These perspectives are effectively what other donors would call cross-cutting themes that are meant to be integrated across all policies and programs.

72 SDGs. The document also uses the principle of LNOB, as well as the Addis Action Agenda commitment to spend 0.15-0.20% of GNI on LDCs, to justify the geographic focus of Swedish aid on “the least developed and most vulnerable countries” (50).

However, the SDGs are not equally prominent under all of the themes. Under the human rights theme, for instance, the government notes that its own ambitions on human rights, democracy and rule of law are “considerably higher than those agreed upon in the 2030 Agenda” (20). This focus on democracy, human rights and the rule of law has increasingly become a central tenet of Swedish foreign policy and even more so following the 2018 elections when the centre-left governing coalition became more reliant on the Center Party and the Liberals (more centre-right leaning parties) for support in parliament (Anonymous interview October 2019a). In November 2019, the government formally launched its “Drive for Democracy,” a commitment that Sweden will “stand up for democratic principles in all contexts, work to help strengthen democracy and voice criticism against democratic deficits or risks of backsliding” (Sweden 2019f npg; 2019c). The drive for democracy has had a strong influence on Sweden’s recent approach to development cooperation (Anonymous interview October 2019a). Overall, Sweden appears to the use the SDGs in this document to justify the need for a new aid policy and also particular pre-existing policy priorities.

As with the post-2015 PGU reporting, the aid policy included several segments of text coded as “activist leadership”, including references to Sweden’s active leadership on issues related to sustainable development. It signals this activist leadership ambition by highlighting its commitment to be a “driving force” or a “global voice” for particular issues, like democracy, human trafficking or gender equality. There are also several segments coded as “influencer leadership.” For instance, there are several references to Sweden’s status as a “role model” in areas such as environment (25) and development cooperation more broadly (41). Compared to the PGU, these leadership ambitions are less explicitly linked to the SDGs as they are primarily referenced under particular thematic priorities. In part, this is because the SDGs feature less prominently in the aid policy in general compared to the PGU.

Another important code that emerged in the document analysis was the “commitment to multilateralism” code. This multilateral commitment is a prominent thread throughout the policy document and is a fundamental part of Sweden’s donor leadership narrative. Sweden suggests that multilateral organizations, and in particular the UN, are a “central platform for normative influence on the global, regional and national stage” (47). The Swedish

73 government aims to have its voice heard in these fora through both “financial contributions and strategic advocacy.” The Swedish government also commits that it will “act to ensure that the [multilateral] system is well-equipped and capable of contributing to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda” (6). In addition to building capacity of multilateral institutions, the government also commits to influencing international agendas, including the SDGs and the Addis Agenda, to encourage a great focus on Swedish priorities such as gender, sustainability and democracy and human rights (Sweden 2017e). Indeed, the commitment to “stand up” for democracy and human rights, even when in some developing country contexts where they may be one of the few donors to do so, also represents an important part of Sweden’s global leadership identity narrative (Anonymous interview October 2019a). Like the PGU, then, this aid policy serves to communicate Sweden’s international leadership ambition, particularly in multilateral fora.

4.2.2.3 The SDGs in Sida Strategies, Policies and Communications

Sweden’s primary development cooperation agency, Sida, is governed by a series of strategies dictated by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.40 The SDGs are most prominent in the “Strategy for capacity development, partnership and methods that support the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development (2018-2022)” (Sweden 2019e). The strategy aims to respond to the challenges and opportunities implicated in the increased level of ambition around sustainable development embedded in the SDGs, acknowledging that implementing the SDGs requires “new solutions, new knowledge and new forms of working” (3). More specifically, it suggests that capacity development of partner countries, greater and more innovative mobilisation of resources (including in Sweden) and the strengthening of the “global partnership for sustainable development” are essential to achieving the SDGs. It explicitly references two SDGs – 16 and 17 – as further justification for a focus on partner country capacity development and partnerships. The strategy commits Sida to building institutional capacity in developing countries, finding innovative and catalytic forms of collaboration and funding from a broad set of actors both within Sweden and internationally (e.g. companies, investors, higher education institutions), all of which the document frames as being essential to achieving the 2030 Agenda.

40 Sida is the primary implementation agency of Swedish development cooperation. Other government agencies which implement Swedish development cooperation include the Folke Bernadotte Academy and the Swedish Research Council.

74 While this strategy frames itself as a response to the 2030 Agenda, the turn to other societal actors in the context of Swedish development cooperation and undertaking more innovative ways of working were conversations happening within Sida even prior to the SDGs (Anonymous interviews October 2019a-b). At the same time, the commitments to capacity building, innovative resource mobilization and partnership, while they may have predated the SDGs in Swedish development assistance discourse, also reflect several of the broad principles of the SDGs (e.g. ownership and partnership). Thus, in this way this could be considered as an SDG strategy. Notably, two of the primary objectives of this strategy also include “Greater Swedish representation in strategic posts in international development cooperation” and “Greater use and feedback of Swedish expertise and experience in international development cooperation” (3). These two objectives represent another instance of Sweden linking its desired positioning as a leader in development cooperation with SDG implementation.

The SDGs are inconsistently integrated across the other strategies, however, despite discussions between Sida and MoFA around how to better incorporate the SDGs in the strategies (Anonymous interview October 2019a). For instance, they are mentioned in the strategy for multilateral development policy and in most of the recent regional and sectoral strategies (e.g. Gender Equality), but they are not included in others such as the strategy for Sustainable Peace (2017-2022) (Sweden 2018c). When they are mentioned in the strategies, it is usually in the form of a generic introductory statement that “Sweden’s development cooperation is founded on the principles of aid and development effectiveness as well as the international agreements that the international community reached in 2015: The 2030 Agenda, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Paris Agreement on climate change” (see for example: Sweden 2018h, 1; 2019d, 1). Some strategies, like the strategy for gender equality, reference the specific SDG (in this case SDG 5) and this strategy also suggests that “gender equality and women’s and girls’ empowerment are pre-requisites for implementing the whole 2030 Agenda and fulfilling the Global Goals” (Sweden 2018i, 1).

Overall, these strategy documents use the SDGs (and other international initiatives) to set the scene and justify existing priorities in specific sectors, regions or countries. The specific objectives and activities of the strategies, however, are not explicitly aligned with the relevant SDG targets/indicators. It is similarly not clear the extent to which reporting on the strategies includes the SDGs. The strategy for sustainable economic development commits that

75 reporting is to be conducted “with reference to the 2030 Agenda” (Sweden 2019d, 5). However, it is not yet clear that reporting on this strategy has taken this form, given that it is only in the first year of implementation. SDG language is more prevalent in the more recent iterations of strategies (post-2017), in part as the new strategy development guidelines requires that strategy drafters outline how the strategy contributes to the Agenda 2030 in the context section (Sweden 2017g).

Another flagship policy launched in the post-2015 period is Sida’s multidimensional poverty toolbox (Sweden 2017a). Sida staff describe this policy as a cornerstone of their approach to leaving no one behind (Anonymous interviews October 2019a-b). One of the justifications for the policy includes the call under SDG 1 to “end poverty in all its forms everywhere” including the target 1.2 to “reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions.” For Sweden, developing and implementing a multidimensional approach to poverty contributes to the achievement of this goal and target. However, the policy was also inspired by Sweden’s commitment for its work to be guided by “poor people’s perspectives” as outlined in the 2016 aid policy. Nevertheless, this policy was explicitly linked to the achievement of the SDGs.

Sida’s communications material, including sectoral briefs and portfolio overviews, also make reference to the relevant SDGs and include a generic section describing the purpose of the SDGs: “The Global Goals for Sustainable Development include everyone—and we can all contribute. The goals are interdependent and therefore indivisible. Sida’s main contribution is to implement development cooperation, thereby reducing poverty and saving lives. Together we can build a better future where no one is left behind” (see, for example, the portfolio overviews on Environment and Climate Change (Sweden 2015a, 1), Peace and Security (Sweden 2018b, 1) or Employment (Sweden 2015b, 1)).

4.2.2.4 The SDGs and Aid in the Swedish SDG Action Plan

While the Swedish SDG action plan is mostly focused on domestic implementation, it also makes reference to Sweden’s international contribution to the SDGs that is relevant to discuss here (Sweden 2018f). For Sweden’s international contribution, the action plan does not identify specific thematic areas. Rather, like the other documents analysed in this section, it commits Sweden to being an active force for the SDGs, for example by advocating for the integration of the SDGs in budgeting in international fora as diverse as regional organizations

76 such as the Nordic Council, ASEAN, Union for the Mediterranean, as well as the EU, UN, WTO and OECD, among others. It also highlights Sweden’s ongoing international leadership in multilateral contexts such as the international dialogue on peacebuilding and state- building, climate finance, as well as development cooperation, noting that the latter is well regarded internationally (8).41 In this way, the action plan further reinforces Sweden’s activist leadership narrative, an activism that includes the SDGs and Sweden’s development cooperation.

Overall, Sweden is highly policy responsive to the SDGs given that they are integrated in the high-level policy instruments guiding Sweden’s aid work. While there is no overarching SDG strategy, some of the lower-level strategies address key elements of the Agenda. Nevertheless, as this section demonstrates, in terms of the sectoral and thematic strategies within Sida, the SDGs are less prominent than in the higher-level strategies like the PGU and the 2016 aid strategy. Furthermore, several of the policies outlined in these documents (e.g. policy coherence, capacity building, gender, etc.) were already prominent in Swedish development discourse prior to the SDGs. In this way, the SDGs codified pre-existing Swedish policies and ambitions in the global sustainable development arena. Yet, even if Sweden’s policies were already well-aligned with many of the SDGs, it still chose to communicate some of those priorities with SDG language, as outlined above. Furthermore, each of the policies also elaborates a narrative of Sweden’s identity as an activist international leader, one that explicitly links the SDGs, along with the two other agreements reached in 2015 that Sweden describes as the new sustainable development agenda, to this leadership narrative.

4.2.3 Practice Responsiveness

This section assesses the extent to which Sweden is responsive to the SDGs in terms of its aid practices including in its statistical system, projects and corporate processes.

Sweden has been an active member of the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG indicators (IAEG-SDG),42 as well as in the OECD’s Total Official Support for Sustainable

41 Interestingly, unlike other SDG and development related documents, the action plan is only currently available in Swedish, signalling that the audience for this plan is largely domestic, rather than international. 42 The IAEG-SDG is responsible for the development and implementation of the global indicator framework for the goals and targets of the 2030 agenda (UN 2020c). The OECD serves as the secretariat for the International Task Force of Experts building this new measure of total official support for sustainable development (TOSSD).

77 Development (TOSSD) discussions and IMF/World Bank discussions on data and the SDGs (Sweden 2019a, 11). In 2017, Sida conducted a pilot study, in cooperation with the OECD- DAC Working Party on Statistics (WP-STAT), aimed at developing a reporting method through which donors would be able to report their activities in relation to the SDG targets (Rasmussen and Habram 2017; OECD 2019a). Following the pilot study, Sweden committed to scaling up this pilot by integrating the SDG targets in its statistical system in order to report on how its 2019/20 flows contribute to the SDGs.43

Sweden funds a number of projects related to SDG processes and implementation.44 Among the most prominent is the Swedish Leadership for Sustainable Development (SLSD) (Sida 2019). This project began in 2013, prior to the adoption of the SDGs, but aimed to respond to the ongoing SDG negotiations (Anonymous interview October 2019a). This project is a network of over 20 companies and expert organizations initiated and coordinated by Sida. It is a “forum for valuable knowledge-exchange, concrete projects and collaborative models for poverty reduction and sustainable development”(Sida 2019, npg).

Another prominent project includes the Swedish Investors for Sustainable Development (SISD) that aims to “explore the role of investors in the SDGs” (Sweden 2019b). The SISD is a partnership founded 2016 between 18 institutional investors, pension funds, asset managers, insurance companies and Sida. The network comprises five goal-specific working groups around SDGs 5, 6, 8, 11 and 16, seeking to “feed ideas, experiences, learning and new ways of thinking into the operative network.” In this project, Sida envisions itself as a “facilitator and catalyzer for the platform” rather than as a donor in the traditional sense (Sweden 2019b). Key outcomes of the project include greater investment by network members in line with the SDGs, investment in World Bank (WB) bonds promoting SDG 11 and the initiation of the Stockholm Declaration, signed by 29 actors with total assets under management of USD 1 trillion committing to working with the SDGs in their investing and reporting. This project also served as a model for a similar platform launched by the UN

TOSSD is “a new international statistical framework for monitoring official resources and private finance mobilised by official interventions in support of sustainable development” (OECD 2020, npg) 43 The SDG statistical reporting is not replacing Sida’s existing statistical system (e.g. DAC-CRS indicators) but represents an additional layer of reporting. 2019/2020 flows have not yet been reported so at this stage I cannot comment on the implementation of this system but interviewees indicated that the work on integrating the SDGs in the statistical system was well advanced (Anonymous interview October 2019c). 44 All project information from Openaid.se database (Openaid 2019)

78 Secretary-General: The Global Investors for Sustainable Development Alliance (Anonymous interview October 2019b; Leone 2019).

Through its bilateral programming, Sweden supports SDG implementation in partner countries. For instance, its SDG and Agenda 2030 project in Bosnia and Herzegovina aims to prepare the country for SDG implementation, including through the development of an “SDG Roadmap” for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through the Governance Reform Fund Sweden supported the institutionalization of an SDG council and the development of an inclusive SDG 16 monitoring methodology in Georgia. A similar project in Moldova aimed to enhance the oversight role of its parliament in monitoring progress in implementing the SDGs. Projects undertaken in partnership with multilaterals such as UNDP have also contributed to the development of local SDG governance structures in Colombia and Cambodia, for instance (Openaid 2019).

Sida has also provided support to organizations working to influence SDG implementation internationally and domestically, particularly SDG 16. For instance, it provides support for Transparency International’s work on developing alternative indicators of SDG 16, as well as the Community of Democracies’ development of voluntary indicators for SDG 16. Similarly, Sida provides support to ReAct’s advocacy efforts to include anti-microbial resistance (AMR) in countries’ VNRs and build capacity by identifying entry points to tackle AMR through existing country SDG programs. It also funds similar efforts by the International Disability Alliance to advocate for disability inclusion in the SDGs. Its support for SDG implementation is not limited only to civil society or transnational NGOs. Sida has also supported private sector networks such as the GSMA Mobile Industry Leadership network that aims to engage CEOs in the SDGs and drive SDG adoption by mobile operators.

In terms of project communications, project descriptions occasionally reference the relevant SDG but these references to the SDGs are not consistent across Sweden’s project portfolio.45 Notably, most projects involving multilateral organizations or international financial institutions (e.g. various UN agencies, OECD, Interparliamentary Union, World Bank etc.) are linked to relevant SDGs and many of the projects involving UN agencies note their SDG

45 This project portfolio represents projects implemented not only by Sida but other ministries/agencies that manage Swedish ODA (e.g. MFA, Folke Bernadotte Academy and other government ministries).

79 custodian roles.46 The presence of the SDGs in other corporate procedures such as evaluation, rules and guidelines is more limited. For example, the SDGs are not currently integrated in Sida’s evaluation guidelines and procedures (Sweden 2018e).

Overall, Sweden is highly responsive to the SDGs at the level of aid practice as it funds projects explicitly related to the SDG process and is integrating the SDGs in its statistical systems and reporting (see Figure 8). The SDGs have had a less visible impact on other aid practices, including evaluation procedures or financing mechanisms. As was the case with Sweden’s aid policies, its contribution to SDG processes in partner countries, its leadership on SDG-related issues in multilateral institutions like the OECD and its own SDG specific projects such as the SLSD and SISD also clearly contribute to Sweden’s SDG leadership ambitions. Policy Responsiveness • SDGs prominent in central aid policy instruments, including policy coherence for sustainable development instrument. • Increasingly consistent references to SDGs in strategies and communications (more prevalent in recent post 2017 strategies). • Some policies specific to SDG principles like LNOB (or references to SDG principles in other policies/communications). • SDGs framed as driving force in Swedish aid policy (also used to communicate leadership ambitions). Practice Responsiveness • Dedicated institutional structures for SDG implementation across government (including aid specific structures). • SDGs integrated in internal monitoring, evaluation and statistical systems. • Funds several SDG-specific projects, including supporting SDG implementation in partner countries.

Overall: High Responsiveness Figure 8 Summary of Sweden's SDG Responsiveness

When considering Sweden’s policy and practice responsiveness, it is important to acknowledge that the relative effort required by Sweden to implement SDG related-policies and practices is not as large as for some of its peers, given its pre-existing capacity to generate new policies and strategies. This ability to generate and implement new policy is confirmed by the number of policies currently being implemented in Sida, as well as several

46 Custodian agencies are UN organizations (and occasionally other international organizations like the OECD) responsible for compiling, verifying and submitting country data and metadata on particular SDG indicators to the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) (UN 2017).

80 of the OECD peer reviews that describe Sweden as an agile and effective donor (OECD 2019b; 2014a).

Furthermore, Sweden had already been working on many of the issues addressed by the SDGs (e.g. sustainability, innovativeness and inclusive development). It also remains one of the only donors to actually have a policy coherence for development instrument in the form of the PGU. Indeed, it was able to easily adapt the PGU to SDG language and thereby meeting the policy coherence element inherent to the SDGs. It similarly adapted existing corporate procedures like its sectoral strategies, briefs or portfolio overviews to the SDGs. In this way, Sweden’s pre-existing capacity in the form of its policy coherence and aid architectures facilitated its SDGs responsiveness as it did not have to implement significant changes to be highly responsive to the SDGs. Nevertheless, I do not argue that Sweden’s high policy capacity was a driving force in Sweden’s political commitment to the SDGs but rather that it had an easier starting point for SDG implementation than its donor peers. At the same time, even with this easier starting point it was not inevitable that Sweden would choose to pursue an SDG champion state role.

4.3 Drivers of Sweden’s SDG Responsiveness

While Sweden’s pre-existing policy capacity and policy coherence instrument may have facilitated its ability to respond more comprehensively to the SDGs, it is still important to understand how the SDGs came to be part of Sweden’s leadership identity narrative and in turn how the specific characteristic of Sweden’s reputational aspirations shaped its approach to the SDGs. An analysis of Sweden’s VNR is useful for understanding the origins of Sweden’s SDG leadership narrative, particularly as it outlines the justification for Sweden to take a leadership role in the Agenda 2030. The VNR further reinforces several of the narratives in the aid policies (e.g. commitment to multilateralism, Swedish exceptionalism) described previously.

4.3.1 Show and Tell and the Impact of the Voluntary National Review in Sweden

Sweden presented its first VNR in 2017. Preparations substantively began in early 2017 (Anonymous interview October 2019d). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared the VNR, with support from the Ministry of Finance (where the original responsible Minister for the SDGs – the Minister for Public Administration – was based), Ministry of Enterprise and

81 Innovation, the 2030 delegation and the Swedish Agenda 2030 Ambassador (Bexell and Jönsson 2018; Anonymous interview October 2019d). The final report was based on a series of domestic reports, particularly a statistical report produced by Statistics Sweden (SCB) analysing Sweden’s progress against the SDG targets and indicators, as well as localising them where necessary. The VNR also built on reports produced by the delegation for the 2030 Agenda and from 86 government agencies and embassies and consultations with civil society (Sweden 2017c). In addition to the July 2017 presentation at the HLPF, the report was also presented domestically at an invite-only launch event in June 2017 (Bexell and Jönsson 2018).

One of the Swedish government’s core aims for the VNR was to not only highlight its own favourable starting position but also to share its challenges, including in areas such as education, the gender-pay gap and sustainable consumption. Sweden’s commitment to sharing its challenges partially reflects its view that the HLPF, despite its shortcomings, is a learning forum designed to share experiences and lessons learned. It is also linked to Sweden’s perception that this honest communication about its own challenges is well received by other countries when they attend international meetings or engage bilaterally – in other words, to the reputational benefits accrued (Anonymous interview October 2019d). It also wanted to ensure that the VNR highlighted Sweden’s commitment to a whole-of-society approach and it dedicated a chapter to non-state and sub-state SDG actions in Sweden (Anonymous interview October 2019d).

As with several of the aid documents analysed in the previous sections, the two leadership codes and the commitment to multilateralism codes are prominent in this document. A fourth code— “Swedish exceptionalism”— is another important feature of the VNR. Overall, the VNR shows and tells a story about Swedish exceptionalism and its tradition of activist international leadership, particularly in multilateral and/or donor contexts, all of which support and justify its commitment to be a leader in SDG implementation. Chapters 2-4 of the VNR outline the key principles guiding Sweden’s approach to the SDGs, Sweden’s “favourable starting position” for implementing the 2030 Agenda, and existing institutional and governance arrangements for implementing the SDGs. These chapters explicitly link particular features of Swedish identity (e.g. welfare state, solidarity and innovation) and Sweden’s high achievement in areas such the economy, health or gender equality, to its approach to SDG implementation. Furthermore, an important starting point for Sweden in its

82 Agenda 2030 work is to continue to develop and transform its “societal model and sustainable welfare state, at home and as part of the global system” (9). It also commits, based on its values of solidarity and “thinking globally and acting locally,” to undertake its work on the SDGs through broad and innovative partnerships including the whole of society and other countries. This VNR further makes reference to several of Sweden’s pre-existing policies and achievements that also contribute to SDG implementation, including its national sustainable development strategy, the PGU, its domestic environmental goals, an active gender equality policy, its strong economy and its successful welfare model.

Sweden’s “favourable starting point” is a clear expression of the Swedish exceptionalism narrative, and as argued by Bexell and Jönsson (2018), is one of the reasons justifying its ambition to be a leader in SDG implementation. Indeed, this “favourable starting point” is a “driving force” for Sweden and Swedish stakeholders to work towards SDG implementation at home and abroad. Importantly, Sweden is quick to note in the VNR that this favourable starting position is not only a self-identified characteristic but is also confirmed by a myriad independent international analyses and global rankings. In this way, these sections about Sweden’s starting point and principles further contribute to the narrative of Swedish exceptionalism and use this exceptionalism to justify its leadership ambitions around SDG implementation.

The VNR also outlines Sweden’s “preliminary results” against each SDG, based on a statistical report prepared by SCB. The analysis is for the most part brief, outlining areas where Sweden performs well domestically, the relevant domestic challenges and Sweden’s international contribution (including both foreign policy and development assistance). This chapter does not report against the SDG targets and indicators.47 As previously mentioned, the VNR also includes a dedicated chapter to SDG action implemented by different actors in Swedish society, including local government, large, small and medium small enterprises, civil society and the research community. This chapter includes a section about Sweden’s international contribution through the EU, UN and IFIs, highlighting its activism in these fora to strengthen and support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, as well as the contribution of its development assistance. This section further underscores Sweden’s commitment to multilateralism and taking an active leadership role, arguing that “Sweden has long pursued

47 In part this may be because SCB produced a thorough statistical report as part of the VNR preparation process (it has also since produced several statistical analyses for Sweden’s progress against applicable targets and indicators).

83 an active foreign policy” (66) and that support for the UN and multilateral organizations has “long been a cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy” (69). The VNR as a whole is rife with examples of Sweden’s activist leadership in multilateral organizations and initiatives such as its international climate support, the 2017 UN Ocean Conference, the Global Deal Initiative and its initiatives against antibiotic resistance. Sweden views multilateral cooperation as being “more important than ever in the modern era” (8).

The VNR also includes a brief summary of potential conflicts of objectives and interests “to be identified and managed” (72). This section aims to identify potential conflicts or synergies between different SDGs in a Swedish context. However, in the VNR itself, it provides only two examples of potential goal conflicts around “consumption and sustainable development” and “enterprise on difficult markets”. The former concerns the need to balance Swedish consumption patterns and emissions reductions, while the latter refers to the role of Swedish companies in countries with political, social or environmental conditions that contradict Sweden’s own ambitions concerning human rights, gender equality, environmental protection, labour standards and anti-corruption. This analysis is in keeping with Sweden’s commitment to policy coherence, as expressed through the PGU. In fact, this goal-conflict analysis in the VNR closely mirrors that of the PGU. Nevertheless, this section was at the time a unique feature of Sweden’s VNR, as few other countries had included analysis around policy coherence for the SDGs (Kindornay 2018) .

The Swedish government was initially reluctant to specialize in a particular goal or area given the interconnectedness of the agenda (Anonymous interview October 2019d). However, the VNR includes a dedicated chapter addressing “special themes” reflecting particular Swedish priorities within the agenda. These include: gender equality, women’s rights and feminist foreign policy; international climate support; the UN Ocean Conference 2017; the Global Deal initiative; innovation policy and special collaborative programmes; and initiatives against antibiotic resistance. As described earlier, these are all priorities that also permeate Sweden’s development cooperation policies. They are also areas or initiatives in which Sweden takes an active leadership role internationally. Similarly, in the eighth and final chapter, Sweden reaffirms its commitment to key principles including: partnerships, collaboration, human rights, inclusion and leading the transition to sustainable development. It also reiterates Sweden’s commitment to remaining active at the international level, through

84 the EU and the UN and also in the “international follow-up system established for the 2030 Agenda and the global goals” (86).

While it is mostly focused on Sweden’s domestic progress against the SDGs (a deliberate choice by the Swedish government given the universality of the agenda), the VNR also makes multiple references to Swedish development cooperation. For example, the goal by goal analysis includes examples of goal-relevant activities in Sweden’s development cooperation and there are also examples from specific projects in Tanzania, Mozambique and Cambodia, each of which highlight Sweden’s particular priorities, especially partnership with local organizations, private sector and multilateral organizations. These are also projects in which Sweden can demonstrate that it played a leadership role in bringing together diverse actors or in shedding light on key issues like SRHR or sustainable tax systems. Indeed, the references to Swedish development assistance further contribute to the exceptionalism and leadership narratives described above. For instance, the VNR points to the 2016 OECD Peer Review that “presents Sweden as a global leader in the area of development with a strong engagement for the 2030 Agenda” (13). There are also numerous references to the fact that Sweden was the first donor to achieve the 0.7% target and that it continues to spend 1% of GNI on ODA, reaffirming its status and reputation as possessing “a generous and ambitious development cooperation and humanitarian aid” (70).

These similar themes are also reflected in the HLPF presentation and delegation. At the 2017 HLPF, the Minister for Public Administration and the Swedish Ambassador for the 2030 Agenda led the HLPF delegation consisting of representatives from government, municipalities, trade unions, CSOs, parliamentarians, private sector and academia. The breadth of the delegation reflected the Swedish emphasis on partnerships and involving all sectors of society in SDG implementation (Anonymous interview October 2019d). As Bexell and Jönsson, (2018) argue, “the selection of participants to the official Swedish HLPF delegation had strong symbolic dimensions supporting identity formation” (10). Importantly, while the government encouraged delegation participants to share their experiences and lessons learned, there was also an expectation that participants would not take an overly critical tone against the government in their interventions and HLPF activities (Anonymous

85 Interview October 2019d). This limiting of criticism further speaks to the curated nature of this delegation.48

The HLPF presentation itself began with a short video “Welcome to the Future” featuring different generations of Swedes. The video begins with the older generation reflecting on Sweden’s impressive progress when it comes to poverty, food security, environment, gender equality and peace. The video then shifts to the future younger generation of the “world in 2030” which presents an image of a much more diverse Sweden, and one in which drinking from plastic bottles, food waste, the gender pay gap and unequal access to internet are unthinkable. In this way, the video touches on the theme of Swedish exceptionalism by highlighting its past progress and future ambitions.

The Minister for Public Administration, Ardalan Shekarabi, opened his speech by underscoring his pride “that several international analyses have concluded that Sweden has a favourable starting point” (Sweden 2017f). He further highlights the peaceful and democratic conditions in Sweden, its successful and inclusive welfare model and its long tradition of cooperation as advantages for achieving the SDGs. Further references to Swedish exceptionalism include noting its dynamic and innovative private sector, its strong climate laws, its approach to policy coherence and its aid generosity. As with the VNR document, Swedish leadership (specifically the activist leadership code) is another important theme of the speech, which argues that all countries “need to step up to implement the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement. For this we need leadership. Sweden has the ambition to be one of the leading countries in the implementation of the Agenda.” In this way, the speech links the 2030 Agenda to Sweden’s leadership narrative. The speech is also very clear about the specific character of Sweden’s leadership that involves “standing up for rights, sharing the burden, tackling challenges and working together in building innovative partnerships.”

While Sweden views the HLPF very much as a forum for learning and knowledge sharing, there is also an acknowledgment that the VNRs necessarily involve some element of self- promotion (Anonymous interview October 2019d). It is clear from the preceding discussion

48 Subsequent Swedish HLFP delegations continued with this tradition of broad representation while also keeping in mind the thematic areas under review and so the Swedish delegation to the HLPF is usually composed of a balance between business, civil society and thematic experts (Anonymous interview October 2019d). The government is also committed to ensuring that the HLPF is a year-long process and for each HLPF prepares thematic briefs in consultation with relevant stakeholder groups (Anonymous interview October 2019d).

86 and existing analysis of the Swedish VNR experience that the VNR and HLPF presentation serve to showcase and reinforce several elements of Sweden’s leadership narrative seen in several of the aid documents described earlier in this chapter, namely its commitment to leadership in multilateral fora and Swedish exceptionalism at home or in its foreign policy approaches. The VNR explicitly links Sweden’s SDG implementation, both at home and abroad, to its already well-cultivated identity and international reputation as an activist leader committed to partnerships and multilateral cooperation. It also justifies Sweden’s ambition to lead on SDG implementation by pointing to its internationally recognized and validated “favourable starting position.”

4.3.2 Sweden’s Reputational Aspirations

In order to explain Sweden’s response to the SDGs, it is important to understand its specific reputational aspirations. Firstly, the SDG leadership aspiration “is ascribed to the government rather than to the country as a whole,” with the government facing criticism from within parliament and from civil society about the delay in launching the national action plan and its lack of progress around particular goals such as sustainable consumption and production (Bexell and Jönsson 2018, 11; Swedish Delegation for the 2030 Agenda 2019). At the same time, there is strong support for the SDGs across political parties in Sweden (with the exception of the populist right-leaning Sweden Democrats) and in both the 2014 and 2018 elections, foreign policy and the SDGs were not prominent election issues.49 Moreover, the election manifestos of the major parties in both elections suggest that while there are some differences in approach to foreign policy (e.g. focus on the environment, NATO membership and policy priorities at the EU), most parties envision some form of international leadership role for Sweden, particularly in the aid domain.

One distinguishing feature of the Social-Democrat and Green coalition foreign policy approach was the fact that, compared to other parties, this coalition was more interested in both “UN policy overall and a more ambitious campaign to get Sweden elected to the Security Council” (Ekengren and Möller 2020, 64). For instance, the Social Democrat’s 2014 manifesto foreign policy pledges included strengthening the United Nations, a recommitment

49 Traditional election issues in Sweden include state regulations, size of the public sector, taxation levels, social welfare and increasingly, immigration (H. Oscarsson and Holmberg 2015).

87 to the country’s UNSC seat bid and greater activism in the EU around human and labour rights and democracy (The Local 2014b; Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti 2014). The Green party’s manifesto also included a commitment to safeguard the goal of one percent GNI allocated to development assistance and increase Sweden’s international advocacy around justice, peace and sustainable development (Miljöpartiet de gröna 2014). The Alliance parties’ 2014 manifesto (the incumbent government) was light on foreign policy commitments but did include similar international leadership commitments particularly around environmental issues, again demonstrating that international leadership ambitions cross party lines in a Swedish context (Alliansen 2014; The Local 2014a; H. E. Oscarsson and Polk 2014). In terms of the UN and multilateralism, while the other parties expressed support for Sweden’s UNSC candidature, they were more critical of the strong UN focus in Swedish foreign policy and spending on the campaign (Ekengren and Möller 2020). This objection to the UN focus, however, was not rooted in skepticism about multilateralism as a principle, but rather reflected a belief that Sweden should focus its multilateral efforts on the EU. As such, a commitment to multilateralism also appears across party lines (Ibid.).

In terms of the 2018 election, both the Social Democrat’s and Green Party’s (the main parties of the governing coalition) 2018 manifestos were the only ones to make reference to leadership on the SDGs and Agenda 2030, as well as maintaining the 1% aid target (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti 2018). Yet, at the level of public discourse, the SDGs and foreign aid were not an election issue. Rather, issues of immigration and integration featured more prominently in the 2018 election discourse (Aylott and Bolin 2019). Thus, this government’s SDG leadership role aspiration had less to do with domestic electoral politics and more with the government’s ambition in terms of international politics.

Indeed, international leadership ambitions are not unique to this particular governing coalition, given a long-standing effort by Swedish governments to cultivate a national brand as a progressive “moral superpower” (Dahl 2006). As argued by Jezierska and Towns (2018, 58), “the notion of Sweden as a ‘moral superpower’ has been a consistent feature in official representations, a feature often accompanied by policies to actively assist imitation by others.” This ambition to be a “moral superpower” has a long legacy in Swedish foreign policy dating back to the 1960s when “Sweden’s foreign policy became more active and the government emphasized the role that neutral states could play internationally in building bridges, mediating and acting as a critic” (Nilsson and Zetterlund 2016, 765; Nilson 1991).

88 Another core feature of this “moral superpower” narrative that emerged during the Cold War included solidarity with developing countries (Dahl 2006; Browning 2007). As Browning (2007, 34) argues, “solidarity with the Third World was perhaps most important to Sweden, where it became a highly idealistic element of the country’s foreign policy.” A commitment to providing high levels of development assistance was an important expression of this solidarity, with the country being the first to meet the UN’s 0.7% aid target in 1974.

Since the end of the Cold War, as Dahl (2006) documents, certain elements of Sweden’s “moral superpower” ambition have altered, namely in the greater “Europeanization” of Swedish foreign policy,50 a shift in geographic focus to the Baltic region and a greater emphasis on human rights. Some features, however, have remained consistent. In particular, the activist nature of its foreign policy and the centrality of the UN and other multilateral for a. As argued by Björkdahl (2013, 326), “Sweden is the archetype of a small state acting as a norm entrepreneur using ideas and norms to gain an influence in international affairs,” with multilateral setting being an important avenue for these norm promoting activities. Sweden has been the source of many substantive policy initiatives internationally (Lawler 1997), including on conflict prevention (Björkdahl 2013), sustainable development (Ingebritsen 2002) and more recently gender equality (Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamond 2016).

This activist internationalism also applies to its leadership within donor circles. As argued by Lumsdaine (1993, 66), Sweden “consciously see[s its] role in the aid process as one of seeking to set higher standards, to reform and correct the aid process by example.” This donor leadership identity conception is one that is still strongly in place, as evidenced by Sweden’s willingness to stand up for democracy and human rights even in situations where other donors may not be doing so (Anonymous interview October 2019a). Indeed, as consistently referenced in Sweden’s aid documents and policies, it is more ambitious than other donors and international agendas like the SDGs when it comes to this particular issue area. Other areas in which Sweden’s has played a normative entrepreneurial role in the development space, often in cooperation with other Nordic countries or “like-minded” donors, include influencing donor policy in the EU and in more specific areas such as gender equality (Elgstrom 2017) and policy coherence (Elgström and Delputte 2016). Innovativeness is also another important element of Sweden’s brand as a donor, whether it be

50 Sweden joined the European Union in 1995.

89 in its ways of working (e.g. using guarantees51) or the types of projects it undertakes (e.g. working with social entrepreneurs) (Anonymous interview October 2019a-b). In this way, Sweden’s ambition to be a leader among donors is not only in terms of its overall aid generosity, but also in terms of substantive policy areas and practices that it pursues in its own work.

Having a positive reputation as a donor yields strategic benefits internationally, as seen by Sweden’s successful UNSC bid in 2016.52 Sweden’s UNSC campaign emphasized it’s positive international reputation and touted its contributions as one of the largest donors to the UN system and a donor that “delivers on global commitments: 1 per cent of GNI in official development assistance, ambitious climate change action, a generous asylum policy, and engagement in disarmament” (Sweden 2015c, npg). Amid discussions during the 2015 refugee crisis of potentially slashing its aid budget, the Swedish foreign minister allegedly warned that Sweden would have to end their UNSC campaign if these cuts were to take place given the damage it would do to Sweden’s reputation (Jacobsen 2015). In this way, Sweden’s aid was an important “trump card” in their UNSC bid (ibid.).

The SDGs (and Sweden’s SDG leadership narrative), on the other hand, were less prominent in Sweden’s UNSC campaign materials, compared to its aid generosity, credibility in development issues and long history of multilateral engagement (Wallström 2015). In part, this may be attributed to the fact that the campaign began prior to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, rather than to the SDGs’ lack of perceived utility in furthering Sweden’s bid (Ekengren and Möller 2020). Indeed, the SDGs later became one of Sweden’s priorities in the UN (Sweden 2018g).

Importantly, maintaining a reputation for being a progressive and multilateral leader is not only motivated by a desire to achieve particular strategic foreign policy benefits or clout but is also rooted in Swedish norms and values around welfare, solidarity, inclusiveness and social democracy (Bergman 2007). More recently, sustainability and feminism are also values pursued through Swedish foreign policy, with the launch of the feminist foreign policy

51 Sida Guarantees are similar to an insurance policy that involves promises to provide “financial compensation in the instance of an event that results in harm or loss” (Sida 2017, 1). Effectively, it allows Sida to share risk with financial institutions in developing countries by offering to cover a portion of a potential loss. Sida guarantees represent a novel financial instrument leveraged by Sida to “unlock financing and investments” as financial institutions would be more likely to lend to farmers or entrepreneurs in developing countries. 52 Sweden served as a non-permanent member of the UNSC from 2017-2018.

90 and sustainable development being one of Sweden’s priorities at the UN (Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamond 2016). However, these are idealized expressions of Swedish values. Domestically, in Sweden, there is increasing debate about its immigration and integration policies, as well as the rising influence of the populist Sweden Democrats party, both of which belie some of these idealized values around solidarity and inclusiveness. In its foreign policy, however, these idealized expressions of Swedish values remain.

Nevertheless, Sweden’s contemporary reputational aspirations are most evident in its nation branding activities. Sweden has a very clearly elaborated national branding strategy with the vision that “in a world with major challenges, Sweden’s free and open society functions as a hub for innovation and co-creation” (Sweden 2017b, 5; 2017d). The strategy emphasizes four core values: innovation, openness, caring and authenticity. In addition to these four core values, Sweden focuses on four “profile areas”: innovation, creativity, society and sustainability. The core values and profile areas both represent objectives of the branding strategy, they are “what [Sweden] want others to think and feel when they encounter Sweden and Swedish representatives” (7). Like the preceding analysis of Sweden’s VNR, this brand strategy is also rife with examples of the “Swedish exceptionalism” code, emphasizing features such as Sweden’s social model, its welfare state, innovativeness, creativity and sustainability. More importantly, however, the nation branding is explicit in its link to reputation arguing that “a strong image of Sweden abroad is important for achieving political objectives, promoting trade, attracting investment, tourists and talent, and encouraging cultural and scientific exchange” (2).

While the SDGs do not appear in the branding strategy, they are included in Sweden’s broader branding materials. For instance, the brand Sweden website “Sharing Sweden,” includes a brochure about Sweden’s contribution to the SDGs. The brochure “Accepting the challenge – Sweden and the 2030 Agenda” provides a summary of Sweden’s progress on and international contribution to each of the SDGs (Sweden 2018a). Narratively, it uses the SDGs and Sweden’s international contribution to further promote Sweden’s global leadership ambition. For instance, it highlights Sweden’s high rankings on a range of indices including the UN Sustainable Development Goals Index, and that Sweden has:

always taken a huge interest in international cooperation, actively concerned itself with global issues and displayed a strong curiosity about the outside world. If Sweden

91 were to brag, it would probably be about global partnerships. [Sweden] stands firmly behind financial support to developing countries, the transfer of environmentally friendly technologies globally and the promotion of trade and increased macroeconomic stability (24).

Importantly, the brochure is part of a toolkit, comprising this booklet, exhibition material and other promotional material, about the 2030 Agenda aiming to “encourage, inspire discussions, inspire and raise awareness.” Sweden designed this toolkit to be used by Swedish officials and embassies working with particular target groups around the world (e.g. policymakers, youth organizations, representatives of NGOs, journalists, schools and teachers) to promote Sweden’s work on the SDGs. These promotional efforts are another expression of Sweden’s international leadership style, involving leading through example and encouraging imitation (Jezierska and Towns 2018).

Indeed, what is evident from the preceding discussion about Sweden’s international leadership aspirations is that it aspires to be both an activist and an “influencer”. The former involves active diplomacy to achieve particular goals, while the latter relies more on leading by encouraging imitation. To undertake an influencer-style mode of international leadership, the influencer in question needs to have policies, practices or characteristics in place for others to emulate. For example, much of the discourse described earlier around Sweden’s favourable starting position and its exceptionalism affirm Sweden’s authority and expertise, justifying its ability and even its obligation to influence other states to emulate it. Importantly these two modes of leadership are inherently related, with “influencer” leadership lending further legitimacy to Sweden’s activism mode of international leadership.

These dual modes of leadership also characterize Sweden’s leadership approach to the SDGs. Very early in the implementation period of the SDGs, the Swedish government declared its intention to be an SDG “champion state” (Bexell and Jönsson 2018). More specifically this SDG leadership narrative focuses both on raising the profile (activism) of the SDGs in multilateral settings and on illustrating what is possible when it comes to the implementation of the SDGs (“influencing”). As one interviewee stressed, it is less important that Sweden be a leader in and of itself, but that it was more important that it lead by example, that Sweden shows what is possible and inspire others (Anonymous interview October 2019d).

92 Sweden’s leadership aspirations are also internationalist in nature, placing a strong emphasis on multilateralism. As previously outlined, this commitment to multilateralism remains an important feature of Swedish policy and communications. Sweden views multilateralism as essential given current global challenges (Sweden 2017c).53 Another expression of Sweden’s commitment to multilateralism in terms of its development assistance specifically is the relatively high share of its aid through multilaterals, compared to its donor peers (OECD 2019b). Given that the SDGs represent a significant multilateral initiative and also codify many of Sweden’s more specific thematic priorities around sustainability, gender equality, innovation and partnerships, it is unsurprising that the Swedish government has also sought a leadership role in the SDGs.

Making claims to SDG leadership and implementing the goals in practice, then, enables the Swedish government to maintain the country’s international reputation as an activist leader in multilateral setting. Maintaining such a reputation has tangible benefits for Sweden internationally. As its nation branding strategy makes clear, building a strong international reputation and national brand has economic and strategic benefits for the country. As mentioned previously, the strategy explicitly states its aim to promote trade, increase investment, attract tourists and talent and promote cultural exchange (Sweden 2017d). In terms of more strategic benefits, a good reputation can lead to leadership positions in multilateral fora, such as a UNSC seat. For instance, at the most recent HLPF Sweden was approached by the UN Secretary General to lead the drafting of SDG declaration (Anonymous interview October 2019a).

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that Sweden is highly policy and practice responsive to the SDGs in terms of its approach to foreign aid, suggesting a high political commitment to the goals. On the international stage of the HLPF and within its donor policy and SDG related documents, Sweden showed and told a story about its identity as an exceptional, activist, multilateral internationalist and progressive donor. In declaring its ambition to be a leader in SDG implementation, Sweden clearly linked the SDGs with its long-standing aspiration to be a global leader. This embedding of the SDGs in Sweden’s leadership narrative is also evident

53 While multilateralism remains an important part of Sweden’s foreign policy ambitions, it is relying less on groups such as Nordic+, in part due to the changing aid practices and narratives of members like Denmark (Anonymous interview October 2019a).

93 in the way in which it uses its performance and commitments around the SDGs to communicate and justify its leadership ambitions.

Sweden’s claims of international leadership in multilateral settings is a long-standing feature of its foreign policy and even across different Swedish political parties. This multilateral leadership ambition is linked to strategic ambitions (e.g. leadership roles in multilateral institutions) and idealized expressions of domestic Swedish values around solidarity, welfare, peace and social democracy, as well as a domestic expectation that Sweden take on leadership roles internationally. The chapter suggests that the SDGs, as the latest high-profile multilateral initiative and one that codified many of the government’s other policy priorities, were useful to the Swedish government’s efforts to maintain the country’s reputation as an active leader in multilateral fora.

This chapter also suggests that Sweden’s global leadership aspirations take two forms, including leadership through activism and leadership through “influencing”. Both of these modes of leadership also characterize its approaches in the donor space and have influenced its approach to the SDGs. The fact that Sweden’s leadership rests on the idea of leading by example (“influencing”) raised the stakes of SDG implementation in the country both domestically and in terms of its development assistance. In order to encourage emulation and imitation, an influencer state like Sweden needs to ensure that it has something to emulate— be it in the form of aid policies or aid practices. That Sweden has gone beyond rhetorical nods to the SDGs in aid documents can be attributed to this fact that one component of Sweden’s leadership aspirations is to lead by example through concrete SDG implementation, including in its aid policy and practices.

Concerning the impact of this show and tell dynamic on goal-attaining behaviour in Swedish aid, there is some evidence of institutionalisation, as Sida is increasingly integrating the SDGs in its statistical reporting system and in other corporate procedures (e.g. communications and strategies) and the prioritisation of the SDGs appears to have continued even following the 2018 election (as demonstrated by the maintenance of key roles like the SDG ambassador and appointing of new SDG-related positions). However, given that the SDG leadership role is, domestically, closely associated with a particular government this may mean that Sweden’s SDG leadership ambitions may change if a new governing coalition is elected. At the same time, however, there is a domestic expectation that Sweden take on leadership roles internationally that appears to be consistent across political parties and

94 among Swedes. As argued by Nilsson and Zetterlund (2016, 765), “that Sweden would contribute to international order has been broadly accepted among Swedes and, to some extent, even expected.” Thus, Sweden’s leadership ambitions in the context of the SDGs is likely to be protected by this tradition and domestic expectation of multilateral leadership. In sum, Sweden’s high responsiveness can be attributed to the linkage of SDG implementation with its exceptional donor leader identity narratives. The linking of the SDGs to these identity narratives are in turn linked to its reputational aspirations for international leadership in multilateral fora.

95 Canada

“The Sustainable Development Goals are as meaningful in Canada as they are everywhere else in the world, and we are committed to implementing them at home while we work with our international partners to achieve them around the world”

-Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Address to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Canada 2017a)

5.1 Introduction

2015 marked an important year, not only for the adoption of the SDGs, but also for Canadian politics with the election of the Trudeau Liberals. Following his electoral victory, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau famously declared that “on behalf of 35 million Canadians: we’re back,” signalling an intention to return to a compassionate and engaged Canada (The Canadian Press 2015). This was a refrain oft repeated even in international fora such as the Paris Conference of the Parties (COP) for the Framework Convention on Climate Change, where Trudeau also pledged that Canada would take on a “new leadership role internationally” (Canada 2015b). This pledge and ambition have shaped the content and character of the Liberal government’s foreign policy, including its development assistance.

This chapter surveys Canada’s responsiveness to the SDGs in terms of foreign aid policy and practice. It finds that while Canada has clearly framed itself as a leader in SDG 5 (Gender Equality), the SDGs are unevenly integrated in policy documents. The SDGs have had less of an impact on aid practices. Overall, the chapter suggests that Canada is moderately responsive. The second section explains these trends, situating them in the context of the Liberal government’s reputational and domestic electoral aspirations. It outlines how the SDGs contribute to the construction of a humble feminist Canadian leadership narrative that, in turn, is rooted in Liberal perceptions of Canadian identity.

96 5.2 Canada’s SDG Responsiveness

Figure 9 provides a timeline of key events post-2015 in Canada September 2015 – UN adopts Agenda 2030 and SDGs October 2015 – Trudeau Liberals win Federal election May- July 2016 - Launch of International Assistance Review consultations June 2017- Launch of the Feminist International Assistance Policy September 2017- Trudeau Speech at UNGA Fall 2017- OAG conducts SDG Audit, GAC begins VNR process February 2018- Funds for SDG Unit and activities allocated in Budget 2018 April 2018- OAG presents publishes SDG Audit April- May 2018- VNR consultations undertaken May 2018 - SDG hub launched at STATSCAN July 2018- Canada presents its first VNR at HLPF 2018 September 2018- Establishment of SDG Unit in ESDC June 2019- Interim national SDG strategy released Figure 9 Canada SDG Timeline

5.2.1 SDG Governance in Canada

There was initially some debate about where the responsibility for SDG implementation would lie within the federal government. The government explored several options in federal departments including: Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) and even Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs (CERNAC) (Anonymous interview June 2019a). Rather than identifying one department, in 2016, the Privy Council Office (PCO) named five departments to lead on SDG implementation: GAC, Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC), ECCC, CERNAC and Status of Women Canada. It also tasked Statistics Canada with the development of a Canadian Indicator framework and the collection of Canada’s SDG data for global reporting. These five departments began to work with PCO to develop a national strategy. However, an Office of the Auditor General (OAG) audit conducted in the fall of 2017 found that this arrangement did not constitute a coherent “federal governance structure based on clearly articulated departmental roles and responsibilities” (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2018).

In Budget 2018, the government allocated $49.4 million over 13 years to establish a “robust Sustainable Development Goals unit” to coordinate Canadian efforts in order to advance the SDGs both internationally and domestically and fund monitoring and reporting activities by Statistics Canada (Canada 2018, 165). The government appointed the Minister of Children, Families and Social Development as the primary responsible minister for SDG

97 implementation, placing the SDG Unit under ESDC.54 The government also identified six other ministers and their departments to support the SDG Unit: the Minister of International Development and La Francophonie; the Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs; the Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development; the Minister of Indigenous Services; the Minister of Environment and Climate Change; the Minister of Status of Women; and the Minister of Employment, Workforce Development and Labour (Canada 2018a).55

In addition to the SDG unit, there are also informal working groups comprised of the relevant ministries for SDG implementation that meet regularly at director general, deputy minister and ministerial level (Anonymous interview June 2019a). These working groups were created in early 2019 to coordinate SDG implementation efforts and the creation of a national implementation strategy (ibid.). The interim national strategy was released in June 2019 (Canada 2019a). This provisional strategy proposes to establish other multi-stakeholder SDG governance institutions, including a representative external advisory committee and an SDG forum. However, it is yet to be seen if these will be implemented following the publication of the final national strategy (ibid.).56 STATSCAN has also developed a Canadian Indicator Framework to measure Canada’s progress towards the SDGs (Ibid.).

GAC and the Minister of International Development are responsible for leading on Canada’s international contribution to the SDGs. Within GAC itself, there are few formal structures in place charged with SDG implementation. As of 2019, there is one deputy-director within the development policy branch responsible for Agenda 2030. Thematic specialists are also responsible for the specific SDGs relevant to their specialization (e.g. nutrition specialists have responsibility for SDG 2, gender equality specialists SDG 5) (Anonymous interviews June 2019b-c). Furthermore, while the 2018 budget did have a section dedicated to SDG implementation, Canada’s ODA budget is not specific to or designed around the SDGs.

Nevertheless, in Canada, the responsibility for overall SDG implementation lies with a domestic facing government agency. The decision to place the responsibility for SDG

54 This role in leading SDG implementation was re-affirmed in the most 2019 mandate letter for the new Minister for Children, Families and Social Development (Canada 2019d). 55 Following the 2019 election, some ministerial portfolios shifted and the new mandate letters (with the exception of the one described in the previous footnote and the mandate letter of the Minister of International Development) do not make clear their role in SDG implementation domestically or internationally. 56 The interim document does not really address Canada’s international contribution to the SDGs. In part, this is attributed to the fact that FIAP is Canada’s international SDG strategy (Anonymous interviews June 2019a-c).

98 implementation under a domestic agency also demonstrates the extent to which Canada has embraced the universality of the SDGs. As the quote at the beginning of the chapter and, in fact, the rest of Trudeau’s address to the UNGA, illustrate this narrative of Canadian humility and honesty about the problems it faces domestically. In this address, Trudeau emphasizes that “[Canadians] face many of the same challenges you do. Canada remains a work in progress” (Canada 2017a). As will be discussed, this narrative plays into the international brand the Trudeau government seeks to cultivate. The choice of responsible ministers and departments also signals Canada’s priorities within the 2030 Agenda, including issues such as indigenous reconciliation, gender equality and climate change.

5.2.2 Policy Responsiveness

In 2016, Canada conducted a broad-based international assistance review (IAR). This was an almost unprecedented consultation process with participation from 15,000 people in 65 countries (Global Affairs Canada 2017c). Following these substantial consultations, GAC launched the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) in June 2017. The majority of this section on policy responsiveness focuses on FIAP, as multiple government interview respondents described FIAP as Canada’s SDG implementation policy in the context of development assistance (Anonymous interviews June 2019b-c). This section thus attempts to address to questions specific to FIAP: 1) is the FIAP an SDG policy? and 2) did the adoption of the SDGs influence the content of FIAP? It also identifies the ways in which the Canadian government uses the SDG to signal its international leadership ambitions.

The stated aim of FIAP is to “eradicate poverty and build a more peaceful, more inclusive and more prosperous world” (Global Affairs Canada 2017c). The FIAP is organized around 6 core action areas: 1) Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girl; 2) Human Dignity; 3) Growth that Works for Everyone; 4) Environment and Climate Action; 5) Inclusive Governance; and 6) Peace and Security. In terms of explicit SDG content, there is a short section at the start of the policy entitled “Sustainable development goals: a global action plan” that essentially outlines the aim of the 2030 Agenda “to eradicate poverty and build peace around the world” (Global Affairs Canada 2017c). The emphasis on the poverty and peace dimensions of the agenda are interesting and arguably reflect the core elements of development Minister Bibeau’s initial mandate letter in 2015 that tasked her with refocusing Canadian aid on the “poorest and most vulnerable” and supporting fragile states (Canada

99 2015a). This section also explicitly elaborates Canada’s specialization within the Agenda 2030:

Sustainable Development Goal 5- achieving gender equality and empowering women and girls -is at the heart of Canada’s approach to implementing the 2030 Agenda because it will drive progress towards achieving the other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). We believe that the best way to eradicate poverty and leave no one behind is through a feminist international assistance policy. We are committed to helping achieve the SDGs in Canada and in developing countries.

Here the government has explicitly identified SDG 5 as its primary priority and as an effective lever to implement the rest of the 2030 Agenda. While the policy and government officials will reference other SDG priorities for Canada’s development assistance (e.g., SDG 2-4, SDG 16 etc.), this almost singular focus on a single SDG is unique to the Canadian case. As will be discussed in subsequent sections, this specialization was a deliberate decision linked to Canada’s particular circumstances as a donor and the reputational aspirations of the Liberal government. Furthermore, an argument about effectiveness is also embedded within this framing, namely that focusing on gender equality is the “best” way to implement the Agenda, in keeping with ongoing donor overtures to aid effectiveness and playing to the narrative of Canada as a responsible donor. In this way, Canada’s focus on SDG 5 is not only framed as the “right” thing to do but also the most “effective”.

In the rest of the document, the SDGs are referenced 9 times, while the 2030 Agenda is referenced 7 (as a comparison, feminism/t is used almost 40 times in the document). Specific SDGs are also peppered in each of the Action Areas. More specifically the policy references SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-being), SDG 4 (Quality Education), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), SDG 13 (Climate Action), SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong institutions).57

In the FIAP, SDG language is used to frame priorities. For instance, under the human dignity action area the FIAP specifically elaborates how Canada will explicitly achieve SDG 4 (Quality Education) (Canada 2017). However, the use of SDGs as framing devices is inconsistent. For example, under the Environment and Climate action area, the only

57 Notably absent from the policy (with the exception of SDG 8) are the SDGs that reflect the industrialization agenda of developing countries (e.g. SDG 6-11). Thus, like many donors Canada is focusing on the traditional bread and butter of development assistance.

100 environment relevant SDG mentioned is SDG 13, with the other environment or water- related SDGs (6, 12, 14 and 15) absent. However, the section references several themes that are reflected in these other SDGs. For instance, the section discusses the importance of ensuring sustainable access to clean water, adequate sanitation and hygiene - all of which would neatly fall under SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation) (ibid.). References to SDG 1 are similarly absent despite numerous references to poverty eradication.

Not only are the references inconsistent but also reflect a narrow interpretation of the SDGs. For example, the section on environment is largely concerned with women’s particular vulnerability to climate change and their involvement in climate change mitigation and adaptation. Similarly, the reference to SDG 8 is mainly linked to Women’s economic empowerment rather than increasing access to decent work for all marginalized populations. Thus, while these actions and commitments are linked to specific SDGs, the narrative in FIAP is a very narrow interpretation of those SDGs. The inconsistent usage of SDG language and narrow interpretations of individual SDGs reflects the government’s desire to specialize and focus development assistance priorities. GAC interview respondents confirmed this choice to specialize, while stressing that through specialization in SDG 5 and focusing on gender equality, Canada will also contribute to all of the other SDGs (Anonymous interviews June 2019b-c).

In June 2019, GAC released more specific and elaborated policies around the six FIAP Action Areas, as well as FIAP “guidance notes.”58 SDG language is even less integrated in these action area policies than in the FIAP. All of the policies reference the SDGs in the form of a text box with the following language: “Canada is committed to helping achieve the Sustainable Development Goals in Canada and in developing countries. SDG 5… is at the heart of Canada’s approach to implementing the 2030 Agenda because it will drive progress toward achieving the other SDGs” (Global Affairs Canada 2017b, npg). Some of the policies, such as that concerning growth and peace make perfunctory references to the SDGs in their introductory sections. For instance, in the growth policy it is argued that the SDGs will not be met without “private-sector expertise” (ibid.)

58 These policies are: Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girls; Human Dignity (including health and nutrition, education and a feminist approach to gender equality in humanitarian action); Growth that Works for Everyone; Environment and Climate Action; Inclusive Governance and Peace and Security. The guidance notes more specifically concern innovative financing, innovation in international assistance, transparency and openness and a feminist approach to innovation and effectiveness

101 As with FIAP, the content of each of these policies is clearly implicitly aligned with the relevant SDGs, even at the target level. For example, Canada’s committed actions to improve gender-sensitive nutrition clearly contribute to the achievement of several targets under SDG 2. More specifically, the commitment to support increased participation of women and girls in household decision making about nutrition and diet issues and to explore new financing models and mechanisms to overcome challenging nutrition issues contributes to SDG Targets 2A and 2.3. Nevertheless, the policy does not make reference to these targets and more generally, explicit SDG language is not consistently used as a framing device or for other purposes in these supplementary policies.

SDG language is more prevalent in the guidance notes. For example, the note on innovative financing cites the estimated USD $2.5 trillion annually needed to meet the SDGs (Global Affairs Canada 2019d). When framing Canada’s role in innovative financing, it notes that there are “significant opportunities for Canada to develop solutions that help achieve the SDGs and close the SDG financing gap, including expanding its collaboration with private capital and investors” (Global Affairs Canada 2019d, npg). In this same section, Canada commits to “demonstrate that investing in support of the SDGs can yield both development and financial returns” and identifies the mobilization of “new resources and innovation for the SDGs” as one of GAC’s operational pathways in this area (Ibid.). It is unsurprising that this note makes most reference to the SDGs, compared to the other guidance notes, as it highlights Canada’s co-chairship of the UN Group of Friends of SDG Financing and other leadership actions Canada has taken through fora such as the G7. Similarly, the note on transparency emphasizes Canada’s role as “a leader on feminist open government in support of the 2030 Agenda” and commits to ensuring transparency in tracking progress towards the 2030 Agenda (Global Affairs Canada 2019e). It also identifies the VNR process as a tool to “secure feedback in policy design” (npg). In this way, GAC uses SDGs in these guidance notes to frame Canada’s role, leadership and commitments.

To return to the questions at the outset of this section, FIAP and its associated Action Area policies are SDG policies in that there is nothing in them that explicitly contradicts the goals or the principles of the 2030 Agenda. Furthermore, government respondents specifically described FIAP as an SDG policy. At the same time, the references to 2030 Agenda and SDG language are inconsistent and largely used as framing devices for Canada’s particular priorities and commitments. A more specific SDG strategy might, for example, link the

102 proposed actions or commitments more explicitly to particular goals or targets. Alternatively, it might also include greater analysis around SDG principles such as LNOB, include a section on policy coherence or outline synergies/trade-offs between the goals. Instead, Canada’s development policies in the post-2015 period have taken a feminist focus (Tiessen 2019; Brown 2018a; OECD 2018c).

The decision to focus on these particular areas and feminism are largely the result of internal government decision-making and the results of the IAR (Chapnick 2019, anonymous interviews June 2019b-c). Implementing a feminist development assistance policy was not part of Minister Bibeau’s initial mandate letter (although there are references to championing women’s rights and closing gaps in reproductive rights and health care), while “supporting the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” was one of the identified priorities (Chapnick 2019; Canada 2015a). Furthermore, one of the stated aims of the IAR was to “help shape Canada’s approach to implementing the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development” (Global Affairs Canada 2017d).

However, in the early months of the Trudeau government feminism became increasingly part of the Liberal brand both in terms of public statements, op-eds penned by the prime minister and, of course, the appointment of a gender-balanced cabinet. Indeed, as suggested by Senator Peter Boehm, former Deputy Minister for International Development during the development of FIAP, “the Prime Minister is a very committed feminist who chose as his international development minister Marie-Claude Bibeau who had worked in Africa, who had worked with CIDA, a very strong feminist who really wanted to focus the policy on women and girls. So if you have that sort of activism demonstrated by the leader of the country and the minister in charge- well, its clear the bureaucracy has to follow” (Interview Senator Boehm, Ottawa).

The guiding document for the international assistance review gave one of the first concrete indications that feminism would be a key priority for Canada’s development assistance (Global Affairs Canada 2016). This document also laid out the core guiding questions for the IAR. The 2030 Agenda and the SDGs do feature quite prominently in the guiding questions and context. Of the 26 questions, 5 specifically referred to Agenda 2030 and the SDGs. SDG

103 language also framed or contextualized all of the core proposed priorities.59 For example, the document highlighted one of the goals of the Agenda to end discrimination and invest in children (ibid.). It also noted that the Agenda links economic, social and environmental action, as well as issues of peace, governance, pluralism, diversity and human rights (ibid.). The document also acknowledged the threat to development gains for the 2030 Agenda posed by humanitarian crises (ibid.).

To some extent, then, the SDGs did influence the development of FIAP, as GAC used the Agenda 2030 as a framing device to guide the IAR process. Furthermore, government respondents emphasised that there was no question that Agenda 2030 and the SDGs would play an important framing in Canada’s development assistance policy, particularly since most of the submissions to the IAR were steeped in SDG language (Anonymous interviews 2019 b-c).60 Yet, the final content of the FIAP focused less on the Agenda and the SDGs than the guiding questions and framing of the IAR guidance note would suggest. The summary of FIAP in Canada’s 2018 VNR also acknowledges that FIAP is not only an SDG policy, rather it also “embodies Canada’s commitments to international frameworks such as the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on development financing” (Canada 2018a, 24).

In sum, Canada is moderately responsive to the SDGs at the level of policy. More specifically, Canada’s primary policy response to the SDGs is one of specialization in SDG 5. Indeed, Canada uses the SDGs in its development related policies, as well as communications from the Minister for International Development and the Prime Minister, to signal its aspiration to be and identity as a feminist leader (the “feminist” code in Appendix D). In this way, the SDGs have to a certain extent become embedded within Canada’s donor leadership narrative.

5.2.3 Practice Responsiveness

This section assesses the extent to which Canada is responsive to the SDGs in terms of its aid practices including in its statistical system, projects and corporate processes.

59 The priorities were: health and rights of women and children, clean economic growth and climate change, governance, pluralism, diversity and human rights, peace and security, and responding to humanitarian crises and the needs of displaced populations. 60 However, civil society respondents felt they had greater influence on the FIAP’s approach to specific issue areas, for instance greater support for women’s orgs and the focus on sexual and reproductive health and rights, rather than SDG principles.

104 The SDGs, at the goal level, are partially integrated in GAC’s monitoring and evaluation practices around the FIAP and its action areas. More specifically, “[GAC] results frameworks will incorporate results and indicators aligned with the Action Area policies and, where appropriate, the SDGs in order to concretely demonstrate progress against the theory of change outlined in the FIAP” (emphasis added) (Global Affairs Canada 2017a). GAC developed four sets of indicators to measure progress against each of the FIAP action areas, track global gender equality trends, monitor Canada’s gender equality advocacy efforts and progress on gender equality within GAC (Global Affairs Canada 2019c).61 The description of the “Global Indicators” outlines that they are designed to measure progress on the SDGs (ibid.). The global indicators for gender equality, health and nutrition and education match, for the most part, their SDG counterparts. The global indicators for growth, environment, inclusive governance and peace and security, on the other hand, are distinct. For instance, Canada will measure financial inclusion by the proportion of adults (m/f) with an account at a bank or another type of financial institution or mobile money provider, while it will measure progress on the environment through country rankings on the Environmental Performance Index (ibid.).

Some of the global indicators have been adapted from their SDG counterparts. For instance, Canada has committed to reporting on SDG 3.7.1 - Proportion of women of reproductive age (aged 15-49 years) who have their need for family planning satisfied with modern methods but with the added qualification of women who are married or in a union. Similarly, under SDG indicator 4.C.1- Proportion of teachers in: (a) pre-primary; (b) primary; (c) lower secondary; and (d) upper secondary education who have received at least the minimum organized teacher training (e.g. pedagogical training) pre-service or in-service required for teaching at the relevant level in a given country - Canada has chosen to focus solely on primary school teachers.

The reinterpretation of SDG indicators and the choice to source some of the global indicators from other global indices and organizations clearly reflects Canadian priorities for its development assistance. For instance, under the peace and security theme, it proposes to report on the number of women uniformed members working in UN peacekeeping operations— an indicator it has linked to SDG 16 and that is also aligned to Canada’s much

61 Importantly, no OECD-DAC bilateral donor is currently using the SDG targets and indicators as their primary results/monitoring framework. The DAC is developing a voluntary “SDG Focus field” to complement existing DAC-reporting requirements (Benn et al. 2018).

105 publicized commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda (ibid.). Thus, these global indicators (and the data that will be collected on them) represent another avenue through which Canada is able to communicate its particular development assistance priorities. This communication, however, is still done under the framework of the SDGs, as even the unique indicators are linked to relevant SDGs.

Rather than drawing on specific indicators from the SDGs, GAC’s other global indicators are linked to relevant SDGs at the goal level. For instance:

• Number of women and girls provided with access to sexual and reproductive health services, including modern methods of contraception, through GAC funded projects (linked to SDG 3) • Number of people (m/f) receiving micronutrient supplementation, including iron and folic acid, through GAC programming (linked to SDG 2) • Number of people benefitting from gender-sensitive health and nutrition services through GAC projects (linked to SDG 2). (Global Affairs Canada 2019c)

Engineers without Borders conducted a detailed mapping exercise of the FIAP Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) against the relevant SDGs and found that SDG 5 and SDG 16 were the most referenced SDGs, followed by those related to education, health and climate change (EWB-CIDP 2019). Of the 17 SDGs only 10 have been linked or implicated by the FIAP KPIs.62 The fact that all the SDGs do not feature in the KPIs further illustrates the specialization dynamics described earlier.

The 2017-2018 Official Development Assistance Accountability Act (ODAAA) report, dedicates a section to Canada’s implementation of the 2030 Agenda (Global Affairs Canada 2018). This section reports on both Canada’s international contribution to the Agenda and its domestic implementation (ibid.). The references to Canada’s international contribution reaffirm Canada’s commitment to SDG 5 and outline Canada’s reporting to the HLPF. In terms of domestic action, it outlines the creation of the SDG Unit and the activities of Statistics Canada. The rest of the report is organized around the FIAP Action Areas but the SDGs are once again used as a framing device for particular issue areas.

62 The full KPIs can be found at https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development- enjeux_developpement/priorities-priorites/fiap_indicators-indicateurs_paif.aspx?lang=eng

106 In terms of other corporate processes, some project documents and/or memos to the minister for project approval normally indicate to which SDG they contribute (Anonymous interview June 2019b-c). Alignment with the SDGs is also one of the assessment criteria for project proposals from civil society partners. However, civil society respondents indicate that requirements vis a vis the SDGs are inconsistent or ad hoc and that there are far more stringent requirements with regards to a project’s contribution or impact on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls (Interviews with Inter Pares, UNICEF, World Vision, CCIC 2019). Indeed, Calls for (project) Proposals from GAC do not mention Agenda 2030 or the SDGs, as evidenced by a survey of past calls from 2015-2019 (Global Affairs Canada 2020a). The 2030 Agenda is also briefly mentioned in GAC’s Departmental Plan (2020-2021), although there is no reference to specific SDGs (Global Affairs Canada 2020b).

There are no specific projects around the SDG process and there are few formal positions associated with the SDGs, although there is one deputy director responsible for development policy planning who works on SDGs and Agenda 2030. SDG implementation more broadly is managed within Global Affairs Canada by the Strategic Policy Branch and subject specialists are responsible for providing expertise on particular SDGs e.g., health specialists are responsible for the health-related SDG. Looking at all projects on GAC’s Project Browser from 2015-2020, the SDGs only appear in the project descriptions of 7 projects, albeit 5 of the 7 are contributions to international organizations such as the OECD, WHO and UNESCO (Global Affairs Canada 2019a).63 The other two projects that make reference to the SDGs are: the Global Advocacy Initiative Prioritizing Girls’ and Women’s Health Rights and Well- being and Support for the JobStart Philippines Program Rollout. The former represents GAC’s contribution to the Women Deliver conference that took place in the Summer of 2019, while the latter is a project, administered by another international institution — the Asian Development Bank, that aims to establish a national JobStart program in the Philippines (ibid.). Thus, SDG language appears in primarily multilateral associated projects and contexts.

Canada’s practice responsiveness then is largely at the level of communications and framing of its projects, particularly for an international audience—as demonstrated by the kinds of projects that merit SDG language. This relative lack of a meaningful response in terms of aid

63 I initially conducted this project browser search (using SDG and Agenda 2030 as search terms) in February 2020 and then updated in October 2020.

107 practice is, in part, linked to the perception of the SDGs not as a tool for implementation but as a global framework that frames aid discussions among donors, development partners and other stakeholders (e.g., development constituencies). This trend is not unique to Canada, as very few donors have gone beyond linking their existing monitoring and evaluation frameworks with the SDGs.

Canada’s lack of a more comprehensive aid practice response is partly tied to Global Affairs Canada’s limited ODA budget and policy capacity (Anonymous interview January 2019). The recent 2018 DAC peer review of Canada noted the loss of institutional knowledge and development expertise following the amalgamation of CIDA and implementation of a rotational staffing system in GAC (OECD 2018c). It further suggested that delivering the commitments outlined in FIAP will require “new skill sets, new ways of working and strong technical support from sector and cross-cutting specialists” (ibid, 21). Implementing and streamlining new policy and practices at GAC are also difficult given GAC’s highly bureaucratic and centralized nature (ibid., interview Kindornay May 2019).

The OECD-DAC’s peer review report also highlighted the lack of policy coherence structures within GAC and the Canadian government more broadly that might aid with more coherent SDG implementation (OECD 2018c). Government interview respondents acknowledged that SDG implementation in bilateral development assistance is challenging, particularly around measuring progress (Anonymous interviews June 2019b-c). They further referenced ongoing discussions at the DAC about potential ways that bilateral donors as a collective might report on their SDG-related activities. Thus, in part, the superficial references to the SDGs in internal monitoring and evaluation frameworks stems from uncertainty about forthcoming DAC reporting requirements vis a vis the SDGs, further demonstrating Canada’s reliance on DAC policy and practice guidance, rather than in-house development expertise or initiative. In this way, policy generation within GAC constrained Canada’s responsiveness particularly at the level of practice. Nevertheless, overall Canada can be considered as moderately responsive to the SDGs (See Figure 10).

108

Policy Responsiveness • SDGs references in key aid policy documents. • Specialization in a particular SDG (SDG 5). • Some reference to SDGs in FIAP guidance notes and sectoral policies. • Some references to SDG principles in other policies. • SDGs framed as important but one of many other priorities (e.g. Feminist foreign aid policy). However, most of the other priorities are linked to relevant SDGs at goal level. Practice Responsiveness • Dedicated institutional structures for SDG implementation across government (one middle management level responsible within aid agency and sectoral specialists). • SDGs integrated at goal level in internal monitoring and evaluation system. • Some references to SDGs in project communications. • Some references to SDGs in corporate procedures (e.g. Call for Proposals)

Overall: Moderate Responsiveness Figure 10 Summary of Canada's Responsiveness

In fact, Canada has undertaken greater SDG implementation measures domestically than in terms of its foreign aid policy.64 In part, this reflects the influence of the 2018 OAG audit on Canada’s preparedness to implement the SDGs. The audit found that “the Government of Canada made a clear commitment in 2015 to implement the 2030 Agenda” but lacked a clear governance process or means of implementation [as of 2017]” (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2018). Numerous respondents cited this audit as an important catalytic factor in Canada’s responsiveness to the SDGs, in particular the creation of internal governance structures (e.g., the SDG unit) (Anonymous interview June 2019a).65 This domestic focus is also in keeping with Canada’s emphasis on the universality of the SDGs, which serves the Liberal government’s particular reputational aspirations, as will be discussed in the next section.

5.3 Drivers of Canadian SDG Responsiveness

The following sections aims to explain Canada’s responsiveness by examining show and tell dynamics in its participation in the HLPF and VNR processes. It will also unpack the role of

64 Examples include: an SDG funding programme, integrating the SDGs in domestic facing policies (e.g. national poverty reduction strategy, federal sustainable development strategy and the national housing strategy) and even laws (e.g. National Housing Act). 65 The decision to undertake an audit on SDG preparedness originated within the OAG but was influenced by the OAG’s participation in the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). Several other SAI’s have conducted SDG preparedness audits (e.g. Austria, Netherlands, Poland etc.) to varying effects.

109 Canada’s, and more specifically the Trudeau government’s, reputational aspirations and the perceived instrumentality of the SDGs in serving these aspirations.

5.3.1 Show and tell and the impact of the VNR in Canada

One of the most important indicators of show and tell includes the way in which national identities and narratives are framed and performed at the HLPF through the VNR process. This section outlines the narratives that underpin Canada’s identity performance through this process. While Canada’s VNR document and presentations both draw on common Liberal refrains targeted to a domestic audience (e.g., the Canada child benefit, “diversity is our strength”, feminism, reconciliation etc.), the VNR was not launched or presented domestically, signalling that the intended audience of this exercise was very much an international one (Anonymous Interview Ottawa June 2019b). Overall, there was very little visibility of the VNR domestically.

Canada presented its first Voluntary National Review in July 2018.66 The preparation of the VNR began in Fall 2017, well before Canada had begun to finalize a common vision on how it would approach the SDGs or even had a clear SDG leadership structure (anonymous interview June 2019b). The lead department for coordinating the VNR was GAC, which worked with 27 federal government departments (Anonymous interviews June 2019b-c).67 This was a challenging process, as GAC and the implicated government departments were not accustomed to working in an integrated way as partners (rather than hierarchically) to produce a common document (ibid.). In addition to working with other government departments, GAC also undertook consultations with Canadians in April and May 2018 through a web portal where they were invited to share their efforts towards achieving the SDGs but there was no domestic review of the final VNR (Jungcurt 2018; Global Affairs Canada 2018a).

The government had several core aims for the VNR. First, it wanted to ensure that all 17 goals were covered by the report and to demonstrate key lessons learned under each (Anonymous interview June 2019a-b). It further wanted to emphasize both the principles of universality and LNOB in a Canadian context (ibid). Indeed, Canada was one of the first to

66 Canada intends to present a VNR at least once more before the 2030 deadline (Anonymous interview June 2019a). 67 ESDC will lead Canada’s second VNR, they did not lead this one as the government had not yet identified them as the lead SDG implementation department (SDG Unit created after the VNR in September. 2018)

110 have a dedicated section on LNOB in its VNR (Kindornay 2019). The VNR also highlights both Canada’s domestic and international actions, with each SDG chapter including a section on Canada and the world. The government also viewed the VNR as an opportunity to showcase efforts from the whole of Canadian society including stakeholders such as municipalities and a grade 5 student (Canada 2018a).68

The prominence of the feminist theme (“feminism” code in Appendix D) in the VNR further demonstrates the specialization dynamics discussed above, although it does include goal-by- goal analysis for each of the SDGs. The VNR identifies 5 focus areas: “advance gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls; grow the economy and narrow the socioeconomic gaps that exist between different groups; advance self-determination and improve relationships with Indigenous peoples; foster inclusion; and advance action on climate change and clean growth” (Canada 2018a, 7). The VNR carefully balances Canada’s international and domestic contributions (to the point some felt it better reflected domestic commitments) (Anonymous interview May 2019).

The Minister for Children, Families and Social Development Jean-Yves Duclos led the HLPF delegation in 2018. The delegation also included multiple stakeholders from provinces/territories, municipalities, civil society, youth, indigenous peoples and the private sector. The multi-stakeholder nature of this delegation was a deliberate decision to reinforce the importance of Canada’s whole of society approach to the SDGs (Anonymous interview June 2019a). The VNR was co-presented by Minister Duclos and the Parliamentary Secretary for International Development Celina Caesar-Chavannes. In his opening remarks, Minister Duclos repeated Trudeau’s assertion that the SDGs are meaningful both at home and abroad (Canada 2018d). He further emphasized Canada’s efforts around poverty reduction both domestically and internationally and in “ensuring a more sustainable future” (ibid.). Similarly, while presenting in her capacity as Parliamentary Secretary for International Development, Caesar-Chavannes discussed both domestic and international actions and commitments particularly around environmental issues, indigenous peoples and under- represented groups.69 Their speeches also underscored Canada’s identity as a leader on SDG

68 Budding conservationist, Danielle, proposed to combat elephant and rhino poaching by creating a “tiny tracker” to be placed inside their horns and an accompanying app to alert authorities if the horn was being cut. 69 Canada interprets under-represented groups as women, newcomers, indigenous peoples, people with disabilities and LGBTQ2 communities (Canada 2018a).

111 5, arguing that “Canada has become a global champion for gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, both at home and abroad” (ibid.).

Two other prominent codes emerged in the qualitative analysis of the VNR (see Appendix D): humility and commitment to multilateralism. The overarching narrative presented in the VNR, the speeches to the HLPF and UNGA, as well as the responses to questions posed is one of a humble Canada that “is your ally and partner on our common path to fulfilling the 2030 Agenda” (Canada 2018d). In his closing remarks Minister Duclos reinforced this narrative, arguing that “Canada finds itself privileged to have so many friends in this room and around the world, friends and allies with whom we look forward to collaborating on all sorts on global challenges, including ones specific to SDGs” (Global Affairs Canada 2018b). This humility narrative is further evidenced by Canada’s acknowledgement of the challenges it faces at home around issues such as those who are being left behind, poverty and environment (Kindornay 2019). The focus on friendship and partnership also illustrates another core element of Canada’s VNR message, concerning Canada’s strong belief in multilateralism. As argued by Duclos, “in building a better world, multilateralism demonstrates that we are stronger when we stand together” (Canada 2018d).

At the same time, the “humble Canada” identity narrative is partially belied by Canada’s numerous segments of texts coded as “leadership”. For instance, the VNR references Canada’s leadership on a variety of issues and in several multilateral fora. In addition to numerous references to Canada’s 2018 G7 Presidency, other examples in the VNR of Canada’s leadership in the context of development assistance include:

The Government of Canada is at the vanguard of international efforts to advance gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls (51).

Canada is recognized for its role in promoting values of diversity, inclusion and human rights for all, and for its relentless focus on all those who face exclusion and discrimination (81).

Canada has a long history of supporting developing countries’ efforts to build resilient infrastructure for coastal communities (73).

112 As a strong global advocate for the health, rights and well-being of the poorest and most vulnerable in developing countries, Canada is committed to advancing a human rights-based approach to health (36). (Canada 2018a)

As alluded to earlier, the composition of the Canadian delegation and the choice of presenters is also an integral part of Canada’s identity performance at the HLPF. While the head of state did not present the VNR, the choice of a domestic minister served to reinforce Canada’s commitment to the universality of the agenda. Furthermore, the co-presentation of the VNR by one of Canada’s few black MPs, the presence of representatives of indigenous people, youth and other stakeholders on the delegation and the bilingualism of the presentation is also demonstrative of the strength of Canadian diversity, a signature Liberal refrain.

In this way, through the VNR and HLPF presentation, Canada’s identity performance was one of a humble feminist ally, but one who also has a proven track-record of multilateral leadership, particularly in gender equality. Crucially, this identity performance is couched in SDG language. Canada is a leader on SDG 5, while the “humble Canada” reflects its emphasis on the universality of the Agenda. Similarly, the multiple overtures to friendship, ally-ship and partnership, all narratives that avoid placing Canada in a hierarchical relationship with other countries, are linked to the principle of multi-stakeholder partnership to achieve the SDGs (especially SDG 17).

This particular performance also permeates Canadian behaviour in other multilateral venues. For instance, several SDGs were also reflected in the themes of Canada’s G7 Presidency (e.g., Oceans, Decent Work, Gender Equality, etc.). In addition, Canada convened a meeting between finance and international development ministers to specifically discuss SDG financing with the resulting Charlevoix Commitment on Innovative Financing outlining the necessity of the commitment for mobilizing funding to “work towards the aspirations outlined in the Sustainable Development Goals” (Global Affairs Canada 2019b; interview Senator Boehm 2019). Canada’s framing of its Security Council seat bid (2016- 2020) drew on SDG language. One of Canada’s pledges as part of its bid is to “explicitly link the work of the Security Council to the 2030 Agenda and include active and innovative consideration of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the Security Council’s work” (Canada 2019b). The very logo of Canada’s campaign was “inspired” by the colours of the 2030 Agenda (Canada UN Mission 2018).

113 The fact that SDG language has appeared in other policies in Canada, even those concerned with domestic issues, provides another indicator of show and tell. For instance, Canada’s first national poverty reduction strategy “Opportunity for All” is linked with SDG 1, as well as six other SDGs linked to food security, health, quality education, gender equality, inclusive and sustainable economic development, decent work and reduced inequalities (Employment and Social Development Canada 2018). The strategy was also designed to position Canada as a “world leader in poverty reduction” (ibid.). Similarly, the new National Housing Strategy and its associated Act are also framed as contributions to the SDGs (Canada 2018b; 2019c). The Federal Sustainable Development Strategy (FSDS) is also framed as Canada’s contribution to the 12 environmentally focused SDGs (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2019). The document also includes several segments of text coded with the “leadership” code, including references to Canadian leadership internationally on issues of inclusivity, innovation, clean technology and sustainable development issues more broadly (ibid.). Ensuring that the FSDS is “linked to global movements in sustainable development such as the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs” was also seen as an important component of this leadership by government and the sustainable development advisory council (anonymous interview 2019c/d). In each of these instances, Canada’s leadership is couched in the framework of the SDGs.

The effects of show and tell on Canadian foreign aid policy more specifically are most readily observed through the framing of FIAP and its associated reporting. As previously mentioned, FIAP does explicitly lay out Canada’s unique role in and approach to SDG implementation. Indeed, the “core” of Canada’s approach is SDG 5 (Global Affairs Canada 2017c). The framing of the KPIs also suggests that going forward the impacts of Canada’s development assistance activities will also be framed in the context of the SDGs. In donor fora, such as the DAC, Canada’s interventions are often framed with the language of the SDGs and it has been very involved in ensuring DAC reform efforts are aligned with the SDGs and in developing the DAC’s proposed SDG field (Anonymous Interview January 2019). In Budget 2019, while there was no dedicated section to the SDGs, Canada’s international leadership in terms of development (through “innovative” initiatives such as the International Assistance Innovation and Sovereign Loans Programs) are also framed as contributing to Canadian SDG leadership. In this way, SDG language is also used to perform Canada’s more specific identity as a bilateral aid donor.

114 This linking of Canadian leadership and the SDGs is not consistent across all multilateral institutions. For instance, SDG language is not used to frame Canada’s behaviour at NATO or the WTO. Similarly, references to the SDGs in speeches, statements or interventions in the domestic fora, like the House of Commons, from the Minister of International Development are inconsistent and appear to be dependent on the audience or topic in question. For instance, in over 100 interventions in the House of Commons on development related topics, former Minister of International Development and La Francophonie, Marie-Claude Bibeau, only referenced the SDGs and Agenda 2030 twice in a debate concerning the 2017-2018 estimates (Canada 2017b). In the first reference she underlined how Canada’s international assistance to SRHR would contribute to SDG target 3.7 and in the second instance she reaffirmed that Canada’s feminist international assistance would “also support the achievement of the sustainable development goals as part of the agenda 2030” (11359).70 The fact that the SDGs and Agenda 2030 were not a common feature or framing device in the Minister of International Development’s interventions on aid underscores that Canada did not target its SDG commitments in foreign aid to a domestic audience.

More broadly in parliament, since 2015, there have only been 26 references to Agenda 2030 and the SDGs in Parliament in 13 debates. Five of the debates in which Members of Parliament (MPs) referenced the SDGs and/or Agenda 2030 revolved around Bill C-57 to amend the FSDS (Canada 2017c; 2017d; 2018e; 2018f; 2018g). In these particular debates, the Liberals, including former Minister of Environment and Climate Change Catherine McKenna, point to the integration of the environmental SDGs in the updated FSDS (as described previously in this chapter) as evidence of Canada’s commitment to the 2030 agenda and thereby justifying the amendment as also serving Canada’s international commitments.

In all of these instances, however, the Agenda and the SDGs are used more as framing device to communicate or justify Canada’s pre-existing priorities. There has not been, for instance, as of 2020, a substantive debate about the Agenda 2030, the SDGs and Canada’s role in the agenda. Interviewees also suggest that the discussion of the SDGs is similarly limited in

70 This data stems from a search of Hansard for Minister Bibeau’s interventions during her tenure as Minister of International Development- available here: https://www.ourcommons.ca/publicationsearch/en/?View=D&Item=&ParlSes=from2015-12-03to2019-03- 31&oob=&Topic=&Proc=&Per=88449&Text=&RPP=15&order=&targetLang=&SBS=0&MRR=150000&Pag e=7&PubType=37

115 parliamentary committee work (Interview Vandenbeld May 2019). Overall, the inconsistent usage of SDG language in domestic and certain international fora speaks to the very particular audience of Canada’s identity performance in the context of the SDGs-namely an international UN related audience. The subsequent section will outline more specifically the role of this international audience in Canada’s reputational aspirations.

5.3.2 Canada’s Reputational Aspirations

Multiple interview respondents from government and civil society indicated that the adoption of the SDGs in 2015 was fortuitous timing given that the newly elected Trudeau government wanted to do foreign policy differently. This fundamental change in government ushered in a new discourse around Canadian foreign policy and a larger appetite and willingness from the highest levels of government to undertake new policy initiatives across sectors. It also signalled a renewed preoccupation with Canada’s international reputation.

Indeed, a qualitative analysis of the Liberal’s election materials, speeches and documents, demonstrated a clear picture of the Liberal’s reputational aspirations. More specifically, an explicit goal of the Liberal’s pre-election (2015) approach to foreign policy was to “restore Canada’s reputation” and restore Canadian leadership in the world, particularly in multilateral institutions like the UN (Liberal Party of Canada 2015, 65-68). In their pre- election platform, the Liberals created a narrative of a Canada with a damaged international reputation due to the mismanagement of Stephen Harper. They promised a return to Canada’s tradition of international leadership, including its role in creating the UN, “because Canada can make a real and valuable contribution to a more peaceful and prosperous world” (68). For foreign aid policy, more specifically, the Liberals promised a return to a “compassionate Canada” and a re-orientation of aid around the poorest and most vulnerable (ibid.). The Liberals also promised a greater commitment to creating a clean environment and sustainable development (ibid, 39).

These commitments are justified through the Liberal narrative of Canadian identity, namely that of Canadians being “open, accepting and generous” (64). As seen in the VNR, another important code that emerged in this Liberal narrative is Canadian commitment to liberal internationalism including a commitment to multilateralism specifically (Paris 2018; Nossal 2018). As outlined by GAC, “the commitment to multilateralism is the cornerstone of Canada’s foreign policy”(Global Affairs Canada 2015). Canada’s provision of development

116 assistance is also an essential component of Canadian internationalist-based identity narratives (Brown, den Heyer, and Black 2016; Mason 2011; Kymlicka 2003; Holloway 2006). As suggested by Minister Bibeau in her introduction to FIAP, Canada commits to the provision of aid “because international solidarity is a shared Canadian value” (Global Affairs Canada 2017c). This view is reflected by bureaucrats and in speeches about Canada’s foreign aid that cite Canada’s long tradition of supporting a values-based international order (Anonymous interviews June 2019b-c). The actual motivations and drivers of Canadian aid policy are more complex than “Canadian values” and national interest also forms part of the Liberal narrative of aid (see for example, Swiss 2016; Brown, den Heyer, and Black 2016).

Nevertheless, the Liberal government’s narrative of Canadian aid policy and their desire to restore Canada’s international reputation for compassionate and constructive leadership are linked to their perception of Canadian values and identity. Importantly, as argued by Brown (2018, 149), the Canadian values and identity with which the Liberals are concerned are those of the Liberal electoral base- characterized by a “more cosmopolitan and internationalist perspective often associated with the legacy of Lester B. Pearson, including United Nations peacekeeping.” Thus, any interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy and development assistance moves since the election of the Trudeau Liberals should be understood within this desire to reignite Canadian leadership, particularly in multilateral fora- in line with the perceived priorities of the Liberal base. Indeed, since 2015, Canada has increasingly taken on leadership roles in a variety of multilateral institutions, including through its G7 Presidency, co-chairing international groups such as the Open Government Partnership, and its spearheading of the Women Deliver conference. Canada is also pursuing a leadership role in the context of the SDGs through its co-chairing, in partnership with Jamaica, of the Group of Friends on SDG Financing. The ultimately unsuccessful bid for a non-permanent Security Council seat was also another important signal of Trudeau’s foreign policy ambitions (Charron 2018; Carbert 2018; Canada 2016).

What role do the SDGs play in advancing these foreign policy and reputational ambitions? The SDGs are a multilateral UN-based framework that codifies global commitments to gender equality, sustainable development and climate action, among other goals. All of the SDGs are well aligned and in fact reflect key components of Liberal foreign policy aspirations. Several government respondents indicated that there was a certain inevitability that the SDGs, as this shared multilateral global framework for sustainable development,

117 would feed into Canada’s new aid policy (Anonymous interviews June 2019b-c). Beyond aid, justifying other policies as furthering SDG implementation also contributes to the construction of a reputation of Canada as a responsible global citizen that takes international commitments seriously (Anonymous interview June 2019d). The breadth and scope of the SDGs allows for their usage in policies as diverse as sustainable development, housing and poverty. In this way, the SDGs represent a useful and flexible legitimation tool for pre- existing Liberal objectives.

The SDGs also offered strategic benefits for Canada. Indeed, an understanding of Canada’s behaviour vis a vis the SDGs and in the UN should be understood partially through the lens of its, ultimately unsuccessful, Security Council seat bid (see, for example, commentary from Zilio 2018). The SDGs appeared in different elements of Canada’s bid. For instance, as part of its bid, Canada pledged to “explicitly link the work of the Security Council to the 2030 Agenda and include active and innovative consideration of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the Security Council’s work” (Canada 2019b). Gaining a Security Council seat also involves gaining substantial support from developing countries. Canada’s commitment to the universality of the Agenda is strategic in that it allows it to rhetorically avoid the traditional hierarchical relationship between developed and developing countries, while also masking, to a certain extent, its relatively low generosity in terms of overall ODA spending. Even FIAP, ostensibly a foreign aid policy document, includes references to Canada’s domestic commitment to the SDGs. Indeed, there is a recognition, even within the Canadian government, that Canada lags other like-minded donors in terms of its overall funding levels (Anonymous Interviews January 2019, June 2019b-c). Canada is not a donor who has met the 0.7% ODA/GNI commitment, nor have there been any meaningful discussions by the Liberal government about reaching that target, although there was a commitment in pre-Covid budgets (2018) to scale up ODA modestly.

Government representatives also cite Canada’s comparatively lower ODA as a reason for focusing Canadian aid around core goals (Anonymous interviews June 2019b-c). The feminist SDG 5 specialization is seen, by both government bureaucrats and politicians, as a means to leverage Canada’s comparative advantage in gender equality in order to take on a leadership role among donors (Global Affairs Canada 2017c). Similarly, there is a sense among government and also Canadian development NGOs that the SDG 5 specialization makes Canada stand out among other donors and within the broader Agenda 2030 (Interview

118 Vandenbeld, May 2019, Interview Kindornay 2019, Anonymous Interviews June 2019b-c). Thus, by drawing on this feminist framing, Canada can gain reputational capital as a donor, in spite of its lagging ODA commitments. Whether this perception of feminist leadership is shared by donor peers and other target audiences outside of Canada is unclear. For instance, all three case countries studied for this project make some claim to leadership on gender equality/women’s empowerment in development assistance.

As previously argued, the desired audience of Canada’s reputational aspirations in the context of the SDGs specifically is largely international. For instance, the linkage of Canada’s international leadership in institutions like the G7, the DAC and the UNSC to SDG implementation, as well as Canada’s VNR, demonstrates the importance of the international audience in Canada’s SDG show and tell. While the government may not perceive the SDGs, on their own, as a useful domestic electoral tool (as evidenced by inconsistent references domestically), the desire for international leadership as a feminist donor more broadly is targeted to a domestic audience. As Black (2019, 5) argues, FIAP’s focus renders Canadian development policy “more readily identifiable and ‘brand-able’, notably to key domestic constituencies”. The feminist branding is certainly well aligned with the Liberals’ perception of their female-dominated base (Brown 2018a). As outlined above, the multilateralist leadership aspiration is also tied to the Liberals’ perception of the foreign policy preferences of their electoral base. While awareness of the SDGs in Canada is relatively low, the SDGs are also well aligned with the perceived internationalism of this base (ibid.).71 In this way, the SDGs become salient in a domestic electoral context as part of and as a justification of the feminist and multilateral internationalist branding of the Liberals’ development assistance policy but importantly, they are not the main focus of this branding. As such, the SDGs are complimentary to other reputational tools such as claims to feminism and multilateral internationalism.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that Canada has moderate political commitment to the SDGs, as evidenced by its moderate overall responsiveness. In its aid policies, documents and communications, Canada used the SDGs to show and tell a story of its feminist leadership, as well as to frame its pre-existing priorities. Thus, Canada has embedded the SDGs, and

71 A recent Ipsos poll found that 51% of Canadians had heard of the SDGs, but only 11% felt that they were somewhat or very familiar with the SDGs (Ipsos 2019).

119 specifically SDG 5, in its donor identity and donor leadership narratives. Canada has similarly used the HLPF and VNR to perform another component of Canada’s leadership narrative namely —that of a humble ally and partner. Beyond the VNR and HLPF, Canada has also integrated SDG language in a suite of domestic facing policies to signal its commitment to the universality of the agenda, again playing into the humble Canada narrative.

The chapter argued that the SDGs represent an important reputation tool for Canada internationally. In part this is linked to the specific Liberal government’s reputational aspirations. From the early days of the Trudeau government, recreating Canadian leadership internationally was a key priority. Canadian international leadership, for the Trudeau Liberals, involved a recommitment to the multilateral internationalism of the Pearson era. They also sought to distinguish this leadership by characterizing it as feminist. Both of these components of Canada’s international leadership post-2015 are rooted in Liberal perceptions of Canadian identity and the expectations vis a vis foreign policy of its electoral base. Similarly, the launching of an IAR and subsequent adoption of FIAP aimed at improving Canada’s reputation as a bilateral aid donor.

The government perceived the SDGs as useful tools in building this reputation for Canadian leadership, including its aid leadership. This perceived utility of the SDGs stems, in part, from potential strategic benefits in terms of other foreign policy ambitions like the UNSC campaign and overcoming Canada’s low ODA levels. As a multilateral initiative the government also viewed the SDGs as a means to demonstrate that it is a committed global citizen. The taken-for-grantedness, expressed by interview respondents, that the SDGs would be embedded within Canada’s new aid policy suggests that the goals were well aligned with pre-existing Liberal priorities. The reputational element of Canadian motivation does not mean that there is not a genuine commitment to the SDGs in Canada. Canadian interviewees, both within government and among civil society, agreed that Canada was committed to the Agenda even if the roll out of institutions, policies and funding were slower to follow. Nevertheless, Canada’s moderate responsiveness can be attributed to the fact that the Liberals aspired to cultivate a reputation as a humble, feminist ally and not a reputation specifically for SDG leadership in the aid domain. In other words, the SDGs were important but one of several reputational tools, alongside feminism, humility and leadership roles in specific multilateral fora.

120 The 2015 election was a pivotal moment in the trajectory of Canada’s SDG response. Indeed, this chapter would have undoubtedly evolved quite differently if the Harper Conservatives had retained power in 2015 or if Andrew Scheer had been successful in his 2019 run, including his promise to cut aid by 25% suggesting that aid and likely the SDGs would not be a priority (Valiante 2019).This hypothetical suggests that Canada’s SDG responsiveness is tenuous given how intertwined it is with the Trudeau government’s specific reputational aspirations.

121 United Kingdom

6.1 Introduction

The UK remains, as of 2020, one of the few OECD-DAC donors to spend 0.7% of its GNI on ODA and is the first G7 country to enshrine this commitment into law. While there is broad support for this spending commitment in parliament, it is notable that it was a Conservative government that spearheaded the movement towards achieving and institutionalizing this commitment.72 This spending commitment is now an integral part of the UK’s donor identity narrative, while UK aid more broadly represents an important soft power tool for the UK. The UK was highly responsive to the MDGs, in terms of its development assistance, and was also actively involved in the negotiation of the SDGs through then Prime Minster David Cameron’s co-chairing of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. However, the 2016 Brexit referendum and Cameron’s subsequent resignation altered the trajectory of SDG implementation in the UK. In this way, the UK is an interesting and important case as it demonstrates that the commitment to the SDGs and the perceived utility of the goals can change, with implications for implementation.

The first section lays out the UK’s performance against measures of policy and practice responsiveness. The current evidence suggests that while there is a certain level of policy responsiveness (albeit the integration in policy remains superficial), there has been little practice responsiveness. The UK government envisions the SDGs largely as a tool through which to communicate and justify its pre-existing policy priorities. The latter half of the chapter puts forward an explanation for these trends by comparing pre-and post-Brexit approaches to and narratives about aid and global development goals. More specifically, it finds that post-Brexit government chose to bolster their international reputation by leaning on the 0.7% commitment rather than the SDGs.

Importantly, the majority of fieldwork occurred prior to the completion of the UK’s VNR process in February-March 2019. Since the presentation of the VNR, there has been a marked increase in SDG activities in the UK, suggesting that the VNR process has galvanizing effects, even on aid policy and practice. This chapter was also substantively researched and

72 This once again confirms that the role of political orientation in aid policy is not necessarily clearly divided along left-right lines as outlined in Chapter 3.

122 written prior to the integration of DFID with FCO in September 2020 and the announcement that the UK would no longer meet the 0.7% commitment in November 2020.

6.2 UK’s SDG Responsiveness

Figure 11 provides a timeline of key events post-2015 in the UK

March 2015 – International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act passes July 2015 – International Development Committee (IDC) launches first inquiry into the SDGs in the UK November 2015 – New UK aid strategy released June 2016 – Brexit referendum; David Cameron resigns; IDC publishes first report on SDGs in the UK July 2016 – Theresa May becomes Prime Minister June 2017 – General election, Conservative-DUP government November 2017 – UK commits to presenting a VNR August 2018 – VNR consultations begin December 2018 – IDC launches second inquiry into progress on the SDGs in the UK June 2019 – Theresa May resigns July 2019 – UK VNR presentation, Boris Johnson becomes Prime Minister July 2020 – The Prime Minister announces the merger of DFID and FCO September 2020 – DFID merges with FCO into FCDO

Figure 11 UK SDG Timeline

6.2.1 SDG Governance in the UK

The overall lead for SDG implementation in the UK lay with the Department for International Development. The government justified this choice by pointing to DFID’s expertise in sustainable development and the Agenda 2030 negotiations, as well as the fact that “the primary purpose of the Goals is to eradicate extreme poverty”(DFID 2017b, 1). Within DFID, a team of 9 people was responsible for coordinating the Voluntary National Review process and there was also an SDG Summits team of 19 people that coordinated the UK’s participation in the HLPF and UN Summit processes (DFID FOI request 2019). In this way, the structures within DFID to address the SDGs had more to do with the international processes of the SDGs, rather than the internal implementation of the SDGs within DFID.

Concerning cross-government coordination, in September 2017, the government established an interdepartmental group for planning and performance review on the SDGs, co-chaired by senior civil servants DFID and the Cabinet Office. According to a response to parliamentary inquiries on this subject, this group met regularly during the planning and preparation of the

123 VNR process. During the VNR process, the government also designated Senior Responsible Officers to act as chapter leads for the VNR process. Each department also had one or more nominated SDG champion “whose responsibility is to promote the SDGs and the VNR in their department” (IDC 2019c, 19). The DFID SDG team held weekly meetings with SROs and other implicated civil servants beginning November 2018 to ensure smooth coordination of the VNR process (IDC 2019b).

As of April 2020, the SDGs were integrated in single departmental plans (SDPs) of all government departments including DFID’s. SDPs lay out the high-level priorities for each government department and how they will go about achieving them. “Integration” in this case refers to linking some of the policy commitments in the SDPs to particular SDGs at the goal level (e.g. the policy commitments will have the relevant SDG in brackets). Prior to the VNR, the references to the SDGs were not standard across government departments, however in the most recent June 2019 iterations of the SDPs, the references to the SDGs were more consistent across government departments (UKSSD 2017; UK 2019c).

Nevertheless, it is not clear whether these structures put in place to produce the VNR will continue to exist beyond the VNR process. In the VNR itself, the government committed to undertake a review of ministerial and official level structures. However, as of October 2020, there is no publicly available evidence that this review has taken place or is in process. There has also yet to be a stand-alone institution responsible for SDG implementation and the UK has not committed to developing a national SDG implementation strategy as other countries have done.

6.2.2 Policy Responsiveness

Despite its status as lead department for SDG implementation, DFID did not have a dedicated SDG strategy. However, the SDGs featured in several of its prominent policy documents to varying extents. This section surveys major policy documents since 2015 and attempts to unpack where and how the SDGs were used in DFID’s policies and strategies.

The SDGs were mentioned briefly in the overarching aid strategy- UK Aid: Tackling global challenges in the national interest - published in November 2015, only a few short months after the adoption of the SDGs in September 2015. The strategy was centered around 4 pillars: 1) strengthening global peace, security and governance; 2) strengthening resilience and response to crisis; 3) promoting global prosperity; and 4) tackling extreme poverty and

124 helping the world’s most vulnerable. While these four pillars were all clearly implicitly aligned with the SDGs, the strategy made only 4 explicit references to the goals. The most substantive reference to the SDGs was an explanation of what they are, presenting the SDGs as the “UN Global Goals” that “focus on eradicating extreme poverty forever and finishing the job of the Millennium Development Goals in key areas like health, nutrition and education” (DFID 2015, 7).

The aid strategy also committed the UK government to leading the world in implementing the LNOB promise. In 2019, DFID published a policy paper entitled “Leaving no one behind: Our promise” (DFID 2019c). The paper made clear that the elimination of extreme poverty is at the core of the UK’s interpretation of LNOB, arguing that “no one should face the indignity of extreme, absolute, chronic poverty” (n.p.). There were also references to the importance of building inclusive institutions and inclusive data collection. The commitment further identified specific groups to be prioritized such as youth, older people, women and girls and people with disabilities. This specific elaboration of an LNOB commitment and its linkage to poverty eradication is unsurprising given that former UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, was an early champion of the principle and its role in eliminating extreme poverty.73 This LNOB commitment also followed several reports from the UK’s Independent Commission for Aid Impact in 2016-2017 that suggested further efforts would be necessary to better include LNOB in UK aid initiatives (ICAI 2018).

While the development community in the UK welcomed this LNOB commitment, they also criticized the implementation of this commitment in DFID programming (with the exception of inclusive data collection) (Bond 2019). Indeed, the commitments are broad, for example “listening and responding to the voices of those furthest left behind” and “holding ourselves to account” (DFID 2019c, npg). Other commitments such as the promise to achieve gender equality and stop modern slavery also reflect pre-existing policy priorities that were now being reframed as contributing to LNOB. The only element of this particular commitment to have a more specific strategy is the commitment to support an inclusive “data revolution” through the Inclusive Data Charter Action Plan. DFID’s Inclusive Data Charter Action Plan lays out how DFID will follow the principles of the Inclusive Data Charter, an initiative of the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data (Global Partnership for Sustainable

73 The LNOB principle was first proposed by a UK-based charity Save the Children in a report published shortly after the beginning of the post-2015 discussions (Fukuda-Parr and Hegstad 2018)

125 Development Data 2018; DFID 2018b). The UK is an “anchor member” of the GPSDD and a contributing partner to the Inclusive Data Charter (ibid.). Data disaggregation was a clear priority for DFID even prior to the publishing of this action plan. In 2017, for example, DFID published a Data Disaggregation Action Plan committing to disaggregate data on the basis of sex, age, disability and geography (DFID 2017a). The SDGs or “Global Goals” were referenced in both documents as a justification for why data disaggregation is important as “it will not be possible to realise and evidence delivery of the Global Goals without significant improvements in the gathering, analysis and use of disaggregated data” (ibid.).

In 2019, the SDGs increasingly appeared throughout other corporate strategies, including recent iterations of DFID’s SDP. In DFID’s previous single departmental plans, each policy commitment was linked to a relevant SDG in brackets. The iteration of the SDP published in June 2019, however, explicitly linked DFID’s mandate with the SDGs arguing that DFID “leads the UK’s efforts to reduce poverty and deliver the SDGs” (DFID 2019e). It also goes farther by framing the document using the language of the core principles of the SDGs- the 5 Ps (Peace, Planet, Prosperity, People, Partnership).74 The SDP is also in line with the overarching aid strategy and in fact reframed the 4 pillars using the 5Ps (e.g. Peace refers to pillar 1, Planet refers to pillar 2, Prosperity refers to pillar 3, People refers to the pillar 4). In this way, the newest SDP does not represent a significant change in priorities from the 2015 aid strategy. Rather it is a reframing of the existing priorities using core SDG principles. This communicative aspect is also reflected in the way that the SDGs are linked to the policy commitments in the SDP. For instance, under “Peace”, several of the commitments around reducing corruption, addressing violence against faith and gender minorities, combatting modern slavery and ending child, early and force marriage are framed (in brackets) as contributing to SDG 16, SDG 5 and also SDG 8 respectively. With the exception of addressing violence against faith and gender minorities specifically, these were all priorities in the original UK Aid strategy.75 Furthermore, there is no analysis of how particular policy commitments contribute to the SDGs at a target and indicator level. This shift in framing is

74 Aid Quality is also one of the overarching categories. Also of note, is that the UK used the term SDGs in the latest iteration instead of “global goals”. For the longest time, even during the VNR process the UK government was referring to the SDGs as the “global goals”. When asked why this was the case, government representatives stressed that this was not a downplaying of sustainable development, although several members of civil society interpreted this linguistic choice exactly in this way. 75 The SDP also includes high level results from the previous year but these results are not framed using SDG targets or indicators or even at the goal level. The following section discusses the SDGs and DFIDs results frameworks in more depth.

126 partially the result of the new Secretary of State Rory Stewart who wanted to ensure that the “five key framing devices” of the SDP reflected the SDGs, as he understood the SDGs as tools to talk about “how our action on poverty, on climate and the environment, come together” (IDC 2019b). This revised SDP was rewritten in five weeks prior to the presentation of the VNR (IDC 2019b).

The SDGs are also peppered throughout specific sectoral strategies published post 2015, mostly as a framing device to justify particular pre-existing priorities as contributing to the achievement of the goals. For instance, in DFID’s first disability strategy underscores that the inclusion of people with disabilities in development work is essential to the achievement of the SDGs, along with other international agendas such as the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) and the WHO’s Mental Health Action Plan. The only form of substantive analysis around disability and the SDGs is in the form of a footnote outlining where people with disabilities fit within the SDGs: “The SDGs include people with disabilities in their overarching call to LNOB but also contain a total of 11 explicit references to people with disabilities under five of the seventeen goals”(DFID 2018d, 3). Similarly, in DFID’s Youth Agenda Approach (DFID 2016a, 3), there is a dedicated section to Agenda 2030, however it is mostly a summary of what the “Global Goals” are and highlights that young people “must be at the heart of implementing, monitoring and evaluating the global goals”.

There is not, for example, an analysis of interlinkages between youth policy and the SDGs. DFID’s strategic vision on Gender similarly briefly links gender equality to the achievement of the SDGs and makes only one explicit reference to SDG 5, noting that Goal 5 and the other 17 SDGs “brought with them a global commitment and framework with the potential to put gender inequality” (DFID 2018c, 9). DFID’s position paper on Governance also uses the language of the SDGs to justify its prioritization of governance: “Progress on the SDGs is inextricably shaped by politics. Getting the governance right is the bedrock for progress on all the Goals” (DFID 2019a, 1). In this way, the SDGs are used to justify particular policy priority choices, rather than DFID’s identity as a donor.

It is also notable that there is not a clear narrative about the UK’s particular role within the Agenda 2030. There are narratives about the UK’s leadership role in negotiating the goals and some emphasis on the goals on women’s empowerment and justice. In March 2019, then Secretary of State Penny Mordaunt indicated that there were ongoing discussions about

127 “which particular goals [the UK] are globally the complete game changers in” (IDC 2019a, 21) While it is clear that the UK has particular focus areas when it comes to aid (e.g. their 4 pillars), these are not communicated as particular specializations within the SDGs. Rather they are identifying priorities and linking those priorities to the SDGs. In terms of whether the SDGs have led to shifts in policy priorities since the adoption of the SDGs, DFID staff highlighted greater attention to innovation, governance, partnerships and the private sector, although all of these topics had been a part of the development discourse and DAC debates even prior to 2015 (Anonymous interviews March 2019a-b). The turn to the private sector in terms of development was also a priority of the Conservative government and is a policy heavily criticized by the UK’s development community as potentially undermining the UK’s global contribution to the SDGs (Bond 2019)

While not specific to foreign aid, in 2017, the UK also published a document about the UK’s approach to Agenda 2030 and the SDGs in March 2017 (DFID 2017b). However, the document is largely rebranding of pre-existing initiatives or highlighting achievements from the UK aid program in the pre-SDG period. For instance, under SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), DFID highlights its Policy Framework for Agriculture (published November 2015) and its current work with development finance institutions and the World Bank to contribute to agricultural growth and sustainability. Similarly, under the other SDGs DFID references pre-existing commitments and programs and reframes them as contributing to the SDGs. In July 2019, the UK (DFID and the Cabinet Office) published a report on “Implementing the Sustainable Development Goals” that outlines “the ways that the Government is supporting the delivery of the [SDGs]”(UK 2019b). Like the previous document, this is an overview of examples under each SDG of commitments and policies that the UK is and has been undertaking that are relevant to the SDGs.

Overall, the UK does have some policy responsiveness in terms of its foreign aid policy in that SDG language does appear in DFID’s major policy instruments and there is a commitment to particular SDG principles, such as LNOB and the 5Ps. Regarding the usage of the SDGs in these policies, they appear largely to be a tool to communicate and justify the UK’s pre-existing development priorities, rather than to communicate a particular donor identity. The 2019 DFID SDP is, perhaps, an exception to this as the SDGs, along with poverty reduction, are briefly linked to DFID’s mandate. It is also notable that there has been a visible increase in consistency of references to the SDGs in DFID and the UK

128 government’s policy documents since the ramping up of the VNR process in 2019. This suggests that the preparation of a VNR has implications for foreign aid, at least at the level of policy and rhetoric. It is too soon to tell, however, if the increased usage of the SDGs in DFID’s policies will also translate to an institutionalization of the SDGs in the new FCDO’s communications, policies or ways of working.

6.2.3 Practice Responsiveness

As previously mentioned, data collection around the SDGs is one of the UK’s priorities. Domestically, the UK reports on 70% of the SDG targets and indicators making it a leader in coverage (Anonymous interview March 2019c). In terms of development assistance, the UK has been active in developing the proposed DAC voluntary SDG field and in the Inter- Agency Expert Group on the SDG Indicators. DFID staff indicated that DFID itself was working on aligning DFID’s targets and indicators to the SDG targets and indicators (Anonymous interview March 2019b). While the SDGs were integrated with the high-level objectives at the goal level in both the 2018 and 2019 SDP and Annual Report (this was not the case with the 2017 and 2016 iterations), SDG targets and indicators were not integrated.76 There are two brief references to SDG indicators related to incidence of malaria and neglected tropical diseases in DFID’s 2015-2020 results estimates published in August 2020 (DFID 2020). Nevertheless, overall, DFID’s approach to data in the SDG era, thus, focuses more on data disaggregation (as discussed above) than reporting on SDG targets and indicators.

This lack of integration at the target and indicator level is also interesting given that previous DFID results and performance frameworks “relied heavily on monitoring and reporting progress against global development outcomes, in particular progress towards the Millennium Development Goals” (DFID 2014, 2). More specifically, prior to 2014, DFID followed a four-level results framework of which one level specifically measured progress against MDG standard indicators.77 MDG indicators also appeared in other levels of DFID results. Annual reports and even individual country profiles included a green-amber-red and narrative analysis of progress against the SDGs, as shown in Figure 12 (DFID 2012). Recent country

76 DFID results framework launched in 2016 include a set of 14 headline indicators to measure progress against the objectives of the aid strategy and the SDP. None of the 14 are SDG indicators (DFID 2016b). 77 The four levels of DFID’s Results Framework 2011-2015 included: 1) Progress on key development outcomes (MDGs) 2) DFID results 3)Operational effectiveness and 4) Organizational efficiency

129 profiles, however, make one generic reference to achieving the SDGs in a section entitled “Contribution to the Global Goals and other Government Commitments” (DFID FOI Request 2019). This is not organized goal by goal, nor do they report on particular SDG indicators, rather this section reports high-level results, such as number of children supported to gain education, number of people with access to energy etc.

Figure 12 Example MDG Analysis in DFID Country Profiles (DFID 2012)

Figure 13 Example SDG section in DFID Country Profiles (DFID 2018a)

This shift away from the four-level approach to corporate results represented a broader shift “from an accountability and communication driven corporate results framework, to a more performance-focused management framework”(OECD 2017b). This reflected the Conservative government’s commitment to increase transparency and value for money (Valters and Whitty 2017). While reporting progress against the MDGs began under Labour- appointed Clare Short, the 2010 Conservative- Liberal Democrat Coalition government did make a commitment to “measure aid success in line with the MDGs” and continued to implement the previous approach with a greater emphasis on the MDGs prior to the release of the new results framework in 2016 (Valters and Whitty 2017, 26).

Nevertheless, the increased number of goals under the SDGs and their extensive targets and indicators made them difficult for DFID to work with at an operational level and DFID grappled with “whether and how to incorporate the SDG goals, targets and indicators in their corporate approach”(OECD 2017b, 8). In part, this reflected an initial objection to the large

130 number of SDGs (Anonymous interview 2019b). Nevertheless, it would appear that DFID decided to incorporate the SDGs at the goal level, rather than at the target and indicator level and decided against the goal by goal analysis conducted as part of earlier results reporting (see comparison of Figure 12 and 13).

Another important result of this reform period included the creation of DFID’s “Smart Rules”, the mandatory rules that govern DFID’s programming (DFID FOI request 2019). They include guidance on a variety of subjects ranging from accountability and due-diligence and programme design to delivery standards and project reporting templates (DFID 2019h). This document is relevant for discussion, here, as DFID argued that the SDGs have been “built in” to and guided this document (DFID FOI request 2019). However, the SDGs (as the “Global Goals”), are briefly mentioned three times in the 118-page document. More specifically, the “Partnership Principles” section is justified as a “commitment to reducing poverty and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (Global Goals)…and other international obligations” (22), similarly the section on bilateral programming standards notes that country offices “use a range of tools to determine how our resources can be best used to contribute to the UK Aid Strategy, DFID’s SDP and the Global Goals” (50). In this way, there is little guidance in this document about whether and how to integrate the SDGs at the level of internal corporate and programming processes.78

DFID (now FCDO) funds/has funded five projects explicitly related to the SDGs in developing countries, specifically around SDG data collection.79 For example, the Monitoring the SDGs project, implemented by UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), aims to “improve the use and dissemination of the SDG indicators at national and international levels” (DFID 2019g). As previously mentioned, DFID also funds the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data. Indeed, many of these SDG-specific projects

78 The FOI request also indicated that the SDGs “feature in guides for developing concept notes, monitoring, reviewing and scoring documents, logical frameworks and the Partnership Principles.” However, the Smart Guides are not publicly available (DFID FOI Request 2019) 79 The projects are: “Monitoring the SDGs” (6, 651, 975 pound budget), “Better global poverty data and measures to track progress towards the 2030 UN Sustainable Development Goals” (300,000 pound budget), “Discussion of how the Sustainable Development Goals are being evaluated” (47,000 pound budget), “Implementing Agenda 2030: Increasing the impact of Commonwealth Organisations 2017-2019” (27,310,000 pound budget)- this project is effectively core contribution to Commonwealth associated intergovernmental organizations, “Supporting SDG 16 through Global and National Advocacy and Data Management” (800,000 pound budget)- support for the UNDP to deliver advocacy, data management and country support to raise the profile of SDG 16 prior to the HLPF in July 2019 -UNDP actually made a proposal for funding to DFID (DFID project tracker).

131 are channeled through or to multilaterals such as various UN institutions or the GPSSD. Another development at the project level, relevant to DFID’s SDG response, is that recent (2019) updates of project descriptions and business cases increasingly link projects to relevant SDGs and some even to relevant targets and indicators. For instance, DFID framed its core contribution to UN Agencies (e.g. UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNWomen, UN Global Compact) and some multilateral programmes (e.g. Commonwealth) as contributing to “ensure that the UN system is fit for purpose to support implementation of the 2030 Agenda” (DFID 2020). Similarly, more sector specific projects were justified, in part, by their contribution to specific SDG targets. However, of the over 1500 active projects with information available on the UK’s development project tracker, only 21 projects make these kinds of broad or more specific reference to the SDGs.

Policy Responsiveness • Brief references to SDGs in key aid policy documents. • Some references to SDGs and SDG principle LNOB in other policies. • SDGs framed as business as usual and largely used to re-frame or justify pre- existing priorities. Practice Responsiveness • One team within former aid agency to coordinate VNR process. • SDGs referenced in monitoring and evaluation system at goal level. • Some brief and generic references to SDGs in project communications and corporate documents. • Funds some projects associated with SDGs.

Overall: Low-Moderate Responsiveness Figure 14 Summary of UK's SDG Responsiveness

Overall, while there is some responsiveness at the level of policy and practice (see Figure 14), DFID had a complacent attitude to its approach to the SDGs given that so much of its work was already aligned with the SDGs (Anonymous interviews March 2019 a-b). As argued by DFID, its “historical commitment to the Millennium Development Goals and now the SDGs means that all DFID’s work relates to the Goals in some degree” (DFID FOI Request 2019). This complacency is something also acknowledged by then Secretary of State Rory Stewart who argued that “there is still a lot of work to be done in DfID. We should not be complacent about what has happened in DfID. There is a tension here. We were set up to…focus on extreme poverty. Some of these indicators relate to extreme poverty indirectly, not directly. There are clear connections, right? There is a clear connection between gender equality and poverty; there is a clear connection between peace, justice and strong

132 institutions. But, when you begin to get into life below water, you move out of the traditional comfort zone of DfID” (IDC 2019b, n.p.). He then promised to “use [the SDGs] as a tool to change the way that DfID thinks about things and to challenge staff in DfID to be less resistant to pure environmental proposals” (ibid.). This did not materialize as Stewart left his post only a few short weeks after the VNR presentation.

6.3 Drivers of UK responsiveness

Given that so much of the UK’s and other DAC donors’ work were already aligned with the SDGs, the lack of new programming or policy may not indicate a lack of commitment to the SDGs. However, as argued by the International Development Committee of the UK parliament in its report of the UK’s progress on the SDGs, “though there are several examples of DFID activity that can be mapped against particular SDGs, it is less clear how central the SDGs are to DFID’s understanding of its mission” (IDC 2019, n.p.). Indeed, the most obvious effects of the SDGs on the UK’s foreign aid policy and practice lie at the level of communication and rhetoric. In terms of aid policy, the SDGs are used by the UK to justify and communicate pre-existing priorities.

Even the practices outlined in the previous section are at their core communicative, including framing results as contributing to particular goals or justifying particular approaches (e.g., inclusive data or partnerships) in this same way. The UK’s experience with the MDGs is illuminating in that it demonstrates that DFID’s engagement with previous global development goals were more substantive. As argued by Black and White (2003), DFID “embraced the...Millennium Development Goals more strongly than any other bilateral donor” (58). He notes that the MDGs were given “pride of place” in key strategy documents and there were significant internal efforts within DFID to accommodate the MDGs (ibid).

There are two elements of the UK’s SDG responsiveness that warrant explanation: the role of the VNR in ramping up SDG activity both within DFID and through the UK government, as well as, the fact that DFID used the SDGs to justify or re-frame pre-existing priorities, rather than to carve out a specialization within the SDG framework or link them more fundamentally to donor identity or leadership narratives, as other donors have done.

133 6.3.1 Show and Tell and The Impact of the Voluntary National Review in the UK

The UK presented its first VNR on July 16, 2019, making it one of the last OECD-DAC donor countries to do so. The UK first committed to undertake a VNR in November 2017. However, initial consultations did not begin until August 2018, while substantive preparations began in October 2018 (IDC 2019c). As previously mentioned, in late October 2018 DFID appointed Senior Responsible Officers and SDG Champions in relevant government departments to draft particular chapters of the VNR.80 Importantly, SROs and champions were not allocated additional resources for their work on the VNR and SDGs, limiting their ability to actually complete these tasks.

Throughout fall 2018 and winter 2019, DFID and chapter-lead departments held 35 stakeholder engagement events, supported by an Emerging Findings and Further Engagement document, although these were usually not widely advertised and sometimes ad-hoc.81 The engagement events targeted particular sectors or groups, including parliamentarians, international development organizations, civil society, local delivery organizations, private sector and faith groups. DFID also undertook engagement through an online portal that functioned to collect 270 “case studies” of SDG-relevant activities in the UK. In total, DFID engaged more than 380 organizations through the VNR process.

Concerning the broader impact of the VNR process in the UK, many of the SDG-specific policies and practices highlighted earlier in this chapter (e.g., SDG mainstreaming in the SDPs, DFID’s LNOB commitment, implementing the SDGs document) began or were launched in the months preceding the VNR, suggesting that in order to show and tell, one must have something to show and tell. As suggested by former chair of the International Development Parliamentary select committee, Stephen Twigg, the VNR “[focused] the government’s attention on to the SDGs” as it created an immediate deadline with a concrete output (Interview Stephen Twigg March 2019). Thus, the VNR put pressure on the government to begin to take more concrete action on the SDGs (e.g. implementation) and

80 Other government departments tapped to write VNR chapters include: Department for Work and Pensions, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Department of Health and Social Care, Department for Education, Government Equalities Office, Department for Business, Energy. And Industrial Strategy, HM Treasury, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Home Office. 81 DFID intended to use the Emerging Findings and Further Engagement document as a consultation device, for something for stakeholders to engage with. The Emerging Findings document essentially provides background information about the VNR and provided a goal by goal preview of the information that would appear in the VNR (e.g. case studies, key data, areas for further work, key goal interlinkages) (DFID 2019b).

134 dedicate time and resources to putting together a narrative on SDG implementation in the UK for the VNR. This involved collecting case-studies and identifying SDG relevant government activities and programs to highlight. It also necessitated new initiatives (e.g. mainstreaming the SDGs in SDPs) and a reframing of pre-existing commitments, particularly around the UK’s development assistance, using the language of the SDGs, hence the rewriting of DFID’s SDP five weeks before the presentation.

Concerning the aim of the VNR, the UK government wanted to use its VNR as “an opportunity… to cast light on the areas where we have performed less well, push back on areas where we think we have maybe performed better than people have acknowledged, and find intelligent ways of reflecting on the gap between rhetoric and reality, or the gap between what we do abroad and what we do at home” (IDC 2019b). Thus, while this represents an acknowledgement of the universality of the agenda (and the VNR was balanced between domestic implementation and international contributions), the government also perceived the VNR as an opportunity to communicate and defend its record, in particular concerning the UK’s role as a global leader.

The desire to cast light on areas of poor performance is arguably belied by the strong narrative about the UK’s global leadership throughout the VNR. Indeed, one of the most prominent code to emerge in the qualitative analysis of the VNR was “leadership” (see Appendix D). More specifically, the VNR constructs a narrative of UK leadership as an innate characteristic and a tool for action or influence, particularly in international settings. The former is rooted in references to British expertise, for example around measuring poverty (29) and data (102). In fact, there was a heavy emphasis the UK’s leadership on data collection, with DFID Director-General Economic Development and International, Nick Dyer noting that “there is far more data in this report than many of the other VNRs that we see out there” (ibid.). Data collection is one of the clear focus areas of the UK’s SDG response, with an entire chapter dedicated to the UK’s approach to SDG data collection. Data is also central to the chapter on LNOB that provides several examples of data-centered initiatives such as a Race Disparity Audit and a civil society project around increasing data collection around disability in development projects. Each goal-focused chapter provides “The Data Picture” of progress on particular goals (and occasionally at the target level but this is not systematic). In fact, many of the “activity snapshots” and case studies provided in the VNR also point to data-centered initiatives. It is also buttressed by references to UK spending in particular

135 areas, for instance in providing finance for climate resilience (166), global health threats (59) and clean energy (102).

The framing of British leadership as a tool is centered on how the UK has used its leadership to secure key policy goals internationally, from ending hunger, championing LGBT and disability rights and combatting climate change. This active leadership narrative is also supported by references to the UK’s leadership in negotiating the goals, as well as participation in multilateral organizations and initiatives such as the UN Panel on women’s economic empowerment (37), the Scaling Up Nutrition initiative, GAVI, the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery and the Green Climate Fund, among others. Crucially, many of these initiatives and leadership examples involve actions or commitments taken prior to 2015. In this way, the VNR serves as a reminder of the UK’s previous leadership, rather than carving out a novel leadership role within the SDGs.82

The government also sought to showcase a whole-of-UK approach including contributions from the devolved administrations (Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) and non- governmental actors, including civil society and private sector actors. The whole-of-UK approach reflects the government view that they “cannot centralise responsibility for delivering these goals. It is not a Government’s responsibility; it is all Government, all officials, civil servants, civil society, private sector” (IDC 2019a). This argument shifts the primary responsibility for SDG implementation away from the central government to other segments of UK society. Rather, the government envisions its role as removing “some of the effort of ‘getting with the programme’, whether it is business or other organizations that want to start to contribute more to the delivery of these goals” (Penny Mordaunt, oral evidence, IDC 2019a).

The UK’s identity as a leader in the context of development assistance hinges most clearly around the 0.7% law. Looking at the co-occurrence of the 0.7% and leadership codes (Appendix D) demonstrates that in almost all the contexts in which the 0.7% law is mentioned in the document, it is used to showcase UK leadership as “one of the largest providers of ODA in the world” (205) and “one of the leading international contributors to the goals” (12, emphasis added). There are also numerous references to UK leadership in other development sectors such as global health, poverty, climate and gender equality. In fact,

82 With, perhaps, the exception of SDG data.

136 almost every chapter in the VNR makes reference to some form of UK leadership domestically and abroad, with 35 segments of text coded with the “leadership” code. In this way, the UK uses the VNR to remind the audience of its pre-existing leadership in development, specifically by highlighting its track record on the quality and quantity of its ODA.

The VNR presentation in July shared many of the characteristics of the VNR document. The presentation began with a short video emphasizing the UK’s domestic activities and accomplishments related to particular goals, namely SDG 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 13 and 16.83 Following the video, presentations were made by the former Secretary of State Rory Stewart, Dr. Claire Melamed of the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, Michele Giddens of Bridges (a UK impact investor) and Rebecca Hawkins, a young activist from the Climate Coalition. The composition of the delegation clearly reflects the UK’s particular priorities within the Agenda- namely climate action, private sector mobilization and the importance of SDG data.

Like the physical document, the VNR presentation highlights British leadership, including in development. At the very start of his remarks, Stewart underscored that the UK was “very proud that we continue to spend 0.7% of our GNI on international aid” (DFID 2019f). His speech also highlighted areas such as climate (including the net zero emissions by 2050 commitment), employment and education, where the UK has made progress while also sharing challenges around housing, food banks, child poverty and prisons.84 He closed his remarks by emphasizing that “development whether abroad or at home connects to issues of money, politics and power and above all the lesson we’ve taken from this is the lesson of humility, that the only wisdom is the wisdom of humility. Humility is endless.” This focus on humility is interesting, given that it had featured less prominently in the UK’s SDG narratives prior to Stewart’s short tenure as Development Secretary.

The VNR and the presentations serve to remind the audience of the UK’s leadership, both through its domestic progress and actions and activism on specific files in international venues. What it does not do is construct a coherent narrative about where the UK, either

83 The only development related initiative highlighted was the “Connecting classrooms through global learning” programme that is a partnership between the British Council and DFID aimed at increasing access to quality education both within Britain and abroad (“Connecting Classrooms through Global Learning” n.d.). 84 The latter represents a personal commitment from the development Secretary, as he had previously held a junior ministerial position as Minister of State for Prisons and Probation.

137 domestically or in terms of foreign aid, aspires to be within the Agenda. Within the foreign aid policy domain, the UK’s leadership is framed through reference to the 0.7% law and expertise in particular development areas, rather than being framed explicitly using SDG language (for example, through a specialization in a particular area).

6.3.2 The UK’s Reputational Aspirations

The UK presents an interesting case when considering the impact of reputational aspirations on SDG implementation, as there has been a clear shift in the content and nature of the UK government’s reputational aspirations. While aid and the 0.7% law remain an important reputational tool for the UK post-Brexit, the UK perception of the SDGs as a reputational tool appears to be limited.

6.3.2.1 David Cameron, the SDGs and “Detoxifying” the Conservative Brand

When David Cameron became the leader of the UK Conservative Party in 2005, he committed to “detoxify” and modernize the Conservative brand, following decades of being seen as the “nasty-party… unchanged, unrepentant and just plain unattractive” (Heppell and Lightfoot 2012, 132). This campaign included the EU referendum proposal, a commitment to LGBTI equality, a focus on the environment, among other issues outside of the traditional Conservative wheelhouse (Green 2010). Another key component was the 0.7% ODA commitment, as well as “a broader engagement with internationalism” (Interview Stephen Twigg March 2019).

The Cameron Conservatives followed a “One World Conservatism” approach to foreign policy more generally, bringing together liberal and conservative principles - “Liberal because Britain must be open and engaged with the world, supporting human rights and championing the cause of democracy and the rule of law… but Conservative, because our policy must be hard-headed and practical, dealing with the world as it is and not as we wish it were” (Conservative Party 2010a, 109). Their foreign policy commitments in this era included a commitment to act with “moral authority” and renew and reinforce Britain’s engagement with the rest of the world, including “working as a constructive member of the United Nations, NATO and other multilateral organizations” (Conservative Party 2011).

Foreign aid was an integral part of this brand of conservative internationalism. Cameron was a strong advocate for aid, stressing a “moral obligation to make poverty history” and that

138 “0.7 per cent of our Gross National Income is [not] too high a price to pay for saving lives” (UK 2011). At the same time, in keeping with Conservative values, he also argued that aid “is a vital contributor to [the UK’s] long-term national security” (Conservative Party 2006, 8). This commitment to aid also included a commitment to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The 2009 Conservative Green Paper “One World Conservatism” laid out the Conservatives proposed approach to aid. The MDGs feature prominently in this document, in part as a framing device reinforcing the moral imperative to end extreme poverty, which the document names as an “insult to our humanity,” but they are also framed as a “crucial guiding star for the whole international community” (Conservative Party 2009, 8).85

As argued by Heppell and Lightfoot (2012, 132), leaning on “compassionate conservatism” or “progressive ends-conservative means” was an ultimately successful attempt to “re- orientate the party’s position to the centre ground and the location of the median voter and move away from the traditional core Conservative concerns that reinforced the nasty party imagery.” Thus, the Conservatives’ aid policy served an instrumental purpose in improving their domestic electoral reputation. This commitment to international aid was not merely talk, as in March 2015, the UK passed the International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act, enshrining the 0.7% GNI spending commitment into law, the only OECD-DAC donor to do so (as of 2020). The Conservatives also repeatedly committed to and in fact did maintain DFID’s status as an independent agency (until 2020), recognizing “how much DFID contributes to Britain’s global reputation” (UK 2010).

While there were key aid policy changes during Cameron’s tenure- namely a turn to the private sector, more emphasis on aid to conflict-affected countries, the creation of an independent aid watchdog (Independent Commission on Aid Impact) and a “more apolitical approach to portfolio management”, the Conservatives retained the basic tenets of the previous Labour government’s approach to aid policy, namely a focus on eradicating poverty and achieving the MDGs (Clarke 2018). For instance, DFID’s business plan in this period listed the honouring of international commitments and supporting actions to achieve the Millennium Development Goals a core priority for the government.86 Another core priority of

85 At the same time, the document also acknowledges that the MDGs “less useful for measuring DFID’s specific performance”, hence the development of a multi-tiered performance measurement system described earlier. 86 Even DFID’s planned departmental expenditure in the early years of the Cameron Conservatives were broken down by both the departmental priorities and the MDGs.

139 the business plan was to “influence the global development system… to ensure coordinated worldwide action to deliver international development goals” and to “develop a long-term programme to enhance UK ‘soft power’ [using] all our national instruments, including a world class programme of aid” (DFID 2011, 6-8).87 The prominence of the MDGs in Cameron’s aid narrative is unsurprising given that the MDGs codify the norm of ending extreme poverty, thereby fitting neatly with the moral narrative of Cameron’s justification for aid (Hulme and Fukuda-Parr 2009).88

The Post-2015 Agenda became another cornerstone of Cameron’s rhetoric around foreign aid. The 2015 Conservative Manifesto reaffirms the commitment to aid and also includes a commitment to “push for new global goals to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030 and promote human development, gender equality and good governance” (Conservative Party 2015). In what some describe as a political coup, given significant opposition from within his party to his approach to aid, Cameron was appointed by then Secretary General of the UN Ban Ki- Moon to co-chair the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (Kamau, Chasek, and O’Connor 2018). This gave him, and the UK, a prominent role and influence on the Post-2015 Agenda, while boosting the UK’s reputation in the development field. Cameron was particularly concerned with ensuring that eliminating extreme poverty was at the core of the new goals. For example, during a parliamentary debate on the G7 and post-2015 Agenda, he even went as far as to argue that eradicating extreme poverty “has to come before issues of inequality” (House of Commons (HC)-Deb G7 2014). He also wanted to ensure that the successor goals were underpinned by the “golden thread” of good governance (HC-Deb Millennium Development Goals 2013).

His championing of the global goals, as vehicles to eliminate poverty while strengthening governance systems, stemmed from Cameron’s particular brand of liberal Conservative internationalism that invoked an outward-looking Britain and one whose national interest was best served by renewing and reinforcing its engagement with the rest of the world (Beech 2011). Prior to the Brexit vote, Cameron continued to champion the goals both at home and abroad, arguing that the SDGs are a “clarion-call… to eliminate, for the first time in human

87 Unlike the Labour government, the Conservatives did not produce a coherent aid-related strategy or white paper between 2010 and 2015 (OECD 2014b; Clarke 2018). 88 During this time there were also several campaigns, namely “Make Poverty History” and concerted activism from a well-organized and well-resourced development community in the UK. Both of which, helped to propel ending extreme poverty and the MDGs onto the UK’s aid agenda.

140 history, the scourge of extreme poverty” (UK 2015). Given this high-level commitment from the Prime Minister and leadership during the negotiations, the UK was poised to be a leader on SDG implementation.

6.3.2.2 Global Britain, the 0.7% donor

The June 2016 Brexit referendum was a pivotal moment in British politics with ramifications for all policy work in the UK, including SDG implementation. As argued by Glencross and McCourt (2018, 585), Brexit “unsettle[d] other countries’ expectations about the UK’s role in the world.”89 In other words, the outcome of the Brexit vote altered the reputational needs of the UK and necessitated a rethinking of the role of UK aid and foreign policy more generally vis a vis the UK’s reputation and influence. More specifically, the UK’s reputational aspirations in the post-Brexit climate involved the need to repair the reputational damage wrought by Brexit, particularly in international fora.

Then Prime Minister Theresa May first signaled her foreign policy ambitions in October 2016, arguing that the referendum was a vote “to forge an ambitious and optimistic new role in the world” (May 2016). In a speech outlining the government’s Brexit negotiating objectives, May more specifically outlined a vision of a “Global Britain— the best friend and neighbour to our European partners [and] a country that reaches beyond the borders of Europe... A country that goes out into the world to build relationships with old friends and new allies alike… A great, global trading nation that is respected around the world and strong, confident and united at home” (UK 2017a). This idea of “Global Britain” became a core narrative about the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy approach.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) suggests that Global Britain is “about reinvesting in our relationships, championing the rules-based international order and demonstrating that the UK is open, outward-looking and confident on the world stage” (FCO 2018b, npg). While there has yet to be a clearly articulated “Global Britain” strategy, clear policy directions include strengthening the “special relationship” with the United States and pursuing bilateral trade agreements with countries such as China.90 Like Cameron’s “liberal

89 A clear expression of this reputational damage includes the UK’s failure to win the election of a UK judge to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in November 2017, for example. 90 Daddow (2019) argues that “Global Britain extended the “pragmatic” tradition in British foreign policy, themed around the dogged pursuit of vital British economic and security interests through the exercise of its hard and soft power capabilities” (Daddow 2019)

141 conservative” internationalism, Global Britain also places emphasis on the importance of multilateral institutions, promising that the UK’s commitment to the UN will remain “core” to the UK’s foreign policy (FCO 2018a, npg).

Where do foreign aid policy and the SDGs more specifically fit within the ambition of Global Britain? Unlike her predecessors, May was a less vocal supporter of British aid and her first appointment for Secretary of State for International Development, Priti Patel, was firmly an aid sceptic (Mawdsley 2017). However, throughout her leadership she continued to reaffirm her government’s commitment to the 0.7% ODA spend, justified in part because of the reputational and soft power benefits it provides. In evidence given to the Foreign Affairs select committee, the FCO stressed that its status as a 0.7% donor “gives [the UK] tremendous influence within international institutions”(FCO 2018a). It also underscores that:

the UK is rightly proud of its leadership on international development. We were one of only 6 countries to meet the UN’s 0.7% GNI ODA target in 2016, the third largest contributor of global ODA overall. We are, as the manifesto commitment makes clear, committed to ensuring that ODA remains fit for purpose and fully supports and helps deliver the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals in which we played a full part in securing. Our development budget not only helps us to champion the poor but— alongside the diplomatic network—gives us access and insight on key global issues that matter to partners and are important to UK national interests.

Like Cameron, the post-Brexit Conservative view of foreign aid recognized that British aid is a significant reputational tool that makes “a powerful statement of Global Britain’s place in the world” (Conservative Party 2017, 39). Unlike Cameron, however, the discourse around justifying aid shifted away from a balance between the moral imperative to end extreme poverty and the national interest, and became more explicitly linked to the national interest.91 For instance, the 2017 Conservative Manifesto justifies the commitment to lead the world in development because “it protects our interests: by building a safer, healthier, more prosperous world, we can protect our own people from disease, conflict and instability” (ibid). May vowed to keep the 0.7% spending, but “with new rules to spend it more effectively” (30). More specifically, the Conservatives argued that (39):

We do not believe that international definitions of development assistance always help in determining how money should be spent, on whom and for what purpose. So

91 Under Cameron, there was, of course, a link to national security and the national interest but it was balanced by the rhetoric around the moral imperative of ending extreme poverty. Furthermore, May shied away from Cameron’s liberal Conservatism, promising that under her government “there will be no ideological crusades” (Conservative Party 2017).

142 we will work with like-minded countries to change the rules so that they are updated and better reflect the breadth of our assistance around the world. If that does not work, we will change the law to allow us to use a better definition of development spending, while continuing to meet our 0.7 per cent target.

This further demonstrates an increasing turn towards the national interest, as the UK under the May Conservatives, tried to find maneuver room within the ODA budget for initiatives serving the national interest as well as trying to change aid rules, even if it meant changing domestic law in a way contrary to international aid practices, although in the end it did not come to this.

In practice, the shift to national interest translated to greater ODA spending away from DFID to other government departments and the eventual DFID merger. For instance, the 2019 statistical report on the UK’s ODA spending shows an 11.3% increase in ODA spending from other government departments. Internationally, in the DAC, the UK successfully pushed to alter spending rules so that a greater proportion of UN peacekeeping contributions, contributions to development banks like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and certain security related activities, such as demining and counter terrorism could count as ODA (DFID 2017c). Thus, even with the pivot to a more national interest focused aid frame, the UK still sought to lead internationally on aid, choosing to go through international fora to change the aid rules in its favor. Then development Secretary Priti Patel justified this international advocacy to change ODA rules by arguing that “as a country that plays by the rules, we take a leading role in influencing and shaping these rules” (UK 2017b).

Thus, while the justificatory narratives around aid, as well as certain practices around ODA spending in the UK shifted, maintaining a leadership role among donors remains an important instrument in maintaining the UK’s international reputation. Unlike the domestic targets of Cameron’s reputational moves with compassionate conservatism, the reputational targets of “Global Britain” are primarily international, including within the international development community and in multilateral institutions (Gifkins, Jarvis, and Ralph 2019). As argued by Mawdsley (2017, 10), holding prominent positions among donors and multilateral institutions “enable[s] UK leaders, diplomats and civil servants to project direct and indirect influence over international norms, debates and policy statements.” Adhering to the 0.7% commitment is a core part of maintaining that leadership status in these particular contexts. For instance, a study of the UK’s influence at the UN found that the UK’s reputation in the UNGA “would be in sort of free fall territory” without the 0.7% commitment, particularly

143 given that development is the top priority for many member-states (Gifkins, Jarvis, and Ralph 2019, 7).

The 0.7% commitment is an integral part of the UK’s donor identity narrative, with former DFID leadership and government ministers frequently referencing the commitment in a variety of international fora from the DAC to the UN. The SDGs, on the other hand, and compared to the role of the MDGs in previous Conservative aid policies, feature far less prominently. In the only reference to the SDGs, the 2017 Manifesto promised to “continue to use our aid budget in alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals,” along with other priorities such as ending extreme poverty, saving children’s lives and girls’ education. While the Global Britain narrative described earlier does highlight the UK’s leadership in negotiating the goals, it lacks a concrete narrative about implementing the goals and where the UK stands within the Agenda, other than its broad support for the goals. This reflects the fact that the government chose to rely on the reputational capital already offered by the 0.7% commitment, rather than the SDGs.

The UK was initially opposed to the large number of goals, wanting to keep the number closer to 12 (IDC 2016; Anonymous interview 2019b). As suggested by David Cameron prior to the adoption of the goals, “I don’t believe they will cut it at 17. There are too many to communicate effectively… There’s a real danger they will end up on a bookshelf, gathering dust” (Ford 2014). While the UK eventually relented on the number of goals, the sense that there are too many goals remains, with senior DFID staff pointing to the number of goals as a significant implementation challenge (Anonymous interviews 2019a-b). Furthermore, in her oral evidence to the IDC’s ongoing inquiry into the UK’s progress on the SDGs, then Secretary of State Penny Mordaunt stated that the SDGs should be “business as usual… we do not need extra people running round doing things to specially embed additional fringe activity” (IDC 2019). While this in part reflects a desire to minimize the burden of SDG implementation on government agencies, it also reflects an attitude that the SDGs do not imply a significant change in how development (both domestically and internationally) is accomplished. Indeed, when asked about the role of the SDGs in UK aid, DFID respondents indicated that the SDGs are an “overarching framework” that is already implicit in all of the UK’s development work (anonymous interviews February 2019a-b; DFID FOI request 2019). This interpretation of the SDGs arguably suggests no need for an explicit change in policy orientation.

144 Furthermore, the greatest challenge faced by the UK when it comes to its development assistance is justifying the 0.7% spend, given the increasing anti-aid sentiment emboldened by the broader Brexit rhetoric. The Secretary of State for International Development during much of the VNR, Penny Mordaunt, was initially interested in the communicative power of the SDGs. Indeed, at an SDG engagement event a senior DFID staff member explained that the Secretary of State was interested in leveraging the SDGs, particularly as they are universal, as a way to better communicate the UK’s development work. Furthermore, initial activities around the goals were communications campaigns including a #myglobalgoal twitter campaign in January 2018 and a global goal arts competition for British youth. The VNR itself acknowledges the communicative role of the SDGs, suggesting that the SDGs “have given us a way of talking about all this” (UK 2019a, 4). However, public knowledge of the SDGs in the UK is low, with a recent Ipsos poll finding that 51% of people surveyed had never heard of the SDGs (Ipsos 2019). This belies the potential utility of the SDGs in better communicating the UK’s development work in an increasingly aid-sceptic environment. Rather the focus of domestic narratives around aid have narrowed in on the idea of national interest, results and greater accountability as a means to convince domestic audiences of the importance of aid (Mawdsley 2017).

Thus, the perceived utility of the SDGs for furthering the UK’s post-Brexit reputational aspirations (e.g. repairing its international reputation and justifying its aid spend domestically) is limited. The UK can still accrue reputational benefits, and chose to do so, from its aid programme via its 0.7% commitment and policy leadership on more specific development issues such as disability, data, governance and preventing sexual exploitation and abuse, without carving out a particular niche or leadership narrative around the SDGs. In other words, the bulk of the reputational work performed by the UK’s aid program has already been done with the 0.7% commitment. As previously mentioned, the former DFID itself was also a significant source of reputational capital.

Following Brexit and Cameron’s exit, interview respondents remarked on a notable lack of high-level political commitment from Cameron’s successors to the SDGs (to the point where Theresa May wearing an SDG pin was considered as a significant improvement by SDG enthusiasts in the UK) (Interview Andrew Griffiths February 2019). As argued by one of the many former Secretary of States, Rory Stewart, “to be very blunt, one big challenge is going to be how much emphasis the next Prime Minister and the head of the Cabinet Office put on

145 the SDGs” (IDC 2019b). May’s successor, Boris Johnson, is an aid skeptic who eventually merged DFID with the FCO. While, like May, he initially continued to stand by the 0.7% commitment, in November 2020 this commitment was scrapped due to the Covid-19 pandemic (Dickson 2020). While it is early yet to concretely assess Johnson’s approach to the SDGs specifically, the SDGs appear to have even less political priority than under May.

Justine Greening September 2012- July 2016 Priti Patel July 2016- November 2017 Penny Mordaunt November 2017 – May 2019

Rory Stewart May 2019 - July 2019 Alok Sharma July 2019 – February 2020 Anne-Marie Trevelyan February 2020 – September 2020 (Final Secretary of State for International Development)

Figure 15 DFID Secretary of States (2015-2020)

The lack of high-level commitment from various UK Prime Ministers is further compounded by a revolving door of Secretary of State’s for International Development, each with their own particular priorities and visions for DFID. Between 2015-2020, the UK has had 6 Secretaries of State for International Development (see Figure 15). As argued by Rory Stewart (IDC 2019b),

the problem DfID has is that every Secretary of State who comes in suddenly has a new priority. To take an example, traditionally we did not do work on disabilities. A new Secretary of State will come in, and suddenly we have to stand up a new centrally managed programme on disabilities. We did not have experts on urban planning and cities, and we will suddenly decide that we need to do something on global goal 11, and then we have to stand it all up.

Not only did Brexit affect the reputational needs of the UK internationally, but also constrained its ability to implement new policy initiatives not associated with leaving the European Union. For instance, by April 2019, when the VNR preparations were in full swing, 101 DFID staff had been seconded to work on Brexit (DFID 2019d). The SDG team within DFID had initially been protected from Brexit related re-assignments during the VNR process, although following the end of the VNR process some of the core team members left (IDC 2019a). As previously mentioned, DFID was responsible for coordinating the UK’s VNR and SDG implementation more broadly. This placed a high burden on the SDG team given that DFID is an international facing department but was not as well placed in raising the profile of the SDGs among other branches of government. While this issue of DFID’s capacity to influence other government departments does not explain the UK’s limited

146 political commitment, it was an important barrier to meaningful implementation, particularly domestically. Indeed, the IDC inquiry into the UK’s SDG implementation also found the lack of “administrative means”, including human resources, a key barrier to SDG implementation (IDC 2019c). Nevertheless, the most significant impact of Brexit of relevance for the SDGs was the shift in the UK’s reputational needs and aspirations.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter suggests that while the UK demonstrates some responsiveness to the SDGs, prior to the VNR process the country had a low political commitment to the SDGs. While the UK used the SDGs to frame pre-existing policy priorities, it did not link the goals to its donor identity narratives.

The UK’s initial engagement with the 2030 Agenda, particularly by David Cameron, demonstrates that the perceived utility of the SDGs in furthering particular leadership ambitions can translate to high level political attention and engagement. The Cameron Conservatives perceived aid and the MDGs, and later the SDGs, as instrumental in detoxifying the Conservative brand and thereby courting more centrist votes. However, the Brexit referendum shifted the UK’s reputational needs both domestically and internationally. Domestically, Brexit emboldened aid-skeptic rhetoric meaning that the government needed to more consistently justify the 0.7% commitment. Given the relatively low awareness of the SDGs domestically, the goals are a less useful narrative than national interest and accountability in countering this aid-skepticism. Internationally, the 0.7% commitment already offered the UK significant reputational clout in multilateral settings and it was that commitment, rather than the SDGs, that became a central part of the Global Britain narrative (at least until 2020 and the Covid-19 pandemic). As such, the UK’s lower responsiveness can be explained by this shifting reputational landscape and the lack of reputational advantage offered by the SDGs.

Another important trend evident from this case is that the ramping up of SDG activity in the UK prior to the VNR, at least at the level of policy and rhetoric, which suggests that the VNR does have a galvanizing effect- even on aid policy, as seen by the shift in approach to DFID’s SDP. However, in September 2020 the UK government, merged DFID with the FCO and in November 2020 abandoned the 0.7% commitment, now bringing in to question the centrality of aid itself to the UK’s Global Britain strategy and its reputational ambitions. Time will tell

147 if the post VNR-results described in this chapter are indeed sustainable without a dedicated international development agency, however, given the current trajectory more meaningful and sustained SDG implementation in the UK is unlikely.

148 Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

This dissertation located the origin of donors’ variable political commitment to the SDGs, in order to illuminate the mechanisms through which global development goals drive behavioural change among bilateral OECD-DAC donors. To this end, I outlined the unique features of the SDGs as ambitious and vague, with weak institutionalisation. I also suggested that the learning and best-practice sharing function of the SDGs’ follow-up and review mechanism (the HLPF and VNR) was less prominent than intended and that these processes were largely performative in nature.

In keeping with these unique characteristics, I then offered an argument that took seriously the potential of this performance and show and tell on the SDG-specific stages of the HLPF and VNR, as well as in aid policies, practices and rhetoric to shape state behaviour. It also acknowledged, however, that the sensitivity of donors to this mechanism was dependent on reputational concerns. I suggested that those donors more likely to link their donor identity narratives to the SDGs and be responsive to the SDGs were those whose governments perceive that the SDGs are useful in furthering or maintaining a particular reputation. The three empirical chapters traced how this argument applied in the three cases of Sweden, Canada and the UK. I illustrated that Sweden and Canada demonstrated greater political commitment to the SDGs than the UK.

This conclusion begins with a comparative analysis of the three cases, assessing how the different components of the central argument apply across the cases. This comparative analysis is useful for identifying the nuances, strengths and limitations of the argument. This chapter also identifies both research and policy contributions and offers potential areas for future research. I have also included a brief discussion about the implications of the Covid- 19 pandemic for this research.

7.2 Comparative Analysis

In summarizing the central argument of the dissertation, I offered four propositions:

149 1) The SDGs exert influence on states through their integration in donor normative frameworks, particularly through linkage with donor identity, in a process of show and tell by donors to both international and domestic audiences.

2) Donor states are more likely to link their aid policy and donor identity narratives to the SDGs based on their relative concern for building or affirming a particular reputation.

3) Donors perceived instrumentality of the SDGs in building these reputations determines their choice to use the SDGs specifically as a reputational tool.

4) Donors’ perception of SDG fit with their international or domestic strategic aims and/or resonance with desired reputation audience shapes their perceived instrumentality of the SDGs in furthering reputational aspirations.

In this section, I comparatively assess the extent to which the propositions applied across the three case studies.

7.2.1 The Impact of Show and Tell (Proposition 1)

I argued that show and tell dynamics in the performative sites of the HLPF, VNR and aid normative frameworks (e.g., policies, practices and communications) had the potential to influence state behaviour, particularly through the embedding of the SDGs in donor aid frameworks and the linkage of the goals to donor identity narratives. To assess the impact of this performative mechanism of goal influence, I investigated how and the extent to which donors integrated the SDGs in their aid frameworks. Across the three cases, there was variation in the extent to which and how the SDGs are embedded in donor normative frameworks.

Among the three cases, the SDGs are most consistently embedded across Sweden’s aid policies, practices and aid communications. For instance, Sweden organized its post-2015 reporting on its Policy for Global Development (PGU) around the 17 goals, and there is some analysis of SDG linkages in its 2016 aid policy framework, as well as in Sida’s strategies and policies. The SDGs appear in Canada’s primary aid policy — the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) — but are less consistently referenced or analysed in more sector specific policies or its aid communications. Similarly, in the UK prior to the VNR process,

150 the SDGs were only briefly mentioned in its overarching aid strategy. I noted that following the VNR process, the SDGs increasingly appeared in other corporate strategies such as DFID’s Single Departmental Plan (SDP).

However, even Sweden who committed SDG leadership, uses the SDGs more as a framing device to communicate and justify particular narratives and ambition rather than as a central guiding principle of its aid policies and practices. Canada and the UK similarly leverage the SDGs in this way. This rhetorical and framing effect of the SDGs across the three cases confirms flexibility of the SDG script that can be used to communicate and justify a host of pre-existing priorities and policies.

I argue, then, that the crucial difference between the three cases lies more in whether donors link the SDGs to their donor identity narratives, than how often or how consistently the SDGs appear in aid policies or communications. In Chapter 3, I argued that this linking of the SDGs with these identity narratives in the process of show and tell can influence donors by leading to a prioritization of goal attaining behaviour because it comes to be linked with the achievement of a particular identity, including leadership aspirations and, in the longer term, through the institutionalisation of the SDGs in donors’ aid practices and institutions.

All three case countries aspire and make claims to identities as leaders within the donor community. However, the SDGs feature differently in their leadership narratives. Canada and Sweden both linked the SDGs to their donor leadership narratives. Sweden most explicitly declared its ambition to be a leader in SDG implementation— an assertation that also appeared in the aid specific stages of their aid policy documents and communications. With the launch of the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), Canada indicated its reputational ambition to be a leader specifically in the implementation of SDG 5: Gender Equality. Sweden, on the other hand, more explicitly referenced implementation in its leadership narrative, while Canada’s SDG-5 leadership narrative in FIAP was less explicitly linked to the implementation of the SDGs. In this way, Sweden’s SDG champion state ambition raised the importance of actually undertaking goal-attaining behaviour (rather than just rhetorical nods to the SDGs), as the framing and even, perhaps, credibility of its donor leadership narrative hinged around implementation. For Canada, the implications of its SDG 5 leader narrative for SDG implementation involved policies and practices contributing specifically to gender equality and women’s empowerment.

151 In contrast to Sweden and Canada, the UK used its 0.7%/GNI ODA law as a cornerstone of its donor leadership narrative, rather than a linkage to the SDGs. Furthermore, the UK has not outlined a clear narrative about the UK’s role within the SDGs, apart from references to the UK’s previous leadership during the negotiation of the goals. As such, there was even less of an imperative to implement the SDGs in the UK to bolster its claim to donor leadership.

These trends are also evident on the SDG-specific stages of the HLPF and VNR, both of which are also important sites of show and tell. In the three case chapters, I outlined the stories donors told on these stages. Sweden reinforced its SDG leadership narrative, its own exceptionalism and a commitment to multilateralism. Canada, similarly, told a story about the return of a humble feminist ally to the multilateral stage, underscoring its commitment to SDG 5 and to the universality of the Agenda 2030. The UK, on the other hand, sought to remind its peers of its international leadership, including its donor leadership through the 0.7% law. As was the case with the donor-specific stages described in the previous paragraphs, Canada and Sweden wove the SDGs into their claims to international leadership, while the UK relied on another tool to do so (e.g. the 0.7% law). Nevertheless, all three donors under study engaged in some form of show and tell behaviour.

Whether this show and tell actually changed donors’ behaviour, through the long-term effects of donor identity linkage and/or institutionalisation, is less evident. The ramping up of SDG related activity (e.g. new policy announcements, creation of SDG institutional arrangements or stakeholder engagement) prior to the VNR across all three cases suggests that the show and tell of the VNR process specifically prompts some level of implementation. The UK is the most obvious case of the impact of the VNR on SDG implementation, as prior to the 2018-2019 preparations there was very little SDG activity both domestically and in terms of foreign aid policy. In the months and weeks prior to the VNR, DFID launched SDG-related policies (e.g., the LNOB commitment) and increased integration of the SDGs in SDPs, for example. In Canada, preparations for the VNR occurred alongside key SDG commitments including budget allocations for the SDGs, a commitment to the development of a national action plan and the launching of the SDGs Hub. The effect of the VNR is less apparent in Sweden, in part due to the fact that it had already begun SDG implementation prior to the presentation of the VNR in 2017 (e.g. appointing a delegation in 2016, forming an international high-level 2030 Agenda political group in 2015). Thus, the VNR may matter more in countries with lower political commitment as it compels them to undertake some

152 form of implementation (or commitment to implement) in order to have something to show and tell in the VNR and at the HLPF.

Similarly, the impact of show and tell in donor specific sites (e.g. aid policies and practices), is not clear. In part, this is because five years after the Agenda’s adoption is too soon to observe some of the institutionalisation or identity linkage effects described in Chapter 3. There is some indication of institutionalisation in the Canadian and Swedish case, as they linked their monitoring and evaluation systems (e.g. their targets and indicators) to the SDGs at the goal, and occasionally indicator, level. As described above both Canada and Sweden have begun to link their leadership aspirations to the SDGs. In principle, the linking of the SDGs, either through an explicit focus on implementation (Sweden) or specialization (Canada), to these donors’ leadership narratives may raise the stakes of SDG implementation as goal-attaining behaviour becomes linked to the achievement or maintenance of a particular donor identity narrative. However, it is difficult to observe this particular effect in the short- term.

7.2.2 Reputation and the SDGs (Propositions 2-4)

The preceding discussion described the performative mechanism through which the SDGs elicit behavioural change. However, this cannot account for why some donors (e.g. Canada and Sweden) choose to link their donor identity narratives to the SDGs while others (e.g. the UK) do not. In Chapter 3, I argued that donors’ sensitivity to the mechanism of show and tell was rooted in their particular reputational aspirations and the perceived instrumentality of the SDGs in furthering those reputations. Reputation is a particularly compelling explanation given the performative dynamics of the SDGs. The SDGs are a flexible script that can be used to communicate a range of identities, while the HLPF and VNR processes provide a high-profile stage for donors’ reputational performances.

In each of the case chapters, I identified the reputational needs and aspirations of the relevant governments. Sweden sought to maintain its long-standing reputation for international leadership, particularly in multilateral settings. Specifically, it aimed to further a reputation for two modes of leadership: leading through activism and leading by example. Canada, on the other hand, aimed to restore its international reputation as a credible multilateral partner. It also sought to portray Canada as a feminist leader in its international assistance. In both cases, then, the SDGs are a useful reputational tool given that they are one of the latest high-

153 profile multilateral initiative and one that codified other priorities (such as sustainability and gender equality) of interest to these two countries. The primary difference between Canada and Sweden, is that Sweden’s reputational aspirations specifically involved leadership through example which raised the importance of having concrete SDG implementation.

The UK, conversely, faced different reputational challenges associated with Brexit and increasing domestic criticism of its aid spending. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, Brexit damaged the UK’s international reputation, making its allies and peers unsure of its position in the world. As such, much of the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy, aside from the Brexit negotiations and trade policy, involved restoring the UK’s international reputation through the notion of Global Britain. Aid, and particularly the 0.7% commitment, is an important part of the UK’s Global Britain and donor leadership narratives. I argued that the centrality of the 0.7% commitment in these narratives could be attributed to the reputational benefits it entails for the UK, particularly in international settings like the UN. This pre-existing spending commitment enables the UK to remind its international audience that it is a credible partner in these multilateral settings characterized by a high proportion of aid recipients or those who value foreign aid (e.g., other donors and multilaterals).

The merging of DFID with FCO and the abandonment of the 0.7% commitment, however, raises questions about the future of UK aid and its perceived utility as an international reputational tool for the UK. Several former Prime Ministers, such as Tony Blair, David Cameron and Gordon Brown, spoke out against the merger, lamenting the loss of one of the UK’s “great international assets” and that the merger would mean “less respect for the UK overseas” (Batha and Thomson Reuters Foundation 2020). Supporters of the integration plan, such as Tory MP Bob Seely and Prime Minister Boris Johnson, argue that the merger will improve the effectiveness of UK aid and its ability serve the UK’s strategic and diplomatic interests abroad (McVeigh 2020). However, the UK abandoned the 0.7% commitment and cut the aid budget by 2.9 billion pounds in light of the economic impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic (BBC 2020).

There is an interesting parallel with the Canadian case, given that like the UK, it was also seeking to restore an international reputation that the incoming Liberal government perceived as lost, yet Canada did choose to use SDGs (and a return to multilateralism more broadly) as a tool to restore that reputation. Unlike Canada, the UK chose to rely on a pre-existing reputational tool in the form of the 0.7% commitment to re-assure its peers of its international

154 commitments. This difference between the two countries may stem from the fact that the UK was responding to a specific disruption to its international reputation caused by Brexit and thus needed to remind and reassure an international audience of its previous leadership, including in the donor realm. As such, it relied on a hallmark of its pre-Brexit leadership: the 0.7% commitment. The idea of Canada’s lost international reputation, on the other hand, was a partisan construction playing to the Liberals’ left-leaning electoral base who perceived that Canada’s international reputation had been damaged by the previous Conservative government. As such, the Liberal government did not have examples of international leadership or spending commitments on which to rebuild this “lost” reputation (although the lost reputation narrative relied on idealized narratives of Canada’s multilateralist past). Instead, it had to build a contemporary leadership narrative— one that reflected the Liberal government’s own priorities (e.g., feminism and sustainability) and took into account new global priorities and initiatives like the SDGs.

Throughout the empirical chapters, I explained the origins of these reputational aspirations by looking at both potential strategic motivations and domestic electoral politics. As an example of relevant strategic motivations, I outlined how both Sweden and Canada campaigned for UNSC seats in the early years of the SDGs. The SDGs were less prominent in Sweden’s campaign compared to Canada’s, in part because the campaign began prior to 2015. Nevertheless, the Swedish campaign did make reference to the importance of sustainable development. The SDGs were an important part of Canada’s ultimately unsuccessful campaign. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Canada pledged to explicitly link the work of the Security Council with the SDGs and the very logo of the campaign drew on the colours of the goals. These examples suggest that having a good reputation in the context of the SDGs can serve strategic purposes, particularly if those strategic aims are based in the UN or multilateral system, as the SDGs resonate well with this specific international audience.

In all three cases, I also discussed the role of domestic electoral politics in shaping donors’ reputational aspirations. Domestic electoral politics can shape a state’s foreign policy, including foreign aid policy ambitions and reputational aspirations. In Sweden, across party lines there is an expectation that the country takes on a leadership role internationally. Partisanship did, however, play a role in the SDG leadership ambition as this role was more closely associated with the governing coalition’s international aspirations geared towards sustainability and leadership in the UN (rather than other multilateral fora like the EU). As

155 previously mentioned, in the Canadian case, the Liberal government’s overtures to restoring Canada’s international reputation aimed to play to its left-leaning internationalist base (Brown 2018b). Its commitments to feminism and environment also resonated with this particular domestic audience.

Where the 0.7% commitment was a powerful reputational tool for the UK internationally, domestically, however, it faced increasing pressure to justify its 0.7% aid spending. Despite then Secretary of State Penny Mordaunt’s interest in using the SDGs to better communicate aid, the UK has chosen to focus on results, accountability and how aid contributes to the national interest (e.g., by preventing migration and terrorism) in order to justify the commitment. I attributed this focus on national interest rather than the SDGs to low knowledge of the SDGs domestically in the UK (compared to Canada and Sweden), limiting the utility of the framework in communicating and justifying the UK’s aid spending. Thus, the SDGs were also a less compelling reputational and justificatory tool domestically.

A comparison of these donors suggests that the propositions (2-4) concerning the instrumentality of the SDGs in building particular reputations is a compelling explanation for donors’ responsiveness to the SDGs. It also suggests that the SDGs lend themselves better to certain reputational needs or aspirations than others. For instance, states seeking a positive international reputation in multilateral fora may be more likely to be responsive to the SDGs than those who are seeking a positive reputation among a more constrained group of allies. Similarly, those seeking a positive reputation in issue areas like the environment, gender equality or development assistance may be more responsive than those focused on reputation in a security-related context.

7.2.3 Explaining Donors’ Goal Commitment

To return to the question posed at the beginning of this dissertation— why do some donors demonstrate a greater political commitment to global development goals than others — I argue that some donors demonstrate a greater political commitment to global development goals than others because of differing sensitivity to the performative mechanism of show and tell which is in turn rooted in differing concerns for their reputation, and their perception of the SDGs utility in furthering their reputations. The importance of reputation in driving donor’s commitment stems from the fact that the SDGs, unlike previous global goals, likely influence behaviour through the performative mechanism of show and tell. When donors

156 show and tell, using the script of the SDGs, a narrative about their identity, especially donor leadership, it raises the importance of goal-attaining behaviour as that behaviour becomes linked with the achievement of a particular identity. Show and tell through the SDGs provides another venue through which to build and communicate a particular reputation both to international and domestic audiences. In this way, the performative nature of the SDGs raises the saliency of reputation as a determinant of donors’ goal commitment.

I do not, however, want to overstate the impact of the SDGs on donor aid practices given the case evidence. While I identified some SDG-relevant practices (e.g. funding SDG projects, integrating the SDGs in monitoring and evaluation frameworks), I did not observe a significant shift in aid practices, even in a case with high political commitment like Sweden. Furthermore, the aid practices I did observe were largely communicative in nature, for instance embedding the SDGs in internal monitoring and evaluation frameworks is a form of communicating results and priorities. Rather, the SDGs have had a greater impact on how donors talk about aid than how they practice aid. The lower impact of the SDGs on aid practice suggests that the show and tell mechanism of the SDGs, at least in the short term, is limited in its ability to drive meaningful changes in practices.

7.3 Research Limitations and Areas for Future Research

7.3.1 Research Limitations

The most significant limitation to the research of this dissertation is the fact that it took place only five years into a fifteen-year agenda. As such, while I have suggested that in the long- term show and tell, particularly the linking of the SDGs to donor identity and leadership narratives, can generate meaningful goal attaining behaviour, it is likely too soon to observe the donor identity linkage and institutionalisation impacts of show and tell in each of the donor countries. Furthermore, in any fifteen-year period, most democratic countries will undergo several elections and changes in government that would also impact several of the key factors identified in the central argument. The UK case, for instance, illustrates how donors’ reputational aspirations and donor leadership narratives can change rapidly. Thus, the longevity of the impacts of show and tell on donor practices remains unclear.

Second, as I focused on particular government’s reputational aspirations and perception of SDG fit with particular audiences, I did not discuss how targeted audiences (either international or domestic) receive this linking of the SDGs. It was not clear from interviews

157 and the research whether and how audience reception might shape donors’ political commitment to and implementation of the SDGs. Over time, audience reception could alter donors’ perception of the SDGs’ utility in furthering a particular reputation, particularly if that SDG-reputation link is not well received or does not result in the desired strategic/electoral outcome. For instance, it will be interesting to see how Canada’s failed Security Council bid will impact its foreign aid framing and SDG response. Relatedly, I observed that very few respondents discussed the impact of aid recipients in terms of shaping donor priorities or as potential reputational audiences.

7.3.2 Areas for Future Research

7.3.2.1 Domestic SDG Responsiveness

The arguments of this dissertation were limited to the implementation of the SDGs in foreign aid policy, rather than domestic implementation. However, all three countries also have varying levels of domestic implementation that warrant investigation. I suspect that the central argument about show and tell and reputation would also apply to states’ domestic response. For instance, in the Canadian case, I briefly noted that Canada appears to be more responsive in terms of its domestic response (e.g. domestic facing SDG institution, SDGs appear in a few domestic policies and law). I alluded to the fact that its commitment to universality of the SDGs also contributes to furthering the “humble Canada” narrative. Nevertheless, domestic implementation of the SDGs may face different constraints than foreign aid policy. For instance, there may be a greater role for parliaments, sub-national governments or domestic civil society in driving states’ domestic SDG response. Future research could more concretely identify the conditions under which these other factors might matter.

7.3.2.2 Applying the argument to other OECD-DAC and Emerging Donors

A clear extension of this research would be to assess the saliency of these arguments in other OECD-DAC donors. The preliminary survey of DAC donor responses in Appendix E, provides some evidence that the arguments of this dissertation also apply to diverse cases like Ireland and Japan. For example, Ireland reinvigorated its foreign aid policy in 2018, incorporating the SDGs in its aid budgeting processes. Indeed, based on the preliminary 2018 scan, Ireland appears to be highly policy and practice responsive. Importantly, like Canada and Sweden, Ireland has made similar claims to internationalist donor and SDG leadership,

158 providing further evidence of the role of reputation, particularly in international venues, in driving responsiveness (Government of Ireland 2016). Japan also announced its intention to “become a role model for the world in the implementation of measures to achieve the SDGs,” although there has been less of a response in its foreign aid policy compared to domestic initiatives (Japan 2017, 4).

It would also be interesting to see whether these arguments about show and tell and reputation would apply to emerging or non-traditional donors such as China or the UAE, as these donors have not been traditionally responsive to international donor agendas. International relations research on reputation suggests that most states, no matter their political system or foreign policy ambitions, care about their international reputation (albeit in different ways) and want to “play a role in the international system” (Zartner and Ramos 2011, 73). Thus, future research could investigate whether particular reputational aspirations lend themselves more readily to global goal responsiveness.

7.3.2.3 Expanding theory about the role of individuals and accountability

With a longer timeline, researchers may observe different factors that might close the rhetoric-implementation gap around implementing the SDGs. Here, I offered an explanation focused largely on reputation but over time, other factors may influence implementation. For instance, while the research for this project did not suggest that individuals and/or domestic institutions play a role in driving goal commitment, the UK and Canadian cases suggest that they may play a role in spurring concrete implementation action.

Although my fieldwork took place prior to his tenure, the increase in SDG-activity within DFID during Rory Stewart’s short tenure as development secretary suggests that key individuals can spur implementation. In Canada and Sweden, interview respondents noted that particular ministers such as Jean-Yves Duclos (former Minister for Families, Children and Social Development) and Isabella Lövin (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Environment and Climate Change as of 2020) held an interest in the SDGs, although none linked these individuals specifically with driving high-level political commitment to the SDGs in their countries. This suggests then that individuals may take on more importance in explaining SDG implementation in cases of lower goal commitment as the lack of political commitment might be an opportunity for SDG-champions at the ministerial or even

159 bureaucratic level. An analysis of donors with no donor leadership aspirations (donors like Greece, Austria or Hungary, for example) may illuminate more about the role of individuals.

The Canadian case raises an interesting question about whether SDG audits and other international organizations can influence SDG implementation, particularly by holding governments to account. The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) has actively attempted to carve out a role in the international sustainable development agenda, most recently through a commitment to review and monitor the implementation of the SDGs in its 2017-2022 strategic plan (Montero and Blanc 2019; INTOSAI 2020). As of 2020, national supreme audit institutions (SAIs), working with INTOSAI, have conducted SDG audits in over 73 countries (IISD 2019; INTOSAI 2020). Montero and Le Blanc (2019) suggest that SDG audits can be an important tool through which to improve SDG implementation and hold governments to account. Interview respondents in the Canadian case indicated that the OAG’s SDG preparedness audit contributed to concrete SDG implementation commitments but analysis of other SDG audits suggests that not all of these audits are effective or received positively (IDI and INTOSAI 2019). Nevertheless, SDG audits, or other national and international accountability mechanisms, may have an important role to play, perhaps in driving political commitment, but in driving SDG implementation. I only superficially referenced accountability in this dissertation, in part because such mechanisms are still nascent and the creation of national accountability mechanisms in and of itself requires some level of political commitment that warrants explanation. Future research could explore the role and effectiveness of accountability mechanisms like SDG audits in driving implementation.

7.4 Research and Policy Contributions

My research makes contributions to the both the literature on governance through goal setting and the determinants of aid policy. I also offer several implications for policy makers and aid or SDG practitioners wishing to increase political commitment to the SDGs.

7.4.1 Contributions to Governance through Goal Setting

As one of the first comparative studies of the impact of the SDGs on donors, this dissertation sheds light on how governance through goal setting works in practice. In the introduction to this dissertation, I noted that there was still a poor understanding of how global goals elicit goal-attaining behaviour at the national level. I surveyed existing explanations of global goal

160 influence (largely from the MDG experience) and suggested that the focus on the power of numbers and benchmarking/ranking was not a salient explanation when looking specifically at the case of the SDGs (that aimed to explicitly avoid competitive dynamics) and bilateral aid donors. Indeed, an important lesson from this work is that different goal-based agendas and different governance targets have different characteristics which must be taken into account when trying to identify relevant mechanisms of influence.

I argued that the performativity of goal setting and particularly of the SDGs should be taken seriously as a potential avenue for influence. To this end, I outlined an SDG-specific mechanism of influence, one that departs from previous arguments about the role of the power of numbers and external actors in driving political commitment to global goals. My findings suggest that scholars investigating the steering effects of the SDGs should analyze the content of states’ identity performances and reputational aspirations in the context of the SDGs in order to understand their commitment to global goals.

While this project had less to do with assessing effectiveness and more with explaining how the SDGs work in practice, the findings do raise questions about effectiveness. More specifically, my findings suggest that in the short-term and among this specific target group (bilateral foreign aid donors), the SDGs are less effective in inducing meaningful goal- attaining behaviour compared to their ability to influence rhetoric. As I outlined above, however, the short-term rhetorical effects may lead to shifts in behaviour but this would only likely only be observed in the longer-term.

7.4.2 Contributions to Foreign Aid

This dissertation investigated the impact of a specific goal-based international agenda on foreign aid policy. As argued by Swiss (2017, 22), “donors have been swayed by distinct trends in the focus of aid throughout the years”, some trends of which derive from international agendas. Scholars, for instance, have assessed the impact of the aid effectiveness agenda (OECD 2008; 2011; Samy and Aksli 2015; Leiderer 2015), international gender equality (Moser and Moser 2005; Engberg-Pedersen 2016; Grown, Addison, and Tarp 2016; Swiss 2017) and environmental initiatives (Roberts et al. 2009; Kim 2009; Hicks, Parks, and Roberts 2010; Shine and Campillo 2016). They explain how international agendas achieve influence by focusing on a range of factors including: identity

161 and ideas, aid agency characteristics and the influence of activist donor groupings, civil society or individuals.

Building on analysis centred around the role of donor normative frameworks and nation branding (Van der Veen 2011; Varga 2013; Fukuda-Parr and Shiga 2016; Brown 2018b), I offered a novel explanation looking to the role of reputation in shaping the content of donors’ aid policies and as a result their response to global development goals. I argued that foreign aid policy, in and of itself, is a prop that donors can leverage for reputational purposes. Looking beyond the impact of global goals, aid scholars should continue to pay attention to how donors use the content of their aid policies (and not only their disbursements) to build particular reputations.

This dissertation also further reaffirms arguments that the interaction between domestic and international factors drives foreign aid policy choices (see, for instance, Lundsgaarde 2012; Swiss 2017). I argued that the SDGs offered donors a script and venue but that the choice of donors to use this script and perform in this venue is partially linked to domestic political dynamics.

7.4.3 Implications for Policy

Empirically, this dissertation documented several ways donors integrated the SDGs in their aid policies and practices. This could take the form of embedding both the goals and targets in their internal monitoring, statistical and evaluation frameworks, ensuring all project communications are linked to the SDGs, funding SDG related processes or developing specific strategies around key SDG principles such as LNOB. It also provided three distinct approaches to SDG specific institutions within government (e.g., shared responsibility, a team within a foreign ministry or team within a domestic facing agency). While it is too soon to observe longer-term effects of these different policy options, each has its advantages and disadvantages. For instance, ensuring that all project communications include references to the SDGs, at least at the goal level, is one way that aid agencies can raise the profile of the SDGs among the general public at very little expense or effort on the part of the aid agency.

Embedding the SDGs, particularly at both the goal and target level, in internal monitoring and evaluation frameworks may help to raise the profile of the SDGs among aid agency staff, particularly at the operational level. It may also facilitate reporting against the SDGs, as it becomes part of annual reporting routines rather than a separate process specifically for

162 international meetings and venues like the HLPF. At the same time, integrating the SDGs at the target level may not be feasible for smaller aid agencies given the sheer number of indicators (254). The SDG targets and indicators may also not be appropriate for domestic reporting where aid agencies need to be very specific about what their aid was used for. The recognition that a domestic audience is concerned with how their tax dollars are spent is why many monitoring and reporting systems often place more emphasis on outputs such as number of initiatives funded or people/communities supported rather than development outcomes that are difficult to attribute to one country’s foreign aid. Regarding specific policies or instruments for LNOB and/or policy coherence of sustainable development, the advantage of having a dedicated strategy is that it raises the profile of these issues in the aid agency and ensures that there is a strategy in place to achieve them. There is a risk, however, that these dedicated instruments for policy coherence or LNOB just become bureaucratic box checking exercises if there are not clear follow-up and accountability mechanisms. Nevertheless, this dissertation outlined several potential ways aid policymakers can approach SDG implementation in their aid policies and programs.

For those hoping to influence donors’ political commitment to the SDGs, the findings of this dissertation suggest that SDG advocates should try to link the SDGs with donors’ international leadership or domestic electoral ambitions by framing their advocacy campaigns around how the SDGs contribute to donor identity. These advocates could also try to build greater awareness of the SDGs among the electorate through awareness raising campaigns which could in turn make donors more likely to see the SDGs as a useful political tool domestically.

7.5 The SDGs in the time of Covid-19

I undertook the majority of the research for this project prior to the outbreak of the global Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020. However, it would be remiss not to acknowledge that this pandemic has and will continue to profoundly impact both international agendas and foreign aid.

By August 2020, the UN system had already published numerous articles about Covid-19 and the SDGs. For instance, the UNDP described the pandemic as a “grievous blow” to the goals, one that threatens to reverse the already tenuous progress made (UNDP 2020, npg). At the same time, the UN system is already reframing the SDGs as the “best option to reduce the

163 worst impacts of Covid-19 and to recover better” (United Nations 2020, npg). This quick reframing re-affirms the flexibility of the SDG script to be used for a variety of purposes. In this case, the UN system is attempting to maintain momentum for the goals despite the massive challenge presented by the pandemic.

Regarding the implications of the pandemic for the conclusions of this dissertation, I have already suggested that the influence of global goals can be tenuous and subject to the whims of electoral cycles or particular governments. Unexpected crises, like the pandemic, further contribute to the tenuousness of global goal commitment and may also affect the perceived importance, as well as the content of donors’ reputational aspirations. Already, donors are beginning to reframe their leadership aspirations towards leadership in Covid-19 response. The UK, for instance, is already touting its “leadership in the global response to Covid-19” (BBC 2020, npg). The findings of this dissertation suggest that if donors’ leadership narratives shift (and the perceived instrumentality of the SDGs in serving those narratives), this may impact their SDG responsiveness as SDG implementation will no longer be important for the maintenance of those leadership narratives.

The pandemic is also affecting donors’ spending patterns and policy choices. For instance, some donors, like the UK, have already announced cuts to their foreign aid spending in light of the domestic economic impact of the pandemic (BBC 2020). Others, like Canada, are pledging to focus aid on Covid-19 recovery and in particular bolstering their health sector spending (Canada 2020). The pandemic is a powerful reminder that aid programmes are affected by a host of internal and external factors. These factors are not all weighted equally and can shift in importance at different moments in time. At this particular moment, the pandemic is the most prominent factor influencing aid policy decisions rather than other international agendas or electoral considerations.

Overall, the pandemic further demonstrates the flexibility of the SDGs in communicating priorities to bring a diverse group of actors together, even in times of crisis. However, it also reinforces the precarity of SDG policy gains and also of aid commitments.

7.6 Conclusion

This project was conceived in 2016, as I began to wonder whether the colourful logos adorning my bleak work cubicle would actually have any impact on the policies and practices of bilateral aid donors. Following several years of research, it is clear that the impact of the

164 SDGs is mixed. As this dissertation has demonstrated, the 17 goals provide a flexible script that donors can use to perform particular narratives or identities for both domestic and international audiences. However, while some donors have reframed their aid narratives around the SDGs, the impact of the goals on aid practice is limited. There is some evidence that the show and tell of the VNR and HLPF process does catalyse SDG implementation in the short run. Whether this implementation endures beyond these particular stages remains to be seen.

This dissertation also outlined how reputation drives donors’ political commitment to the goals. However, the case chapters and the discussion on Covid-19 demonstrated that reputational aspirations can change depending on the government or political environment. Thus, the fact that reputational aspirations are a primary driver of goal responsiveness means that any progress on SDG implementation among donors may be tenuous. Nevertheless, despite this limited and potentially precarious impact on donors’ aid policies and practices, at the very least, the SDGs will continue to provide development staff with cheerful office décor until 2030.

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Appendices

Appendix A: List of Interviews

UK Interviews

192 1. Stephen Twigg, Labour MP and former head of UK Parliament International Development Committee 2. Amy Dodd, Head of Engagement, Development Initiatives, former head of UK Aid Network 3. Andrew Griffiths, Head of Advocacy Sightsavers, Member -Together 2030 4. Kit Dorey, Policy and Advocacy Adviser, Bond UK 5. Carolina Karlstrom, SDG Network London 6. Lewis Ryder Jones, Policy, Advocacy and Communications Officer, Scotland’s International Development Alliance 7. Louise Scott, Director, Global Sustainability, PwC (Remote Interview) 8. Emily Auckland, UKSSD Network Director (Remote Interview) 9. Dr. Jess Gifkins, University of Manchester (Remote Interview) 10. Steve Kenzie, Executive Director, UN Global Compact UK (Remote Interview) 11. Dr. Kristina Diprose, Urban Institute, University of Sheffield (Remote Interview) 12. Stefan D’Errico, Head of Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning, IIED (Remote Interview) 13. Allan Macleod, Bristol SDG Research and Engagement Associate, Bristol City Council (Remote Interview) 14. Erica Belanger, Assistant Director, Safehands and Chair UK SRHR Network 15. Jonathan Glennie, Former Director Policy and Research Save the Children UK (Remote Interview) (3 Anonymous Interviews from Department for International Development, Office of National Statistics)

Canada Interviews 1. Peter Boehm, Senator, Former Deputy Minister for International Development 2. Peter Taylor, Director, Strategic Development, International Development Research Centre 3. Shannon Kindornay, Director, Research, Policy and Practice, CCIC 4. Martin Fischer, Director of Policy, World Vision Canada 5. Rita Morbia, Co-Executive Director, INTERPARES (Remote interview) 6. Beth Woroniuk, Policy Lead, The Match International Women’s Fund 7. Heather McPherson, NDP MP and Former Executive Director, Alberta Council for Global Cooperation (Remote interview) Simon Chorley, International Programs Manager, UNICEF Canada (Remote interview) 8. JP Bervoets, Community Foundations Canada, Alliance 2030 (Canadian SDG-related NGO network) (Remote interview) 9. Jon Beale, SDSN Canada (Remote interview) 10. Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal Member of Parliament, Member of Foreign Affairs Committee (Remote interview) 11. Margaret Catley-Carlson, former President of CIDA (1989-1992), Global Water Partnership (Remote interview) (11 Anonymous Interviews from the following government departments: Environment and Climate Change, Employment and Social Development Canada, Global Affairs Canada, STATSCAN, Office of the Auditor General, and two NGOs)

Sweden Interviews 1. Anna Blucher, Policy Advisor, ForumSyd Viveka Palm, Head of Unit, Statistics Sweden (Remote interview)

193 2. Katarina Sundberg, Former Secretary, Agenda 2030 Delegation 3. David Wiking, Former SIDA Manager, Consultant (Remote interview) 4. Johanna Sandahl, Delegate, Swedish Agenda 2030 Delegation, Swedish Society for Nature Conservation 5. Hannah Stanton, Delegate, Agenda 2030 Delegation (Remote interview) 6. Andreas Dolk, International Cooperation-Head, We Effect 7. Asa Thomasson, Policy and Advocacy Co-ordinator, Concord Sweden 8. Mikael Leyi, Head of International Development, Olof Palme International Center 9. Victor Astrom, Senior Policy Advisor, Agenda 2030, Swedish Society for Nature Conservation 10. Micah Gryzwnowicz, International Advocacy Advisor, RFSL (5 Anonymous Interviews from SIDA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Appendix B: Sample Semi-Structured Interview Guide

Section A: Goal Responsiveness • When and how did you first hear about the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)? • How do you use the SDGs in your work? • How does your aid agency use the SDGs? • How involved was your country in SDG negotiations? • What is your country’s strategy to achieve the SDGs through foreign aid (e.g., is there a new institution being set up? Is there a specific strategic document being produced)?

Section B: Donor Normative Frameworks • Why does your country undertake a foreign aid programme? • How would you describe your country as a donor? • What is unique about your country’s approach to foreign aid compared to other bilateral donors? Why is this particular feature unique? • What are your country’s current foreign aid policy priorities? o How were these priorities decided upon? o Why these priorities in particular? o Can you describe for me your country’s foreign aid policy making process (e.g. are there consultations with civil society, experts, multilateral institutions etc.) • Where do the SDGs fit among these priorities? • What is your country’s role in multilateral institutions that work on foreign aid (e.g, United Nations, OECD Development Assistance Committee etc.)?

Note: Interview script varied depending on interviewee (e.g. bureaucrat vs politician vs civil society)

Appendix C: List of Participant Observation Events

Event Title Host Location Date DFID Voluntary National DFID London, 13 March 2019 Review Engagement Event UK

194 “Hidden connections: Mott MacDonald London, 14 March 2019 stories that matter to UK business and society” (Keynote speaker: Neil Briscoe, deputy director at DFID) UK progress on the SDGs UK Parliament London, 15 March 2019 Oral Evidence Session- International UK Secretary of State Penny Development Select Mordaunt Committee Summit on Canada’s Global Canadian Association Ottawa, 27-28 November Leadership for the Study of Canada 2019 International Development (CASID), Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), Canadian Partnership for Women and Children’s Health (CanWaCH).

195 Appendix D- Code System

Appendix E- Survey of Donor Approaches to the SDGs (2018) Donor VNR SDG Institutions Policy Responsiveness Practice Responsiveness Domestic Present Responsiveness ed Australia Y • Different • Some reference in • Not evident • SDG Data Website (2018) departments given post-2015 aid lead for VNR policies to SDGs • Senior officials • 2018 OECD peer group chaired by review: “Australia the Department of influenced the 2030 the Prime Agenda but has yet Minister and to explicitly align DFAT its various frameworks and particularly its aggregate performance framework to the SDGs" Austria N • Follows • 2016-2018 Three- • Not evident • n/a “mainstreaming Year Programme on approach” so all Austrian federal ministries Development are responsible includes ODA for SDG matrix linking key implementation objectives to the • Inter-ministerial SDGs. working group on • Relevant SDGs the 2030 Agenda referenced in (IMAG) is country-strategies. responsible for

197 coordination and communication for the SDGs. Belgium Y • Inter-Ministerial • In 2017 launched a • Country-level results • National Sustainable (2017) Conference for “Comprehensive in Annual Report Development Strategy Sustainable Strategy Note” that reported against (NDS) approved in Development builds on the relevant SDGs (at Spring 2017- includes (IMCSD)- approach of the goal level). several priority includes ministers SDGs (e.g. themes (food, from federal, managing synergies housing, procurement, regional and and trade-offs/ advocacy). community breaking down ministers- acts as silos). Not an SDG central policy per se. coordination mechanism for dialogue between federal/federated authorities implementing the 2030 Agenda • Minister of Sustainable Development to “follow” implementation of 2030 Agenda in Belgium. European/Internat ional implementation responsibility of

198 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Development Cooperation and Deputy PM and Minister for Foreign Affairs and European Affairs. Canada Y • SDG Unit • FIAP priorities • Referenced in Key • Interim National (2018) (ESDC) mapped on to SDGs Performance Implementation • SDG ADM/DM • SDG language Indicators (KPI) Strategy released Working Groups appears in some • Used in some Call for • SDG Funding other development proposals/project Program policies (e.g. action documents • SDG Data-hub area policies) • SDG language appears in other strategies (e.g. Federal Sustainable Development Strategy and Poverty Reduction Strategy) Czech Y • SDG • Strategic • No information • Czech SDGs Awards Republic (2017) implementation Framework includes available in English. (awareness raising coordinated at the brief section on initiative) national level by Global • Strategic Framework the Government Development- of the Czech Republic Council on includes 2030- includes 6 Sustainable commitment to priority areas Development increase share of aid (people/society, (GCSD), chaired to 0.33% GNI by economic growth,

199 by the Prime 2030 and development of Minister. The commitment to cities/regions, work of the focus on SDG 16 conservation, global GCSD is and coordinating development and supported by its SDG response with good governance). Secretariat in the EU. Also a focus on SDG Sustainable • Commitment that 17. Development the SDGs “will be Department of the reflected” in new Office of the Development Government of Cooperation the Czech Strategy 2018-2030 Republic. Denmark Y • Ministry of • Recent aid strategy • Danish SDG • Danish National (2017) Finance "The World 2030" Investment Fund: Action Plan on SDGs responsible for has small section supports the UN presented to national dedicated to Sustainable parliament. *Danish implementation explaining how the Development Goals only • Ministry of SDGs "reflect new through commercial • As part of the national Foreign Affairs challenges and investments in action plan, the responsible for opportunities". developing countries government will international • Have created their (operates out of assess the implementation. own informal goal Danish DFI- IFU). consequences of new "18" on youth. legislation and major • The strategy makes initiatives for the explicit SDGs when prioritisation of considered relevant specific SDGs. The for Denmark and the prioritisation varies impacts are by country category significant. (fragile, stable, transition

200 economies) and • SDG data collected global public goods through statistics (e.g. gender, energy, agency climate, SDG 16/17). France Y Using existing • Does not have a • Relevant goals • SDG data collection (2016) sustainable specific SDG outlined in Call for by national statistical development strategy but Agence Proposals/Projects in agency structures: Francaise de AFD • Developing an SDG • Interministerial Developpement Roadmap that might Delegate for does outline how its include SDGs in Sustainable work contributes to budget process, Development each SDG. impact assessments of • Ministry for • The Interministerial future laws, public Europe and committee for policy review etc. (not Foreign Affairs international yet released so cannot (MEAE) cooperation and verify) responsible for development international (CICID) included implementation. SDG • Network of senior implementation as sustainable one of the “grand development objectifs” of French officials who development coordinate all cooperation (along sustainable with the Paris development agreement, Addis issues within the Agenda etc.) various ministries. • Two national councils: Development and

201 Ecological Transition Finland Y Using existing • Finnish • Development • There is a national (2016) sustainable Development Policy cooperation “theory implementation plan: development 2016-2020 has four of change” “Government Report structures: priority areas that documents do include on the 2030 Agenda • Prime Minister's correspond with the relevant SDG and for Sustainable Office assumed 11/17 SDGs targets at the outcome Development.” responsibility for and output level (but • Progress on coordinating outcomes/outputs implementation plan national SDG themselves not SDG to be reviewed in implementation. specific) 2019, • Coordination • Finnish "Society's secretariat within Commitment to the PMO Sustainable • Coordination Development" network involving updated in 2016 to key ministries. align with the SDGs. • PM is also chair • Within government of the National the Prime Minister’s Commission on Office requested all Sustainable Ministries to chart and Development. assess key policy • Development measures taken within policy committee the Ministries and is also involved their administrative with international branches in SDG implementing all of implementation. the 17 Goals and 169 • National targets of Agenda Commission on 2030 (not just ones Sustainable

202 Development and directly relevant to the Development their ministries). Policy Committee • Gap analysis was also also have a conducted on working group to Finland's develop preparedness to governance implement the SDGs. models promoting • Implementation of sustainable Agenda 2030 is development. reported annually to parliament • Finland has carried out various initiatives to assess progress on sustainable development in the country. The initiatives include: an assessment of the state of sustainable development in Finland in 2019, based largely on information generated through the country’s national indicators for sustainable development; an evaluation of Finland’s sustainable development policy through the Polku

203 2030 (‘Path 2030’) project; and the establishment of a “citizens’ panel” on sustainable development • Being incorporated in budget processes. Germany Y Using existing • GIZ's strategic • GIZ's annual • Using National (2016) sustainable direction includes reporting is based Sustainable development section on Germany around their four Development Strategy structures: and the SDGs and strategic aims with (since 2002) as • State Secretaries the SDGs are a relevant SDGs framework to achieve Committee for "frame of mentioned (but not SDGs- new version Sustainable reference". necessarily the adopted in 2017 Development • BMZ's most recent targets/indicators) outlines how (chaired by Head development policy • BMZ runs a 2030 Germany will achieve of federal document (2017) implementation the SDGs on three chancellery) and also has a section on initiative to support levels: In Germany, the the SDGs, but the 5 partner countries. With Germany, By • Council for roadmaps are not Includes an SDG Germany. Sustainable SDG specific. implementation fund: • SDG Data collection Development- "2030 Agenda Independent Transformation advisory council Fund" to support policy alignment with the SDGs, mobilising private/domestic resources for SDGs or capacity building around SDG M&E.

204 • Senior management position at BMZ dedicated to Agenda 2030 "Commissioner for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" whose mandate includes: • 1) managing BMZ's position in the national/international processes on SDGs • 2)coordinating work at BMZ across directorates-general on the SDGs, • 3) developing Germany's development policy and aligning it with the goals for sustainable development, • 4) further developing and implementing the Federal government's strategy for sustainable development and supporting the partner countries of German development

205 cooperation to align with SDGs. Greece Y • Office of • No information • No information • VNR outlines 8 (2018) Coordination, available in English available in English “Greek National Institutional, but VNR states that Priorities for the International and they are working: SDGs” (pg 9) European Affairs “to adopt • Committed to produce of the General development National SDG Secretariat of the cooperation policy implementation plan Government so as to reflect the in 2019. responsible for SDGs SDGs. implementation in partner countries (pg 120).

Hungary Y • Ministry of • 2018-2020 Action • From 2015 to 2016, • Special emphasis on (2018) Foreign Affairs Plan of the through the bilateral SDG 6 ** and Trade International expenditures, became responsible for Development Hungary almost member SDG Cooperation (IDC) quadrupled the of the implementation Strategy (2014- amount of ODA DAC in • SDG 2020) calls for the channelled to the 2016 Coordination was alignment of the least developed performed IDC Strategy with countries. through the Inter- the 2030 Agenda. ministerial Coordinative Committee for International Development Cooperation established in

206 2014, consisting of high-level officials from the line ministries

Iceland N • In 2017, working • In process of • No information • Working group SDG group formed creating a new available. status report to be including the development policy. submitted in 2018 Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Welfare, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and Statistics Iceland, to manage the analysis, implementation and promotion of the Sustainable Development Goals

207 Ireland Y • Minister for • New aid policy • SDGs incorporated • National SDG (2018) Communications, (2018) identifies in aid budget Implementation Plan Climate Action SDGs as process (e.g. budget (2018-2020) and Environment overarching holders have to note • New Sustainable has overall framework within in order of priority Development Strategy responsibility for which Ireland will which SDG is being being prepared will be promoting SDGs. focus on four targeted in each unit better aligned with • Minister of (gender equality, of funding) SDGs Foreign Affairs humanitarian aid, • In Annual Reports • Producing an SDG and Trade climate action and on results by Policy Map to identify responsible for governance). On country, relevant policies that can foreign those particular SDGs being support the policy/internation SDGs, the policy supported are achievement of al development elaborates concrete indicated. multiple SDGs. element. actions. • SDGs incorporated in • Each SDG target • SDGs also appear in Government has been assigned other sectoral Departments’ a lead policies (e.g. social Statements of Strategy Department. protection policy • Exploring using SDG • Senior Official etc.) in other department Group, chaired by budgets. Department of • Hosts regular Taoiseach stakeholder forums on established to the SDGs. oversee/monitor • Developing an online SDG SDG platform. implementation • Designating SDG and report to Champions (national Government organizations) • SDG • Committed to produce Interdepartmental national reports on Working Group implementation of the

208 SDGs every two years and 3 more VNRs before 2030. • SDG data collection

Italy Y • Presidency of the • Three-year Strategic • No information • Integrated SDGs in (2017) Council of and Planning available in English the National Ministers to lead Document of the Sustainable on the Italian Development Development Strategy implementation of Cooperation 2016- (NSDS) 2017-2030. the NSDS, with 2018 period adopts • In May 2017, support from the “content and National Institute of Ministry for the structure of the Statistics published Environment, Agenda”. 100 SDGs indicators Land and Sea • The 2016-2018 (34 more compared to (Domestic document commits those circulated in implementation) to making the 2030 December 2016). and the Ministry Agenda “central” to of Foreign Affairs development and International policies/strategies. Cooperation • Priority areas of the (“External” strategy linked to implementation) relevant SDGs. Japan Y • Cabinet body- • Development • Not evident. • Adopted SDGs (2017) SDG Promotion Cooperation White implementation Headquarters Papers since 2015 Guiding Principles in headed by the PM include sections 2016. Includes 8 and composed of dedicated to Japan’s priority areas linked all ministers. actions on the to relevant SDGs. Established to SDGs, although • Japan SDGs Award foster close most of the • SDG Action Plan cooperation examples provided 2018 focuses on three

209 among ministries are from domestic overarching goals: 1) and to lead SDG initiatives like the promoting Society implementation SDG award or 5.0, which • Commitment to action plans rather corresponds to the “mainstreaming” than examples of SDGs, 2) vitalising the SDGs in the development local areas through government’s projects. SDGs, and 3) plans, strategies empowering women and policies. and future generations.

Luxembourg Y • Minister for • Identifies SDG 5, • To harness other • Third report of the (2017) Sustainable 13 and 16 as cross- kinds of financing in National Plan for Development and cutting themes. addition to ODA Sustainable Infrastructure and • Development planned creation of a Development to be Minister for cooperation strategy a “Luxembourg aligned with the International “Luxembourg’s Sustainable SDGs. Cooperation General Development Finance responsible for Development Platform (LSDF)” to SDG Cooperation act as the interface implementation. Strategy- The Road between potential • Leveraged pre- to 2030” outlines financial contributors existing four priority areas (both public and sustainable that are linked to 12 private) and project development of the 17 SDGs. directors institutions: Interdepartmental Commission on Sustainable Development, Interministerial Committee for

210 Development Cooperation and the National Plan for Sustainable Development National (PNDD) The Y • Minister for • SDGs are “guiding • In addition to regular • Regular SDG Netherlands (2017) Foreign Trade and principles” of new results reporting reporting Development Dutch policy organized around • Statistics agency cooperation (2018). There is a Dutch thematic published baseline supported by brief section on the priorities, also reports report on SDGs in SDG coordinator SDGs in the policy on contribution to Netherlands, updated • SDG coordinator that elaborates what SDGs by goal. in 2019 to develop a leads they are and core • Upcoming theory of Monitor of Well- interministerial principles (e.g. change documents Being and SDGs 2019 working group of human rights, a purportedly to system. focal points to “prevention include SDG • Policy study on SDGs support coherent agenda”, language (has not conducted by the implementation of innovation, been released yet so Netherlands SDGs cooperation) can’t verify) Environmental • Relevant SDGs are • Indicators and targets Assessment Agency indicated for each of Foreign Trade and • SDG Action day thematic objective Development • SDG website for (e.g. preventing Cooperation (BHOS) awareness raising. conflict, reducing do not use SDG • Dutch SDG investing poverty, promoting language but the initiative (public- sustainable relevant SDG is private partnership) growth/climate indicated (e.g. similar • Audit on SDG action, enhancing to Canada). preparedness Dutch international conducted by Dutch earning capacity) SAI.

211 New Zealand N • Not evident. • SDGs briefly • Increased ODA in • Narrative Imperative mentioned in NZ 2018 to be allocated competition (SDG Aid Programme over four years to a awareness raising Strategic Plan 2015- projected increase to initiative) 2019. 0.28% of GNI • National SDG • Strategic Plan 2015- Summit 2018 hosted 2019 includes by Universities New commitment to Zealand (awareness update the Aid raising and Porgramme results partnership framework to promotion) reflected investment priorities and the SDGs. Norway Y • Ministry of • SDGs reference in • In project reporting • Annual Reports on (2016) Foreign Affairs other policy partners must include SDG implementation and Ministry of documents (e.g. a paragraph on how presented to Finance civil society the project is related Norwegian Parliament collaborate on principles) to the SDGs. and general public. SDG reporting • 2017 White Paper • Some call for • SDGs integrated in (Finance on the SDGs and proposals include budget white paper coordinates) Norway’s reference to specific (cannot verify-in • Inter-ministerial Development Policy SDGs or SDG Norwegian) contact group led (presented to principles (e.g. • Established a Policy by Ministry of parliament) outlines LNOB) Coherence Forum Foreign Affairs Norway’s priorities (government-civil • Each goal is within the agenda society forum) assigned a • National SDG data coordinating collection ministry • Prime Minister is Co- chair of UN Sec-

212 Gen’s SDG Advocacy Group. Poland Y • Ministry of • SDGs briefly • No information • Strategy for (2018) Entrepreneurship mentioned in 2016- available in English. Responsible. and Technology 2022 Multiannual Development (SRD) responsible for Development (2017) lays out 700 domestic Cooperation actions to increase implementation Programme. prosperity in Poland. while Ministry of Supporting Refers to the SDGs Foreign Affairs implementation of and in particular Responsible for the SDGs by the SDGs 8 and 9. external international implementation. community is one • Task Force for the of the priorities for Coherence Poland’s between the SRD multilateral and the 2030 engagement. Agenda was • Programme appointed to includes prepare Poland commitment to for the Voluntary policy coherence for National Review development and 2018. The Task the SDGs. Force includes representatives of ministries, social organisations, social and economic partners, NGOs, public statistics, civil society,

213 academia and youth. • Ministerial coordinators were also appointed for respective SDGs for the VNR process Portugal Y • Ministry of • National Plan for • Not evident. • Council of Ministers (2017) Foreign Affairs, Policy Coherence adopted with the Ministry for Development is intragovernmental of Planning and aligned with guidelines for the Infrastructure, national priorities 2030 Agenda in 2016. responsible for for the SDGs. • Statistics Portugal overall monitors Portugal’s coordination. progress against the • Two inter- SDG ministerial targets/indicators. commissions: foreign policy (domestic implementation) and development cooperation (external implementation) • Network of focal points from different government departments

214 Slovak Y • Coordination of • Commitment in • Not evident. • Six national priorities Republic (2018) Agenda 2030 is VNR to align the (education, shared by the Medium-term environment, Deputy Prime strategy for settlements, social Minister’s Office Development inclusion, rule of law) for Investments Cooperation of the linked to relevant and Slovak Republic SDGs at goal level. Informatization 2019-2023 with the and the Ministry six national of Foreign and priorities and the European Affairs. SDGs. • Government Council involving key line ministers, as well as representatives of NGOs, academia, private sector, and city and regional associations has also been established.

Slovenia Y • Permanent Inter- • Agenda 2030 • Not evident • SDGs embedded in (2017) ministerial mentioned once in National working group on 2017 resolution on Development Strategy development development 2030 policies cooperation. established in • Slovenia targets for 2017 as SDGs 1) decent coordination work and economic mechanism. growth;

215 2) sustainable consumption and production; 3) climate action; and 4) peaceful and inclusive societies. • Thematic priorities in development cooperation strategy linked to relevant SDGs at goal level. South Korea Y • Ministry of • Korea’s second • Korea’s second mid- • Several pre-existing (2016) Foreign Affairs mid-term ODA term ODA policy initiatives adapted to (MOFA), policy (2016- (2016-2020) commits SDGs e.g. Third Ministry of 2020) “set the that government will National Basic Plan Environment SDGs as the ROKs aim to increase ODA for Sustainable (MOE), Statistics ODA policy to 0.2% GNI by Development (2016- Korea, and the vision”. 2020. 2035) outlines 14 Office for • Government • From 2016, each strategic targets Government established ministry and agency around four Policy principle of carrying out various overarching goal areas Coordination “Inclusive ODA” to ODA projects must including: healthy responsible for address LNOB by specify the SDGs and land; integrated and SDG partnering with targets that are safe society; inclusive implementation. diverse actors relevant to the creative economy; and • Korea National (public and non- particular projects global prosperity and Assembly UN governmental). submitted. the 140 Government SDGs Forum • President announced Policy and (NSD) was series of special Governance Tasks. founded by 43 projects targeting members of the particular SDGs e.g. National Better Life for Girls’

216 Assembly Initiative, Safe Life collaboratively for All Initiative with the Korea Association for Supporting the SDGs for the UN (ASD), a NGO with special consultative status with the ECOSOC. • Pre-existing SD act and National Commission on Sustainable Development Spain Y • High • The Master Plan • Information not • Action Plan for the (2018) Commissioner for Spanish available in English. Implementation of the the 2030 Agenda Cooperation 2018- 2030 Agenda who reports 2021 sets forth four, directly to the closely President of the interdependent, Government General Goals, • Office of the HC which correspond to 2030 Agenda four of the five established in the dimensions of the Office of the 2030 Agenda: President of the people, planet, Government prosperity and • High-Level group peace. for inter- • It also adopts the first 16 SDGs as its

217 ministerial co- own strategic ordination objectives • Ministerial focal points for each SDG and targets • Commitment to create a Sustainable Development Council as a consultation body including representatives from different stakeholders. Sweden Y • Minister for • The Policy for • Goals referenced in • Adopted a Swedish (2017) Public Global Sida’s portfolio Action Plan for the Administration Development overviews 2030 Agenda in 2018 responsible for (PGD) was • 2030 Agenda (Swedish only) national relaunched to more mentioned as • Published specific implementation explicitly align with “principal value” for briefs on 5 SDGs (6, • Each ministry SDGs. Sida and cooperation 7, 11, 12, 15) (2018) responsible for • Recent reporting on partners (one of the • #FirstGeneration SDG particular goal Sweden’s PGD assessment criteria communications • Consultation organized around for partners) campaign. group for the each of the 17 • SDG specific • Swedish public 2030 Agenda with SDGs. projects, such as agencies published state secretaries • Sectoral strategies Swedish Leadership Letter of Intent to from the Ministry include relevant for Sustainable work on Agenda 2030 of Finance, the goals. Development. • SDG data collection Ministry for • Ambition to be a Foreign Affairs, leader on SDGs.

218 the Ministry of the Environment and Energy and the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation. • Commissioned a “Swedish Delegation for the 2030 Agenda” to include stakeholders from across Swedish society (7 members) Switzerland Y (2016 • Forum • “The 2030 Agenda • Not evident. • In 2015, Federal and Nachhaltige is an important Council 2018) Entwicklung reference commissioned a (“Sustainable framework for comprehensive Development Switzerland’s baseline assessment Forum”) ensures international and gap analysis of that the different cooperation, which the implementation levels of state aligns its activities status of the SDGs at authority remain with the SDGs” federal level in contact and • Swiss Foreign • SDG frame the exchange Policy Strategy Sustainable information. 2016–19 defines the Development Strategy • Stakeholder broad outlines of (SDS) 2016–19 that engagement Switzerland’s under-lines the need through 2030 international for sustainable Agenda Advisory commitment for the development to be a Group legislative period coherent feature of all

219 until 2019. policy areas. Nine Sustainable thematic areas linked development forms to SDGs at goal level. one of the four key priorities of the strategy (SDGs briefly mentioned in this section). • SDGs briefly described in Dispatch on International Cooperation 2017– 20 The United N • DFID given • Published document • Few projects • SDG data-hub Kingdom (2018) overall lead in on UK’s approach associated with SDG • In principle, Single Y cooperation with to Agenda 2030 and processes (e.g. VNR Department Plans in (2019) Cabinet Office. the SDGs (not a and data collection) government should Mostly for VNR policy-mostly re- • Brief references in assess their preparations branding) country profiles contribution to SDGs • Senior • Brief reference in • Communication but does not appear to Responsible overall aid strategy campaign on twitter be consistent. Officers in each (2015) (not aid specific) department (associated with VNR process) United States N • Not evident • Brief reference to • Not evident. • US Statistical Agency the SDGs in 2015 provided US Quadrennial information on SDG Diplomacy and indicators Development Review.

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