DIPLOMACY of POWER

Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument t STEPHEN S. KAPLAN with

MICHEL TATU

THOMAS W. ROBINSON

WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN

DONALD S. ZAGORIA and JANET D. ZAGORIA

PAUL JABBER and ROMAN KOLKOWICZ

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

DAVID K. HALL

COLIN LEGUM

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION Washington, D.C. :j,; ;::,t',: ~ ~ URiS LiBRARY

\ \" ~ .' :, *.. Ctn'di!A·~":;i'·~'~13.'. a:I=R 11 1982 Copyright© 1981 by TO MY FAMILY THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 1775 Massachusetts Avenue. N.W.• Washington. D.C. 20036

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data: Kaplan, Stephen S Diplomacy of power. Bibliography: p, Includes index. I. tRussia-Armed Forces-History-20lh century. 2. Russia-Foreign relations--1945- 3. Russia­ Military policy. 4. World politics-1945­ I. Title. UA770.K28 327.1'17'0947 80-25006 ISBN 0-8157-4824-8 ISBN 0-81 57-4823-X (pbk.)

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':'\ 1ASl"1{ru! :',1 ,,,.,tollA ~"71111•.. ~L;!~~.· \. Diplomacy of Power THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICT 273 rever, was the decision to station strong military units on maneuvers in particular caused the Chinese to transfer additional, though )iI, a deployment begun sometime after the signing of the still marginal, troops and equipment to Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. iefense pact in January 1966 and shifted into high gear in Last, increased patrolling by both sides and the exigencies of the Cultural vember 1967 several divisions, armed with tanks and mis­ Revolution caused rising tension all along the border. Although by early :cupying permanent bases in Mongolia. 1969 the impending end of the Cultural.Revolution promised to subtract mer of 1968 the Russians held their first large maneuvers in a disruptive and potentially dangerous element, the Soviet buildup more :I completed a rail line between Chita, a major Soviet mili­ than offset that possibility and probably made the Chinese fear the future. d Choibalsan, Mongolia's second largest city, where a new ~as established. Soviet strength inside Mongolia was esti­ iivisions, including one tank division. The magnitude of this The March 1969 Military Clashes on the Ussurill t the balance of power between the two states' forces. The heir best to redeploy their own forces in response. After the The many incidents along the border after early 1969 may be divided )Uan maneuvers, several Chinese divisions were redeployed into the very small-but important-group whose immediate cause prob­ Mongolian border and significant numbers of artillery pieces ably can be traced to Chinese military initiatives and the much larger ~ed from the Fukien region. Finally, with the Cultural Revo­ group that available evidence indicates were due to Soviet a'ction. There g to a close, the Chinese began a..gain to stress the importance are little data on most of those incidents after the first two in March 1969, ::1:ion and Construction Corps. tn all, the Chinese increased which is unfortunate, since there is a fundamental difference between ty in the northeast and in Inner Mongolia by four or five those two and most of the subsequent occurrences. Whereas the March 2 king the total forty in both areas, as against the thirty-five or incident seems, on balance, to have been perpetrated by the Chinese and .Si08S in the traditional orientation. The Chinese also tight­ the March 15 incident by the Soviet army to punish the Chinese for the rder security in response to similar Soviet moves. 10 earlier "transgression," almost all subsequent actions were Soviet-initiated lusions emerge from this analysis of comparative border activities designed to support concurrent diplomatic initiatives, to test )re 1969. First, for long periods a rough balance of forces Chinese military reaction, or to pin the Chinese back during the period military regions on the Sino-Soviet border, trading Chinese of Soviet military buildup. These later incidents have been relatively nu­ leriority for Soviet equipment and mobility advantages, and merous and show the character of deliberate Soviet use of force. Yet since nese troop concentrations in Manchuria with Soviet defense the data necessary to draw firm conclusions about the nature of those Ie Arnur and in Central Asia. Second, the balance changed incidents is lacking, I shall concentrate on only the first two Sino-Soviet when the Soviet Union began to improve the quality and, clashes, presuming that they have enough in common with the rest to t, the quantity of its forces. Third, the balance seems to have permit extrapolation. I will also examine the imbalance and the uneven y upset by the movement after 1966 of Soviet troops and pace of the respective Soviet and Chinese military buildups and related o Mongolia and close to the Sino-Mongolian border. Soviet foreign policy activities to judge the wider effects of the Soviet use of rk Times, December 11,1966; Washington Post, December 11, 1966; force after March 1969. a, January 11, February 15, and March 10, 1967; New York Times, On March 2 a skirmish took place at Damansky Island between Soviet 7; Krasnaya Zvez.da, July 31,1968; Dal'n;y Vostok, no. 1, 1968; arti­ and Chinese frontier formations. More than thirty Soviet border guards 1 Salisbury, New York Times, January 3, 1969; Novosti Mongoli, and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers were killed or wounded. 967; Los Angeles Times, july 10, 1969; New York Times, May 24, -SM, "Military Affairs of Communist China, 1968," Tsu Kuo, no. 59 Tension all along the border rose quickly and both armies increased their ,pp. 20-36, which quotes Sing-tao Jih-pao, August 3 (p. 2), October . state of readiness. On March 15 at the same location there was a second, ~mber 9 (p. 3), 1968; Communist China 1967 (Kowloon: Union res), pp. 230-31; Japan Times (Tokyo), March 9,1967; The Econo­ 11. This section is based on Robinson, ''The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute," pp. 1969; and Le Monde, April 14, 1969. 1187-90. 274 Diplomacy 01 Power THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICT 275 larger clash with greater loss of life. Whereas the first battle had lasted south and the other just north of the island. The southern post had the two hours, the second took nine hours. Both sides used heavy weapons. disadvantage that its line of sight did not include the island itself (al­ The Chinese reportedly lost several hundred men, the Russians an un­ though the river-arm and the Chinese bank could be seen) and thus on­ specified number. Sino-Soviet relations entered a new and dangerous the-spot,patrolling was necessary to determine Chinese presence on the stage. Incidents, if not actual military clashes, began to be reported all island. The Chinese border post, named Kung-szu after the local Chinese along the border and lasted until the famous September meeting at the settlement, was located on a hillock directly across from the island. Peking airport between Premiers Chou En-Iai and Aleksei Kosygin. On the night of March 1-2, a mixed group of about three hundred Damansky Island is in the Ussuri River, which forms the boundary Chinese frontier guards and regular soldiers dressed in white camouflage between the Soviet Union and China, about 180 miles southwest of crossed the ice from the Chinese bank to Damansky Island, dug foxholes Khabarovsk. The Chinese claim the island was once a part of the Chinese in a wooded area overlooking the southernmost extremity, laid telephone bank, became separated by erosion of the river, and during low water in wire to the command post on the Chinese bank, and lay down for the late summer can be reached on foot from the Chinese shore. The main night on straw mats. Sometime early in the morning, the duty man at the channel of the Ussuri passes to the east of the island. The river at this Soviet outpost south of the island reported activity on the Chinese bank. point is wide and the river-arm (as the Chinese call it) or the channel Around 11 :00 a.m. a group of twenty or thirty armed Chinese were seen (the Soviet term) appears to be nearly as wide, and may be as deep at moving toward the island, shouting Maoist slogans as they went. The high water, as tye channel on the east. From the location of navigation Soviet outpost commander, Strelnikov, and an undetermined number of markers on the two shores and the curvature of the river, ships appear to his subordinates set off for the southern extremity of the island in two traverse the eastern channel. The island itself is uninhabited, although armored personnel carriers, a truck, and a command car. Arriving on the Chinese fishermen used it for drying their nets and both nations have done island (or perhaps remaining on the ice covering the river-arm west of some logging on it. About one mile in length and one-third mile wide, it is the island) a few minutes later, Strelnikov and seven or eight others dis­ flooded during the spring thaw. The island is largely wooded, with some mounted and moved out to warn the oncoming Chinese, as they had open areas, and rises to twenty feet above the water. There is extensive several times previously. Following a procedure developed for such occa­ marshland on the Soviet side of the river, which in winter forces Russian sions, the Russians strapped their automatic rifles to their chests (reports vehicles to detour about two miles before they can move onto the ice differ: some say they left their weapons behind) and linked arms to pre­ toward the island. In March 1969 the river was frozen nearly solid, and ~nt the Chinese from passing. A verbal altercation may have taken place multiton vehicles could be driven over the ice. at this point. In any case, the Chinese arrayed themselves in rows and The characteristics of the immediate area are similar to those elsewhere appeared to be unarmed. But when the Chinese had advanced to about on the Ussuri: boggy marshes along both sides, low elevation though lwenty feet from the Russian group, the first row suddenly scattered to slightly higher on the Chinese side, sparse population along the river the side, exposing the second line of Chinese, who quickly pulled sub­ front, and poor land for agriculture. The meager Soviet population is con­ machine guns from under their coats and opened fire on the Russians. centrated farther inland, along the Vladivostok-Khabarovsk sector of the Strelnikov and six of his companions were killed outright. Simultaneously, Trans-Siberian Railway and the road that parallels it. Chinese settlements . from an ambush to the Russians' right, the three hundred Chinese in fox­ in this area of the river are even more sparsely populated. Most of the also opened fire, catching the entire Russian unit by surprise. Mor­ border incidents in the area before March 2 took place on two larger and tar, machine gun, and antitank gunfire also commenced at that moment more important islands, Kirkinsky and Buyan, situated to the north and from the Chinese side. The Chinese apparently then charged the Russians south respectively. However, Damansky had previously been the scene of and hand-to-hand fighting ensued. The Soviet unit was overrun, and the several near-violent meetings between groups of Soviet and Chinese fron­ Chinese (according to Soviet charges) took nineteen prisoners and killed tier guards. them on the spot. They also carried away Soviet equipment, which they The Soviet Union maintained two border outposts in the area, one just put on display. 276 Diplomacy of Power THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICT 277 Seeing the battle, Senior Lieutenant Bubenin, head of the northern Chinese, who had allegedly sneaked over the previous night, lodged on outpost, and nearly his entire command set out for the scene. Racing up the island. Whatever the cause, the battle began in earnest around 9:45 or in an armored car, he succeeded in gaining the right ftank of the Chinese, .10:00 a.m., with mortar and artillery fire from the Chinese bank and, by fQrcing them to divide their fire. But he also found himself in the middle 10:30, heavy fire from three points there. of the island in the ambush that the Chinese had prepared for Strelnikov The Chinese now threw more than a regiment (around 2,000 men) (who had not proceeded that far). Bubenin's vehicle was hit and dis­ the fray, charging across the ice and gaining possession of at least abled, and he himself was wounded and shell-shocked. He managed to of the island. When they saw this wave of Chinese, the Russians get into another armored car and direct the battIe from it. A series of !sought to block their advance with fire from machine guns mounted on melees ensued, with charges by both sides. Finally, the Russians state, iarmored personnel carriers, but moved back, either off the island or to they pinned down, for a time surrounded, and then forced the retreat of eastern extremity, when they saw that the Chinese had more men. the remaining fifty or sixty Chinese to their own side of the bank. The ~U8sian accounts speak of a ratio of ten Chinese to every Russian.) The Chinese took all their wounded with them, although they left behind directed intense artillery fire not only at the Soviet troops but . some equipment. The entire battle lasted about two hours, and the Rus­ at the eastern channel of the river separating the island from the sians were so shorthanded that civilians had to be pressed into service bank, hoping to slow or stop the movement of heavy vehicles over as ammunition bearers. Although both sides claimed victory, neither ice. The Russians, adopting tactics used by the Americans in the Russian nor Chjnese forces remained permanently on the island after the War, allowed the Chinese to advance, and then counterattacked battle, although the Russians periodically moved off and on at will (later, large numbers of tanks, armored cars, and infantry in armored per­ they were reported to have abandoned it altogether to the Chinese). carriers. Soviet artillery, brought in since the March 2 incident, The battIe on March 15 was somewhat different. Preparations on both iIW11ched a fierce barrage at 1 :00 p.m., raking Chinese positions as far sides were much more complete, forces were larger, losses were higher, as four miles. Three such attacks were mounted, each breaking and the engagement lasted much longer. There was also no element of the Chinese positions. The first two faltered when ammunition surprise. In contrast to the encounter on March 2, it is not clear who gone. The third apparently broke up the Chinese position on the began the battle on the 15th. Soviet and Chinese sources differ, of course, and the Chinese retreated to their own bank, taking their dead and and the Soviet documentation is again more voluminous. This time the !founded. The Russians state that they did not follow up the Chinese Russian case is much less convincing, and the moral overtone present in with large-scale garrisoning of the island, although they continued reports of the earlier battle is muted, if not entirely absent. Both sides patrolling. The battle was over at 7:00 p.m., having lasted more probably had built up their forces in the intervening fortnight, intending nine hours. The Russians lost about sixty men (including the border to wrest permanent control of the island away from the other or, failing commander) and the Chinese eight hundred, both figures probably that, to deny the other side its unhindered use. lCluding dead and wounded. The number of Soviet casualties was lower Apparently the Russians increased the frequency of their patrols of the robably because the Russians had an advantage in tactics and armament, island after March 2. They still did not station a permanent force on the had planned their movements in advance. island, however, lest the Chinese zero in on them with artillery and mor­ tar. A small scouting party did spend the night of March 14-15 on the island, and it is possible that this group was used to lure the Chinese into Soviet Strategy between March and September 1969 a frontal attack. The Chinese say that the other side sent "many" tanks to the island and the river-arm ice at about 4:00 a.m. on the 15th, attack­ Beginning with the second Damansky incident, the Soviet Union put ing Chinese guards on patrol. It is not clear why such a large force would into practice a new strategy toward the Chinese. Summed up by the be needed to attack a patrol. The Russians state that their own early­ term "coercive diplomacy," the changed strategy sought to com­ morning patrol, consisting of two armored cars, discovered a group of hine diplomatic and military pressure in an effort to make the Chinese Diplomacy of Power 278 THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICT 279 see not only the desirability of settling the border problem itself, but also the border treaty that was the secondary object; and (4) the threat of an the possibility of using a border settlement as the basis for an all-around anti-Soviet entente composed of all the other powerful states in the improvement in relations. It is true that there was an apparent contradic­ world headed by the United States and China.12 tion in the two halves of this new policy: if by means of political-military To demonstrate to the Chinese their resolve on the border question, coercion the Soviet Union drove China first to the bargaining table and from April on the Russians not only brought up a large volume of military then to the signing of a new border treaty, the Chinese would probably reinforcements-both troops and equipment-but also began to use the not have been disposed to take the next step of improving or even discuss­ military superiority created to initiate (or take advantage of) "incidents" ing the improvement of relations in other areas. Nonetheless, the Soviet to serve as signals to the Chinese of the seriousness of the Russian intent. leaders did make up their minds to try to push the Chinese into renewed A series of such incidents, amounting to a campaign supported by hints of border talks as an important goal in itself, and evidently hoped that the nuclear attack and other untoward consequences, occurred during the Chinese would see the eventual wisdom of signing a new border treaty late spring and throughout the summer of 1969 and peaked in late and at least talking about other outstanding issues. Coercion along the August. Publicly admitted clashes took place on April 16, 17, and 25, border thus had more than one purpose: on the one hand, an attempt to May 2, 12-15,20,25, and 28, June 10-11, July 8 and 20, and August 13; solve a particular and important problem in Soviet-Chinese interstate and the two governments charged each other with having perpetrated relations, and on the other, a means of "talking" to the Chinese about the dozens of other incidents. By' September China had charged the Soviet desirability of rq;olving other ideological and national differences. Ap­ Union with 488 "deliberate" violations of the frontier from June through parently the Russians determined that "success" on the border issue August, and the Russians had accused the Chinese of 429 violations in (border talks leading to a negotiated treaty settlement or to a joint state­ June and July alone.13 Although the Chinese, unlike the Russians, did not ment that the border issue was considered settled) was worth pursuing provide details of their side of these stories-which under other circum­ in its own right, even if it was achieved at a cost, in the short term, of lack stances would lead to the suspicion that Peking was the initiating side­ of progress on other issues. Soviet accounts lacked the convincing authenticity of their portrayals of The Russians took another risk in employing coercive diplomacy. Their . the two earlier episodes. The more interesting fact is that the publicized diplomatic moves were of necessity accompanied by punishing military affairs took place in widely scattered locations along the border: some actions at the border and by threats of more severe military actions to follow. They also felt it necessary to strengthen their forces along the 12. Later I will discuss the Soviet Union's discovery that its enlarged, powerful entire length of the Soviet-Mongolian-Chinese border, not merely to border force could serve anti-Chinese policy objectives unrelated to the border ques­ tion, as in South Asia in 1971 and Southeast Asia in 1978-79. give support to the new politico-military campaign but, more important, 13. June 10-11: NCNA, June 11, 1969 (in SCMP, no. 4438, June 12, 1969, pp. to deter and defend against any repetition of the first Damansky incident. 22-23); New York Times, June 12, 1969; Pravda, June 12, 1969 (in CDSP, vol. 21, The Russians sought to control the local situation by absolute superiority .-0.24, July 9,1969, pp. 9-14). July 8: NCNA, July 9,1969; New York Times, July in tactical conventional forces and the strategic situation by absolute .. 1969; Pravda, July 8,1969 (in CDSP, vol. 21, no. 28, August 6,1969, p. 34); Radio Moscow, July 10, 1969 (translated in U.S, Foreign Broadcast Information Service superiority in combined forces, including nuclear arms. This meant a lPBIS], Daily Report: Soviet Union, July 14, 1969, pp. A30-A32). July 20: Pravda, huge buildup of forces against China in every category, which would September 11, 1969 (in CDSP, vol. 21, no. 37, October 8, 1969, pp. 8-10). August dislocate the Soviet economy and push Peking toward the West. To pre­ 13: Pravda, August 13,1969 (in CDSP, vol. 21, no. 33, September 10, 1969, pp. 3-6); serve Soviet security in the narrow sense, then, Moscow took a chance . New York Times, August 14, IS, 16, 1969; Christian Science Monitor, August 14, 1969; FBIS, Soviet Union (August 14, 1969), pp. AI-A4; Izvestiya (and other that it could handle any long-term Chinese response and any shorter-term Soviet sources), August 16, 1969 (in FBIS, Soviet Union, August 19, 1969, pp. A21­ anti-Soviet realignment of political forces. In retrospect, that may seem A2S); Tel'man Zhanuzakor, "Combat on the Border," Qazaq Edibiyeti (Kazakh­ not to have been a worthwhile gamble: border security was assured but lItan), August 23, 1969 (translated by Radio Liberty Committee, n.d.); Sovetskaya at the cost of (1) China's fear and hostility; (2) its resolve to modernize Klrgiziya, February 24, 1974 (in FBIS, Soviet Union, February 28, 1974, pp. C2­ e3); SCMP, no. 4435, p. 24; NCNA, August 19, 1969 (in FBIS, Daily Report: its economy and military to counter the Soviet Union directly; (3) lack of Communist China, August 20, 1969); and New York Times. September 9, 1969. 280 Diplomacy of Power THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICT 281 on the Ussuri River-scene of the March events, some on islands in the their Warsaw Pact allies on the possibility of a nuclear strike. It is doubt­ Amur River, some along the Sino-Mongolian border, and some in the ful whether the Soviet Union had any intention of actually carrying out Sinkiang-Kazakhstan region not far from the Chinese nuclear test site at the threat, in view of the necessary magnitude of such a nuclear attack Lop Nor and the historic Dzungarian Gates invasion route between the and its cc:msequences for Moscow's relations with every other country, as two countries. well as the very high level of radiation-induced casualties that would have Because the Chinese military were preoccupied with political and ad­ been suffered by all the other states of Northeast Asia downwind from the ministrative matters associated with the Cultural Revolution, and because Chinese nuclear test facilities, missile deployment sites, and airfields. the Soviet Union not only enjoyed strategic superiority but also had hinted But this carefully orchestrated mixture of threat, military action, and that it would take drastic measures if China did not cease its provocations diplomatic initiative did have its intended effect on the Chinese: in early and reconvene the border talks, it is difficult to imagine that it was the September they agreed, apparently under extreme Soviet pressure, to Chinese who took the military initiative. Although in some instances allow Kosygin to meet Chou in Peking on September 11. (Kosygin had Chinese forces on the spot may have taken the offensive to forestall attempted to meet Chou at Ho Chi Minh's funeral in Hanoi, but Chou anticipated attack, it is doubtful, in view of these relative weaknesses, that deliberately left for Peking before Kosygin was due to arrive. Kosygin this was Chinese strategy in general. Rather, the period before Septem­ therefore returned to the Soviet Union, but when he landed in Soviet ber 11, 1969, when Chou and Kosygin met at the Peking airport, must be Central Asia on his way back: he received word from Moscow that the seen as a textbqpk case of the use by Moscow of combined political, mili­ Chinese had finally agreed to receive him and that he should change his tary, and propaganda means to force Peking to take an action-renew plans and fly to Peking.)15 Although no official announcement was made the talks-it otherwise resisted and to teach it not to attempt more sur­ of what transpired at the Peking airport, semi authoritative sources report prises like that at Damansky. . that both sides agreed to cease armed provocations along the border; im­ These Soviet military actions accompanied a series of diplomatic notes mediately resume border negotiations, suspended since 1964, at the setting forth in detail the Soviet position on the border problem and sug­ deputy ministerial level; restore diplomatic relations up to the ambassa­ gesting that all points of difference could be settled by agreeing upon a doriallevel; and step up trade and economic relations. Apparently Peking mutual and definitive border treaty. The Russians repeated the terms set agreed to these "suggestions," despite Chinese efforts to wriggle out of a forth in the abortive 1964 talks and parried each Chinese counterargu­ resumption of talks through counterproposals on September 18 and ment with historical or ideological points of their own, all the while co­ October 6. 16 Border negotiations resumed in Peking on October 20. ordinating diplomatic notes with military action.14 Before going on to the post-September 1969 period, it is well to sum­ The most interesting and threatening aspect of the politico-military marize Soviet and Chinese policies from March to September. The Rus­ campaign was the Soviet hint of nuclear attack against China and its strategy was two-pronged. Soviet diplomatic notes suggested restoring linkage in timing and publicity with a serious border incident in August !,relations up to the ambassadorial level, increasing trade, opening talks on and with the peak of Moscow's diplomatic campaign to bring the Chinese resolution of ideological differences, and settling the border question back to the negotiating table. The hint was conveyed indirectly by former through compromise. Resolution of these questions would obviously con­ Soviet news correspondent Victor Louis in the September 18 London stitute a qualitative improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet actions, Evening News but Western intelligence sources had known of it in mid­ en the other hand, were threatening: continual drubbings along the August. The Russians also let it be known that they had sounded out border, possibly striking Chinese nuclear facilities, and the hint of detach­ ing border provinces (particularly Sinkiang) from the Chinese body poli­ 14. Tass, Pravda, and 11.vestiya, March 30, 1969 (in CDSP, vol. 21, no. 13, April tic and turning them into Mongolias. Perhaps the Russians were not 16, 1969, pp. 3-5, and FBIS, Soviet Union, April I, 1969, pp. AI-A7); FBIS, Soviet Union (April 14, 1969), p. AI; CDSP, vol. 2, nos. 23-27 (July 2, 9, 16, 23, and 30, IS. New York Times, September 12 and 13, 1969. 1969), and FBIS, Soviet Union (June 18, 1969); and Pravda, June 14, 1969 (in 16. New York Times, September 12, 1969, and Le Monde, November 10-11, CDSP, vol. 21, no. 24, July 9, 1969), pp. 9-13. 1974. 282 Diplomacy of Power THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICT 283 serious about major military activities, but it is much more likely that the Russians join in mutually withdrawing military forces at least fifty they were following a strategy of parallel military and diplomatic escala­ kilometers from the border.l1 The trick was to convince the Russians that, tion, postponing a choice between them until forced by events. through minor (but reversible) changes in the Chinese position, a nego­ The Russians' strategy arose from their wish to avoid facing over the tiated solution to the border problem was not entirely out of the question. long run an increasingly powerful and unfriendly China in Asia while The Chinese felt they had no choice but to go along with the Soviet pro­ they were immersed in managing difficult problems in Eastern Europe posals for resuming negotiations. They concluded it was better to buy off and sustaining strategic and crisis-management competition with the the Russians in the short rnn through negotiations that, like those con­ United States throughout the world. It seemed best to attempt to address ducted in 1964, they had no intention of carrying to conclusion on Soviet the "China problem" before it became unmanageable. Since the border terms.iS question was of immediate strategic concern and was the only means of inftuencing the Chinese directly, it was decided to force this issue-at least to do whatever was necessary to bring the situation under Soviet Soviet Strategy after September 1969 control. The Russians hoped that proposals for improvement in relations would take some of the bitterness out of the pill the Chinese would have The Chou-Kosygin meeting in Peking signaled the successful conclu­ to swallow, provide the basis for longer-term (that is, post-Maoist) im­ sion of Moscow's strategy of c<1ercing the Chinese back to the negotiating provement in rt¥ations, supply a propaganda cover for military action table and of convincing them that any further disruptive behavior along taken and contemplated, and establish a fall-back position in case the the border would be to their disadvantage. Although the talks were not carrot-and-stick border strategy did not work. productive and the Chinese could be said to have attained their own goal Chinese strategy, born of weakness, was to reject, delay, or ignore both of preventing higher levels of Soviet violence, border incidents were no parts of the Russian strategy. Seeing the Russian buildup and feeling its longer a major contributing factor to continued Sino-Soviet animosity. effects, the Chinese undertook a policy of gradual diplomatic retreat. The record shows clearly that, after the talks be~an, publicly reported Their note of May 24 dropped the previous de facto opposition to nego­ incidents declined to a frequency of one to three a year and were much tiations (their pronouncements had always stressed the desirablity of less severe. Several of these were clearly associated with training exercises such talks and blamed the Russians for their breakdown) and conceded of one side to which the other side chose to react; others were evidently that the abortive 1964 negotiations might now be resumed. Their presence intentional probings of the opposition's defenses. With the large increase. at the Ussuri-Amur border talks in Khabarovsk from lune to August and jn troop dispositions along the frontier after March 1969, this steep de­ their willingness to sign a one-year navigation agreement with the Rus­ . cline in publicly reported incidents can only indicate that both sides sians constituted two further steps toward negotiations. Finally, after the agreed, tacitly or explicitly, to carry out the relevant clause of the Soviet Peking airport meeting in September, the Chinese not only accepted the proposal of September II (and the Chinese proposal of October 8, Soviet bid to resume full-scale negotiations but also, in their note of 1969), to maintain the status quo along the frontier until the exact loca­ October 8, dropped the one condition that had been the primary obstacle tion of the boundary was agreed upon and delimited, to avoid armed con­ to agreement in 1964--that the Russians agree on the "unequalness" of 17. FBIS, Communist China (May 26, 1969), pp. A1-A10, and SCMP, no. the historic series of treaties defining the border before there could be any 4426 (May 29, 1969), pp. 24-36. further movement toward a new treaty. These concessions made it appear 18. See SCMP, no. 4498 (September 18, 1969), p. 25; Far Eastern Economic Review (September 25, 1969), p. 759; "Statement of the Government of the People's that, procedurally and substantively, little separated the two parties from Republic of China," October 7, 1969, in Peking Review, no. 41 (October 10, 1969), quick and final agreement except horse-trading some unimportant river pp. 3-4; New York Times, October 8, 1969; "Document of the Ministry of Foreign islands and small amounts of territory on the Sinkiang-Tadzhik border. Affairs of the People's Republic of China," October 8, 1969, in Peking Review, no. 41 (October 10, 1969), pp. 8-15, and SCMP, no. 4517 (October 10, 1969), pp. 30­ After the negotiations began, however, the Chinese backed away from 39. For details of the Soviet and Chinese negntiating strategies from 1969 to 1976, this advanced position and threw up a further obstacle by demanding that see Robinson, Sino-Soviet Border Situation, pp. 28-56. 284 Diplomacy of Power THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICT 285 flicts, and to stop sending forces into disputed areas or to disengage forces the scene of alleged clashes, but not the shoreline. The exact location of that had penetrated those areas. alleged incidents on the Sino-Mongolian frontier is difficult to determine In general, the impression after September 1969 is of a border closely because neither side chose to publicize them. guarded by both sides. Each side took extreme precautions to prevent There were a number of other specific occurrences related to border accidental local clashes and avoided escalation to the use of more de­ tension: the seizure and expUlsion of two Soviet diplomats in Peking in structive weapon systems and of larger numbers of men. In most cases, 1974 on spy charges;21 the detention in China, and later the release, of a regular army units were not engaged, at least if one believes the Soviet Soviet helicopter and its crew after the Russians alleged it had lost its accounts are accurate (the Chinese version is usually either lacking in bearings and run out of fuel while on a medical evacuation mission;22 detail or missing). The forces engaged were KGB-controlled border Soviet refusal, until 1974, to allow Chinese ships to navigate the Kazake­ troops on the Soviet side and probably similar formations of Production vichevo channel near Khabarovsk without permission during the summer and Construction Corps units on the Chinese side. low-water season;23 a maritime accident off Hainan;24 slowness or inabil­ Relative quietude along the frontier thus stemmed from the Peking ity to corne to agreement on the yearly river navigation agreements; and agreement (whether tacit or negotiated), the military buildup on both a Soviet show of force in early 1978.25 Each of these was an additional sides, and the safety valve of periodic border negotiations. Neither side indicator of the trouble on the border and therefore of Sino-Soviet rela­ wished to engage the other frequently, although occasional deliberate tions in general, and a gauge ofthe degree of progress, or lack thereof, of forays tested thetdefenses of the opposition. Each charged the other with the Peking border talks and of Soviet strategy. this sort of activity-the Russians accusing the Chinese of conducting More broadly, each side took precautions in the regions on its own training operations only meters from the Mongolian boundary and the side of the boundary to build up the economy and population, invest in Chinese charging the Russians with flying aircraft several kilometers into infrastructure, cement the loyalty of local native peoples to the national Chinese territory-but neither seems to have reacted violently to such government, and send out from its core area (especially in the Chinese movements. The danger of escalation and the density of troops along the case) large numbers of people from the dominant ethnic group. On the frontier were too high for punitive measures. .,' The small number of publicized incidents amounted to one side's put­ 21. NCNA, January 19, 1974 (in FBIS, People's Republic of China, January ""III .,,111 ting a toe across the line (or patrolling disputed areas at times and in 23,1974, pp. A3-A4); New York Times, January 20, 21, and 24, 1974; NCNA (in .- FBIS, People's Republic of China, January 23, 1974, pp. AI-AS); Christian Science .. 11.11 ways slightly different from those tacitly agreed upon) and then quickly Monitor, January 25, 1974; NCNA, January 24, 1974 (in FBIS, People's Republic 1:1 withdrawing it. It is quite possible that the two sides agreed to suppress . China, January 25,1974, pp. AI-A2); The Economist (January 26, 1974), p. 43. news of further incidents. In 1974, for instance, there were rumors and 22. See Pravda, March 21,1974 (in CDSP, April 17, 1974), p. 3; Peking Review 29, 1974), p. 5; New York Times, March 20, 23, and 29, May 3, 6, and 9, allegations of a large clash on the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan border/II and in 4; FBIS, Soviet Union reporting a wide variety of Soviet sources, March 29, 1974, November of that year both Moscow and Peking denied Western reports Cl, April 5, 1974, pp. C1-C2, April 29, 1974, pp. CI-C2, April 30, 1974, pp. Cl- of five battles along the Sino-Mongolian frontier.20 The location of re­ May 3,1974, pp. CI-C2, May 6, 1974, p. Cl, May 7, 1974, pp. C6-C7, May 13, pp. C1-CI0, May 16, 1974, pp. C5-C6, May 23, 1974, pp. CI-C2, June 10, ported incidents has varied. In the Sin kiang-Kazakhstan region, alleged pp. CI-C2, June 24, 1974, p. Ct, June 28, 1974, pp. CI-C2, August 8, 1974, incursions almost invariably occurred in the Dzungarian Gates area; and pp. CI-C4, and November 4, 1974, pp. C3-C4; FBIS, People's Republic of China, along the Arnur-Ussuri boundary, the islands of disputed ownership were lune 24, 1974, p. A4; SCMP, April 1-4, 1974, pp. 65-66; The Economist (June 22, 1974), pp. 27-28; Daily Telegraph (London), June 26, 1974. 19. Such incidents are vaguely alluded to in the Chinese periodical Li-shih Yen­ 23. Pravda, May 24,1974 (in CDSP, vol. 26, no. 20, June 12, 1974, p. 4). chiu (Historical Research) of December 1974, and in the Soviet journal Problemiye 24. NCNA, April 18, 1971 (in FBIS, Communist China, April 19, 1971, p. Ai); Dal'nogo Vostoka (Problems of the Far East) of January 1975. and Tass, March 31,1971. 20. Daily Telegraph, December 17, 1974; Pravda, December 20, 1974; Reuters 25. New York Times, March 29, and April I, 6, 8, 9, and 10, 1978. See also and Agence France Presse, December 17, 1974 (in FBIS, People's Republic of China, CDSP, vol. 30, no. 13 (April 26, 1978), pp. 5-10, and no. 14 (May 3, 1978), pp. December 18, 1974, p. E2); Tass, December 19, 1974 (in FBIS, Soviet Union, De­ 1--5; FBIS, Soviet Union, vol. 3, nos. 61-69 (March 29-Aprill0, 1978), pp. Rl, RI, Rt-R5, RI-R6, Rl, Rl, RI-R4, RI-R5, and RI-RS, respectively. cember 19, 1974, p. Cl).